The Battle

of
Lindley's Mill
By

Algie I. Newlin
Emeritus Professor of History
Guilford College
Greensboro, North Carolina

Published by
The Alamance Historical Association
Post Office Box 411
Burlington, North Carolina 27215
1975

 Copyright 1975 by Algie I. Newlin

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7433579

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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements

Preface

Prologue

Roads to the Battle

11

The Ambush at Stafford's Branch

17

The Battle for the Prisoners

19

On the Plateau

22

At the End of the Battle

27

The Race to Wilmington

31

An Evaluation of the Battle

32

Bibliography

34

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Acknowledgements
I wish to express appreciation to my friends who have read the manuscript for
this treatise and for the benefit of their criticism: Dr. Edward F. Burrows, Professor of
History, Guilford College; Dr. Lindley S. Butler, Chairman of the Department of Social
Studies, Rockingham Community College; Dr. Grimsley T. Hobbs, President of Guilford
College; James McLamroc, Guilford County Historian; Herbert Poole, Library Director,
Guilford College; and Dr. George Troxler, Associate Professor of History, Elon College.
I am grateful to Herbert Poole for his editorial assistance in preparing the manuscript
for publication and to George Colclough, Secretary of the Alamance County Historical
Association, for the arrangements for publication.

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The Battle
of
Lindley's Mill

Page - 4

Preface
Eli Caruthers once expressed the hope that someone would make a thorough
study of the Battle of Cane Creek, the name he gave to the Battle of Lindleys Mill.
For nearly 125 years historians have been content to regard his account as the most
extensive yet given. In offering the present interpretation of the battle, I have no
thought that it will close the subject to future research into the occurrences of that
autumn day nearly two hundred years ago.
My interest in the history of this almost-forgotten event has several sources and
reaches across most of four decades. I was born within a mile of the battle site.
Lindleys Mill was built twenty-five years before the battle by two of my ancestors,
Thomas Lindley and Hugh Laughlin. This conflict between the Whig and Tory armies
took place on the plantation of Thomas Lindley. Two of my early years were spent at
the pioneer homesite of that plantation. As a teenager I traveled the road from Spring
Meeting House to Lindley's Mill many times. The ford across Stafford's branch and the
road around the base of the hill from which the Whigs launched their first surprise
attack became and remain familiar scenes in my mind. My relatives helped to bury
the dead and care for the wounded who were casualties in the bitter battle. During
several years of my life, my home was on the road which was used by the opposing
armies in their race from Lindley's Mill to Wilmington by way of Pittsboro.
All of these circumstances have combined over the years with my familiarity
with the battle area and the surrounding country to keep alive a desire to know more
about the battle. My long delay in beginning this study was a mistake. Had I begun it
fifty or sixty years earlier, l would have had access to a stock of tradition lying in
relative freshness in the minds of people whose immediate ancestors had lived during
the time of the battle. I take no succor from the moral in this observation. It is, in
fact, the historians plight.

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Prologue
The story of the Battle of Lindleys Mill is a gripping drama which has waited
patiently in the shadows for the curtain to be raised for over 100 years. After that of
Guilford Court House. It was the hardest-fought battle or the American Revolution in
North Carolina; yet it has been little more than a name in the general history of the
State. Like most other conflicts in the area during the closing stages of the war, it
was a battle in which North Carolina Tories were pitted against North Carolina Whigs.
The aura of drama surrounding the battle rises from the character of the terrain, the
strong psychological element involved, the astuteness of the leaders of the opposing
armies, and the intensity and duration of the struggle.
In the period in which the battle was fought the character of the Revolutionary
War in North Carolina was different than during the e previous two years when the
British were pushing with relentless determination their domino plan for conquest of
the southern states, starting with Georgia and taking the states in succession in a
northward sweep. Georgia fell, and the British gained control of Charles - ton and
much of the interior of South Carolina. With the nearly total destruction of the
American arm y at Camden, prospects for Whig control of North Carolina appeared
gloomy. At that point in the war George Washington appointed Nathanael Greene to
command American operations in the South. During the next three months the new
commander engaged continuously in the prodigious task of gathering and molding an
effective fighting force, while constantly avoiding a major clash with the superior
British force pursuing him without relief under the leadership of Charles Cornwallis.
An important aspect of Greene's strategy in this running battle was sapping the
strength of the enemy by constant sniping, stabbing, skirmishing, and foiling British
foragings, actions which the units of Greenes army inflicted upon British soldiers who
ventured beyond the protection of the army. Though the race across North Carolina is
considered generally a classic military retreat by General Greene, in reality it was
also a continuous conflict which stretched over six weeks and almost twice across the
state. In this type of battle the strength of the British army was taxed more than that
of the American with a crippling effect so as to match possibly that inflicted upon it
at Guilford Court House. In this long campaign the British plan to conquer the South
was foiled, and after the Battle of Guilford Court House their pursuit of the Americans
was turned into a forced march with the American army in pursuit as far as Cross
Creek. Within a few days after this race ended, the two commanders led their armies
out of North Carolina for other fields of combat.

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With the departure of these two armies the war in North Carolina became less
of a continental rebellion and more of a civil war. Armed bands and small armies of
Whig and Tory partisans struggled to annihilate one another by hit-and-run attacks
and skirmishes and by spreading terror among the families and friends of their
enemies. A small British force in Wilmington, commanded by Major James Craig, was
all that kept the war from being strictly a struggle between two civil factions. The
role of this British force was restricted to minor forays into the country around
Wilmington, furnishing ammunition and medical supplies to Tories in the backcountry
of the state, and receiving prisoners brought in by Colonel David Fanning and other
Tories.
By the first of September, 1781 most of the Whig forces in the Cape Fear Valley
had been dispersed or had disintegrated with the termination of the short terms of
their enlistment. At that time David Fanning, the most noted of the Loyalist leaders,
turned his attention to the Haw River Valley where John Butler was in command of a
small Whig force. It was during this period of a seeming Tory resurgence in North
Carolina that the Battle of Lindleys Mill occurred.
The military acumen and training of the two opposing leaders were well
matched in this long and bloody battle. Colonel Fanning had planned and executed a
startling raid on Hillsborough which fired the Whigs to attempt a bold interception at
Lindleys Mill. His reputation as an unpredictable and strikingly successful leader in
the type of warfare then being waged had risen rapidly in recent months. James Craig
had commissioned him a Lieutenant Colonel in the Loyalist forces of Chatham and
Randolph counties and had outfitted him with a resplendent uniform consonant with
his rank. Eli Caruthers described Fannings military genius and reputation at the time
of the battle in the following manner:
During the last three months, his movements had been rapid; his plans bold and
daring; and in every conflict he had come off victorious. Few men, with the
same amount of force, have ever accomplished more in the same length of
time; ...1

His phenomenal success in bold ventures and his cruel retaliatory vengeance on
individual Whigs and their families spread terror through the Whig communities of the
back country. In the view of the historian Samuel Ashe:
It must be said, that he was one of the boldest men, most fertile in
expedients and quick in execution, that ever lived in North Carolina. Had he
1

Eli Caruthers, Revolutionary Incidents and Sketches of Character Chiefly in the "Old North State,"
(Philadelphia:, Hayes & Zell, 1854), p. 231.

