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The Pale God


Israeli Secularism and Spinozas Philosophy of Culture

-------------------------------- Gideon Katz--------------------------------------

Israel: Society, Culture and History


Yaacov Yadgar
(Political Studies, Bar-Ilan University), Series Editor

Editorial board
Alan Dowty,
Political Science and Middle Eastern
Studies, University of Notre Dame

Allan Silver,
Sociology,
Columbia University

Tamar Katriel,
Communication Ethnography,
University of Haifa

Anthony D. Smith,
Nationalism and Ethnicity,
London School of Economics

Avi Sagi,
Hermeneutics, Cultural studies,
and Philosophy, Bar-Ilan University

Yael Zerubavel,
Jewish Studies and History,
Rutgers University

----------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------

The Pale God


Israeli Secularism and Spinozas
Philosophy of Culture
--------------------------- Gideon Katz--------------------------------Translated by Miriam Ron and Jacky Feldman

Boston
2011

A catalog record for this title is available from the Library of Congress.

Copyright 2011 Academic Studies Press


All rights reserved
ISBN 9781936235384
Book design by Olga Grabovsky
On the cover: Sunrise with Sea Monsters, William Turner
Published by Academic Studies Press in 2011
28 Montfern Avenue
Brighton, MA 02135, USA
press@academicstudiespress.com
www.academicstudiespress.com

Contents

Introduction1
Chapter 1: Three Options for Secularism in Israel9

I. Foreword. 9

II. Judaism as culture.15

III. Reservations about Judaism.28

IV. Spiritual Judaism. 38

V. The distress of secularism.45
Chapter 2: Why Spinoza? 55

I. The historical-cultural context. 56

II. Special philosophical relevance61
Chapter 3: Imagination and the Masses:

An Outline of the Object of Politics69

I. Non-reflective consciousness and the image

of the dream: the epistemological aspect. 69

II. Instability, associations and egocentrism: the psychological aspect. 76

III. Inconsistency, conformism and hostility in the life of

the masses: the political aspect. 83
Chapter 4: Political Secularism92

I. Undermining religion.97

II. Rationalization of the masses and political power.99

III. Does rationalization mean overcoming religion?  103

IV. The importance of religion in the establishment of political power.  106

V. Moderating religious tradition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

VI. Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience.  125
Chapter 5: The Role of the Philosopher

in His Society in Times of Secularization 143

I. The Healthy Judgment, the radiance of theology

and the problem of the philosophers sincerity.  143
v

--------------------------------------------------------------------------Contents--------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. The resonance of truth.  148


III. Metaphysical secularism. 157
IV. The schematic nature of Spinozas thought.  160

Chapter 6: Traditionalism as an Optional



Form of Secularism in Israel 169

I. Traditionalism in Israel.  170

II. Spinozian articulation and the secular nature of traditionalism. 179
Conclusion 189
Bibliography 201
Index  209

vi

---------------------------------------------------------------------Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------

Introduction

Among many Israeli intellectuals, secularism arouses discomfort. For


them, the secular publicand Israeli society as a wholehas become
devoid of the legacy of Jewish culture, and remains without roots or a
substantive identity. Other Israeli intellectuals claim that the incessant
search of secular Israelis for new relationships to Judaism is a result of
a misunderstanding on the part of the secular. They demand a writ of
divorce from religion, and from Judaism in particular. Common to all
is their distress with Judaism; for some, Israeli society has abandoned
Judaism and, consequently, is impoverished and bereft of a past. For
others, Judaism is a burden which prevents the creation of a new
national society.
These thinkers have proposed solutions to resolve these problems.
The aim of this book is to present their approaches, explain why their
proposals lead to a dead end, and suggest a solution derived from
Spinozas philosophy. In these few sentences, we have hinted at the
subject of the book and the assumptions upon which it rests. As we
all know, secularism is a complex concept. It refers to behavior and
identity, to historical processes and changes. The object of this book is
thought, and it deals with the views of men of letters and philosophers
on the question of the worthy place for Judaism in the lives of secular
people. The basic principle underlying this research is that, whatever be
the elements of thought included in it, secularism is not just an abstract
topic. It takes place in a concrete context and can only be analyzed
within that context. This concreteness is relevant for the contents of
thought, just as it is relevant for understanding historical processes or
1

---------------------------------------------------------------------Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------

sociological facts. The reason for this is simple: many of these contents
criticize a particular religious tradition. It is specifically because of the
specific, concrete context of our book that the contents of thought
we will examine are not limited to what has been produced in Israeli
culture. Zionism, especially the thought of spiritual Zionist thinkers,
is important for the secular public in Israel, if only because this is the
thought of the founding fathers of Israeli society.
From what has already been claimed, and even from the title of the
book, it becomes clear that the web of thought discussed here is not
homogeneous. We will deal here with the thought of Israeli intellectuals
and the philosophy of Spinoza. In spite of the differences between these
kinds of thought, their relationship is not artificial, and the justification
for this pairing will be presented later on in the book. For the moment,
I will suffice with one brief comment. The problem is evident in the
thought schemes of Israeli intellectuals. The investigation of the
thought of Spinoza is part of the development of its solution. This is
not a philosophical recommendation that falls like a note from heaven.
This solution is rooted in Israeli culture, and may shed light on trends
rooted in that society. It gives rise to severe criticism of the approaches
of Israeli intellectuals. The solution I will provide here not only breaks
through the impasse to which the approaches of Israeli intellectuals
lead, but also helps us in understanding this impasse.
In order not to leave things unclear, let me now specify their
principles. There is a wide variety of approaches among Israeli
intellectuals, but they all share a common basic assumptionthat
Judaism as a set of contents bearing religious significance can no
longer serve as a basis for the Jewish collective. Secularization, the
establishment of the State of Israel, liberation from the oppressive
rule of the halakhaall these have given birth to a new national
identity. The common religious sources are not included in it. To
our great surprise, this assumptionwhich would seem to be selfunderstoodis not part of the secular position which may be
developed from Spinozas thinking. What he calls secularism suits his
efforts to provide a basis for political authority. Such authority enables
the striving for the creation of autonomous, secular human life. But
2

---------------------------------------------------------------------Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------

such an effort does not require the rejection of religious tradition. On


the contrary, such life necessitates a common spirit. An essential part
of this spirit is the images that are part of religious tradition. Thus,
Spinozas thought, according to the explanation I will provide here,
strives towards something complex: the fostering of religious tradition
on the one hand, and the rationalization of the image of God and the
neutralization of religious experts on the other.
For Spinoza, secularization is at base a political project. In the
framework of this process, there is no need to kill Godas in the
well known slogan of Nietzschebut to moderate him. It suffices to
transform him from an unknown and capricious God, who cannot
be worshipped without the leadership of religious virtuosos, into
a pale God: the image of a transcendental power that has become
rationalized and can be easily placated through accepted morality
and the ways of the fathers. This moderated tradition can serve as a
common culture and as the basis for political authority. This is the gist
of secularism according to Spinoza. This option is especially germane to
the changes wrought by Zionism among the Jewish peopleafter all,
Zionism sought to redefine the Jewish people and place it in a political
framework. The materialization of this change does not necessarily
involve the abandonment of religious tradition and, consequently, the
forsaking of the spiritual content common to Jews gathered in Israel. A
better option is the rendering of religious tradition more malleable and
better adapted to political life. But for various reasons, some of which
will be explained in the Conclusion, this is not the accepted model of
secularism in Israel. We have already hinted that it clashes with the
views of Israeli intellectuals with respect to the place of Judaism in the
world of secular people. In the course of the book, we will show that it
also conflicts with the positions taken in Zionist thought with respect
to these questions.
Let us now define several of the key terms. As we wrote, the concept
secularism implies a view, a position and a content of thought. Any
concept which fulfills these two criteria will be designated in this book
as secularism. First: it expresses the modernist ethos that man creates
his life autonomously, both as an individual and as a collective. Thus,
3

---------------------------------------------------------------------Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------

it rejects the validity of transcendental authority. Second: it negates


religious tradition as a normative content whose interpretation is
in the hands of a monopoly of religious experts. This definition, of
course, demands justification. It has two advantages: it suits all the
webs of thought cited here, i.e. the main views of Israeli intellectuals;
and it provides a solution to the problems they raise. Unlike overly
abstract definitions

like the identification of secularism with


immanencethe conditions for this definition are faithful to the
concrete nature of secularism. It does not impose upon it general
formulas, but leaves ample room for the polemic element of the secular
position as a reaction to certain religious transitions (especially the
second condition).
Another phrase which calls for explanation is what we term
Spinozas philosophy of culture. The term secularism does not
appear in Spinozas work, nor, certainly, does the term philosophy
of culture. These do, however, fit the analysis which I attribute to
him in my explanation. In my understanding, the special quality of
his thought is the great attention he devotes to the consciousness of
the masses and their spiritual life. The political philosophy of Spinoza
has an epistemological and an ontological basis. The establishment of
authority and the lack of stability inherent to that authority cannot
be understood in isolation from the spiritual traits found among
members of society. Thus, Spinozas philosophy contains a philosophy
of culturea broad reflection on the roles of traditions, contents
and images in social life and the examination of their relevance for
the establishment of rational authority. This is also, as we will show
at length, the most productive framework for viewing the problems of
Israeli secularism.
The order in this book is as follows. In Chapter 1, we describe the
positions of Israeli intellectuals with respect to the relation of the
secular Israeli to Judaism. Here we describe three options: Judaism
as a culture; a position taking exception to Judaism; and spiritual
secularism. The chapter concludes with a description of the difficulties
of each of these options; furthermore, this difficulty is compounded
by the fact that this repertoire of options continues what were
4

---------------------------------------------------------------------Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------

considered, at the beginning of the 20th century, to be the solutions


expressed by the spiritual Zionism. Thus, we come to understand the
need for the development of another option. This alternative option
is developed in Chapters 2 through 5. There we describe the nature of
the masses according to Spinozatheir spiritual life and the reasons
for its instability and passivity. Special attention is required to clarify
the nature of Spinozian secularism: the striving for the formulation
of a rational authority and the harnessing of a moderate religious
tradition to undergird it. Chapter 6 returns to the Israeli reality, and
it consists of two parts: the first section describes the nature of the
traditionalism in Israel, while the second chapter explains why this
option may be considered as an example of Spinozas proposals and
how it may be reconstructed from this philosophical perspective. It
is not understoodas is accepted among its researchersmainly
through the religious practices inherent in it, but in epistemological
and political categories. These categories enable us to understand
muted secularism and the profound significance inherent in it. Thus,
the intense study of the philosophy of Spinoza is the basic foundation
of this book: the metaphysical issues in his thought shed light on
concrete phenomena in Israeli society. It also enables us to reject more
vehemently its accepted secular options.
***
I am very grateful to the Posen Foundation which assisted with the
writing of the book, and to Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, which
assisted with its publication.

--------------------------------------------------------------------- Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------ChapterI -----------------------------------

Three Options for


Secularism in Israel

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------I. Foreword------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Foreword
Israeli intellectuals are deeply concerned over the potential meaning of
Judaism for the Israeli secular public. In the course of their deliberations,
they deal with a wide range of topicsthe Jewish identity of secular
people; the proper place for Jewish studies within the educational
system; the Jewish library; the Jewish roots of Israeli culture; the
development of non-Orthodox Jewish traditional alternatives, such as
the traditionalist (masorti) movement, the Reform and Conservative
movements, Judaism as culture, and secular Judaism; the shaping of a
Jewish Israeli public space, and more. These intellectuals fear that the
secular public, and the entire Israeli society in its wake, have renounced
their intellectual assets and, in doing so, their future as well. As pointed
out earlier, not all share this view: some intellectuals claim that in order
for Israeli society to fully mature, it must cut itself off from its religious
heritage, which they view as oppressive. All the intellectuals expressing
these viewswhether they call for a rapprochement with Judaism
or for further distancingshare a common focus, i.e. the potential
significance of Judaism for the Israeli secular public.
Before describing and analyzing these notions, I would like to
propose some preliminary comments. The ideas we will be discussing
are part of a lively debate on the Jewish identity of secular Israelis.
This debate is not identical to the one on the relations between religion
and the State, which is a political issue. What the sides in that conflict
seek to clarify is the nature of the threat between the parties and the
proper distribution of power. That debate does not attempt to clarify
9

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

the significance of Judaism for the non-religious public, nor does it


attempt to define the nature of any secular position. In other words,
the discussions on the relations between religion and State in Israel
revolve around the presence of religionthe position of its contents
and institutions in Israeli public life. On the other hand, the discussion
on the significance of Judaism for the secular public focuses on the
meaning of secularism (which is linked to philosophical issues) and on
the question of the Jewish identity of secular Jews (which is linked to
cultural issues). It is therefore not surprising that this discussion found
no place in the public conflicts between the religious and the secular
in Israeli society. The opposite is true as well: as the issues linked with
the problems of religion and society were linked to power struggles
among the parties, the main debate concerned the parties demands
and their justifications rather than any examination of secularism or
of the values of the secular public.
Moreover, as indicated in the introduction, Israeli culture expresses
the secular Jews distress as his estrangement from his pasta
widespread phenomenon in the spiritual life of Israeli society. This is the
subject of numerous essays, songs, and literary works.1 This distress can
be apprehended in a number of ways. The secular persons limited affinity
with tradition is often likened to orphanhood, its main expressions
being his ignorance of Judaism and his alienation from the sources of
humanistic Hebrew culture. A similar claim is that the alienation of
the secular from their past relegates Judaism to the Ultra-Orthodox,
thereby damaging the richness of Jewish culture. Signs of distress
arising from the weakness of the attachment to the past were already
manifest during the early years of the state. Two significant examples
were Baruch Kurzweils book Our New LiteratureContinuity or
Revolution? and Nathan Rotenstreichs essay entitled On Jewish Existence
at the Present Time. As is well known, the two authorsone religious
and the other secularwere particularly sensitive to the superficiality
of Judaism among the secular public. Both sides were concerned that
1

These things are true for the Hebrew culture, in general. For an extended analysis of
this, see Schweid, Three Night Watches. I expanded this point further in the Hebrew
version of this book. See Katz, Core of Secularism, Chapter 10.
10

------------------------------------------------------------------------I. Foreword------------------------------------------------------------------------

Judaism would have no real significance for Israeli society.


This distress is the background for the intellectual ideas discussed
in this book, and both those who seek to liberate themselves from
the hold of Judaism and those who fear for the destiny of a collective
without roots relate to these feelings of distress; it is their reaction
to it that sets them apart. Those who call for a rapprochement with
Judaism seek to infuse it with new meaning and adapt it to the secular
public, while those who wish to liberate themselves from Judaism
seek to escape it once and for all and create a post-Jewish collective
experience.
This chapter has two goalsthe first is to present the views of Israeli
intellectuals on the relation between secularism and Judaism (for the
moment, we will postpone the question of their image of Judaism); this
task is more challenging than it seems at first. Most of the expressions
we will describe are fragmentary in nature; the intellectuals who write
on these topics do so because the significance of Judaism for the secular
public and for Israeli society concern them personally, even if it is not
the main area of their interest or expertise. Thus, their expressions
do not generate a broad, comprehensive debate about Judaism or
about its potential significance for secular peoplethey are mostly
sporadic expressions of opinion. In order to deal with these sporadic
and fragmentary expressions, we need to examine the entire discourse
and the types of positions expressed there. By examining several of
these positions together, we may more easily identify them as efforts to
describe Judaism as a human cultural creation in order to present it as
a palatable option for the secular public. This holds true with respect to
other positions as well. The second aim of this chapter is to identify the
dead-end of the various paths of Israeli secularism, as will be clarified
in the last section. For now, we will simply state a few general points.
These options exhibit severe weaknesses: one option is foreign to the
inclinations of Israeli society; another neutralizes the basic meaning
of the Judaism it sets out to investigate; while the third ignores the
fact that Judaismin all its shapes and formsrepresents a content
shared by the Jewish collective.
We will now describe the three options, which will provide a key to
understanding the development of the chapter. The first model we will
11

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

be looking at can be summed up under the slogan Judaism as culture,2


and its main contents are as follows: the ensemble of contents unique
to the Jewish people and perceived as having been created by flesh and
blood Jews. In Israel, this view of Judaism as culture is infused with a
national tone, according to which Jewish creations (i.e. works created by
Jews) are the property of the nation. The representatives of this model
struggle to provide a literary or philosophical interpretation to religious
contents and thus account for or strengthen their affinity towards them
or their legitimate ownership of them. The philosophical ideas that
serve as a framework for their interpretations are anthropocentrism
and humanism. One can find countless examples of these views;3 all
share the notion that the secular person shapes his life without any
transcendental authority, and that he no longer views tradition as
content deriving from divine revelation, but rather as the creation of
the Jewish people.
Judaism as culture represents the most important tendency in
Israeli society. It is widespread among Israeli intellectuals, politicians
and jurists, and within the secular education system. Another set of
views we will present here claims that secularism implies alienation
from Judaism. The arguments put forth by some proponents of this
view focus on the ideal individual attitude of the secular person towards
his traditionthat the adoption of Jewish contents on the part of
secular people conflicts with an honest recognition of their secularism.
Other intellectuals focus on the public-political sphere. They claim that
a genuine secularism requires that that the State of Israel dispense with

The attempt to describe Judaism as a culture derives from a long and complex tradition
within Jewish thought, including some of the Wissenschaft des Judentums ideas, the
ideas of the Haskala, and a long list of Zionist thinkers (Ahad Haam, Zeev Jabotinsky,
Berl Katzenelson, Micha Yossef Berdichevsky, Haim Nachman Bialik, Mordechai
Kaplan, and many others). On the history of the notion of Judaism as culture and its
various versions, see Schweid, Towards. The discussion here focuses on the expressions
of this idea among Israeli intellectuals.
For example: Nathan Rotenstreichs writings on the renewal of the halakha today;
Menachem Brinkers claims on the cultural war in Israel; the debates on the teaching
of the Bible in Israel and the attempts at analyzing it as a literary work; the attempts
to turn the halakha into the basis of Israeli law; and some of the cultural experiments
made by the kibbutz movement.
12

------------------------------------------------------------------------I. Foreword------------------------------------------------------------------------

all religious and Jewish symbols. The intellectuals who voice these ideas
present Judaism as a threatening entity which is intrinsically in conflict
with political life. These positions figure in the debate on Israel as a
state of all its citizens, as well as among some of the supporters of a
bi-national State or of multiculturalism.
The third model to be discussed could be entitled spiritual
secularism. This model has been gaining popularity in the last decades
within so-called new-age circles, although it has roots in spiritual
Zionism (particularly in the work of A.D. Gordon) and in some esoteric
ideas from the 1950s found in the works of Yosef Schechter and Pinhas
Sadeh. These views are of a highly religious tone, which is characterized
by the striving towards being aware of the other, transcendental
dimension of life. This dimension, however, does not resemble the
transcendental images of accepted religion; in many cases, it is also
presented to the individual through an eclectic reservoir of symbols
and teachings of various origins, but including Jewish contents, taken
mainly from Hassidism and the Kabbalah.
From the discussion above, it is clear why intellectuals who call for
Judaism as culture or who express reservations about Judaism address
the secular public in Israel. However, how is the last modelspiritual
Judaismat all suitable for the world of secular people? The answer
derives from the definition which was formulated in the introduction.
The spiritual approaches presented above choose contents and symbols
from mystical Jewish trends, albeit without granting them any
normative significance. What is described in the introduction as one of
the characteristics of secularismthe negation of religious tradition as
a content whose interpretation lies exclusively in the hands of religious
virtuosidoes not vanish as a result of the interest in religious
symbols. Moreover, such views express the notion of mans autonomy,
as arises from their eclectic nature. In presenting the interested person
with a mlange of sources, they actually call upon him to shape his
spiritual world for himself. This demand is not limited to a single act
of choice; rather, he is required to choose over and over again. In this
way, the modernistic view of man as a self-generating autonomous
subject makes up for the contents taken from various religious and
13

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

mystical traditions.4 In any case, the secular nature of these views is


not neutralized by the overwhelming presence of mystical symbols and
religious contents, because the focus is on the relationship between
man and these contents. Man is presented as shaping his own spiritual
world; what is borrowed from religious tradition is borrowed as a result
of his autonomous choices, and does not express his subordination to
tradition. In fact, the transcendental dimension present in the reservoir
of symbols fills a rather passive function; it does not represent any
authority empowered to command. It becomes a kind of mirror through
which man can identify the depths of his life.
As indicated above, thought on the meaning of Judaism for the
non-religious public does not originate with Israeli culturethe
proponents of spiritual Judaism were deeply involved in it. Therefore,
a presentation of the views of Israeli intellectuals regarding the
significance of Judaism for secular people must include the thoughts
that were expressed in Zionism, and which are still perceptible in Israeli
intellectual life. This will be discussed at length in the last section of
this chapter, its main point being as follows. Spiritual Zionism reacted
to the break with Judaism in three different ways: in the eyes of Yaakov
Klatzkin and, to a great extent, Yosef Haim Brenner, national revival
means that Judaism should not serve as a basis for the identity of
the Jewish collective; Ahad Haams secular position is based on the
annulment of the religious meaning of Judaism, and on the latters
affirmation as a national culture, which is to be apprehended in secular
categories;5 and A.D. Gordon presents a paradigm in which the cosmic
force of life replaces the transcendental dimension of traditional
religion. In this way, Judaism is transcribed as a religious-cosmic
content.
Klatzkin proposed abandoning Judaism altogether; Ahad Haam
formulated Judaism as a form of human tradition; and Gordon, for
4

Both the post-modern approach to truth and the capitalistic market view resonate in
this eclecticism. For more on this, see Tavori, New Age in Israel; Ruah-Midbar, Tarbut;
Heelas, New Age.
This position was also accepted by the supporters of political Zionism, although they
were opposed to the precedence Ahad Haam granted to Jewish secular culture over
social and political action.
14

-------------------------------------------------------------II. Judaism as Culture-------------------------------------------------------------

his part, attempted to infuse it with a new religious meaning that was
not based on traditional divinity. Each of these paradigms presented
a particular approach to Judaism, which was suitable for those who
had turned their backs on religious tradition as a normative system
originating in divine revelation. The fact that this repertoire of solutions
still prevails in Israeli intellectual life has many implications: if, indeed,
we become convinced that the secular paths commonly found in Israeli
culture all lead to some type of dead end, we will be forced to reach
the conclusion that this dead end did not start with Israeli culture.
The roads that were paved within the spiritual world of Zionism, the
paradigms outlined at the time, all failed. It will then be our duty to
reach beyond them and develop a new option.

II. Judaism as Culture


As mentioned above the common points shared by the various
proponents of Judaism as culture lie in the attempt to present Judaism
as a human creation whose uniqueness stems from the fact that it was
created by Jews. The Bible is perceived as a wonderful literary text; the
Jewish way of life embodies moral or other values (not only for Ahad
Haam, as we know, but also in the eyes of, for example, A.B. Yehoshua
and Amos Oz).6 In this section, we will examine statements made by
Israeli intellectuals on three main topics: the efforts to determine the
identity of Judaism as culture as a legitimate alternative to traditional
Judaism; the way in which they deal with the consciousness of the
break with historical Judaism; and the possibility of expressing this
identity in the Israeli public sphere.
We will start with Menachem Brinkers article on the limits of the
culture war in Israel. In Brinkers view, the culture war stems from the
dispute over Jewish culture, in the contrast between the ways in which
6

I do not presume to present all the relevant theories linked to the Judaism as culture
approach. What will be missing hereas in academic research in generalis a
description of the thoughts on Judaism among the members of the kibbutz movement.
This thinking is interesting not only because of the nature of its participants, but as
a reflection on one of the most intensive attempts in Israeli society at formulating a
Judaism geared towards secular people.
15

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

it is perceived by the religious, on the one hand, and by the secular,


on the other. He formulates the core of this dispute using the terms
origin and originality:7
A consistent secular approach emphasizes the fact and the value of
originality, i.e. that every Jew is also a potential source, and not only a
passive tool for the transmission of Jewish culture; a religious-traditional
approach, for its part, will emphasize that whoever considers himself as
the bearer of Jewish identity takes part in a given culture, which does
not originate with him, and which has, according to traditional Jewish
faith, an absolute origin. According to the latter approach, Jewish culture
is not a historical adventure, whose future cannot be predicted; one can
distinguish a stable pattern, which is persistent across all its changes and
upheavals, and which also shapes the future in advance. This distinction is
particularly salient in the attitude of Jewish culture towards its past. For
the secular creator of culture, such as Bialik or the Kibbutz Movement,
for example, the texts, ceremonies and customs of the past are, first
and foremost, material that will lead to the making of new creations
that will be different, in one way or another, from those of the past. For
the guardians of the traditional culture, the texts, religious rituals and
customs of the pastat least the main bulk of themrepresent binding
models and norms that may not be tampered with.

In the above words, Judaism as perceived by secular people is


compared to Judaism as perceived by the religious. The conflict
between these two approaches results from their extreme difference:
the secular approach attributes the creation of culture to man, granting
importance to the fact of his originality; the religious approach, for
its part, attributes the contents to one absolute source. The secular
approach is open and dynamic, whereas the religious approach exhibits
permanent patterns, and those who maintain it have a passive role.
Another formulation of this opposition is found in the claim that
the past is only raw material for the secular, while for the religious
people the past is perceived as a norm which they must maintain.
Through these binary oppositions, Jewish culture is presented as
an alternative to traditional Judaism. The contents of these pairs of
7

Brinker, Culture War, p. 279.


16

-------------------------------------------------------------II. Judaism as Culture-------------------------------------------------------------

oppositions (original versus origin and dynamism versus passivity)


express Brinkers preference for secular culture, and his analysis is an
attempt at legitimizing it.
This portrayal of secular Jewish culture as dynamic and creative
accurately reflects the widespread image of the secular person among
Israeli intellectuals. The secular person is presented as someone who
does not embrace traditional contents, but as someone who scrutinizes
them and shapes them according to his choice. This is, for example, S.
Yizhars main claim, in his famous article entitled The Courage to Be
Secular8: The secular person is someone who takes upon himself to
be constantly in a revolutionary situation [] thus the secular person
is aware of his duty to decide, constantly, about the issues at stake. The
fact that people once acted as they did is not sufficient reason for us to
act this way today.9 Brinker speaks in similar terms, although he uses
a slightly different tone: A secular person lives by his thought more
than by his instinct of belonging. He comes to terms with the dictates
of modernity invoking the absence of a single life-style for all human
beings. He demands and, in fact, takes on the freedom of determining
for himself and by himself, from his intellectual and psychological
sources, what is good and what is bad in his tradition, as in any other
human tradition.10
The secular person is presented as having set himself free from the
bonds of tradition. Thus, we should not be surprised that he is also
described as the one who discovers its hidden treasures and, in fact,
who saves Jewish tradition from the ongoing repression perpetrated
by the Orthodox. As put by journalist Yakov Rabi:11
During most of Diaspora history, and particularly during the hundreds
of years prior to the Haskala, the path of Jewish heritage was narrow,
albeit deep: serving God in two waysprayer and supplication, fasting
and other religious rituals, on the one hand; and the Torah study, on

9
10
11

Yizhar, Courage, p.75. This rather famous article appeared in the early 80s, at a time
when the return to religion was widespread within the secular population.
Yizhar, Courage, p. 75.
Brinker, Without Doctrine, p. 57.
Rabi, Knowing Judaism.
17

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

the other. In other words, Torah study, which is essentially and mainly
the Oral Law, the Talmud or large chunks of it, the debates of Abaye
and Rava, the deliberations of the halakhahair-splitting longwinded
debates. Only those who left the fold, adopting a so-called bad lifestyle,
free of the suffering inflicted by the tyranny of the halakhaexpanded
the domain of our cultural assets; it was they who enabled the Bible, the
Kabbalah and religious philosophy to regain their pride, and clarified
and refined the meaning of all Jewish religious contents. These things
could take place only within a liberal-scientific, historical-philological
or esthetic approach. Even halakhic research

the foundation and


institution of the rabbinate and learningwas expanded and clarified
only outside the confines of the yeshiva and the beit-midrash, under the
wings of modern scholars (regardless of whether or not they observed
commandments in their private lives) and in academic research centers,
seminars and university libraries. Woe unto us as Jews and woe unto
Judaism as a cultural system if the orthodoxy of the pious faithful were
to continue to rule.12

This type of argument is the backbone of the claims made by


historians, such as Josef Dan and Amos Funkenstein, claiming that
they are the keepers of Jewish tradition, and better keepers than the
Ultra-Orthodox.13 The statements brought forth so far represent the
effort to present secular Jewish tradition as an alternative to traditional
Judaism. What they imply is the claim that the bearers of this culture
should be thought of as the faithful followers of historical Judaism. This
issue vaguely expresses the second point we mentioned abovecoming
to grips with the awareness of the break from traditional Judaism. This
issue directly concerns some of the intellectuals writing about these
topics, who express opposing views: some speak of the power of this
break and, based on this recognition, try to clarify the possibilities open
to them; others, on the other hand, claim that this break is non-existent.
The words of Meir Ayali, a member of Kibbutz Yifat, are an example
of the first position. His fear is that the members of the kibbutz
movement will lose their post-biblical literary-cultural heritage.14 In
12
13
14

Kedmi, Jewish Identity, p. 62.


Dan, Collapse; Funkenstein, Secular Judaism.
Ayali, Religious Tradition, p. 20.
18

-------------------------------------------------------------II. Judaism as Culture-------------------------------------------------------------

his view, Judaism is fraught with religious symbols and, therefore, it


is absurd to demand from someone whose heart has emptied itself of
religious faith to return to the faith. The possibilities that open to the
secular Jew who wishes to return to his sources are the following: to
adopt a purely religious approach and fake faith, or to define Judaism
as a purely national phenomenon, without any spiritual attributes or
specific values.15 This dichotomy expresses the awareness of the gulf
between the secular person and Judaism. Ayali attempts to overcome
this by suggesting a third option: Great spiritual and moral values
appeared among this nation and became its heritage, and they are
what determined its unique character. They found their expression in
numerous cultural creationsnot only in the Bible, determined day-today behavior and were symbolized in a number of commandments that
determined our mentality. Can a return, even partial, not be possible for
a person who strips away the trappings of simple faith from all these, a
faith which has also undergone change from generation to generation?16
Ayali provides further details on his proposal as he proceeds.
The contact with the sources of Judaism requires that their spiritual
significance be clarified. In order to do so, we must revert to study as
a basic value, and return to the symbols of Judaism: By renewing the
existence of these symbols, albeit in a selective way only, we will grant a
more Jewish character to our life [] and we will return the missing link
from the chain that binds us to generations of our ancestors and branches
of our brothers.17 It is doubtful if this suggestion of Ayalis provides any
real solutionindeed, what return to Judaism can there be for the one
who does away with the trappings of simple faith? How can selectivity
help him in this endeavor? What Ayali suggests is, in actual fact, not that
different from the dichotomy he finds unsatisfactory. These problems,
however, are not of our concern at this point; we only mention them
here because they illustrate the difficulty of overcoming the break from
religious tradition. Those conscious of this break are reminded of it not
only when they reflect on their remoteness from tradition, but also in
15
16
17

Ayali, Religious Tradition, p. 22.


Ayali, Where is Honesty? p. 129.
Ibid., p. 129.
19

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

their attempts to overcome it.


The poet Avraham Shlonsky presented a totally opposite view. He
questioned the fact that the continuity of Judaism represented a unity:
What continuity is there, for example, between a chapter from Amos,
or from the Song of Songs, Job and the Psalms, and the bull that gored
the cow? Even from a formal point of view, other than style and syntax,
there is, so to speak, no unbroken link between the Bible, the Mishna
and the Talmud.18 This general objection leads Shlonsky to claim that
the problem of the secular is not the break but, in fact, the loss of faith
in continuity:
The question of culture is that of the active inheritance. Our generation
has enjoyed a generous portion of itbecause this is the generation of
a great tikkun. Whoever does not live todays eventsin the destiny of
the world and in the destiny of Israelas a period of revolution, will
never comprehend the theory of the stages of the changes also taking
place within us. He will see what is new and claim: Blasphemy. He will
hear the other and say: tradition is being abandoned. But tradition does
not amount to a fixed and stable sum of significant values that need
to be maintainedrather, it is a power pushing towards continuation,
in which imagination and difference, in their unaggressive opposition,
create continuity. To quote Lenin: Maintaining a tradition does not
mean in any sense being satisfied with it.19

Shlonsky does not see the secular as having squandered away their
tradition, but rather as carrying out, unknowingly, a tremendous
revolution within this tradition. The main reason for their distress
stems from their lack of understanding of their role, and from the
misunderstanding of the dynamic nature that characterizes every
tradition. The claim that tradition, by nature, is comprised of a
wide range of contents leads many intellectuals to think that they
are standing on the threshold of a new Jewish culture whose entire
image will only take shape in the future. Therefore, the construction
of a continuous and unified Jewish culture is a task that necessarily
surpasses their activities and their time period. This same tone is
18
19

Kedmi, Jewish Identity, p.112.


Ibid., p.113.
20

-------------------------------------------------------------II. Judaism as Culture-------------------------------------------------------------

also voiced by Daniel Ben Nahum, a member of Kibbutz Mizra, who


translated the work of Ber Borochov into Hebrew:
A new, integral Jewish culture will develop here, built on the foundations
of Jewish heritage. The ones who were right were those who claimed that
this heritage comprised both religious Judaism and the Haskalah, as well
as the history of emancipation, and even the Bund, with all its mistakes;
and Spinoza and Marx, as well. A new, integral Jewish culture will arise
here, one that is synthetic in the deep sense of the word. How will it grow?
This is a question for the generations to come, a very difficult issue. This
is an endeavor that is no less grand and important than the economic
establishment of the Jewish people on productive grounds. The task is
not for us to complete.20

The words spoken by the people presented aboveAyali, Shlonsky


and Ben Nahumillustrate their opposing views, along the continuum
that stretches between secular Judaism and Jewish tradition. Some,
like Shlonsky, feel that secular people are located along this continuum,
while others, like Ayali, feel that they are outside it; one party
emphasizes the existence of the break, whereas the others believe that
the awareness of the break shows a misunderstanding of the ways a
culture is created.
Some intellectuals, however, found another way of dealing with the
awareness of the break: they attempt to clarify which life experience in
Israeli society can best perpetuate Jewish tradition. Their focus is not
on a general evaluation of the break from Jewish tradition, but rather
on the attempt to clarify how a secular person can connect to tradition.
For example, in Eliezer Schweids book, Judaism and Secular Culture, he
presents the humanistic secular approach, as well as the potential place
of religious contents within it.21 He opens with the following question:
Is it not possible to define the notion of secular culture in a positive
way, without casting away religious contents that seem positive from the
point of view of this culture?22 The answer he suggests is based on his
evaluation of human life. Faith is not meaningless for the non-believer,
20
21
22

Ben Nachum, Judaism, p.77.


Schweid, Secular Culture, pp. 221-248.
Ibid., p.223.
21

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

as it is an alternative that interprets the meaning of his decision to


take the opposing direction.23 Therefore, faith and the absence of
faith do not contradict each other; they represent conjoining spiritual
worlds.24 Choosing one of them throws light on the meaning of the
alternative choice: No human decision is totally devoid of ambivalence.
The road not chosen is felt through pangs of pain that we experience at
every crossroad.25 According to Schweid, the secular person can find
religious tradition interesting, since through it he can reach a deeper
understanding of the significance of his decisions. In other words,
the secular persons affinity with religious contentswith his past,
his culture and its various traditionsimplies the actual fulfillment
of his identity. In this way, the secular person contributes genuine
meaning to the world of traditiona world he can no longer accept
in all its simplicitywhich becomes part of his consciousness as a
secular person.
A similar attempt is found in the book On Jewish Existence at the
Present Time by philosopher Nathan Rotenstreich, who suggested an
interpretation of the relevance of the halakha in the life of the secular
person. The gist of his thought is as follows: the contents of tradition
have been expropriated from the regular authority and submitted to
the judgment of the individual (the examples of Yizhar and Brinker
cited above illustrate this point very well); the religious meaning of
tradition has gone. What does Rotenstreich propose to the secular
person interested in tradition? He starts by claiming that the main
point of Jewish religious tradition is the halakha rather than the Bible.26
This claim stems from the role filled by the halakha in the life of the
Jewish people in the past, as well as from the contents to be found in it,
which are relevant for the modern Jew. In his view, the halakha is what
enabled a unified national life to take place in the past. In the present,
this unity is achieved through the framework of a sovereign state.
This outcome enables a change to take place in the attitude towards

23
24
25
26

Ibid., p. 236.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 237.
Rotenstreich, Jewish Existence, p. 51.
22

-------------------------------------------------------------II. Judaism as Culture-------------------------------------------------------------

the halakha: rather than looking at it as a unifying factor for life as a


nation, one should examine its philosophical importance.27
How can a renewed affinity with religious Jewish tradition, i.e. with
halakha, take place? Rotenstreichs reply is that the halakha tends to
judge the present in light of the past. Lighting a fire on the Sabbath
is forbidden; therefore, turning the light on is forbidden today. In
other words, the inflexibility of the halakha stems from the fact that
it is anchored in the past.28 The devotion of the modern Jew cannot
be attributed to the obedience to the authority of past generations.
The inflexibility of the halakha means it cannot serve as a foundation
for the perpetuation of tradition, although the ideas it contains can
serve as a genuine basis for the modern Jews interest in his religious
tradition. To quote Rotenstreich: The modern Jew is likely to find
reason and justification for his allegiance to Judaism, not because it
is a given system, but because it contains ideas and thoughts that are
meaningful to him.29
What are these ideas that Rotenstreich finds in the halakha?
Modern-day life is based on scientific culture, which abstains from
taking a moral stand. In other words, scientific culture measures man
according to his ability to act, to turn potential into reality. It does
not bother to clarify which potential element would be worth realizing.
Scientific culture generates a lifestyle that is universal and which the
modern Jew is called upon to digress from, in order to fulfill a tradition
that is his own. How can religious Jewish tradition serve as the modern
Jews own tradition and extricate him from the universal culture of
science, according to Rotenstreich? His answer is that the philosophical
ideas invested in a life of halakha call for a critical look at the necessary
limitations of shapeless spontaneity or spontaneity without
boundaries,30 which characterize a science-based lifestyle. What the
scientific culture lackspointing to the limitations of the fulfillment
of possibilitiesis a basic principle in the Jewish halakhic life.

27
28
29
30

Ibid., p. 53.
Ibid., p. 52.
Ibid., p. 53.
Ibid., p. 76.
23

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

According to Rotenstreich, The limits of mans action are determined


by scientific and technological knowledge. Jewish tradition, for its part,
sets boundaries to mans action, not determined by the possibilities
enabled by his knowledge, but based on the orders incumbent upon
him and the responsibility he is required to take upon himself.31
Thus, the main idea proposed by Rotenstreich is based on the fact
that the halakha contains a dimension that is critical of the culture of
science. In his view, the adoption of this dimension is a highly significant
spiritual act: it has the power to connect the Jew to his tradition and
set ethical limitations on the culture of science and technology. The
adoption of this critical dimension contained within the halakha is
likely to express the main value of secular lifethe shaping of human
life in an autonomous way, insofar as man fulfills his own sovereignty
by imposing limits upon himself.
Rotenstreich addresses himself to the individual in his attempt
to delineate the secular Jews relation to Judaism. Judaism can assist
the secular person in shaping his spiritual world and nurturing his
autonomous life. In this way, according to Rotenstreich, he can perpetuate
religious tradition, while shaping his secular life. Schweid suggests a
similar schemahe also addresses himself to the individual. In his view,
the contents of religion and a life of faith are relevant for the secular
person since they enable him to grasp the significance of his own spiritual
decisions as a secular person. In other words, the solutions suggested
by Rotenstreich and by Schweidif we are willing to consider these
as real solutionsare suitable for secular people whose spiritual life is
sufficiently vibrant, for those who reflect on their spiritual choices and on
their spiritual world. Not all Israeli intellectuals address themselves to this
group of secular peoplesome strive to find the relevance of Judaism for
wider realms of being, i.e. for Israeli society or for the State of Israel. We
will now observe two examples that illustrate this last point.
Amos Oz expresses the secular persons sense of belonging to
Jewish tradition, in the following way: in his view, the culture of the
people of Israel is made up of a hodgepodge of contents. The history
of the culture of Israel over the last thousands of years is made up of
31

Ibid., p. 61.
24

-------------------------------------------------------------II. Judaism as Culture-------------------------------------------------------------

a series of bitter quarrels [] Jewish culture at its best is a culture


of cooperation, of negotiations, of looking here and there [] It is a
spiritual essence which goes hand-in-hand with the idea of democracy
like a polyphonya choir of different voices that are orchestrated
by a system of accepted rules.32 And what does this anarchic culture
contain, according to Oz? All that the people of Israel has, all it has
accumulated over the generations, what was generated inside as well
as what was absorbed from the outside and became a member of the
household [] what is in Hebrew and what is in other languages. What
is written and what happens outside the written texts.33
According to Oz, the nature of Jewish culture grants the secular
authority a central and vital role. Since the halakha rejects variety, the
various factions within Judaism cannot coexist without a secular
authority or a non-Jewish authority. The secular State is the framework
that perpetuates the richness and variety of Jewish culture; it maintains
the multiple currents and contents as a shared experience. A.B. Yehoshua
goes one step further, and claims that it is the Israeli State and society
that have the power to fully enable the unfolding of Jewish culture.
Yehoshuas starting point is that the Jew is defined in two waysboth
as member of a nation and of a religion. One of the achievements of
Zionism is to liberate him from religion and to define him based on
his belonging to a nation. On this basis, Yehoshua presents a hierarchy
between the Jew and the Israeli: the Jew always represents a partial
way of life, whereas the Israeli represents the full measure of the Jewish
experience within a binding framework. The word Israeli represents a
total Jewish lifestyle [] This totality stems first of all from living within
a specific territory, which is the main basis for identity; from a popular
language, and from a well-defined lifestyle and society, which is called
upon to provide answers for each individual within its framework.34
How does the Jewish way of life come about as part of the Israeli way of
life? Yehoshuas answer is that the person living in the Diaspora cannot
realize his Jewish values within his lifes frameworks. The Judaism of
32
33
34

Oz, All the Hopes, p. 43.


Ibid., p. 48.
Yehoshua, In Praise of Normality, p. 126.
25

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

the Israeli is fullerhe can express his Jewish values within the Israeli
experience. This is how he illustrates this point:35
Is an Israeli jail, for example, managed according to the system of Jewish
values? This is a real question. When IDF soldiers keep combat ethics,
Jewish values are strengthened; but when IDF soldiers commit atrocities
Jewish values collapse. There is no longer any separation between a
closed spiritual world, where ideas are discussed, and reality, where this is
irrelevant. Large sections of our spiritual heritage were only theoretical,
and the fascinating and painful thing in Israeli reality is the exposure of
theory to life.

