Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
Editorial board
Alan Dowty,
Political Science and Middle Eastern
Studies, University of Notre Dame
Allan Silver,
Sociology,
Columbia University
Tamar Katriel,
Communication Ethnography,
University of Haifa
Anthony D. Smith,
Nationalism and Ethnicity,
London School of Economics
Avi Sagi,
Hermeneutics, Cultural studies,
and Philosophy, Bar-Ilan University
Yael Zerubavel,
Jewish Studies and History,
Rutgers University
----------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------
Boston
2011
A catalog record for this title is available from the Library of Congress.
Contents
Introduction1
Chapter 1: Three Options for Secularism in Israel9
I. Foreword. 9
II. Judaism as culture.15
III. Reservations about Judaism.28
IV. Spiritual Judaism. 38
V. The distress of secularism.45
Chapter 2: Why Spinoza? 55
I. The historical-cultural context. 56
II. Special philosophical relevance61
Chapter 3: Imagination and the Masses:
An Outline of the Object of Politics69
I. Non-reflective consciousness and the image
of the dream: the epistemological aspect. 69
II. Instability, associations and egocentrism: the psychological aspect. 76
III. Inconsistency, conformism and hostility in the life of
the masses: the political aspect. 83
Chapter 4: Political Secularism92
I. Undermining religion.97
II. Rationalization of the masses and political power.99
III. Does rationalization mean overcoming religion? 103
IV. The importance of religion in the establishment of political power. 106
V. Moderating religious tradition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
VI. Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience. 125
Chapter 5: The Role of the Philosopher
in His Society in Times of Secularization 143
I. The Healthy Judgment, the radiance of theology
and the problem of the philosophers sincerity. 143
v
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Contents--------------------------------------------------------------------------
vi
---------------------------------------------------------------------Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------
Introduction
---------------------------------------------------------------------Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------
sociological facts. The reason for this is simple: many of these contents
criticize a particular religious tradition. It is specifically because of the
specific, concrete context of our book that the contents of thought
we will examine are not limited to what has been produced in Israeli
culture. Zionism, especially the thought of spiritual Zionist thinkers,
is important for the secular public in Israel, if only because this is the
thought of the founding fathers of Israeli society.
From what has already been claimed, and even from the title of the
book, it becomes clear that the web of thought discussed here is not
homogeneous. We will deal here with the thought of Israeli intellectuals
and the philosophy of Spinoza. In spite of the differences between these
kinds of thought, their relationship is not artificial, and the justification
for this pairing will be presented later on in the book. For the moment,
I will suffice with one brief comment. The problem is evident in the
thought schemes of Israeli intellectuals. The investigation of the
thought of Spinoza is part of the development of its solution. This is
not a philosophical recommendation that falls like a note from heaven.
This solution is rooted in Israeli culture, and may shed light on trends
rooted in that society. It gives rise to severe criticism of the approaches
of Israeli intellectuals. The solution I will provide here not only breaks
through the impasse to which the approaches of Israeli intellectuals
lead, but also helps us in understanding this impasse.
In order not to leave things unclear, let me now specify their
principles. There is a wide variety of approaches among Israeli
intellectuals, but they all share a common basic assumptionthat
Judaism as a set of contents bearing religious significance can no
longer serve as a basis for the Jewish collective. Secularization, the
establishment of the State of Israel, liberation from the oppressive
rule of the halakhaall these have given birth to a new national
identity. The common religious sources are not included in it. To
our great surprise, this assumptionwhich would seem to be selfunderstoodis not part of the secular position which may be
developed from Spinozas thinking. What he calls secularism suits his
efforts to provide a basis for political authority. Such authority enables
the striving for the creation of autonomous, secular human life. But
2
---------------------------------------------------------------------Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------- Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------ChapterI -----------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------I. Foreword------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Foreword
Israeli intellectuals are deeply concerned over the potential meaning of
Judaism for the Israeli secular public. In the course of their deliberations,
they deal with a wide range of topicsthe Jewish identity of secular
people; the proper place for Jewish studies within the educational
system; the Jewish library; the Jewish roots of Israeli culture; the
development of non-Orthodox Jewish traditional alternatives, such as
the traditionalist (masorti) movement, the Reform and Conservative
movements, Judaism as culture, and secular Judaism; the shaping of a
Jewish Israeli public space, and more. These intellectuals fear that the
secular public, and the entire Israeli society in its wake, have renounced
their intellectual assets and, in doing so, their future as well. As pointed
out earlier, not all share this view: some intellectuals claim that in order
for Israeli society to fully mature, it must cut itself off from its religious
heritage, which they view as oppressive. All the intellectuals expressing
these viewswhether they call for a rapprochement with Judaism
or for further distancingshare a common focus, i.e. the potential
significance of Judaism for the Israeli secular public.
Before describing and analyzing these notions, I would like to
propose some preliminary comments. The ideas we will be discussing
are part of a lively debate on the Jewish identity of secular Israelis.
This debate is not identical to the one on the relations between religion
and the State, which is a political issue. What the sides in that conflict
seek to clarify is the nature of the threat between the parties and the
proper distribution of power. That debate does not attempt to clarify
9
These things are true for the Hebrew culture, in general. For an extended analysis of
this, see Schweid, Three Night Watches. I expanded this point further in the Hebrew
version of this book. See Katz, Core of Secularism, Chapter 10.
10
------------------------------------------------------------------------I. Foreword------------------------------------------------------------------------
The attempt to describe Judaism as a culture derives from a long and complex tradition
within Jewish thought, including some of the Wissenschaft des Judentums ideas, the
ideas of the Haskala, and a long list of Zionist thinkers (Ahad Haam, Zeev Jabotinsky,
Berl Katzenelson, Micha Yossef Berdichevsky, Haim Nachman Bialik, Mordechai
Kaplan, and many others). On the history of the notion of Judaism as culture and its
various versions, see Schweid, Towards. The discussion here focuses on the expressions
of this idea among Israeli intellectuals.
For example: Nathan Rotenstreichs writings on the renewal of the halakha today;
Menachem Brinkers claims on the cultural war in Israel; the debates on the teaching
of the Bible in Israel and the attempts at analyzing it as a literary work; the attempts
to turn the halakha into the basis of Israeli law; and some of the cultural experiments
made by the kibbutz movement.
12
------------------------------------------------------------------------I. Foreword------------------------------------------------------------------------
all religious and Jewish symbols. The intellectuals who voice these ideas
present Judaism as a threatening entity which is intrinsically in conflict
with political life. These positions figure in the debate on Israel as a
state of all its citizens, as well as among some of the supporters of a
bi-national State or of multiculturalism.
The third model to be discussed could be entitled spiritual
secularism. This model has been gaining popularity in the last decades
within so-called new-age circles, although it has roots in spiritual
Zionism (particularly in the work of A.D. Gordon) and in some esoteric
ideas from the 1950s found in the works of Yosef Schechter and Pinhas
Sadeh. These views are of a highly religious tone, which is characterized
by the striving towards being aware of the other, transcendental
dimension of life. This dimension, however, does not resemble the
transcendental images of accepted religion; in many cases, it is also
presented to the individual through an eclectic reservoir of symbols
and teachings of various origins, but including Jewish contents, taken
mainly from Hassidism and the Kabbalah.
From the discussion above, it is clear why intellectuals who call for
Judaism as culture or who express reservations about Judaism address
the secular public in Israel. However, how is the last modelspiritual
Judaismat all suitable for the world of secular people? The answer
derives from the definition which was formulated in the introduction.
The spiritual approaches presented above choose contents and symbols
from mystical Jewish trends, albeit without granting them any
normative significance. What is described in the introduction as one of
the characteristics of secularismthe negation of religious tradition as
a content whose interpretation lies exclusively in the hands of religious
virtuosidoes not vanish as a result of the interest in religious
symbols. Moreover, such views express the notion of mans autonomy,
as arises from their eclectic nature. In presenting the interested person
with a mlange of sources, they actually call upon him to shape his
spiritual world for himself. This demand is not limited to a single act
of choice; rather, he is required to choose over and over again. In this
way, the modernistic view of man as a self-generating autonomous
subject makes up for the contents taken from various religious and
13
Both the post-modern approach to truth and the capitalistic market view resonate in
this eclecticism. For more on this, see Tavori, New Age in Israel; Ruah-Midbar, Tarbut;
Heelas, New Age.
This position was also accepted by the supporters of political Zionism, although they
were opposed to the precedence Ahad Haam granted to Jewish secular culture over
social and political action.
14
his part, attempted to infuse it with a new religious meaning that was
not based on traditional divinity. Each of these paradigms presented
a particular approach to Judaism, which was suitable for those who
had turned their backs on religious tradition as a normative system
originating in divine revelation. The fact that this repertoire of solutions
still prevails in Israeli intellectual life has many implications: if, indeed,
we become convinced that the secular paths commonly found in Israeli
culture all lead to some type of dead end, we will be forced to reach
the conclusion that this dead end did not start with Israeli culture.
The roads that were paved within the spiritual world of Zionism, the
paradigms outlined at the time, all failed. It will then be our duty to
reach beyond them and develop a new option.
I do not presume to present all the relevant theories linked to the Judaism as culture
approach. What will be missing hereas in academic research in generalis a
description of the thoughts on Judaism among the members of the kibbutz movement.
This thinking is interesting not only because of the nature of its participants, but as
a reflection on one of the most intensive attempts in Israeli society at formulating a
Judaism geared towards secular people.
15
9
10
11
Yizhar, Courage, p.75. This rather famous article appeared in the early 80s, at a time
when the return to religion was widespread within the secular population.
Yizhar, Courage, p. 75.
Brinker, Without Doctrine, p. 57.
Rabi, Knowing Judaism.
17
the other. In other words, Torah study, which is essentially and mainly
the Oral Law, the Talmud or large chunks of it, the debates of Abaye
and Rava, the deliberations of the halakhahair-splitting longwinded
debates. Only those who left the fold, adopting a so-called bad lifestyle,
free of the suffering inflicted by the tyranny of the halakhaexpanded
the domain of our cultural assets; it was they who enabled the Bible, the
Kabbalah and religious philosophy to regain their pride, and clarified
and refined the meaning of all Jewish religious contents. These things
could take place only within a liberal-scientific, historical-philological
or esthetic approach. Even halakhic research
Shlonsky does not see the secular as having squandered away their
tradition, but rather as carrying out, unknowingly, a tremendous
revolution within this tradition. The main reason for their distress
stems from their lack of understanding of their role, and from the
misunderstanding of the dynamic nature that characterizes every
tradition. The claim that tradition, by nature, is comprised of a
wide range of contents leads many intellectuals to think that they
are standing on the threshold of a new Jewish culture whose entire
image will only take shape in the future. Therefore, the construction
of a continuous and unified Jewish culture is a task that necessarily
surpasses their activities and their time period. This same tone is
18
19
23
24
25
26
Ibid., p. 236.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 237.
Rotenstreich, Jewish Existence, p. 51.
22
27
28
29
30
Ibid., p. 53.
Ibid., p. 52.
Ibid., p. 53.
Ibid., p. 76.
23
Ibid., p. 61.
24
the Israeli is fullerhe can express his Jewish values within the Israeli
experience. This is how he illustrates this point:35
Is an Israeli jail, for example, managed according to the system of Jewish
values? This is a real question. When IDF soldiers keep combat ethics,
Jewish values are strengthened; but when IDF soldiers commit atrocities
Jewish values collapse. There is no longer any separation between a
closed spiritual world, where ideas are discussed, and reality, where this is
irrelevant. Large sections of our spiritual heritage were only theoretical,
and the fascinating and painful thing in Israeli reality is the exposure of
theory to life.
Ibid., p. 133.
26
teach
us regarding the strengthening of the secular persons identity?
Naturally, one can look at is as an expression of the secular publics
growing self-confidence as it generates its own culture. The process
of secularization undoubtedly involves tearing oneself away painfully
from Jewish tradition; over the course of the generations, however,
there has been an accumulation of rich cultural creation in all realms
of lifeliterature, thought, ways of life, politics, and morewhich is
deep enough to enable the secular person to take root in it. The focus
on secular culture can also be a kind of acknowledgement of the futility
of the attempts to rewrite traditional Judaism as a culture. This project
most likely implies that the attempts on the part of Ayali, Rotenstreich,
Schweid, Brinker, Rabi, and of many others who are not mentioned
here, have failed. The contents of Judaism are religious contents; as
such, they settle easily into the heart of the simple believer. Removing
the religious significance from these contents has turned them into
artificial symbols, fraught with explanations and justifications, and
they are no longer indispensable. Locking oneself up within secular
creativity thus expresses a sign of this disappointment. It could also
illustrate the two possibilities that were just mentioned: given the selfconfidence of the secular culture, the editors of the encyclopedia do
not hesitate to abandon the pointless efforts of rewriting traditional
Judaism as a culture.
41
This last example shows us that, although this chapter deals with the secular thinkers,
the nature of their thought is not determined exclusively by their personal identity.
We limit ourselves to this group because it suffices for the drawing of a schematic
picture of the Israeli debate on the meaning of Judaism for the secular public.
Liebman, Culture War.
30
42
43
44
45
Ibid., p. 9.
Samet, Advance One Class.
Shochat, Fascist Ecology.
Ofir, Present.
31
secular family members read the Haggadah of their own free will; and
in Israeli culture, and particularly in Kibbutz society, attempts have
been made at creating alternative, secular Passover Haggadot. The
secular person could have chosen texts which he feels closer to and
which reflect his own world.
Why then are secular people attached to the Passover Haggadah?
Ofir attempts to answer this question by looking at its core significance.
In general terms, his claim is that one can identify the entire structure
of a discourse that revolves around the opposition between the Jew and
the Gentile, whose main outline has been preserved, not only in the
rabbinical discourse but also in the secular nationalistic discourse, which
rebelled against it and tried to replace it.46 The aim of this discourse is to
organize Jewish self-consciousness and the Jewish historical experience
as it has been experienced throughout the generations.47 According to
Ofir, the links between Israel and the other nations are shaped along
the plot which is told in the Haggadah. Its main lines are as follows: the
Gentiles oppress the people of Israel; the people of Israel turns to its
God, who responds to this call by humiliating the oppressive Gentile. As
stated, this narrative determines the Jewish peoples self-consciousness,
and is ahistoric in status:
The entire history of Israel is the history of the descent from Egypt,
enslavement in Egypt and the Exodus from Egypt. Henceforth, Israel has
no history, only stories whose beginning and end are foreknown, since
they are generated as analogies to the first and last historical event,
History with a capital H. Henceforth, each story will be a reflection of
the first story and will serve as a concretization, at different times and in
various places, of the eternal return of the paradigm: Israel/Gentile/God.48
The call for the release from these texts is the conclusion drawn
from the analysis of the politico-cultural function of Jewish sources,
which have caused tremendous damage. The narratives they formulate
nurture Israeli nationalism, and particularly the notion that peace
46
47
48
Ibid., p. 53.