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been on the Whig side, his fame would have been more enduring than that of
any other partisan officer whose memory is now so dear to all patriots.2

John Butler, commander of the small Whig force which clashed with the Tories
at Lindley's Mill in a daring attempt to rob them of the fruits and glory of their
startling psychological victory at Hillsborough, was an able and experienced military
leader. His attachment to the Whig cause began in 1775 when he became a member
of the Committee of Safety and a Major of Militia in the Hillsborough District. He
became a Brigadier General in 1779. His combat experience included command of
North Carolina militia in some of the most noted battles of the Revolution in the
South: Stono Ferry, Camden, and Guilford Court House. Although the militia under his
command was not heavily crowned with laurels in some of the battles, he must have
gained the experience which made his handling of the small force at Lindleys Mill a
masterful performance.
As Fanning was completing the mobilization of his force to strike the Whigs on
Haw River, he received information that Governor Thomas Burke had gone to
Hillsborough. This prompted him to follow his recent decision to capture the Whig
governor and deliver him to the British in Wilmington. With a Loyalist force which he
had collected in Chatham and Randolph counties along with two small regiments of
Scottish Highlanders from the Cape Fear Valley, he pushed rapidly toward
Hillsborough. On the morning of September 12, 1781 after a night march, reputedly
under the cover of a heavy fog, his forces swept into the village from all sides and
captured all he had sought in this temporary capital of the State.3 His political booty
included the Governor, most of the members of the Governor's Council, a few other
prominent Whigs, and an armed force of possibly two hundred men. The Hillsborough
raid was Fanning's masterpiece:

Samuel A. Ashe, "David Fanning" in: Biographical History of North Carolina (Greensboro, N. C.: C. L.
Van Noppen, 1925), V, p. 93.
3
John H. Wheeler. Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851 (Philadelphia: Lippincott,
Grambo and Co., 1851), p. 333. Wheeler says Fanning entered Hillsborough on the evening of
September 13th. Caruthers (Op. cit., pp. 206, 214) uses the same date. Fanning stated, however, that:
"At seven o'clock on the morning of the 12th we entered the town," Cf.: "Narrative of Col'n David
Fanning Written by Himself Detailing Astonishing Events in North Carolina from 1775 to 1783," North
Carolina State Records (Goldsboro, N.C.: Nash Bros, 1907), XXII, p. 20. While neither Wheeler nor
Caruthers say they used Fanning as a source, his date is accepted as being accurate both here and by
Ashe (Op. cit., 1, p. 694) and by Hugh F. Rankin in his: The North Carolina Continentals (Chapel Hill :
University of North Carolina Press, 1971), p. 364.

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The capture of the Governor was one of the most remarkable feats of the
Tories during the war, and one of the most remarkable events in North
Carolina...4

One elusive Whig slipped through the Tory dragnet around Hillsborough,
borrowed a horse, and dashed off to warn General Butler and spread the alarm
through the Whig country around Hawfields. The news was truly alarming. To the
Whigs Colonel Fanning was the most hated and the most feared man in North
Carolina. Recruits assembled quickly and preparations were made for the Whig army
to hasten to some point on the Wilmington road where it could stage an attempt to
free the prisoners. The geographic location and the terrain near Lindley's Mill offered
the most promising opportunity for such a maneuver.
During a trip to Wilmington to confer with Major Craig, commander of the
British force at the port, Fanning had made the capture of the Governor of North
Carolina one of his objectives. Similar objectives had been formulated by Loyalists in
states to the north. These had included the capture of the Governor and General
Assembly of New York, the capture of the Continental Congress, and the kidnapping of
George Washington. None had been achieved. Fanning had already tried this tactic.
He had swept into Pittsboro on July 15, 1781, rounded up a large number of
prominent Whigs, and hustled them off to Wilmington to place them in the custody of
the British.
Around the first of September, however, the thought of capturing the Governor
was at least secondary in Fanning's mind to the immediate need to destroy the Whig
force on Haw River. It was for this latter purpose that a force was mobilized on Deep
River. As described by Fanning:
I found myself at the head of 950 men of my own regiment, exclusive of
McDougald (sic) and McNeil's regiments ... On the 9th of September I was
joined by Col'n McDougald of the loyal militia of Cumberland County, with 200
men; and Hector McNeil, with his party from Bladen of 70 men.5

These three units as described by Fanning add up to 1,220 men, which is

considerably larger than the estimates from later sources of the number of Loyalists
at the Battle of Lindley's Mill. Caruthers, who collected data from both Whig and Tory
sources long after the battle, came to the following conclusion:

4
5

Caruthers, op. cit., p. 206.

Fanning, op. cit., p. 206.

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The number engaged on either side is not known with any degree of
certainty, but according to the best traditional accounts, or those which
seemed to be most worthy of credit, the Tories had about six hundred,
and the Whigs about three hundred or a little more.6
This estimate leaves the Loyalist force at Lindley's Mill far short of the number
with Fanning on Deep River a few days earlier and raises the question as to whether
the Tory leader culled a large number of the 950 men who came to him and chose
only the well-armed and those fitted best for the hard and delicate venture. He is
known to have done this on a previous occasion.
Colonel Fanning also stated that the Whigs had 400 men at Lindley's Mill.7
According to Caruthers estimate, however, they had "three hundred, or a little
more." A short while before the battle General Butler is said to have had 240 men in
his little army.8 There are indications that recruits joined Butler after the warning
was given that Fanning intended to attack him. Others came after the Tory raid on
Hillsborough. Caruthers said that a Captain Hadley, with a company of Whigs from
below Cross Creek, was with General Butler at the Battle of Lindley's Mill.9 He also
said that the Loyalists outnumbered the Whigs by a ratio of two to one. These reports
lead to the cautious estimate that the number of Whigs at Lindleys Mill was between
three and four hundred and the number of Loyalists between six and seven hundred.
General Butler also had the assistance of Colonel Robert Mebane, a daring and able
leader.
Colonel Fannings command of the entire Loyalist force is sometimes
questioned. There is an unverified tradition that the Highlanders refused to serve
under him. In spite of this tradition, or contrary to it as the case may be, events at
Hillsborough and at Lindley's Mill indicate that Colonel Fanning commanded the
combined forces of the Loyalists, with Colonel Hector McNeil and Colonel Archibald
McDougal in command of the Highland regiments as his subordinates.10

Caruthers, op. cit., p. 208.