Yehoshuas ideas represent an attempt to explain how Israeli


society, which is of a secular nature, can express Jewish tradition. In the
description we provided here, his position is close to Ozs position: both
characterize Judaism in some way (pluralism, ethics) and designate
Israeli societya society of Jews organized within a political life that
is unique to themas the framework in which it can be expressed.
Until this point, we have been examining a number of Israeli
intellectuals who express, in various ways, the idea of Judaism as
culture. These intellectuals present Jewish culture as an alternative
to Jewish tradition, and attempt to explain how the former is a
continuation of the latter. This is what all of them attempt to do: by
juxtaposing the opposing terms source and originality, Brinker
opposes Jewish culture to religion in general; Rotenstreich claims that
the secular persons delving into the halakha will serve as a source for
the formulation of norms within a scientific culture; Shlonsky believes
that the revolution taking place in this generation is part of Jewish
tradition as a whole; while Yehoshua aims at realizing Jewish values
within the Israeli experience.
These intellectuals did not focus on what the Jewish people created
in the course of the process of secularization as the basis for the identity
of the secular Jew. This focus, which is exceptional within the discourse
of Israeli intellectuals, is the key purpose of the secular encyclopedia
New Jewish Time (Zman Yehudi Hadash), an enterprise that aims at
35

Ibid., p. 133.
26

-------------------------------------------------------------II. Judaism as Culture-------------------------------------------------------------

strengthening the identity of the secular Jew. What is proposed to


the secular person who consults it is not a transcription of Judaism
as a culture, but rather the creation that developed in the course of
the New Jewish Time. This is what the initiator and editor of the
project, Yair Tzaban, writes in the introduction to the project volumes.
He writes about the famous meeting between David Ben Gurion and
Rabbi Yeshaya Karelitz (the Chazon Ish), in which secularism was
spoken of in terms of an empty cart. Tzaban expresses his surprise
at the fact that, in voicing his defense of secularism, Ben Gurion spoke
of the settling of the land, of its building and development, but did not
emphasize the achievements of the new Jewish culture, particularly of
the Hebrew culture, in all its aspects.36 According to Tzaban, another
example of the disregard for the secular culture is the absence of the
word secularization or secularism from the Hebrew Encyclopedia.
This leads him to the conclusion that underlies the foundation of the
project of this encyclopedia: The public that defines itself as secular
should learn about the meaning of secularism, and how the processes
of modernization and secularization unfolded in our nation and in
other nations.37
Ahad Haam, of course, was the first to voice the idea of compiling
an encyclopedia that would incorporate all the knowledge necessary
for the construction of the identity of the secular Jew. This notion was
behind his writing The Treasury of Judaism (which, ironically, was finally
published in Russian) Thus, the idea of compiling the New Jewish Time
stems from Ahad Haams thought: the secular person should try to
overcome his difficulties by compiling texts that build his identity and
by familiarizing himself with them. However, the difference between
the two projects is significant: Ahad Haam sought to encompass all
of Jewish tradition, as familiarity with the works of people of ancient
times was a central axis in the creation of the non-religious Jew. The
writers of the New Jewish Time disagree with this view; they strive to
define the secular Jews identity on the basis of secular Jewish culture.38
36
37
38

Yovel, New Jewish Time, p. XI.


Ibid., p. XI.
See Jobani, Models of Secularism.
27

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

What is the significance of this change? What does the focus on


modernity

or perhaps, confining oneself to modernity

teach
us regarding the strengthening of the secular persons identity?
Naturally, one can look at is as an expression of the secular publics
growing self-confidence as it generates its own culture. The process
of secularization undoubtedly involves tearing oneself away painfully
from Jewish tradition; over the course of the generations, however,
there has been an accumulation of rich cultural creation in all realms
of lifeliterature, thought, ways of life, politics, and morewhich is
deep enough to enable the secular person to take root in it. The focus
on secular culture can also be a kind of acknowledgement of the futility
of the attempts to rewrite traditional Judaism as a culture. This project
most likely implies that the attempts on the part of Ayali, Rotenstreich,
Schweid, Brinker, Rabi, and of many others who are not mentioned
here, have failed. The contents of Judaism are religious contents; as
such, they settle easily into the heart of the simple believer. Removing
the religious significance from these contents has turned them into
artificial symbols, fraught with explanations and justifications, and
they are no longer indispensable. Locking oneself up within secular
creativity thus expresses a sign of this disappointment. It could also
illustrate the two possibilities that were just mentioned: given the selfconfidence of the secular culture, the editors of the encyclopedia do
not hesitate to abandon the pointless efforts of rewriting traditional
Judaism as a culture.

III. Reservations about Judaism


The views presented in this section share the call to dispense with
Judaism as the basis for the identity of secular Jews, both at the
individual level as well as at the level of society. This claim is not new: as
we remember, Yaakov Klatzkin expressed it very strongly. He believed
that religion, which helped the Jewish people survive both spiritually
and in its political life, has vanished forever; therefore, the Jewish
people recreate itself on the basis of secular elementsa shared
territory and the Hebrew language. Another more familiar expression
of the alienation from Judaism is linked to the group of the Young
28

-------------------------------------------------- III. Reservations about Judaism--------------------------------------------------

Hebrews (best known by the derogatory name The Canaanites,


coined by Avraham Shlonsky). This group included YoNathan Ratosh
and Adia Horon, the linguist Uzi Ornan, the poet Aaron Amir, the
historian and journalist Boaz Evron, the journalist and public figure
Uri Avneri, and others. One expression of the Young Hebrews sharp
disagreement with Judaism appeared in Aaron Amirs article in Aleph,
the movements journal, in 1950:39
Judaism in its entirety, all the values and creations of its historys
tradition, is foreign to the generation of its youth, the Sons of the Land
(bnei haaretz), not because they have grown to hate the teachers or as a
consequence of a defective teaching method; rather, it has become foreign
in spite of those who strove to make them love Judaism. It is essentially
foreign to them because the social reality which they come from and into
which they are growing is naturally and essentially opposed to the Jewish
experience. It is strange to them because they are strangers to it.

All the members of the Young Hebrews shared these reservations


concerning Judaism. They also believed that Jewish heritage was
retarding the formation of an Israeli nation. However, all the persons
mentioned here did not share the same view on every topic; for Ratosh,
Horon and Amir, Judaism should be rejected in favor of a primeval
Hebrew culture, which they hoped to return to as the basis for the
identity of the immigrant society that would crystallize in Israel. This
culture, however, was not the final destination for intellectuals such
as Avnerihe followed Ratoshs trend by rejecting Judaism, but
drew away from the latters cultural visions and called for the creation
of a Hebrew collective, which would blend into the political space
surrounding it, and whose identity would be shaped entirely within a
secular-national framework.
The importance of the approaches mentioned aboveboth that of
Klatzkin and that of the Young Hebrews and their followersdoes not
lie in their impact on the public, nor in their adoption by intellectuals:
Klatzkins analyses of the loss of Judaism have been forgotten; the
visions of Ratosh and his friends about the new Hebrew drew few
39

Gretz, The Canaanite Group, p.5.


29

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

followers and certainly did not develop into a politically significant


ideologythe details of these approaches have become dim and
their plans seem like nave daydreaming. The claim contained in these
approaches, however, gave rise to a certain option within the ongoing
debate on the future of Judaism among Israelis. In other words, those
who believe that in order for Israeli society to crystallize it must cut
itself off from Judaism are not formulating a new claim. This option has
many predecessors, who grant those calling for alienating oneself from
Judaism a certain historical and ideological depth.
We will now expand several of these ideas. As we proceed, we will
be able to see that the reservations concerning Judaism were shared by
intellectuals who are very distant from one another: Zionists, who fear
for the secular future of the State of Israel (such as Gershon Weiler and
Yigal Elam); the perpetuators of the Canaanite idea (Boaz Evron, Uzi
Ornan); and anti-Zionists who strive to eradicate from Israeli society
nationalist myths that originate in Judaism (Adi Ofir). The reader will
also notice that a secular philosopher (Gilad Bareli) and an Orthodox
philosopher (Yeshayahu Leibovitz) both claim that the religious
meaning of Judaism is unaccessible to the secular person who strives
to acquaint himself with it.40
A partial characterization of the model of the views we will be calling
reservations about Judaism can be found in Charles Liebmans article
on the culture wars in Israel.41 In this article, Liebman distinguishes
between two secular cultures present in Israeli intellectual lifethe
first he calls Jewish secularism (which can serve as the general term
for the secular cultures that maintain a positive link with Judaism);
the second, which is alienated from Judaism, Liebman links with
Western post-modern consumer culture. This is how he describes it:
This culture is, at best, indifferent to Jewish tradition and in certain
aspects, even hostile to it. At the level of the individual, its most
extreme supporters avoid celebrating any Jewish tradition or ceremony.
40

41

This last example shows us that, although this chapter deals with the secular thinkers,
the nature of their thought is not determined exclusively by their personal identity.
We limit ourselves to this group because it suffices for the drawing of a schematic
picture of the Israeli debate on the meaning of Judaism for the secular public.
Liebman, Culture War.
30

-------------------------------------------------- III. Reservations about Judaism--------------------------------------------------

Its extreme political expression is post-Zionism, i.e. the objection to the


existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish State.42
Liebman believed that this trend was prominently represented in
the media and among academics in the humanities and social sciences
departments. In characterizing the nature of this culture, he quoted
Haaretz journalists. For example, Gideon Samet described secularism
as an experience superior to nationalism: The new language is made
up of new forms of consumption of culture and leisure, which are
transnational. This is the case, for example, in popular music, cinema,
travels abroad, fashion, and even in the way people talk.43 Orit Shohat
writes that From that day [when Rabin was murdered] onwards, Israeli
society should have split, primarily based on this criterion: democrats
on one side, and all the others on the opposite side; democrats versus
royalists (Davids royalty which is being renewed in Hebron), democrats
versus fascists, democrats versus the religious.44
We will now turn to more detailed expressions of reservations
about Judaism, in which the renunciation of Judaism is presented
as the conclusion of an analysisexamples of this can be found in
the writings of post-Zionist intellectuals. In his book The Work for
the Present, Adi Ofir analyses the secular peoples use of texts from
the religious tradition.45 He devotes one chapter to the Passover
Haggadah, opening with a question pertaining to the unique status
of this text for the secular public, most of whom read the Passover
Haggadah on the night of the Seder. This is highly surprising, for a
number of reasons: the text is not easily accessible to the average
Israeli readerthe language is difficult and the text is made up of an
assemblage of pieces, which makes it hard to understand; contrary
to many other religious ceremonies that are celebrated by secular
people (such as circumcisions, bar mitzvahs, and weddings), the
Haggadah is not read under the auspices of a religious figure who
leads the ceremony and determines its contentsin other words,

42
43
44
45

Ibid., p. 9.
Samet, Advance One Class.
Shochat, Fascist Ecology.
Ofir, Present.
31

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

secular family members read the Haggadah of their own free will; and
in Israeli culture, and particularly in Kibbutz society, attempts have
been made at creating alternative, secular Passover Haggadot. The
secular person could have chosen texts which he feels closer to and
which reflect his own world.
Why then are secular people attached to the Passover Haggadah?
Ofir attempts to answer this question by looking at its core significance.
In general terms, his claim is that one can identify the entire structure
of a discourse that revolves around the opposition between the Jew and
the Gentile, whose main outline has been preserved, not only in the
rabbinical discourse but also in the secular nationalistic discourse, which
rebelled against it and tried to replace it.46 The aim of this discourse is to
organize Jewish self-consciousness and the Jewish historical experience
as it has been experienced throughout the generations.47 According to
Ofir, the links between Israel and the other nations are shaped along
the plot which is told in the Haggadah. Its main lines are as follows: the
Gentiles oppress the people of Israel; the people of Israel turns to its
God, who responds to this call by humiliating the oppressive Gentile. As
stated, this narrative determines the Jewish peoples self-consciousness,
and is ahistoric in status:
The entire history of Israel is the history of the descent from Egypt,
enslavement in Egypt and the Exodus from Egypt. Henceforth, Israel has
no history, only stories whose beginning and end are foreknown, since
they are generated as analogies to the first and last historical event,
History with a capital H. Henceforth, each story will be a reflection of
the first story and will serve as a concretization, at different times and in
various places, of the eternal return of the paradigm: Israel/Gentile/God.48

The call for the release from these texts is the conclusion drawn
from the analysis of the politico-cultural function of Jewish sources,
which have caused tremendous damage. The narratives they formulate
nurture Israeli nationalism, and particularly the notion that peace
46
47
48

Ibid., p. 53.
Ibid., p. 85.
Ibid., p. 102.
32

-------------------------------------------------- III. Reservations about Judaism--------------------------------------------------

threatens the existence of the Jewish people. The danger such sources
entail is particularly severe because they are shared by the various
camps of Israeli society, both religious and secular. What does Ofir
suggest should be done? One suggestion is to maintain at all costs the
threatening presence of the Gentile and the fundamental role of every
external threat that is perceived as an expression of essential otherness.
Another way, which Ofir believes best describes his proposal, is to try to
liberate the discourse or change it.49
In Ofirs case, the alienation from Judaism is justified as a way to
liberate the discourse. Other justifications for the desired liberation
from Judaism are found in the works of sociologist Uri Ram. In his
view, Hebrew secular nationalism contains a blurred or repressed form
of Judaismthis must be the case, since Judaism is what justified
its act of colonization. However, democracy and the secular values
underlying this secular nationalism clash with the presence of Judaism
in Israel. Ram describes this conflict as follows:
Secularism implies the recognition of the absence of any given meaning
in the world. Freedom implies generating meaning out of free will.
Democracy is a form of regime that is based on secular freedom. There
is a basic contradiction between a democratic regime and collective
faith, whether it is defined as religion or as nation (naturally, religion
and nation can coexist in a democratic regime, however the latter
cannot exist within a religious or nationalist commitment). Religion and
nationalism strive to mold the individual existential void according
to the fixed patternswhich are invented every now and againof
collective memory: whether through following the commandments and
believing in an eternal omnipotent God, or by striving towards a unique
national-historical goal, like the values which principals instill in the
minds of young children in dark totalitarian countries, God forbid. In
order to maintain a democratic life, i.e. a secular and free life, a clear and
deliberate act of forgetting must be initiated.50

Thus, the strong claim for alienation from Judaism stems from the
contradiction which Ram sees between Judaism on the one hand, and
49
50

Ibid., p. 56.
Ram, In Praise of Forgetting, p. 357.
33

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

democracy and the secularism which underlies it, on the other. He thus
offers the reader three possibilities:
In Israel, a cultural struggle is taking place over collective memory,
both theoretically and concretely. It is a struggle between three main
historical approaches: the national approach to history, which contains
the unsolved contradiction between democracy and Judaism; the
nationalistic approach to history, which solves this contradiction by
renouncing a democratic future; and the civic approach to history, which
solves this contradiction by renouncing the ethnic past. This is a struggle
taking place between a past which calls for burying the future and a
future which calls for burying the past. The choice is: a tormented past or
a reasonable future.51

It is clear to the reader which possibility Ram favors: Judaism


is an obstacle to the creation of a democratic and secular future for
Israeli society, and it is essential that it be renounced. The intellectuals
presented in this section are post-Zioniststheir dissociation from
Zionist ideology is perceptible even in the short extracts cited in this
section. The dissociation from Judaism, however, is not limited to these
circles; this conclusion is arrived at through a variety of different and
even conflicting arguments, including those marshaled by persons who
identify deeply with the Zionist enterprise. Philosopher Gershon Weiler
is one such example. In his view, the Jewish halakha is in fundamental
conflict with the State as a secular entity:
The halakha recognizes only slaves. It recognizes no national will; it relies
on the slaves will whose aim it is to please his master. There is no room
in the halakha for the citizen who is free to choose his lifestyle within
the framework of laws that he legislates by way of his freely elected
representatives. Hence, it is diametrically opposed to the principles that
inspire the State, and his life as a person and as a citizen. Perhaps the
position of the halakha is that a person need not be a citizen at all; this
is the problem of the halakha. The problem of the State is that a person
cannot be a citizen and the slave of a being whose representatives claim
His supreme authority.52
51
52

Ibid., p. 349.
Weiler, Theocracy, p. 291.
34

-------------------------------------------------- III. Reservations about Judaism--------------------------------------------------

Weiler knows very well that his claims about the halakha are but
one of its many aspects (he even indicates this prominently in his book,
on the text appearing on the back cover). His position, however, that
Judaism is dangerous for the State of Israel because of the tension that
exists between its basic values and the secular State, is based on the
recognition of one of halakhas aspects. In his view, the mere presence
of this trend in Judaism endangers the State of Israel. Historian Yigal
Eilam expresses a similar view of the struggle between the State and
Judaism, and thus his book is entitled The End of Judaism.53
Weiler and Eilams views differ greatly from those of Ofir and Ram.
The differences between them are reflected in the nature and intensity of
their dissociation from Judaism. For Ofir, for example, Judaism mutilates
the Israeli, in the sense that it contributes to his holding of distorted
views; it is at the root of nationalism and stirs up war. In Weilers opinion,
Judaism as the religion of halakha undermines the existence of the State.
In spite of the differences between them, these intellectuals express a
shared view: Judaism is perceived as an ensemble of contents which,
given what they are, endanger the values of secular life.
We will now turn to the last example of the representatives of the
position we called reservations about Judaism. We are referring to
the provocative article written by philosopher Gilad Bareli, entitled On
the Secularized Study of Torah.54 Bareli directs his claimsand, in
fact, his criticismat the cultural phenomenon of the spread of the
study of religious texts among secular people (whether it is the Talmud,
the Agadah, traditional biblical exegesis, etc.) This learning takes place
in secular batei midrash and in colleges, such as Alma. In his article,
Bareli defines the secular person as follows: [He] is not a person
who considers himself as exempt from the fulfillment of religious
obligations, but someone who does not recognize these obligations or
the source of their validity in any way; he does not recognize them
because, for him, they are groundless, which is why they are obligatory
for no one. From his point of view, they are not obligations which, for
some reason, are not applicable to him or from which he is exempt: they
53
54

Eilam, The End of Judaism.


Bareli, The Study of Torah, pp. 9-23.
35

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

are not obligations at allneither with respect to their contents, nor


with respect to their validity.55
The aim of Barelis article is to show that this secular
personsomeone for whom the basic concepts of Judaism are
meaninglessis a stranger to Judaism. Even if he desires, the religious
contents are inaccessible to him. Barelis central assumption is borrowed
from Russells and Freges philosophy of languagemore specifically,
the claim according to which understanding of any content depends
on the conditions in the world and on previous assumptions: The very
existence of a content [] and the possibility of it being understood
depend on the presence of specific concrete conditions in the world
[] in such a way that it is doubtful that whoever rejects them can, in
a coherent way, hold on to the possibility of grasping these contents.56
Since the secular person, according to Bareli, is not someone who
rejects the existence of God, but someone who rejects the meaning of
the concept of Godhe cannot understand texts that revolve around
this and similar concepts:
What can the totally secular person understand when studying the
midrashim on the Vision of the Chariot and the Creation, the laws
pertaining to prayer and intention, sacrifices and sacred things. All of
these are imbued with religious concepts which, in order to be understood,
call for the acceptance of a system of presuppositions, beliefs, and a way
of life; they are based on behavioral patterns and the experiences they
imply, which are entirely foreign to the totally secular person, who denies
and rejects them.57

In other words, the secular person, if indeed he is genuinely secular,


the totally secular person, in Barelis language, must reject any study
of religious contents as such, or he must admit that he is not secular
in the full sense of the term. One way or another, genuine secularism
and any approach to Judaism as a collection of religious contents are
two contradictory possibilities. The genuine secular person must avoid
55
56
57

Ibid., p.10.
Ibid., p.15.
Ibid., p. 17.
36

-------------------------------------------------- III. Reservations about Judaism--------------------------------------------------

studying Judaism; naturally, he can study it as historical material or


as an ensemble of cultural expressions, but Judaism as a religion is
inaccessible to him.
Although this chapter deals with the positions of secular intellectuals,
we should deviate for a moment from this frame in order to take a look
at the deep similarity between Barelis claims and Yeshayahu Leibowitzs
position. In one of his articles, Leibowitz responded to the question as
to how the secular person could celebrate the Jewish holy days.58 He
claimed that there are two ways of understanding the Jewish holy days:
as permanent formulas expressing service to God, which are imposed
upon man or as human-popular institutions, which were meant to
fulfill the needs of man or of the nation. This dichotomy is essential
for Leibowitzs categorical analysis: The entire meaning of the holy day
lies in its religious content, and any cancellation of this content (which
is often euphemized as innovation of content) is nothing more than
the annulment of the meaning of the holy day and its transformation
into a pointless festival, devoid of any value or meaning. Therefore, the
Jewish holy days are necessarily foreign to secular people. In a nutshell,
it is impossible to bring free young people to the traditional holidays.
The traditional holy days have no meaning for them and, therefore,
a person cannot feel any affinity towards them, if he does not take
upon himself the yoke of the Heavenly Kingdom. Leibowitz leaves no
possibility of affinity with the Jewish holy daysand with tradition,
in generalfor the secular person. For him, religion has meaning only
for the one who believes in its divine origin; the secular person must
alienate himself from it if he intends to remain secular.
Until this point, we have cited a number of claims made by Israeli
intellectuals, all of whom reach the conclusion that the secular person
and his world are in conflict with Judaism. The reader may claim that
the inclusion of these intellectuals in the same categoryKlatzkin,
the Canaanites, Ofir, Ram, Weiler, and Barelidistorts their work, and
puts forth a single position entitled reservations about Judaism by
ignoring or blurring the differences between these figures. This claim
must be rejected for two reasons. Firstly, although it can be assumed
58

Leibowitz, Faith, pp. 67-69.


37

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

that Gershon Weiler had a more positive attitude towards Judaism


than Uri Ram, he invested much intellectual effort into clarifying the
dangers of Judaism for the existence of the secular state, rather than on
delineating a possible meaning of Judaism for secular people. Weilers
warm feelings towards Judaism are, therefore, outside the realm of our
discussion. Naturally, our study is limited to the contents of the remarks
made by these intellectuals, rather than to their full understanding in
light of the authors identity or personality. Secondly, the differences
between the intellectuals do not annul the fact that they reach a common
conclusion. This conclusion

reservations about Judaism

is of
considerable public significance; therefore, if an intellectual holds this
view, we should consider it, rather than the justifications he brings to
support it, as sufficient basis for characterizing that view.

IV. Spiritual Judaism


Over the last few years, Israeli cultureand many other cultures in
the Westhas been marked by a blossoming of the New Age trend,
which includes familiarization with Oriental meditation techniques,
numerology, alternative therapy methods, esoteric teachings, ecology,
and even Judaismmainly the Kabbalah. As indicated at the beginning
of the chapter, this eclecticism is an essential feature of the New Age:
it enables the individual to express his selfhood, as well as the modern
ethos of man as a self-fashioning subject. The individual explores the
various possibilities, meanders among them regularly, and chooses
according to his taste.
These trends

and, apparently, their predecessors as they


appeared in Israeli culture of the late 1950scan be characterized as
follows: unlike the secular positions described above, here the Jewish
contents are not voided of religious meaning; while God still refers to
a transcendental being, this does not imply an acceptance of tradition
or a return to it. Religious tradition, as perceived by the bearers of
spiritual culture, has no collective meaning, and its interpretation is
not given to the rabbis. In fact, God no longer serves as a source of
authority with the power to guide the believer through life, but as a
being whose presence is mysterious. Thinking about this presence is
38

-------------------------------------------------------------- IV. Spiritual Judaism---------------------------------------------------------------

likely to rescue man from the sphere of his everyday life, where his soul
dwells in exile, and help him discover another dimension of his life.
Religious symbols are thus integrated into a project whose main
focus is to help man discover his individuality, and to discover the divine
within him. In other words, as mentioned above, the representatives of
this trend seem to have nothing to do with our topic of interest; those
advocating a spiritual path towards Judaism seem to represent a
religious current that has nothing in common with the world of secular
people. But how then are we to understand why most representatives of
these trends are perceived as secular and that their readers and students
are also identified as such? Perhaps this reflects the superficiality of the
secular-religious classification or, more precisely, the flaws in the use
of the term secular? I do not think so. Spiritual trends proliferate
among the secular public because some of their key values reflect the
secular way of life: they perceive religious contents as raw material
for the fulfillment of the idea of autonomous human life. Religious
contents are not perceived as a call to respond to the commands of a
God who reveals Himself to his people and whose will is transmitted
through a common and binding tradition; rather, the Divinity and its
presence are more like a resonating box through which it is possible
for the individual to feel his individuality, as well as the depth of his
life, rather than ordering a specific lifestyle. The secular nature of the
spiritual approaches is determined on the basis of the role played by
religious contents, and is not undermined by their presence.
We will now investigate these approaches through the prism of the
world of several such intellectuals, beginning with Pinchas Sadeh in the
late 1950s. In the last two decades of his life, Sadeh was deeply involved
in editing and publishing religious texts for the secular public, including
a collection of prayers, and collected stories about Rabbi Nachman
of Breslov and the Baal Shem-Tov. His interest in and admiration
for Judaism were very uncharacteristic of his early days: in his wellknown book Life as a Parable, published in 1958, he sharply criticizes
Judaism, highlighting its flaws. This followed the rejection of his first
published collection of poems, Masa Dumah. Sadeh characterizes the
critics coldness towards these poems as a misunderstanding, which he
explains as follows: I dont think that the misunderstanding towards
39

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

me was accidental. I think it hadand still hasa deep reason. I


believe that the reason lies in the fact that the Jew [] is essentially
non-religious, whereas I am essentially religious. What is the meaning
of religious for Sadeh? The supreme value in my world is the soul,
which God created in all its uniqueness, and to whom he gave every
fruit of the Gardens trees to eat, and every animal and fish to rule
over. The world is the souls landscape.59 Judaism, on the other hand,
is a collective and suffocating religionin fact, not a religion but the
oppression of the religious feeling. Sadeh explains this as follows:
How can something that is not individual be religious? Life, which is
Gods world, is directed towards the individual! But do Jewish religious
texts contain any recognition of the individual? Do they include any
hint of the souls everlasting nature? Judaism could only understand
the notion of redemption as social redemption, because it understood
guilt only in terms of social, criminal guilt; Judaism never gave birth []
to any real genius in literature, philosophy or art unless the individual,
by accident or as a result of persecution, sought beyond its borders. []
Judaism is irony, politics, vulgarity, nullity, science, materialism, i.e.
everything that seals the source of life, that freezes the heart and shuts
any door leading to the Kingdom of Heaven; it is the enemy of greatness,
of love, of longing, of charm, of the real sin, of truth itself.

What characterizes Sadehs world throughout his oeuvre is his


unequivocal reduction of religion to the individuals attachment to God,
and his indifference and even outright mockery towards any broader
social context. In his view, life is the story of the individual facing God:
Man is a cosmic being, he exists within the infinite, i.e. within God;
he is not a social being, he does not exist within the city or the State.60
His faithfulness to himself echoes Nietzsches motive of self-creation,
which Sadeh presents as an act of religious significance: I want to be
faithful to life. This is my criterion. I have no other way of coming into
contact with God [] Only through life [] this is the only contact I have
with the divinity, of which I know nothing, and this I want to express.61
59
60
61

Sadeh, Life as a Parable, p. 185.


Ibid., p. 414.
Ibid., p. 36.
40

-------------------------------------------------------------- IV. Spiritual Judaism---------------------------------------------------------------

As mentioned above, Sadehs deep interest in Judaism, particularly


in Hassidism, in the final period of his life, does indicate a change in
his religious world. What Sadeh found at the start of his journey in
thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Friedrich Hlderlin, and Herman
Hesse, he found in old age in Hassidic works and in the corpus of Jewish
prayers, as is witnessed through his project of editing Jewish books.
As we recall, Sadeh edited these books for the secular public. His role
as mediator was the creation of a rapprochement between the secular,
who had become estranged from the spiritual world, and the language
and contexts of those books. Through his editing and in the essays he
appended to them, he granted them a new meaning, expressing secular
values. For example, his editing work made the prayer book (Aneni
[Answer Me]A Selection of Prayers and Religious Poems of the People
of Israel, from the Covenant of the Pieces to The Present Day) into a series
of poems whose common denominator was the potential link between
them and the individuals world. Sadeh states this clearly in the epilogue:
Naturally, I had no specific intention of giving this book the shape, even
if partial and limited, as a prayer book or a mahzor [festival prayer book],
which is why I made my choice without any obligation to normative
values. For example, I did not include the Amidah [the 18 daily blessings]
although, from the normative point of view, it is the fundamental prayer
in the prayer book; of course, as such, it has become rote. What I chose
was what evoked in me a feeling of wonder, of magic, of respect, a sense
of how awesome is this place or how beautiful is this place. In other
words, my true interest was in prayer as an expression of individual
faith, of mental enlightenment or spiritual creation. As for the social or
psychological role of prayer []that did not interest me in the least.

In spite of his religious state of mind, Sadeh assumes that


religious tradition is raw material subject to his judgment and taste.
The fundamental justification for the choice of certain texts is the
extent to which it corresponds to the world of the individual. These
elementsif we return to the example we cited abovestand out
in the personal essays included in the book Aneni. Personal moments
in Sadehs life shed light on the prayers; the meaning attached to
them is in fact their power to express the murmurs of Sadehs soul,
41

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

as is all great poetry. What, then, is the difference between Sadeh


and the representatives of Judaism as culture? Those intellectuals
seek to infuse Jewish contents with new meaning, having rejected
their religious meaning. In their world, God has lost his status as
superior transcendent being and becomes a kind of literary hero.
Sadeh, on the other hand, cleaves to God; in his world, however, God
becomes a means towards sensing ones own unique existence. The
individuals truthfulness in relation to himself, his uncompromising
self-fashioningthis Nietzschean tendency is expressed in a religious
tone. To this tendency he adds the expropriation of tradition from the
hands of religious authorities: the Jewish books which Sadeh edits are
not presented to the reader as part of a religious tradition expressing
Gods will, as interpreted by accepted figures of authority; they are
presented as spiritual works that have the power to generate spiritual
enlightenment, spiritual creation.
Thus, the ideas found in the forewords to the books edited by
Sadeh are expressions of the secular ethos of the individual who
creates his own world. This ethos is reflected in the individual choice
of the contents of tradition; vowels and punctuation are not the only
things that render these texts comprehensible to secular peoplethey
simply make them more accessible. What actually makes them more
understandable is the individualistic approach to them, through which
the secular project of self-fashioning is expressed using religious
language; thanks to these ideas, it is clear and even obvious to Sadeh
that his work is suited for secular people: It seemed to me like I was
taking someone, who was locked up inside some Ultra-Orthodox
ghettoIm referring to Rabbi Nachmanto bring him to the secular
reader so that the latter would be able to read him, just like hed read
secular masterpieces like Pascal or Tristan and Isolde.62
Another intellectual expressing a spiritual approach is writer and
educator Yosef Schechter. As a Bible teacher at the Reali School in
62

Reuveni, Interview, p. 61. Naturally, the assumption that these books were geared for
secular people was not Sadehs alone; he published them through publishing houses
directed towards secular people (Carta, Schoken). The editors working for these
publishing houses shared in his assumptions by agreeing to publish these books, as
did the secular people who purchased them.
42

-------------------------------------------------------------- IV. Spiritual Judaism---------------------------------------------------------------

Haifa, Schechter gathered around him a group of youngsters who were


involved in spiritual study. Towards the end of the 1960s, some of them
went on to establish Yodfat, a settlement in the Galilee. Schechter never
moved there but the Yodfat residents continued corresponding and
meeting with him, and he came to stay with them several times a year.63
The main idea emphasized by Schechter in his writings is that God
exists in mans soulor the divine in man, as he calls it. Mans goal
is to identify this dimension of his existence, which he tends to forget
in his everyday life. In other words, religious life is characterized by a
constant awareness of the fact that man lives on two planes: on the
psychological-biographical-social plane, and on the plane of internal
meaning, whose discovery Schechter and his students called internal
work. The plane of internal meaning is the bridge between the world
of Torah and our contemporary world, so that instead of saying I
believe (ani maamin), one should say I am aware. Schechter explains
the principles of Judaism for his contemporaries and replaces I believe
by I am aware, as follows:
I am aware of the fact that within myself there is a plane of life other than
the plane on which I make do in my daily life at home, at work, etc., and
it is the plane on which I become aware of the meaning of my life; I am
conscious of the fact that I need to rediscover this meaning constantly; I
am conscious of the fact that there is a divine force whose radiation I feel
in situations of love, vital spontaneity, responsibility, etc.; I am conscious
of the fact that the meaning of my life lies in the wholeness that is in
the present; insofar as memories from the past and expectations for the
future strengthen this wholeness, I use them.64

Similar to what takes place today in New Age circles, Schechter


suggests that Judaism is one among many spiritual contents. He
strives to illustrate the similarities between Hassidism and various
foreign teachings. In his view, the teachings that call for internal
work and those that call for mans improvement (tikkun) share a
common denominator. This emerges from the numerous explanations
63
64

Tadmor, The Divine in Man.


Ibid., p. 148.
43

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

he provided his students regarding the meaning of the commandments


or other Jewish contents. In answer to the question as to whether there
is a parallel to the mantra in Judaism, he replied that in Judaism there
is a visual mantra: I have set the Lord always before me.65 In an article
he wrote on The Phylacteries from a Symbolic Point of View (1976),66
he indicated that the phylactery placed on the head symbolizes human
awareness, willfulness, and mans intention and added that its place
between the eyes represented the center, as mentioned in Indian and
Chinese literature. When asked about the importance of the link with
Oriental doctrines, he answered: In our technological and bureaucratic
world, most people have distanced themselves from God as well as from
the god inside themselves, and these methods are designed to bring
individuals and groups closer to the divine within themselves. With the
assistance of these methods, any Jew can achieve partial understanding
of Hassidism, understand the Shabbat and Yom Kippur from an internal
aspect, and may be enabled to seriously advance towards internalizing
Judaism as a whole.67 Through all these explanations, Schechter tried
to bring his students closer to Judaism, albeit without leading them
towards becoming observant. This he viewed as unacceptable, since
it was an extreme reaction to the ignorance of the religious, internal
aspect. In reaction to this, people started leading extreme ritualistic
lives. This return to religion has a destructive aspect, it has a measure
of superficiality, of fashion. Its for the masses.68
Schechter opposes superficiality and the masses to internality and
the individual. Following the rabbis and adopting extreme rituals are
not the desirable path for man to follow in nurturing his spiritual world.
In his view, Judaism is part of the discovery of the divine within man;
internal work has no source of authority outside the individual who
discovers his hidden existence, the divine within him. What expresses
the autonomist ethos of the individual is the eclectic nature of the
spiritual tendency, thanks to which secular people can accept it as part

65
66
67
68

Ibid., p. 85. (The biblical citation is based on the King James translation).
Ibid., p. 247.
Ibid., p. 306.
Ibid., p. 302.
44

-----------------------------------------------------V. The distress of secularism-----------------------------------------------------

of their world. The student is exposed to a multitude of doctrines and


contents, from which he chooses; through these decisions, he creates
his own unique world. Judaism is no longer perceived as a religious
tradition, whose interpretation is in the hands of rabbis. It becomes
raw material; the individual has to examine for himself which contents
are not worn out and give them meaning.69
Schechters attitude towards Judaism is not very different from that
of Sadeh. Both emphasize the existence of God, while transferring the
focus from God to the autonomous individual. The divine represents
the other dimension of the souls life; man discovers its depth and
mysteries. The individuals autonomist position is also perceptible from
the status of religious tradition, which is subject to his judgment and
affinities; he chooses from that tradition based on his preferences and
infuses meaning into its parts. It is therefore clear why Schechters and
Sadehs views on Judaism are convenient for secular people, or at least
why we are entitled to call their views secular, as per the definition
submitted in the introduction: they denounce religious tradition as
a set of contents whose meaning is left exclusively in the hands of
an accepted religious authority, and express the modernistic ethos,
according to which man shapes his own life autonomously.

V. The distress of secularism


As we have already mentioned, secularism gives rise to feelings of
discomfort among intellectuals, and even among its proponents;
although the Jewish collective has liberated itself from an oppressive
religious tradition, it has remained rootless, with a weak sense of
identity. In addition to this deep discomfort, we should note the
difficulties inherent in the three approaches mentioned above, as well
as in the traditions of Zionist thought that preceded them.
We shall start with the Judaism as culture approach. It seems to
me that the weaknesses of each of the ideas included in the discussion of
this approach above are quite obvious. Is the individual indeed an active
agent only in secular Jewish cultureas claimed by Brinkerwhile
69

Ibid., p. 293.
45

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

in the religious approach the static and passive aspects are central?
Where then, according to this taxonomy, are we to place revolutionary
religious creators, such as the Maimonides and Rabbi Nachman of
Breslov? Rotenstreichs ideas give rise to another series of issues: can
halakha serve as a source of inspiration for the secular person striving
to contain the all-invasive scientific culture? To what extent will he be
able to delve into the fine details of the halakhic discussion if most of
its significance is foreign to him and its main call is for man to restrain
himself? Yehoshuas claims are also insufficient: how is Judaism to
be fulfilled within Israeli reality? His own examples demonstrate the
extent of the difficulty: are battle ethics, for example, a Jewish issue at
all, and what are the Jewish values that underscore a prison wardens
proper behavior?
The weaknesses inherent in the option of Judaism as culture
stem not only from the problems exhibited by certain specific ideas;
more serious problems are linked to its essence. The main point of
this option lies in the effort to extricate the contents of Judaism from
their religious meaning; it proposes a mixed bag of interpretations for
these contents: from the search for a secular meaning of the religious
symbols found in religious texts (birth, bar mitzvah, marriage and
death) to the literary interpretation of the chapters of the Bible. The
strong rejection of these religious contents, which is the basic premise
of the Judaism as culture approach, is deficient in three points. First,
as we have learned from works written by sociologists of religion in
the last decades, and from the debated of the secularization thesis,
religions have not disappeared; indeed, they are widespread across
Western societies. In spite of the criticism of religion and the decline
in the status of religious authorities, people are in need of religious
symbols in order to express their deepest inner being. Rewriting
Judaism as a human creation amounts to erasing these vital meanings.
Second, the spiritual assets of the Jewish people are for the most part
religious; these contents are not perceived from within as a cultural
work, as a whole whose main value is contemplative and aesthetic.
The self-perceptions of these contents are religious; they testify to
the will of God rather than to the acts of creative persons. In other
words, the attempt to conceptualize Judaism as a culture implies a
46

-----------------------------------------------------V. The distress of secularism-----------------------------------------------------

level of contradiction: its proponent is asking to recognize the very


thing he is castrating.70 In my view, these problems are attested to by
the weak status of the Bible in Israeli society. As everyone knows, it
was Zionism that granted the Bible precedence among Jewish sacred
scriptures; this was, however, accompanied by a total disregard for its
religious significance. Exalting what had already been castrated was
an unstable endeavor: the denial of its religious contents weakened
the strength of the Bible and turned it into one more book among
many literary masterpieces. Finally, Jewish religionfaith, the image
of God, and the lifestyle that derives from theseform the common
spiritual basis for all Jews. The attempt to formulate Judaism as a
culture means erasing the single layer of meanings that is shared by
the entire Jewish collective.
The second option presented above

the negation of
Judaismmeets with another difficulty: the distancing from Judaism
is foreign to the tendencies found within Israeli society. According to the
Guttman Institute reports, Israel is one of the most traditional Western
societies; thus, intellectuals who call for divorcing Israeli society from
Judaism are estranged from the fundamental tendencies rooted in
the society. We can see this not only in the ideas of the Canaanite
Movement and the reaction to them, but more recently, in the protest
brought forth in the articles of Bareli and Ofir: the latter condemns the
attachment felt by the majority of the Jewish public for the Passover
Haggadah, the prayer book and the Yom Kippur Mahzor; Bareli, for his
part, objects to the rapidly spreading study of religious texts among
secular people. The phenomena opposed by these intellectuals are the
reflection of a shared tendencythe secular publics search for its
religious roots without renouncing its secular identity.
Spiritual Secularism, the third option described above, seems to
present an advantage over the two other approaches: it enables secular
people to express their values and fulfill their lifestyle without negating
the religious meaning of Jewish tradition; it somehow manages to
bring together secularism and Judaism as a religious tradition. This
70

Strong formulations of this type of criticism, although slightly different from those
brought here, can be found in Kurzweil, Ahad Haam.
47

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

impression soon dissolves under closer analysis: Judaism, as proposed


in this optionat least as proposed in the writings of the intellectuals
we have discussedis not perceived as the spiritual baggage belonging
to a collective, but merely as part of the world of the individual. In other
words, what is suggested in the approaches of spiritual secularism is
a kind of private Judaism. This is true for two reasons. First, these
approaches do see the spiritual contents that a person finds relevant
as part of a culture or of a national tradition, but deliberately suggest
something eclectic. The contents of Judaism are included in a transnational repertoire, from which the individual person is requested
to choose in order to shape his own world. Second, authenticity and
autonomy are the key values in these approaches. They are expressed
in the call for the individual to decide what contents to adopt, and to
continuously reconfirm his choices. The result is that the affinity of the
secular to religious tradition is reduced to the individual; this relation
has to express his own self, his changing tendencies, and does not imply
the acceptance of any external burden.
Judaism is included as part of an eclectic repertoire. The relation
to Judaism is not based on the acceptance of an external authority
but on the secular ethos, whose values are autonomy and authenticity.
The writings of Sadeh and Schechter reflect these points, which is why
I claim that for them, Judaism does not represent a content shared
by a collective. The fact that these circles speak of the Divinity does
not alter my claims. The subjective nature of their viewsthe fact
that the focus of religious life is not God but, rather, His presence
within manmeans that the Divinity cannot function as a source of
authority; it is not a transcendental being that shows men how to live.
Religious tradition does not indicate what His will is; it is part of an
eclectic repertoire which the individual chooses from as he wishes, as
he sets out to fashion his own world.
From the things I have so far described, we can see what was meant
by the dead-endeach of these options exhibit essential problems:
one, in its attempt to understand Judaism, it castrates its fundamental
meaning; another is foreign to the inclinations of Israeli society; and
the last ignores the fact that Judaism, in all its shapes and forms, is a
content shared by the Jewish collective. The differences between these
48