Ibid., p. 85.
Ibid., p. 102.
32
threatens the existence of the Jewish people. The danger such sources
entail is particularly severe because they are shared by the various
camps of Israeli society, both religious and secular. What does Ofir
suggest should be done? One suggestion is to maintain at all costs the
threatening presence of the Gentile and the fundamental role of every
external threat that is perceived as an expression of essential otherness.
Another way, which Ofir believes best describes his proposal, is to try to
liberate the discourse or change it.49
In Ofirs case, the alienation from Judaism is justified as a way to
liberate the discourse. Other justifications for the desired liberation
from Judaism are found in the works of sociologist Uri Ram. In his
view, Hebrew secular nationalism contains a blurred or repressed form
of Judaismthis must be the case, since Judaism is what justified
its act of colonization. However, democracy and the secular values
underlying this secular nationalism clash with the presence of Judaism
in Israel. Ram describes this conflict as follows:
Secularism implies the recognition of the absence of any given meaning
in the world. Freedom implies generating meaning out of free will.
Democracy is a form of regime that is based on secular freedom. There
is a basic contradiction between a democratic regime and collective
faith, whether it is defined as religion or as nation (naturally, religion
and nation can coexist in a democratic regime, however the latter
cannot exist within a religious or nationalist commitment). Religion and
nationalism strive to mold the individual existential void according
to the fixed patternswhich are invented every now and againof
collective memory: whether through following the commandments and
believing in an eternal omnipotent God, or by striving towards a unique
national-historical goal, like the values which principals instill in the
minds of young children in dark totalitarian countries, God forbid. In
order to maintain a democratic life, i.e. a secular and free life, a clear and
deliberate act of forgetting must be initiated.50
Thus, the strong claim for alienation from Judaism stems from the
contradiction which Ram sees between Judaism on the one hand, and
49
50
Ibid., p. 56.
Ram, In Praise of Forgetting, p. 357.
33
democracy and the secularism which underlies it, on the other. He thus
offers the reader three possibilities:
In Israel, a cultural struggle is taking place over collective memory,
both theoretically and concretely. It is a struggle between three main
historical approaches: the national approach to history, which contains
the unsolved contradiction between democracy and Judaism; the
nationalistic approach to history, which solves this contradiction by
renouncing a democratic future; and the civic approach to history, which
solves this contradiction by renouncing the ethnic past. This is a struggle
taking place between a past which calls for burying the future and a
future which calls for burying the past. The choice is: a tormented past or
a reasonable future.51
Ibid., p. 349.
Weiler, Theocracy, p. 291.
34
Weiler knows very well that his claims about the halakha are but
one of its many aspects (he even indicates this prominently in his book,
on the text appearing on the back cover). His position, however, that
Judaism is dangerous for the State of Israel because of the tension that
exists between its basic values and the secular State, is based on the
recognition of one of halakhas aspects. In his view, the mere presence
of this trend in Judaism endangers the State of Israel. Historian Yigal
Eilam expresses a similar view of the struggle between the State and
Judaism, and thus his book is entitled The End of Judaism.53
Weiler and Eilams views differ greatly from those of Ofir and Ram.
The differences between them are reflected in the nature and intensity of
their dissociation from Judaism. For Ofir, for example, Judaism mutilates
the Israeli, in the sense that it contributes to his holding of distorted
views; it is at the root of nationalism and stirs up war. In Weilers opinion,
Judaism as the religion of halakha undermines the existence of the State.
In spite of the differences between them, these intellectuals express a
shared view: Judaism is perceived as an ensemble of contents which,
given what they are, endanger the values of secular life.
We will now turn to the last example of the representatives of the
position we called reservations about Judaism. We are referring to
the provocative article written by philosopher Gilad Bareli, entitled On
the Secularized Study of Torah.54 Bareli directs his claimsand, in
fact, his criticismat the cultural phenomenon of the spread of the
study of religious texts among secular people (whether it is the Talmud,
the Agadah, traditional biblical exegesis, etc.) This learning takes place
in secular batei midrash and in colleges, such as Alma. In his article,
Bareli defines the secular person as follows: [He] is not a person
who considers himself as exempt from the fulfillment of religious
obligations, but someone who does not recognize these obligations or
the source of their validity in any way; he does not recognize them
because, for him, they are groundless, which is why they are obligatory
for no one. From his point of view, they are not obligations which, for
some reason, are not applicable to him or from which he is exempt: they
53
54
Ibid., p.10.
Ibid., p.15.
Ibid., p. 17.
36
is of
considerable public significance; therefore, if an intellectual holds this
view, we should consider it, rather than the justifications he brings to
support it, as sufficient basis for characterizing that view.
likely to rescue man from the sphere of his everyday life, where his soul
dwells in exile, and help him discover another dimension of his life.
Religious symbols are thus integrated into a project whose main
focus is to help man discover his individuality, and to discover the divine
within him. In other words, as mentioned above, the representatives of
this trend seem to have nothing to do with our topic of interest; those
advocating a spiritual path towards Judaism seem to represent a
religious current that has nothing in common with the world of secular
people. But how then are we to understand why most representatives of
these trends are perceived as secular and that their readers and students
are also identified as such? Perhaps this reflects the superficiality of the
secular-religious classification or, more precisely, the flaws in the use
of the term secular? I do not think so. Spiritual trends proliferate
among the secular public because some of their key values reflect the
secular way of life: they perceive religious contents as raw material
for the fulfillment of the idea of autonomous human life. Religious
contents are not perceived as a call to respond to the commands of a
God who reveals Himself to his people and whose will is transmitted
through a common and binding tradition; rather, the Divinity and its
presence are more like a resonating box through which it is possible
for the individual to feel his individuality, as well as the depth of his
life, rather than ordering a specific lifestyle. The secular nature of the
spiritual approaches is determined on the basis of the role played by
religious contents, and is not undermined by their presence.
We will now investigate these approaches through the prism of the
world of several such intellectuals, beginning with Pinchas Sadeh in the
late 1950s. In the last two decades of his life, Sadeh was deeply involved
in editing and publishing religious texts for the secular public, including
a collection of prayers, and collected stories about Rabbi Nachman
of Breslov and the Baal Shem-Tov. His interest in and admiration
for Judaism were very uncharacteristic of his early days: in his wellknown book Life as a Parable, published in 1958, he sharply criticizes
Judaism, highlighting its flaws. This followed the rejection of his first
published collection of poems, Masa Dumah. Sadeh characterizes the
critics coldness towards these poems as a misunderstanding, which he
explains as follows: I dont think that the misunderstanding towards
39
Reuveni, Interview, p. 61. Naturally, the assumption that these books were geared for
secular people was not Sadehs alone; he published them through publishing houses
directed towards secular people (Carta, Schoken). The editors working for these
publishing houses shared in his assumptions by agreeing to publish these books, as
did the secular people who purchased them.
42
65
66
67
68
Ibid., p. 85. (The biblical citation is based on the King James translation).
Ibid., p. 247.
Ibid., p. 306.
Ibid., p. 302.
44
Ibid., p. 293.
45
in the religious approach the static and passive aspects are central?
Where then, according to this taxonomy, are we to place revolutionary
religious creators, such as the Maimonides and Rabbi Nachman of
Breslov? Rotenstreichs ideas give rise to another series of issues: can
halakha serve as a source of inspiration for the secular person striving
to contain the all-invasive scientific culture? To what extent will he be
able to delve into the fine details of the halakhic discussion if most of
its significance is foreign to him and its main call is for man to restrain
himself? Yehoshuas claims are also insufficient: how is Judaism to
be fulfilled within Israeli reality? His own examples demonstrate the
extent of the difficulty: are battle ethics, for example, a Jewish issue at
all, and what are the Jewish values that underscore a prison wardens
proper behavior?
The weaknesses inherent in the option of Judaism as culture
stem not only from the problems exhibited by certain specific ideas;
more serious problems are linked to its essence. The main point of
this option lies in the effort to extricate the contents of Judaism from
their religious meaning; it proposes a mixed bag of interpretations for
these contents: from the search for a secular meaning of the religious
symbols found in religious texts (birth, bar mitzvah, marriage and
death) to the literary interpretation of the chapters of the Bible. The
strong rejection of these religious contents, which is the basic premise
of the Judaism as culture approach, is deficient in three points. First,
as we have learned from works written by sociologists of religion in
the last decades, and from the debated of the secularization thesis,
religions have not disappeared; indeed, they are widespread across
Western societies. In spite of the criticism of religion and the decline
in the status of religious authorities, people are in need of religious
symbols in order to express their deepest inner being. Rewriting
Judaism as a human creation amounts to erasing these vital meanings.
Second, the spiritual assets of the Jewish people are for the most part
religious; these contents are not perceived from within as a cultural
work, as a whole whose main value is contemplative and aesthetic.
The self-perceptions of these contents are religious; they testify to
the will of God rather than to the acts of creative persons. In other
words, the attempt to conceptualize Judaism as a culture implies a
46
the negation of
Judaismmeets with another difficulty: the distancing from Judaism
is foreign to the tendencies found within Israeli society. According to the
Guttman Institute reports, Israel is one of the most traditional Western
societies; thus, intellectuals who call for divorcing Israeli society from
Judaism are estranged from the fundamental tendencies rooted in
the society. We can see this not only in the ideas of the Canaanite
Movement and the reaction to them, but more recently, in the protest
brought forth in the articles of Bareli and Ofir: the latter condemns the
attachment felt by the majority of the Jewish public for the Passover
Haggadah, the prayer book and the Yom Kippur Mahzor; Bareli, for his
part, objects to the rapidly spreading study of religious texts among
secular people. The phenomena opposed by these intellectuals are the
reflection of a shared tendencythe secular publics search for its
religious roots without renouncing its secular identity.
Spiritual Secularism, the third option described above, seems to
present an advantage over the two other approaches: it enables secular
people to express their values and fulfill their lifestyle without negating
the religious meaning of Jewish tradition; it somehow manages to
bring together secularism and Judaism as a religious tradition. This
70
Strong formulations of this type of criticism, although slightly different from those
brought here, can be found in Kurzweil, Ahad Haam.
47
For example, Eliezer Schweid, Avraham Shapira and the Shdemot Circle.
For example, when he explains that those possessing an atheistic conception have no
internal relation to society or to nature. In an article written on the 50th anniversary of
Gordons death, he remarks that work, and especially agriculture, has two important
elements in the internal life of man: the conquest of the universe and the merging into
the universe. Tadmor, The Divine in Man, p. 165.
51
-----------------------------Chapter II -----------------------------------
Why Spinoza?
--------------------------------------------------------------------- Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------
One should not interpret the focus on Spinoza* as indicating that his
thought alone can contribute to the discussion of the problems of
secularism; in 17th-century philosophy, there are various formulations
of secular theologies that introduce the notion of individual salvation
independent of divine truth. These philosophical approaches can
provide an interesting perspective for examining the problems faced by
secularism at any time and in any context. This is the case with Kants
definition of enlightenment and in his views on establishing ethics
through religion; it is also the case with Mills and Rousseaus political
ideas. Our preference of Spinozas notions for our discussion has both
historical and philosophical reasons. The historical reasons lie in the
unique cultural context in which his thought developed. Judaism and
Jews occupy a special place in his world, while he himself has played
a unique role in Jewish consciousness in recent generations: Spinoza
is the person who endless numbers of Jewish heretics, lost souls,
free people, secularists and nationalists have turned to in order to
define their individual identity, as well as the ever-changing identity of
their people.1 In other words, his thought is intimately linked to the
problems of Israeli secular society, although this does not imply that it is
philosophically privileged in any way. This claim must be demonstrated
by examining Spinozas thought, which is the aim of following chapters.
I quote from Spinozas Ethics with the common abbreviations; I use page numbers
from other books by Spinoza as they appear in the quotations.
Naturally, Nietzsches thought has been another important philosophical reference for
secular Jews in their attempt to solve various questions of identity. Nietzsches impact
on Hebrew culture and Jewish intellectuals is discussed by Golomb, Nietzsche.
55
4
5
6
7
For an interesting analysis of Spinoza, his Jewishness, and its significance, see an early
article by Leo Strauss: Strauss, Early Writings, pp. 216-223.
This is only a partial list. The following people also felt a strong attachment to Spinozas
thought: Albert Einstein, Henri Bergson, Sigmund Freud, Heinrich Heine, as well as
leaders of the Religious Zionist Movement. Several examples of researches dealing with
Spinozas impact on Jewish thinkers are: Schwartz, Religious Zionism; Goetschel, Heine;
Goetschel, Modernity; Yakira, Strauss; Melamed, Maimon; Motzkin, Luzzatto; Kaplan,
Freud; Lachover, Haskalah; Levy, The Notion of Judaism; and Navon, Herman Cohen.
Sokolov, Spinoza and his Time; Klatzkin, The Life of Spinoza.
See the note that introduces the Hebrew translation of Spinozas Theological-Political
Treatise, opening page.
See for example Strauss, Early Writings, 216-223..
Weiler, Theocracy, p. XIV.
56
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
26
ideas, as well as the nurturing of desirable beliefs; they are not limited
to the clarification of the possible means of control of the uneducated
mob lacking in any spiritual dimension, as we find in Plato.
Since these questionsexistential distress and the question
of the massesform the basis of Spinozas philosophy, it can be
linked to two models of secularism. The first model could be entitled
metaphysical secularism. This system comprises the terminology and
the approaches which Spinoza develops throughout the Ethics, and
through which he suggests a full alternative to religion: the personal
God, which stands at the heart of the revelatory religions, is replaced
by an infinite substance. This concept of God is totally purified of any
concrete cultural or religious aspect. The other key religious concepts
are similarly purified: destiny and divine Providence are replaced by
the conatus and by an infinite chain of causes expressing the necessary
actualization of the substance. The philosophers life is secular in the
sense that his knowledge is founded on the rejection of all revelatory
and historical religions; the philosopher sticks to a logical-philosophical
analysis that reveals his existence within the divine and the moral and
political conclusions that derive from such an analysis.