Fanning, op. cit., p. 208.
8
Ashe, op. cit., p. 36.
9
Caruthers, op. cit., p. 200.
10
According to Fanning (Op. cit., pp. 205-206), he and Colonel Hector McNeil joined forces on
September 5, 1781 to attack Colonel Thomas Wade's Whig force on Drowning Creek. According to
Archibald D. Murphey, Fanning assumed command. The Murphey account observes that McNeil's force
was several times as large as that of Fanning. This is another instance of Scottish Highlanders serving
under Fanning's command. Cf.: The Papers of Archibald D. Murphey (Raleigh: E. M. Uzzel & Co., 1914),
II, p. 390.
7

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Roads to the Battle

There could be no question in General Butlers mind that Colonel Fanning
would hurry out of Hillsborough with his body of prisoners along the best route to
Wilmington. This had to be the road leading south east to an intersection at Lindleys
Mill, where the Wilmington Road crossed Cane Creek and turned south toward
Pittsboro. General Butler must have been aware of this road and of the importance of
the intersection at Lindleys Mill. A road from a ford across Haw River near the mouth
of Alamance Creek and his campsite, directly south to Lindleys Mill, provided General
Butler with a short route to that point.
There is at least one tradition regarding the events immediately prior to
Fanning's close on Hillsborough which a review of contemporary maps and those
published within the next twenty-five years suggests is probably in error. Fanning
himself is the cause of the confusion. Writing from memory nine years after the
event, he said:
I had previously determined within myself to take the Rebel. Governor Burke.
of North Carolina ... Now I thought it a favorable opportunity ... The Rebel
General John Butler , and Col. Robert Maybin of the Continental Line, lay
within 40 miles of our encampment ... It was supposed by my officers, that I
intended to attack them. After marching 16 miles to Rocky River, I went a little
distance out of my road, to a friend's house, for intelligence, of the situation of
the Rebels; during which, time, the guide led my little army about two miles
out of the way, towards General Butler. On my return, I was under the
necessity of making my intentions known; and immediately directed my march
toward Hillsborough; I pushed all that day and the following night; ...11

Something stronger than presumption must be used to challenge such a clear

account and to suggest that the Tory Colonel may likely have made a mistake about
the actual location of his army at the time he describes. The maps show that the ford
across Rocky River was twenty-five miles from Butler's position; too far for any short
advance or feint (It was supposed by my officers, that I intended to attack them) to
be effective or even to be known by the enemy. Likewise, the distance from the re to
Hillsborough appears too great even for an army which "pushed all that day and the
following night." An additional reason for questioning Fannings statement is found in
the position of the roads to the north from the ford at Rocky River. The maps show

11

Fanning, op. cit., pp. 206-207.

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that General Butlers position could have been reached by following either, and
neither road is appreciably more direct than the other.
At Lindleys Mill there was an intersection of the Hillsborough Road with that to
Alamance Creek. The distance to Hillsborough was fifteen miles less than from Rocky
River, and a two-mile march on the road north from the ford would certainly have
been seen as a threat to General Butler, whether he lay on either bank of Haw River,
eight or twelve miles from the intersection at the mill. Returning to the intersection,
as Fanning observes, and moving out to the east put Fannings army on the road to
Hillsborough which would have been just over twenty miles away and could have been
reached by marching that day and the following night. The Colonel's visit a little
distance ... to a friends house, for intelligence ... of the rebels could have been to
the home of a prominent Tory who lived near Lindleys Mill.

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Since the situation at the Rocky River ford provided little or no opportunity for
making the maneuver which Fanning describes and since the situation at the Cane
Creek ford fits the description almost perfectly, one is led to believe that the action
occurred at that point rather than at Rocky River. It is ironical that Butler chose this
very location to surprise and challenge Fanning on his return from Hillsborough two
days later. Map Number 1 should facilitate an understanding of the foregoing
discussion.
The roads were of tremendous importance to the Whigs, and so was the terrain
along the road for at least a mile to the east of Lindley's Mill. Here was a battle
position which gave General Butler as near a perfect place as could be found for
launching attacks on a superior force with any hope of effecting the escape of the
Governor and other prisoners. A sixty- or seventy-acre plateau wedged in between the
forks of the Alamance and Hillsborough roads provided a strategic place for the
deployment of the Whig forces. It may be an exaggeration to call the Plateau a
citadel, but on its southern end it is bordered by a sharply declining slope of fifteen
or twenty feet. This slope is especially sharp around the southeastern corner 6fthe
Plateau where the Hillsborough road crosses Stafford's Branch and bends around the
knob-like corner of the Plateau. From there to Lindleys Mill the road follows a narrow
strip of lowland between the foot of the declivity and the north bank of Cane Creek.
At any point on the road from Staffords Branch to Lindleys Mill the Tories would be
easy marks for muskets or rifles of Whigs stationed on the rim of the Plateau above
them. The Whig army, deployed on this broad strategically- located plateau, would
also be in position to make simultaneous surprise attacks on both the Tory advance
guard and on the rear guard where the prisoners were being herded along.12

12

Tradition and Eli Caruthers are at variance with the present interpretation. A tradition persists in the
community around Lindley's Mill that the battle took place at the southeastern corner of the Plateau.
This treatise proposes that only a part of the battle could have taken place there. Caruthers makes two
references to the location. In his first, while referring to the Whig search for a place to confront the
Tory army, he says:
The ground at John Alston's Mill, a little above or below what is now Lindley's Mill appeared to be
the most suitable, and there they made their stand. (Op. cit., p. 208.)

If there was a John Alston's Mill at that location at that time its site has never been found. A major
part of the battle was a few hundred yards to the east of Lindley's Mill, but Highlanders kept up a siege
of the southeastern corner of the Plateau from low ground a "little ... below" Lindley's Mill. The spirited
engagement near spring Meeting House was approximately a mile east of the mill.
The second reference made by Caruthers is incredible:
According to my information, the battle was not at Lindley's Mill but at old Jack Alstons a little
above. When the Tories arrived at Lindley's Mill on their retreat a few of the Whigs had rallied
there and a small skirmish ensued; but it was only a little brush on their rear or their flank. (Op.
cit., p. 225.)

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With this brief evaluation of the relative numerical strength of the opposing
forces and a glance at the place chosen by the Whigs for the most effective use of
their small army against superior numbers, one can now begin to follow the two
armies in their race to Lindleys Mill.
The exact location of General Butlers army either at the time of the receipt of
the stunning news of the raid on Hillsborough or immediately prior to his dash to
Lindleys Mill is not known. Certainly circumstances demanded he move his force with
all possible speed. Regardless of which side of Haw River he was on, he would of
necessity arrive at Lindley's Mill on the road from Alamance Creek. If he were on the
north side of the river, the ford across Haw River near the mouth of Alamance Creek
would enable him to reach the road. He must have arrived at his destination well
ahead of the arrival of the Tories, in ample time to make a complete survey of the
terrain where he made his ingeniously devised plan for a surprise attack on the
moving Tory army.
The exact time of the departure of the Loyalists from Hillsborough is somewhat
clouded by contradicting reports. Fanning indicated his 'objectives had been reached
by seven o'clock in the morning. This must have meant that by that hour he had
rounded up all the prisoners he wanted, had emptied the jail of its Loyalist prisoners,
had possibly stuffed it with Whigs, and had scoured the village for supplies. A delay of
five to seven hours in departing Hillsborough has not been fully explained, but a
major reason may be found in the looting spree in which nearly all of the Tories
seemed to have been involved after they had accomplished their objective so
successfully. The discovery of a large stock of whiskey brought new life to the men.
They yielded to no restraint and became a howling mob as they swarmed about the
village, rioting and looting. It was not until noon, and possibly two o'clock in the
afternoon, before they could be restored to sufficient order to begin the march to
Wilmington. Even then some of the rioters are said to have been left behind. For
whatever reason, their delay provided precious time for General Butler to complete
preparations for receiving them at Lindleys Mill.