-----------------------------------------------------V. The distress of secularism-----------------------------------------------------

options can be summed up as follows. Reservations about Judaism


differs from the two other approaches: it calls for the Jew to renounce
tradition, while the other two strive to define his relation towards
it. The difference between the two approaches which we grouped
together, i.e. between Judaism as culture and spiritual secularism,
is evasive, but remains strong: the representatives of Judaism as
culture relate to Judaism as the bearer of a common national content,
while emptying it of all religious meaning; they link it to a collective
by accounting for its creation and continuity in historical categories.
Spiritual secularism, at least as expressed by the intellectuals we have
cited, retains the religious significance of Judaism, but deconstructs its
collective identity. Thusand this conclusion has surprising political
significancespiritual secularism is close to the position expressed by
the secular intellectuals who reject Judaism; both deprive Judaism of
any public statusone neglects the collective aspect of Judaism, so
that it not restrict of its adaptability to serve the individual, while the
other opposes the public status of Judaism for political reasons. In other
words, the various explanations lead to a common positionJudaism
is no longer the common basis for Israeli society.
It thus emerges that the main weakness of the position which we
called reservations about Judaism is not exclusive to this position;
most surprisingly, this problem is also true of Judaism as a culture
which, as we recall, proposes to treat Judaism as a national culture.
However, can a Judaism whose religious significance has been uprooted
serve as genuine basis for society? What Jews coming from distant
places have in common is a tradition of religious symbols; in all other
aspects, we find only multiplicity. Therefore, any attempt to base the
identity of the Jewish public on a national culture, in which secularism
must be perceived as the total annulment of any religious meaning,
willfully ignores any shared meaning while highlighting the mixed
bag of cultural traditions (esthetic, literary, linguistic, etc.) among the
various members of the Jewish people.
To sum up, the positions we described here present various
problems, but they all share one important weakness. The intellectuals
who express them attempt to formulate something suitable for their
society. Their proposals, however, are sterile, as they are opposed to
49

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

prominent inclinations of the society (reservations about Judaism) or


because they do away with what is shared by the members of this society
(Judaism as culture and spiritual secularism). Therefore, in spite of
all the efforts of intellectuals to come up with formulas expressing the
secular publics spiritual world, the secular public remains cut off from
their past and from the possibility of formulating a common culture
and identity.
The significance of the claim that these options lead to a dead-end
becomes more serious when we recall that this repertoire of solutions
did not originate in Israeli culture; these approaches were first
formulated as part of spiritual Zionism, in light of the crisis brought
about by secularization. As mentioned above, the reservations about
Judaism approach is clearly expressed in the thought of Yaakov
Klatzkin. Another important representative of this approach is Yosef
Haim Brennerthis is the gist of his scandalous article On a Vision
of Conversion to Christianity. According to Brenner, it is a mistake to
base the life of the collective on Judaism; identifying with the world
of the Bible is a private issue; neither this world, nor any other Jewish
content, has any special status. The individuals identification with
specific Jewish works is the only justification for his affinity with them,
just as it is the only justification for his affinity with any intellectual
work, whatever its national identity.
Thus, the claim that the secular person should liberate himself from
the burden of his inheritance was not first uttered as part of Israeli
culture. This is also true of the position of Judaism as culture. Ahad
Haams position was highly important in establishing this approach;
he suggested the following model: Jewish culture is the result of the
activity of a national spirit which is unique to the Jewish people.
This basic assumption does away with the religious significance of
Judaism, which is perceived as the creation of the Jewish people. Its
moral significance,and the historical value of its works and symbols
form the basis for the secular-national meaning attributed to Judaism.
The national Jew, i.e. the secular Jew, is called upon to follow it, as a
kind of analogy to halakhas normative lifestyle. The Book of Books,
however, is no longer a sacred text, and God is just another superior
being, which the Jew happens to believe in. The duty of the national
50

-----------------------------------------------------V. The distress of secularism-----------------------------------------------------

Jew to familiarize himself with these contents is justified by the latters


national status.
The main herald of the spiritual position in Zionism is Aaron David
Gordon. This thinker considered the relation to cosmic life as the
main action required in order to revive Judaism. Generally speaking,
he identified the return to nature with the return to Judaism; Jewish
creation, including religious creation, can only occur as a result of the
proper assimilation into the life of the universe. Only the return to
nature and the devotion to work, particularly manual labor, can assure
the vitality of Jewish creation. Gordons view is the example of the
spiritual position similar to what was described above in the thought
of Sadeh and Schechter. All these thinkers rewrite Judaism in religious
terms, as it becomes loaded with new religious meaning, different
from its traditional form. It no longer depends on divine revelation; its
contents do not reveal His will. Judaism becomes a repository of symbols
expressing the individuals position facing the transcendental or cosmic
dimension; its gist lies in the subjective meaning of religious experience.
In short, the classification suggested above does not represent Israeli
culture aloneto a large extent, Israeli intellectual life perpetuates the
trends found in spiritual Zionism. How are we to understand this point?
Does this continuation stem from the tremendous impact of Zionist
thought on Israeli intellectuals? I do not think so, although these
thinkers did leave their mark on the thought of Israeli intellectuals. The
thinker who influenced them the most was Ahad Haam, if only because
his thinking shaped to a large extent the commonly accepted view in
Israel of the secular-national position towards Judaism. Gordons
thought has substantial presence among certain Israeli intellectuals
not discussed here,71 and he clearly had a deep influence on Schechter,
who wrote a book about him, taught him at the Reali School (instead of
teaching Ahad Haam), and who expressed clearly Gordonian thoughts.72
71
72

For example, Eliezer Schweid, Avraham Shapira and the Shdemot Circle.
For example, when he explains that those possessing an atheistic conception have no
internal relation to society or to nature. In an article written on the 50th anniversary of
Gordons death, he remarks that work, and especially agriculture, has two important
elements in the internal life of man: the conquest of the universe and the merging into
the universe. Tadmor, The Divine in Man, p. 165.
51

----------------------------------------- Three Options for Secularism in Israel-----------------------------------------

There is no point expanding on the important role played by


Brenner in Israeli culture. However, notwithstanding all the influences
we mentioned, I do not believe that the positions voiced by Israeli
intellectuals are conscious or unconscious reproductions of the possible
solutions of the previous generation. The Canaanites did not formulate
their position by absorbing Brenners arguments, or even Klatzkins
pessimistic views. It would be pointless to try to name a single
source for the entire range of views expressed by the representatives
of the reservations about Judaism. Could it be that the Canaanite
Movement, Gershon Weiler, Gilad Bareli, Adi Ofir, a few journalists
from the Haaretz newspaper, Boaz Evron, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, and
others all reached their conclusions regarding Judaism, based on one
or two Zionist thinkers?
The ideas of the representatives of the option of Judaism as culture
may have been based upon the cultural concept of Ahad Haam, but they
derived different conclusions from it; moreover, this certainly cannot
be the case with respect to the thinkers whom we called spiritual
(Gordon is totally foreign to Pinchas Sadeh, who never alludes to him
in his writings). In other words, the intellectual constructions of Israeli
intellectuals were not formulated as a result of the impact of members of
the previous generation. This repeat performance should be described
as follows: Israeli intellectuals share the same repertoire of positions in
relation to Judaism as those who preceded them, but did not inherit
it from them. Contemporary intellectuals reiterate the same reactions
towards an identity crisis that gives them no respitetheir sense of
estrangement from their ancestors religious traditions. They react
to this crisis in three waysexpressing reservations about Judaism,
formulating it as a culture, and granting it meaning in a spiritual
wayall of which attempt to deal with the problem of their identity. In
other words, Israeli intellectuals did not develop the answers provided
by their predecessors. This limitationso it should be calledmost
likely does not stem from an overenthusiastic adoption of Zionism but
rather from its abandonment: if these intellectuals were to take a closer
look at the solutions offered in the Zionist schools of thought, they
might feel the need to go beyond what the latter had to suggest.
52

-----------------------------Chapter II -----------------------------------

Why Spinoza?

--------------------------------------------------------------------- Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------

One should not interpret the focus on Spinoza* as indicating that his
thought alone can contribute to the discussion of the problems of
secularism; in 17th-century philosophy, there are various formulations
of secular theologies that introduce the notion of individual salvation
independent of divine truth. These philosophical approaches can
provide an interesting perspective for examining the problems faced by
secularism at any time and in any context. This is the case with Kants
definition of enlightenment and in his views on establishing ethics
through religion; it is also the case with Mills and Rousseaus political
ideas. Our preference of Spinozas notions for our discussion has both
historical and philosophical reasons. The historical reasons lie in the
unique cultural context in which his thought developed. Judaism and
Jews occupy a special place in his world, while he himself has played
a unique role in Jewish consciousness in recent generations: Spinoza
is the person who endless numbers of Jewish heretics, lost souls,
free people, secularists and nationalists have turned to in order to
define their individual identity, as well as the ever-changing identity of
their people.1 In other words, his thought is intimately linked to the
problems of Israeli secular society, although this does not imply that it is
philosophically privileged in any way. This claim must be demonstrated
by examining Spinozas thought, which is the aim of following chapters.

I quote from Spinozas Ethics with the common abbreviations; I use page numbers
from other books by Spinoza as they appear in the quotations.
Naturally, Nietzsches thought has been another important philosophical reference for
secular Jews in their attempt to solve various questions of identity. Nietzsches impact
on Hebrew culture and Jewish intellectuals is discussed by Golomb, Nietzsche.
55

---------------------------------------------------------------------- Why Spinoza?----------------------------------------------------------------------

In the first part of this chapter, I will be discussing the historical


context and describing the unique place Spinozas thought occupies
in the Jewish search for identity in recent generations. The following
section will discuss the philosophical reasons, and will be limited to
a few general remarks. The discussion that ensues in the remaining
chapters will contribute towards clarifying these points.

I. The historical-cultural context


Spinoza played an important role in the thought of many Jewish
philosophers, such as Moses Mendelssohn, Moses Hess, Hermann
Cohen, Solomon Maimon, Nachman Krochmal, Leo Strauss,2 Martin
Buber and Emmanuel Levinas, and intellectuals, such as Abraham
Krochmal, Samuel David Luzzatto, Meir Letteris, Aaron Zeitlin and
others.3 It is a known fact that Spinozas thought and, more specifically,
his political ideas deeply influenced the founders of Zionism: Nachum
Sokolov and Yaakov Klatzkin wrote books about him;4 Joseph Klausner
referred to him with admiration; and David Ben Gurion viewed him
as a guide and encouraged the translation of his works into Hebrew.5
On a number of occasions, he has been described as one of the fathers
of political Zionism.6 Spinozas life and work also play a role in Israeli
culture. In the introduction to his book entitled Jewish Theocracy,
Gershon Weiler describes the discussion in his book as a footnote to
Spinozas Theologico-Political Treatise.7 Boundless Happiness, a
film on Spinoza which shows the philosopher living in an apartment
2

4
5

6
7

For an interesting analysis of Spinoza, his Jewishness, and its significance, see an early
article by Leo Strauss: Strauss, Early Writings, pp. 216-223.
This is only a partial list. The following people also felt a strong attachment to Spinozas
thought: Albert Einstein, Henri Bergson, Sigmund Freud, Heinrich Heine, as well as
leaders of the Religious Zionist Movement. Several examples of researches dealing with
Spinozas impact on Jewish thinkers are: Schwartz, Religious Zionism; Goetschel, Heine;
Goetschel, Modernity; Yakira, Strauss; Melamed, Maimon; Motzkin, Luzzatto; Kaplan,
Freud; Lachover, Haskalah; Levy, The Notion of Judaism; and Navon, Herman Cohen.
Sokolov, Spinoza and his Time; Klatzkin, The Life of Spinoza.
See the note that introduces the Hebrew translation of Spinozas Theological-Political
Treatise, opening page.
See for example Strauss, Early Writings, 216-223..
Weiler, Theocracy, p. XIV.
56

----------------------------------------------I. The historical-cultural context----------------------------------------------

building in Holon, the publication of a collection of poems dealing with


ethics,8 academic papers and university courses, the activities held
at the Jerusalem Spinoza Institute, numerous discussions on Hebrew
internet sites that are devoted to his thought, his position regarding
Judaism, and his special relevance todayall of these are only some
of the many cultural activities relating to Spinoza in Israel.
We cannot provide a detailed description of all the above. However,
we can provide a brief illustration of the tremendous importance of
Spinoza for non-religious Jews: the exceptional work of the Hebrew
translators of the Ethics as agents of ideas. The Ethics, Spinozas
most important work, was translated into Hebrew three times9 (few
philosophical works have been translated this often).10 The first
translation was by the Galician intellectual Shlomo Rubin, the second
one was by Yaakov Klatzkin, and the third translation was carried out
by Yermiyahu Yovel.11
As claimed above, the approaches of the Hebrew translators of
the Ethics to the object of their work are entirely different from those
8
9

10

11

Eliraz, Spinoza and Friends.


Rubin, Research of a God; Klatzkin, Ethics; Yovel, Ethics. These translations were carried
out over the last hundred years, a period of great intensity in the history of the Jewish
people. Rubins translation was published in 1885, in the heart of the haskala centers in
Eastern Europe; the second one was published in 1925, when the Zionist idea was gaining
strength; the third and final translation one was published in 2003, in Israel.
The Hebrew readers are not spoiled as far as translations of philosophical works go;
although Platos Symposium and Maimonidess Guide to the Perplexed were translated
into Hebrew three times, many philosophical works have never been translated,
while others were translated once or not always fully, and these translations are
often outdated. Aristotles Metaphysics and his Physics, for example, were never fully
translated; neither were Hegels main works. Humes Treatise of Human Nature is only
partially accessible to the Hebrew reader. The same applies to Jewish philosophyone
example is the outdated translation into Hebrew of Moses Hesss Rome and Jerusalem.
Rubin was born in Dolina, Galicia, in 1823. A prolific writer, he wrote extensively about
Jewish folklore and traditions. He was deeply interested in persons who were persecuted
because of their views or thoughts. He translated K. Gotchkovs play Uriel DAcosta. His
interest in these persecuted thinkers accounts for his prolonged work on Spinoza. In
addition to various essays and articles he compiled about Spinoza, Rubin also translated
his Grammar of the Hebrew Language. Rubins life was characterized by endless wanderings
and conflicts with the rabbinical establishment. He lived a long life and died in 1910.
Details of his wanderings and the campaigns against him can be found in Klausners
preface to Rubins book The Ethics and in Dorman, Spinozas Disputes, p. 190, note 106.
57

---------------------------------------------------------------------- Why Spinoza?----------------------------------------------------------------------

of translators of other works.12 The translators of the Ethics, in the


translation itself and particularly through what they wrote about it,
function as active liaisons between the thought of the excommunicated
Jewish philosopherthe other, the first secular Jewand the
modern Jewish reader.13 The most important part of their work lies
in their attempt to clarify the special relevance of Spinozas life and
philosophical work for the Jewish people today. Each of these translators
translated Spinozas most important work into the Hebrew language in
full awareness that, in doing so, he was making a vital contribution to
Hebrew culture, and that the study of Spinoza and his thought could
help clarify questions pertaining to a Jewish existence that was no longer
based on a religious lifestyle. This awareness is clearly felt in the Hebrew
translators introductions and in the reactions these translations drew.14
We will simply evoke some of the best-known reactions: Samuel David
Luzzattos opposition to Rubins first attempts at translating the book
was based on the claim that the very act of translation would introduce
Hellenismthe opposite of Judaisminto the Hebrew language. In
his response, Rubin tried to refute this claim by stating that, from a
Jewish perspective, Spinoza and his thought were legitimate.15 The fact
that Klatzkins translation was so deeply rooted in the Hebrew linguistic
tradition was the main point that drew Franz Rosenzweigs attention
to it. In a critical essay, Rosenzweig expressed his wonder at the fact
that such a translation was carried out by a representative of the formal
Zionist approach, which strived to free itself of the Jewish peoples
religious baggage.16 Oded Schechter, in his critique of Yovels translation,
speaks against the hidden Zionist conviction, which Yovel attributes to
Spinozas thought, and, surprisingly, opposes Yovels translation to that
of Klatzkin with respect to this parameter.17 These various reactions

12
13

14

15
16
17

I expanded this point in my article: Katz, Spinozas Translators.


Particularly in these works: Rubin, Six Paintings; Rubin, A Decisive Answer; Klatzkin,
The Life of Spinoza; Yovel, Heretics.
See introductions to the following works: Rubin, Research of a God; Klatzkin, The Ethics;
Yovel, Ethics.
Regarding this discussion, see: Motzkin, Luzzatto.
Rosenzweig, The New Hebrew.
Schechter, Yovel and Spinoza.
58

----------------------------------------------I. The historical-cultural context----------------------------------------------

revolve around similar issues: secularism, the attitude towards tradition


and religion, Spinozas affinity with Judaism, etc. These issues arise both
in the translators and in the critics minds as they attempt to mediate
between Spinoza and his Hebrew-speaking readers.
One must remember that these acts of mediation between Spinozas
thought and the Hebrew reader took place in differing historical
contexts: Rubins translation appeared towards the end of the period
of the Haskala; Klatzkins translation appeared in the formative years
of the Zionist movement; and Yovels translation was published when
the state was already in existence. Therefore, the differences between
these translator-mediators transcend their individual differences (such
as their intellectual abilities, level of education, and spiritual affinities);
they also reflect broader differences that stem from the conditions that
characterized the various periods. Rubins attempts at legitimizing
Spinoza reflects the distress of an oppressed, educated person living in
a traditional community who wishes to remain faithful to his people,
although he has no clearly-defined nationalist approach. Klatzkin, for
his part, sees great similarities between Spinozas thought and Judaism,
while he predicts that both will be totally annihilated. This prediction
leads him to expect an entirely new beginning for the Jewish people in
the Land of Israel, where it will succeed in liberating itself from its past.
Such a momentum stems from the promise contained in the Zionist
idea, which had yet to be fulfilled. On the other hand, some element
of the concrete fulfillment of secular Jewish life in the State of Israel
is reflected in the search for the historical roots of Jewish secularism
suggested in Yovels translation. In this sense, we can say that the
various translators approaches are infused with a broader significance,
and that the introductory sections to the Ethics serve as platforms for
the expression of the searchings and questionings of secular Jews over
the last hundred years.
The Hebrew language itself and its status in translations became
a special topic of interest in the study of Spinoza. As we all know,
Spinoza had an excellent command of the Hebrew languagehe even
wrote a Hebrew grammar book. Some of the translators have raised
the hypothesis that there is a special connection between the Ethics
and the Hebrew language, and view the translation into Hebrew as
59

---------------------------------------------------------------------- Why Spinoza?----------------------------------------------------------------------

an act of restoration of stolen property to its owner. Rubin believed


that Spinoza would have written his book in Hebrew had he not been
persecuted by the rabbis.18 According to Klatzkin, Spinoza formulated
his philosophical thoughts in Hebrew. In Klatzkins view, the affinities
between the words and the Hebrew language are crucial when seeking
to understand Spinozas method; therefore, the Hebrew translation
should be considered the source of the Ethics, and it is to the credit of
the Hebrew language, rather than to the credit of the translator.19 In
other words, the first two translators viewed their task not as an act
of translation, in the usual sense of the term, but as the restoration of
a major asset of the Hebrew culture to its rightful place. The original
Hebrew character which these translators attribute to the Ethics, as well
as the sense of reparation which they attribute to the return of the
Ethics to the Hebrew language, stem from their understanding of the
link between Spinoza and Judaism; it is also colored by their view of the
relevance of Spinoza for the Jews of their time. The myth of the Hebrew
origin of the Ethics no longer serves as a motive for the last translator
of the Ethics. In Yovels eyes, a new translation is called for because
of reading requirements, because of the changes undergone by the
Hebrew language, and because of the need to correct the inaccuracies
found in his predecessors translations.20 Yovel translated Spinoza into
modern Hebrew, a Hebrew very distant from that of the Middle Ages,
which Klatzkin used in his translation. The fact that modern Hebrew
replaced ancient Hebrew drew much attention on the part of critics of
Yovels translation. According to Schechter, the critic mentioned above,
Yovels new translation into secularized Israeli Hebrew, the language of
Protestant nationalism,21 silences the ancient layers of Hebrew, i.e.
the Jewish past. The fact that Schechters claim is totally unfounded22
is irrelevant to us; more important is the nature of the issues that arise
naturally when we deal with Spinoza: Zionism, secularism, the Hebrew
18
19
20
21
22

Rubin, A Decisive Answer, p. 23.


Klatzkin, The Ethics, p. XIX.
Yovel, Ethics, p. 59.
Schechter, Yovel and Spinoza, p. 107.
A critique of this appeared in Schmidt, The End of the Road; Katz, Spinozas Translators,
p. 60, note 78.
60

----------------------------------------------II. Special philosophical relevance----------------------------------------------

language, the attitude towards tradition, the status of religion, the


roots of Israeli culture, etc.

II. Special philosophical relevance


As we have indicated above the fact that Spinozas thought and identity
occupy a significant place in the discussion of the identity of the
modern Jew is an important point in any attempt to determine the
cultural and historical context of his thought. It does not, however,
grant his philosophy any particular theoretical status. This status
was achieved thanks to other unique qualities that characterize his
thoughtits relevance for dealing with the difficulties faced by
secularism, particularly given its particular difficulties in the Israeli
context. The special patterns of analysis in Spinozas works also make
them particularly germane.
What then are these basic issues which make Spinozas thought
relevant to the problems faced by the secular Jew? The purpose of
Spinozas philosophical thinking is to help find a new order in life and
to redeem mans soul from its distress. The titles of his books testify to
this, as do the introductions to a number of them. For example, Spinoza
opens his Treatise on the Improvement of Understanding (henceforth:
TdIE) by describing himself as akin to a terminally ill person who
sees his certain death in front of his eyes.23 Through philosophy, he
strives to become attached to the eternal and infinite entity, and the
permanent joy it entails. In this way, he can be redeemed from the vain
desires that fill him, and from the disturbances that beset him endlessly
throughout his life. A quick comparison with Descartes well-known
foreword to the Discourse on the Method highlights the therapeutic
aspect of Spinozas philosophy. In his foreword, Descartes relates
some personal issues, the aim of which was to seek the truth, and the
method for achieving this. Spinoza speaks of lifes instability and of
the dissatisfaction with physical pleasure and with honor. Descartes
23

TdIE, Chapter 7; On the philosophical importance of the introduction, see the


comment of Joachim, TdIE, pp. 14-15. In his opinion, the Treatise was meant to be
part of a larger work, so that the existing introduction was to serve as the introduction
to the planed much larger opus.
61

---------------------------------------------------------------------- Why Spinoza?----------------------------------------------------------------------

philosophical aim is to discover a theoretical truth and reinforce it,


while for Spinoza philosophy becomes a clearly therapeutic act aimed
at saving ones soul.
In his foreword to the TdIE, Yosef Ben Shlomo emphasizes this
point,24 adding that Descartes did not search for a cure for life in
philosophy, since he found its meaning in religion.25 On the other hand,
the fact that Spinoza was torn away from his community and from its
commonly-accepted beliefs determined the purpose of his philosophy.
An acute existential problem lies at the heart of Spinozas philosophy,
and his main purpose is essentially therapeutic; hence, this thinker
is particularly close to the Jewish secular public. This is an important
reason (though not the only one, as we remarked) why he and his
thought have been quoted by non-religious Jews for many generations
in their efforts to deal with their problems, which recall his own, and to
define their new identity. The secular person has cast off a rich spiritual
and religious tradition which determined the meaning of his ancestors
life. Although this Jew may long for tradition he can no longer find in
it a refuge from his distress. Just like Spinoza, he remains uncomforted
by tradition and faces death alone. Spinozas exceptional philosophical
achievements make him a special asset for the secular Jew; indeed, the
philosopher formulates an entire system of ideas that draw on historical
religion and its values. Divine protection, for example, is replaced by
the conatus, while the comfort of the world-to-come is replaced by the
immortal and by the rational love of God. The fact that Spinoza suggests
a comprehensive approach to all human aspects of lifeethics, politics,
psychology, religion, tradition and the relation to Godmeans that the
secular person tormented by the question of the meaning of existence
can draw on an all-encompassing secular philosophical approach; he can
adopt a total approach, as complete as religion, while remaining secular.
He can achieve this with the help of a thinker whose image and thought
he feels close to in a unique way.26
24
25

26

TdIE, Hebrew, p. 10.


From this point onwards, I will be using the term religion for either of the two
revelatory religions: Judaism and Christianity. For more on the meanings of religion
for Spinoza, see Yovel, Critique of Religion; Guttmann, Spinoza.
Smith, Spinoza and Liberalism, p. XII.
62

----------------------------------------------II. Special philosophical relevance----------------------------------------------

Another problem which underlies Spinozian philosophy pertains to


the issue of the masses, which renders it uniquely relevant for modern
society in general, and for Israeli society in particular. Spinoza was not
the first Western philosopher to perceive the masses as a philosophical
problem. Platos discussions in The Republic, which deal with the
productive condition, as well as the political consequences of the souls
division into three parts, may be considered as one such philosophical
analysis. Clearly, the interest of both philosophers in the masses
stems from their view of philosophy as therapy. Their understanding
that philosophy can cure man from his distress and save him from
suffering obligated them to clarify what it could offer to the spiritually
weak person, i.e. the masses. In any case, Spinozas interest in the
masseshis attempts to account for their inconsistency, to clarify
their characteristic way of apprehending things, and to suggest ways of
putting their life in orderall make him a highly relevant philosopher
for modern mass society. Moreover, his philosophical analysis of
the masses takes their spiritual difficulties into consideration. What
system of belief is required in order to establish a stable authority?
What characterizes the mentality of the member of the masses, and
what relief does he gain from being part of some futile religion? Such
questions take up a significant part not only of his Theological-Political
Treatise (henceforth: TTP) and of the Political Treatise (henceforth: PT),
but also of the Ethics. This focused attention derives from Spinozas
conception of the masses as those exhibiting limited spiritual abilities
and confused tendencies; he saw the understanding of the nature of the
masses as extremely important. To a large extent, Spinozas analysis of
questions pertaining to society and to power can be characterized as
an epistemological-political analysis. The difference between Spinoza
and Plato is useful in order to clarify this point: Plato characterizes the
average person as one whose desires control his soul; the member of the
masses does possess understanding, but it is subjugated, and practically
insignificant. What characterizes him is ravenousness. For Spinoza, on
the other hand, the masses are characterized by their mentalitythe
average person is led by his desires, but what characterizes him is his
imagination, which is a form of consciousness. Spinozas conclusions
about the masses include spiritual problemsprejudice, confused
63

---------------------------------------------------------------------- Why Spinoza?----------------------------------------------------------------------

ideas, as well as the nurturing of desirable beliefs; they are not limited
to the clarification of the possible means of control of the uneducated
mob lacking in any spiritual dimension, as we find in Plato.
Since these questionsexistential distress and the question
of the massesform the basis of Spinozas philosophy, it can be
linked to two models of secularism. The first model could be entitled
metaphysical secularism. This system comprises the terminology and
the approaches which Spinoza develops throughout the Ethics, and
through which he suggests a full alternative to religion: the personal
God, which stands at the heart of the revelatory religions, is replaced
by an infinite substance. This concept of God is totally purified of any
concrete cultural or religious aspect. The other key religious concepts
are similarly purified: destiny and divine Providence are replaced by
the conatus and by an infinite chain of causes expressing the necessary
actualization of the substance. The philosophers life is secular in the
sense that his knowledge is founded on the rejection of all revelatory
and historical religions; the philosopher sticks to a logical-philosophical
analysis that reveals his existence within the divine and the moral and
political conclusions that derive from such an analysis.
Spinozas interest in the question of the masses does not enable
him to suffice with this model of the abandon of revelatory religions.
Those who are able to behave in such a way are those who follow the
directives of reason. Spinoza often emphasizes how rare such people
are, and that society as a whole cannot be expected to act this way.27
The difference mentioned above between Platos view of the masses and
that of Spinoza is relevant once more. Plato does not view the masses
as people who need to get their spiritual life adjusted, but rather as a
mob, frantically acting out their desires, who it is essential to suppress
in order to create a united society whose pieces fit; the philosopher
becomes king, since the masses serve mainly as objects to be controlled
rather than liberated. Thus, the crux of the political problem in The
Republic is the portrayal of the image of the ruler. Spinoza, on the other
hand, apprehends the masses as possessing reason, albeit of a lesser
degree and needing to be regulated. The aim of political philosophy is to
27

See for example E 1App; TTP, pp. 76-77.


64

----------------------------------------------II. Special philosophical relevance----------------------------------------------

rationalize the entire scope of societys strengths. In Spinozas case, this


rationalization involves activation, improvement and intensification.
The problem of the masses is not solved by finding the ruler to control
it; rather, it implies an in-depth analysis of the mentality of the masses
and of the possible ways to improve and empower thema topic which
Spinoza reverts to continuously throughout his writings. Therefore, the
validity of Spinozas model of metaphysical secularism is very limited.
Although secular people who look to Spinoza as a basis for formulating
their views emphasize this metaphysical secularism, it cannot, due to
its limitations, be considered as the main and most fruitful model found
in his philosophy. This philosophy comprises another model, which
can be entitled political secularism. This model includes his views
on establishing the rationalization of society: strengthening political
authority, undermining the authority of the religious establishment,
and examining ways to formulate a popular religion or religious
tradition that pose no threat to the ruling power.
One final reason for discussing Spinoza within the framework of
our topic is the following: from what has been explained above, it is
clear that Spinozas philosophy discusses at length the question of the
place of religious tradition, and clarifies the reasons for its survival. In
the interpretations of Spinoza, one often finds complaints as to the
lack of understanding of mans historicity. These interpreters claim that
Spinoza does not perceive man as a historical creature, but that man
is only discussed on the basis of his ontology and of the epistemology
that derives thereof.28 As some interpreters have noted in recent years,
this analysis is erroneous.29 In the following chapters, I will attempt
to address this question and will argue in favor of the important role
played by Spinozas historical consciousness.30 In any case, and quite
surprisingly, Spinozas thought on questions pertaining to secularism
and traditionalism is unique not because of its historicity, but rather
as a result of its focus on ontology, which others see as a weakness

28
29

30

This view is expressed in, for example, Hampshire, Spinoza, p. 194.


Preus, The Bible, p. 32 and Chapter 5; Smith, Spinoza and Liberalism, p. 63 and notes 16
& 17, p. 225; Morrison, History.
Chapter 8, particularly the end of the chapter.
65

---------------------------------------------------------------------- Why Spinoza?----------------------------------------------------------------------

in his thought. Spinozas ontological analysis is of particular value in


the clarification of cultural questions. Spinoza analyzes the necessity
of tradition and the ways to moderate it, first and foremost within
the framework of ontology. Passivity and being mired in imagination
characterize man in general, and the masses in particular, not because
of some specific historical link, but due to the structure of the finite
entity called man. From the perspective of this philosophy, the
obstinate existence of religions in the Western world, which perplexes
some sociologists of religion, as well as the blurring of the sharp
dichotomy between traditional and modern societies, are developments
that are to be expected. There are fixed givens within the nature of
man and society, in its finite existence, in its limited consciousness
and necessary passivity that call for a permanent, continuous and allpenetrating influence of traditions, including religious traditions. This
eternity which is revealed through Spinozas ontological analysis was
abandoned by modern thought on tradition, due to the latters oversensitivity to historicity. This is another reason for seeking solutions to
the questions this book addresses within Spinozas thought.

66

----------------------------Chapter III ----------------------------------

Imagination and the


Masses: An Outline of
the Object of Politics

Imagination and the


Masses

-----------------I. Non-reflective consciousness and the image of the dream -----------------

This chapter focuses on imagination, i.e. the cognitive function


characteristic of the masses. My intention is not to provide a
comprehensive analysis of this concept, but to clarify certain issues
relevant to the discussion presented in this section.1 I will discuss
the concept of the imagination under three rubrics, each focusing
on a specific philosophical domain: epistemology, psychology and
politics. This division is not justified methodologically: the first level
of knowledge, centered on the imagination, like many other topics in
Spinozas thought, cannot be exhausted by an in-depth discussion within
the framework of a single philosophical field. This division thus serves
practical purposes and the sake of clarity, facilitating identification of
the problems discussed in each of the following chapters, as well as the
solutions I will suggest for them.

I. Non-reflective consciousness
and the image of the dream :
the epistemological aspect
Spinoza presents his epistemological theory in the TdIE, in his Short
Article on God, Man and his Happiness (henceforth: KV) and in the Ethics.2
He describes the various levels of knowledge and provides examples of
them. The first level of knowledge is based on the perception of single
1

The issue of imagination is often discussed in the interpretation of Spinoza. See, for
example: Raven, Tradition; Blair, Imagination; De Deugd, Imagination; Garret, Truth and
Imagination; and Preus, Spinoza and Vico.
Particularly in E 2p40s2; E 2p41-43; TdIE in its entirety, where the degrees of
knowledge are discussed in pp. 8-12.
69

------------------------------------------------------Imagination and the Masses------------------------------------------------------

elements which our senses relay to us in a fragmented way. In the


Ethics, this type of knowledge is entitled opinion or imagination.3
This knowledge is based on vague experience (experientia vaga),
on a perception arising from hearsay (ex auditu) or from some
sign (ex aliquo signo) which all may employ as they see fit.4 Spinoza
distinguishes three types of defective ideas that are included in the first
level of knowledge: fictive, doubtful and false ideas; these are mostly
discussed in the TdIE, pp. 50-69.5 The second level of knowledge is
entitled reason; it is based on the perception gained with the help of
general concepts.6 The third level is entitled intuitive science (scientia
intuitiva) in the Ethics; it is described as the knowledge of something
gained with the help of its proximate cause, i.e. through God.7 In the
TdIE, this type of knowledge is explained in terms of the individuals
self-perception.8
In the TdIE, Spinoza provides several examples for the first level of
knowledge: the fact that I know my date of birth; that I will eventually
die one day; that oil feeds fire; and that man is a thinking animal.9
These examples are not similar: awareness of my date of birth is based
on hearsay, whereas knowledge concerning the effect of the oil on the
fire is based on vague experience. In the TdIE and in the Ethics, Spinoza
illustrates the difference between the three levels of knowledge through
a single examplefinding a fourth number with the help of three
numbers and the proportion between them.10
3

4
5

8
9
10

E 2p40s2. On the difference between Spinoza and Plato in the understanding of the
imagination, see De Deugd, Imagination, p. 22.
TdIE, p. 8; KV, Part II, Chapters 1 and 2.
Idea ficta, idea falsa and idea dubia are all opposed to idea vera. Joachim, TdIE,
Chapter4, calls these types pseudo-cognitive types. De Deugd, Imagination., p. 69,
rightly criticizes this attempt.
There is a difference between the Ethics and the position expressed in the TdIE. The
approach expressed in the latter is closer to the first degree of knowledge, whereas in
the Ethics, it is closer to the third degree. The question as to how a person can surpass
the third degree of knowledge is discussed in De Deugd, Imagination, p. 185.
Spinozas use of this term (for example, in E 1p28s), makes it clear that he refers to
God.
TdIE, p. 9; Joachim, TdIE, p. 47.
TdIE, p. 8-9.
Ibid., p. 9-10; E 2p40s2.
70

-----------------I. Non-reflective consciousness and the image of the dream -----------------

In presenting his epistemological theory, Spinoza distinguishes


between its three levels; many of his interpreters follow his lead and
emphasize this division and the links between its elements.11 In fact,
Spinozas epistemological theory actually suggests a distinction more
basic than these degreesthat between non-reflective and reflective
consciousness. The various divisions suggested by Spinoza easily fit
this dichotomy. Imagination, with all the faulty ideas it produces, is an
example of non-reflectivity, while the two other degrees of knowledge,
reason and the science of observation, are examples of reflective
consciousness, albeit with varying degrees of intensity.12
The importance of this distinctionbetween reflective and nonreflective consciousnessis particularly salient in places in which
Spinoza describes imagination as a kind of dream or daydream13an
image he often uses. In the TdIE when describing the false idea, he
indicates that falsehood, in itself, is not very different from the dream
(non multum differat a somnio).14 The false idea is also described as
dreaming with our eyes open, or while awake.15 In TdIE, Spinoza
explains one of his main epistemological ideasthat truth is a test
to itselfby using these images: Anyone who possesses the truth
can therefore not doubt the fact that he possesses it, but whoever is
deep into a lie or a mistake can easily imagine that he is in the truth.
This way, the dreamer can dream that he is awake, but the person who

11

12

13

14
15

For the possible sources of Spinozas epistemology, see Wolfson, Spinoza, vol. II,
Chapter 16, particularly p. 132, where he claims that Spinoza adopts Saadia Gaons
understanding of the term auditory knowledge, i.e. what becomes known through
hearsay. However, contrary to Saadia Gaon, for Spinoza this represents the lowest
degree of knowledge, and is illegitimate from a philosophical point of view.
At this point, the reader may rightly wonder what a non-reflective idea refers to.
Indeed, every idea contains some degree of reflectivity, or else one would not be able
to describe it in terms of cognitive activity. The answer must take into consideration
the possible centers of reflection rather than its degree alone and the means of
confirmation included in the idea. This point will be clarified in the next chapter.
Spinoza uses few images, and he certainly does not grant them any special status in
the development of his thoughts, as Plato does in The Phaedrus, for example; thus if
this image recurs, there must be good reason for it.
TdIE, p. 24, note 1.
Ibid., p. 25.
71

------------------------------------------------------Imagination and the Masses------------------------------------------------------

is awake can never think that he is dreaming.16 He reverts to these


images in a more careful and suggestive tone, in his description of the
deeds of the prophets in TTP.17
The aspect common to imagination and the dream is their state of
consciousness. The mind is not active in combining ideas and creating
links between them; they are created without approval, as thoughts
wander about. The imagining consciousness is expressed in the dream
and in the imagination by means of passive acceptance;18 this passivity
stems from the absence of the reflective dimension within it. As a result
of this characteristic of imagination, Spinoza emphasizes, through
various examples, the absence of doubt of defective ideas. In the TdIE,
he presents the day of birth and parents identity as examples of such
ideas, and adds that what he means are matters about which I have
never felt any doubt.19 The absence of doubt, here, does indicate the
presence of some nucleus of truth found in the defective ideaas De
Deugd (among others) believes;20 rather, it points to the nature of the
imagining consciousness. The fact that this consciousness is devoid of
any reflectivity means that it neither negates nor imposes anything
in any substantial way, but that in its passivity it accepts the external
data as unquestionable. The absence of doubt, or the imaginary
certainty, is similar to the absence of doubt that characterizes the
dreamers judgment of the images of his dream. In other words, the
absence of doubt points to the passive adoption of a datum external to
consciousness, rather than its raw truth.21 One could also add that this
characteristic of doubtlessness points to the basic tendency of the nonreflective consciousness: due to its passivity, it tends to approve while
16
17
18
19
20

21

KV, p. 163.
TTP, pp. 13-16.
I will revert to this topic in Chapter 4, section 5, and Chapter 5, section 2.
TdIE, p. 8.
De Deugd, Imagination, p. 22; such a claim corresponds to De Deugds main tendency,
which involves identifying the epistemic value of the first level of knowledge (see, for
example, pp. 51-52).
E 2p49s: When we say that a man rests in false ideas, and does not doubt them, we do
not, on that account, say that he is certain, but only that he does not doubt, or that he
rests in false ideas because there are no causes to bring it about that his imagination
wavers . See also E 2p44s.
72

-----------------I. Non-reflective consciousness and the image of the dream -----------------

fully distracted, rather than to negate, since negation implies a greater


measure of distinction concerning the negated object and the reasons
for its negation, i.e. a greater measure of reflectivitythat is, unless
the negation is already included in the idea that was accepted without
any doubt by consciousness.
In other places, Spinoza distinguishes more directly between
reflective and non-reflective consciousness without making use of
the image of the dream; these examples may help us understand this
distinction and its importance. In the concluding words of the Ethics,
Spinoza contrasts the ignorant and the wise man, writing as follows:
For not only is the ignorant man troubled in many ways by external
causes, and unable ever to possess true peace of mind, but he also
lives as if he knew neither himself, nor God, nor things. The wise
man, on the other hand, insofar as he is considered as such, is hardly
troubled in spirit, but being, by a certain eternal necessity, conscious
of himself, and of God, and of things, he never ceases to be, but always
possesses true peace of mind.22 Consciousness and the absence thereof
are opposed to each other with respect to three entities: the mind,
God and things. It is vital to mention these three since reflectivity,
just like non-reflectivity, cannot become clear within the framework
of consciousness alone, without its objects, so to speak, not even in
relation to the link between consciousness and a specific object.23 For
22
23

E 5p42s.
Spinozas formulation in this concluding paragraph of the Ethics is very important. Two
things can be said about the text at this point: 1. In this paragraph, Spinoza draws a
comparison between the ignorant and the wise man and describes their situation while
reverting twice, and in the same order, to the objects of their consciousness (sui, Dei,
rerum). The special position of this concluding paragraph and the exact and frequent
repetition of these words grant them special importance. From an ontological point of
view, the words should open with God and not with the self; Spinoza, however, opens
in this way in order to point to the reflective dimension of knowledge. This reflective
dimension does not refer only to the internal mode of consciousness; it necessarily
depends on the distinction of the external context. Therefore, the self is emphasized,
while in the same breath it is repeatedly recognized in things and in the divinitythis
time, of course, in proper order. 2. The ignorant is called ignarus, while his lack of
self-consciousness is indicated by the words quasi inscius sui. The words inscius sui,
as far as I know, is not found in classical Latin. Even if this is not an innovation of
Spinozas, this non-classical, new meaning of self-awareness, a form of subjectivity,
is emphasized by the use of quasi. Self-consciousness is also emphasized here by the
73

------------------------------------------------------Imagination and the Masses------------------------------------------------------

Spinoza, unlike Descartes, understanding something in a clear and


distinct manner is synthetic rather than analytic.24 It is only by placing
an element within its context and exhibiting its causal affinities that
one can know it in an adequate manner.25 The same is true regarding
the minds perception of itself. Therefore, the minds knowledge of itself
or absence thereof represents the immediate knowledge of its causal
link to things and to God. Reflection and non-reflection are therefore
anchored in a general disposition, rather than in the internal situation
of consciousness.26 This disposition is determined by the context in
which man apprehends himself and things; essentially, things can be
conceived in two ways: through non-reflective imagination or reflective
thought: either insofar as we conceive them to exist in relation to a
certain time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be contained
in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature.27
Clearly, these two options represent the extremes. The total absence
of imagination represents God alone: If there is a God, or omniscient
Being, such a being cannot form fictitious hypotheses.28 Spinoza
repeatedly formulates his considerations about man and his abilities,
using quantitative conditional words (quatenus, eatenus).29 Man,
including the ultimate philosopher, cannot extricate himself from his
finite status and from his passive condition, while the common person
also exhibits a certain degree of activity and reflectivity. This fact, that

24

25

26
27
28
29

pronoun in a reflective form and by the fact that Spinoza speaks of the absence of
knowledge differently from the way he refers to the ignorant.
See Gilad, Method, pp. 91-92. This is discussed at length there. On this point, Spinozas
claim in the TdIE, p. 37 is of great importance: For the latter [from eternal things] are
all by nature simultaneous.
The epistemological ideal of Descartess clear and distinct refers to synthesis because
the knowledge of something implies the exposure of its causal context and the
presence of its limits. The difference between Descartes and Spinoza which I remarked
above is particularly relevant to the claim regarding the cogito: Descartes points to the
I as a thing whose necessary existence is detached from any context.
See note 23; compare: Hallett, Spinoza, p. 66.
E 5p29s.
TdIE, p. 19.
For example, E 5p30,31; E 5p11,12. Such examples are found on nearly every page
of the Ethics. The use of these conjunctive adverbs (together and separately) is more
complex, as is indicated, for example, in Cassels dictionary.
74

-----------------I. Non-reflective consciousness and the image of the dream -----------------

mans consciousness is always found between these extremes, between


full reflective activity and its absence, and between being aware of the
fullness of the eternal context of things and failing to distinguishing it,
does not rule out the importance of the sharp and primal distinction
between these poles. Only through this distinction can one understand
the nature of mans active and activated consciousness, as well as its
status.
The level of reflectivity of consciousness is perceptible at the
psychological level as well. All of Spinozas ideas on passions and
passivity are linked to this topic. I will limit myself to a short remark
and will expand further in the next section. In the extract from the final
words of the Ethics, which are cited above, the tranquil wise person is
contrasted with the ignorant person, who is ceaselessly tossed about
by his thoughts. In the foreword to the TdIE, Spinoza also emphasizes
emotional turmoil and lack of reflectivity. After his description of
the minds confusion, he adds that this as a fact I suppose everyone
knows, though few, I believe, know their own natures.30 Between the
two parts of this sentence, there is an apparent opposition rather than
a contradiction. Those who experience being tossed about are those
who do not know themselves. More precisely: their excitement stems
from the nature of their consciousness, just like the dreamerto use
Spinozas image of the non-reflective consciousnessis moved by the
images of his dream precisely because he cannot know himself or the
way he is in the world.
The distinction between reflective and non-reflective consciousness,
as well as its description using the image of the dream, touch on
essential points in Spinozas thought. In using these motifs, Spinoza
perpetuates a long philosophical tradition which associates the ignorant
with the dreamer and the goal of philosophy with awakening and the
effort to live a life of wakefulness.31 At this point, we should be more
specific and clarify the role of this image in Spinozian epistemology. As

30
31

TTP, p. 3.
Platos images of philosophy as a form of awakening are also applicable to Spinozas
philosophy. The non-philosophical person is caught in a deluding web of sleep; thus,
imagination characterizes the cognitive activity of the masses.
75

------------------------------------------------------Imagination and the Masses------------------------------------------------------

mentioned above, the types of human consciousness are not identical to


either of the two extremesabsence of reflectivity or full reflectivity;
moreover, we can assume that just as the human body is made up of
different types of elements, so too mans mind is also heterogeneous.32
The nature of the ideas it comprises and the degree of intensity of
reflection they entail are neither homogeneous nor permanent.33 The
heterogeneity of consciousness and the existence of secondary degrees
of knowledgenot necessarily three or fourpoint to the rich and
concrete aspects of thought, but do not rule out the validity of this
basic distinction between the tendency of finite consciousness towards
passivity or towards activity or between reflective and non-reflective
consciousness. The image of the dream points to one pole of the
repertoire of consciousnesses, and, its importance notwithstanding,
bears a schematic role; the tendency of consciousness towards passivity
rather than reflexivity is not necessarily simple or unitary, and is
certainly not as transient as the dream situation.