Spinozas interest in the question of the masses does not enable
him to suffice with this model of the abandon of revelatory religions.
Those who are able to behave in such a way are those who follow the
directives of reason. Spinoza often emphasizes how rare such people
are, and that society as a whole cannot be expected to act this way.27
The difference mentioned above between Platos view of the masses and
that of Spinoza is relevant once more. Plato does not view the masses
as people who need to get their spiritual life adjusted, but rather as a
mob, frantically acting out their desires, who it is essential to suppress
in order to create a united society whose pieces fit; the philosopher
becomes king, since the masses serve mainly as objects to be controlled
rather than liberated. Thus, the crux of the political problem in The
Republic is the portrayal of the image of the ruler. Spinoza, on the other
hand, apprehends the masses as possessing reason, albeit of a lesser
degree and needing to be regulated. The aim of political philosophy is to
27
28
29
30
66
I. Non-reflective consciousness
and the image of the dream :
the epistemological aspect
Spinoza presents his epistemological theory in the TdIE, in his Short
Article on God, Man and his Happiness (henceforth: KV) and in the Ethics.2
He describes the various levels of knowledge and provides examples of
them. The first level of knowledge is based on the perception of single
1
The issue of imagination is often discussed in the interpretation of Spinoza. See, for
example: Raven, Tradition; Blair, Imagination; De Deugd, Imagination; Garret, Truth and
Imagination; and Preus, Spinoza and Vico.
Particularly in E 2p40s2; E 2p41-43; TdIE in its entirety, where the degrees of
knowledge are discussed in pp. 8-12.
69
4
5
8
9
10
E 2p40s2. On the difference between Spinoza and Plato in the understanding of the
imagination, see De Deugd, Imagination, p. 22.
TdIE, p. 8; KV, Part II, Chapters 1 and 2.
Idea ficta, idea falsa and idea dubia are all opposed to idea vera. Joachim, TdIE,
Chapter4, calls these types pseudo-cognitive types. De Deugd, Imagination., p. 69,
rightly criticizes this attempt.
There is a difference between the Ethics and the position expressed in the TdIE. The
approach expressed in the latter is closer to the first degree of knowledge, whereas in
the Ethics, it is closer to the third degree. The question as to how a person can surpass
the third degree of knowledge is discussed in De Deugd, Imagination, p. 185.
Spinozas use of this term (for example, in E 1p28s), makes it clear that he refers to
God.
TdIE, p. 9; Joachim, TdIE, p. 47.
TdIE, p. 8-9.
Ibid., p. 9-10; E 2p40s2.
70
11
12
13
14
15
For the possible sources of Spinozas epistemology, see Wolfson, Spinoza, vol. II,
Chapter 16, particularly p. 132, where he claims that Spinoza adopts Saadia Gaons
understanding of the term auditory knowledge, i.e. what becomes known through
hearsay. However, contrary to Saadia Gaon, for Spinoza this represents the lowest
degree of knowledge, and is illegitimate from a philosophical point of view.
At this point, the reader may rightly wonder what a non-reflective idea refers to.
Indeed, every idea contains some degree of reflectivity, or else one would not be able
to describe it in terms of cognitive activity. The answer must take into consideration
the possible centers of reflection rather than its degree alone and the means of
confirmation included in the idea. This point will be clarified in the next chapter.
Spinoza uses few images, and he certainly does not grant them any special status in
the development of his thoughts, as Plato does in The Phaedrus, for example; thus if
this image recurs, there must be good reason for it.
TdIE, p. 24, note 1.
Ibid., p. 25.
71
21
KV, p. 163.
TTP, pp. 13-16.
I will revert to this topic in Chapter 4, section 5, and Chapter 5, section 2.
TdIE, p. 8.
De Deugd, Imagination, p. 22; such a claim corresponds to De Deugds main tendency,
which involves identifying the epistemic value of the first level of knowledge (see, for
example, pp. 51-52).
E 2p49s: When we say that a man rests in false ideas, and does not doubt them, we do
not, on that account, say that he is certain, but only that he does not doubt, or that he
rests in false ideas because there are no causes to bring it about that his imagination
wavers . See also E 2p44s.
72
E 5p42s.
Spinozas formulation in this concluding paragraph of the Ethics is very important. Two
things can be said about the text at this point: 1. In this paragraph, Spinoza draws a
comparison between the ignorant and the wise man and describes their situation while
reverting twice, and in the same order, to the objects of their consciousness (sui, Dei,
rerum). The special position of this concluding paragraph and the exact and frequent
repetition of these words grant them special importance. From an ontological point of
view, the words should open with God and not with the self; Spinoza, however, opens
in this way in order to point to the reflective dimension of knowledge. This reflective
dimension does not refer only to the internal mode of consciousness; it necessarily
depends on the distinction of the external context. Therefore, the self is emphasized,
while in the same breath it is repeatedly recognized in things and in the divinitythis
time, of course, in proper order. 2. The ignorant is called ignarus, while his lack of
self-consciousness is indicated by the words quasi inscius sui. The words inscius sui,
as far as I know, is not found in classical Latin. Even if this is not an innovation of
Spinozas, this non-classical, new meaning of self-awareness, a form of subjectivity,
is emphasized by the use of quasi. Self-consciousness is also emphasized here by the
73
24
25
26
27
28
29
pronoun in a reflective form and by the fact that Spinoza speaks of the absence of
knowledge differently from the way he refers to the ignorant.
See Gilad, Method, pp. 91-92. This is discussed at length there. On this point, Spinozas
claim in the TdIE, p. 37 is of great importance: For the latter [from eternal things] are
all by nature simultaneous.
The epistemological ideal of Descartess clear and distinct refers to synthesis because
the knowledge of something implies the exposure of its causal context and the
presence of its limits. The difference between Descartes and Spinoza which I remarked
above is particularly relevant to the claim regarding the cogito: Descartes points to the
I as a thing whose necessary existence is detached from any context.
See note 23; compare: Hallett, Spinoza, p. 66.
E 5p29s.
TdIE, p. 19.
For example, E 5p30,31; E 5p11,12. Such examples are found on nearly every page
of the Ethics. The use of these conjunctive adverbs (together and separately) is more
complex, as is indicated, for example, in Cassels dictionary.
74
30
31
TTP, p. 3.
Platos images of philosophy as a form of awakening are also applicable to Spinozas
philosophy. The non-philosophical person is caught in a deluding web of sleep; thus,
imagination characterizes the cognitive activity of the masses.
75
33
but even act as hindrances, not infrequently causing the death of those
who possess them.34 These things that only seemingly satisfy the mind
are Richness, Fame, and the Pleasures of Senses.35 The mind becomes
totally addicted to these pleasures, and is loath to give up what is
certain for something that is still uncertain,36 i.e. to prefer an unknown
pleasure over a known pleasure. However, once the mind has achieved
satisfaction it is followed by extreme melancholy, whereby the mind,
though not enthralled, is disturbed and dulled.37 In other words, the
situation of the mind is that of someone unable to subdue his desires and
hence is depressed due to his dissatisfaction. The turbulencebetween
uncontrollable desires and their pointlessnessonly illustrates what
Spinoza often points to as the telltale sign of mans distress: confusion,
running around between opposite excitations, living between hope and
fear, and not knowing the external reasons; like waves on the sea,
driven by contrary winds, we toss about, not knowing our outcome and
fate.38 At the beginning of the TdIE, he compares this existence to the
situation of a sick man struggling with a deadly disease.39
Life experience acquaints all men with this inconsistencyeven
those who do not know themselves.40 This is thus a starting point for
philosophical analysis rather than a conclusion that emerges from that
analysis. In the course of his psychological discussions in the Ethics,
particularly in Book III, Spinoza describes this inconsistency in what
can be called phenomenological terms; he also explains it and the
suffering it involves. It is important to recall that the aim of Spinozian
philosophy is not only to save man from the turbulence of his mind,
but also to grant these phenomena a comprehensive articulation. This
task is not a means only; it is an issue in itself. In the next section, we
will discuss this in greater depth. At this point, we should simply recall
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
TdIE, p. 5.
Ibid, p. 3.
Ibid, p. 6.
Ibid, p. 4.
E 3p59s. The masses (vulgus, multitude, plebs) are characterized by inconsistency, an
addiction to passions, foolishness and feelings of inferiority. Spinoza refers to this
repeatedly in his writings: see TTP, pp. 13, 57, 77, 81-82.
TdIE, p. 5.
TTP, p.3.
77
that human faults are not, in Spinozas eyes, disabilities that must be
erased at once; they are necessary expressions of divine multiplicity.41
This approach determines the non-judgmental tone that characterizes
his analyses of human weaknesses and ailments. One example of this
is his famous claim that he would seek to examine human feelings as
people look at lines and volumes.42 The main point in this statement
is not the assertion of a logical and alienated analysis, as might be
understood, but the emphasis on the suspension of judgment and the
full commitment towards understanding people as they are, with all
their weaknesses and in all their wretchedness.43
The reasons for the inconsistency of the mind and for its sufferings
can only be fully apprehended within the framework of Spinozian
ontology,44 the starting point of such an analysis being the conatus.
The striving towards existence, as commentators rightly emphasize,
is a dynamic act between what strives towards existence and what is
outside its realm.45 At the beginning of Book III of the Ethics, Spinoza
presents some of its basic rules: something can only be destroyed by
an external cause,46 and The striving by which each thing strives to
persevere in its being involves no finite time, but an indefinite time
(indefinitum).47 From that point on, particularly from Proposition 14 in
Book III onwards, it becomes clear that the way emotions exist in the
mind depends on the way external things impact on it. The structure
of emotions, as revealed in Spinozas theory of the affects, is antipodic.
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
The first book of the Ethics concludes with the following topic: to the question why
God did not create all men so that they would be governed by the command of reason,
he answers as follows: because he did not lack material to create all things, from the
highest degree of perfection to the lowest.
E 3pr.
This approach characterizes Spinozas thought in other places as well. At the beginning
of the TP, he criticizes the philosophers who in his view apprehend people not as they
are, but as they themselves would like them to be (TP, p.287). Spinozas approach is
based on his doing away with normative behavior, which characterizes weaknesses as
bad or wrong. See E 3pr and note 41 above.
This topic will also be discussed in later chapters.
Hallett, Spinoza, Chapter 4; see also Lloyd, Nature, from p. 13 onwards, including a
comparison with Leibniz and Descartes.
E 3p4.
E 3p8.
78
Sadness and happiness, and all the other emotions that are defined
in relation to them, are perceived with the aid of the conatus, based
on their capacity to strengthen or weaken existence. The main concept
used in this analysis is association, the general mechanism of which is
outlined in Proposition 14: If the mind has once been affected by two
emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected
by one of the two, also be affected by the other.48 The explanation
provided as proof is based on the fact that man apprehends the outside
world through himself; the activation of external bodies tell us more
about our own bodies than about these external bodies. The two types
of impression become indistinguishable as they are apprehended by
the body, and become linked to one another. This associative aspect
is therefore a basic expression of mans egocentric existence, of the
distorted prominence of his body and of his entire individuality as the
main medium through which things appear.49
Associativity, the mechanism of linking random things analyzed
throughout Book III expands continually as per its nature, thereby
turning man into a hyper-sensitive creature that is continuously tossed
about. The untrammeled spreading of associations stems first of all
from the nature of imaginationit places in the present an idea that
does not exist, and renders it present.50 Therefore, the impact of a thing
is not limited to the present: Man is affected with the same affect of joy
or sadness from the image of a past or future thing as from the image
of a present thing.51 Since the image of a thing comprises its existence,
as often as we recollect a thingeven though it does not actually
existwe still regard it as present, and the body is affected in the same
way.52 The random and fragmented perception of the imagining person
48
49
50
51
52
A similar principle is formulated in E 2p18: If the human body has once been affected
by two or more bodies at the same time, then when the mind subsequently imagines
one of them, it will immediately recollect the others also.
See Halletts description of mans egocentrism in Spinoza, p. 65. He is absorbed by the
temporary existence of things and does not observe their eternal status. This implies
mental poverty, and mans imposing himself upon nature and divorcing it from the
rest of mankind. See also De Deugd, Imagination, p. 62.
E 2p17d, cd.
E 3p18.
E 3p47s; E 3p36; E 3p36d.
79
57
E 3p27.
E 3p27s.
E 2p17.
E 3p23. In the note to this proposition, it is indicated that this happiness can hardly
be stable (vix solida).
E 3p46.
80
fear because one of them is violent); it also means that our feelings will
be more intense and conflicting. If we love something that someone
else loves, we love is all the more stably; likewise, if we love something
that someone we hate loves, we will suffer from the minds agitation.58
In other words, the associative model of the imagining
consciousness, or of the tossing about of the mind, is disseminated as
a result of the possibility of rendering present non-existing ideas in
the imagination and due to their epidemic-like transitivity: Anything
whatever can be the accidental cause of hope or fear.59 They result in
the mind being tossed about endlessly, since there is no hope without
fear, and no fear without hope.60 All this can be summarized as follows:
the associative tendency of consciousness is the result of egocentrism.
The arbitrary collection of ideas is possible due to this principle: the
impressions left by two bodies are linked to one another because they
are contained among the impressions of the apprehending body, which
becomes more influential than the impressions of the two separate
bodies.
There is one important general point which we may learn from
the associative pattern; it is formulated in clear terms in the note
to Proposition 32, in Book III. Spinoza explains, following a long
discussion on associations, that experience teaches us that our existence
is similar to that of children, as they laugh or cry simply because
they see others laughing or crying; moreover, they desire forthwith
to imitate whatever they see others doing, and to possess themselves
whatever they conceive as delighting others. What is striking in
this comparison to children is the aspect of passive existence in the
imagination. Another point expressed in this comparisonwhich is
of interest to us at presentis the childs domination of the world.
58
59
60
E 3p31.
E 3p50.
E 3p50s. These claims, which bear rich existential significance, stem from the
definitions of the basic terms which they employ. As mentioned in E 3p18s2, hope is
an unstable form of happiness, which stems from image we have of something in the
future or in the past which we are uncertain about. Fear equals unstable sadness and
is described in identical terms. These passions are generated out of doubtful images,
and as such they also involve the opposite passions.