The supposition that the battle took place at a mill a "little above" Lindley's is negated by geography
and by Colonel Fanning's sole objective in his retreat from Hillsborough to Wilmington. No mill could
have been located on the millpond which served Lindley's Mill. The millpond extended for a mile up the
stream. Approximately another mile farther up the stream the site of Davis' Mill is still to be seen, but
this mill was not erected until after the Revolutionary War. At Lindley's Mill the road from Hillsborough
to Wilmington made a sharp tum to the south across Cane Creek. Colonel Fanning would never have
left this road to go up stream for one or two miles to fight the Whig army and by so doing run the risk
of losing any of his prisoners when the road was open for him to hurry on to his destination by way of
Pittsboro. His action after the Battle of Lindley's Mill justifies this interpretation.

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From Hillsborough to Lindleys Mill the Tories were on the road they had
traveled the previous afternoon and night. Their late start made it necessary for them
to halt for the night a few miles short of Haw River.13 They were in need of a good
nights sleep after two hard days and one night without any sleep or relaxation,
except for the drunken spree in Hillsborough. On the morning of the thirteenth they
would have been under way by about five o'clock, if they met their customary time of
departure. Woodys Ford across Haw River, supplemented by a ferry, was about two
and one-half miles south of what is now Saxapahaw and approximately four miles
from Lindleys Mill. At that season of the year the water in the river was generally
low. Most of the soldiers and prisoners probably waded the broad stream to shorten
the time of crossing.
In traversing Haw River the Tory army passed from an area which was
predominantly Whig into the rather narrow Cane Creek Valley in which neutral
Quakers were in a majority, but in which there was a scattering of Whigs and Tories.
Along the roads south of this area Loyalist inhabitants were increasingly numerous
until the Deep River Valley where their greatest concentration was to be found.
At about ten oclock on the morning of September 13th following a march of
four or five hours, the advance guard of the lumbering Loyalist army descended the
hill to the ford across Staffords Branch and started around the bend in the road
toward Lindleys Mill within easy range of the Whig marksmen concealed on the hill
above their right.
If a candid description of this ramshackle procession could be given, it might
make a striking picture: between six and seven hundred Loyalist militia, many in
civilian dress and others in hunting garb with possibly two hundred well-guarded
prisoners, all trudging along a narrow, winding way. Due to the narrowness of the
road, the line must have extended for a mile at least. When the advance guard
reached Stafford's Branch, the rear guard with the prisoners must have been near
Spring Meeting House. The segment of the army which guarded the prisoners was
commanded by Captain John McLean who had been chosen for this responsibility
because he had abstained from the revelries in Hillsborough the day before. Colonel
Fanning and most of the other officers probably wore uniforms, but Colonel Hector
McNeil who commanded the advance guard, following a premonition of the night
before, had donned a hunting attire similar to that worn by many of his men. The
Governor and members of his Council were no doubt well dressed. In addition would
13

Fanning, op. cit., p. 207. Fanning says they camped 18 miles from Hillsborough and 8 miles from
Lindley's Mill.

Page - 15

have this army pulling two cannon which had been seized in Hillsborough the previous
morning, but no evidence has been found of the use of any artillery in the coming
battle. The officers and possibly some others were on horseback, but the men who
comprised the great body of the soldiers and the prisoners were on foot.

Page - 16

The Ambush at Stafford's Branch

For some unexplained reason the Tory advance guard had no forward scouts to
protect it against surprise attack. Because of this they blundered headlong into a
well-laid Whig trap which gave them a tremendous shock and stopped the whole
army:
As the Tories were crossing the creek, and advancing through a hollow of low
ground, along which the Toad led, the Whigs from the brow of the hill, on the
south side of the stream, gave them a de liberate fire, and with tremendous
effect ... Quite a number were killed and wounded as they approached the
stream, and before any danger was known or apprehended.14

This description of the first encounter of the battle conforms to the geography
at Stafford's Branch and the south eastern point of the Plateau perfectly, but it has
been subject to misinterpretation. The word creek without any identification
prompts the thought that the Tories had crossed Cane Creek and that the ambush
took place on the south side of that stream. A study of the terrain can leave no doubt
that the ambush was at Stafford's Branch and not on the south side of Cane Creek.
Stafford's Branch was the creek to which reference was made. It flows to the
southeast, and the right bank of the stream" may be considered the" south side.
The Whigs appear to have withheld their fire until those who led the advance
guard had passed the south eastern point of the Plateau. Their line stretched from
there back to the ford and up the hill beyond. With this much exposure to the fire of
the Whig weaponry from the hill above them, it is not surprising that many of them
were cut down.
Colonel McNeill, on seeing so many of his men cut down by the first fire, and
perceiving that if they continued to advance, it would be a great sacrifice of
life, ordered a retreat; ...15

Doubtless this was a wise decision, but when Colonel Archibald McDougal, who
commanded the larger regiment of Highlanders shamed him for ordering a retreat:
The order was then countermanded ... At the first fire of the Whigs, five or six
balls entered the Colonel's body, and he fell dead on the spot. So did several
others, and many more were wounded.16

14
15
16

Caruthers, op. cit., p. 210.

Ibid.
Ibid.

Page - 17

The effort to keep the news of Colonel McNeil's death from his men was
important:
... for many of the Scotch declared afterwards, that had it been known at the
time, they would not have fired another gun, but would have sought safety in
any way they could.17

This ambush was the first conflict of the day and a vital part of the Whig
strategy, but it was far from the whole battle as tradition has pictured it. On the hill
overlooking the road across Staffords Branch is a marker erected in 1915, bearing the
inscription, Here was fought the Battle of Lindley's Mill. Tradition must have been
the source of this statement. Without doubt the initial surprise attack took place from
this hill, but its area and contour are so limited that only a small portion of the Whig
army could have found concealment on it or even a place from which to fire upon the
Tories on the road below. That portion of the advance guard of the Tories which
received the shock of the first fire from the ambush could have been only a fraction
of the entire army. The events which followed this attack in rapid succession show
that the ambush must have been a diversion. planned to coincide with and to
facilitate the simultaneous Whig attack on the rear of the Loyalist army in a
determined effort to give the prisoners who were being herded along in that part of
the line a chance to make a break for freedom.18 It gave the Tories a great shock and
enabled the Whigs to launch their second attack.