II. Instability, associations and


egocentrism:the psychological aspect
At the opening of TdIE and in the course of the Ethics, Spinoza describes
mans sufferings (animi fluctuatio); he recalls the masses craving for
things that not only bring no remedy that tends to preserve our being,
32

33

The human body is composed of a great many individuals of different natures;


Corpus humanum ex plurimis diversae naturae individuis componitur (E 3p17s).
This point can be derived not only from the relation between the attributes, but also,
for example, from the fact that the person living with the knowledge of himself, God,
and things knows the structure of reality only as a sketch. He is aware of the existence
of the infinite attributes, but not of their identity. He knows the logic behind the allpenetrating multiplicity of substance, although he does not grasp the concrete fullness
of this multiplicity. TdIE, p. 37: It would be impossible for human infirmity to follow
up the series of particular mutable things. This schematic aspect of the philosophers
understanding leads him to notice continually the eternal existence of things, but
leaves a large space for dim ideas and for varying degrees of reflective intensity, i.e.
of heterogeneous consciousness. While I do not deny distinctions between different
levels of knowledge, they should, however, be considered as the conceptual basis for
understanding mental activity in light of Spinozian ontology and psychology, rather
than topics that exhaust all manifestations of thought.
76

-----II. Instability, associations and egocentrism:the psychological aspect -----

but even act as hindrances, not infrequently causing the death of those
who possess them.34 These things that only seemingly satisfy the mind
are Richness, Fame, and the Pleasures of Senses.35 The mind becomes
totally addicted to these pleasures, and is loath to give up what is
certain for something that is still uncertain,36 i.e. to prefer an unknown
pleasure over a known pleasure. However, once the mind has achieved
satisfaction it is followed by extreme melancholy, whereby the mind,
though not enthralled, is disturbed and dulled.37 In other words, the
situation of the mind is that of someone unable to subdue his desires and
hence is depressed due to his dissatisfaction. The turbulencebetween
uncontrollable desires and their pointlessnessonly illustrates what
Spinoza often points to as the telltale sign of mans distress: confusion,
running around between opposite excitations, living between hope and
fear, and not knowing the external reasons; like waves on the sea,
driven by contrary winds, we toss about, not knowing our outcome and
fate.38 At the beginning of the TdIE, he compares this existence to the
situation of a sick man struggling with a deadly disease.39
Life experience acquaints all men with this inconsistencyeven
those who do not know themselves.40 This is thus a starting point for
philosophical analysis rather than a conclusion that emerges from that
analysis. In the course of his psychological discussions in the Ethics,
particularly in Book III, Spinoza describes this inconsistency in what
can be called phenomenological terms; he also explains it and the
suffering it involves. It is important to recall that the aim of Spinozian
philosophy is not only to save man from the turbulence of his mind,
but also to grant these phenomena a comprehensive articulation. This
task is not a means only; it is an issue in itself. In the next section, we
will discuss this in greater depth. At this point, we should simply recall
34
35
36
37
38

39
40

TdIE, p. 5.
Ibid, p. 3.
Ibid, p. 6.
Ibid, p. 4.
E 3p59s. The masses (vulgus, multitude, plebs) are characterized by inconsistency, an
addiction to passions, foolishness and feelings of inferiority. Spinoza refers to this
repeatedly in his writings: see TTP, pp. 13, 57, 77, 81-82.
TdIE, p. 5.
TTP, p.3.
77

------------------------------------------------------Imagination and the Masses------------------------------------------------------

that human faults are not, in Spinozas eyes, disabilities that must be
erased at once; they are necessary expressions of divine multiplicity.41
This approach determines the non-judgmental tone that characterizes
his analyses of human weaknesses and ailments. One example of this
is his famous claim that he would seek to examine human feelings as
people look at lines and volumes.42 The main point in this statement
is not the assertion of a logical and alienated analysis, as might be
understood, but the emphasis on the suspension of judgment and the
full commitment towards understanding people as they are, with all
their weaknesses and in all their wretchedness.43
The reasons for the inconsistency of the mind and for its sufferings
can only be fully apprehended within the framework of Spinozian
ontology,44 the starting point of such an analysis being the conatus.
The striving towards existence, as commentators rightly emphasize,
is a dynamic act between what strives towards existence and what is
outside its realm.45 At the beginning of Book III of the Ethics, Spinoza
presents some of its basic rules: something can only be destroyed by
an external cause,46 and The striving by which each thing strives to
persevere in its being involves no finite time, but an indefinite time
(indefinitum).47 From that point on, particularly from Proposition 14 in
Book III onwards, it becomes clear that the way emotions exist in the
mind depends on the way external things impact on it. The structure
of emotions, as revealed in Spinozas theory of the affects, is antipodic.
41

42
43

44
45

46
47

The first book of the Ethics concludes with the following topic: to the question why
God did not create all men so that they would be governed by the command of reason,
he answers as follows: because he did not lack material to create all things, from the
highest degree of perfection to the lowest.
E 3pr.
This approach characterizes Spinozas thought in other places as well. At the beginning
of the TP, he criticizes the philosophers who in his view apprehend people not as they
are, but as they themselves would like them to be (TP, p.287). Spinozas approach is
based on his doing away with normative behavior, which characterizes weaknesses as
bad or wrong. See E 3pr and note 41 above.
This topic will also be discussed in later chapters.
Hallett, Spinoza, Chapter 4; see also Lloyd, Nature, from p. 13 onwards, including a
comparison with Leibniz and Descartes.
E 3p4.
E 3p8.
78

-----II. Instability, associations and egocentrism:the psychological aspect -----

Sadness and happiness, and all the other emotions that are defined
in relation to them, are perceived with the aid of the conatus, based
on their capacity to strengthen or weaken existence. The main concept
used in this analysis is association, the general mechanism of which is
outlined in Proposition 14: If the mind has once been affected by two
emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected
by one of the two, also be affected by the other.48 The explanation
provided as proof is based on the fact that man apprehends the outside
world through himself; the activation of external bodies tell us more
about our own bodies than about these external bodies. The two types
of impression become indistinguishable as they are apprehended by
the body, and become linked to one another. This associative aspect
is therefore a basic expression of mans egocentric existence, of the
distorted prominence of his body and of his entire individuality as the
main medium through which things appear.49
Associativity, the mechanism of linking random things analyzed
throughout Book III expands continually as per its nature, thereby
turning man into a hyper-sensitive creature that is continuously tossed
about. The untrammeled spreading of associations stems first of all
from the nature of imaginationit places in the present an idea that
does not exist, and renders it present.50 Therefore, the impact of a thing
is not limited to the present: Man is affected with the same affect of joy
or sadness from the image of a past or future thing as from the image
of a present thing.51 Since the image of a thing comprises its existence,
as often as we recollect a thingeven though it does not actually
existwe still regard it as present, and the body is affected in the same
way.52 The random and fragmented perception of the imagining person
48

49

50
51
52

A similar principle is formulated in E 2p18: If the human body has once been affected
by two or more bodies at the same time, then when the mind subsequently imagines
one of them, it will immediately recollect the others also.
See Halletts description of mans egocentrism in Spinoza, p. 65. He is absorbed by the
temporary existence of things and does not observe their eternal status. This implies
mental poverty, and mans imposing himself upon nature and divorcing it from the
rest of mankind. See also De Deugd, Imagination, p. 62.
E 2p17d, cd.
E 3p18.
E 3p47s; E 3p36; E 3p36d.
79

------------------------------------------------------Imagination and the Masses------------------------------------------------------

is thus not limited to the presence of external things; it is subject to


ongoing and unlimited presence. The influential things resonate
repeatedly within consciousness. In other words, the association
resembles the dream; it is presence contained within consciousness,
in which the ideas drift about, without any reflective dimension. They
hatch and wander back and forth endlessly by themselves, tossing the
mind about.
The strengthening of the associative mode mainly stems from its
transitive nature. The minds attitude toward things is not determined
within itself alone, but also through the mediation of a third party: If
we imagine a thing like us, toward which we have had no effect, to be
affected with some effect, we are thereby affected with a like effect53;
if someone, who has still not provoked in us any emotion, arouses joy
in someone who is similar to us, we will feel love towards him; and the
opposite is true for sadness and hatred.54 These arbitrary networks of
ideas are created in various ways: something that makes us feel happy,
and which in our eyes resembles something that makes us feel sad,
will give rise to both feelings of hatred and love at the same time;55
whoever imagines that the person he hates is possessed by sadness,
becomes happy, and vice versa.56 Emotions that originate in objects
that are similar to those that gave rise to emotionsthis linking
mechanism is not limited to private subjects, but stands at the root
of generalizations: If someone has been affected with joy or sadness
by someone of a class, or nation, different from his own, and this joy
or sadness is accompanied by the idea of that person as its cause,
under the universal name of the class or nation, he will love or hate,
not only that person, but everyone of the same class or nation.57 The
fact that emotional existence is found through the ongoing mediation
of additional subjects means not only that we will react to a growing
number of things (for example, all the members of a collective arouse
53
54
55
56

57

E 3p27.
E 3p27s.
E 2p17.
E 3p23. In the note to this proposition, it is indicated that this happiness can hardly
be stable (vix solida).
E 3p46.
80

-----II. Instability, associations and egocentrism:the psychological aspect -----

fear because one of them is violent); it also means that our feelings will
be more intense and conflicting. If we love something that someone
else loves, we love is all the more stably; likewise, if we love something
that someone we hate loves, we will suffer from the minds agitation.58
In other words, the associative model of the imagining
consciousness, or of the tossing about of the mind, is disseminated as
a result of the possibility of rendering present non-existing ideas in
the imagination and due to their epidemic-like transitivity: Anything
whatever can be the accidental cause of hope or fear.59 They result in
the mind being tossed about endlessly, since there is no hope without
fear, and no fear without hope.60 All this can be summarized as follows:
the associative tendency of consciousness is the result of egocentrism.
The arbitrary collection of ideas is possible due to this principle: the
impressions left by two bodies are linked to one another because they
are contained among the impressions of the apprehending body, which
becomes more influential than the impressions of the two separate
bodies.
There is one important general point which we may learn from
the associative pattern; it is formulated in clear terms in the note
to Proposition 32, in Book III. Spinoza explains, following a long
discussion on associations, that experience teaches us that our existence
is similar to that of children, as they laugh or cry simply because
they see others laughing or crying; moreover, they desire forthwith
to imitate whatever they see others doing, and to possess themselves
whatever they conceive as delighting others. What is striking in
this comparison to children is the aspect of passive existence in the
imagination. Another point expressed in this comparisonwhich is
of interest to us at presentis the childs domination of the world.

58
59
60

E 3p31.
E 3p50.
E 3p50s. These claims, which bear rich existential significance, stem from the
definitions of the basic terms which they employ. As mentioned in E 3p18s2, hope is
an unstable form of happiness, which stems from image we have of something in the
future or in the past which we are uncertain about. Fear equals unstable sadness and
is described in identical terms. These passions are generated out of doubtful images,
and as such they also involve the opposite passions.
81

------------------------------------------------------Imagination and the Masses------------------------------------------------------

Just like the imagining person, the child cannot attain anything beyond
himself. Anything outside himself must be absorbed by himthis we
learned from the discussion on the strengthening of the associative
model. The networks of associations to be found everywhere mean that
we project ourselves more and more onto the world. Naturally, this
projection is not an expansion but a distortion. The associative model
thus sheds light on the nature of egocentrism: the false attribution of
things to the individual distorts the external world, while at the same
time conceals its separate existence. Egocentrism and the associations
it entails do not represent an imaginary empowerment because of the
assimilation of the world, but rather something akin to diffusion.61 In
order to understand the extent of this diffusion, we must recall that
due to the level of knowledge of the masseswho live in imagination
and follow its callingsman has no clear notion either of his body
nor of external bodies: so long as the human mind perceives things
from the common order of Nature, it does not have an adequate, but
only a confused and mutilated knowledge of itself, of its own body,
and of external bodies. 62 Following these words, he writes that we
do not possess a proper consciousness of the body but only of bodily
impressions that involve the ideas of external things. Since we possess
no proper consciousness of them, we possess a clear consciousness
neither of our minds nor of our bodies.
In order to understand the irrational meaning of imagination and
of the associative pattern, we must recall that within the framework
of Spinozas thought. The explanations we provided for associativity
cannot rely on the assumptions usually attributed to it. For in common
senseas well as in the history of philosophy, as perceived by Hume,
for examplethe association is understood based on causal relations
between bodies and ideas. The relation among ideas in the mind is the
result of the accidental encounter of their physical objects. In Spinozas
philosophy, the parallel attributes does not account for the arbitrary
union of ideas by way of a causal link between them and their physical
objects. In Spinozas thought, the gathering of the components linked
61
62

Compare: Joachim, Ethics, p. 160ff. and Gilad, Method, p. 185, on Joachims remarks.
E 2p29c.
82

------III. Inconsistency, conformism and hostility in the life of the masses ------

through association, as it is fragmented and arbitrary, expresses the


passiveness of consciousness and the inadequate consciousness that
characterizes it. Associative clusters are a phenomenon that reflects the
weakness of consciousness and which, ultimately, recall hallucinations.
What regulates the connection between the ideas is not the presence of
the bodies that impose their representation in accordance with links of
causality, but rather the accumulation of events within a non-reflective
consciousness.

III. Inconsistency, conformism and


hostility in the life of the masses
the political aspect
Until this point, the description of life at the first degree of knowledge
has focused on the individual; however, one can easily see that it also
involves one point of important political significance. The individual
who lives essentially in imagination limits his world to idiosyncratic
reactions. He looks at things as an individual and thinks with a nonreflective consciousness, while some of his thoughts closely resemble
hallucinations and dreams. Imagination leads him towards ongoing
instability, towards the distorted prominence of his individuality and,
in fact, also towards the blurring of the separateness of his existence
from the world. At the same time, collectives of such people share
common and deeply rooted patterns. People exhibiting the first level
of knowledge make up the vast majority of mankind. Their life is one
of conformism: they have common and strong prejudices; they strictly
obey religious and political authorities; in spite of the basic instability
that characterizes their activities, they tend to accept external norms
of behavior: We shall also strive to do also whatever we imagine men
to look on with joy, and on the other hand, we shall be averse to doing
what we imagine men are averse to.63 Why does the non-reflective
consciousness not disintegrate into a madmans consciousness,
63

E 3p29. In the note at the bottom of the page, Spinoza mentions that he refers to
the following people: By men in this and the following propositions, I mean men
whom we regard without any particular emotion (affectu nullo). Raven, Tradition, p.
319 describes this sentence as the general rule of social conformism.
83

------------------------------------------------------Imagination and the Masses------------------------------------------------------

ensconced in his own individuality? What is it that binds these two


characteristics of societythe instability of individuals and their
tendency to adopt shared external patterns? What is it that links the
inconsistency of the masses, which Spinoza underscores every time he
deals with them, with conformism?64 And how is it possible to reinforce
authority, which determines some of the patterns shared by mankind,
given this instability?65
64

65

Raven, Tradition proposes an interesting analysis of the question. I will be discussing


her solution on a number of occasions in the footnotes.
Seemingly, the answer is clear; it is presented in E 4p54s: Because men rarely live
from the dictate of reason, these two affects, humility and repentance, and in addition,
hope and fear, bring more advantage than disadvantage. So since men must sin, they
ought rather to sin in that direction. If weak-minded men were all equally proud,
ashamed of nothing, and afraid of nothing, how could they be united or restrained by
any bonds? The mob is terrifying, if unafraid. Spinoza immediately recalls in positive
terms the prophets way of raising the peoples feelings of humiliation, which showed
the extent of their concern for them. In my view, in spite of the great importance of
these claims, they do not exhaust Spinozas answer to the question on the possibility
of basing ones behavior on conduct that is dictated by reason. Taming the masses
is one component in the strengthening of rational political authority, but it is not
everything; the proof of this claim lies at the heart of the next two chapters. At this
point, we need only clarify that Spinozas view of semi-rationality is presented by
his commentators as though it were the main point. One good example is found in
Yovels notes in his translation of the Ethics. These notes concern us not only because
Yovel is an important exponent of Spinoza, but because his interpretation is echoed
in Israeli cultural life. Regarding that passage in the Ethics, he writes as follows: The
people this refers to will not really live according to the orders of reason; rather, they
will superficially imitate them, as follows from their education (which is perceived as
taming), out of respect shown to figures of authority and out of fear of punishment,
rather than from any rational knowledge. In other words, their behavior will be quasirational. This, according to Spinozaparticularly in the Theological-Political Treatise, is
the foundation of society and of the rational State: its role is to get non-rational people
to act rationally, in order to enable them to enjoy the freedom and mutual assistance
of the State, and to savor the fruit of reason even if they did not achieve it through
their awareness of it (Yovel, Ethics, pp. 331-332, Note 1). Further on (E 4p73s),
Yovel writes: In the Theoretical-Political Treatise, Spinoza suggests [] a term for the
popular religion of reason, which is an analogy or external imitation (in conduct, not
in intentions) of the real religion of reason (Yovel, Ethics, p. 351, Note 2). Clearly,
such an approach cannot stand on its own. The main process it suggests is not clear:
How does one get the masses to copy and adopt rational patterns of behavior? This
is a very weighty question, if one reverts to Spinozas claim that the desirable aim of
the State is not to lead the masses with a shepherds staff, as if they were sheep. We
will discuss this at further length in Chapter 4. For the moment, we will sum up the
elitist view which Yovel attributes to Spinoza: the philosopher possesses the religion
84

------III. Inconsistency, conformism and hostility in the life of the masses ------

We will respond to the last question in the following chapters. The


answer to the other questions is simple: conformity and inconsistency
are both clear expressions of the same thingthe passivity of the
person exhibiting the first degree of knowledge. The egocentrism of
the person imagining, his idiosyncratic nature, does not represent the
activism of Nietzschean super-man who powerfully demonstrates his
uniqueness (naturally, this type of hero is foreign to Spinozian thought);
it represents, on the other hand, a person who, for the most part, thinks
partial thoughts due to his lack of reflection. This passivity is what
leads him to accept cultural constructs unconditionally. In other words,
accepting an idea without confirmation and without any doubt
represents the egocentrism of the dream characters and emphasizes the
internal situation of passive consciousness; the tendency of the person
of the first degree of knowledge to adopt things based on hearsay and
to adopt solutions by copying other peoplesuch as we see from
Spinozas example of the proportionemphasizes the nature of the
affinity of the passive mind to the external. However, what is described
as external (imitation) and what is described as internal (the absence of
reflection) are two different manifestations of the same consciousness.66
In other words, the masses are unstable and readily tend to adopt
external models. Society is characterized by constant trembling and
the weakness of the non-reflective consciousness, while conformity
represents the flipside of instability. This complexity, seemingly full of
contradictions, characterizes the various aspects of the passive masses.
The explanation as to the link between instability and conformism does
not rule out any tension between them; it only clarifies the complexity
of the phenomenon that will lie at the heart of Spinozas political
analyses.67 His criticism of religious authority, his claims as to the

66
67

of reason and does away with the lies and foolishness of the religions of revelation.
The masses, for their part, are guided by manipulations and imitations; their lives are
not based on any dimension of independent spiritual life; they are tamed.
See note 23 above.
A combination similar to that between conformism and instability is found in
imagination, from an epistemological point of view. On the one hand, imagination is
influenced only by individual things and bodies (TdIE, p. 31: The imagination is only
affected by particular things). The sense-related and private nature of imagination is
also obvious in Spinozas remarks on the contents of the prophets, in TTP, pp. 3032.
85

------------------------------------------------------Imagination and the Masses------------------------------------------------------

necessity of having one spirit, so to speak and his establishment of


the authority of the State, can only be understood in relation to this
passive mind and two-faced nature of the masses. Since this tension
is chronic and deep, its reasons being ontological, epistemological
and psychological, the effort to perfect human society is doomed to
be temporary, just as it is possible. A first step in such an endeavor is
to analyze the masses based on their independent mental categories.
Hence the need to analyze imagination, more than reason, is essential
for an understanding of political issues.
The tensions found among the masses do not stem from their
instability alone; rather, they derive from the fact that the people
who make up the masses are hostile to one another. In this context,
we should recall Spinozas claim that people entertain more powerful
feelings of love or hatred towards one another than towards other
things, since they imagine that they are free.68 This hyper-sensitivity
still does not imply hostility; the explanation for hostility lies in the idea
which Spinoza reverts to several times: in the TP, he writes that each
person strives to see others live according to his own views, accepting
whatever he accepts and rejecting whatever he rejects.69 The outcome
is that we strive to be first and attempt to oppress one another. This
claim is further detailed in the Ethics, where it is explained how love
seemingly represents [t]his striving to bring it about that everyone
should approve his love and hate is really ambition. And so we see
that each of us, by his nature, wants the others to live according to his
temperament; when all alike want this, they are alike an obstacle to on
another, and when all wish to be praised, or loved, by all, they hate one
another.70 This tendency is understood within the general framework
of egocentrism,as detailed above. As we recall, Spinoza pointed to the

68
69
70

On the other hand, the marked tendency of imagination is to stick to universals. In


the Ethics, it is mentioned that the mind does not have the ability to comprehend
the multiplicity of details; therefore, it places them under a single thing, which is
determined according to the position of the body based on physical encounters (E
2p40s1). In other words, imagination has two opposite tendencies: it creates universals
for itself but is only influenced by individual elements.
E 3p49s.
TP, p. 289.
E 3p31cs.
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------III. Inconsistency, conformism and hostility in the life of the masses ------

resemblance between the modes of existence of people and those of


children.71 Egocentrism refers to swallowing the other, which we do
by identifying each of the other persons impulses as ones own, while
the imposition of our preferences on the other represents the flip side
of this same tendency. These imaginary and mutual acts of swallowing
each other by the members of the masses can only lead to total war.
What has been said so far does not cover the entire Spinozian
explanation concerning the basic feelings of animosity of human beings
towards one another. I will mention only one additional explanation
which, in my view, is the Archimedean point of the issue. In broad
terms, at the heart of Spinozas thought we find a series of essential
oppositions that are linked to one another: eternity and time; the
genuine idea versus the fruit of the imagination. Another pair of
opposites which Spinoza reverts to, include a life of partnership (which
represents the wise mans natural tendency) and total war (in which the
member of the masses is mired).
The final opposition, that between the wise mans life of partnership
and the hostility which characterizes the masses, is both epistemic
and metaphysical. In other words, this opposition is essentially
linked to the other opposites mentioned so far. As we recall, Spinoza
indicates that there are two frameworks through which things can
be perceivedeither in relation to a particular time and place, or
as included within God and eternal.72 The insight into the eternal
status of things is an insight into the dynamic nature of substances,
which penetrates all the manifestations of its multiplicity. It is
only by noticing this dynamism that the individual can achieve his
genuine affinity to totality and his finite-infinite place within it.73 This
realization has, therefore, a therapeutic side, and a special effect on the
wise persons overcoming death and on his tendency to observe life.74
Philosophical considerations help the wise person realize his belonging
to totality; it bears no sign of a mystical leap towards the infinite,

71
72
73
74

E 3p32s.
E 5p29s.
Hallett, Spinoza, Chapter 1
E 4p67.
87

------------------------------------------------------Imagination and the Masses------------------------------------------------------

involving the abolition of all partitions; on the contrary, it represents


the acknowledgement of ones belonging to society, to the State and
to mankindwhere his best interests lie.75 The life of partnership
is anchored in the wise mans understanding of his ontic belonging;
the opposite holds true with respect to the members of the masses,
whose consciousness implies a distorted approach to himself and to
his existence in the world. This distortion results in his alienation and
being cut off from totality. The all-penetrating dynamism is no longer
within his reach, and, consequently, his genuine affinity with the world
disintegrates. He is ontologically uprooted.
Moreover, the member of the masses creates defective images and
concepts of God. In the notes that appear along with Book I of the Ethics,
Spinoza speaks of such images and concepts on a number of occasions.
The main concept is that of a transcendental God who personally
supervises His creations.76 Spinozian ontology helps one understand
the importance of such a concept for the self-understanding of the
member of the masses. Furthermore, this type of person is alienated,
as we will now proceed to describe. In many places throughout the
Ethics, Spinoza emphasizes the transitive sequence that characterizes
the path of immanent action of the substance. This immanence
cannot be presented as merely a contour of the Beingwithout any
transcendental being; rather it is characterized by a basic internal
dynamism: a finite thing is pulled into action by another finite thing.77
God does not act outside such things but within them.78 The fact that
the finite is found within finite things is essential for its situation
as a finite thing. Within the defective concept of the transcendental
God, the member of the masses denies its ontic determination. He is
pulled awayin his imagination, naturallyfrom the final things
and from the chain of private causes which he is part of, and rises
straight towards the infinite. In this way he acquires for himself an
imagined status, which can be called meta-final. His real situation is

75
76
77
78

As emphasized in E 4p30ff.
For example: E 1p17cs; E 1p33s2.
E 1p28.
E 1p18,p26,p28.
88

------III. Inconsistency, conformism and hostility in the life of the masses ------

not revealed through these images, but in light of Spinozian ontology


and according to the nature of the distortion. Once again, like with the
cutting off and the static condition described in the previous section,
one holding the view of the transcendental God is torn away from
the concrete context of which he is part and remains alienated from
everything, in his dreamlike reality.
This chapter contributed towards extending the discussion from
imagination in the individuals mind to its importance for the mind
of the masses. Its conclusions can be summed up as the outline of the
basic notions that lie at the root of Spinozas political reflections. The
masses, and human society as a whole, are inconsistent, fraught with
internal conflicts, and easily adopt external patternsnone of these
components rules out the other. The reasons for the complex nature of
the masses are found in ontology, epistemology and psychology. This
clarifies somewhat the claim, formulated at the end of the previous
chapter, that Spinozas insights into the spiritual problems of the masses
are based on ontology. The masses instability and submissiveness do
not stem from the spirit of a particular period; rather, they stem from
the passive nature of their mentality. Any thought of the possibilities
of perfecting the masses life must start with a presentation of this
background.

89

----------------------------Chapter IV ----------------------------------

Political Secularism

-------------------------------------------------------------Politacal secularism-------------------------------------------------------------

Politacal secularism
In his writings, particularly in the Ethics and in the TTP, Spinoza
questions religious authority1: the Ethics are fraught with remarks on
the false concepts of revelatory religions. The attribution of freedom
and spontaneity to the Divinity, miracles and miraculous apparitions,
the distinction between will and intellect, Gods personalized
image

these, among other distorted concepts, become clear


through a logical analysis of God.2 In the TTP, we witness another
type of objection. Spinozas subversive reading of the Holy Scriptures,
which highlights their contradictions, and which exhibits a historical
sensitivity to the time they were written and edited, amounts to an
act of de-canonization. His claims as to the indivisibility of political
sovereignty challenge religious authority. Through these moves,
Spinoza seeks to undermine the authority of those who imagine
themselves to be Gods agents. Throughout his entire philosophical
work, Spinoza mounts a comprehensive objection to the authority of
revelatory religion; he criticizes its basic concepts, its cultural legacy,
and its legitimization in the modern State.
Spinozian thought is, however, not limited to this. The complexity
of the masses, their inconsistent and conflict-prone nature, the fact that
they easily adopt external patterns, the important role of imagination
in the life of the masses, and the fact that the reasons for the nature
of the masses are elementary, i.e. ontologicalall this led Spinoza
1

On the link between Spinozas view of religion and the religious ideas found in his
surroundings, see: Popkin, The Study of the Bible; Popkin, Fisher; Popkin, Quakers;
Hunter, Radicalism; Nadler, Biography, particularly Chapter 7.
For example, E 1p15s; E 1p17cs2; E 1p33s2.
93

--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------

to expand his philosophical mission well beyond the presentation of


a comprehensive attack on religion. Spinoza was well aware that the
nature of the masses made forms of authority that could be labeled
as spiritual or cultural necessary. Although political authority
possesses various means for shaping the life of men, the central place
of awareness in his analysis of the masses leads him to realize the
importance of beliefs, of common concepts, and of images, and to
search for their possible origins. For Spinoza, any objection to religion
must be accompanied by a clarification of the sources of an alternative
spiritual authority that will contribute towards the establishment of
political sovereignty.
The main text dealing with these issues is the TTP; however, as I will
show in this chapter, Spinozas statements should not be understood
apart from his epistemological and ontological analysis, as it appears
in the Ethics.3 It is here that Spinozas special relevance for the topic of
this book appears once again. Spinozas interest in the undermining
of religious authority, in the outcome of this undermining, and in the
formation of alternative sources of authorityall make him relevant
to the problem of secularization in Israeli society. Spinoza examines
the beginnings of the modern state and notices that large numbers
of people are changing their lifestyleshistorical religions are slowly
loosing their grip as other centers of power emerge. To a certain extent,
this resembles the situation of the Jewish collective in Israel: it is being
shaped at a time when religion is withering away and the state is taking
shape. Political sovereignty is becoming the central authority, although
it does not eliminate the power of culture and tradition which, to a
large extent, continue to determine the concepts and images held by
members of society. Therefore, more than we need Spinozas opposition
to religion, we need the strength of his thought on the construction of
spiritual authority which, along with political authority, are the heirs
3

I disagree with the assumption that it is possible to understand Spinozas political


views by looking at his political and theological essays alone (TTP and TP), as we
find in: Strauss, Spinoza, p. 112; Smith, Spinoza and Liberalism, p. XV. In the previous
chapter, we explained why Spinozas epistemology is vital for understanding the object
of politics and the problems involved with it. In this chapter, as in the next one, I will
demonstrate that it is vital for an understanding of the solutions to these problems.
94

-------------------------------------------------------------Politacal secularism-------------------------------------------------------------

to religion; together, they strive towards the rationalization of society.


One more point: commentators who describe Spinozas analyses of
these questionsthe nurturing of a universal or popular religiontend
to overemphasize the passivity of the masses. They claim that Spinoza
promotes a type of reformed religion as a means of organizing the life
of the masses.4 In opposition to the capricious temperament of the
masses and their intrigue-prone nature, they promote reformed religion
as a kind of manipulation that leads the masses unconsciously towards
a semi-rational life. This description underlies the fact that Spinozas
reformed religion is based on the assumption that the passivity of the
masses calls for manipulative direction of their lives. This emphasis
obscures another, more important fact: Spinozas orientation towards
reformed religion is not bound to that religions particular postulate;
its main function is to stimulate the masses.
If this aim is misunderstood, Spinozas orientation towards the
shaping of the life of the masses in a semi-rational way remains
unclear. Indeed, the main point of manipulation is not to enforce some
external thing or to justify its usefulness, but the way it is assimilated
and the results of this assimilation. The interesting question regarding
the reformed religion advocated by Spinoza is: how are impressions and
ideas found in the consciousness of the masses? Secondary questions
are, among others: why does Spinoza glorify stories as a means towards
instilling religious images? What is the simple concept of God and
what is the nature of the response inherent in obedience? All of these
questions should only be discussed in light of the special nature of
the consciousness of the masses, i.e. in relation to the functioning of
the ideas of imagination. These clarifications will help us understand
how Spinoza strives to base the authority of the reformed religion
on patterns that are immanent to the mentality of the masses. This
authority is not only imposed upon it, but is based on the tendencies
of the masses; the crux of the idea of the reformed religion lies in
the structure of the consciousness of the masses and their activity,
not in leading them about as if they were blind. By illustrating this
point, we will understand that reformed religion is not only part of the
4

See, for example, Hallett, Spinoza, p. 139 onwards.


95

--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------

rationalization process of society through semi-rational manipulations


that have the potential to create a reformed political life; rather, it is
a program for the activation of the life of the masses, which is called
here stimulation.
As we see in the title of the chapter, the aim of the discussion
here is to clarify the nature of political secularism. This concept, as
we remember, was introduced in Chapter 2, in which I claimed that
two models of secularism could be linked to Spinozian philosophy.
The first model is entitled metaphysical secularism; it refers to
the entire system of concepts and approaches that are presented as
a full alternative to religion. Substance replaces the personal God at
the heart of revelatory religions, and removes all concrete cultural
and religious connotations from its philosophical speculations. It is
the philosopher to whom this type of secularism can be attributed;
he is the secular subject. It is only thanks to knowledge like his that
one may understand the logical-ontological analysis of the Spinozian
God, follow the command of reason and reject all revelatory religions.
However, the problem of secularism in Spinozas thought cannot be
understood through such models. His great sensitivity to the problems
of the consciousness of the masses accounts for the existence of another
secular positionpolitical secularism. This concept comprises his goals
for the rationalization of society: the undermining of the authority of
the religious establishment, the examination of ways of developing
popular religion and the establishment of political authority.
I will present Spinozas political secularism based on four principles:
that political authority is the most efficient way to rationalize the life
of the masses; that religion is likely to endanger political authority but
it is also vital in establishing it; that, therefore, the rationalization of
the masses comprises a program for moderating religious tradition and
harnessing it to political life; and that this moderation can only become
clear if we understand how the religious tradition is maintained in the
consciousness of the masses.
The first two principles are rather straightforward, while the
two latter ones call for more speculative interpretation. Thus, the
interpretation suggested here begins with its more overt expressions in
Spinozas writings and moves to the more implicit ones, as will become
96

---------------------------------------------------------- I. Undermining religion----------------------------------------------------------

clear in the discussion. The first part of the chapter (sections 1-4) will
deal with the first two principles, while the second part (sections 5
and 6) will deal with the latter principlesthe meaning of the flexible
forms of reformed religion, and the clarification of its forms in the
consciousness of the masses, as well as its political significance.

I. Undermining religion
Much of Spinozas efforts in the TTP are devoted to a subversive reading
of the Scriptures. His arguments, based upon philological analyses, will
not be examined here; for our purposes, we will simply indentify the
trends present in the analysis and their aims. The most obvious is the
de-canonization of the Scriptures. Spinoza indicates that Scripture
consists of a variety of different books, of different periods and for
different men, and compiled by a variety of authors.5 These writings
are written by a large number of men, of different temperaments
and at different times.6 This de-canonization not only identifies the
multiplicity of sources in the text, but enquires into the process by
which the sacred canon was accepted. At the end of the discussion
on the authors of the Old Testament, Spinoza writes: It very clearly
follows from this that the learned in the Law called together a council
to determine what kind of books should be received as sacred and
which should be excluded. Hence, anyone desirous of being sure about
the authority of them all must go through the entire deliberative
process afresh seeking justification for each of them.7 In other words,
the sacredness of the text is not inherent, but the outcome of human
decisions. The way to establish the authority of the books of scripture
is by examining justification for each of them.
His clarification concerning the difference between his claim and
the position of lay people (profani) helps us in understanding his aim:
I admit that some impious persons who find religion a burden, may
discern an excuse for wrongdoing here and may infer, without any
5
6
7

TTP, p. 188.
Ibid., p. 178.
Ibid., p. 154.
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--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------

justification but merely to indulge their pleasures, that Scripture is


thoroughly flawed and corrupted and consequently lacks authority.8
Such claims, Spinoza explains, could be attributed to him through false
interpretation. His aim is rather to show that the words of God is
not contained in a certain number of books, and that in so far as the
Bible teaches what is requisite for obedience and salvation, it could not
have been corrupted.9 In opposition to the contradictions in the Holy
Scripturethe outcome of their various sources and of the process of
their canonizationSpinoza suggests one source of authority, which
is repeatedly presented through the expression a pure conception of
the divine mind.10
Clearly, Spinozas proposal is neither straightforward nor simple.
If we take into consideration the inconsistent and passive nature of
the masses, its tendency to adopt hearsay and conventions without
criticismwhich was the focus of the previous chapter, particularly
its last sectionone cannot hope to base the concept of holiness on
the natural inquisitiveness of the masses. In other words, one cannot
understand Spinozas proposal exclusively in terms of the authority
(whether fictitious or not, this is a question we will discuss later) that
it grants the masses; rather, it should be understood in relation to its
outcomes regarding the status of religious representatives and of the
stability of the political power. This is clearly indicated by Spinozas
claims regarding the extended authority of religious leaders: Everyone
knows how much influence right and authority in sacred matters have
with the common people and how much everyone listens to someone
who possesses such authority. I may say that whoever has this power
has the greatest control over the peoples minds.11 Since the authority
of these religious figures is based on their mastery of the Holy
Scriptures, Spinozas call for identifying what is most important with
a pure conception of the divine mind robs them of their hold on the
text, thereby impinging on their power. This damage to their authority

8
9
10
11

Ibid., p. 164.
Ibid., pp. 164-165.
Ibid., p.10.
Ibid., p. 245.
98

-------------------------II. Rationalization of the masses and political power-------------------------

is clear to all: the power of the religious figures over the masses poses a
continuous threat to the State. The way to overcome this is by clarifying
the political principle according to which the authority of the State
extends to religious matters, rather than political issues alone. Those
who insist upon leaving the religious power in the hands of religious
authorities [are] attempting to divide the government. Conflict and
discord [] will inevitably ensue and will never be resolved.12 To this,
we should add something that was not clearly stated, but which derives
logically from the above: within the context of the beginnings of the
modern State, the realization of the principle of a united political
power calls for the weakening of religious figures.13 The stronger their
status, the harder it is to undermine their authority and transfer it
into the hands of the political body. One effective way of weakening
this type of power is by nurturing a popular relationship to the spirit
of the Holy Scriptures.
This view of de-canonizationthe nurturing of a popular trend
in order to establish the unity of the political poweris only partial.
Two issues that are intertwined with it remain to be clarified: that the
establishment of political power is a means of rationalizing society and
improving it; and that religion is necessary to assure the stability of
political power, which alone can assure the rationalization of society.
These two topics will be discussed in the next two sections.