81
Just like the imagining person, the child cannot attain anything beyond
himself. Anything outside himself must be absorbed by himthis we
learned from the discussion on the strengthening of the associative
model. The networks of associations to be found everywhere mean that
we project ourselves more and more onto the world. Naturally, this
projection is not an expansion but a distortion. The associative model
thus sheds light on the nature of egocentrism: the false attribution of
things to the individual distorts the external world, while at the same
time conceals its separate existence. Egocentrism and the associations
it entails do not represent an imaginary empowerment because of the
assimilation of the world, but rather something akin to diffusion.61 In
order to understand the extent of this diffusion, we must recall that
due to the level of knowledge of the masseswho live in imagination
and follow its callingsman has no clear notion either of his body
nor of external bodies: so long as the human mind perceives things
from the common order of Nature, it does not have an adequate, but
only a confused and mutilated knowledge of itself, of its own body,
and of external bodies. 62 Following these words, he writes that we
do not possess a proper consciousness of the body but only of bodily
impressions that involve the ideas of external things. Since we possess
no proper consciousness of them, we possess a clear consciousness
neither of our minds nor of our bodies.
In order to understand the irrational meaning of imagination and
of the associative pattern, we must recall that within the framework
of Spinozas thought. The explanations we provided for associativity
cannot rely on the assumptions usually attributed to it. For in common
senseas well as in the history of philosophy, as perceived by Hume,
for examplethe association is understood based on causal relations
between bodies and ideas. The relation among ideas in the mind is the
result of the accidental encounter of their physical objects. In Spinozas
philosophy, the parallel attributes does not account for the arbitrary
union of ideas by way of a causal link between them and their physical
objects. In Spinozas thought, the gathering of the components linked
61
62
Compare: Joachim, Ethics, p. 160ff. and Gilad, Method, p. 185, on Joachims remarks.
E 2p29c.
82
------III. Inconsistency, conformism and hostility in the life of the masses ------
E 3p29. In the note at the bottom of the page, Spinoza mentions that he refers to
the following people: By men in this and the following propositions, I mean men
whom we regard without any particular emotion (affectu nullo). Raven, Tradition, p.
319 describes this sentence as the general rule of social conformism.
83
65
------III. Inconsistency, conformism and hostility in the life of the masses ------
66
67
of reason and does away with the lies and foolishness of the religions of revelation.
The masses, for their part, are guided by manipulations and imitations; their lives are
not based on any dimension of independent spiritual life; they are tamed.
See note 23 above.
A combination similar to that between conformism and instability is found in
imagination, from an epistemological point of view. On the one hand, imagination is
influenced only by individual things and bodies (TdIE, p. 31: The imagination is only
affected by particular things). The sense-related and private nature of imagination is
also obvious in Spinozas remarks on the contents of the prophets, in TTP, pp. 3032.
85
68
69
70
------III. Inconsistency, conformism and hostility in the life of the masses ------
71
72
73
74
E 3p32s.
E 5p29s.
Hallett, Spinoza, Chapter 1
E 4p67.
87
75
76
77
78
As emphasized in E 4p30ff.
For example: E 1p17cs; E 1p33s2.
E 1p28.
E 1p18,p26,p28.
88
------III. Inconsistency, conformism and hostility in the life of the masses ------
89
----------------------------Chapter IV ----------------------------------
Political Secularism
-------------------------------------------------------------Politacal secularism-------------------------------------------------------------
Politacal secularism
In his writings, particularly in the Ethics and in the TTP, Spinoza
questions religious authority1: the Ethics are fraught with remarks on
the false concepts of revelatory religions. The attribution of freedom
and spontaneity to the Divinity, miracles and miraculous apparitions,
the distinction between will and intellect, Gods personalized
image
On the link between Spinozas view of religion and the religious ideas found in his
surroundings, see: Popkin, The Study of the Bible; Popkin, Fisher; Popkin, Quakers;
Hunter, Radicalism; Nadler, Biography, particularly Chapter 7.
For example, E 1p15s; E 1p17cs2; E 1p33s2.
93
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------Politacal secularism-------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
clear in the discussion. The first part of the chapter (sections 1-4) will
deal with the first two principles, while the second part (sections 5
and 6) will deal with the latter principlesthe meaning of the flexible
forms of reformed religion, and the clarification of its forms in the
consciousness of the masses, as well as its political significance.
I. Undermining religion
Much of Spinozas efforts in the TTP are devoted to a subversive reading
of the Scriptures. His arguments, based upon philological analyses, will
not be examined here; for our purposes, we will simply indentify the
trends present in the analysis and their aims. The most obvious is the
de-canonization of the Scriptures. Spinoza indicates that Scripture
consists of a variety of different books, of different periods and for
different men, and compiled by a variety of authors.5 These writings
are written by a large number of men, of different temperaments
and at different times.6 This de-canonization not only identifies the
multiplicity of sources in the text, but enquires into the process by
which the sacred canon was accepted. At the end of the discussion
on the authors of the Old Testament, Spinoza writes: It very clearly
follows from this that the learned in the Law called together a council
to determine what kind of books should be received as sacred and
which should be excluded. Hence, anyone desirous of being sure about
the authority of them all must go through the entire deliberative
process afresh seeking justification for each of them.7 In other words,
the sacredness of the text is not inherent, but the outcome of human
decisions. The way to establish the authority of the books of scripture
is by examining justification for each of them.
His clarification concerning the difference between his claim and
the position of lay people (profani) helps us in understanding his aim:
I admit that some impious persons who find religion a burden, may
discern an excuse for wrongdoing here and may infer, without any
5
6
7
TTP, p. 188.
Ibid., p. 178.
Ibid., p. 154.
97
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
8
9
10
11
Ibid., p. 164.
Ibid., pp. 164-165.
Ibid., p.10.
Ibid., p. 245.
98
is clear to all: the power of the religious figures over the masses poses a
continuous threat to the State. The way to overcome this is by clarifying
the political principle according to which the authority of the State
extends to religious matters, rather than political issues alone. Those
who insist upon leaving the religious power in the hands of religious
authorities [are] attempting to divide the government. Conflict and
discord [] will inevitably ensue and will never be resolved.12 To this,
we should add something that was not clearly stated, but which derives
logically from the above: within the context of the beginnings of the
modern State, the realization of the principle of a united political
power calls for the weakening of religious figures.13 The stronger their
status, the harder it is to undermine their authority and transfer it
into the hands of the political body. One effective way of weakening
this type of power is by nurturing a popular relationship to the spirit
of the Holy Scriptures.
This view of de-canonizationthe nurturing of a popular trend
in order to establish the unity of the political poweris only partial.
Two issues that are intertwined with it remain to be clarified: that the
establishment of political power is a means of rationalizing society and
improving it; and that religion is necessary to assure the stability of
political power, which alone can assure the rationalization of society.
These two topics will be discussed in the next two sections.
Ibid., p. 245.
Naturally, there is a big difference between the period in which Spinoza is thinking his
thoughts and our time. Spinoza expresses the hardships faced by the modern state
striving to stabilize its new authority opposite forces that are more deeply rooted. He
did not foresee a modern State with all its strengths, including the power to threaten
political freedom.
99
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
grind, cook, weave and sew for himself as well as doing the many other
things that are needed to sustain life.14 They most certainly would be
unable to fulfill their spiritual needs, i.e. the arts and sciences, which
are also supremely necessary to the perfection of human nature and its
happiness.15 Without a political body, men are condemned to a life of
misery, which Spinoza describes in very strong terms: wretched and
brutish lives.16 This degraded life is the lot of the lonely individual,
who is portrayed as living outside society. The gathering of men
involves dangers and fearthe background to this is detailed in the
third section of the previous chapter. Political power is indispensible
in order to prevent people from harming each other, and to keep the
incontrollable passions of the members of the masses in check.17 If they
remain alonewhich is not perceived as a real possibilitythey live
like beasts; if they come together in a disorderly way, they live within
their imaginations, deeply involved in their passions and at odds with
each other. Whether alone or as a horde, people actually live alone.
Their genuine cohesion and the appearance of a safe and nurtured life
call for the presence of an external and common authority.
All human beings tend to accept this type of authority. Whether
barbarous or civilized, they create a political situation.18 They do
not accept it as a result of rational recommendations; rather, we can
deduce this from the general nature or position of mankind.19 At
the beginning of the PT, we find a longer, albeit no more detailed
explanation, in which Spinoza indicates that the public strives to be led
naturally,20 i.e. through a common passion, such as common hope, or
fear, or the desire of avenging some common hurt.21 Towards the end
of this explanation, Spinoza adds: But since fear of solitude exists in all
men, because no one in solitude is strong enough to defend himself, and
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
TTP, p. 72.
Ibid., p. 72.
Ibid., p. 72. On p. 197, it is written as follows: without mutual help [] human beings
necessarily live in great misery.
Ibid., pp. 72-73.
TP, p. 290.
Ibid., p. 290.
Ibid., p. 316.
Ibid., p. 316.
100
the
former and the latter represent opposite and necessary manifestations
of the fundamental passivity of life in the imagination. Identifying
these tendencies, as I have already indicated in the previous chapter,
is the basis for the sensitivity in Spinozas thought to authority and
its fragility.23
For Spinoza, as has already been pointed out, political authority
is the means towards the rationalization of society. The term
rationalization refers to two things: first of all, the fundamental
role of political power is to ensure a rational regularization, the aim
of which is to organize the life of the public whose members cannot
be saved from themselves or from their imagining consciousnesses. If
men were able to behave rationally rather than to follow their passions,
political power would be superfluous.24
22
23
24
Ibid., p. 316.
In the TTP, p. 211, Spinoza writes at length about the vulnerability of the political
power. He starts with a detailed description of the unstable character of the masses,
and then claims They have never succeeded in devising a form of government that
was not in greater danger from its own citizens than from foreign foes, and which was
not more fearful of the former than of the latter
TP, p. 316.
101
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
Political power is the medium or the basis for improving the life
of the masses. Rationalization does designate a utopian model, but
also the concrete possibility of perfecting collective and private life and
molding them in accordance with more rational patterns. In this, it is
infinitely more successful than religious power. In any case, Spinoza
does not try to impose an ideal political model on society. In addition
to the supra-temporal ontological context that characterizes his political
observations, those observations are also continuously linked to the
context of a given collective,25 their main point being the attempt to
improve it. The processual nature of rationalization and the entire
rational approach of Spinozas political observation are found throughout
the PT. In a more complex way, they also determine Spinozas analysis
as it appears in the TTP. Naturally, these claims need to be clarified and
justified, as we will discuss further in the current section.
Secondly, the rationality of political power is perceptible not only
through its aim, but also through its basic pattern of behavior. This
pattern is based on the understanding of the consciousness of the
members of society, i.e. of the mentality of the masses and the nature of
its causality. In other words, the cognitive and psychological limitations
of the masses are the basic data in the foundation of authority. The
psychological law that serves to establish such authority is stated in E
4p7: An affect cannot be restrained or taken away except by an affect
opposite to, and stronger than, the affect to be restrained.26 How did
this become the basis for the rational action of the authority in power?
Insofar as this authority claims the right to pass judgment on good and
evil, it holds the power to impose life in common. Moreover, it does not
do so in an ineffective mannerby seducing people into believing in
the necessity of the authority and the need to obey itbut through
threats and promises, i.e. by employing a contradictory and sufficiently
strong passion. The rationality of power refers here to its basis in the
order and laws of the consciousness of the masses.27
25
26
27
This relative proximity to the socio-political context of the time is also perceptible in
the impact of the special status of the emerging modern State in Spinozas thought,
as stated in note 13.
See also E 4p17.
Religion too functions on the basis of threats and promises of rewards. The sovereign
102
28
29
30
political power is more rational than religion, not because it makes use of this
psychological rule, but given the nature of its aims.
TTP, p. 200.
Ibid., p. 201: a subject is one who does by command of the sovereign what is useful
for the community and consequently also for himself.
As mentioned earlier, the danger faced by the individual as a result of the centralized
power of the State is not discussed in Spinozas essays. On the State in Spinozas
political philosophy, see: Dan Oyl, Power; Feuer, Liberalism; Gildin, A Political Problem;
Hallett, Spinoza, Chapter 11; and De Deugd, Political-Theological.
103
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
32
33
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
36
37
38
39
40
TTP, p. 194: Everyone without exception can obey, not merely the very fewvery
few, that is, in comparison with the whole human racewho acquire the habit of
virtue by the guidance of reason alone. The term salvation refers to a life of simple
obedience or the adoption of good attributes.
Ibid., p. 194.
Ibid., p. 184.
This image is commonly found among Israeli commentators: Englard, Law; Ravitzky,
Models. Israeli commentators are of particular importance, as they have been vital in
the creation of the images suggested by Spinoza for the relations between religion and
the State, and in order to understand his approach to religion in general.
TTP, p. 238: God has no special kingdom among men except through those who
exercise sovereignty.
Ibid., p. 240.
107
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
also the duty of the sovereign authority alone to lay down how a person
should behave with piety towards their neighbour, that is, to determine
how one is obliged to obey God.41
Thus, the sovereign political power expresses the moral aspect of
obeying God. There is no hierarchy between the State and religion; the
sovereign political power and its rules, which determine right and wrong,
become established because they are faithful to the fundamental spirit of
religion. One very important question concerns the nature of this spirit,
and how it is presented by Spinoza in his analyses. Without clarifying
this, his claims will remain too abstract. From what has been said to
this point, it is clear that the political power clearly has no intention
of rejecting or uprooting religion, but seeks its assistance and adapts
it to the sovereignty of the State, and that the general justification for
this transcends the limitations of Spinozas time and place. It lies in
the recognition of the power of religious contents to determine mens
moral conduct and in the recognition that nothing can replace religion
in playing this role. The political powers reliance on religion harnesses
images and deeply-rooted concepts that call forth obedience in the aim
of organizing social life and establishing its authority. This recruiting
of religious images and concepts is also vital in order to guarantee the
validity of state law. Religious affairs are likely to be determined by
people, based on their individual and distorted interpretations, thereby
granting validity to their taking exception to state laws. The authority
of the State over matters of religion will prevent this and enable it to
establish these laws as a common basis for all.42
A key concept in understanding the role of religion is expressed
by the words sovereign spirit or one spirit, so to speak (una veluti
mens), which appears throughout the TP and, to a lesser extent, in
the Ethics.43 These words point to a unity and to a vague concept of
spirit. What are the mental contents of this spirit? In what way does
unity imply its existence? Spinoza makes a point of reiterating them
together, rather than explaining them. For example, peoples desire to
41
42
43
TP, p. 316.