17

lbid., p. 211.
ln 1832 a William Allen made an appeal fora pension. In his application he said that he was a Whig
and one of those captured by the Tories at Hillsborough, and that he saw Colonel McNeil killed in the
Battle of Lindley's Mill. This would certainly imply that he was not with the other prisoners at the rear
of the Tory force. After fifty-one years he could have been mistaken. Cf.: North Carolina State
Records, XXII, p. 10.
18

Page - 18

The Battle for the Prisoners

One important part of the day's struggle which has been overlooked completely
until now is the battle for the prisoners which took place at the rear of the Tory
position. This must have been near Spring Meeting House which was located on the
south side of the Spring Friends Cemetery at that time. From the northern part of
their position on the Plateau, the Whigs were in position to send a striking force
through the woods to a place from which they could spring a surprise attack on the
Tory rear guard when the sound of the first shots at Stafford's Branch reached them.
Hitting the front and the rear of the Tory army simultaneously would catch much of
the enemy army clogging the narrow, winding road between the two points and
hopefully throw the whole into such a state of confusion as to give a short time for
the attack on the rear to free the prisoners. The action and apparent great anxiety of
the Tory officers, Captain McLean (whose troops guarded the prisoners), Colonel
McDougal, and Colonel Fanning, give evidence that there were two simultaneous
attacks. There can be no doubt of the force and significance of the attack on the
rear. The Tory leaders gave full attention to the security of the prisoners and made
no immediate effort to outflank the Whigs. As Caruthers described the attack:
Captain McLean halted his men in the rear and they sat down to rest. On
hearing the first fire of the Whigs, Governor Burke and most of the prisoners
jumped to their feet and looked about; but the captain told them to be quiet;
for if they should attempt to escape they should everyone be shot down; they
had to obey.19

The immediate reaction of the prisoners must have been exactly what the Whig
attackers had hoped for and was, of course, the reason for the attack. A tradition,
also given by Caruthers, shows the high degree of alarm among the Tories caused by
the Whig attacks:
A few years ago an old Quaker friend, who appeared to have been well
informed on this subject , and whose powers, though he was four score, were
unimpaired by age, told me that Colonel McDougal, after he took command,
came under great excitement and- to use his own language, 'in a foam of
sweat', to the house in which the prisoners were the n kept, and took an oath
that if the Whigs did flank him as they were trying to do, and drive him to
extremities, he would put his prisoners all to death, before he would suffer
them to be taken from him.20

19
20

Caruthers, op. cit., p. 210.

Ibid., pp. 212-213.

Page - 19

When Colonel McDougal succeeded the fallen Colonel McNeil he became the
commander of all the Highlanders, including McLean's company guarding the
prisoners. He was obviously alarmed at the possibility of the imminent loss of the
prisoners, as he cl early stated that the Whigs were attacking that part of the Tory
force, and if they should seem about to succeed he would put the prisoners all to
death before he would allow it.
Colonel Fanning demonstrated that he too was anxious about the safety of the
prisoners. He made it his first concern after the attack at Staffords Branch:
I ordered a retreat back to where we left the prisoners and after securing them
I made the necessary preparation to attack the enemy; and after engaging
them for four hours they retreated.21

This was the critical stage in the battle-the time when the Whigs appeared to
be on the verge of winning the objective for which they made the daring attack on
the Loyalist army. The prisoners were alert for any opportunity to make a break for
their freedom, and their chances were never more promising.
Obviously the Whigs made a strong attack on the Tories who guarded the
prisoners. The frantic threats by Captain McLean and Colonel McDougal to massacre
the prisoners rather than see any of them escape show the gravity of the Whig
assault. It must have been a hard-fought battle of some duration. A large part of the
Tory army was thrown into the fight, and their ranking officers were directing the
defense. It is probable that General Butler was there directing the attack made by a
considerable portion of his army though no supporting evidence has been found. It is
likely also that the threats by the Tory leaders to massacre the prisoners were
shouted to the Whigs as well as to the prisoners. Tradition gives this as a reason for
the withdrawal of the Whigs from this phase of the battle.
What was ... the house in which the prisoners were kept ... after the first
attack on their position in the army? The statement could imply that all the prisoners
were crowded into the unnamed house. If this is true or if even a large part of the
two hundred or more prisoners were packed into one house in the area, it must have
been Spring Meeting House for it is unlikely that any other in the area was large
enough to accommodate most of them.

21

Fanning, op. cit., p. 207.

Page - 20

The duration and severity of the battle near the Meeting House lends support
to the tradition that a number of the men killed in the Battle of Lindley's Mill were
buried in the Quaker cemetery near the Meeting House.

Page - 21

On the Plateau
As noted earlier, the final part of Fannings laconic account describes the close
of the conflict near the Meeting House and the beginning of the next stage of the
day's battle:
... after securing (the prisoners), I made the necessary preparation to attack
the enemy; and after engaging them for four hours they retreated.22

Whether Fanning made the plans for the counterattack alone or in consultation
with Colonel McDougal makes little difference, the succeeding events reveal an attack
on the Whig position from the south and from the north at about the same time. The
first of these must have been the attack by the Highlanders on the Whigs who manned
the hill overlooking the ford across Staffords Branch. To take up a position from
which to make this attack it was not necessary for the Tories to run the gauntlet
across the ford and follow the road through the narrow defile where the small stream
cuts between the two hills. Just prior to coming within sight of the waiting Whigs, the
Loyalists could leave the Hillsborough Road, turn south down to Cane Creek, then
move up its left bank to the lowland between the creek and Stafford's Branch. Map
Number 2 may clarify the several movements discussed throughout this account.
Meager records lead to the belief that Colonel McDougal placed his men in
somewhat of an arc around the promontory from which the Whigs had sprung their
initial ambush. The number of dead and wounded found after the battle, scattered
over the low ground between the two streams and in the bed of Stafford's Branch,
reveal the position of a large portion of the attacking force. Bullets and musket balls
found on the slope of the hill on the east side of Stafford's Branch opposite the Whig
position lead to the belief that McDougals men infiltrated the tree-covered slope to
an elevation which enabled them to snipe at the Whigs across the defile. The bed of
the occupied portion of Stafford's Branch is now from eight to ten feet wide, and its
west bank is from two to six feet high. If the stream was similar in 1781, it made a
natural entrenchment from which the Tories could keep up a steady fire on the Whigs
on the hill above. Traditional references to the creek running red with blood and
bodies of the dead and wounded found in the stream were certainly to this part of
Stafford's Branch and not to the sluggish waters of Cane Creek nearby to the south.
After the battle many dead and wounded were found in this area, and this must have
been the location of the pit in which thirty-four of the dead were buried.

22

lbid.

Page - 22

McDougal's strong assault on the Whig position on this southeastern point of the
Plateau was made to attract the attention of the Whig forces to that point and
possibly to draw some of their troops from the north, thereby facilitating Fannings
counterattack. The topography of the wooded approach and the failure of the Whigs
to keep pickets on the alert combined with Fanning's astuteness turned a surprise
counterattack into a temporary success. A study of the geography of the area renders
it difficult to understand why the Whigs were not on the alert for a flanking
movement. The point of the attack was about as close to the main body of the Tory
army on the road to the west of Spring Meeting House as to the scene of the battle
below the ford on Staffords Branch. Their route led to higher ground on the plateau
where the hills and undulations were less marked. It is easy to see in this attack that
Fanning was holding the body of his army including the attackers between the Whig
force and his primary interest, the prisoners.