II. Rationalization of the masses


and political power
In the TTP, the TP and the Ethics, Spinoza emphasizes the indispensability
of alliances among human beings as the root of political sovereignty. In
a life of solitude, men would have neither the necessary time nor the
strength to provide their basic material needsto plough, sow, reap,
12
13

Ibid., p. 245.
Naturally, there is a big difference between the period in which Spinoza is thinking his
thoughts and our time. Spinoza expresses the hardships faced by the modern state
striving to stabilize its new authority opposite forces that are more deeply rooted. He
did not foresee a modern State with all its strengths, including the power to threaten
political freedom.
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--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------

grind, cook, weave and sew for himself as well as doing the many other
things that are needed to sustain life.14 They most certainly would be
unable to fulfill their spiritual needs, i.e. the arts and sciences, which
are also supremely necessary to the perfection of human nature and its
happiness.15 Without a political body, men are condemned to a life of
misery, which Spinoza describes in very strong terms: wretched and
brutish lives.16 This degraded life is the lot of the lonely individual,
who is portrayed as living outside society. The gathering of men
involves dangers and fearthe background to this is detailed in the
third section of the previous chapter. Political power is indispensible
in order to prevent people from harming each other, and to keep the
incontrollable passions of the members of the masses in check.17 If they
remain alonewhich is not perceived as a real possibilitythey live
like beasts; if they come together in a disorderly way, they live within
their imaginations, deeply involved in their passions and at odds with
each other. Whether alone or as a horde, people actually live alone.
Their genuine cohesion and the appearance of a safe and nurtured life
call for the presence of an external and common authority.
All human beings tend to accept this type of authority. Whether
barbarous or civilized, they create a political situation.18 They do
not accept it as a result of rational recommendations; rather, we can
deduce this from the general nature or position of mankind.19 At
the beginning of the PT, we find a longer, albeit no more detailed
explanation, in which Spinoza indicates that the public strives to be led
naturally,20 i.e. through a common passion, such as common hope, or
fear, or the desire of avenging some common hurt.21 Towards the end
of this explanation, Spinoza adds: But since fear of solitude exists in all
men, because no one in solitude is strong enough to defend himself, and
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21

TTP, p. 72.
Ibid., p. 72.
Ibid., p. 72. On p. 197, it is written as follows: without mutual help [] human beings
necessarily live in great misery.
Ibid., pp. 72-73.
TP, p. 290.
Ibid., p. 290.
Ibid., p. 316.
Ibid., p. 316.
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-------------------------II. Rationalization of the masses and political power-------------------------

procure the necessaries of life, it follows that men naturally aspire to


the civil state; nor can it happen that men should ever utterly dissolve
it.22
In these statements, Spinoza overlooks something: human beings
naturally tend to gather together, either out of their fear of loneliness
or because of some common passion. However, this coming together
does not suffice to account for the creation of the political situation,
i.e. the fact that they organize their life through some general and
common authority. The consolidation of life under fixed laws cannot be
explained merely by their striving to come together; the explanation
for this, to my understanding, can be found in what was said about the
masses, in the third section of the previous chapter. People naturally
adopt an external authority, just as they tend to settle into their privacy.
These opposing tendencies characterize them in equal measure. The
development of authority and its acceptance are as natural as mans
egocentric existence, given their dream-like consciousness

the
former and the latter represent opposite and necessary manifestations
of the fundamental passivity of life in the imagination. Identifying
these tendencies, as I have already indicated in the previous chapter,
is the basis for the sensitivity in Spinozas thought to authority and
its fragility.23
For Spinoza, as has already been pointed out, political authority
is the means towards the rationalization of society. The term
rationalization refers to two things: first of all, the fundamental
role of political power is to ensure a rational regularization, the aim
of which is to organize the life of the public whose members cannot
be saved from themselves or from their imagining consciousnesses. If
men were able to behave rationally rather than to follow their passions,
political power would be superfluous.24
22
23

24

Ibid., p. 316.
In the TTP, p. 211, Spinoza writes at length about the vulnerability of the political
power. He starts with a detailed description of the unstable character of the masses,
and then claims They have never succeeded in devising a form of government that
was not in greater danger from its own citizens than from foreign foes, and which was
not more fearful of the former than of the latter
TP, p. 316.
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--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------

Political power is the medium or the basis for improving the life
of the masses. Rationalization does designate a utopian model, but
also the concrete possibility of perfecting collective and private life and
molding them in accordance with more rational patterns. In this, it is
infinitely more successful than religious power. In any case, Spinoza
does not try to impose an ideal political model on society. In addition
to the supra-temporal ontological context that characterizes his political
observations, those observations are also continuously linked to the
context of a given collective,25 their main point being the attempt to
improve it. The processual nature of rationalization and the entire
rational approach of Spinozas political observation are found throughout
the PT. In a more complex way, they also determine Spinozas analysis
as it appears in the TTP. Naturally, these claims need to be clarified and
justified, as we will discuss further in the current section.
Secondly, the rationality of political power is perceptible not only
through its aim, but also through its basic pattern of behavior. This
pattern is based on the understanding of the consciousness of the
members of society, i.e. of the mentality of the masses and the nature of
its causality. In other words, the cognitive and psychological limitations
of the masses are the basic data in the foundation of authority. The
psychological law that serves to establish such authority is stated in E
4p7: An affect cannot be restrained or taken away except by an affect
opposite to, and stronger than, the affect to be restrained.26 How did
this become the basis for the rational action of the authority in power?
Insofar as this authority claims the right to pass judgment on good and
evil, it holds the power to impose life in common. Moreover, it does not
do so in an ineffective mannerby seducing people into believing in
the necessity of the authority and the need to obey itbut through
threats and promises, i.e. by employing a contradictory and sufficiently
strong passion. The rationality of power refers here to its basis in the
order and laws of the consciousness of the masses.27
25

26
27

This relative proximity to the socio-political context of the time is also perceptible in
the impact of the special status of the emerging modern State in Spinozas thought,
as stated in note 13.
See also E 4p17.
Religion too functions on the basis of threats and promises of rewards. The sovereign
102

--------------------------III. Does rationalization mean overcoming religion?--------------------------

III. Does rationalization


mean overcoming religion?
Based on their roles as well as their courses of action, the State and
the ruling authority are rational. In order to protect their position, the
higher authorities are very much obliged to work for the common good
and direct all things by the dictate of reason.28 Moreover, the general
good is necessarily related to the interest of the individual. Therefore,
the obedience shown by the citizen differs from that of the slave or
the child.29 From what has been explained so far, one might think that
the understanding of political secularism that should be attributed
to Spinoza calls for the shaping of social life through political means
alone. In the final analysis, he aims at seeing a political society devoid
of any religion; in the meantime, however, until the harmful revelatory
religions are eradicated, he suggests a popular, weakened and harmless
religion for the masses under control of the political power. This view is
erroneous, and it is essential that we clarify this mistake, as it is at the
core of the link between the political authority and religious life, which
is the key issue of political secularism. We will thus be examining the
considerations that motivate those expressing this view, after which
we will attempt to explain why they should be rejected on principle.
The reasons for this rejection will become clearer as the discussion
progresses throughout this chapter.
One could claim the following: according to Spinoza, the State will
become the sole and definitive authority in the life of society.30 He had
no choice but to make his statements on the necessity of religion; these
claims should only be perceived in their historical context. Had Spinoza
written his works at a later period, he would not have attributed

28
29

30

political power is more rational than religion, not because it makes use of this
psychological rule, but given the nature of its aims.
TTP, p. 200.
Ibid., p. 201: a subject is one who does by command of the sovereign what is useful
for the community and consequently also for himself.
As mentioned earlier, the danger faced by the individual as a result of the centralized
power of the State is not discussed in Spinozas essays. On the State in Spinozas
political philosophy, see: Dan Oyl, Power; Feuer, Liberalism; Gildin, A Political Problem;
Hallett, Spinoza, Chapter 11; and De Deugd, Political-Theological.
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--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------

any role to religion or tradition in the life of society.31 His aim is to


dismantle the hold that religion has on public life and replace it with
political powerthis outcome is the main point of the rationalization
of society. Moreover, the tendency of the masses towards instability
places the stability of the authority at stake. In the TTP, Spinoza
emphasizes the fact that everyone focuses on the external forces which
endanger sovereignty and the State, but the rulers know well that the
greatest dangers come from within: A commonwealth is always in
greater danger from its citizens than from its enemies [] He, upon
whom the whole right of the dominion has been conferred, will always
be more afraid of citizens than of enemies.32 Religion and superstition
can easily become the foundation for social instability. When explaining
in the TPP why the political sovereign must retain control of religious
issues as well, he claims as follows:33
People are very prone to go astray in religion and make dubious claims
that result from the diversity of their understanding, and generate
serious conflict, as experience clearly testifies. It is therefore certain that
if no one were obliged by law to obey the sovereign power in matters
that he thinks belong to religion, then the law of the state would depend
upon the different judgments and passions of each individual person. For
no one would be obligated by the law if he considered it to be directed
against his faith and superstition, and on this pretext everyone would be
able to claim licence to do anything.

In other words, religion can totally undermine political rule. Religion


grants the masses a basis for immersing themselves in their passions,
and disintegrates societya risk that stems from the basic nature of
the masses. It is not only the authority of the religious authorities that
poses a threat to the political power, but also the accessibility of the
contents of religion. These contents are likely to grant individuals a
sufficiently broad basis for wrongly interpreting the beliefs that are
31

32
33

McSheas claims, in Political Philosophy, p. 181, are an example of this position. He


explains that in the image of the ideal state as implicated in Spinozas thought; religion
is non-existent.
TP, p. 318. See note 23 above.
TTP, pp. 171-172.
104

--------------------------III. Does rationalization mean overcoming religion?--------------------------

desirable for them, and to provide them with a source of authority to


which they may assign their own private purposes.
For this reason, in addition to the reasons brought earlier, one could
claim that Spinozas essential aim is to bring about full secularization
through the politicization of society, and that in the TTP, his interest
in religion stems less from the fundamental logic of his thought,
but rather from the restrictions of permitted expression at his time
and from the power of revelatory religions in the consciousness of
his contemporaries. This is why the proposal to establish a reformed
religion was one appropriate to the times. One should not seek any
ontological-epistemological meaning in it. According to this line of
argument, the meaning of political secularism which was attributed here
to Spinozaa secularism geared towards all of society and not towards
the philosopher, and which aims at rendering religion more flexible
and adapting it to political lifeis groundless as an interpretation
of Spinozas long-term aims. It suits his short-term intention for as
long as society fails to release itself from the grip of futile religion. In
the final analysis, it is suggested, Spinoza strove to eradicate religion
and uproot it from society in order to prevent it from damaging the
authority of the sovereign political power.
Continuing this line of argument, Spinoza makes no essential
distinction between metaphysical secularism and political secularism.34
Not only does the authority of religious authorities threaten the
sovereign power, but even the fact that the contents of religion are
accessible to the masses is dangerous: both are in opposition to the
rationalization and stabilization of society. Spinozas metaphysical
analyses expose distortions in concepts, while his political observations
expose the dangers they entail as concepts rooted in the public.
The common aim of both metaphysical and political secularism is,
therefore, to reject religion. Their only limitations lie in the publics
capacity to accept philosophical claims. In a nutshell, the only meaning
of secularism that can be attributed to Spinoza is the struggle to
release man from religion and to instruct him to follow his reason
or to follow reason as it is expressed through the sovereign political
34

See Chapter 2, section 2.


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--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------

power. The proposed model of political secularism is only the broader


type of Spinozian secularism, as reflected through the limitations on
permissible expression in Spinozas day, and as perceived through the
distorted perceptions of the members of the masses.
As mentioned above, I believe that this understanding is wrong.
The type of political secularism that can be attributed to Spinoza
cannot be reduced to the demand for the politicization of society and
the desire to eradicate religion. The words political secularism here
designate an approach that clarifies the essential need for a religious
tradition founded on an ontological, epistemological and psychological
analysis of the masses. This analysis is not anchored in the time of
Spinoza or in the historical context of the period. Its validity lies in
mans finality and in his permanent modes of existence. Through this
type of analysis, Spinoza examines how religious tradition can lie at the
foundation of political life and how its dangers can be avoided. Those
who believe that it is possible to do away with religion entirely and base
human life on political authority alone overlook a deep ontological and
epistemological consideration in Spinozian thought: in human life, the
distortion of truth is more basic than truth itself. This is the reason
why the cognitive limitations of the masses do not appear in Spinozas
thought as an unnecessary appendage to the study of truth and God;
they are a basic aspect of nature and of human society. To understand
the spiritual needs of the masses we are compelled to pay attention to
the important role of religious tradition; we are compelled to notice the
need for concrete tradition as it is given in the life of a concrete society.
As such, the philosophical endeavor focuses on the way religious
tradition adapts to political authority, or on the clarification of ways to
subjugate tradition to this authority.

IV. The importance of religion in


the establishment of political power
As a first step, we will examine the political role of religion in the eyes
of Spinoza. Spinoza emphasizes the need for the Holy Scriptures in
imbuing morality. Only a very limited number of people are capable
of adopting good attributes by following reason. The vast majority of
106

-----IV. The importance of religion in the establishment of political power -----

people do this by simply obeying the scriptures or some revelation,


as all men possess the capacity to obey.35 Therefore, Scripture has
brought great consolation to mortal men,36 and has prevented much
bloodshed.37 The adoption of a moral way of life, which is the model of a
rational social life, needs the Holy Scriptures and the spirit of obedience
which they have the power to arouse in men.
The necessity of the contents of religion is also apparent in the link
between political power and religion. It is often claimed that Spinoza
places religion and the State in a hierarchical order, with religion being
subject to the authority of the State.38 Clearly, Spinozas call for religious
issues to be under the authority of the political power, as well as his
efforts to weaken the authority of religious functionaries, are geared
towards subjugating religion to political power; however, this subjection
entails more complex links, as the political power wraps itself up in
the spirit of religion.39 By repeating the claim according to which God
has no kingdom over men except through those who hold power,40 he
places the sovereign power in an independent positionthis is the most
striking element in this declarationbut he also grants the sovereign
power this status because it embodies Gods wish. In other words, the
absolute authority of political power is expressed by its applicability to
religious affairs as well, but this authority has religious meaning. In the
Ethics and in the TTP, when explaining that the basic moral concepts
only achieve their full meaning within the political context rather than
within the context of the natural situation, he identifies obedience to
revelation with obedience to the sovereign political power: It is []
35

36
37
38

39

40

TTP, p. 194: Everyone without exception can obey, not merely the very fewvery
few, that is, in comparison with the whole human racewho acquire the habit of
virtue by the guidance of reason alone. The term salvation refers to a life of simple
obedience or the adoption of good attributes.
Ibid., p. 194.
Ibid., p. 184.
This image is commonly found among Israeli commentators: Englard, Law; Ravitzky,
Models. Israeli commentators are of particular importance, as they have been vital in
the creation of the images suggested by Spinoza for the relations between religion and
the State, and in order to understand his approach to religion in general.
TTP, p. 238: God has no special kingdom among men except through those who
exercise sovereignty.
Ibid., p. 240.
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--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------

also the duty of the sovereign authority alone to lay down how a person
should behave with piety towards their neighbour, that is, to determine
how one is obliged to obey God.41
Thus, the sovereign political power expresses the moral aspect of
obeying God. There is no hierarchy between the State and religion; the
sovereign political power and its rules, which determine right and wrong,
become established because they are faithful to the fundamental spirit of
religion. One very important question concerns the nature of this spirit,
and how it is presented by Spinoza in his analyses. Without clarifying
this, his claims will remain too abstract. From what has been said to
this point, it is clear that the political power clearly has no intention
of rejecting or uprooting religion, but seeks its assistance and adapts
it to the sovereignty of the State, and that the general justification for
this transcends the limitations of Spinozas time and place. It lies in
the recognition of the power of religious contents to determine mens
moral conduct and in the recognition that nothing can replace religion
in playing this role. The political powers reliance on religion harnesses
images and deeply-rooted concepts that call forth obedience in the aim
of organizing social life and establishing its authority. This recruiting
of religious images and concepts is also vital in order to guarantee the
validity of state law. Religious affairs are likely to be determined by
people, based on their individual and distorted interpretations, thereby
granting validity to their taking exception to state laws. The authority
of the State over matters of religion will prevent this and enable it to
establish these laws as a common basis for all.42
A key concept in understanding the role of religion is expressed
by the words sovereign spirit or one spirit, so to speak (una veluti
mens), which appears throughout the TP and, to a lesser extent, in
the Ethics.43 These words point to a unity and to a vague concept of
spirit. What are the mental contents of this spirit? In what way does
unity imply its existence? Spinoza makes a point of reiterating them
together, rather than explaining them. For example, peoples desire to
41
42
43

Ibid., pp. 242-243.


TTP, pp. 206-207.
For example, in TP, pp. 297, 298, 301.
108

-----IV. The importance of religion in the establishment of political power -----

be in some type of political situation is explained in the TP on the basis


of a shared passion, and he writes: [A] multitude comes together, and
wishes to be guided, as it were, by one mind.44 This one mind, or
common spirit, is assigned a clear mental dimension in places where
Spinoza describes it as the minds and bodies of all would compose, as
it were, one mind and one body.45 He indicates that the unity depends
on common spiritual contents: Especially necessary to bring people
together in love, are the things which concern religion and morality.46
The affinity of each for the other can be understood in terms of what
was said above: unity is not expressed solely though the establishment
of a common law; it includes the readiness of the masses to obey it.
This readiness is one of the key topics in Spinozas political analyses.
He viewed the citizens as the body endangering the stability of power,
even more than the enemies of the state.47 The danger inherent in
the masses should be understood on the basis of their characteristic
mentality and, clearly, if one wishes to limit this danger, one has to do
away with its causes. Hence, the unity of mankind calls for more than a
common legal basis; it calls for nurturing the readiness to obey on the
basis of the mentality of the masses. This is partly achieved through
reward and punishment, restraining through threats and nurturing
hope. It is also partly achieved through shared ideas that make up the
one mindnorms, moral choices, and common images that bring
the masses to obey the rational law that organizes their lives. This will
enable the spirit of the sovereign power to become establishedit
is the right of deciding what is good, evil, equitable, or iniquitous,
that is, what must be done or left undone by the subjects severally or
collectively.48 The sovereign authoritys shaping of the conduct of the
public must be built upon the images and concepts that are rooted in its
consciousness and that lead it to act. The spirit of religion is the most
important source of such images.
One more thing should be added to what we just said about the
44
45
46
47
48

TP, p. 316.
E 4p18s (ut omnium mentes et corpora unam quasi mentem, unumque corpus component.)
E 4ap15.
See notes 23 & 30 above.
TP, p. 309.
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necessity of common images deriving from religious tradition and which


help consolidate the sovereign political power. According to Spinoza,
concepts such as culture, nation and tradition are not single entities.49
This status can be attributed to them only according to the definition
of the individual thing, as it appears in the Ethics: By singular things
I understand things that are finite and have a determinate existence.
And if a number of individuals so concur in one action that together
they are all the cause of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent,
as one singular thing.50 This definition unmistakably expresses the
dynamism that characterizes Spinozian thought. Single does not
refer to something but rather to a way of acting. Joachim remarks that
this definition of single was taken from Spinozas view of the way the
various parts make up the body.51 Another model for this is the mind,
i.e. the way the various ideas make up the general idea called mind.
When we apply this definitionwhich is said in relation to things
in generalto a collective, we understand something beyond the
claims mentioned above supporting the necessity for the one spirit.
The individuation of society is not determined by a static identity;
it cannot be fixed in accordance with formal data or a common past.
The concrete meaning of its unity depends on its force of actionits
ability to function as a cause for its results. This can be formulated
more precisely with the help of conditional conjunctions, in the style
of Spinoza: a society is a single entity to the extent that it is the cause
of a result. Every society strives towards individuation as a collective
and achieves it to the measure of its causal force; this causal force is
not granted to it as some abstract data that is found outside concrete
life; therefore, the readiness of a society to act in concert and obey the
law is an issue essential to its being. This readiness is not necessary in
order for a society to become more or less orderlyit is necessary so
that it can exist to a greater or a lesser extent. The concepts of religion
49

50
51

TTP, p. 225: Nature certainly does not create people, individuals do, and individuals
are only separated into nations by differences of language, law and morality. It can
only be from these latter factors, namely law and morality, that each nation has its
unique character, its unique condition, and its unique prejudices.
E 2d7.
Joachim, Ethics, p. 125.
110

---------------------------------------------- V. Moderating religious tradition-----------------------------------------------

and the images that make any human being obey form the vital basis
for the existence of a common force of action. Thus, the presence of
a tradition of such shared images is important for the existence of a
society as a specific entity.
Until this point, we have seen that political secularism is based on
the shaping of human life within a sovereign political authority. This
authority does not render the social function of religious tradition
superfluous, but needs to reconstruct it. The second principle of political
secularism, as recalled at the beginning of this chapteraccording to
which religious tradition is necessary in order to establish a political
order and ensure its stabilitybecomes clear to us only from the
outside, at this point: we have become more aware of its importance
for Spinoza than of its significance. It has become clear to us that this
political secularism should not be assimilated with some extreme form
of secularism, which Spinoza was prevented from expressing fully
due to the limitations of the time and place in which he lived. The
logic of his thought stands in opposition to the rejection of religion
and its concepts. From what has been said in the last paragraphs, we
understand that religionmore specifically the spirit of religion or
soft religion, whose nature we have yet to clarifyis essential for the
strengthening of ethics, for the appearance of one spirit, so to speak,
and in order to guarantee a societys individuation. However, what is
the role of religious tradition in the cultural-political approach, which
we have called here political secularism? Before we answer this,what
exactly are the flexible shapes of religion, and in what way do they
nurture the sovereign power? We will answer these questions in the
next two sections. In the fifth section, we will outline the main points
of the desired religious tradition, while in the sixth, we will explain
how such a tradition is likely to contribute to the establishment of the
political authority.

V. Moderating religious tradition


Clifford Geertzs well-known distinctions between worship of the text
and traditionalism will help us describe Spinozas process of building
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--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------

tradition and rejecting institutionalized religion.52 Through these two


concepts, Geertz distinguishes between religion that is subjected to
the authority of specialists and religion that exists in a broader sense,
through family and community. At the end of the TTP, Spinoza tries to
explain the dispute in the Christian world over the right of the superior
authorities to possess the interpretations of Gods words. One of the
reasons he raises is the following: They vastly increased the number
of religious dogmas and so utterly intertwined these with philosophy
that its highest interpreter had to be both a consummate philosopher
and theologian, and busy himself with an immense number of useless
speculations, something which is only possible for private men and
those with a great deal of free time.53 The fact that religion is a domain
reserved for people who specialize in the Holy Scriptures means that
the political authorities are prevented from setting foot in these
affairs. The reasons for this are clear, although they are not distinctly
mentioned in the text. This specialization keeps authority exclusively in
the hands of those who have been trained for it; it clearly distinguishes
between the latter and the others. The lesson Spinoza derives from this
discussion is that the conditions that enable this kind of specialization,
i.e. some form of worship of the text must be prevented. He explains
that the higher authorities of his day should be the possessors of sacred
affairs and adds the following: they do not allow religious dogmas to
proliferate or become confused with knowledge.54
In contrast to the specialization and complexity that typify the
knowledge of religious experts, the gist of religion is always presented
as something simple, and that simplicity is seen as attesting to its
truth. After demonstrating at length that the Holy Scriptures are rife
with contradiction, Spinoza indicates those contradictions do not
impinge upon the essence of religion: in so far as it is properly so
called [the word of God], it is not defective or distorted or truncated.55
The Divinity of the Holy Scriptures does not depend on any specific

52
53
54
55

Geertz, Islam.
TTP, p. 248.
Ibid., p. 249.
Ibid., p. 169.
112

---------------------------------------------- V. Moderating religious tradition-----------------------------------------------

text; it would remain even if the scriptures were written in other


words or in another language, because the essence of the Law is
to love God above all things and ones neighbour as oneself. And
this cannot be adulterated nor penned in a slap-dash, error-prone
manner. For if Scripture ever taught anything else than this, it would
necessarily have had to teach everything else differently, since this is
the foundation of all religion. Were this removed, the entire structure
would immediately collapse.56
Spinoza employs a series of binary oppositions to describe the link
between religion as based in the authority of religious expertswho
represent the object of Spinozas criticismand a moderate religious
tradition, which is based on a transcendental authority and its life in
peoples hearts: specialization versus simple concept; text versus
direct revelation in the heart; contradictions versus truths guaranteed
by simplicity. To these, we may add: closed tradition versus open
tradition. This latter distinction appears only incidentally in the TTP,
in his discussion of the Pharisee tradition; however one should not
measure its importance by its manner of presentation, but rather
based on the principle it expresses. In that passage, Spinoza claims
that his method of interpretation is the surest way of enquiring into
the true intention of the Holy Scriptures. He then mentions two
traditionsthat of the Pharisees and that of the Pope, each of which
rejects the other. Spinoza then claims as follows: we are obliged, by
our method, to consider one Jewish tradition as uncorrupt, namely
the meaning of words in the Hebrew language we have received from
them.57 His adoption of this linguistic tradition does not mean,
however, that he accepts the tradition of the Pharisees. The difference
between them sheds light on a distinction that is important for our
purposes: linguistic tradition is reliable, since those who convey it
cannot change it. Any attempt to change the interpretation of the
words will result in a lame and unsubstantiated interpretation of the
intention of all the authors who employ this same word.58 Moreover,
56
57
58

Ibid., p. 170.
Ibid., p. 105.
TTP, p. 105: For it could never have been of any use to change a words meaning, but
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--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------

The learned share with the common people in preserving a language,


but the learned alone preserve books and the meanings of texts.59
Two models of tradition are presented in this passage. The first
may be entitled open tradition; all human beings may be bearers of
this tradition; the contents conveyed through this tradition and the
meaning of words are visible and open to all;60 they are public and are
integrated into an infinite number of contexts. The openness of this
tradition guarantees its credibility; indeed, any alteration is immediately
compared to other instances and is interpreted as an incomprehensible
distortion. On the other hand, the tradition of the books intention
is closed. The bearers of this tradition are an elite group of specialists.
The means employed by this tradition of ideas are limited and hard to
comprehendthey are valuable books. This tradition is hidden and
restricted for large portions of the public. Its closedness means that it
is dependent on the will of the members of a small group and subject
to their decisions, including forgeries, while the members of the group
remain immune to any criticism.
This opposition between closed and open traditions accords with
all the other oppositions mentioned above. A limited group of religious
experts exert their authority as part of the closed tradition, immune
to any criticism; this situation is convenient for issuing random
orders, while keeping all others distant from the centers that control
the interpretation of tradition. The religious tradition which Spinoza

59
60

it might quite often have been useful to someone to alter the meaning of a passage []
We are thus wholly convinced, for these and other reasons, that it could never have
entered into anyones head to corrupt a language but might certainly occur to someone
to misrepresent the meaning of a writer by doctoring his texts or interpreting them
wrongly. We can thus rely on tradition as for the meanings of the words, but we
cannot rely on tradition for their intentions as they appear in the Holy Scriptures.
Changing them will likely profit those who transmit the tradition over the generations.
TTP, p. 105.
Spinoza comes up with an interesting claim, according to which the meaning of words
is determined by their use, which is close to Wittgensteins approach. Words do not
have a permanent, essential meaning; they are part of peoples lifestyle. Language
changes as lifestyles change. TTP, p. 165: Words acquire a particular meaning simply
from their usage. Words deployed in accordance with this usage in such a way that,
on reading them, people are moved to devotion will be scared words, and any book
written with words so used will also be sacred.
114

---------------------------------------------- V. Moderating religious tradition-----------------------------------------------

suggests in the TTP presents entirely different characteristics: it is


open, borne by the common people, it is not limited to a text and its
interpretation is found in simple terms in the hearts of all men.
The opposition between open and closed traditions appears on
a number of occasions throughout the discussion. On one occasion,
Spinoza identifies the popular principles of religious tradition as that
which is transferred from one generation to another in an open and
transparent way. This pattern of transfer is cited as an explanation
for the unquestionable truth of these principles.61 Clearly, more than
describing the transfer of religious truths, Spinoza indicates its
possibility, thereby encouraging the development of a tradition of
concepts and images of this type.
There is one place in which this opposition appears with no link to
religious contents, but rather to political culture. In the TP, Spinoza
discusses the question as to what extent something can be done without
taking into account the opinion of the citizens.62 In this fragment, he
explains that hiding ones intentions from the enemy is useful, but that
it is harmful to hide them from the citizens. We will now take a look at
these claims in full:
Everyone will also admit with me that it is far better for the right counsels
of a dominion to be known to its enemies, than for the evil secrets of
tyrants to be concealed from the citizens. They who can treat secretly of
the affairs of a dominion have it absolutely under their authority, and
as they plot against the enemy in time of war, so do they against the
citizens in time of peace. Now that this secrecy is often serviceable to
the dominion, no one can deny; but that without it the said dominion
cannot subsist, no one will ever prove. But, on the contrary, to entrust
affairs of state absolutely to any man is quite incompatible with the
maintenance of liberty; and so it is folly to choose to avoid a small loss
61

62

TTP, p. 170: It remains, then, indisputable that this is what Scripture has always
taught and consequently that no error has occurred here affecting the sense, which
would not have been noticed at once by everybody. Nor could anyone have corrupted
it without immediately betraying his malicious intent. Therefore, there is no
distortion of the foundations: that God exist, that he provides for all things, that he
is omnipotent, that he has decreed that the pious will fare well and wrongdoers badly,
and that our salvation depends upon His grace alone.
TP, p. 342.
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--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------

by means of the greatest of evils. But the perpetual refrain of those who
lust after absolute dominion is, that it is to the essential interest of the
commonwealth that its business to be secretly transacted, and other like
pretences, which end in the more hateful a slavery, the more they are
clothed with a show of utility.

Hiding the matters pertaining to the sovereign authorities thus


reveals a tendency towards tyranny. Spinoza demands that powerrelated issues be revealed, as long as it does not harm state security.
The weaknesses of this closed political tradition are hinted at here in
his writing on slavery and freedom,63 as well as on the following page.
There, Spinoza writes about the reaction of the masses to the limited
information on matters relating to the authorities: as for the populace
being devoid of truth and judgment, that is nothing wonderful, since
the chief business of the dominion is transacted behind its back, and
it can but make conjectures from the little, which cannot be hidden.
For it is uncommon virtue to suspend ones judgment.64 What we
indicated in section 3 of the previous chapter, regarding the nature
of the masses, relates to this matter. The passivity of the imagination
is also manifested in the unconditional acceptance of what it knows
based on hearsay alone. The same epistemological-political principle
used by Spinoza to justify the subjugation of religious matters to the
sovereign political power should serve us here too.65 The fact that the
masses do not understand religious matters does not entail a dearth
of interpretation or an avoidance of relying on the Holy Scriptures;
rather, it gives rise to misunderstandings and to the reliance on proof
designed to justify individual decisions. This, in turn, tears society apart
and harms the validity of the law. In the same vein, limited knowledge
concerning political issues will not lead to the suspension of judgment,
but rather to the mass-production of fallacious hearsay, which many
people will use as the basis for their evaluation of reality. The weakening
of society due to its reliance on faulty ways of understanding the
63

64
65

As for the kind of freedom that Spinoza can ascribe to the masses, this will be discussed
at the end of this chapter and in the next chapter.
TP, p. 341.
In addition to other arguments. See note 32 above, as well as the discussion above.
116

---------------------------------------------- V. Moderating religious tradition-----------------------------------------------

Holy Scriptureswhich is described in section 1 of this chapteris


therefore identical to the weakening of society due to the masses
relying on doubtful assumptions. The consciousness of the masses is,
of course, the reason for these tendencies. The first level of knowledge
does not require more than hearsay and the blind adoption of guesses.
Hiding issues pertaining to the sovereign authority is wrong not
only because it weakens the masses, but because it generates conditions
that further irrational powers. Spinoza hints at this in his writing on
slavery and freedom. In order to understand this, we should recall what
has already been discussed above on issues of religion. Closed traditions,
whether political or religious, are subject to the whims of rulers, be they
tyrants or priests; the fact that knowledge and decisions are transmitted
to them alone makes them into unrestrained rulers, whereas they may
be restrained through overt and open traditions. Spinoza does not write
this, but it derives logically from his thought: the very exposure of such
matters implies a deep change, as it means that the contents are no
longer in the unrestrained hands of a single expert or ruler. The fact that
the best interest of the public should be the primary principle guiding
the authorities inevitably results in their rationalization. The inevitable
improvement of the regime does not have to result from actual criticism;
the possibility of criticism suffices. The very existence of the ruling power
as an overt actor with clear goals suffices to improve it to some degree.
The importance Spinoza assigns to exposing stately matters, and
his descriptions of popular religion as an open tradition, illustrate
the nature of the rationalization proposed in his theological-political
writings. This rationalization is not the imposition of an ideal model on
society, but rather the improvement of the culture that is already deeply
rooted within it, in order to render it more rational. The empirical and
processual nature of Spinozas analysis of culture-related questions
is clearly expressed here. His intention is to divert commonly accepted
models in order to generate conditions enabling the development of a
more rationally regulated society. In other words, this rationalization
is not achieved by adopting some external system, but through internal
improvement and the empowerment of the life of a specific society. The
call for opening traditions and breaking the monopoly of experts over
traditions is one example of this internal improvement.
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--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------

Until now, we have described the religious tradition which Spinoza


opposes to the one anchored in sacred texts, whose interpretation
lies in the hands of specialists. Some of the most striking features of
the religion which Spinoza goes on to describe are the simplicity of
religious principles, their identification with moral conduct and their
settling in the hearts of men. In most cases, Spinoza mentions these
three principles together, and they become, for him, the essence of
Gods words: For both reason and the beliefs of the prophets and
Apostles evidently proclaim that Gods eternal word and covenant
and true religion are divinely inscribed upon the hearts of men, that
is, upon the human mind.66 We should add here that the medium
through which the divine word is conveyed is not of a textual nature.
The opposition between the popular religious tradition and established
religion can, to a large extent, be summed up as the opposition between
heart or mans spirit and sacred writings. This difference between
writings and spiritual life is prominent in all the instances in which
Spinoza dwells upon the simplicity and truth of religious tradition.67
The following words comprise a vivid description of this point: God has
revealed through the Apostles that His covenant is no longer written
in ink or on stone tablets but rather on the heart by the spirit of God.68
66
67
68

TTP, p. 163.
Ibid., p. 163.
Ibid., p. 230. In my view, this should be considered as the background for Spinozas
deep interest in the Hebrew language. Commentators of his Hebrew grammar indicate
that the abstract principles which he attributes to itsuch as the priority of the
noun, for exampleare a reflection of his ontological distinctions. The question,
however, is why Spinoza had to formulate his metaphysical views through a grammar
book? Hadnt he succeeded in doing so in several of his books? Moreover, it is doubtful
that Spinoza, whose thought is marked by its tremendous empathyits desire to
devote itself entirely to the understanding of its nature and its objectshas to
violate linguistic categories in order to imbue them with metaphysical distinctions.
The methodical character which Spinoza attributes to the Hebrew language must be
understood in other terms; it is part of his efforts to erode the sanctified status of
the biblical text. This questioning also involves a change in the status of the Hebrew
language: it is no longer the language of God but that of men. Exposing its rules
throws light on its worldly and human nature. Spinozas thought not only marks the
onset of Biblical criticism, but also the project of the secularization of the Hebrew
language. Naturally, such claims need to be justified, and I hope to do so in a future
essay.
118

---------------------------------------------- V. Moderating religious tradition-----------------------------------------------

This opposition is developed by emphasizing the importance of


the story as the medium for the transmission of the divine word, as
opposed to the entire corpus: When we say an awareness of the biblical
narratives is most necessary for the common people, we do not mean
awareness of literally all the histories in the scared writings, but only
the ones that are most important and which most clearly demonstrate,
on their own, apart from the others, the doctrine just mentioned, and
which have the most influence on peoples minds.69 The individual
biblical story is placed here at center. In this way, what stands out is
the simple identification with the characters, or the lesson, as Spinoza
calls it further on.70 Placing the individual story at center is vital in
order to prevent it from being engulfed in a broad system of stories;
this would make the understanding of the story a complicated work
of interpretation. It is for this reason that Spinoza emphasizes the
importance of the individual story which can be understood in its
entirety, independent of the larger body of sacred writings: For if all
the biblical histories were required to prove its doctrine, and it were
impossible to draw a conclusion without a thorough consideration
of absolutely all the narratives, then obviously the demonstration
and derivation of the Bibles doctrine would surpass the capacity and
abilities not just of the common people but all mankind.71
A central theme in the moderation of religious tradition is its
subjection to mans independent judgment. This can be perceived as a
kind of clarification of the notion that the divine word is inscribed in
the heart. At the beginning of this claim, Spinoza compares or opposes
law to religion and claims the following: If every individual had the
liberty to interpret the public laws at his own discretion, no state
could survive; it would immediately be dissolved by this very fact, and
public law would be private law.72 This impossibility does not apply
to religion; on the contrary: Since it [the religion] does not consist so
much in external actions as in simplicity and truth of mind, it does not

69
70
71
72

TTP, p. 77.
Ibid., pp. 78-79.
Ibid., pp. 77-78.
Ibid., p. 116.
119

--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------

belong to any public law or authority. For simplicity and truth of mind
are not instilled in men by the power of laws or by public authority,
and absolutely no one can be compelled to be happy by force of law.
It requires rather pious and fraternal advice, a proper upbringing and,
more than anything else, ones own free judgment.73
In order to better understand the claim that the divine word is
revealed in every mans heart, one must clarify the way God acts, as it
is described in the TTP, the aim of which is the development of popular
religion. In this text, Spinoza emphasizes Gods rational action in a
number of ways. Naturally, the context of the discussion prevents him
from discussing these topics in a through and precise way, as he does in
the Ethics. But even so, the necessary and rational actions of God are the
outstanding principles of His nature. Divine guidance is the fixed and
unalterable order of nature, whereas natural laws are nothing other
than the eternal decrees of God and always involve truth and necessity.74
One important detail in this context is the way God intervenes in
human affairs, as it appears in the TTP. Spinoza maintains something
of the significance of Gods humanized actions in the eyes of human
beingschoice, assistance, and providenceby granting them a
new meaning based on His actions, and regulated by eternal laws.
One example of this is the definition given to the word choice: For
given that nobody does anything except by the predetermined order
of nature, that is, by the eternal decree and direction of God, it follows
that no one chooses any way of life for himself nor brings anything
about, except via the particular summons of God, who chose this man
in preference to others for this task or that way of life.75 The fact that
God follows eternal law does not alienate him from the life of men and
their destiny. Mans special destinythe divine touch in his lifeare
not denied here; they are anchored in regularity. Thus, popular religion,
as it appears in the TTP, defines in its own way the finite-infinite status
of man. A general expression of this relation between God and mankind
is found in the fact that divine protection is determined by moral laws.
73
74
75

Ibid., p. 116. .
Ibid., pp. 44-45.
Ibid., p. 45.
120

---------------------------------------------- V. Moderating religious tradition-----------------------------------------------

This, in turn, is presented as an important lesson to be learnt from the


Holy Scriptures. God takes the greatest care of men, or rather of those
who live piously and honestly, while inflicting many punishments on
the rest and segregating them from the good.76
As mentioned above, Gods rational activity does not transform him
into an alienated Divinity. His concern, His all-seeing nature and His
providence are preserved, but they are entwined with His organized
and eternal activity. The general meaning of this is clear, although it is
not explicitly indicated: the questioning of the authority of religious
experts also results in the rationalization of the concept of the divine.
His organized and unalienated activity removes the monopoly over His
representation from the hands of the elite in power, and distributes it
in equal proportions among all.
The religious reform, as it appears in the TTP, may be summed
up as follows: Spinoza attempts to generate a new religious feeling
suitable for political life. This feeling is the results of the changes in
images and postulates. The word of God is not revealed through the
Holy Scriptures, contained in the text or known by specialists; it lies
in the hearts of men. Its principle is ethical, simple and undistorted; it
is demonstrated in each and every one of the holy stories. The image
of God is an important component in the creation of this new feeling;
God protects his creatures, knows their ways, and his relation to them
is anchored in organized and eternal lawfulness. He is not alienated
from men, but mans relation to God is not exclusive; it can only be
understood on the basis of the divine order. This feeling thus stems
from changes in the way in which the divine presence is manifested.
The motives for His behavior are not hidden; they are overt, just like
His actions. Therefore, neither He nor His teachings are the exclusive
property of some dominant religious or religious-political elite.
In the third section of the previous chapter, we dealt with the
hostility of the masses. We claimed there that the consciousness of the
member of the masses tends towards egocentric distortions, which lead
him to falsely grasp himself as an outsider to the existing order. The
all-penetrating dynamism is no longer within his reach, and neither
76

Ibid., p. 77.
121

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is his genuine relation to the world. The member of the masses is


detached from an ontic point of view; hence in Book IV of the Ethics,77
the knowledge of God represents the key axis for clarifying the way
people connect to one another. The new religious feeling described
herewhich, in my view, represents the main point of religious
reformis linked to the Archimedean point in the member of the
masses consciousness of belonging. Gods rational activity, providence
based on moral lawsall these rule out the meta-finite status that the
believer in the vain religion imagines for himself. He does not stand
before his God, alone and opposite his maker, but as someone who
belongs to the divine order and acts within it. Thus, mans metaphysical
position is reformed. What stood at the root of his detachment from
everything becomes the source of his attachment, and brings him
somewhat closer to the solidarity of the philosopher. In other words,
the readiness to act in an ethical way is one of the reasons for the
usefulness of reformed religion for society. The basic metaphysical
position contained within this religionnaturally, more felt than
known by the believeris a more fundamental reason for this.
We can now understand what is comprised in the political secularism
which is attributed here to Spinoza. The main point of this politicalcultural project lies in the rationalization of society. One useful means
of achieving this is the establishment of a proper political authority;
this is a raw datum. Understanding the nature of the masses, as learnt
from this ontological-psychological study, includes clarification of the
conditions necessary to guarantee the stability of political sovereignty.
Religion plays an important part in this matter, both with respect to
the dangers it entails, as well as in its potential utility. Consequently,
the rationalization of social life not only implies the rejection of the
authority of religious experts; it also involves shaping a religious
feeling that originates in the cultural traditions of the masses. It has
the power to gear the response of the masses to obey the ethical rules
and reform the metaphysical attitude that is reflected in their life and
identity. Political secularism denies the religious establishment the
monopoly over religious tradition, while nurturing a gentle form of
77

E 4p28 onwards.
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---------------------------------------------- V. Moderating religious tradition-----------------------------------------------

religious tradition, which has the power to nurture ethical behavior


and solidarity.
Political secularism covers all the concepts discussed so
farimagination and the nature of non-reflective consciousness, the
instability of the masses and the possibility of moderating them, and
the construction of a political power and its reinforcement through
religion. This political secularism is both narrower and broader than
expected. Shaping life with the help of political sovereignty represents
the essence of the secular way of lifein this sense, it can be called
narrow; to achieve its goals, it recruits the possibilities embodied in
religious lifein this sense, it is broader than one might have expected.
The political secularism which we attribute to Spinoza is a theologicalpolitical tendency; the rationalization which it seeks to bring to social
life is linked to the rationalization of the concept of God. In both cases,
we seek to perfect existing patterns rather than adopt an external
onethe limited improvement of life in society through the culture
and politics already found in it.
What has been described above can be summed up under the title
New Religious Feeling. This feeling is based on the strengthening of
the authority of the simple believer. However, what is the basis of this
authority? What in the structure of consciousness of a member of the
masses can grant him this strength? One should ponder this question
seriously, as it does not arise merely as the result of the interpretation I
suggested in the previous chapter; it is a dominant tendency in Spinozas
writings. In certain places, particularly in the TTP and in the TP, Spinoza
describes the activities of the members of the masses as though they
arise or should arise from a source within the self. He claims that the
content of the ideas that give rise to obedience depends to a large extent
on the judgments of the obeying person: Every person, knowing himself
better than anyone else, should believe whatever he considers best for
strengthening his love of justice.78 He reverts to this on other occasions:
Just as it [the Bible] was once adapted to the understanding of the
common people, so also anyone may adapt it to his own beliefs if he sees
that in this way he can obey God with fuller mental assent in matters
78

TTP, p. 182.
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concerning justice and charity.79 In political contexts, which are less


complex from a rhetorical point of view, Spinoza also emphasizes this
element of will. In the TP, for example, he writes that commonwealth,
whose peace depends on the sluggishness of its subjects, that are led
about like sheep, to learn but slavery, may more properly be called a
desert than a commonwealth.80 In other words, any state deserving of
the name relies on the activity of its citizens, including the masses that
are part of it, rather than on leading them like sheep.
There is one profound difficulty, which arises in presenting the
simple believer, a member of the masses, as the source of authority
for religious principles. Spinozas ontology and epistemology describe
him as oscillating, without direction, between fear and hope. If so,
such authority would seem to be groundless. What force of action
can be attributed to the citizens of the State, to the masses who are
best known for their passive spirit? The member of the masses, as we
described in the previous chapter, lives in deep passivity; he uncritically
adopts chance hearsay, sticks to his vague experience and oscillates in
his emotions and behaviors. So what meaning can there be to the claim
that the aim of the State is that people use their free reason and not live
like animals or machines?81 Is this is not what they do by nature? The
mob is terrifying, if unafraid.82 This terrifying is deeply engrained in
the nature of the masses; what kind of authority, then, and what type
of freedom of thought can be linked to individuals who are members
of the masses?
One might claim that when Spinoza speaks of the freedom of
people, he is only referring to the general public. Improving the state
and religion is a process of rationalization.83 The degree of reason
that can be assigned to life in society depends entirely on the type of
governing power. This does not solve the difficulty mentioned above:
in a free country, the masses do not live like animals or machines; in
other words, does the rationalization of society not involve stimulating
79
80
81
82
83

Ibid., p. 178.
TP, p. 314.
TTP, p. 252.
E 4p54s.
See TP, pp. 295-296.
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---------- VI. Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience-----------

the passive life of the masses, rendering them more active? In fact, in
considering the new religious feeling underlying Spinozas descriptions
of popular religion, at least as described so far,on what basis will it be
found in the consciousness of the masses? It seems that removing the
word of God from the authority of the specialists of the Holy Scriptures
somehow involves the intensification of ones life; however, how can
this intensification take place? Clearly in the masses, like in all that
exists in Spinozas ontology, there is a certain measure of activity.
What requires clarification is not the claim that the masses possess
the force to actthis is obvious; what does require some explanation
is the nature of what is attributed to the masses: what is the force
that underlies a suitable political life, one that can be shaped through
an appropriate religious tradition and which takes this lower level of
consciousness into consideration?