E 4p18s (ut omnium mentes et corpora unam quasi mentem, unumque corpus component.)
E 4ap15.
See notes 23 & 30 above.
TP, p. 309.
109
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
50
51
TTP, p. 225: Nature certainly does not create people, individuals do, and individuals
are only separated into nations by differences of language, law and morality. It can
only be from these latter factors, namely law and morality, that each nation has its
unique character, its unique condition, and its unique prejudices.
E 2d7.
Joachim, Ethics, p. 125.
110
and the images that make any human being obey form the vital basis
for the existence of a common force of action. Thus, the presence of
a tradition of such shared images is important for the existence of a
society as a specific entity.
Until this point, we have seen that political secularism is based on
the shaping of human life within a sovereign political authority. This
authority does not render the social function of religious tradition
superfluous, but needs to reconstruct it. The second principle of political
secularism, as recalled at the beginning of this chapteraccording to
which religious tradition is necessary in order to establish a political
order and ensure its stabilitybecomes clear to us only from the
outside, at this point: we have become more aware of its importance
for Spinoza than of its significance. It has become clear to us that this
political secularism should not be assimilated with some extreme form
of secularism, which Spinoza was prevented from expressing fully
due to the limitations of the time and place in which he lived. The
logic of his thought stands in opposition to the rejection of religion
and its concepts. From what has been said in the last paragraphs, we
understand that religionmore specifically the spirit of religion or
soft religion, whose nature we have yet to clarifyis essential for the
strengthening of ethics, for the appearance of one spirit, so to speak,
and in order to guarantee a societys individuation. However, what is
the role of religious tradition in the cultural-political approach, which
we have called here political secularism? Before we answer this,what
exactly are the flexible shapes of religion, and in what way do they
nurture the sovereign power? We will answer these questions in the
next two sections. In the fifth section, we will outline the main points
of the desired religious tradition, while in the sixth, we will explain
how such a tradition is likely to contribute to the establishment of the
political authority.
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
52
53
54
55
Geertz, Islam.
TTP, p. 248.
Ibid., p. 249.
Ibid., p. 169.
112
Ibid., p. 170.
Ibid., p. 105.
TTP, p. 105: For it could never have been of any use to change a words meaning, but
113
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
59
60
it might quite often have been useful to someone to alter the meaning of a passage []
We are thus wholly convinced, for these and other reasons, that it could never have
entered into anyones head to corrupt a language but might certainly occur to someone
to misrepresent the meaning of a writer by doctoring his texts or interpreting them
wrongly. We can thus rely on tradition as for the meanings of the words, but we
cannot rely on tradition for their intentions as they appear in the Holy Scriptures.
Changing them will likely profit those who transmit the tradition over the generations.
TTP, p. 105.
Spinoza comes up with an interesting claim, according to which the meaning of words
is determined by their use, which is close to Wittgensteins approach. Words do not
have a permanent, essential meaning; they are part of peoples lifestyle. Language
changes as lifestyles change. TTP, p. 165: Words acquire a particular meaning simply
from their usage. Words deployed in accordance with this usage in such a way that,
on reading them, people are moved to devotion will be scared words, and any book
written with words so used will also be sacred.
114
62
TTP, p. 170: It remains, then, indisputable that this is what Scripture has always
taught and consequently that no error has occurred here affecting the sense, which
would not have been noticed at once by everybody. Nor could anyone have corrupted
it without immediately betraying his malicious intent. Therefore, there is no
distortion of the foundations: that God exist, that he provides for all things, that he
is omnipotent, that he has decreed that the pious will fare well and wrongdoers badly,
and that our salvation depends upon His grace alone.
TP, p. 342.
115
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
by means of the greatest of evils. But the perpetual refrain of those who
lust after absolute dominion is, that it is to the essential interest of the
commonwealth that its business to be secretly transacted, and other like
pretences, which end in the more hateful a slavery, the more they are
clothed with a show of utility.
64
65
As for the kind of freedom that Spinoza can ascribe to the masses, this will be discussed
at the end of this chapter and in the next chapter.
TP, p. 341.
In addition to other arguments. See note 32 above, as well as the discussion above.
116
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
TTP, p. 163.
Ibid., p. 163.
Ibid., p. 230. In my view, this should be considered as the background for Spinozas
deep interest in the Hebrew language. Commentators of his Hebrew grammar indicate
that the abstract principles which he attributes to itsuch as the priority of the
noun, for exampleare a reflection of his ontological distinctions. The question,
however, is why Spinoza had to formulate his metaphysical views through a grammar
book? Hadnt he succeeded in doing so in several of his books? Moreover, it is doubtful
that Spinoza, whose thought is marked by its tremendous empathyits desire to
devote itself entirely to the understanding of its nature and its objectshas to
violate linguistic categories in order to imbue them with metaphysical distinctions.
The methodical character which Spinoza attributes to the Hebrew language must be
understood in other terms; it is part of his efforts to erode the sanctified status of
the biblical text. This questioning also involves a change in the status of the Hebrew
language: it is no longer the language of God but that of men. Exposing its rules
throws light on its worldly and human nature. Spinozas thought not only marks the
onset of Biblical criticism, but also the project of the secularization of the Hebrew
language. Naturally, such claims need to be justified, and I hope to do so in a future
essay.
118
69
70
71
72
TTP, p. 77.
Ibid., pp. 78-79.
Ibid., pp. 77-78.
Ibid., p. 116.
119
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
belong to any public law or authority. For simplicity and truth of mind
are not instilled in men by the power of laws or by public authority,
and absolutely no one can be compelled to be happy by force of law.
It requires rather pious and fraternal advice, a proper upbringing and,
more than anything else, ones own free judgment.73
In order to better understand the claim that the divine word is
revealed in every mans heart, one must clarify the way God acts, as it
is described in the TTP, the aim of which is the development of popular
religion. In this text, Spinoza emphasizes Gods rational action in a
number of ways. Naturally, the context of the discussion prevents him
from discussing these topics in a through and precise way, as he does in
the Ethics. But even so, the necessary and rational actions of God are the
outstanding principles of His nature. Divine guidance is the fixed and
unalterable order of nature, whereas natural laws are nothing other
than the eternal decrees of God and always involve truth and necessity.74
One important detail in this context is the way God intervenes in
human affairs, as it appears in the TTP. Spinoza maintains something
of the significance of Gods humanized actions in the eyes of human
beingschoice, assistance, and providenceby granting them a
new meaning based on His actions, and regulated by eternal laws.
One example of this is the definition given to the word choice: For
given that nobody does anything except by the predetermined order
of nature, that is, by the eternal decree and direction of God, it follows
that no one chooses any way of life for himself nor brings anything
about, except via the particular summons of God, who chose this man
in preference to others for this task or that way of life.75 The fact that
God follows eternal law does not alienate him from the life of men and
their destiny. Mans special destinythe divine touch in his lifeare
not denied here; they are anchored in regularity. Thus, popular religion,
as it appears in the TTP, defines in its own way the finite-infinite status
of man. A general expression of this relation between God and mankind
is found in the fact that divine protection is determined by moral laws.
73
74
75
Ibid., p. 116. .
Ibid., pp. 44-45.
Ibid., p. 45.
120
Ibid., p. 77.
121
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
E 4p28 onwards.
122
TTP, p. 182.
123
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
Ibid., p. 178.
TP, p. 314.
TTP, p. 252.
E 4p54s.
See TP, pp. 295-296.
124
---------- VI. Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience-----------
the passive life of the masses, rendering them more active? In fact, in
considering the new religious feeling underlying Spinozas descriptions
of popular religion, at least as described so far,on what basis will it be
found in the consciousness of the masses? It seems that removing the
word of God from the authority of the specialists of the Holy Scriptures
somehow involves the intensification of ones life; however, how can
this intensification take place? Clearly in the masses, like in all that
exists in Spinozas ontology, there is a certain measure of activity.
What requires clarification is not the claim that the masses possess
the force to actthis is obvious; what does require some explanation
is the nature of what is attributed to the masses: what is the force
that underlies a suitable political life, one that can be shaped through
an appropriate religious tradition and which takes this lower level of
consciousness into consideration?
E 2p43s.
E 2p49.
125
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
---------- VI. Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience-----------
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
90
91
---------- VI. Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience-----------
93
This question can be answered as follows: the tentative tone which Spinoza adopts
when writing about theological ideas does not hint at the fact that obedience is
anchored in some other thing; it is one of his stratagems in expropriating these ideas
from the authority of religious figures and transferring them to the authority of the
individual, to the assent from the heart. In fact, in my understanding, this tentative
tone is one of Spinozas stratagems in questioning institutionalized religious authority.
This, however, is not all; this stratagem ends with obedience being part of the believers
assent from the heart. Spinozas sensitivity to the existence of a spiritual authority
and his awareness of the instability of the masses result in his claims finally leading to
the strengthening of some authority rather than to its undermining. In other words,
we are once again faced with the problem we started with: if we base obedience on a
source found within the member of the masses means, we must clarify the nature of
this source within and for the self. What can guarantee the presence of the spirit of
obedience beyond that is tentatively depicted in theological ideas? What is the basis
for building obedience on the judgment of the member of the masses? Could it be that
the spirit of obedience does not only derive from the content of the theological idea,
but also derives, somehow, from the epistemic status of such an idea?
E 2p49.
129
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
mind apprehends it. The second remark is as follows: nearly every single
idea can, in a specific context, guide conduct and contain commands.
However, this claim is irrelevant to our discussion, since the aim of
the distinction here is to emphasize the ideas that explicitly contain
commands as a fundamental manifestation of their contents, a type of
practical users manual, rather than instructions that may implicitly
be attributed to those ideas.94
Employing the distinction we just made, we may identify an
important means of expressing the approval of specific ideas, one
particularly relevant for the first degree of knowledge. This may be
easily seen by looking at the example brought by Spinoza in the TdIE
in order to distinguish between the various levels of knowledge. The
fact that a single example is used for all three degreesfinding the
fourth number within a proportional seriesemphasizes the fact that
the degree of knowledge is not determined based on the known object,
but rather on the way in which it is apprehended. The first degree of
knowledge is attributed to merchants, who are described as follows:
Tradesmen will at once tell us that they know what is required to find
the fourth number, for they have not yet forgotten the rule which was
given to them arbitrarily without proof by their masters.95 The next
example is of those who exhibit a slightly higher level of knowledge;
they (alii) are described thus: Others construct a universal axiom from
their experience with simple numbers, where the fourth number is self-
94
95
What we call here command depends to a certain extent on the context. The
knowledge that the dog is a barking animal is likely to guide my actions in certain
conditions. Generally speaking, every element of knowledge that is approved or
rejected by our consciousness impacts upon us in a certain way. This, however, does not
undermine the distinction suggested here between guiding ideas and theoretical
ideas. This distinction is based on the presence of a certain act that derives necessarily
from the content of the idea; it is not based on general knowledge that is likely to
guide our actions. Moreover, the member of the masses who believes in a moral order
that originates in the will of God is not primarily concerned with enquiring into the
nature of the moral act; rather, he adopts norms and patterns of specific moral acts in
accordance with the practice in his surroundings, and justifies them by claiming they
are is the will of God. Thus, very general theological ideas may be, in the terminology
I propose here, guiding ideas.
TdIE, p. 10.
130
---------- VI. Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience-----------
Ibid., p. 10.
Ibid., p. 10.
Ibid., p. 11.
131
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
100
101
102
Clearly, it is not only by making use of an idea from the imagination that we can
approve it (a horse with wings); it is also clear that adequate knowledge does not
change the use made of the idea, but rather substantiates it (a mathematician will
calculate a proportion just as a merchant would).
See note 12 in Chapter 3.
E 4p29s.
Here we witness Spinozas pre-modern character. The idealist idea developed by
Kant and in other ways by Nietzsche that the identity of an object depends on the
interpretation given it, is foreign to him.
132
---------- VI. Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience-----------
that is included in the mental act, in the idea. The degree of recognition
of the logical content of the idea, however, remains to be determined.
What we have said so far about guiding ideas will help us
understand the meaning of obedience. As I indicated above, in the
TTP, Spinoza does not analyze obedience in epistemological terms;
his considerations are essentially devoted to political issues. This
does not mean, however, that the epistemology he developed was not
present in dealing with theological-political issues. Thus, the mental
process of merchants can help us achieve a full understanding of the
epistemic aspect of obedience. Spinoza describes the masses thus: the
constancy of the common people is obstinacy, and that they are not
governed by reason [.]103 Since it is associated with the members of
these masses, obedience does not result from their understanding of
the logical contents included in the idea, but rather is an expression of
their acceptance of it.104 The person making use of the theological idea
and who follows the commands it conveys conducts himself exactly like
the merchants who, with the help of a simple mechanical calculation,
approve of the action they heard. By following the commands included
in the idea, the member of the masses actually states that it is justified
in his eyes, without submitting it to any logical-reflective testing.105
This may be the reason why obedience becomes a self-sufficient
criterion which (apparently) renders truth and falsehood superfluous:
Each persons faith therefore must be deemed pious or impious by
reason of their obedience or disobedience alone, and not in relation
to truth or falsehood.106 The lack of necessity for logical approval and
the possibility of expressing approval through implementing orders can
help clarify Spinozas claim, according to which everyone is capable of
obeying but not all are capable of apprehending God with their mind.107
103
104
105
106
107
TTP, p. 12.
Ibid., pp. 180-181.
By claiming this, I do not claim that non-reflective ideas naturally give rise to
obedience, nor that there is no true idea whose approval does not implicate some
action.
TTP, p. 182.
TTP, p. 174: an intellectual or precise knowledge of God is not a gift generally given
to all the faithful, in the way that obedience is.
133
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
110
TTP, p. 194.
See Chapter 3, note 65, and see Halletts approach in Spinoza, p. 140, for what he calls
the pseudo-morality of the masses. For other analyses of the concept of obedience,
see Levin, Revelation, pp. 171-175; Balibar, Spinoza and Politics, pp. 88-95.