Page - 23

Caruthers description of the route followed by the Loyalists in making their

counterattack is given in such general terms that it has been subject to
interpretations which would have them following a long and impossible route across
Cane Creek (See Map Number 2). Applying the account to the geography and the
topography of the area reveals weaknesses in these interpretations:
Amidst all the success on the part of the Whigs, and all the disaster and
confusion among the Tories. Fanning contrived to cross the stream at another
place, or to ascend the hill at another point; and by making a little circuit,
attack his enemies in the rear. Being thus taken by surprise, the Whigs were
thrown into momentary confusion, but quickly recovered; ...23

It is unfortunate that the writer did not give a more complete description of
the events covered by these few lines. Pointing up all this success on the part of the
Whigs must refer to the surprise attacks upon the advance guard and on the rear of
the Loyalist forces. That these brought confusion as well as disaster to the Loyalists is
clearly indicated by casualties and by the shouting and threats of the Loyalist officers.
These successes could have been a contributing factor in throwing the Whigs off their
guard in the face of the later counterattack by their enemy. As tradition has
erroneously translated the second part of this sentence, Fanning has been seen
leading his force across Cane Creek at some point below the mouth of Staffords
Branch, then making a wide circuit on the south side of Cane Creek to some point
above Lindleys Mill to cross Cane Creek again and attack the rear of the Whig forces
on the Plateau. A major weakness in this interpretation is that the "little circuit"
would have been stretched into two or three miles-three-fourths of the way around
the Whig army. Assuming that a crossing at the ford near the mill would have made a
surprise impossible, the next crossing would have had to be above the mill pond which
extended more than a mile above the mill. If such a maneuver had been effected it
would have placed the whole Whig army half way between the major part of the
Loyalist army and their prisoners. Fanning would never have made this mistake.
The surprise counterattack by the Loyalists was the simplest possible operation
involving the shortest possible maneuver. All that Colonel Fanning had to do was to
start at some point on the Hillsborough Road, possibly half way between Spring
Meeting House and Stafford's Branch, and by actually making "a little circuit" Of less
than a quarter-mile toward the north of the Plateau, "cross the stream (Stafford's
Branch) at another place (rather than at the ford) [and) ascend the hill at another
point." Where they crossed Stafford's Branch there is hardly any hill to climb in order

23

Caruthers, op. cit., pp. 211-212.

Page - 24

to reach the Plateau. This flanking movement required only "a little circuit," and all
the while Fanning's forces were kept between the Whigs and the prisoners. This
interpretation fits every step in the story given by Caruthers. It applies his narrative
to the terrain and geography of the area.
The Whigs quickly recovered from their initial surprise and for the next four
hours met the attackers in whatever form of assault they could offer. Little is known
of the sequence of events during this longer phase of the struggle. Charges and
countercharges were made, but neither side was able to hold any ground for any
length of time. Conflicts between small groups and exchanges of shots between
isolated individuals were reported. Though no evidence has been found of the use of
cavalry in the battle, instances of men on horseback, some of them officers, have
come to light.
From the point where Fanning made his surprise attack, the surface of the
Plateau is marked by several undulations and makes a gradual decline to the southern
edge of the wooded battle area. The decline could have been of slight advantage to
the Loyalists in their assaults. At times the fighting must have been intense. At one
point .the Whigs were pressed so hotly that General Butler ordered a retreat, but:
... Col. Robert Mebane got before them, and by argument and remonstrance,
so far inspired them with his own heroic spirit that enough of them returned to
renew the battle and keep the ground.24

At one point in the struggle some of the Whigs are reported to have exhausted
their supply of powder.
... Mebane walked slowly along the line, carrying his hat full of powder, telling
every man to take . . . just what he needed.25

During the long battle on the Plateau, Colonel McDougal's Highlanders must
have kept up a continuous attack on the Whigs manning its southeastern corner at
times even attempting to storm the steep hill.26 The duration and intensity of the
battle in this area may be assumed from the heavy casualties:
Between the foot of the hill and the creek, the dead and dying were strewed
about in every direction, some of them lying in the water. One of the Scotch
companies, the one under the command of Capt. Archibald M'Kay had six killed

24
25
26

Ibid., p. 212.
Ibid., p. 214.
Ibid.

Page - 25

on the ground and twenty- six wounded; some other companies suffered
equally as much and hardly any of them escaped entirely.27

This grim description of the heavy casualties tells part of the story of the long
battle kept up by the Highlanders to keep one segment of the Whig army occupied on
their southern front while Colonel Fanning assaulted them on the opposite front. The
somewhat isolated position of the Highlanders and their heavy casualties lead to the
belief that it was in this lowland sector that thirty-four dead were buried in one
grave.
Caruthers was generous in his praise of the valor of the Whigs during the long
Battle:
... according to the most reliable accounts which I have always had from both
sides, the Tories outnumbered the Whigs at least two to one; and I recollect no
conflict during the war in which there was more real bravery displayed or
which reflected more credit on the Whigs than the one on Cane Creek, except,
perhaps, the one at Rassour's (sic) mill . . .28

The two-to-one ratio applies to the total numerical strength of the two armies.
From their favorable position on the Plateau the Whigs were able to hold their entire
force together in one body and fight a defensive battle though they were attacked on
two fronts, both north and south. The sharp natural escarpment on the south must
have enabled them to maintain that position with a small portion of their army,
leaving the majority of their force to meet Fanning's attack on the Plateau. With their
forces divided, the Loyalists were forced to fight under a definite handicap.
Additionally, they had over two hundred prisoners whom they had to guard against
any possibility of escape or liberation by the Whigs. A contingent of troops sufficient
to hold them must have been left behind. They were located approximately a mile
from the scene of the major battle. The Highlanders comprising a sizeable portion of
the Tory army were isolated from Fanning's counterattacking force as they kept up
their attack from the south east of the Whig stronghold. With this division of the Tory
forces it is likely that the number of Whigs equaled the number of Tories attacking
them on the Plateau, possibly even outnumbering them.

27
28

lbid., p. 215.
Ibid., p. 226.