VI. Invigorating the life of the masses


and the spirit of obedience
In order to clarify the ontological-epistemological basis of the issue of
the invigoration of the masses in Spinozas thought, we must return to
the meaning of this idea in his thought. As we know, Spinoza rejects
the view of the will as a separate faculty in the mind. According to his
words in the TdIE and in the Ethics, the assumption underlying such
a view is that the idea is a static content, something mute, like a
picture on a table, and not a mode of thinking, namely, the very [act of]
understanding.84 An idea is a mental act which, by its nature, involves
affirmation or negation. The opposite claim is also correct: there is no
volition in the mind, no affirmation or negation, apart from what the
idea as such includes.85 Affirmation or negation are not the result of
some independent mental faculty, but are part of thought. These two
statements can be summed up by claiming that each instance of willing
is included in an idea and each idea includes willing.
In the Ethics, it is clearer what willing refers to, i.e. affirmation
84
85

E 2p43s.
E 2p49.
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or negation.86 Spinoza indicates that the difference between various


affirmations is like the difference between ideas; affirmation and
negation are concrete actions that depend upon a concrete idea. They are
also included in the act of imagination: For what is perceiving a winged
horse other than affirming wings of the horse?87 Thus, affirmation
and negation are what mark the actual state of consciousness of the
mind when it recognizes an object. The claims that willing and ideas are
intertwined, irrespective of the state of consciousness, seem to question
what was stated in the first section of the previous chapter. We should
dwell a little on these difficulties, as their solution is necessary in order
to clarify our discussion on the issue of the invigoration of the masses
and the spirit of obedience. These paragraphs described the distinction
between reflective and non-reflective consciousness. Their main claim
was that ideas are found in the non-reflective consciousness without
approval; hence, as we recall, this type of consciousness was described
as similar to a dream. The concepts of non-reflective consciousness
and of approval are seemingly incompatibleat least until we clarify
further the notion of approval. Indeed, approval is an act that has a
reflective aspectconsciousness identifies an item within itself and
either affirms or denies it. What reflective meaning can there be for an
act that takes place in a non-reflective consciousness? Another way of
putting it is as follows: in what way is consciousness non-reflective if
every idea it includes, i.e. every mental act, includes the possibility of
distinguishing its own contents? The interpretative claims presented in
this chapter are not the only ones that clash with the fact that each idea
contains affirmation or negation; it seems that a significant number
of places in the text itself also do: what kind of approval is found in
the consciousness of the person Spinoza describes as [] words of a
parrot or a robot which speaks without mind and sense?88 Moreover,
in general, what is the role of approval in Spinozas description of
the activity of imagination as one relying on vague experience and
the imitative adoption of hearsay? In other words, there is a need
86
87
88

Henceforth, volition or willing refers either to affirmation or negation.


E 2p49s.
TTP, p. 175.
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---------- VI. Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience-----------

to develop a concept of approval in non-reflective consciousness (or


perhaps of non-reflective approval) and to do so only by following
in Spinozas footsteps, since this kind of development is not clearly
suggested in the text. Another possibility is to abandon this concept
of non-reflective consciousness, as well as the distinction between the
two types of consciousness, as a general distinction for interpreting
Spinozas epistemology.
Here is how we can tackle this problem: the fact that the idea contains
the affirmation or the negation of the object that arises in itthis fact
does not clash with the existence of the non-reflective consciousness.
Non-reflective consciousness is not devoid of all elements of selfawareness or of the ability to distinguish its contents. The approval
contained in the ideas that make up this type of consciousness and
that reflects the state of its awareness comprises the identification and
approval of the object of the idea. It makes no distinction as to the
logical content of the object and its context. Therefore, this type of
approval can be described as slight or weaklike the awareness itself.
In the first section of the previous chapter, I indicated that nonreflective consciousness resembles the dream, since the ideas it includes
are devoid of approval. The epistemological principle of the inclusion
of volition in the idea does not clash with these descriptions,as long as
we recall the various possibilities of apprehending the word approval:
in Spinozas thought, ideas are not discrete; they are not units of content
given in separate units of time, but they generate one another. This has
to be the case given the nature of the multiplicity in Spinozas ontology.
The approval that is part of the idea reflects the state of consciousness
in which it appears; approval, as part of a reflective consciousness,
includes the understanding of the way the idea is given, as well as its
affinity with other ideas. On the other hand, approval as part of a nonreflective consciousness is limited to the object, which is isolated from
its context. This type of approval does not amount to much more than
the intention towards an isolated object and the absence of doubt as to
its existence.89
Thus, the rather unsurprising answer to the problem of the nature
89

See the discussion in Chapter 2, section 1.


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of approval within a consciousness described as non-reflective lies in the


multiple possibilities of approval. Given this answer, we will now discuss
the approval of a special category of ideas of imaginationreligious or
theological ideas, their special content being the will of God. Clearly,
from an epistemic point of view, they are in no way special. The
reason that it makes sense to focus on them is their political-cultural
importance. They will also help us explain obedience, which in turn will
enable us to clarify the meaning of the invigoration of the life of the
masses. In other words, an analysis of obedience deals with the core
of the issue concerning us herethe possible sources for expanding
self-authority as they were expressed in the previous sectionsince
obedience has to do with imposing rules pertaining to the believers
way of life. We must therefore examine the nature of the link between
the spirit of obedience and the self-authority which, as we have seen,
stands at the heart of Spinozas efforts to moderate religious tradition.
The argument I am about to present regarding the origin of
obedience is not clearly stated in Spinozas writings; it does, however,
accord with the epistemological and ontological arguments that have
been described in the course of this chapter, and should therefore be
viewed as a kind of extrapolationan argument not clearly stated, but
derived from the logic of Spinozas thought. Indeed, Spinoza indicates
on a number of occasions that the aim of religion is obedience, and that
a persons faith is reflected by his actions and not by the contents that
led him to carry them out.90 Therefore, he leaves these contentsat
least according to the literal interpretation of his statements, to the
persons choice, to what he calls full mental assent.91 In this type of
analysis, religion is a system of ideas that generate obedience. If the
content of the idea that generates obedience is left to the persons
choice, and if the idea is examined in light of the actions that derive
from it rather than in itself,what guarantees the spirit of obedience?
In my view, what we can say about it is that obedience is a response

90
91

See, for example, TTP, p. 179.


TTP, p. 183: Indeed everyone, as we have already said, must adapt these doctrines of
faith to his own understanding and interpret them for himself in whatever way seems
to make them easier for him to accept unreservedly and with full mental assent.
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---------- VI. Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience-----------

to contents that are typical of certain ideasfor example, revealing


the will of God and his emissaries. However, this answer is only part
of the issue. The tentative description of the content of these ideas
hints at the fact that not all depends upon this content. If it did, one
would have to focus on the details of the desired content. Why does
Spinoza only draw the general outline of ideas that generate obedience
and that are thus desirable?92 What guarantees the existence of the
spirit of obedience if one only tentatively designates the contents of
these obedience-generating ideas?
The answer to this is that for Spinoza, the idea is a content that
involves affirmation or negation.93 Within this context, one should
pay attention to a particular type of ideas, i.e. ideas for which the
assumption of their truth involves the order to perform a specific task
or directives on how to perform it (which I will henceforth call guiding
ideas). One such example is an arithmetic rule or a theological idea.
In this regard, I would like to make two remarks. The fact that an idea
comprises a command cannot determine anything regarding the level
of activity or passivity that one should attribute to the soul which
maintains that idea. According to Spinoza, every idea is a mental act;
the passivity or activity which should be attributed to the mind that
possessesthat idea does not depend on content but on the way the
92

93

This question can be answered as follows: the tentative tone which Spinoza adopts
when writing about theological ideas does not hint at the fact that obedience is
anchored in some other thing; it is one of his stratagems in expropriating these ideas
from the authority of religious figures and transferring them to the authority of the
individual, to the assent from the heart. In fact, in my understanding, this tentative
tone is one of Spinozas stratagems in questioning institutionalized religious authority.
This, however, is not all; this stratagem ends with obedience being part of the believers
assent from the heart. Spinozas sensitivity to the existence of a spiritual authority
and his awareness of the instability of the masses result in his claims finally leading to
the strengthening of some authority rather than to its undermining. In other words,
we are once again faced with the problem we started with: if we base obedience on a
source found within the member of the masses means, we must clarify the nature of
this source within and for the self. What can guarantee the presence of the spirit of
obedience beyond that is tentatively depicted in theological ideas? What is the basis
for building obedience on the judgment of the member of the masses? Could it be that
the spirit of obedience does not only derive from the content of the theological idea,
but also derives, somehow, from the epistemic status of such an idea?
E 2p49.
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mind apprehends it. The second remark is as follows: nearly every single
idea can, in a specific context, guide conduct and contain commands.
However, this claim is irrelevant to our discussion, since the aim of
the distinction here is to emphasize the ideas that explicitly contain
commands as a fundamental manifestation of their contents, a type of
practical users manual, rather than instructions that may implicitly
be attributed to those ideas.94
Employing the distinction we just made, we may identify an
important means of expressing the approval of specific ideas, one
particularly relevant for the first degree of knowledge. This may be
easily seen by looking at the example brought by Spinoza in the TdIE
in order to distinguish between the various levels of knowledge. The
fact that a single example is used for all three degreesfinding the
fourth number within a proportional seriesemphasizes the fact that
the degree of knowledge is not determined based on the known object,
but rather on the way in which it is apprehended. The first degree of
knowledge is attributed to merchants, who are described as follows:
Tradesmen will at once tell us that they know what is required to find
the fourth number, for they have not yet forgotten the rule which was
given to them arbitrarily without proof by their masters.95 The next
example is of those who exhibit a slightly higher level of knowledge;
they (alii) are described thus: Others construct a universal axiom from
their experience with simple numbers, where the fourth number is self-

94

95

What we call here command depends to a certain extent on the context. The
knowledge that the dog is a barking animal is likely to guide my actions in certain
conditions. Generally speaking, every element of knowledge that is approved or
rejected by our consciousness impacts upon us in a certain way. This, however, does not
undermine the distinction suggested here between guiding ideas and theoretical
ideas. This distinction is based on the presence of a certain act that derives necessarily
from the content of the idea; it is not based on general knowledge that is likely to
guide our actions. Moreover, the member of the masses who believes in a moral order
that originates in the will of God is not primarily concerned with enquiring into the
nature of the moral act; rather, he adopts norms and patterns of specific moral acts in
accordance with the practice in his surroundings, and justifies them by claiming they
are is the will of God. Thus, very general theological ideas may be, in the terminology
I propose here, guiding ideas.
TdIE, p. 10.
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---------- VI. Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience-----------

evident, as in the case of 2, 4, 3, 6.96 These two levels of knowledge are


rejected further on: the first one is based on the adoption of hearsay,
and as through hearsay we cannot have insight into the essence of a
thing;97 the second degree is based on inductive inference, through
which is it only possible to grasp the accidental properties of things
in nature. 98
These examples characterize the two levels of lower consciousness.
The difference between them lies in the means of their approval: the
merchants knowledge does not distinguish the logical content of
an idea. Spinoza stresses the mechanical use they make of rules of
calculation and the absence of any logical content: they have not yet
forgotten the rule (operatio) which was given to them arbitrarily and
that was brought to their ears without proof (sine demonstratione);
the approval of this action is given by its usethey know quid sit
agendum. What makes their knowledge inferior is that the idea is
approved by the calculation itself with no attention at all given to
the logical content underlying it. They do not even have access to the
logical content, since all they know is the calculation itself, rather than
any explanation provided for it. In other words, we are dealing with
non-reflective approval. The main difference between merchants and
those representing a higher degree of knowledge is the presence of
some degree of discernment as to the content of the idea rather than
mere obedience to its orders. Those of the second level of knowledge,
however, still do not understand the essence of things; they determine
a postulate based on their random experience. But the fact that, in
the first cases of the induction, the fourth number appears clearly
points to some form of comprehensionalbeit unsatisfactoryof
the logical content of the idea. These two lower levels of knowledge are
contradictory: the first is an instance of mechanical and non-reflective
consciousness, whose approval is given only through its use, while the
second one surpasses it somewhat, although it remains limited by its
faulty perception of the logical content of the idea. Since this suffices to
96
97
98

Ibid., p. 10.
Ibid., p. 10.
Ibid., p. 11.
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oppose it to the previous level, we thus learn about the non-reflective


nature of the merchants consciousness.
What we will be claiming here is that there are ideas whose content
includes clear and obvious commands, which can be approved by
carrying out these orders without logical approval.99 This will help
us understand why we described ideas from the imagination as nonreflective ideas:100 although the ideas from the imagination contain
some measure of reflection, such reflection is geared towards identifying
objects rather than the logical content they contain.
The fact that the idea implies the distinction of the existence of the
object as a kind of threshold of reflection is hinted at when Spinoza
indicates that, in the final analysis, things can be apprehended in one
of two ways: either insofar as we conceive them to exist in relation to a
certain time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be contained in
God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature.101 Whether
something is apprehended as part of an adequate ideaas part of the
substance, or if it is apprehended in the imagination, in which objects
of the imagination are interwoven with elements of the imagination,
such as time and placein both cases, it is the same object. Clearly,
the awareness of the logical context of something, the perception
of its existence in the chain of causes,are indeed most relevant for
understanding the object; the objects identity and existence are,
however, given as something solid.102 The fact reported above,
according to which the same example (the four numbers) illustrates
all three degrees of knowledge, also attests to this. Both these cases
teach us something important: that the perception of the object, the
indicating that is included in cognitive activity, is common to all kinds
of ideas. This identification represents the minimum level of reflectivity
99

100
101
102

Clearly, it is not only by making use of an idea from the imagination that we can
approve it (a horse with wings); it is also clear that adequate knowledge does not
change the use made of the idea, but rather substantiates it (a mathematician will
calculate a proportion just as a merchant would).
See note 12 in Chapter 3.
E 4p29s.
Here we witness Spinozas pre-modern character. The idealist idea developed by
Kant and in other ways by Nietzsche that the identity of an object depends on the
interpretation given it, is foreign to him.
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---------- VI. Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience-----------

that is included in the mental act, in the idea. The degree of recognition
of the logical content of the idea, however, remains to be determined.
What we have said so far about guiding ideas will help us
understand the meaning of obedience. As I indicated above, in the
TTP, Spinoza does not analyze obedience in epistemological terms;
his considerations are essentially devoted to political issues. This
does not mean, however, that the epistemology he developed was not
present in dealing with theological-political issues. Thus, the mental
process of merchants can help us achieve a full understanding of the
epistemic aspect of obedience. Spinoza describes the masses thus: the
constancy of the common people is obstinacy, and that they are not
governed by reason [.]103 Since it is associated with the members of
these masses, obedience does not result from their understanding of
the logical contents included in the idea, but rather is an expression of
their acceptance of it.104 The person making use of the theological idea
and who follows the commands it conveys conducts himself exactly like
the merchants who, with the help of a simple mechanical calculation,
approve of the action they heard. By following the commands included
in the idea, the member of the masses actually states that it is justified
in his eyes, without submitting it to any logical-reflective testing.105
This may be the reason why obedience becomes a self-sufficient
criterion which (apparently) renders truth and falsehood superfluous:
Each persons faith therefore must be deemed pious or impious by
reason of their obedience or disobedience alone, and not in relation
to truth or falsehood.106 The lack of necessity for logical approval and
the possibility of expressing approval through implementing orders can
help clarify Spinozas claim, according to which everyone is capable of
obeying but not all are capable of apprehending God with their mind.107

103
104
105

106
107

TTP, p. 12.
Ibid., pp. 180-181.
By claiming this, I do not claim that non-reflective ideas naturally give rise to
obedience, nor that there is no true idea whose approval does not implicate some
action.
TTP, p. 182.
TTP, p. 174: an intellectual or precise knowledge of God is not a gift generally given
to all the faithful, in the way that obedience is.
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This is also the reason why Spinoza describes obedience as ability.108


The meaning of obedience, as presented here, runs contrary to the
commonly accepted way of understanding the call we shall do and
listen; it also runs contrary to what is usually presented, by Spinozas
interpreters, as his political-theological views.109 For Spinoza, obedience
is not the outcome of some manipulation, in which activity is attributed
only to those initiating it. The fact that members of the masses often
obey because they are subject to deep religious or political oppression
should not be the basis for understanding the origin of obedience. In
order to understand what is proposed in this analysis of obedience, it
is more important to note Spinozas frequently expressed ambitions to
found obedience in the believer himself, in the assent from the heart.
Once again, the example of the merchants can be very useful. The origin
of the calculation does not only lie in apprehending some hearsay; it
also lies in the way the idea is adopted by their consciousness, in the
mechanical self-activation of merchants. They approve of the idea
through their use of itthis is an expression of their non-reflective
consciousness. In the same vein, one should not look at obedience as
the expression of their total passivity which, of course, is impossible
for Spinoza; rather, it should be considered as something that is deeply
engrained in the nature of consciousness of the masses. The readiness
of the believer, a member of the masses, to obey, derives from his
mechanical apprehension of thingsthat he gives approval through
use.110 Therefore, in order to guarantee obedience, there is no need to
108
109

110

TTP, p. 194.
See Chapter 3, note 65, and see Halletts approach in Spinoza, p. 140, for what he calls
the pseudo-morality of the masses. For other analyses of the concept of obedience,
see Levin, Revelation, pp. 171-175; Balibar, Spinoza and Politics, pp. 88-95.
Clearly, approval through use is not particular to members of the masses. The
mathematician who clearly distinguishes the logical content of a proposition approves
this idea by using it. The difference between the merchant and the mathematician is
that the former uses the rule as the only tool for approving an idea. In spite of what we
just wrote, one should not conclude that this type of knowledge is limited to ignorant
people and the weak-minded. Many educated people adopt or reject theological ideas
without bothering to examine them, following the trends found in their surroundings.
In other words, what is claimed here about the knowledge of the masses is relevant for
many human groups and in infinity of human situations. This will be discussed in the
conclusion.
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---------- VI. Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience-----------

impose ideas through religious authority. The regularization of the life


of the masses does not mean they have to be led like a flock of sheep. If
the believer possesses ideas of the imagination, apprehended through
his own particular tendenciesthat should suffice. This is likely to
shed some light on Spinozas claim, in the PT, that Men are so to be
led, that they may think that they are not led, but living after their own
mind, and according to their free decision.111
The meaning suggested here for the approval that lies at the root of
obedience can be summed up by the Hebrew term nakhon. This term
will also help us explain the role of the philosophers speculations for
his society. In spoken Hebrew, the word nakhon has two meanings. It
indicates an agreement with what has been brought to our attention
(correct). The combination ze nakhon (thats correct) expresses the
agreement that what has been said is true. If this conclusion is the
outcome of speculative efforts rather than some external impression, a
person will choose the term amiti (true). In my view, the difference
between true and correct is as follows: the first points to an active
revealing of truth, while the second refers to a passive approval of it,
i.e. the agreement with something that has become known to him from
the outside. Another use of the word nakhon is ready as in Im
ready (nakhon) to do this. This refers to the readiness to do something
suggested to me. In other words, the various uses of the word
nakhon point to the two ways of being passive: a relatively passive
acceptance of what seems to be true, and a readiness to act. As we have
indicated throughout this chapter, the philosophical articulation of the
consciousness of the masses involves the articulation of its internal
concepts, and the understanding of the force of action hidden within it.
The main concept of this articulation can be expressed with the help of
the word nekhonut (correctness and readiness). The ambiguity that
characterizes this term makes it useful for designating the essential
affinity between the epistemic status of theological ideas and the
readiness to act implicit in the term nekhonut. The members of the
masses consider the religious images that are part of their consciousness
as the correct (nakhon) contents, where nakhon refers to their feeling
111

TP, p. 382.
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of truth as well as their readiness to act. To be more precise, it refers to


the fact that the sense of truth within the non-reflective consciousness
is approved by way of a readiness to act.112 These two meanings, which
are perceived as having a significant relation within the framework of
Spinozian analysis, characterize the way of acting implied by obedience
that is based on assent from the heart.
This is the key for understanding Spinozas hope that the State
will not be based on the absence of action of its citizens. As we
recall, on a number of occasions Spinoza emphasizes the importance
of nurturing the independence or the self-authority of the member of
the masses, be he citizen or believer. He claimed that a State worthy of
its name must nurture the freedom of thought of its citizens and that,
on the other hand, if it is managed so that the masses live like sheep,
it will be considered as a wilderness.113 His words on the importance
of the assent from the heart go in the same direction, as do his other
claims on the central place to be attributed to the deliberations of
the simple believer. What we discussed in the previous section is also
relevant here: the fact that Spinoza hopes to base the new religious
feeling on the simple believers viewing himself as the source of this
authority, and that Gods word is something engraved in his mind
without any distortion.
Based on what was just said, we can interpret such claimswhich
attribute independent power to the masses and which include the hope
that they will be nurturednot only as part of a manipulative rhetoric
(which remains even after the interpretation suggested here); they
are, on the contrary, genuine demands based on the understanding
of the mechanical dynamism of the masses mentality, of its innate
willingness to adopt the commands included in the religious ideas.
One should not understand the nurturing of the judgment, the assent
from the heart and the freedom of thought, solely based on the moral
justification they can bearthe predominance of nurturing life and
the hope of avoiding death (which Spinoza mentions in the TP);114 we
112
113
114

I took the phrase sense of truth from Vaughan, Myth.


TP, p. 314.
TP, p. 314.
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---------- VI. Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience-----------

must also consider the role of this individuality in ordering social life.
The ability to obey is common to all mankind;115 the degree of intensity
of this ability depends on the way an idea is adopted. The adoption of
an idea in the consciousness of a member of the masses is not likely to
lead to a logical-reflective approval; however, this does not mean that
all non-reflective approvals are one and the same: the acceptance of
an idea based on assent from the heart is not only a worthy basis for
generating obedience to the commands it contains, but also a strong
foundation for it. Indeed, the intense non-reflective approval involved
in acceptance deriving from the assent from the heart is what will be
reflected in the way this idea is employed.
These words on the origin of obedience also clarify the ontologicalepistemological basis for the demand to stimulate the life of the
masses. As we recall, this stimulation is characterized by turning the
simple believer into a source of authority, into the representative of
Gods undistorted demands. Clearly, Spinozas efforts to increase selfauthority do not designate the masses as a spontaneous force that has
the ability to take over political rule, but rather as a means of reinforcing
it. The self-authority that is attributed to the masses was meant to
designate the spiritual platform necessary to generate the political
patterns of the internalization of the law and the adoption of a rational
lifestyle. There is a way of acting anchored in a minimal understanding,
that can establish a moral social life. This we can learn by looking at
the origin of obedience. The importance of this fact becomes clear in
light of what was stated in the third section of the previous chapter.
The reason for the instability of the masses is also the reason for its
potential stability; the passivity of the member of the masses leads him
to perceive everything through his distorted self-concept, but also to
consistently use ideas that are only vaguely distinct in his awareness,
and thereby adopt a law-infused lifestyle.
From what has been claimed so far, we may understand the
meaning of the activity which Spinoza attributes to the masses; we may
also understand why political power has to enrobe itself with religious
contents. The members of the masses who hold religious ideas and
115

See note 107 above.


137

--------------------------------------------------------------Political Secularism--------------------------------------------------------------

adopt them on the basis of the assent from the heart instill within
themselves a moral sensitivity, which derives from their own spirit.
Therefore, one should not view them as having a weak spirit, and as
blindly following their leaders; they should, on the contrary, be viewed
as a large publicincluding the popular stratathat may identify a
religious-moral basis with the ruling power and its leaders, but may
also criticize those leaders. In other words, religious symbols and moral
contents form a link between political authority and the spirit of the
masses. The latter is not a submissive partner, but is spiritually able to
take part in political life and to oppose corrupted power. Motivating the
masses involves rationalization and actualization.
In conclusion, the gist of political secularism involves two
processes. The first can be entitled making-raw: religion dissolves into
a network of images that rely upon individual judgment, and which
involves the rationalization of the concept of God. Religion is set free
from the authority of its specialists; it is released from its doctrinarian
formulations and from its textual basis; it relies on subjective judgment,
through which it maintains the awareness of the moral order of the
world and of the existence of the almighty God, who protects His
creatures. A detailed description of this type of tradition can only be
made for a particular given society. Philosophical inquiry can reveal the
main traits of what is meant by making-raw. The reformed religion
turns religion into the raw material for the social-political order; the
reformed religion does not involve the weakening of the masses or the
exacerbation of its passivity, but its opposite. The network of flexible
religious images has the ability to stimulate the individual spirit and to
establish rational patterns in the life of society.
Thus, it is clear why one ought to beware of manipulation as the key
concept in the description of change as it appears in reformed religion.
This concept emphasizes the passivity of the masses and the action of
those performing the manipulationleading the masses towards aims
that they themselves are unable to discern. However, this is not the
main point of the reform suggested hererather, it is the stimulation
of the masses power to act. Clearly, this does not imply going to the
people in the sense of the Russian anarchists, but rather the claim that
the understanding of secularization depends on the revelation of the
138

---------- VI. Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience-----------

masses force of action. This is the background for the second process
involved in political secularismthe actualization of society through
politicization, in the course of the development of political authority.116
The Spinozian approach to culture described here comprises a
program that is cautious in its promises. It contains no instructions
for establishing a utopia, but rather describes an epistemic-political
infrastructure that is necessary, but also unstable and temporary by
nature. The two main processes, making-raw and actualization, do
not culminate in a celebration of victory; they form a program geared
towards reducing the instability of the masses, restraining its inbred
hostility and instilling a more rational way of life. Spinozas view of
secularism remains a program for limited secularization: striving
towards the improvement of political authority, and grounding that
authority by stimulating the masses and preparing their spiritual and
religious-moral world. The fact that the masses are not only the object
of action but that they are also agents in the process of secularization
determines their nature. This secularization does not depend on
the imposition and fostering of external, semi-rational norms by
philosopher-kings, but on the modification of the prevalent culture
in a concrete society so that it may become the basis for political
authority. This authority is likely to strengthen the rationalization and
intensification of human life, of masses and individuals alike.

116

This book deals with culture as a potential platform for a civilized political life; a
complementary discussion (not carried out here) concerns the ways of actualization
or re-actualization. How is it possible to improve political life so that people, both
individuals and as members of a society, will lead better lives?
139

-----------------------------Chapter V -----------------------------------

The Role of the


Philosopher in His Society
in Times of Secularization

--------------------------------------------------------I. The Healthy Judgment--------------------------------------------------------

The Spinozian philosopher looks at his society based on his insights into
the limitations of consciousness. The liberation of the masses suggested
by the reformed religion and the improvement of the sovereign authority
is based on his understanding of the structure of consciousness of the
masses and its inherent instability, which derives from the nature of the
masses consciousness. A further limitation is the restricted influence of
the philosopher. A philosopher who is aware of these limitations does
not draw negative conclusions, nor does he take exception to his own
society; rather, this awareness serves as a basis for the examination of
the possibilities that the society has to offer for its own wellbeing. One
such example was provided in the previous chapter. I am referring here
to the ontological-epistemological-political analysis, through which we
showed how persons with a lower degree of knowledge have access to a
force of action deriving from obedience. This same logic will enable us to
understand the limitations of the philosophers influence. All of these will
help us understand the role of the philosopher in secularizing his society.

I. The Healthy Judgment,


the radiance of theology and the problem
of the philosophers sincerity
In the TTP, Spinoza claims on a number of occasions that theology and
philosophy are two entirely separate realms: Scripture leaves reason
absolutely free and has nothing at all in common with philosophy, but
that each of them stands on own separate footing.1 He summarizes
the difference between them later on the next page: The object of
1

TTP, p. 9.
143

I. The Healthy Judgment

------------------------------------- The Role of the Philosopher in His Society--------------------------------------

revealed knowledge is simply obedience. It is therefore entirely


distinct from natural knowledge both in its object and in its principles
and methods, and has nothing whatever in common with it. Each of
them [i.e. faith and natural knowledge] has its own province; they do
not conflict with each other; and neither should be subordinate to the
other.2 In other words, the origin of theology lies in revelation and its
purpose is obedience. In this way, it differs from natural knowledge,
even if both are presented as sources or types of knowing. At another
point in the book, Spinoza claims that the main point of theology
cannot be examined through the categories of truth and falsehood:
Yet since we are unable to prove by means of reason whether the
fundamental principle of theologythat men are saved by obedience
aloneis true or false, are we not open to the question: why therefore
do we believe it?3 The answer he provides is: The fundamental dogma
of theology cannot be discovered by the natural light, or at least that
no one has yet proven it, and that is why revelation was absolutely
indispensable.4 The last of these claims is that since theology cannot
be proven by a mathematical proof, we accept it: So it is a sound
judgment to accept this fundamental principle embracing the whole
of theology and Scripture, even though it cannot be demonstrated by
mathematical proof.5 And what is this? For it is indeed ignorance to
refuse to accept something just because it cannot be mathematically
demonstrated when it is confirmed by the testimonies of so many
prophets, is a source of great solace for those whose capacity to reason
is limited, is of great value to the state, and may believed unreservedly
without danger or damage.6 Spinoza concludes this claim as follows:
when one attempts to subordinate theology to reason, he supposes
that theologys authority will have no impact unless it is illuminated
by the natural light of reason.7
These and similar claims are most certainly part of the cunning
2
3
4
5
6
7

Ibid., p. 10.
Ibid., p. 191.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 193
Ibid.
Ibid.
144

--------------------------------------------------------I. The Healthy Judgment--------------------------------------------------------

rhetoric which Spinoza uses in the TTP. Claims that theology is entirely
separate from philosophy and that its main principles are immune to
logical criteria of truth and falsehood aim at dispelling the fears of
the readers of the TTP as to the possible risks entailed by philosophy,
and to assure them that the status of theology is unassailable. Thus,
Spinoza hopes to contribute to the establishment of free enquiry. This
interpretation is easy to prove as follows: this must be a manipulative
declaration, since it is pointless, from the point of view of Spinozian
philosophy, to separate theology from philosophy. The problem with
this unquestionably correct interpretation of the matter is that it is too
obvious, and thus obscures other significant potential interpretations.
The meaning of the claims made in the TTPmore so than in other
booksis related to their extra-textual goal. What is the meaning of the
discussion of the self-radiance of theology for the non-philosophical
reader, if it is not the light of reason? On which philosophical basis will
we be able to claim that religious ideas whose contents are the belief
in revelation, or the theological idea that people may be saved through
obedience alone, cannot be proven to be true or false?
What we discussed in the previous chapterparticularly concerning
the origin of obediencecan help us respond to this. Claims about the
self-radiance of theology and concerning the validity of the healthy
judgment play the same role as the demand to authorize the theological
ideas concerning the assent from the heart. Their aim is to encourage
the adoption of an idea based on the inclinations of the heart. They
are an argument in support of the importance of what we have called
correctness (nekhonut). In other words, their justification derives
from an understanding of the relation between the lack of reflexivity,
the masses sense of truth, and the mechanism of obedience and its
political significance. This point is no less important than the necessity
to avoid clashing with the defenders of theology through manipulative
camouflage of the argument.
This answer raises a difficulty: if the aim of Spinozas claims is to
release the masses from the oppression of the religious authorities in
order to establish them as a source of authority sufficient for action
on the basis of its religious imagesthen the masses should be
protected not only from religious figures but from philosophers as
145

------------------------------------- The Role of the Philosopher in His Society--------------------------------------

well. The establishment of popular authority is contingent upon its


exhibiting a healthy judgment. Philosophical criticism has the power
to undermine it; thus, the object of TTP, at least insofar as is necessary
to ensure the establishment of a broadly useful popular religion, is not
only to protect philosophy from theology, but to protect theology from
philosophy. But what sort of protection is this? Must the philosopher,
in the final instance, obscure his thinking and avoid mentioning the
faults in the faith of the masses? Such questions depend upon the
social role of the philosopher, as assigned him by Spinoza. Indeed,
the philosopher, who is well aware of the distorted concepts that are
deeply rooted in society, appears, given his essence, as a sworn enemy
of this kind of popular culture. His thought exposes the contradictions
between the confused images that are so deeply engrained in society.
What benefit can we expect for the public, for the welfare of the State,
and especially for the fear of God, from the withdrawal of restrictions
set upon these men of thought? The philosopher must, therefore, hide
from his society, and perhaps base his speculative project on delusions,
like declarations on the source of theologys self-awareness. The
philosophers work is bound to be hidden and not open to all, since
otherwise his thought is likely to increase the instability naturally found
in the broader society. Naturally, these claims apply to the philosopher
armed with metaphysical secularism, whose essence is the knowledge
of God purified of all specific cultural connotations adhering to the
concept of God. The Spinozian philosopher belongs to a long tradition
of philosophical figures, from Socrates on, who are seen as endangering
the public.8
Things are actually far more complex: Spinoza often links the
fulfillment of freedom, particularly the freedom of thought, to his
claims on religion and to the issue of the desirable principles of the
political sovereign. One can attribute two meanings to the freedom
of thought advocated by Spinoza: first, freedom of thought for the
members of society; second, freedom of philosophical enquiry. The
first is expressed through his claim that the governing power must
8

These figures include Socrates and Anaxagoras, among others. See the views of Leo
Strauss on the tension between the philosopher and political life.
146

--------------------------------------------------------I. The Healthy Judgment--------------------------------------------------------

avoid legislating laws concerning opinions, with the exception of


rebellious views that undermine the foundations of the State.9 The
individual cannot pass on to the ruler his natural right to the freedom
of thought.10 This view occupies a special place in the TTP, in which
Spinoza claims that the ultimate goal of the State is freedom, and where
he explains that the aim of the state is not dominate or control people
by fear or subject them to the authority of another. On the contrary,
its aim is to free everyone from fear so that they may live in security
so far possible.11 What has been said so far about the assent from
the heart, the healthy judgment and the hope to refrain from the
absence of action concerns the stimulation of the masses, i.e. the
fulfillment of their freedom to the fullest. The second meaningthe
freedom of philosophical enquiryis prominent in the preface to the
TTP: Theological-Political Treatise contain[s] several discourses which
demonstrate that freedom to philosophize may not only be allowed
without danger to piety and the stability of the republic but cannot be
refused without destroying the peace of the republic and piety itself.
The general danger for the masses that derives from the thought
of the Spinozian philosopher must now be formulated through a
number of questions: What is the relation between the freedom of
philosophical enquiry and the stimulation of thought of the members
of society? Is there a connection between the freedom of thought of
the members of society and the stimulation of the life of the masses?
How can philosophical thought contribute to this stimulation, which
comprises, as we recall, the deepening of the believers self-authority
with respect to ideas about religion and the anchoring of obedience
in the natural tendencies of the heart? Can the entire work of the
philosopher be reduced, as we have just hinted, to forming false and
manipulative foundationssuch as the declaration of the independent
and unassailable status of theology? This can also be formulated as
follows: political secularism involves the development of the freedom
of thought of the masses; the images which the masses tend to hold
9
10
11

TP, p. 55; TTP, p.159; and see the interesting statement in the TTP, p.213.
TTP, p. 209.
Ibid., p. 252.
147

------------------------------------- The Role of the Philosopher in His Society--------------------------------------

as true, following their healthy judgment, are false; if so, what is the
role of the political philosopher in the development of a secularism
based on these false images?

II. The resonance of truth


In order to respond to these questions, we must broaden the discussion
of the meaning of truth in Spinozas epistemology and ontology. It
will be particularly useful for us to clarify the potential impact of the
true idea on the consciousness of the masseswhat we have chosen
to call the resonance of truth. Spinoza reiterates, albeit in different
ways, his famous claim according to which truth is the criterion of
truth and falsehood. He backs his claim with the image of light and
darkness: truth reveals itself, as does falsehood, [a]s the light makes
both itself and the darkness plain.12 We should note that the relation
of truth to falsehood is not the same as the relation between truth and
the ideas of imagination. The difference between them is expressed in
Spinozas clear formulation of the relation between truth and the first
degree of knowledge: Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause
of falsity (unica est falsitatis causa), whereas knowledge of the second
and the third kind is necessarily true.13 Clearly, then, the ideas that
originate in the first degree of knowledge, i.e. the ideas of imagination,
cannot be described by means of the distinction between truth and
falsehood. They may be the cause of falsehood, and they may be the
foundation of truth if they have been reformed or deepened. The
relation between truth and falsehood on the one hand, and the ideas
of imagination on the other, is presented once again in the following
sentence: Knowledge of the second and third kinds, and not of the
first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the false.14
The discussion presented in the first section of Chapter 3 can help
us understand these statements. In this section, we explained that
the basic distinction which Spinoza draws in his epistemologymore
12
13

14

E 2p43s.
E 2p41. Curley, Ethics, uses cause of falsity. The term which Spinoza uses is falsitas;
it is only found in late Latin and points to something abstract.
E 2p42; see also E 5p28.
148

------------------------------------------------------- II. The resonance of truth-------------------------------------------------------

basic than that between the various degrees of knowledgeis that


between reflective and non-reflective consciousness. This distinction
is the background for the distinction between the ideas that may be
characterized as true or false and the ideas which, from epistemological
point of view, precede them. Why is that? This is so because the absence
of reflectivity means that the ideas are given in consciousness without
approval, whereas an idea that is either true or false necessarily
includes the approval of its contents,15 i.e. it contains a reflection on
the logical content of its objects. It is evident that ideas given as part
of a non-reflective consciousness precede, from a phenomenological
point of view, the distinction between truth and falsehood. In this
respect, we should view these ideas as raw ideas. They can only be the
basis for a false idea (if they remain uncompleted) or for the true idea
(if completed).16 Consequently, we must take care to describe the ideas
of imagination based on the internal categories of consciousness that
contain them, rather than distort them through distinctions which are
not relevant to them.
This is an important point in understanding the topic of political
and metaphysical secularism, as well as the freedom of philosophical
enquiry in Spinozas thought. The question that was presented at the
end of the previous section was to what extent the true understanding
of the philosopher, when publicly expressed, undermines the beliefs
of the masses and their stability. To what extent can the philosophers
truth, including the contents of thought which are summed up by the
phrase metaphysical secularism, impact on society and endanger it? The
gist of the answer involves what we have called here the resonance of
truththe question as to how and to what extent revealed truth impacts
on the masses, who are mired in imagination. The key to this lies in what
we have already claimed regarding the link between truth and the objects
of imagination or between reflective and non-reflective consciousness.
The analysis of emotions in Book III of the Ethics, as well as the

15

16

As we recall, in that it is being approved, a false idea differs from a fabricated idea. On
the role of approval in these ideas, see Hallett, Spinoza, pp. 86-87.
In E 2p41, Spinoza indicates that the first degree of knowledge is the only reason for
falsity, although clearly this does not mean that it is false by necessity.
149

------------------------------------- The Role of the Philosopher in His Society--------------------------------------

accompanying notes about language and the masses, may serve as a good
starting point for our discussion.17 As we recall, the classification of the
emotions is based on the notion of conatus, the gist of which speaks of
the division of affects according to their tending towards happiness or
sadness. The distinctions between these affects are revealed in a logicalpsychological way. Such exposure throws light on the limitations of
language. These limitations can be seen in a number of ways: words
cannot describe the entire range of affects, since the affect generated
by a particular object contains the nature of that object: There are as
many species of joy, sadness, and desire, and consequently of each affect
composed of these (like vacillation of mind) or derived from them (like
love, hate, hope, fear, etc.), as there are species of objects by which we
are affected.18 Words are thus general; these deficiencies, it appears,
reflect the tendency of the imagination towards generalizations. More
important is the fact that language lacks certain distinctions. Certain
affects become known to the reader through distinctions achieved with
the help of logical-psychological analysis, although no word designates
them. In other words, philosophical analysis is not bound by the
limitations of language: and from that we can deduce in addition other
affects, which we also do not usually distinguish from the others by
any single term.19 The reason for the shortcomings of words lies in the
limited knowledge of those using them: the names of the affects are
found more from the ordinary usage [of words] than from an accurate
knowledge [of the effects].20
The analysis of emotions has great psychological import in Spinozas
philosophy; it is the basis for the articulation of the oscillations of
the mind and of its instability. The gap between this articulation and
the masses use of language recalls the gap between the philosophers
17

18

19
20

For broader discussions of Spinozas philosophy of language, see: Savan, Spinoza and
Language; Yovel, The Masses and Language.
E 2p56. The activations are determined on the basis of their objects, because they
comprise ideas of their objects. This is stated in E 3p56d: The joy arising from A
involves the nature of object A, that arising from object B involves the nature of object
B, and so these two affects of joy are by nature different, because they arise from
causes of a different nature.
E 3p53s.
E 3p52s.
150

------------------------------------------------------- II. The resonance of truth-------------------------------------------------------

true understanding and the distorted knowledge that maintains, with


the help of words, signs of things as existing in the imagination, not
as existing in the understanding.21 This gap illustrates not only the
obvious difference that exists between the philosophers understanding
and the distorted understanding of the imagining person, but also the
resonance of truth. The exposure of the entire network of emotions
and of the way it derives from every things striving for existence takes
place in opposition to linguistic habits and beyond the boundaries of
the lexicon; it reveals the inadequacy of language and the distorted
knowledge that is contained in it. All this is revealed to the philosopher
as a result of his logical-psychological analysis of emotions; however,
even if this truth is revealed and made public, it does not determine the
confused use of words. Linguistic tradition is deeply anchored in the
ways of understanding of the member of the masses and in the nature of
his consciousness. Therefore, more than truth, the logical-psychological
analysis of human emotions, in this case, is akin to a flashlight that casts
light on its surroundings; it resembles the light produced by a tool for
night vision: it enables us to distinguish the details of the object in the
dark, but this fact remains external to the one being seen.
The linguistic tradition and the non-reflective consciousness
which is inherent in it remain immune to the impact of the logicalpsychological analysis found in part of the Ethics. It may very well
be that some other philosophical debate will resonate much more
powerfully in the consciousness of the masses; indeed, not every
topic elicits the same degree of attention. Specific philosophical
topicsreligious criticism, for exampleare likely to undermine
the common beliefs within the masses and change or at least shake
their thinking habits. However, the fact that a philosophical debate
on religious issues will shake the consciousness of the masses more
powerfully does not alter the conclusion we have reached here based on
the example of language. The destructive force of philosophical truth
over the beliefs of the masses cannot be deduced from the way that
falsity dissipates when confronted by truth within the philosophers
consciousness. The former must take the nature of the other
21

TdIE, p. 33.
151

------------------------------------- The Role of the Philosopher in His Society--------------------------------------

consciousness into consideration: the non-reflective consciousness is


imprisoned in its patterns and cannot extricate itself from them in the
same way that the philosopher relinquishes thinking habits which he
once adopted absentmindedly.22 Philosophical debate can have some
impact on non-reflective consciousness; but it is more likely to disturb
that non-reflective consciousness or merely resonate within it rather
than impregnate it with new meanings. This is so because truth is a
light unto itself and unto falsitybut not unto what is imagined. To
a great extent, what is imagined should be perceived as a third thing
(tertium quid),23 located below truth and falsity. Due to the absence
of reflectivity, it precedes this distinction, or is too raw. The reason for
this is because Spinoza, as we recall, sees the first degree of knowledge
as a cause of falsity.
This epistemological issue is important for our understanding
of the role of the philosopher in society. The philosopher does not
possess in his toolbox destructive truths that by their mere presence
undermine the distorted concepts that are commonly found in his
surroundings. The person who fears the philosophers freedom of
enquiry and who believes that the philosopher might openly undermine
his own thoughts or societys stabilitysuch a person makes a specific
assumption regarding the way a true idea makes its impact. Just as
truth is a criterion for itself, so too it is a criterion for untrue ideas in
general, as well as the false and the distorted ideas of imagination. This
assumption is wrong since it ignores two epistemological principles
found in Spinozas philosophy: that the distinction between truth and
falsity is external to the non-reflective consciousness and to the ideas of
the imagination that compose it, as we have already seen; and that the
relation between truth and imagination cannot be clarified solely on an
epistemological basis. It must be understood against the dynamisticontological background of Spinozas philosophy. Truth and falsity are
not descriptions of contents, but of mental activities. They describe the

22

23

He is qualified to distinguish the large difference between himself and the masses,
since he is less bound than others to grasp everything by way of his identity, in an
egocentric manner.
Its meaning, however, does not accord with the medieval use of the concept.
152

------------------------------------------------------- II. The resonance of truth-------------------------------------------------------

minds action or, to be more precise, the way a concrete idea is found
within a concrete consciousness.24 Therefore, the relation between
truth and imagination more closely resembles the relation between the
wise man and the ignoramus, rather than the abstract relation between
the logical contents of two claims.
Hence, the non-reflective consciousness is not undermined or
shaken by the mere presence of truth; it is not this presence that
extricates it, as if by magic, from its inferior epistemic status, but
rather the more intense presence of truth. Clearly, one should not
exaggerate: Spinoza believed that the masses were subject to the impact
of the philosophical enquiry. One can find numerous examples for this,
but suffice it to recall the fact that he published the TTP anonymously.
This indicates how powerful, in Spinozas view, was the impact of
philosophical ideas on the public. Undoubtedly, a philosophical idea
can influence the public, but these ideas necessarily impact from the
outside, through hearsay. This externality emerges in more detail once
we understand imagination and the way it functions. The member of the
masses is drawn after some vague experience. His consciousness is ready
to absorb hearsay and to adopt it uncritically. The free philosophers
thought that reaches the masses is likely to shake them, while the nonreflective consciousness is able to adopt a true idea based on hearsay.
In fact, it is likely that it will tend to adopt such an idea. However, this
does not mean that the masses discern the ideas logical contents.As
long as a consciousness remains non-reflective, truth is perceived as
hearsay; it is given within that consciousness without understanding
and is adopted through imitation. An idea adopted through hearsay is
likely to offend the member of the masses due to his beliefs, to burden
him and trouble his soul, yet it remains no more than hearsay.25
Philosophical thought makes its impact on the consciousness of the
masses through hearsay. Thus, even if it be broad or of long duration,
24
25

See Parkinson, Knowledge.