Clearly, approval through use is not particular to members of the masses. The
mathematician who clearly distinguishes the logical content of a proposition approves
this idea by using it. The difference between the merchant and the mathematician is
that the former uses the rule as the only tool for approving an idea. In spite of what we
just wrote, one should not conclude that this type of knowledge is limited to ignorant
people and the weak-minded. Many educated people adopt or reject theological ideas
without bothering to examine them, following the trends found in their surroundings.
In other words, what is claimed here about the knowledge of the masses is relevant for
many human groups and in infinity of human situations. This will be discussed in the
conclusion.
134
---------- VI. Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience-----------
TP, p. 382.
135
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
---------- VI. Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience-----------
must also consider the role of this individuality in ordering social life.
The ability to obey is common to all mankind;115 the degree of intensity
of this ability depends on the way an idea is adopted. The adoption of
an idea in the consciousness of a member of the masses is not likely to
lead to a logical-reflective approval; however, this does not mean that
all non-reflective approvals are one and the same: the acceptance of
an idea based on assent from the heart is not only a worthy basis for
generating obedience to the commands it contains, but also a strong
foundation for it. Indeed, the intense non-reflective approval involved
in acceptance deriving from the assent from the heart is what will be
reflected in the way this idea is employed.
These words on the origin of obedience also clarify the ontologicalepistemological basis for the demand to stimulate the life of the
masses. As we recall, this stimulation is characterized by turning the
simple believer into a source of authority, into the representative of
Gods undistorted demands. Clearly, Spinozas efforts to increase selfauthority do not designate the masses as a spontaneous force that has
the ability to take over political rule, but rather as a means of reinforcing
it. The self-authority that is attributed to the masses was meant to
designate the spiritual platform necessary to generate the political
patterns of the internalization of the law and the adoption of a rational
lifestyle. There is a way of acting anchored in a minimal understanding,
that can establish a moral social life. This we can learn by looking at
the origin of obedience. The importance of this fact becomes clear in
light of what was stated in the third section of the previous chapter.
The reason for the instability of the masses is also the reason for its
potential stability; the passivity of the member of the masses leads him
to perceive everything through his distorted self-concept, but also to
consistently use ideas that are only vaguely distinct in his awareness,
and thereby adopt a law-infused lifestyle.
From what has been claimed so far, we may understand the
meaning of the activity which Spinoza attributes to the masses; we may
also understand why political power has to enrobe itself with religious
contents. The members of the masses who hold religious ideas and
115
--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------
adopt them on the basis of the assent from the heart instill within
themselves a moral sensitivity, which derives from their own spirit.
Therefore, one should not view them as having a weak spirit, and as
blindly following their leaders; they should, on the contrary, be viewed
as a large publicincluding the popular stratathat may identify a
religious-moral basis with the ruling power and its leaders, but may
also criticize those leaders. In other words, religious symbols and moral
contents form a link between political authority and the spirit of the
masses. The latter is not a submissive partner, but is spiritually able to
take part in political life and to oppose corrupted power. Motivating the
masses involves rationalization and actualization.
In conclusion, the gist of political secularism involves two
processes. The first can be entitled making-raw: religion dissolves into
a network of images that rely upon individual judgment, and which
involves the rationalization of the concept of God. Religion is set free
from the authority of its specialists; it is released from its doctrinarian
formulations and from its textual basis; it relies on subjective judgment,
through which it maintains the awareness of the moral order of the
world and of the existence of the almighty God, who protects His
creatures. A detailed description of this type of tradition can only be
made for a particular given society. Philosophical inquiry can reveal the
main traits of what is meant by making-raw. The reformed religion
turns religion into the raw material for the social-political order; the
reformed religion does not involve the weakening of the masses or the
exacerbation of its passivity, but its opposite. The network of flexible
religious images has the ability to stimulate the individual spirit and to
establish rational patterns in the life of society.
Thus, it is clear why one ought to beware of manipulation as the key
concept in the description of change as it appears in reformed religion.
This concept emphasizes the passivity of the masses and the action of
those performing the manipulationleading the masses towards aims
that they themselves are unable to discern. However, this is not the
main point of the reform suggested hererather, it is the stimulation
of the masses power to act. Clearly, this does not imply going to the
people in the sense of the Russian anarchists, but rather the claim that
the understanding of secularization depends on the revelation of the
138
---------- VI. Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience-----------
masses force of action. This is the background for the second process
involved in political secularismthe actualization of society through
politicization, in the course of the development of political authority.116
The Spinozian approach to culture described here comprises a
program that is cautious in its promises. It contains no instructions
for establishing a utopia, but rather describes an epistemic-political
infrastructure that is necessary, but also unstable and temporary by
nature. The two main processes, making-raw and actualization, do
not culminate in a celebration of victory; they form a program geared
towards reducing the instability of the masses, restraining its inbred
hostility and instilling a more rational way of life. Spinozas view of
secularism remains a program for limited secularization: striving
towards the improvement of political authority, and grounding that
authority by stimulating the masses and preparing their spiritual and
religious-moral world. The fact that the masses are not only the object
of action but that they are also agents in the process of secularization
determines their nature. This secularization does not depend on
the imposition and fostering of external, semi-rational norms by
philosopher-kings, but on the modification of the prevalent culture
in a concrete society so that it may become the basis for political
authority. This authority is likely to strengthen the rationalization and
intensification of human life, of masses and individuals alike.
116
This book deals with culture as a potential platform for a civilized political life; a
complementary discussion (not carried out here) concerns the ways of actualization
or re-actualization. How is it possible to improve political life so that people, both
individuals and as members of a society, will lead better lives?
139
-----------------------------Chapter V -----------------------------------
The Spinozian philosopher looks at his society based on his insights into
the limitations of consciousness. The liberation of the masses suggested
by the reformed religion and the improvement of the sovereign authority
is based on his understanding of the structure of consciousness of the
masses and its inherent instability, which derives from the nature of the
masses consciousness. A further limitation is the restricted influence of
the philosopher. A philosopher who is aware of these limitations does
not draw negative conclusions, nor does he take exception to his own
society; rather, this awareness serves as a basis for the examination of
the possibilities that the society has to offer for its own wellbeing. One
such example was provided in the previous chapter. I am referring here
to the ontological-epistemological-political analysis, through which we
showed how persons with a lower degree of knowledge have access to a
force of action deriving from obedience. This same logic will enable us to
understand the limitations of the philosophers influence. All of these will
help us understand the role of the philosopher in secularizing his society.
TTP, p. 9.
143
Ibid., p. 10.
Ibid., p. 191.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 193
Ibid.
Ibid.
144
rhetoric which Spinoza uses in the TTP. Claims that theology is entirely
separate from philosophy and that its main principles are immune to
logical criteria of truth and falsehood aim at dispelling the fears of
the readers of the TTP as to the possible risks entailed by philosophy,
and to assure them that the status of theology is unassailable. Thus,
Spinoza hopes to contribute to the establishment of free enquiry. This
interpretation is easy to prove as follows: this must be a manipulative
declaration, since it is pointless, from the point of view of Spinozian
philosophy, to separate theology from philosophy. The problem with
this unquestionably correct interpretation of the matter is that it is too
obvious, and thus obscures other significant potential interpretations.
The meaning of the claims made in the TTPmore so than in other
booksis related to their extra-textual goal. What is the meaning of the
discussion of the self-radiance of theology for the non-philosophical
reader, if it is not the light of reason? On which philosophical basis will
we be able to claim that religious ideas whose contents are the belief
in revelation, or the theological idea that people may be saved through
obedience alone, cannot be proven to be true or false?
What we discussed in the previous chapterparticularly concerning
the origin of obediencecan help us respond to this. Claims about the
self-radiance of theology and concerning the validity of the healthy
judgment play the same role as the demand to authorize the theological
ideas concerning the assent from the heart. Their aim is to encourage
the adoption of an idea based on the inclinations of the heart. They
are an argument in support of the importance of what we have called
correctness (nekhonut). In other words, their justification derives
from an understanding of the relation between the lack of reflexivity,
the masses sense of truth, and the mechanism of obedience and its
political significance. This point is no less important than the necessity
to avoid clashing with the defenders of theology through manipulative
camouflage of the argument.
This answer raises a difficulty: if the aim of Spinozas claims is to
release the masses from the oppression of the religious authorities in
order to establish them as a source of authority sufficient for action
on the basis of its religious imagesthen the masses should be
protected not only from religious figures but from philosophers as
145
These figures include Socrates and Anaxagoras, among others. See the views of Leo
Strauss on the tension between the philosopher and political life.
146
TP, p. 55; TTP, p.159; and see the interesting statement in the TTP, p.213.
TTP, p. 209.
Ibid., p. 252.
147
as true, following their healthy judgment, are false; if so, what is the
role of the political philosopher in the development of a secularism
based on these false images?
14
E 2p43s.
E 2p41. Curley, Ethics, uses cause of falsity. The term which Spinoza uses is falsitas;
it is only found in late Latin and points to something abstract.
E 2p42; see also E 5p28.
148
15
16
As we recall, in that it is being approved, a false idea differs from a fabricated idea. On
the role of approval in these ideas, see Hallett, Spinoza, pp. 86-87.
In E 2p41, Spinoza indicates that the first degree of knowledge is the only reason for
falsity, although clearly this does not mean that it is false by necessity.
149
accompanying notes about language and the masses, may serve as a good
starting point for our discussion.17 As we recall, the classification of the
emotions is based on the notion of conatus, the gist of which speaks of
the division of affects according to their tending towards happiness or
sadness. The distinctions between these affects are revealed in a logicalpsychological way. Such exposure throws light on the limitations of
language. These limitations can be seen in a number of ways: words
cannot describe the entire range of affects, since the affect generated
by a particular object contains the nature of that object: There are as
many species of joy, sadness, and desire, and consequently of each affect
composed of these (like vacillation of mind) or derived from them (like
love, hate, hope, fear, etc.), as there are species of objects by which we
are affected.18 Words are thus general; these deficiencies, it appears,
reflect the tendency of the imagination towards generalizations. More
important is the fact that language lacks certain distinctions. Certain
affects become known to the reader through distinctions achieved with
the help of logical-psychological analysis, although no word designates
them. In other words, philosophical analysis is not bound by the
limitations of language: and from that we can deduce in addition other
affects, which we also do not usually distinguish from the others by
any single term.19 The reason for the shortcomings of words lies in the
limited knowledge of those using them: the names of the affects are
found more from the ordinary usage [of words] than from an accurate
knowledge [of the effects].20
The analysis of emotions has great psychological import in Spinozas
philosophy; it is the basis for the articulation of the oscillations of
the mind and of its instability. The gap between this articulation and
the masses use of language recalls the gap between the philosophers
17
18
19
20
For broader discussions of Spinozas philosophy of language, see: Savan, Spinoza and
Language; Yovel, The Masses and Language.
E 2p56. The activations are determined on the basis of their objects, because they
comprise ideas of their objects. This is stated in E 3p56d: The joy arising from A
involves the nature of object A, that arising from object B involves the nature of object
B, and so these two affects of joy are by nature different, because they arise from
causes of a different nature.
E 3p53s.
E 3p52s.
150
TdIE, p. 33.
151
22
23
He is qualified to distinguish the large difference between himself and the masses,
since he is less bound than others to grasp everything by way of his identity, in an
egocentric manner.
Its meaning, however, does not accord with the medieval use of the concept.
152
minds action or, to be more precise, the way a concrete idea is found
within a concrete consciousness.24 Therefore, the relation between
truth and imagination more closely resembles the relation between the
wise man and the ignoramus, rather than the abstract relation between
the logical contents of two claims.
Hence, the non-reflective consciousness is not undermined or
shaken by the mere presence of truth; it is not this presence that
extricates it, as if by magic, from its inferior epistemic status, but
rather the more intense presence of truth. Clearly, one should not
exaggerate: Spinoza believed that the masses were subject to the impact
of the philosophical enquiry. One can find numerous examples for this,
but suffice it to recall the fact that he published the TTP anonymously.
This indicates how powerful, in Spinozas view, was the impact of
philosophical ideas on the public. Undoubtedly, a philosophical idea
can influence the public, but these ideas necessarily impact from the
outside, through hearsay. This externality emerges in more detail once
we understand imagination and the way it functions. The member of the
masses is drawn after some vague experience. His consciousness is ready
to absorb hearsay and to adopt it uncritically. The free philosophers
thought that reaches the masses is likely to shake them, while the nonreflective consciousness is able to adopt a true idea based on hearsay.
In fact, it is likely that it will tend to adopt such an idea. However, this
does not mean that the masses discern the ideas logical contents.As
long as a consciousness remains non-reflective, truth is perceived as
hearsay; it is given within that consciousness without understanding
and is adopted through imitation. An idea adopted through hearsay is
likely to offend the member of the masses due to his beliefs, to burden
him and trouble his soul, yet it remains no more than hearsay.25
Philosophical thought makes its impact on the consciousness of the
masses through hearsay. Thus, even if it be broad or of long duration,
24
25
TTP, p. 175.
De Deugd, Imagination, p. pp. 51-52; Hallett, Creation, p. 57; Hallett, Eternity, pp. 127128; Hallett, Spinoza, pp. 84-85. Compare Gart, Truth and Imagination.
154
28
In the TdIE, p. 7, Spinoza writes: For we can gain from the multitude no small
advantages, provided that we strive to accommodate ourselves to its understanding
as far as possible: moreover, we shall in this way gain a friendly audience for the
reception of the truth. These words not only instruct us at to the rules of caution
that were common in the philosophy of the Middle Ages, i.e. hiding the destructive
conclusions that derive from Spinozas philosophy; he also hints at the value of limited
understanding. What is written in this chapter and in the two preceding chapters
provides the explanation for this.
156
desirable and clear contents contribute to it. The dangers which Spinoza
relates to in speaking of the demise of the sovereign power as a result of
peoples dependence on their contradictory interpretations of religious
issues are also relevant here.29
In the TTP, some of the principles underlying such desirable ideas
are indicated. When writing about the main points of reformed religion,
Spinoza emphasizes Gods personal providence; God is omnipresent and
all is known before Him. His authority is not subject to law, but He does
all things at His absolute pleasure and by His unique grace.30 However,
in the following paragraph, he writes: Worship of God and obedience to
Him consist solely in justice and charity, or in love of ones neighbour.31
In these key statements, Spinoza strives to maintain the personal
relationship between the individual and God and to strengthen it by way
of an explicit and stable system of laws and commands. God looks at
man and judges him; His demands are explicit and constant, but obeying
them is a response to Gods will, which nevertheless maintains a tone of
intimate request. Religious ideas contain a constant oscillation between
the emphasis on law and the emphasis on Gods address to the individual.