Page - 26

At the End of the Battle

After the battle each side accused the other of leaving the field first. In
colonel Fanning's terse account: After engaging them four hours they retreated. It is
possible that Caruthers gives a correct interpretation of the end of the long conflict:
At all events the battle appears to have ended by mutual consent, and both
must have left the ground about the same time ... as the Whigs slowly
withdrew or slackened their fire, the Tories, glad to get away, moved off with
their prisoners towards Wilmington.29

It is obvious that the Whigs had to relinquish their command of the road from
Stafford's Branch to the ford across Cane Creek at Lindley's Mill before the Tories
would dare attempt the use of this vulnerable segment of the march route. After the
Loyalist forces had crossed Cane Creek to continue the long march to Wilmington,
General Butler started his army in pursuit. From this it is apparent that the Whig army
had retreated only a short distance from the scene of the battle. The road
intersection to the north of Lindley's Mill would have been the logical place to wait
for developments, to receive supplies, and to make preparations for the ensuing race
toward Wilmington. Here he would have had two avenues for retreat if the Tories had
chosen to continue their counterattack. It was soon apparent that their one thought
was to get on toward Wilmington with the prisoners.
Near the end of the battle Fanning was seriously wounded and had to be taken
from the battlefield. His brief account gives almost all that is known regarding this
and a subsequent change of command:
At the conclusion of this action. I received a shot in my left arm, which broke
the bone in several pieces; my loss of blood was so great, that I was taken off
my horse, and led to a secret place in the woods. I then sent Liet Woleston to
my little army, for Col'n Arch McDugald, and Major John Rains and Lt Coln Arch
Mckay, to take command ... I also desired that Major Rains return as soon as he
could leave Col. McDugald; as I thought he might be able to save me from the
hands of my enemies.30

This indicates that Colonel Fanning was present as the battle came to an end, but was
not with the Tories on the road to Wilmington immediately afterward. There is no

29
30

Ibid., p. 213.
Fanning, op. cit., p. 207.

Page - 27

indication that his removal from the battle had any effect on the termination of the
conflict, however.
Fanning's hiding place in the woods still remains a secret. Prominent Loyalists
lived near Lindley's Mill, and some of them had extensive lands on which the wounded
Colonel could have been hidden. During the first four days after the battle, four men
cared for him. Most likely Major John Rains was one of them. Seventeen other
Loyalists joined them. The Whigs were quick to learn of Fanning's fate, and following
the battle a small contingent under Captain William O'Neal returned to the area and
made a futile search for him. Major Rains' home was in the strong Loyalist community
on Brush Creek which lies along the boundary between Chatham and Randolph
counties. It is not surprising that he took his wounded commander to this Tory
stronghold when he was able to be moved from his hiding place near Cane Creek.
When the firing ceased and General Butler moved his forces from the battle
area, the Tories must have occupied the southern rim of the Plateau in order to guard
the road which followed the bank of the creek from Stafford's Branch to the ford
across Cane Creek, a few rods from Lindley's Mill. There can be little doubt that the
Tory commanders took advantage of the opening and moved the prisoners and their
army over this course to begin anew their race to Wilmington. If the Whig army halted
at or near the road intersection to the north of the mill it was easy for a small party
of men to sally forth from there to deliver parting shots at the last of the Tories
crossing the creek, as tradition reports. A shoulder of the Plateau over looks the
place where the ford crossed the creek, and from this point it would have been a
simple matter for a small band of Whigs to give the last of the rear guard of the Tory
army this additional aggravation, the last shots in the Battle of Lindley's Mill.
Both Whigs and Tories, pushed by the exigencies of their respective situations,
left their dead, dying, and seriously wounded lying where they fell. The residents of
the surrounding area, mostly Quakers, flocked to the tragic scene that afternoon and
on their own initiative began the greatest humanitarian task this community has ever
had thrust upon it. The exact number of killed and wounded cannot be determined,
but enough is known to indicate that the percentage of the armies which fell on the
field of conflict was high for a battle of the Revolutionary War.31 Samuel A. Ashe, in
his biographical sketch of David Fanning, accepts the figures which Fanning says were
brought to him immediately after the battle.32 According to this account, the Tories
had twenty-seven killed and sixty seriously wounded. The Whigs buried twenty-four
31

Caruthers states: ... it was larger in proportion to the whole 'number that was usual in battles of
that period." Op. cit., p. 214.
32
Ashe, op. cit., p. 95.

Page - 28

and had ninety seriously wounded. The totals numbered fifty-one dead and 150
seriously wounded. In addition to these, thirty wounded Tories and an unknown
number of wounded Whigs were able to leave the field with their respective armies.
These figures lead to the estimate that as many as one fifth of those engaged in the
battle were killed or wounded. This is a high percentage and reflects the intensity of
conflict.
Two accounts of graves in the area where the fighting took place seem to
corroborate Fanning's account to a degree at least. In 1784 a Friends minister named
Elisha Kirk was at Spring Meeting. He left this account:
... we went home with our beloved Friend Zachariah Dicks, and on the way he
showed us the place where he and other friends buried thirty-four men in one
grave, during the late troubles.33

Oscar Braxton, whose home throughout his life was in sight of the Plateau where the
main struggle of the battle occurred, remembered seeing fifteen or twenty graves on
the Plateau about 150 yards north of the point where the first shots of the battle
were fired.34 No one knows if more than one body was buried in any of these graves.
One is tempted to assume that the grave in which thirty-four men were buried was
located in the lowland between Stafford's Branch and Cane Creek.
Caruther's gives a different estimate of the number killed and fatally wounded
in the battle:
A friend, in writing to me from the Scotch region, says that 'including all of
both sides who were slain on the field, and all who died soon after in
consequence of their wounds, the number could not have been much under a
hundred; and this estimate, which looks quite reasonable, taking everything
into view, we suppose to he not far from the truth.35

The figures given by Fanning were intended to account for those who were buried on
the field of battle, but tradition indicates that some of those killed in the battle were
taken away by friends and relatives the next day. It is safe to assume that many of
the 150 who were seriously wounded died from their wounds after being taken from
the battle area. Those who were killed in the battle for the prisoners near Spring

33

Elisha Kirk, "Elisha Kirk's Journal," Friends Miscellany, VI (1) (Eighth Month 1834), p. 29. Caruthers
says thirty-two were buried in one pit. Op. cit., p. 214.
34
Interview with Harvey Newlin, January 12, 1969. Braxton lived to be ninety years old and his mind
seemed remarkably clear until near his death. His father, Jonathan Braxton, born October 2, 1834 lived
in the Hugh Laughlin house near the battlefield until it was razed.
35
Caruthers, op. cit., p. 215.

Page - 29

Meeting House could have been buried in the Quaker graveyard there. Colonel
Lutteral, who died in Hugh Laughlin's house near Lindley's Mill, must have been buried
there.36 It is not difficult to believe that many others who died of their wounds in the
homes in the community were buried in the Spring Meeting Cemetery.
If stones ever marked any of the graves, they have disappeared, and every
tumulus has eroded away. For many decades the soldiers' cemetery on the Plateau has
been plowed over by owners of the land, and all traces of the graves have been
obliterated.
Burying the dead must have been grisly work, but the people of the area
probably completed it within a day or two. Caring for 150 seriously-wounded men
must have been a large task of long duration. The two armies departed, leaving both
of these tasks to the mercy and conscience of the men and women in this part of the
Cane Creek Valley. Practically every home within a few miles of Lindley's Mill and
Spring Meeting House must have been converted into an improvised, if rustic, hospital
ward. Most of the homes were small log houses, and few if any of the families could
take in even one wounded man without great inconvenience. In addition, family
members had to assume nursing duties and provide food and whatever medicine and
bandages they could find. In some instances relatives of the wounded came from
considerable distance to care for wounded kin. This added to the responsibilities of
the generous local families. These tasks were done voluntarily with no hope or
thought of remuneration. History has failed to give due recognition to these
magnanimous humanitarian acts.
Dr. John Pyle, Colonel of a Loyalist regiment which had been cut to pieces by
Whig forces under the command of Colonel Henry Lee six months earlier, lived barely
a quarter-mile south of Lindley's Mill and almost in sight of the scene of the main part
of the battle. He was held in high esteem by his neighbors, and tradition says he was
among those who went immediately after the battle to care for the wounded left
behind by both armies. Three days later Colonel William O'Neal of the Whig army
came into the community to try to locate and capture the wounded Colonel Fanning.
He stated later that he accepted the surrender of Dr. Pyle and ordered him to take
charge of the wounded. This does not necessarily negate the tradition that Dr. Pyle
began attending the wounded immediately after the battle.