This type of mental activity is not found exclusively among the ignorant. It is suitable,
to some degree, for anyone who holds a neglected view, i.e. a view that is determined
without clarification of the logical contents included in its objects; a popular basis,
limited in its reflection, may be found in everyones consciousness, including that of
the philosopher. I will discuss this further towards the end of the next section.
153

------------------------------------- The Role of the Philosopher in His Society--------------------------------------

this impact is necessarily superficialeven when it is spread by people


bearing a higher degree of consciousness. Spinozas words in the TTP
can help us understand how philosophical ideas are present in the
consciousness of the masses: For invisible things which are objects
of the mind alone can not be seen with any other eyes than through
conceptual demonstrations. Those people therefore who do not grasp
the demonstrations, see nothing at all of these things, and therefore
whatever they report from hearsay about such questions, neither
affects nor indicates their minds say any more than the words of a
parrot or a robot which speaks without mind and sense.26 The way
non-reflective consciousness exists and the concrete relation between
the true idea and the ideas of the imagination thus limit the impact of
the philosophers thought.
If so, what is the social role of the philosopher? What kind of
political meaning can be attributed to his thought if, by its nature, it
is destined to exist among the masses through the weak and external
intercourse of hearsay? The answer to this calls for an understanding
of the role of the epistemological discussion in Spinozas political
philosophy. In order to do so, we must disengage from a common
trend in interpretation of Spinoza, which generally evaluates the ideas
of imagination in two ways: as devoid of any epistemic value, or as
the necessary source of adequate knowledge. Although the ideas of
imagination contain distorted knowledge, they can be improved and
reformed.27 The common basis of these two opposite interpretations is
that the ideas of imagination are evaluated in light of higher degrees of
knowledge. The value or lack of value of a confused idea is determined
on the basis of its relation to an adequate idea. This common basis
contains an important assumption: that Spinozas epistemology has
a single horizonthe improvement of mans knowledge and his
liberation from his faulty approaches so that he may attain adequate
knowledge. Imagination is evaluated insofar as it contributes to the
attainment of these cognitive, moral and spiritual aims.
26
27

TTP, p. 175.
De Deugd, Imagination, p. pp. 51-52; Hallett, Creation, p. 57; Hallett, Eternity, pp. 127128; Hallett, Spinoza, pp. 84-85. Compare Gart, Truth and Imagination.
154

------------------------------------------------------- II. The resonance of truth-------------------------------------------------------

It is natural enough that this aim became a prominent one


for Spinozas commentators. The titles of Spinozas books seem to
support this. Moreover the commentators are, after all, proponents of
philosophy, and thus, we may assume, identify with the redemption
accessible to the wise. However, the training of the philosopher is
not the only mission of Spinozas thoughtthe life of the masses
and its improvement are important to him too. Understanding the
life of the masses does not require clarification of the contribution
of the imagination to knowledge, but rather of the contribution of
philosophical enquiry to the understanding of the imagination. The
questions are as follows: How are we to understand the distortions
and defects of inferior consciousness in light of philosophical enquiry?
How can this enquiry contribute towards organizing society, in which
imagination is the most dominant form of consciousness?
At this point, it is important to clarify one point. In Spinozas
thought, rationalization is common both to the improvement of
society and to the education of the philosopher. The difference between
them lies in their degree of improvement. The apprentice philosopher
is someone who is about to extract himself from the oscillations of
the soul, as they are described in the beginning of the TdIE and in
the Ethics; he strives towards achieving the third degree of knowledge.
The masses, on the other hand, are not about to extract themselves
from the domination of the imagination. The question as to how the
masses are to improve their lives does not entertain the possibility
of transcending this inferior degree of knowledge. Thus, Spinozas
political philosophy rests on a trend contrary to that offered to the
student of philosophy; it is based on the understanding of imagination
and the possibilities it entails, and the examination of possibilities for
social-emotional improvement within the framework of a life ruled by
this type of consciousness. The oscillations of the soul, the instability,
the egocentrism, the signs of hostility that characterize the life of the
masses, their acceptance of authority and the source of obedienceall
of these are aspects of the philosophical articulation that is carried
out on the basis of the contributions of adequate knowledge to the
understanding of life ruled by imagination. This epistemological
discussion is at the root of Spinozas political philosophy, and
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corresponds to the main role of the philosopher in society.28


In a nutshell, the conclusions of philosophical enquiry do not
shatter the beliefs of the members of the masses. These conclusions
can be captured by his consciousness as hearsay. The philosopher
knows that his own thought is diffused through the mediation
of vague experience and confused consciousness. Understanding
the power of hearsaysomething Spinoza deals with in several
instancesencourages sensitivity to the way that truth is apprehended.
All this means that the philosopher has to adopt rules of politeness,
which we will detail in the next section. The philosophers political
enquiry, however, cannot be limited to the rules of caution or to the
rules of politeness he adopts in facing the consciousness of the masses,
especially since the philosopher is the only one able to understand and
express this consciousness. In other words, the articulation of the nonreflective consciousness cannot result merely in its avoidance. It must
be expressed as a force that contributes to its improvement.
What we have just claimed makes an additional contribution to what
was remarked in the fifth section of Chapter 4. There we argued that the
main action in the shaping of the masses lives in accordance with semirational patterns is not accomplished through imposing something
external or through justifying its utility, but through encouraging
the assimilation of cultural contents that are likely to deepen the
process of rationalization. This clarification is impossible without an
understanding of the activity of non-reflective consciousness. The
claim that the articulation of non-reflective consciousness must be a
force contributing to its improvementthis claim forms the basis for
guaranteeing the invigoration of the life of the masses from within.
Through this type of articulation, it is possible to establish the authority

28

In the TdIE, p. 7, Spinoza writes: For we can gain from the multitude no small
advantages, provided that we strive to accommodate ourselves to its understanding
as far as possible: moreover, we shall in this way gain a friendly audience for the
reception of the truth. These words not only instruct us at to the rules of caution
that were common in the philosophy of the Middle Ages, i.e. hiding the destructive
conclusions that derive from Spinozas philosophy; he also hints at the value of limited
understanding. What is written in this chapter and in the two preceding chapters
provides the explanation for this.
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------------------------------------------------------III. Metaphysical secularism------------------------------------------------------

of reformed religion on the basis of concepts that are inherent to the


mentality of the masses. Consequently, this authority is likely to be
based on their own natural tendencies rather than being imposed upon
them as though they were being guided by a cattle prod.

III. Metaphysical secularism


The claim as to the danger stemming from the freedom of philosophical
enquiry implies that the philosopher is faced with an acute dilemma:
should he reveal his thoughts or hide them? However, this dilemma
is not the main point: more essential is the question concerning the
nature of the project which the political philosopher offers his society.
Is his philosophy proposed as an enlightened alternative to a distorted
religious approach, or is it aimed at providing an epistemic-ontic basis
for improving the culture and traditions of a given society? What we
have written so far provides a response to this issue.
We have just explained that rationalization is common to the
reform of social life and to the philosophers education process, the
difference being in the range of the improvement. Unlike the philosophy
student, who strives to extricate himself from the confusion of the
mind and reach the third degree of knowledge, the masses live in their
imagination, from which they cannot deviate in order to improve
their lives. In other words, the political project which the Spinozian
philosopher proposes to his society is opposed to that of the student of
philosophy. It is based on the articulation of the imagination and on the
understanding of the possibilities entailed by it. Whoever understands
the message of Spinozas philosophy with respect to the questions that
arise from the process of secularization as an immanent approach,
purified of all particular cultural connotations, misunderstands the
role of the philosopher. The error is that he looks at society from the
point of view of the student-philosopher. In doing so, he loses sight
of the limitations of the consciousness of the masses as well as the
limitations of his own influence: the philosophy student may acquire
the ability to free himself from distorted concepts in ways that the
masses cannot; furthermore, the philosophers thought may not take
root within society as it does in the consciousness of the student.
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------------------------------------- The Role of the Philosopher in His Society--------------------------------------

Whoever proposes secularism as an immanentism devoid of any specific


cultural tradition offers a dubious redemption that can only disturb the
minds of its members and injure them. This type of immanentism and
universalistic approach necessarily comes from the outside; it resonates
with hearsay and amounts to a declaration of the worthlessness of the
concepts of their traditions and images.
The value of metaphysical secularism depends on whether its role
is understood. This secularism reflects ontologyindeed, the claim
about the necessary existence of the substance, its units and its infinity,
is easily presented as secularism. However, for Spinoza, this option
should not be put forward as the principal truth which has the power to
undo lies, nor should it be hidden with the help of some manipulation.
It is a conceptual framework for a socio-political analysis and, therefore,
has a very marginal status. The downplaying of the ontological and
epistemological topics in Spinozas political and cultural discussions can
be perceived as an example of their marginality in these contexts, and
not only as the outcome of his caution, given the political conditions
of his time. The political focus of the philosophers thought lies in the
clarification of the significance of religious traditions and of their great
ability to nurture political life as well as an ethical lifestyle. Enquiries
into this type of platform are based on understanding the limits of
knowledgeboth of the masses and of the philosopherrather than
on the fervor of religious criticism.
The political-cultural philosopher honors the system of images
and concepts that are likely to strengthen the force of action of the
members of the masses, to extract them from a life of slaves and
contribute to the improvement of society. This political and epistemic
sensitivity of the Spinozian philosopher is an expression of the fact
that, thanks to his unique qualities, he is less prone to egocentrism
than others; thanks to his understanding abilities, he can overcome
his limited understanding and perceive his thoughts from the
outside, i.e. get a good view of their presence in the consciousness
of the masses. Thanks to these skills, the Spinozian philosopher does
not become a propagandist of truth who undermines unfounded but
deeply rooted beliefs, but someone who has the power to express the
possibilities of the inferior consciousness. Therefore, not only does
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------------------------------------------------------III. Metaphysical secularism------------------------------------------------------

healthy judgment not need protection from philosophy, but the


philosopherif he understands well his role as well as the limitations
of consciousnesscontributes towards strengthening the position of
healthy judgement and ensuring the recognition of its worth.
We will conclude this section with three remarks; these remarks will
both sum up the topics discuss and clarify the link between what we
have claimed here and two other topics discussed in the book.
First: in the first section of this chapter, we mentioned the problem
of the relation between the philosophers freedom of enquiry and
the freedom of thought of the members of the masses. This topic is
also discussed in section 2, where we explained why the philosopher
does not aim to undermine the healthy judgment of the masses.
From what we have just discussed in section 3, we appreciate further
why philosophical enquiry is necessary for the realization of the
freedom of the masses. This enquiry comprises the articulation of the
consciousness of the masses and is, therefore, vital for its expression,
and for invigorating the life of the masses. This is why Spinoza was
sincere in declaring in the TTP that freedom of philosophical enquiry
is vital for the fear of God and for the welfare of the State. The aim of
the TTP is not only to protect the philosopher from the masses, but to
show how important his thought is for life in society.
Second: all of this does not apply to the philosopher who views
metaphysical secularism as his main work. Such a philosopher views
religious tradition as a lie; for him, it represents an ensemble of
contents which must be analyzed in logical terms. In doing so, he
ignores the question of the presence of the lie in the consciousness
of the imagining person. Thus, what distinguishes metaphysical
secularism from political secularism is the basic category which is
employed in its analysis: one examines religious tradition as true
or false, while the other examines it along what we have called here
correctness (nekhonut). In the framework of metaphysical secularism,
religious tradition is perceived as a lie. This fact is highly significant;
metaphysical secularisms approaches to views on truth resonate in the
life of society. It continuously disturbs the souls of the followers of a
religious tradition, but its power to reveal the false veils and lies of this
tradition is far more limited. It can undermine the hold on the tradition
159

------------------------------------- The Role of the Philosopher in His Society--------------------------------------

and present it as a web of superstitious beliefs, thereby leaving society


spiritually depleted. It is doubtful whether it is able to engender useful
dispositions or structures of consciousness.
Third: Spinozas type of metaphysical secularism is not erased
by political secularism; the ontological-epistemological analysis
which underlies it is the framework for the development of a
cultural approach which we have called political secularism. The
ontological-epistemological framework, which is the background for
metaphysical secularism, gives rise to a more specific analysis of the
question of the meaning of religion and the possibilities contained
in it. Its foundations help clarify the dynamic nature of the idea and
of mental life in general. The analysis reveals the structure of nonreflective consciousness, the chronic instability of the masses, and
their tendency towards activity, with its various political and cultural
meanings. In other words, metaphysical secularism is a type of raw
thought on questions of secularism and tradition. The politicalcultural philosopher who is aware of this cannot evade the masses
and their leaders through caution or cunning or manipulative tactics.
While caution and manipulation are necessary, they are not sufficient;
in order to guarantee the emergence of the good life in society, he must
develop his thought and express it sincerely.

IV. The schematic nature of


Spinozas political thought
Obedience is a key concept in political secularism. Spinozas efforts
to found obedience on the inclinations of the heart of the member of
the masses are designed to provide a base for the shared authority,
which is mainly political. The usefulness of obedience depends on the
desirable contents of the ideas that give rise to it. More precisely, the
fact that obedience is a mechanism that is anchored in the patterns of
consciousness of the masses does not guarantee the establishment of
the political power; this power depends on the nature of the religious
ideas found in his consciousness. The clarification of these contents
represents, therefore, an important part of political secularism. Indeed,
the ambiguity of these contents endangers political stability, just as
160

---------------------- IV. The schematic nature of Spinozas political thought-----------------------

desirable and clear contents contribute to it. The dangers which Spinoza
relates to in speaking of the demise of the sovereign power as a result of
peoples dependence on their contradictory interpretations of religious
issues are also relevant here.29
In the TTP, some of the principles underlying such desirable ideas
are indicated. When writing about the main points of reformed religion,
Spinoza emphasizes Gods personal providence; God is omnipresent and
all is known before Him. His authority is not subject to law, but He does
all things at His absolute pleasure and by His unique grace.30 However,
in the following paragraph, he writes: Worship of God and obedience to
Him consist solely in justice and charity, or in love of ones neighbour.31
In these key statements, Spinoza strives to maintain the personal
relationship between the individual and God and to strengthen it by way
of an explicit and stable system of laws and commands. God looks at
man and judges him; His demands are explicit and constant, but obeying
them is a response to Gods will, which nevertheless maintains a tone of
intimate request. Religious ideas contain a constant oscillation between
the emphasis on law and the emphasis on Gods address to the individual.
Thus, Spinoza combines the following: the necessity to maintain the
personal relationship between the individual and God in order that it
may be adapted to the member of the masses limited capacity to reach
God, and the idea that Gods permanent and clear demands are required in
order to awaken obedience. The use of an idea as non-reflective approval
is based on the commands delivered through guiding ideas.
To this, we should add the following: the Divinity, who is attained
through the knowledge of the member of the masses and who
imposes a moral order upon mankind, instills in the believer a specific
metaphysical position, whose essence is found in a quote from the
Gospel according to John, which Spinoza quotes: each person is in
God and God is in each person.32 As I indicated in the third section of
Chapter 3, this position does away with the false meta-final position

29
30
31
32

Chapter 4, section 2.
TTP, p. 182.
Ibid., p. 183.
Ibid., p. 181.
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------------------------------------- The Role of the Philosopher in His Society--------------------------------------

towards which the believer tends. His extraction from this position is
significant, insofar as it relates directly to the believers basic sense of
belonging to his community and to all Being. This is an Archimedean
point in mans process of socialization and in his tendency to act
rationally and morally within his community. From this, we understand
why, for Spinoza, the status of reformed religion within the State is not
merely that of subordination.33 Although, as we recall, the authority
of the political power does cover religious issues, the political training
of the members of the masses and the possibility of motivating them
depends upon the adoption of religious ideas. These ideas generate
within the member of the masses the readinessas per the meaning
discussed in the previous chapterto adopt a moral lifestyle. In other
words, the power of the State to establish a moral order within society
should not begin with the political power; it requires ideas that instill
within the masses the metaphysical position of belonging to a collective
and responding to the moral order. In these aspects, religious tradition
is a vital platform for maintaining political power with the help of the
force of action of its subjects.
We shall now revert to the main point of the discussion. The contents
of the obedience-provoking ideas are quite general. It is clear, from the
discussion in the sixth section of Chapter 4, that obedience does not
depend exclusively upon the contents of the idea, but also stems from
its epistemic status, i.e. from the commands it entails, and from the way
it is held within the non-reflective consciousness. Naturally, these facts
add no concrete content to the ideas, but they do throw light on the
mechanism which characterizes their presence. In other words, we are
reverting to the arguments that were put forth in the first paragraph of
this section. The tendency to obey is guaranteed by the general type of
ide, and given the limitations of the non-reflective consciousness; but
the dangers of obedience call for a specific discussion of the contents of
these ideas. What should the cultural-traditional origin of these ideas
be? How can we ensure that they guide the believer towards respecting
the political authority, rather than leading to its disintegration through
their individual interpretations, as Spinoza describes in various places?
33

This issue is discussed in Chapter 4, section 3.


162

---------------------- IV. The schematic nature of Spinozas political thought-----------------------

What Spinoza describes in the parts here, as well as in other places,


is not much more than a schematic description of these ideas. Why is
he satisfied with schematic descriptions, if he is aware of the dangers
of ambiguity and schematic descriptions in such matters? The main
reason for this is his sensitivity to the historical context. As has already
been pointed out, some commentators of recent years have indicated
that the accepted convention, according to which Spinoza lacked all
awareness of the historical dimension of human existence, was wrong.34
Indeed, his political writings reveal many examples of this sensitivity.35
A correct interpretation of the Bible must take into consideration the
historical and linguistic context of the text. The biblical scholar must
pay attention to the author: who exactly he was, on what occasion he
wrote, for whom and in what language.36 This means he has to know
the Hebrew language, not only when studying the Bible, but also for
reading the New Testament, [f]or while the latter were propagated in
other languages, they are full of Hebrew idioms.37 Spinoza looks at
the Holy Scriptures as works that can only be understood within their
historical context; his philological analyses emphasize this approach,
although the latter also underlies them.38
This sensitivity is also characteristic of his political enquiries:
the discussions of the types of regimes and of the possibilities of
improving them are not based on a typological, ahistorical division,
but on observation of the regimes of concrete societiesin Holland39
and in Venice.40 This implies that political patterns are not abstract
examples, but are rooted within specific socio-historical contexts and
that they can only be understood by taking these necessary contexts
34

35
36
37
38
39
40

See Chapter 2, notes 28-29. See also the discussion in Raven, Tradition, p. 303, where
she claims that from the perspective of imagination, things appear to be contingent
and, therefore, historical. Thus, for her, imagination is a historical way of thinking,
contrary to the extra-temporal philosophical and scientific thought. See her discussion
of the positions expressed by De Deugd and Curley.
On this matter, see the next paragraph with its accompanying notes.
TTP, p. 101.
Ibid., p. 100.
Ibid., p. 102.
For example, TP, p. 376.
For example, TP, p. 357.
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------------------------------------- The Role of the Philosopher in His Society--------------------------------------

into account. These assumptions are all the more striking in his words
of caution on the limitations of the reform of a specific regime. In
his discussion on the monarchic regime, in the TP, he writes: I am
conceiving of that monarchy, which is instituted by a free multitude,
for which alone these foundations can serve. For a multitude that
has grown used to another form of dominion will not be able without
great danger of overthrow to pluck up the accepted foundations of the
dominion, and change its entire fabric.41 He makes a similar remark
in the TTP, where he claims that it is difficult to get rid of a despotic
ruler, since the people have become accustomed to this type of power
and authority.42 Through these warnings, it is clear that the ways of a
regime are rooted in the political culture that has come about as a result
of specific historical circumstances. One should not look at a regime
based on the character of the leader and his ways, but as a specific
historical, social and political entity. Whoever does not take this vital
context into consideration ignores the reasons for the existence of this
specific regime and his desire to reform it may result in undermining
the entire political authority.
In other words, Spinoza is sensitive to historical factors in his
discussions of politico-cultural phenomena. For this reason, he avoids
dictating useful meta-historical ideas. Although these claims are correct,
they do not exhaust the topic. What we have called here historical
sensitivity has a more essential place in Spinozas philosophy. In order
to outline the religious ideas that should be expropriated from the hands
of religious representativesideas which are important for preparing
the masses for political lifewe must abandon abstract principles and
look at concrete religious traditions and cultures. Whoever accepts
the concept of correctness (nekhonut) as a central axis of Spinozas
approach agrees to this; indeed, this concept points to the contents and
images that people absorb passively from their concrete surroundings.
These contents and images find a home in the consciousness of the
masses. The masses approval tends to reveal itself more through the
use of its contents rather than by the fact of noticing them. What
41
42

TP, p. 340.
TTP, p. 235.
164

---------------------- IV. The schematic nature of Spinozas political thought-----------------------

the masses absorb from their surroundings from hearsay is always


attached to a specific time and place. In other words, the Spinozian
enquiry into the question of culture provides a schema. From here
onwards, the discussion must be conducted within the framework of
a concrete society.
This conclusion, according to which the Spinozian enquiry must
end with the analysis of a concrete culture, reveals the dynamistic
nature of his thought. As we have claimed in this section, Spinozas
enquiry into questions of culture and politics, into the spiritual needs
of the masses and the ways to satisfy them, are geared towards the
articulation of the consciousness of the masses and their invigoration.
Its aim is to look at this consciousness from within, to explain and
express it and, based on these observations, to try to distinguish the
potential ways for improvement contained in it. Such an analysis has
a strongly dynamistic nature; it does not impose perfect models on
societies, but strives to create them from the forces that exist within
them. The designation of the force of action that is to be found within
the non-reflective consciousness is part of the analysis of the inside.
Anchoring this force of action within a concrete tradition of images is
part of this process.
Spinozas philosophy thus traces a schematic diagram for culturalpolitical questions. The political philosopher who follows Spinoza
is compelled to complete it with the data from his own society.
Two conclusions, which are only apparently contradictory, can be
derived from this. The first is that what we have called here political
secularism is a framework for the life of a collective that is based on a
sovereign political power as the main medium of rationalization. This
life relies on the existence of images and concepts that are rooted in the
spiritual life of the masses and which are maintained by its authority.
The schematic aspect of the Spinozian enquiry into these issuesthe
necessity to complete the schema through data provided by a concrete
contextdemonstrates that political secularism is, by its nature,
an unfinished product. It must be concretized in political and cultural
possibilities. In other words, the reasons why Spinoza refrains from
outlining meta-historical ideas are the same reasons for the constant
internal tension that accompanies the application of political secularism.
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------------------------------------- The Role of the Philosopher in His Society--------------------------------------

Political secularism is determined by the spiritual contents that derive


from specific traditions and which take place within concrete political
contexts, rather than by extra-temporal formulas or eternal values.
The second conclusion is that the Spinozian enquiry is only completed
when it is adapted to the particular circumstances in every concrete
society. Its schematic basis, however, is anchored in the revelation
of eternal data about consciousnessbe they ontic, epistemic,
psychological or political. This enquiry proposes a system of concepts
and methods of analysis for understanding societys consciousness, its
spiritual problems and its inherent instability. All this is anchored in
the structure of finite substance. In other words, the Spinozian enquiry
into political and cultural questions begins with the clarification of the
extra-temporal limitations of human consciousness and ends with a
kind of knock on the door: an enquiry into the life of a concrete society
and of the possibilities it contains.

166

----------------------------Chapter VI ----------------------------------

Traditionalism as a
Secular Option in Israel

--------------------------------------------------------I. The Healthy Judgment--------------------------------------------------------

The main claim in this chapter is that traditionalism is a secular option.


This claim is philosophical rather than historical; indeed, my intention is
not to clarify how the ensemble of the religious behavior that sociologists
and anthropologists call traditionalism is the reaction of a Jewish
public to the processes of secularization and modernization, which
penetrated their society and surroundings, particularly Muslim countries.
Moreover, I do not intend to focus on the religious characteristics of
traditionalism, as do researchers who attempt to understand it as a
religious phenomenon; those scholars concentrate on the weakening of
the orthodox patterns that characterize it, but do not relate to the sociopolitical platform that takes shape in the consciousness of the traditional
person. In this chapter, I will use the concepts introduced in Chapters 2
to 5 in order to clarify which of the secular options is included in this
platform. We will come to understand how traditionalism can strengthen
political life-forms and how it is connected to the rationalization and
intensification of social life.
As I have mentioned on a number of occasions, traditionalism
completes Spinozas analysis, whereas the latter strengthens the former
in the following ways. Through traditionalism, as it exists in Israeli
society, we may illustrate the patterns of a reformed religion, which is
free of the authority of religious leaders and provides a spiritual basis
for the adoption of a moral lifestyle within a given political society.
Some of the claims made here, particularly those concerning the source
of obedience, can be demonstrated though this model of traditionalism.
As we will explain later in this chapter, traditionalism is frequently
described as an arbitrary mixture; one of the supporting reasons for
this description is the absence of a philosophical articulation. Moshe
169

-----------------------------------Traditionalism as a Secular Option in Israel-----------------------------------

Shokeid claims that traditional Jews have not developed a consistent


system of rules of conduct or of philosophical justifications for this
mixed style of secularism and religiosity. In retrospect, they see
themselves as maintaining the tradition of their ancestors, which has
been adapted to their present life situation.1 Meir Bouzaglo describes
traditionalism as a practice searching for a worldview, and claims that
the absence of a worldview makes it easier to abandon traditionalism
in favor of other patterns.2 The aim of the discussion that follows here
below is to provide such an articulation.

I. Traditionalism in Israel
Nearly one third of the Jewish population of Israel describe themselves
as traditionalists

approximately half the Sephardic population


and one-fifth of the Ashkenazi population.3 In spite of these figures,
traditionalism is perceived as an unstable religious model, as a poorly
formulated and even illegitimate popular view, which evades the
decision as to whether to adopt secularism or cling to the logic of
orthodoxy.4 Traditionalists are presented as a marginal group within
Israeli spiritual creativity, since the main part of the Israeli culture is
generated by both orthodoxies, not by the middle group.5 Often, the
1

Shokeid, New Trends, p. 88.; Yadgar & Liebman, Beyond the Dichotomy, p. 347. There is
a rich literature on traditionalism, both in Israel and in the world. I rely here on the
studies of Yadgar & Liebman, Shokeid, and Bouzaglo, as they suffice for the needs
of this discussion. One particularly important piece of research is that of Shokeid &
Deshen, The Predicament of Homecoming, which, in its revised and enlarged edition,
comprises three new chapters. References to other research on traditionalism can be
found in Yadgar & Liebman, Beyond the Dichotomy, pp. 341-342, notes 10-12.
Bouzaglo, The New Traditionalist, p. 202, claims that due to its lack of articulation,
traditionalism is easily influenced by secularism or Ultra-Orthodoxy.
Yadgar & Liebman, Beyond the Dichotomy, p. 348, where they present the data from
the Guttman Report, according to which 51% of all Israeli citizens define themselves
as traditionalists, but only 19% of the Ashkenazic population do the same. It should
be noted that traditionalism among non-Ashkenazic Jews has been the object of far
more research than Ashkenazic traditionalism.
Bouzaglo, The New Traditionalist, p. 187; Yadgar & Liebman, Beyond the Dichotomy, p.
348.
Ravitzky, Tablets, p. 275: The greatest quantity and quality of Israeli creative
productionin literature, essays, religious commentaries, arts, or public opinion
170

--------------------------------------------------------I. Traditionalism in Israel--------------------------------------------------------

traditionalists are depicted as holding primitive customs characteristic


of traditional society and foreign to modern society.6
In recent years, anthropologists, sociologists and philosophers have
published studies on traditionalism in Israeli society.7 This change,
according to Shokeid, reflects a new evaluation of this phenomenon,
following a period in which it was ignored and scorned.8 This higher
estimation is attested to not only by the intense research taking place,
but, first and foremost, from the analysis of the phenomenon and the
raising of the possibilities inherent in it. Shokeid himself claims that
Oriental traditionalism could become the most influential option in
Israeli secular culture.9 Charles Liebman and Yaacov Yadgar and, in
other ways, Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, characterize traditionalism as
an outstanding expression of modernity, rather than its victim or as a
useless survivor of pre-modern times.10
The most striking characteristic of the traditionalists way of life
is his selective adoption of religious models. Traditionalists strictly
observe a number of commandments but refrain from performing
other commandments that are anchored in religious prohibitions.
The traditionalist may abstain from lighting fire on the Sabbath, but
drive his car on that day. He may keep kosherby avoiding eating
meat and dairy products togetherwhile using the same plates and
cutlery for both. This selectivity, or the fact that the religious lifestyle
of the traditional person is based on compartmentalization, is clearly
expressed in the wearing of the yarmulke: the traditionalist makes a
point of wearing a yarmulke on special occasions, but only for a limited
time. Yadgar and Liebman view this as the expression of the temporary
acceptance of a religious lifestyle on the part of the traditional
person: The symbolic significance of the yarmulke is, therefore, a
key component of the traditionalist tendency to compartmentalize

7
8
9
10

piecesclearly derives from both orthodoxies, rather than from the middle groups.
For a clear example of the distinction between traditional society and modern society,
see Katz, Traditional Society.
See references in Yadgar & Liebman, Beyond the Dichotomy, p. 341, note 10.
Shokeid, New Trends.
Shokeid, Religiosity, p. 237.
Yadgar & Liebman, Beyond the Dichotomy, p. 346. Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities.
171

-----------------------------------Traditionalism as a Secular Option in Israel-----------------------------------

Jewish religion, to limit what is holy and to distinguish it from the


profane.11 This compartmentalization, they explain, stems from the
main difference between traditionalism and orthodoxy: Religious
demands are always perceived as absolute, but not for me; in other
words, the traditionalist accepts the principlethe same principle
represented and incarnated by the Orthodoxbut this principle is
correct in principle, de jure, in the general and abstract domain; the
de facto, on the other hand, is fulfilled in the private realm, where
religious demands lose their absolute nature and are placed into a
system of relative weights of values, positions and habits, which are
not always consistent.12
The difference between the traditional and the orthodox is
formulated here as the difference between totality, coherence and
generality, on the one hand, and incoherent selectivity, anchored in
the private realm, on the other hand. Bouzaglo presents the difference
between the traditionalist and the Orthodox person in slightly different
terms. His main claim has to do with the total validity of the halakha
and of the rabbis authority in this matter:
The traditional person does not consider himself less Jewish or more
Jewish if he follows this or that rabbi on these issues, or if he appropriates
some issue from the rabbis and sees it as a private matter for each citizen
to decide. This last claim shows that the traditionalist stands against the
position of the halakha as all-encompassing; he may also expand this
claim and stipulate not only that the halakha cannot rule on all issues,
but that Judaism as a whole has no compulsory and unequivocal say. He
thus expresses a position opposite to that of the ultra-orthodox, which
empowers the role of the rabbi and authorizes him to rule on issues
which the halakha does not explicitly engage, and present his followers
with the Torah view on specific issues.13

According to Bouzaglos description, the traditionalist differs from


the Ultra-Orthodox in his rejection of the total applicability of the
halakha and the authority of the rabbis. The fact that the traditionalist
11
12
13

Ibid., p. 352.
Ibid., p. 351.
Bouzaglo, The New Traditionalist, p. 194.
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does not submit to this authority does not mean that he rejects the
rabbis; he respects their rulings, and even feels inferior to them, but
he maintains his religious patterns, at least as long as he views himself
as a traditionalist. What is it, in Bouzaglos eyes, which enables this
independence of the traditionalist from the rabbis? Sometimes, the
traditionalist will not fulfill certain commandments out of weakness,
i.e. he does not perform certain commandments which he believes
should be fulfilled. Bouzaglo, however, views this weakness of the
will as only a partial explanation for the traditionalists behavior. In
his view, the decisions of traditionalism are not only an expression of
weakness, but also derive from the strength of the traditionalist 14he
has a nonessential view of the halakha; he does not grant it existence
in Platonic terms, i.e. independent of its acceptance by the public.
He believes that the halakha is determined here in Israel as deriving
from an equilibrium between those determining the halakha and those
who adopt it.15 He thus sees himself as an agent shaping his religious
lifestyle, rather than as accepting practices submissively in accordance
with rabbinical rulings. This is the basis for Bouzaglos claim that the
traditionalist is engaged in a process of democratization of Judaism
itself; his attitude toward the rabbis is one of respect, but also of
tension.16
To this, we should add several details. As Bouzaglo convincingly
states, the traditionalists choice is not necessarily determined by
difficultyit is harder, for example, to fast on Yom Kippur than not
to turn on the lights on Shabbat. In this case, the traditionalist makes
a point of fulfilling a difficult commandment, while exempting himself
from fulfilling an easier one.17 There are also certain norms that are only
maintained in specific contexts: Yadgar and Liebman indicate that some
commandments are only followed strictly within the home. Traditional
women guard the family purity laws, but not necessarily by behaving
or dressing modestly outside the home.18 This type of behavior is
14
15
16
17
18

Ibid., p. 199.
Ibid., p. 199.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 191.
Yadgar & Liebman, Beyond the Dichotomy, p. 350.
173

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understood only by explaining the logic of the traditionalists selectivity


as based on his own resources, rather than on those of the Orthodox
Jew. Only in this way is it possible to distinguish what guides his
behavior,rather than by observing his allegedly contradictory deviations
from orthodoxy. The main sphere in which traditionalism is expressed
is the intimate onethe family, the neighborhood and the synagogue
community.19 The adoption or rejection of a commandment is based on
what is commonly practiced in the traditionalists surroundings. Clearly,
the traditionalist woman will allow herself to behave in accordance
with her surroundings, without incurring the slightest contradiction.
In the same vein, it is clear that fulfillment of certain commandments
is based not on the difficulty in their performance, but rather on the
models that are commonly found in the local surroundings in which the
traditionalists behavior is shaped.
Focusing on the traditionalists close surroundings emphasizes his
independent religious identity. His religious sensibility is anchored in
fidelity to his ancestors ways, while adopting ideas and models that
are rooted in the home and in the centers of the communities. The
traditionalists religious models, ideas and actions originate, therefore,
within himself. The strength described by Bouzaglo, i.e. the shaping of a
halakhic life based on the decisions of simple believers, only represents
the tip of the iceberg; the traditionalists ability to shape his life, to
remain faithful to certain habits and customs, while adopting concepts
and ideas independently of the authority of religious virtuosi, should
be seen as a more important manifestation of this strength. In other
words, the religious lifestyle depends on the believers not only because
they recognize the fact that they have the power to shape it, but
primarily because the authority to shape their religious lifestyle lies
within the believers themselves.
From what we have claimed so far, we might conclude that
traditionalism is a religious lifestyle which has been reduced to
family-related patterns and to personal and home-related preferences.
However, it would be a mistake to describe it in those terms; in order to
19

Ibid., p. 344.

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understand the issue, we should dwell on the affinity between this type
of religiousness and moral behavior. Bouzaglo emphasizes the affinity
between traditionalism and ethics. He recalls Yeshayahu Leibowitzs
well-known position, according to which the morality of the biblical
commandments is not part of their essential nature. For Leibowitz,
the real justification for the command Love thy neighbor as thyself
lies in its apodosisFor I am the Lord. Bouzaglo goes on to claim
as follows: The traditional person is not prepared to live with this
splitit is impossible for an evil man who keeps all the commandments
to be a fully religious man. The traditionalist will emphasize that the
halakha itself calls for sensitivity to morality.20 Furthermore, the
moral requirements serve as a compass that helps develop the halakha
correctly.21 Yadgar and Liebman express a more cautious view, albeit
similar in its conclusions. They indicate that the interviewees who took
part in their research did not assimilate religiosity with morality or
humanity,22 although they did not see this as an essential point. One can
assume that it indicates their disappointment in the lack of integration
of morality and religion among the Orthodox. Traditionalists expect
the religious person to behave in a moral and human way. One can also
derive the link that exists in their consciousness between morals and
religious tradition from the traditionalists criticism of secularismit
appears to them to be a framework devoid of moral value.23
For the traditionalist, sensitivity to morals is deeply linked to a
religious lifestyle; the disappointment (with the Orthodox) expressed
by the interviewees in Yadgar and Liebmans research indicates
the extent of this sensitivity, a sensitivity anchored in the close
surroundings of the traditionalist; it does, however, extend beyond
these surroundings, since moral sensitivity necessarily has more
general validity. In other words, traditionalism cannot be reduced to
following certain habits and to home-related norms, since it attributes
moral judgment to religious content which, by its nature, is geared

20
21
22
23

Bouzaglo, The New Traditionalist, p. 191.


Ibid., p. 196.
Yadgar & Liebman, Beyond the Dichotomy, p. 353.
Ibid., p. 354.
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-----------------------------------Traditionalism as a Secular Option in Israel-----------------------------------

towards shaping behavior in general.