Thus, Spinoza combines the following: the necessity to maintain the
personal relationship between the individual and God in order that it
may be adapted to the member of the masses limited capacity to reach
God, and the idea that Gods permanent and clear demands are required in
order to awaken obedience. The use of an idea as non-reflective approval
is based on the commands delivered through guiding ideas.
To this, we should add the following: the Divinity, who is attained
through the knowledge of the member of the masses and who
imposes a moral order upon mankind, instills in the believer a specific
metaphysical position, whose essence is found in a quote from the
Gospel according to John, which Spinoza quotes: each person is in
God and God is in each person.32 As I indicated in the third section of
Chapter 3, this position does away with the false meta-final position
29
30
31
32
Chapter 4, section 2.
TTP, p. 182.
Ibid., p. 183.
Ibid., p. 181.
161
towards which the believer tends. His extraction from this position is
significant, insofar as it relates directly to the believers basic sense of
belonging to his community and to all Being. This is an Archimedean
point in mans process of socialization and in his tendency to act
rationally and morally within his community. From this, we understand
why, for Spinoza, the status of reformed religion within the State is not
merely that of subordination.33 Although, as we recall, the authority
of the political power does cover religious issues, the political training
of the members of the masses and the possibility of motivating them
depends upon the adoption of religious ideas. These ideas generate
within the member of the masses the readinessas per the meaning
discussed in the previous chapterto adopt a moral lifestyle. In other
words, the power of the State to establish a moral order within society
should not begin with the political power; it requires ideas that instill
within the masses the metaphysical position of belonging to a collective
and responding to the moral order. In these aspects, religious tradition
is a vital platform for maintaining political power with the help of the
force of action of its subjects.
We shall now revert to the main point of the discussion. The contents
of the obedience-provoking ideas are quite general. It is clear, from the
discussion in the sixth section of Chapter 4, that obedience does not
depend exclusively upon the contents of the idea, but also stems from
its epistemic status, i.e. from the commands it entails, and from the way
it is held within the non-reflective consciousness. Naturally, these facts
add no concrete content to the ideas, but they do throw light on the
mechanism which characterizes their presence. In other words, we are
reverting to the arguments that were put forth in the first paragraph of
this section. The tendency to obey is guaranteed by the general type of
ide, and given the limitations of the non-reflective consciousness; but
the dangers of obedience call for a specific discussion of the contents of
these ideas. What should the cultural-traditional origin of these ideas
be? How can we ensure that they guide the believer towards respecting
the political authority, rather than leading to its disintegration through
their individual interpretations, as Spinoza describes in various places?
33
35
36
37
38
39
40
See Chapter 2, notes 28-29. See also the discussion in Raven, Tradition, p. 303, where
she claims that from the perspective of imagination, things appear to be contingent
and, therefore, historical. Thus, for her, imagination is a historical way of thinking,
contrary to the extra-temporal philosophical and scientific thought. See her discussion
of the positions expressed by De Deugd and Curley.
On this matter, see the next paragraph with its accompanying notes.
TTP, p. 101.
Ibid., p. 100.
Ibid., p. 102.
For example, TP, p. 376.
For example, TP, p. 357.
163
into account. These assumptions are all the more striking in his words
of caution on the limitations of the reform of a specific regime. In
his discussion on the monarchic regime, in the TP, he writes: I am
conceiving of that monarchy, which is instituted by a free multitude,
for which alone these foundations can serve. For a multitude that
has grown used to another form of dominion will not be able without
great danger of overthrow to pluck up the accepted foundations of the
dominion, and change its entire fabric.41 He makes a similar remark
in the TTP, where he claims that it is difficult to get rid of a despotic
ruler, since the people have become accustomed to this type of power
and authority.42 Through these warnings, it is clear that the ways of a
regime are rooted in the political culture that has come about as a result
of specific historical circumstances. One should not look at a regime
based on the character of the leader and his ways, but as a specific
historical, social and political entity. Whoever does not take this vital
context into consideration ignores the reasons for the existence of this
specific regime and his desire to reform it may result in undermining
the entire political authority.
In other words, Spinoza is sensitive to historical factors in his
discussions of politico-cultural phenomena. For this reason, he avoids
dictating useful meta-historical ideas. Although these claims are correct,
they do not exhaust the topic. What we have called here historical
sensitivity has a more essential place in Spinozas philosophy. In order
to outline the religious ideas that should be expropriated from the hands
of religious representativesideas which are important for preparing
the masses for political lifewe must abandon abstract principles and
look at concrete religious traditions and cultures. Whoever accepts
the concept of correctness (nekhonut) as a central axis of Spinozas
approach agrees to this; indeed, this concept points to the contents and
images that people absorb passively from their concrete surroundings.
These contents and images find a home in the consciousness of the
masses. The masses approval tends to reveal itself more through the
use of its contents rather than by the fact of noticing them. What
41
42
TP, p. 340.
TTP, p. 235.
164
166
----------------------------Chapter VI ----------------------------------
Traditionalism as a
Secular Option in Israel
I. Traditionalism in Israel
Nearly one third of the Jewish population of Israel describe themselves
as traditionalists
Shokeid, New Trends, p. 88.; Yadgar & Liebman, Beyond the Dichotomy, p. 347. There is
a rich literature on traditionalism, both in Israel and in the world. I rely here on the
studies of Yadgar & Liebman, Shokeid, and Bouzaglo, as they suffice for the needs
of this discussion. One particularly important piece of research is that of Shokeid &
Deshen, The Predicament of Homecoming, which, in its revised and enlarged edition,
comprises three new chapters. References to other research on traditionalism can be
found in Yadgar & Liebman, Beyond the Dichotomy, pp. 341-342, notes 10-12.
Bouzaglo, The New Traditionalist, p. 202, claims that due to its lack of articulation,
traditionalism is easily influenced by secularism or Ultra-Orthodoxy.
Yadgar & Liebman, Beyond the Dichotomy, p. 348, where they present the data from
the Guttman Report, according to which 51% of all Israeli citizens define themselves
as traditionalists, but only 19% of the Ashkenazic population do the same. It should
be noted that traditionalism among non-Ashkenazic Jews has been the object of far
more research than Ashkenazic traditionalism.
Bouzaglo, The New Traditionalist, p. 187; Yadgar & Liebman, Beyond the Dichotomy, p.
348.
Ravitzky, Tablets, p. 275: The greatest quantity and quality of Israeli creative
productionin literature, essays, religious commentaries, arts, or public opinion
170
7
8
9
10
piecesclearly derives from both orthodoxies, rather than from the middle groups.
For a clear example of the distinction between traditional society and modern society,
see Katz, Traditional Society.
See references in Yadgar & Liebman, Beyond the Dichotomy, p. 341, note 10.
Shokeid, New Trends.
Shokeid, Religiosity, p. 237.
Yadgar & Liebman, Beyond the Dichotomy, p. 346. Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities.
171
Ibid., p. 352.
Ibid., p. 351.
Bouzaglo, The New Traditionalist, p. 194.
172
does not submit to this authority does not mean that he rejects the
rabbis; he respects their rulings, and even feels inferior to them, but
he maintains his religious patterns, at least as long as he views himself
as a traditionalist. What is it, in Bouzaglos eyes, which enables this
independence of the traditionalist from the rabbis? Sometimes, the
traditionalist will not fulfill certain commandments out of weakness,
i.e. he does not perform certain commandments which he believes
should be fulfilled. Bouzaglo, however, views this weakness of the
will as only a partial explanation for the traditionalists behavior. In
his view, the decisions of traditionalism are not only an expression of
weakness, but also derive from the strength of the traditionalist 14he
has a nonessential view of the halakha; he does not grant it existence
in Platonic terms, i.e. independent of its acceptance by the public.
He believes that the halakha is determined here in Israel as deriving
from an equilibrium between those determining the halakha and those
who adopt it.15 He thus sees himself as an agent shaping his religious
lifestyle, rather than as accepting practices submissively in accordance
with rabbinical rulings. This is the basis for Bouzaglos claim that the
traditionalist is engaged in a process of democratization of Judaism
itself; his attitude toward the rabbis is one of respect, but also of
tension.16
To this, we should add several details. As Bouzaglo convincingly
states, the traditionalists choice is not necessarily determined by
difficultyit is harder, for example, to fast on Yom Kippur than not
to turn on the lights on Shabbat. In this case, the traditionalist makes
a point of fulfilling a difficult commandment, while exempting himself
from fulfilling an easier one.17 There are also certain norms that are only
maintained in specific contexts: Yadgar and Liebman indicate that some
commandments are only followed strictly within the home. Traditional
women guard the family purity laws, but not necessarily by behaving
or dressing modestly outside the home.18 This type of behavior is
14
15
16
17
18
Ibid., p. 199.
Ibid., p. 199.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 191.
Yadgar & Liebman, Beyond the Dichotomy, p. 350.
173
Ibid., p. 344.
174
understand the issue, we should dwell on the affinity between this type
of religiousness and moral behavior. Bouzaglo emphasizes the affinity
between traditionalism and ethics. He recalls Yeshayahu Leibowitzs
well-known position, according to which the morality of the biblical
commandments is not part of their essential nature. For Leibowitz,
the real justification for the command Love thy neighbor as thyself
lies in its apodosisFor I am the Lord. Bouzaglo goes on to claim
as follows: The traditional person is not prepared to live with this
splitit is impossible for an evil man who keeps all the commandments
to be a fully religious man. The traditionalist will emphasize that the
halakha itself calls for sensitivity to morality.20 Furthermore, the
moral requirements serve as a compass that helps develop the halakha
correctly.21 Yadgar and Liebman express a more cautious view, albeit
similar in its conclusions. They indicate that the interviewees who took
part in their research did not assimilate religiosity with morality or
humanity,22 although they did not see this as an essential point. One can
assume that it indicates their disappointment in the lack of integration
of morality and religion among the Orthodox. Traditionalists expect
the religious person to behave in a moral and human way. One can also
derive the link that exists in their consciousness between morals and
religious tradition from the traditionalists criticism of secularismit
appears to them to be a framework devoid of moral value.23
For the traditionalist, sensitivity to morals is deeply linked to a
religious lifestyle; the disappointment (with the Orthodox) expressed
by the interviewees in Yadgar and Liebmans research indicates
the extent of this sensitivity, a sensitivity anchored in the close
surroundings of the traditionalist; it does, however, extend beyond
these surroundings, since moral sensitivity necessarily has more
general validity. In other words, traditionalism cannot be reduced to
following certain habits and to home-related norms, since it attributes
moral judgment to religious content which, by its nature, is geared
20
21
22
23
This answer was meant to account for the facts presented so far. It is of a speculative
nature since it must still be justified by the explanatory strength of its claims. The
limitations of this discussion makes it impossible to examine the empirical validity of
this answer, which might certainly be accomplished using research methods different
from those employed in this essay.
176
26
a person may suffice with some instructions, general contents and the
imitation of others. Traditionalism is thus simple both in its concrete
contents and on the level of ideas. Finally, the image of the God at the
heart of such religious life has undergone a process of rationalization.
It is easy to appease it by adopting a moral lifestyle and by performing
a limited number of practices.
From a philosophical point of view, the most interesting fact in the
similarity between traditionalism and the soft religion described in
the TTP is linked to the power attributed to the traditionalist. As we
recall, Bouzaglo wrote about this in his claim that traditionalism is a
process of democratization within Judaism, and that the choices of
the traditionalist should be understood as an expression of strength
rather than weakness of will. What exactly is this strength? Where does
it originate? Clearly, it does not arise from the traditionalists deep
knowledge of religious contents. Yadgar characterizes the awareness of
the traditionalists in opposition to idolaters of the text, recalling the
opposition between reflexivity and the acceptance of what is correct.27
They indicate that the texts and symbols that are important for the
traditionalists convey to them a system of faith, but that this system
tends to be mythical rather than rational and ideological.28 In other
words, the traditionalist adopts his patterns out of habit, and as an
expression of respect rather than out of any deep understanding of
their religious contents.
Based on the discussion in the sixth section of Chapter 4
(Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience), we
can explain how the traditionalists reliance on what is correct is the
source of his self-activity and, in fact, of his power. The description of
the traditionalists acceptance of religious contents, using the term
nachon (correct/ready) is, in a way, a shortcut. This term designates
both the traditionalists sense of truth and the key concept derived
from the Spinozian approach which we have presented; I refer to the
link between both the two meanings of nachona relatively passive
acceptance of a guiding idea, on the one hand, and the approval of
27
28
does not enclose the believer in a separate cell along with the transcendental being; it situates him in some order. Consequently, traditionalism, as a form of reformed religion, can serve as a fertile ground for
political life: it comprises moral regulation; it places the believer within
the world; it awakens all this by stimulating the believer as a figure of
authority; finally, this person is an agent of change rather than a mindless follower of commands.
Spinozian analysis, which reveals the sources of the strength of
reformed religion, also highlights its political importance. Continuing
along this track, we may come to understand the sources of the
strength of traditionalism and its political importance in Israel. What
we claimed in Chapter 4 about the political role of reformed religion
forms the basis for this, and we will now reiterate some of the main
points. One key concept for understanding the role of religion is
expressed through the phrases sovereign spirit or one spirit, so to
speak (una veluti mens), which appear mainly in the TP and, to a
lesser extent, in the Ethics. More than explaining what he refers to
when using the word spirit, Spinoza makes a point of referring to it
as one spirit. What this phrase refers to is that the unity of people
depends not only on the establishment of a shared legal system; it
must also rely on the masses readiness to obey the law. Spinozas
political analysis underlines the necessity for this readiness; indeed,
citizens represent a greater danger for the stability of the ruling power
than do the enemies of the state. The danger that characterizes the
masses becomes clear when the mentality that characterizes them
is revealed (as described in Chapter 3). When attempting to reduce
this danger, one must take its reasons into consideration. Therefore,
bringing people together calls for more than a common legal basisit
calls for nurturing the readiness to obey, based on the mentality of the
masses. This is partly achieved by allocating rewards and punishments,
holding back threats and nurturing hope. It is also partly achieved
through the agency of common ideas that make up one spiritwe
are referring to norms, moral sensibility and common images, which
lead men to obey the rational law that comes to govern their lives.