36

Jonathan Braxton's son, Oscar, reported hearing his father say that he had seen the Colonel's name
written in blood upon the wall of the Laughlin house where it remained legible until the dwelling was
razed. Caruthers indicates that Lutteral was ... Iaid in the burying ground of a neighboring church."
Op. cit., p. 217. At that time Spring Meeting was the only "neighboring church".

Page - 30

The Race to Wilmington

Both armies had lost heavily in the battle, but neither was unable to march to
Wilmington. With Fanning seriously wounded and left in hiding somewhere near
Lindley's Mill, the Tory army renewed its march as quickly as possible. The first
segment of their route was over what has been called more recently the "Old
Pittsboro Road." It is the road that now passes Big Meadows Primitive Baptist Church.*
It must have been late in the afternoon before the Tory army crossed Cane Creek, and
it could have covered only a few miles that afternoon.
General Butler halted his retreat a short distance from the battlefield. The
Tories made no effort to pursue or to attack his army, so he made hasty preparations
to pursue the enemy. There is some indication that reinforcements reached him
immediately after the battle. It is possible that the Whigs did not begin the pursuit
until the morning following the battle. On September 14, a small band of Whigs
skirmished briefly with the rear guard of the Tory army at Hickory Mountain. This
could have been a band of local Whigs known to have been in that area, as it is
possible that General Butler's army had not had sufficient time to cover that di
stance.
When the Tories reached the Deep River Valley they were in Loyalist country.
South of Cross Creek they halted at a well-known Tory rendezvous at McFall's Mill on
Raft Swamp. At that point the prisoners were delivered to Colonel Duncan Ray who
commanded a force sufficient to conduct them safely to Wilmington. In this long race
by the two forces, General Butler's Whigs were never able to threaten seriously the
Tory control of the prisoners. On the other hand, the Tories made only one effort to
strike General Butler's army with any show of force.

*Cornwallis had followed this road on his march from Guilford Court House to
Wilmington.

Page - 31

An Evaluation of the Battle

The Battle of Lindley's Mill can hardly be seen in any interconnected chain of
battles or e vents. It had no connection with the Battle of Guilford Court House,
fought six months earlier, and could have had no influence on the surrender of the
British Anny at Yorktown, a month later. The armies of General Greene and Lord
Cornwallis had gone to South Carolina and Virginia respectively, and the fighting in
this state had little if any direct connection with the military campaigns of a
continental scale being pursued by either the British or the Americans. It was almost
entirely a civil war between Whigs and Tories for the control of the state, though the
war issue of independence or remaining within the British Empire still persisted.
In this phase of the war the Battle of Lindley's Mill ranks as one of the most
important in the state. At the time Whigs and Tories were engaged in that bloody
struggle, no one could imagine that within a month Charles Cornwallis would
surrender his army and lite rally bring the war to its end. Consequently, the control of
North Carolina seemed a vital issue. The outcome of the Battle of Lindley's Mill was
important to this control.
Who won the Battle of Lindley's Mill? It is obvious that the Whigs railed in their
objective that being the release of Governor Burke and the other prisoners taken at
Hillsborough. After fighting the Tories for a half-day they withdrew from the field and
all owed the enemy force to cross Cane Creek and take with them the closely-guarded
prisoners. Though General Butler and his army followed the retreating Tories almost
to Wilmington, they were not able to effect the escape of a single prisoner. It seems a
clear military and psychological victory for the Tories.
As noted, Eli Caruthers called it the Battle of Cane Creek." In his estimation,
it was "one of the most important events in Fanning's career and one of the most
calamitous to the country." It is easy to understand why the events at Hillsborough, at
Lindley's Mill, and along the road from there to Wilmington must have disappointed
and alarmed the Whigs, but the succeeding e vents do not reveal any calamitous
results. A month later the surrender of the British Army at Yorktown brought the war
to an end. Though Colonel Fanning and a small number of Tories continued their
depredations and savage attacks on individual Whigs and small groups, the control of
the country passed to the Whigs rather quickly.
From the standpoint of the Whigs, the sting of defeat at Lindley's Mill must not
have been strong. Up on short notice a militia force had rushed to a strategic point
where it blocked the progress of a superior Tory army for more than one half day.

Page - 32

With no more than half the numerical strength of the enemy, they had executed two
surprise attacks which shocked the whole Tory army and came near to breaking its
grip on highly prized prisoners. When these attacks failed to produce the desired
results, the Whig militia fought a superior enemy for four h ours on fairly even terms
before withdrawing in good order from a strong position to one a little north of
Lindley's Mill. When the roadblock was removed the Tories made no effort to pursue
the Whigs, but took immediate advantage of the open road to avoid further conflict
and resume their march to Wilmington. After the Tory departure, the Whigs in the
area were as free from the Tory menace as they would have been, had they won the
battle. No Tory army ever returned to the Cane Creek Valley or to the Haw River
VaIley.
The pursuit of the Tory army was seen as a bold venture, for much of the route
to Wilmington across the Deep River Valley and along that of the Cape Fear lay in
Tory country. Only once was the Whig army subject to an enemy attack, and this was
after General Butler had given up the pursuit of the Tory force. The long march of the
Tories to Wilmington thus creates the appearance of a retreat and a Whig victory.
These circumstances combined with strong public prejudice, which for the next
100 years branded anything favorable to the Tory cause as bordering on treason,
helped to keep the Battle of Lindley's Mill out of the pages of history.

Page - 33

Bibliography
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Greensboro: C. L. Van Noppen, 1925.
Caruthers, Eli. Revolutionary Incidents and Sketches of Character Chiefly in the "Old
North State." Philadelphia, Hayes & Zell, 1854.
Kirk, Elisha. "Elisha Kirk's Journal." Friends Miscellany. VII (Eighth Month 1834). pp.
20-33.
Lefler, Hugh; and Wage r, Paul, eds. Orange County 1752-1952. Chapel Hill: The
Orange Print Shop, 1953.
Murphey, Archibald D. The Papers of Archibald D. Murphey. Raleigh: E. M. Uzzel &
Company. 1914.
Rankin. Hugh F. The North Carolina Continentals. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1971.
State Records of North Carolina, Vol. XXII (1907). S.v. "Narrative or corn. David
Fanning Written by Himself Detailing Astonishing Events in North Carolina from 1775
to 1783."
Wheeler. John H. Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851.
Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo and Company, 1851.

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