The shaping of the behavior of the masses by the ruling power must
therefore be based upon images and concepts that are rooted in their
184
We should mention here once more that activation remains a topic demanding an
ontological and political development that lies beyond the scope of this book.
186
TP, p. 310-311.
187
188
------------------------------------------------------------------------COnclusion------------------------------------------------------------------------
COnclusion
------------------------------------------------------------------------COnclusion------------------------------------------------------------------------
Certainly, the dichotomy between traditional society and modern society and the
understanding of the power of modern consciousness have already been severely
undermined. Eisenstadts concept of multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, multiple
modernities) is one such illustration. Nevertheless, the dichotomy between tradition
and modernity has substantial salience in the Israeli discourse on secularism. Some
of the ideas presented in Chapter 1those of Rotenstreich, Schweid, Brinker and
Yizharvehemently emphasize this dichotomy.
190
------------------------------------------------------------------------COnclusion------------------------------------------------------------------------
the basis for further discussion. At one point, Spinoza mentions that
mans body is made up of several naturesin other words, he describes
it as a heterogeneous unit.2 This heterogeneityby virtue of the
relation among the attributestypifies the soul as well. Commentators
dealing with Spinozas thinking on consciousness overemphasize the
division into three levels (whose importance I do not deny). In doing
so, they ignore the concrete wealth assigned to mental life in Spinozas
conception. One hint at the heterogeneity mentioned here may explain
this wealth: the ideas, insofar as they are mental activities, insofar as
they are a multiplicity comprising the soul, do not bear a reflexivity
fixed in nature or intensity. The logical contents contained in each of
the mental activities known as ideas are not all approved in the same
manner or measurenot even for the philosopher. The reflexive aspect
of consciousness is thus a heterogeneous activity. These claims, which of
course need to be justified, also bear political and cultural significance.
More than being composed of a distinctive group of the passive masses,
human society is composed of mass manifestations of passivity. A
conclusion deriving from this is that the molds negatively attributed to
the traditional person indeed typify mans basic state of mind. Mans
essential passivity is the basis for his being traditional, i.e. a subject
who easily adopts external contents without approving them.3
In short, from a Spinozian point of view, the assumption of
the three secular options with respect to mans superiority over
traditionespecially over religious traditionis an act of hubris. The
fault in this assumptionas indicated by the Greek termis that man
forgets his human limitations. Whoever believes that modern man has
become lord over himself and his preferences ignores the limits of mans
consciousness that result from his being a finite being with limited
knowledge. By remembering these things, we may come to change the
inferior image that traditionalism bears in Israel, and perhaps not only
2
3
------------------------------------------------------------------------COnclusion------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------COnclusion------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------COnclusion------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------COnclusion------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------COnclusion------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------COnclusion------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------COnclusion------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------COnclusion------------------------------------------------------------------------
199
----------------------------------------------------------------------Bibliorgaphy----------------------------------------------------------------------
Bibliorgaphy
----------------------------------------------------------------------Bibliorgaphy----------------------------------------------------------------------
202
----------------------------------------------------------------------Bibliorgaphy----------------------------------------------------------------------
Guttmann, Spinoza = - ,
217-192 , , , ,
Hallett, Creation = H. F. Hallett, Creation, Emanation, Salvation: A Spinozistic Study,
The Hague, 1962.
Hallett, Eternity = H. F. Hallett, Aeternitas: A Spinozistic Study, Oxford, 1930.
Hallett, Spinoza = H. F. Hallett, Benedict de Spinoza: The Elements of his Philosophy,
London, 1957.
Hunter, Radicalism = G. Hunter. Radical Protestantism in Spinozas Thought,
Aldershot, Burlington, Ashgate, 2005.
Joachim, Ethics = H. Joachim, A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, Oxford, 1901.
Joachim, TdIE = H. Joachim, Spinozas Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione: A
Commentary, Oxford, 1940.
Jobani, Models of Secularism = J. Jobani, Three Basic Models of Secular Jewish
Culture, in G. Katz (ed.), Israeli Secular-Religious Dialectics, Special Issue of
Israel Studies 13.3 (2008): 160-169.
Kaplan, Freud = A. Kaplan, Spinoza and Freud, Journal of the American Academy
of Psychoanalysis, 5 (1977): 299-326.
Katz, Core of Secularism = ,
2011 ,
Katz, Spinozas Translators = G. Katz, In the Eye of the Translator: Spinoza in the
Mirror of the Ethics Hebrew Translators, Jewish Thought and Philosophy 15.2
(2007): 39-63.
Katz, Traditional Society = : , ,
, 1984 , : ,)(
34-27
Kedmi, Jewish Identity = , ,
1975 ,
Klatzkin, Ethics = , ,- ,
203
----------------------------------------------------------------------Bibliorgaphy----------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------Bibliorgaphy----------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------Bibliorgaphy----------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------Bibliorgaphy----------------------------------------------------------------------
Strauss, Early Writings = L. Strauss: The Early Writings (1921-1932), translated and
edited by M. Zank, New York, 2002.
Strauss, Spinoza = L. Strauss, Spinozas Critique of Religion, New York, 1965.
Tadmor, The Divine in Man = - : ,
- ,
Tavori, New Age in Israel = - , : ,) (
2007
TdIE = Works of Spinoza (translated by R. H. M. Elwes), Vol. 2, New York, 1955.
TP = Works of Spinoza (translated by R. H. M. Elwes), Vol. 1, New York, 1955.
TTP = Benedict de Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise (edited by J. Israel),
Cambridge, 2007.
Vaughan, Myth = 2003 ,? ,
Weiler, Theocracy = , ,
Wolfson, Spinoza = H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, 2 Vols., Cambridge,
Mass., 1934.
Yadgar, Traditionalism = , : ,
Yadgar & Liebman, Beyond the Dichotomy = - ,
,) (, ,- , : , :
366-337 , , :
Yakira, Strauss = E. Yakira, Leo Strauss and Baruch Spinoza: Remarks in the
Margins of Strauss Timely Reflections, Studia Spinozana 13 (1997): 161-182.
Yehoshua, In Praise of Normality = , : ,
Yizhar, Courage = 80-74 ,)1981( 79 , ,
Yovel, Critique of Religion = , : ,
269-240 ,)(
207
----------------------------------------------------------------------Bibliorgaphy----------------------------------------------------------------------
, , , = Yovel, Ethics
, , = Yovel, Heretics
() , : , = Yovel, New Jewish Time
, - , 2007
Yovel, The Masses and Language = Y. Yovel, The Psychology of the Multitude and
the Uses of Language, Studia Spinozana 1 (1985): 305-333.
208
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Index-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Index
Ahad Haam
12n2, 14, 14n5, 15, 27, 50-52, 197
The Treasury of Judaism
27
Amir, Aaron
29
Anaxagoras
146n8
Archimed
87, 122, 162
Aristotles
Metaphysics
57n10
Physics 57n10
authority
12, 14, 22, 23, 25, 34, 38, 42, 44, 45, 48, 63, 65, 84-86,
93-109, 111, 112-115, 117, 120-125, 128, 129, 135139, 143-147, 155-157, 160-162, 164, 165, 169, 172174, 180, 182, 184, 186, 187, 189, 190, 194-196, 199
Avneri, Uri
29
Ayali, Meir
17, 19, 21, 28
Bareli, Gilad
30, 35-37, 47, 52
On the secularized
study of Torah
35
Ben Gurion, David
27, 56
Ben Nahum, Daniel
21
Ben Shlomo, Yosef
62
Berdichevsky, Micha Yossef
12n2
Bergson, Henri
56n3
Bialik, Haim Nachman
12n2, 16
Bible
12, 18-20, 22, 42, 46, 47, 50, 65, 93, 98, 119, 123, 163
Borochov, Ber
21
Boundless happiness, a film on Spinoza 56
Bouzaglo, Meir
170, 172-175, 181
Brenner, Yosef Haim
14, 50, 52, 197
On a Vision of Conversion
to Christianity
50
209
Cohen, Hermann
culture
Curley, E.
56
9, 10, 12-32, 38, 42, 45-52, 55, 56, 60, 61, 94, 110,
115, 117, 123, 139, 146, 157, 164, 165, 170, 171,
179, 186, 189, 192-196, 198, 199
163n34
Dan, Josef
De Deugd, C.
definition of secularism
Descartes
Discourse on the Method
17
72, 163n34
3
61, 62, 74, 74n25
61
egocentric
Einstein, Albert
Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah
Elam, Yigal
The End of Judaism
Evron, Boaz
freedom
Frege, F. L. G.
Freud, Sigmund
Funkenstein, Amos
17, 33, 84, 93, 99, 116, 117, 124, 136, 146, 147, 149,
152, 157, 159
36
56n3
17
Gaon, Saadia
Geertz, Clifford
Gordon, Aaron David
Gotchkov, K.
Uriel DAcosta
71n11
111, 112
13, 14, 51, 52, 197
57n11
57n11
Hebrew Encyclopedia
Hebrew language
Hegel, G. W. F.
Heine, Heinrich
Hess, Moses
Rome and Jerusalem
Hesse, Herman
27
25, 28, 31, 58-61, 113, 118n68, 163
57n10
56n3,
56
57n10
41
210
41
29
82
57n10
idea
immanence
irrational
9, 11-13, 23-27, 30, 39, 42, 43, 45-47, 52, 55-57, 59,
62, 64, 70-76, 79-83, 85-87, 93, 95, 102, 104, 109,
110, 114, 117, 123, 134-137, 145, 147-150, 152-154,
160-165, 174, 179-182, 184, 187, 190, 191, 195
20, 63, 66, 67, 69-72, 74-76, 78, 79-89, 93, 95, 100,
101, 116, 123, 126, 128, 132, 135, 148-155, 157,
163, 197
4, 88
82, 117
Jabotinsky, Zeev
12n2
Kant, I.
Kaplan, Mordechai
Karelitz, Yeshaya
Katzenelson, Berl
Klatzkin, Yaakov
Klausner, Joseph
Krochmal, Abraham
Krochmal, Nachman
Kurzweil, Baruch
Our New Literature
Continuity or Revolution?
55, 132n102
12n2
27
12n2
14, 28, 29, 37, 50, 52, 56-60, 197
56, 57n11
56
56
10;
language
25, 31, 35, 36, 42, 102, 60, 110n49, 113, 114, 118,
150, 151, 163, 191n3
30, 37, 52, 175
20
56
56
30, 31, 171, 173, 175, 176; Culture War 30
56, 58
imagination
Leibovitz, Yeshayahu
Lenin, V.
Letteris, Meir
Levinas, Emmanuel
Liebman, Charles
Luzzatto, Samuel David
10
Maimon, Solomon
56
Maimonidess Guide to the Perplexed 57n10
Marx, Karl
21
211
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Index------------------------------------------------------------------------------McShea, R.
Mendelssohn, Moses
meta-finite
metaphysical secularism
Mill, J. S.
myth
104n31
56
88, 122, 161, 183
64, 65, 96, 105, 146, 149, 157,-160, 197
55
30, 60
Nachman of Breslov
39, 42, 46
nation
12, 19, 23, 25, 27, 29, 32, 33, 37, 80, 110, 185
nekhonut
135, 145, 159, 164, 179
New Age
38, 43, 194
New Jewish Time (Zman Yehudi Hadash) 26, 27
Nietzsche, Friedrich
40, 41, 42, 55n1, 85, 132n102, 195, 196, 197, 198
Ofir, Adi
The Work for the Present
Ornan, Uzi
Oz, Amos
pale god
Pascal, B.
Plato
The Phaedrus
The Republic
Symposium
political secularism
Rabi, Yakov
Rabin, Yitzhak
Ram, Uri
Ratosh, YoNathan
reflexivity
Rosenzweig, Franz
Rotenstreich, Nathan
On Jewish Existence
at the Present Time
Rousseau, J. J.
Rubin, Shlomo
The Ethics
Russell
17, 28
31
33-35, 37, 38
29
76, 145, 176, 181, 191
58
10, 12n3, 22-24, 26, 28, 46, 190n1;
10, 22
55
57, 57n11, 58-60
57n11
36
212
theology
tradition
143-147
10, 12-15, 17-24, 26, 28-31, 37-39, 41, 42, 45, 47-49,
52, 57n11, 58, 59, 61, 62, 65, 66, 75, 94, 96, 104,
44
21, 22, 24, 28, 51n71, 190n1
21
10-13, 27, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 45, 47-50, 55, 5961, 64, 65, 96, 103, 105, 106, 111, 122, 123, 138,
139,146-149, 157-160, 165, 166, 170, 175, 186-189,
190n1, 194-199
secularizing 143
Shapira, Avraham
51n71
Shlonsky, Avraham
20, 21, 26, 29
Shohat, Orit
31
Shokeid, Moshe
169-171
Socrates
146
Sokolov, Nachum
56
Spinozas
Ethics
57-60, 63, 64, 69, 70, 73, 73n23, 75-78, 78n41,
84n65, 86, 86n67, 88, 93, 94, 99, 107, 110, 122,
125, 148n13, 149, 151, 155, 184, 197
Grammar of the Hebrew Language 57n11
Political Treatise
63, 78n63, 86, 94n3, 99, 100, 102, 123, 124, 135,
136, 164, 184
Short Article on God, Man
and his Happiness
69
Theological-Political Treatise
56, 63; 72, 84n65, 93, 94, 97, 99, 101n23, 102, 107, 123,
133, 146, 147, 153, 154, 159, 161, 164, 180, 181, 197
Treatise on the Improvement
of Understanding
61, 61n23, 62, 69, 71, 72, 75-77, 125, 130, 155
Strauss, Leo
56, 56n2, 146n8
subjectivity
73
213
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Index-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tzaban, Yair
Weiler, Gershon
Wittgenstein, L.
Yadgar, Yaacov
Yehoshua, A. B.
Yizhar, S.
The courage to be secular
Yovel, Yermiyahu
Zeitlin, Aaron
Zionism
56
13-15, 25, 31, 47, 50,-52, 56, 60, 195, 197
transcendence
true
214