Until this point, we have presented traditionalism as described by
researchers or by those who strive to formulate it. These researchers are
Israeli sociologists whose claims are based on empirical data. They also
know traditionalists personally and from observation; based on their
analysis, we have drawn a portrait of the traditional person. Most of this
description is therefore based on factsdirect or statistical observation
of population groups. To this we should add a speculative investigation
aimed at solving two problems that arise from these descriptions.
First, Yadgar and Liebman have indentified compartmentalization as
an important characteristic of the traditionalist. Selection, which the
others write about, is similar to it; however, what is it that enables
this compartmentalization to take place? Clearly, the traditionalist
allocates a limited place in his life to religious ceremonies, without
oscillating between faith and atheism. What is it then, in his worldview
or in his sensitivity (one should not exaggerate the level of reflexivity
attributed to his position), that enables him to comfortably practice his
religion in such an aspectual way? Second, the religious feeling of the
traditionalist is linked to two contexts which are in tension: on the one
hand, his religious life relies on self-governing and on following what is
accepted in his immediate surroundingsthis is the local context; on
the other hand, for him, religion involves a moral sensitivity that, by
its nature, finds expression through normative and general demands.
What infuses the loyalty to family and community models with general
and generalized moral principles? How are religious models derived
from his intimate world, and how is a more general moral sensitivity
integrated into the religious life of the traditionalist? Do they share a
common origin in his religious world?
The answer to this must derive from the basic fact of religious
lifethe image of God within the traditionalists consciousness and in
its manifestations in the world.24 The gist of this lies in the fact that the
24

This answer was meant to account for the facts presented so far. It is of a speculative
nature since it must still be justified by the explanatory strength of its claims. The
limitations of this discussion makes it impossible to examine the empirical validity of
this answer, which might certainly be accomplished using research methods different
from those employed in this essay.
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traditionalists world is a more harmonious world that enables him to


sequester his religious patterns. Halakhas claim to totality is anchored
in the assumption that every action and every situation in the world can
be classified according to whether it expresses the will of God or fails
to fulfill it. In other words, the religious feeling of the Ultra-Orthodox
person is based on a deep opposition which expresses the halakhas
striving towards totalityeither he fulfills Gods will or he sins before
Him. It can be called religious feeling, since it is based on the perception
of the world as the sphere in which the will of God is expressed and on
the tension that stems from the possibilities contained in this world.
The world of the traditionalist is less tense. The claim according to which
the traditionalists world is more harmonious does not mean that there
are no distinctions or tensions, but that they are milder; the holy, the
secular, the halakha and the State are not absent from his world, but are
not so sharply opposed to one another.
This harmony actually describes how God is present in the world.
What is the nature of a God whose presence generates this type of
religious world? Clearly, this moderation, if we admit its presence,
testifies to the marginality of God in the traditionalists world. This
marginality is understood when we compare the traditionalist to
the Orthodox within Israeli society, or if we look at him from a
historical perspective. How does God become marginal? There are
two possibilities. One: the existence of the Divinity has been reduced
to certain specific aspects. He has become compartmentalized. More
than testifying to the fact that His image is changing, His marginality
testifies to the fact that His presence has been limited.25 Two: God
has become marginal because He has shrunk rather than been pushed
aside. He remains in the corner at the center of the room.26 This is
also expressed by the words the pale God which we used in describing
Spinozas cultural approach.
It is my view that the second possibility is a good reflection of the
traditionalists religious world. This explanation will help us understand
25

26

It seems to me that the term compartmentalization used by Yadgar & Liebman


comprises this assumption.
Based on a linguistic expression of Dov Sadan.
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-----------------------------------Traditionalism as a Secular Option in Israel-----------------------------------

how the characteristics of traditionalism combine to compose a


single life experience. It is only because what stands at the heart of
the traditionalists world is a reduced God, rather than one that has
been pushed aside, that the traditionalist can compartmentalize the
religious patterns without undergoing major emotional upheavals
or heartache. Mans actions are no longer examined by the Terrible
God; the tension between their consequences has been reduced. It
is for these reasons that the traditionalist no longer requires the
constant guidance of religious specialists and virtuosi; he can rely on
his own self-governance and adopt what is commonly accepted by his
surroundingshis religious world is less threatened and tense. The
same goes for moral sensitivitythe fact that Gods will is revealed
through the moral order of the world transforms him from a jealous
keeper to a pleasant and predictable metaphysical entity. God has been
reduced, but He remains in the center; therefore, the traditionalists
religious world is safer. No terrible God is likely to burst in; He exists
fully, albeit in a minor way. The traditionalist can, therefore express his
devotion to Him by adopting patterns drawn from his surroundings,
without requiring instructions from specialists; he may also exhibit
moral sensitivity and expect that this is the right order of things.
Whether or not we accept the explanation just suggested, the
moral issue does take on political meaning in the religious life of the
traditionalist. Moral sensitivity enables him to belong, as a religious
person, to the socio-political world surrounding him. Religious
practice, be it private or home-centered, is not the only focus for the
traditionalists expression of his Judaism. His life in the State of Israel
maintains his Jewish identity, not only through its national-religious
symbols; his moral sensitivity makes the life of the State and the
governing powers into a framework imbued with religious significance.
His full identification with the State of Israel does not imply a utopian
fulfillmentsubjecting it to the will of God or turning it into a
theocracy, as is the case in the tense world of the Ultra-Orthodox. The
State as a secular experience is not exterior to his religious life; whether
he is satisfied or disappointed, it is part of his religious lifenot only
due to the States religious symbols, but also based on his own moralreligious judgments.
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We should note that the possibility for the traditionalist to identify


with the State as a religious person involves his own self-activation. He
tends to identify with the State as the entity through which religious
contents and the moral life may find expression. This identification
derives from the presence of consciousness-related and cultural
dispositions, which enable the individual to deepen his belonging to
society and to the State. In the same way, they also have the potential
to nurture a spirit critical of the workings of power. The person holding
correct religious-moral ideasin the sense we gave to this word in
Chapter 4possesses a consciousness that is not only awakened but
even poised to act. A sense of truth and moral sensitivity necessarily
require a disposition to action. Hence, traditionalism is not a means
for adapting the masses to a seemingly external and foreign political
experience, but rather to prepare them to become an important entity
that shapes political life. These claims are, in fact, an example of what
we have stated at the end of Chapter 4, as deriving from the concept of
correctness (nekhonut).

II. Spinozian articulation and the


secular nature of traditionalism
What we have written in the preceding paragraphs indicates that the
main concept in the world of the traditionalist is close to the concept
of the pale God in the Spinozian view of culture. Thus, traditionalism
and the Spinozian view of culture share a common axis. We will now
examine the link between them in further detail, a link which is hinted at
in the title of this section in the term articulation. As we can see from
the way this term is used throughout the book, it has two meanings:
clarifying a phenomenon, uncovering its essence or gist and, as a result,
uncovering the relation between its various manifestations, which once
seemed accidental and independent from one another; and examining
the phenomenon on the basis of an abstract context (as, for example,
in the application of an epistemic-political analysis examination to
traditionalism). Through this type of analysis, the phenomenon is not
reduced to its empirical data; an analysis of its abstract foundations
enables us to distinguish the various possibilities it entails. Hence,
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articulation is not only the understanding of a phenomenon, but


also its expression; it is the understanding of the range of its possible
manifestations and the justification of some of them.
We will begin by looking at articulation in its first sense. Based on
what was described in the previous section, traditionalism in Israeli
society corresponds, in many ways, to the principles of the popular
religion which Spinoza introduces in the TTP. As we recall, in line with
the reading of Spinoza which we presented in the relevant chapters,
the authority of religious tradition is not limited to a group of religious
specialists, but is found, as a simple concept among believers in
general. It is borne by laypeople and part of an open tradition; it is not
anchored in complex textual interpretations but in the hearts of men.
Obedience derives, not from the masses surrender to the authority
of specialists, but from the non-reflective way in which religious ideas
are held within the consciousness of laymen. The authority of the
masses is expressed through their adoption of religious contents, in
accordance with the tendencies of their hearts, and through their own
power of action. More precisely, Spinozian analysis sheds light on the
link between the adoption of thought contents and the tendency to
use them; consequently, religious tradition can serve as a basis for the
liberation of the masses and for preparing them to live a political life,
as well as for stimulating and stabilizing them.
Traditionalism corresponds to the patterns of popular religion,
which Spinoza described in the TTP, in several ways. The religious
authority of the traditionalist is no longer in the hands of the religious
virtuoso; it is anchored in his habits and decisions. In this sense, his
religious life is more independent than that of the Orthodox believer
who follows the rabbis. This independence signifies the shaping of
thought and behavior within his close surroundingsthe family
and the communityand its presence as part of an open tradition.
Religious patterns are no longer imposed upon him through the decree
of specialists motivated by mysterious motives, but as a result of what
is known and familiar to him. Traditionalism is simple, just like
reformed religion. In any case, its selective patterns renounce most
of the nuances. Whoever adopts only a limited number of habits and
patterns does not require much religious tutoring and guidance; such
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--------II. Spinozian articulation and the secular nature of traditionalism--------

a person may suffice with some instructions, general contents and the
imitation of others. Traditionalism is thus simple both in its concrete
contents and on the level of ideas. Finally, the image of the God at the
heart of such religious life has undergone a process of rationalization.
It is easy to appease it by adopting a moral lifestyle and by performing
a limited number of practices.
From a philosophical point of view, the most interesting fact in the
similarity between traditionalism and the soft religion described in
the TTP is linked to the power attributed to the traditionalist. As we
recall, Bouzaglo wrote about this in his claim that traditionalism is a
process of democratization within Judaism, and that the choices of
the traditionalist should be understood as an expression of strength
rather than weakness of will. What exactly is this strength? Where does
it originate? Clearly, it does not arise from the traditionalists deep
knowledge of religious contents. Yadgar characterizes the awareness of
the traditionalists in opposition to idolaters of the text, recalling the
opposition between reflexivity and the acceptance of what is correct.27
They indicate that the texts and symbols that are important for the
traditionalists convey to them a system of faith, but that this system
tends to be mythical rather than rational and ideological.28 In other
words, the traditionalist adopts his patterns out of habit, and as an
expression of respect rather than out of any deep understanding of
their religious contents.
Based on the discussion in the sixth section of Chapter 4
(Invigorating the life of the masses and the spirit of obedience), we
can explain how the traditionalists reliance on what is correct is the
source of his self-activity and, in fact, of his power. The description of
the traditionalists acceptance of religious contents, using the term
nachon (correct/ready) is, in a way, a shortcut. This term designates
both the traditionalists sense of truth and the key concept derived
from the Spinozian approach which we have presented; I refer to the
link between both the two meanings of nachona relatively passive
acceptance of a guiding idea, on the one hand, and the approval of
27
28

Yadgar & Liebman, Beyond the Dichotomy, p. 345.


Ibid., p. 347.
181

-----------------------------------Traditionalism as a Secular Option in Israel-----------------------------------

that idea by making use of the commands it transmits, on the other.


The fact that the traditionalist has the power to determine his own
behavior stems from the non-reflective nature of his consciousness.
The epistemic status and the readiness to act that are included in
the term nachon are the keys towards understanding the power of
the traditionalist. His popular sense of truth enables him to adopt
commands and to adjust to a moral lifestyle. Thus, the independence of
the traditionalist from rabbinical authority does not leave him feeling
lost and disoriented, but further embeds his patterns of behavior in
his own authority over himself.
Those who agree with these claims also recognize the value of
the Spinozian analysis as an explanation for the consciousness of the
traditionalist, insofar as it is able to present it in a coherent way. As we
recall, the traditionalist was characterized by a selective lifestyle and
independence from the authority of the rabbis, on the one hand, and
a popular and superficial knowledge of religious contents, on the other
hand. These two characteristics seem to clash with one anotherindeed,
the strengthening of authority is contingent upon the status of the
consciousness of the person bearing the authority. On what basis
does the traditionalist, as a person relying on his own non-reflective
consciousness, release himself from the authority of the specialist? The
answer to this is found in the Spinozian analysis of obedience. Following
a guiding idea and shaping ones life accordingly are not characteristic
of the consciousness of a helpless person whose independence would
surprise us. Rather, this assertiveness is anchored in the force of action
of non-reflective affirmation. Religious self-authority, choice, and
democratization are thus intertwined; they are part of one and the same
experience of life, which stems from an active popular consciousness.
The Spinozian analysis sheds light on this, and as such, should be seen
as an articulation of traditionalist consciousness.
One important detail in attempting to understand the link between
traditionalism and reformed religion concerns moral sensitivity. In
the eyes of the traditionalist, religious contents carry moral claims.
In other words, the traditionalist believes that Divine Providence is
based on a moral order. At the end of the previous section, we already
indicated that the image of the reduced Divinity gives rise to aspects of
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--------II. Spinozian articulation and the secular nature of traditionalism--------

traditionalism that can easily be perceived as contradictory: a loyalty


to patterns that take shape at the local level (within the family or the
community) and the moral sensitivity which the traditionalist finds
in religious life. As we recall, these appearances stem from the image
of the pale God. His paleness enables the traditionalist to liberate
himself from the need of help from religious specialists; it also enables
him to easily compartmentalize his religious contents, since in the
harmonious world of the traditionalist, various situations are not
sharply distinguished from one another. Gods paleness is also apparent
insofar as He becomes a background figure identical with a system of
desired instructions; hence, a morally-infused routine can be a key
component in placating God.
Seemingly opposite appearancespartial practices, moral sensitivities, self-governing, popular consciousness and democratizationbecome elements of a single life experience when we come to see them as
deriving from a non-reflective consciousness and from the image of a
pale God, which that consciousness contains. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, articulation can go beyond the coherent description of its object and express it by indicating its importance and drawing
out the possibilities it entails. The first thing to be mentioned in this
context is that the moral sensitivity that is part of a moral religious
life has the same effect as that of the reformed religion. A believer who
adopts the image of a God who acts within a framework of moral and
religious instructions, rather than that of a hidden and capricious entity,
can belong to his surroundings as a religious person. What I wrote in
Chapter 3 about liberating oneself from an imaginary and meta-finite
status is also valid for the traditionalist. In that chapter, I wrote that
the believer in a revelatory religion imagines himself as standing before
a transcendental God; in doing so, he extracts himself from the chain
of causes of finite beings and transcends his status as a finite being. He
assumes the false status of a meta-finite individual. This delusion determines the ontic situation of the individual, who is alienated from the
world, including his own social world. The establishment of a pale God
overcomes this delusion, as this background figure can introduce order
into the world. The believer can use it in order to determine the nature
of his belonging. The moral routine that is projected by such a Divinity
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-----------------------------------Traditionalism as a Secular Option in Israel-----------------------------------

does not enclose the believer in a separate cell along with the transcendental being; it situates him in some order. Consequently, traditionalism, as a form of reformed religion, can serve as a fertile ground for
political life: it comprises moral regulation; it places the believer within
the world; it awakens all this by stimulating the believer as a figure of
authority; finally, this person is an agent of change rather than a mindless follower of commands.
Spinozian analysis, which reveals the sources of the strength of
reformed religion, also highlights its political importance. Continuing
along this track, we may come to understand the sources of the
strength of traditionalism and its political importance in Israel. What
we claimed in Chapter 4 about the political role of reformed religion
forms the basis for this, and we will now reiterate some of the main
points. One key concept for understanding the role of religion is
expressed through the phrases sovereign spirit or one spirit, so to
speak (una veluti mens), which appear mainly in the TP and, to a
lesser extent, in the Ethics. More than explaining what he refers to
when using the word spirit, Spinoza makes a point of referring to it
as one spirit. What this phrase refers to is that the unity of people
depends not only on the establishment of a shared legal system; it
must also rely on the masses readiness to obey the law. Spinozas
political analysis underlines the necessity for this readiness; indeed,
citizens represent a greater danger for the stability of the ruling power
than do the enemies of the state. The danger that characterizes the
masses becomes clear when the mentality that characterizes them
is revealed (as described in Chapter 3). When attempting to reduce
this danger, one must take its reasons into consideration. Therefore,
bringing people together calls for more than a common legal basisit
calls for nurturing the readiness to obey, based on the mentality of the
masses. This is partly achieved by allocating rewards and punishments,
holding back threats and nurturing hope. It is also partly achieved
through the agency of common ideas that make up one spiritwe
are referring to norms, moral sensibility and common images, which
lead men to obey the rational law that comes to govern their lives.
The shaping of the behavior of the masses by the ruling power must
therefore be based upon images and concepts that are rooted in their
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--------II. Spinozian articulation and the secular nature of traditionalism--------

consciousness and which stimulate them towards action. Religious


tradition is a fertile ground for the development of such images.
Another claim which we have already discussed and which is
relevant to our discussion is the following: in Spinozian ontology,
the existence of society and of the nation as individuals demands
explanation.29 By singular things I understand things that are finite
and have a determinate existence. And if a number of individuals so
concur in one action that together they are all the cause of one effect,
I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing.30 Applying
this dynamistic definition (which is well suited to Spinozas thought)
to a group of men emphasizes the fact that the individuation of a
society is not based on formal-statistical data. The individuals ontic
meaning depends on his force of action, on his ability to serve as the
cause of some outcome. If a society is the cause of some outcome, it
is an individual entity; it is an individual in accordance with its causal
force. The status of society as an individual is not given to it a priori,
outside the realm of its concrete life; thus, the readiness of a society
to act jointly and to obey the law is an issue that concerns its very
being. This readiness is not only necessary for the consolidation of
society (as though its existence is guaranteed a priori and there only
remains the question of its consolidation), but also in order that it
exist as an individual entity. The religious concepts and images that
awaken every man to obedience form the crucial basis for a common
force of action. The presence of a tradition of such common images is,
therefore, necessary for the individuation of society itself, and not only
to guarantee its proper functioning.
Spinozian analysis sheds light on the force of action granted as a
result of the adoption of traditional religious images, and it clarifies the
political function of these images; it has the ability to do so because of
its comprehensive nature. Spinozas political approach is anchored in
an epistemological-ontological analysis. The concepts that clarify the
way tradition is rooted, and the level of activity involved in the passive
adoption of religious images, are the key to explaining why this tradition
29
30

TTP, p. 225. See Chapter 4, note 49.


E 2d7.
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-----------------------------------Traditionalism as a Secular Option in Israel-----------------------------------

is necessary for the consolidation of political power. In other words, the


analysis of the chronic instability of the masses provides the key for
understanding the value of religious images that are rooted within the
life of society, as well as their potential role in stabilizing and improving
society through the medium of politics. The value of religious images
and the conditions for political sovereignty, the meaning of religious
tradition and its role in political lifeall become clear through this
system of epistemological-ontological concepts, according to which
traditionalism is perceived as an option for Israeli secularism.
We can also present the above as follows: in Spinozian analysis,
the term secularism is attributed a certain meaning; it refers to the
improvement and stimulation of social life. This takes place by shaping
the lives of the masses within the framework of a sovereignty that is
as rational as possible. The softening of religious tradition found in
Spinozas writings is part of this endeavor; it is not limited to neutralizing
religion and undermining the position of religious virtuosos,it uses
the religious images in order to generate the conditions necessary for
political life: unity, nurturing the spirit of obedience and encouraging
the masses. Therefore, and contrary to the other models of secularism
we reviewed in Chapter 1, Spinozian political secularism is generous
in its preservation of the religious significance of tradition. It does
not secularize the contents of religion, nor does it infuse them with
any alternative meaning, in order to appropriate them as a man-made
culture; rather, it carries out some slight modifications in order to link
these contents with the patterns of secular life. The moderate nature of
this political secularism should not deceive usits secularism is not
abolished by its preservation of religious contents. On the contrary,
these contents are the spiritual platform from which one may derive
one spirit, so to speak, to ground the establishment of political
authority, and deepen the existence of a society as a single thing (in
accordance with Spinozas ontology), which will lead to the activation
and rationalization of society.31 All of these illustrate the concept of
secularism, as per Spinozas approach outlined here.
31

We should mention here once more that activation remains a topic demanding an
ontological and political development that lies beyond the scope of this book.
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--------II. Spinozian articulation and the secular nature of traditionalism--------

What we have claimed so far comprises two important claims which


should be made explicit. First, traditionalism is an individual case of
Spinozas political secularismor perhaps, a concrete example of it.
This has been demonstrated in this section. Second, traditionalism and
political secularism fulfill the conditions for the definition of the term
secularism as was presented at the beginning of the book. They reflect
the modern ethos of man as one who shapes his life autonomously,
thereby setting it free from any transcendental authority; it rejects
religious tradition as a normative content whose interpretation is the
monopoly of religious specialists. To be sure, these measures appear
to be taken in secret. The rejection of the transcendental authority
is formulated as the anesthesization of the Divinity rather than as
opposition to it. The annulment of the status of the religious specialists
is not formulated as a polemic; rather, the religious leaders are shown
respect, but they no longer represent the source of authority. This
procedure, however, should not lead us to false conclusions as to its
nature: in political secularism in general, and in traditionalism in
particular, religion blends with other forms of life; it is not only more
pliant in submitting to earthly power, but it even contributes to the
strengthening of the latter.
It is important to remember that this secularism represents, first
and foremost, possibilities. Secularism, and the reformed religion in
general, can help establish a political framework; the stability and
qualities of that framework, however, depend on the ruling power.32
Moreover, the highly praised qualities of traditionalismstrengthening
moral sensitivity and imbuing belongingdepend on the extent and
the ways to which it is nurtured. What we have explained hereand in
the discussion on reformed religion in generalis the possible relation
between traditionalism and political life. Political secularism is not an
abstract web of ideas, but principles that are tested through concrete
experience and which, therefore, exist in permanent tension. In other
words, political secularism is not given as a complete view; rather, it
represents the nurturing of traditions and political models in light of
certain principles.
32

TP, p. 310-311.
187

-----------------------------------Traditionalism as a Secular Option in Israel-----------------------------------

What we have claimed so far has helped us understand the nature of


traditionalism through Spinozian analysis, and how traditionalism can
be perceived as an option of Israeli secularism. We have also clarified the
type of claim this iswhy it is a philosophical rather than an historical
claim. We did not discuss the conditions that led to the creation of
the religious models that are called traditional. Our interest lies in
the examination of the philosophical essence of traditionalism and
its possibilities; these can only been learned through a system of
epistemological-political concepts, which elucidates tradition in light
of the basic characteristics of the consciousness of the masses. This,
in fact, involves the understanding of the patterns of its passivity and
of its activity. In other words, it is not only the religious nature of
traditionalism that requires clarificationthis is the focus of analysis
of its researchersbut also its epistemic meaning and the political
possibilities it entails. Due to the great sensitivity of his thought to
the mental life of the masses, to their spiritual needs and to their role
in political life, Spinozas writings comprise tools for understanding
traditionalism from this perspective, tools which also enables us to
recognize its secular nature.

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COnclusion

As we described in Chapter 1, the motivation for the development of a


secular position in the framework of Spinozas cultural philosophy was
the weakness of the existing secular options. Given that the existing
solutions all lead to a dead end, and the fact that the repertoire of
current solutions has already been formulated in spiritual Zionist
thought, we attempted to formulate an additional option in the previous
four chapters. Based on that work, and returning to the starting point
of the book, we found that the weakness of the three options put forth
is far more profound than it seemed to us at first. In other words, the
relation between what was described in Chapter 1 and the traditionalist
option is far more complicated than presumed. Traditionalism, as
explained through the Spinozian philosophy of culture, is justified not
only because of the limitations of the other options; traditionalism also
critiques those other options, thus strengthening its claims.
There are two issues comprised within this critique. First, all the
approaches described in Chapter 1 share a similar image of modern
man as the authority for judging tradition; he does not accept tradition
passively, but becomes its masterhe makes his choices based on
his own judgment. In each of the secular options this is expressed
differently: the proponents of Judaism as a culture imbue religious
tradition with new meaning through historical and aesthetic categories.
The deniers of Judaism are convinced of its falsity, whereas spiritual
secularism rewrites it based on syntheses and selections drawn from
the spiritual traditions of other cultures. In each case, the emphasis is
on the autonomy of the individual who selects his symbols based on his
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own preferences and his own personal spiritual world.


The assumption that tradition is subordinate to man is part of
a larger assumption with respect to the nature of modern man: the
modern subject is presented as someone who constructs himself, or
at least as the bearer of an independent and active awareness. He does
not humbly accept the lifestyle or beliefs of his ancestors, without
first evaluating what their value is for himself. The claim that the
modern subject shapes himself and is an independent authority is,
to a great extent, a delusion. In the West, religious tradition has been
the target of critical attack for many generations. It is portrayed as
a consisting of false and conflicting images and as the basis for the
growth of exploitative, harmful and distorted religious authorities. In
this context, modern man can easily exercise his judgment with respect
to religious tradition or manifest his disgust towards it. In doing so,
he can rely on a solid tradition. But his relation towards religious
tradition does not attest to modern mans liberation from the basic
aspects of his traditional existence. Those aspects are anchored in the
passive aspects of his consciousness rather than his stance towards a
particular tradition, even if that tradition be a dominant one. The state
of awareness of modern man, like that of pre-modern man, results, first
and foremost, from his finite nature, which is not subject to historical
processes. In depicting himself, modern man relies too much on the
drama of religious tradition and the revolt against tradition, while
ignoring the passive and diffuse nature of his awareness.1
The epistemic state of the traditionalist person typifies critics of
the tradition as well; the same molds shaping the non-critical adoption
of tradition may be present among both. Both may accept contents,
beliefs and ways of life based on hearsay. The ways in which tradition
is held is a subject not developed in this book, but which may serve as
1

Certainly, the dichotomy between traditional society and modern society and the
understanding of the power of modern consciousness have already been severely
undermined. Eisenstadts concept of multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, multiple
modernities) is one such illustration. Nevertheless, the dichotomy between tradition
and modernity has substantial salience in the Israeli discourse on secularism. Some
of the ideas presented in Chapter 1those of Rotenstreich, Schweid, Brinker and
Yizharvehemently emphasize this dichotomy.
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the basis for further discussion. At one point, Spinoza mentions that
mans body is made up of several naturesin other words, he describes
it as a heterogeneous unit.2 This heterogeneityby virtue of the
relation among the attributestypifies the soul as well. Commentators
dealing with Spinozas thinking on consciousness overemphasize the
division into three levels (whose importance I do not deny). In doing
so, they ignore the concrete wealth assigned to mental life in Spinozas
conception. One hint at the heterogeneity mentioned here may explain
this wealth: the ideas, insofar as they are mental activities, insofar as
they are a multiplicity comprising the soul, do not bear a reflexivity
fixed in nature or intensity. The logical contents contained in each of
the mental activities known as ideas are not all approved in the same
manner or measurenot even for the philosopher. The reflexive aspect
of consciousness is thus a heterogeneous activity. These claims, which of
course need to be justified, also bear political and cultural significance.
More than being composed of a distinctive group of the passive masses,
human society is composed of mass manifestations of passivity. A
conclusion deriving from this is that the molds negatively attributed to
the traditional person indeed typify mans basic state of mind. Mans
essential passivity is the basis for his being traditional, i.e. a subject
who easily adopts external contents without approving them.3
In short, from a Spinozian point of view, the assumption of
the three secular options with respect to mans superiority over
traditionespecially over religious traditionis an act of hubris. The
fault in this assumptionas indicated by the Greek termis that man
forgets his human limitations. Whoever believes that modern man has
become lord over himself and his preferences ignores the limits of mans
consciousness that result from his being a finite being with limited
knowledge. By remembering these things, we may come to change the
inferior image that traditionalism bears in Israel, and perhaps not only
2
3

E 3p17s. See also Chapter 3, note 32.


Note how often academics use passive and impersonal forms of language. Appreciation
for someone is usually expressed through adjectives such as respected, admired,
worthy, etc. Even academics whose thinking is advanced adopt references and
positions, including positions on scientific matters, by assigning judgment to an
unspecified active agent. Is this not what Spinoza characterizes as from hearsay?
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in Israel. Tradition is understood as a system of beliefs and customs


characteristic of an uneducated public, whose relation to tradition is
typified by uncritical adoption.4 The Spinozian analysis teaches us that
uncritical adoption is not the sole property of the traditional person.
The potential latent in tradition, which has been preserved through an
uncritical attitude, is the most important element in the evaluation of
the traditional position, rather than the condemnationboth arrogant
and naveof the mere existence of uncritical positions like these.
Another matter included in the Spinozian critique of the approaches
presented in Chapter 1 is this: we closed the discussion there with the
claim that those approaches undermine the common element in Israeli
society. Thus, in spite of the efforts of the intellectuals who express
these views, and their attempts to devise formulas for the secular public
which will express their spiritual world, this public remains distanced
from its past and from the possibility of formulating a common
culture and identity. The significance of this weakness becomes clearer
in light of the Spinozian philosophy of culture. This was the gist of
what we advanced in Chapters 2 to 5. According to the Spinozian
positionbased on an ontological and epistemological analysisthe
difference between people is the basis for common life. Society, by
nature, tends to be in conflict. Its individuals and groups tend to
be absorbed with themselves and hate each other. This conflicted
multiplicity is the fact which needs to be repaired through political life.
This reform is not necessary in order to satisfy a hegemony external
to society. Successful unification of society is inseparable from its
activation and intensification. The possibility of developing a rational
collective life is linked to the overcoming of inherent tendencies of
enmity and fragmentation. It relies on the development of a common
spiritual platform for mass consciousness. An important source of such
a platform is religious tradition.
The criticism arising from Spinozas philosophy of culture applies
not only to the shared elements of the secularist option. It also casts
new light upon the main weakness inherent in each of them individually.
Those who take exception to Judaism strive for an Israeli society which
4

Yadgar & Liebman, Beyond the Dichotomy, p. 262.


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is limited to a political framework and whose identity is no longer


based on a religious tradition or on a national culture. In Chapter 1,
we explained that this demand offers Israeli society, whose traditional
tendencies are deeply-rooted, something foreign to it. Based on the
Spinozian analysis, we now see that this oversight is not only a result
of the lack of understanding of empirical facts, but also a consequence
of the lack of understanding of the roles played by such facts: the
possibility for a society to exist as a political society depends, to a great
extent, on the existence of a common spiritual platform in its members
consciousness. This claim has been justified in all the chapters in which
we discussed Spinozas thought.
The weakness of the position that takes exception to Judaism was
presented in Chapter 1 as an empirical matterthe willful ignorance
of the tendencies of Israeli society. We have now become aware of its
philosophical significancethe lack of consideration of the importance
of shared spiritual contents for the constitution of the political life
of a society. Spinozas philosophy of culture not only recommends
traditionalism and casts light on its secular nature, but also deepens
the criticism voiced in Chapter 1 by adding philosophical weight to the
claims we advanced at the end of the chapter. This is also true with
respect to the other secular options. As we remember, the proponents
of Judaism as a culture understand Judaism as a continuing national
creation and present its importance in aesthetic and historical
categories. In Chapter 1, we explained that this tendency voices a
paradoxit attempts to create a relation to the Jewish contents created
by the Jewish people but voids them of their religious significance.
It attempts to familiarize itself with something that it has uprooted
from its source. Consequently, it cannot offer Judaism as the shared
content of the Jewish immigrant society in Israel. For what is shared
by them are the religious images rather than the expressions that have
developed in the communities from which they came. Basic Jewish
symbols rather than liturgythis is what is common to Jewish Israelis.
Thus, the nullification of the significance of those symbols, by its very
nature, emphasizes difference and distance; these issues have already
been discussed in Chapter 1. The Spinozian analysis adds an additional
element. It is highly doubtful that the reformulation of Judaism as
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a national culture, devoid of religious content, can serve as heir to


the role played by shared Jewish tradition. As explained primarily in
Chapters 3 and 4, the utility of religious tradition is that it provides
a basis for the moral order in the world and that it has the potential
to attach the believer to his society. A properly moderated religious
tradition creates spiritual conditions similar to those that bring the
Spinozian sage to realize that his own good is inextricably related to
the good of his neighbor. Thus, the weakness of Judaism as a culture
is not only that it denies the religious content that forms the basis
of Judaism, but its abandonment of that content without providing
something that could serve as its replacement.
In spiritual secularism, the approach to the religious content
remains. It is the only one of the secular options that retains some of
its religious meaning (perhaps this is the reasons for its flourishing
in secular culture over the last two decades). Its main deficiency was
named in Chapter 1 as the unraveling of Judaism: Judaism is not
perceived as a collective content, but is part of a global and eclectic
reservoir of beliefs. The Spinozian analysis sheds light on several of
the disadvantages in the integration of such mystical contents. The
political significance of the particular religious tradition is insofar as
it provides a possible base for the formation of a single spirit, so to
speakthat normative basis rooted in images of a common deity,
imbued with law, who imposes a moral order upon the world. The
eclectic nature of the mystical culture of the New Age makes it an
atomizing force, heterogeneous in its sources, which reflects no general
order, and which only with difficulty can provide the basis for a shared
spirit. Furthermore, the cultural-political purpose of the Spinozian
analysis is to develop religious contents that can be fruitful for the
rationalization of society and the invigoration of the masses. Thus,
there is value in the transmission of spiritual contents in what is called
an open tradition. The possibility that they may be guarded by bearers
of secrets, who maintain their expertise in traditions that are closed,
secret or inborn, may lead to the rise of an authority that threatens
the political authority that fosters the rationalization of society. This
danger is to be expected among the experts of established religions, but
it may also arise on the part of those imagined as gifted with magical
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powers. The social and political status of various wonder workers


hints at this.
Spinozas philosophy of culture criticizes the options presented
in Chapter 1, while recommending traditionalism as a secular option
which may succeed where others have failed. It continues the Jewish
religious tradition in an organic fashion; instead of rewriting or erasing
it, it focuses on moderating it. This minor action is far deeper than
it seems at first, as its possible meaning is the establishment of the
spiritual conditions necessary for the creation of a collective which may
create its life based on a political authority.
If one accepts my argument so far, one should recognize an
additional advantage of traditionalism. Zionism is the politicization of
the Jewish peoplethe organization of Jews in a political framework;
this is the great accomplishment of the secularization of the Jews,
but for this to take place it was not necessary to uproot the Jewish
collective from its common religious traditions. It would have sufficed
to moderate them to fit political life. Unquestionably, there were good
historical reasons for the three options mentioned in Chapter 1, but
the reasons are not sufficient for the adoption of the modes of thought
generated by those reasons. Traditionalism is the secular option which
most closely corresponds with the process of secularization which
Zionism caused among the Jewish people. What was mentioned in
passing in Chapter 1the fact that the range of options in Zionist
thinking is identical to the common options in Israeli societynow
takes on new significance: the articulation of political secularism was
not made by Zionist leaders and intellectuals. But it is found in the
philosophy of a Jewish philosopher who lived at a distance from his
people.
Why then was this source ignored? Why did Zionist thinkers not
employ his thought to clarify the nature of secularism needed for
the politicization of the Jewish people? I cannot offer a full response
to these questions here. I will suffice with one answer of particular
relevance to our discussion: in order to appreciate the status of
Spinoza in Zionism and in Israeli culture, it must be studied in a
broader perspective, particularly in light of the influence of Nietzsches
philosophy as the source of influence for the formation of secular ideas
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in the West in general, and in Hebrew culture in particular. Nietzsches


critique of religion and the values he proposed for those who liberate
themselves from the lies of religious tradition lead to a particular mold
of secular life. Its characteristics are as follows. First: secularism is
liberation from the yoke of God. This liberation is unconditional. God
is dead. What remains is a sobered man who does not seek solace from
imagined metaphysical entities. He is, on the contrary, obligated to
shape his life according to new values. Second: secular life is at root
an individual existential mission. The rejection of the false religious
tradition and the uprooting of the false images of God is a struggle that
takes place in the soul of the individual. This individuality is attested to
quite clearly through the values that stand at the center of sober secular
life: authenticity and self-creation. The secular hero of Nietzsche - and
that of his philosophy as a wholeis the autonomous individual who
lives an authentic life anchored in his unique existence.
The Spinozian version of secularism is diametrically opposed to this
in each of the aforementioned aspects. First, it does not seek to remove
the image of God, but to moderate it and render the religious tradition
that attests to it more flexible. This is what we referred to here as the
pale God. In general, the Spinozian version of secularism does not
see religious tradition as a veil blinding the eyes. By nature, because of
its ontic structure, man adopts contents passively. He is always in the
midst of things, and this is reflected in his entire spiritual existence.
Second, secularism is not an individual matterit is a political project.
Its object is the masses and its means are the political authority which
tends, by its nature, to be rational.
These two models of secularism are opposed to one another. The
first is individualist and existentialist, revolutionary and atheistic; the
second is political, moderate and traditionalist. The hero of Nietzschean
philosophy is the autonomous individual seeking authentic life,
anchored in his unique existence and expressed with revolutionary
fervor. For Spinoza, manand the philosopher is no exceptionis a
traditional creature.
Frequently, the Nietzschean model obscures the Spinozian one.
Under the influence of Nietzschean thought, Spinoza scholars tend
to understand the object of their study as if his secular message were
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restricted to what we called, in Chapter 2, metaphysical secularism:


the shattering of the lies of religion and the proposal of a metaphysical
alternative for this distorted system of concepts. Thus, they also tend
to overemphasize the role of rhetorical strategems in his writingsas
if the relation between the first book of Ethics, the strong criticism of
the concepts of revealed religion, and the TTP is that between truth and
manipulation. In the four chapters here dealing with Spinoza, I proposed
an alternative view. Its main principles are: the relation between the
Ethics and Spinozas moves in the TTP is that between raw thought
and developed thought. The logical structure of the substance is not
determinant in evaluating the value of religious conceptions; it is merely
a system of concepts useful for understanding the nature of inferior
thought, i.e. imagination, and for appreciating its spiritual needs.
The dominance of Nietzsche resulted in a Nietzscheization of
Spinoza. Another important influence of Nietzsche may be found
among Zionist thinkers, particularly those of spiritual Zionism. These
thinkers understood secularization through a Nietzschean perspective,
even if they did not share Nietzsches anti-religious fervor. For them,
the world of religion was the world of their fathers. They never related
to their past with Nietzschean animosity and anger. Moreover, they
made great efforts to propose a new relation to their religious tradition.
But they completely abandoned the God of the Jews, and in doing so
submissively adopted Nietzsches conception. In other words, they
avoided any involvement with the problem of the death of God, but
uncritically accepted the news that indeed the God of the Jews was
dead. In place of this God, they established trans-human forces and
rewrote Judaism in its light. Ahad Haam based his analysis on the
national spirit; Gordon on cosmic life. Klatzkin and Brenner took
for granted the world without God.
The possibility of examining Judaism in light of a pale God never
occurred to these thinkers. The Nietzschean assumption of the death
of the God of the Jews blinded them. Thus, the pale God is not
one of their solutions, even though it fits the project they dedicated
themselves to so well. The Nietzschean assumption of the death of the
God of the Jews dominates not only the founders of the State of Israel,
but all the secular options we described in Chapter 1 as well. Thus, it is
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taken as self-understood that a secular person who wishes to be faithful


to Judaism must do so only after extricating from it the traditional
image of God. The rewriting of this God-image as national culture, its
understanding through historical and aesthetic categories, provide one
framework for redefining the meaning of Judaism. Another possibility
is defining it through an eclectic content which is no longer understood
as testimony to the will of the traditional God, but as a reservoir from
which man chooses and creates his own world based on Nietzschean
values such as self-creation and authenticity.
What we have argued so far is also related to the common claim of
scholars that traditionalism is antithetical to secularism. Scholars who
investigate traditionalism see it as a kind of religious behavior. They
often describe it against the background of the religious behavior of
Mizrachim, or see it as a third option which challenges the division
into religious and secular. The analysis of the epistemic-political
aspect that is part of traditionalism reveals that what seems to be the
weakening of religious contents is a possible base for political activism.
The concrete religious contents are understood differently if we analyze
their political and epistemic meaning. Only then do we see the processes
of simplification of religion and its transformation into a valuable
tradition for moral and political socialization. This philosophical
analysis enables us to liberate ourselves from the secular existentialist
pathos of Nietzschean thought and to recognize the power contained
in the moderation of religious tradition for the creation of a basis for
the development of secular ways of life. By investigating traditionalism
in light of the Spinozian articulation, we may reveal the deeper, muted
secularism inherent in it. This secularism takes place through rendering
the religious contents so prominent on the surface more malleable.
From all we have written, it becomes clear why traditionalism is
the best option for the development of a secular way of life, why it
is particularly adapted to the secularization process taking place in
Israel, and whyin spite of its great importanceit is not evident.
In this defense of traditionalism, I do not proclaim that the problem
of secularization has been solved. It has, however, been redefined: the
recognition of the importance of religious tradition and its potential
required that we respect is contents, just as this recognition requires
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that we always recognize its dangers. There is a constant risk that


strong spiritual authorities may develop, authorities which may conflict
with the political authority and foster disputes and even wars. The
containment of this development depends not only on the contents of
religion and its persons, but on the nature of political life. The reliance
on religious tradition is a risky move. Another problem is that reliance
on religion seems too dangerous in the context of Israeli society,
especially in the eyes of the secular public. The adoption of religious
values looks like a move whose bad end can be foreseen in advance. Any
turn to religion may easily be described with the images of theocracy,
the fragile identity of the secular person, and return in repentance to
Orthodox religious observance. But this image is, in no small measure,
the result of the attempt to remove all traditional religious elements
from Jewish culture. This tendency has, to some extent, impeded the
formulation of moderate traditional forms. In summary, religious
tradition is both essential and dangerous. This claim applies in general,
and to Israeli society in particular. These issues become so complicated
because religious tradition appears so dangerous; consequently, it
retains its dangerous, immoderate forms. We have a vicious circle.
The resolution of this tangled situation is the main challenge that
Spinozas philosophy of culture poses for Israeli society: the foundation
of traditionalism as a broad cultural option and the understanding of
its importance for a secularism oriented towards the establishment of
a political life as rational as possible.

199

----------------------------------------------------------------------Bibliorgaphy----------------------------------------------------------------------

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Morrison, History = J. Morrison, Spinoza and History, in: R. Kennington (ed.),
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204

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199-193 , ,
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Ruah-Midbar, Tarbu = : ,-
- , ,
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205

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,
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208

------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Index-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Index

Ahad Haam
12n2, 14, 14n5, 15, 27, 50-52, 197

The Treasury of Judaism
27
Amir, Aaron
29
Anaxagoras
146n8
Archimed
87, 122, 162
Aristotles

Metaphysics
57n10

Physics 57n10
authority
12, 14, 22, 23, 25, 34, 38, 42, 44, 45, 48, 63, 65, 84-86,
93-109, 111, 112-115, 117, 120-125, 128, 129, 135139, 143-147, 155-157, 160-162, 164, 165, 169, 172174, 180, 182, 184, 186, 187, 189, 190, 194-196, 199
Avneri, Uri
29
Ayali, Meir
17, 19, 21, 28
Bareli, Gilad
30, 35-37, 47, 52

On the secularized

study of Torah
35
Ben Gurion, David
27, 56
Ben Nahum, Daniel
21
Ben Shlomo, Yosef
62
Berdichevsky, Micha Yossef
12n2
Bergson, Henri
56n3
Bialik, Haim Nachman
12n2, 16
Bible
12, 18-20, 22, 42, 46, 47, 50, 65, 93, 98, 119, 123, 163
Borochov, Ber
21
Boundless happiness, a film on Spinoza 56
Bouzaglo, Meir
170, 172-175, 181
Brenner, Yosef Haim
14, 50, 52, 197

On a Vision of Conversion

to Christianity
50
209

------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Index------------------------------------------------------------------------------Brinker, Menachem


Buber, Martin

12n3, 15, 17, 22, 26, 28, 45, 190n1


56

Cohen, Hermann
culture

Curley, E.

56
9, 10, 12-32, 38, 42, 45-52, 55, 56, 60, 61, 94, 110,
115, 117, 123, 139, 146, 157, 164, 165, 170, 171,
179, 186, 189, 192-196, 198, 199
163n34

Dan, Josef
De Deugd, C.
definition of secularism
Descartes

Discourse on the Method

17
72, 163n34
3
61, 62, 74, 74n25
61

egocentric
Einstein, Albert
Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah
Elam, Yigal

The End of Judaism
Evron, Boaz

79, 101, 121, 152


56n3
171, 190n1
30, 35
35
29, 30, 52,

freedom
Frege, F. L. G.
Freud, Sigmund
Funkenstein, Amos

17, 33, 84, 93, 99, 116, 117, 124, 136, 146, 147, 149,
152, 157, 159
36
56n3
17

Gaon, Saadia
Geertz, Clifford
Gordon, Aaron David
Gotchkov, K.

Uriel DAcosta

71n11
111, 112
13, 14, 51, 52, 197
57n11
57n11

Hebrew Encyclopedia
Hebrew language
Hegel, G. W. F.
Heine, Heinrich
Hess, Moses

Rome and Jerusalem
Hesse, Herman

27
25, 28, 31, 58-61, 113, 118n68, 163
57n10
56n3,
56
57n10
41
210

------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Index------------------------------------------------------------------------------Hlderlin, Friedrich


Horon, Adia
Hume

Treatise of Human Nature

41
29
82
57n10

idea

immanence
irrational

9, 11-13, 23-27, 30, 39, 42, 43, 45-47, 52, 55-57, 59,
62, 64, 70-76, 79-83, 85-87, 93, 95, 102, 104, 109,
110, 114, 117, 123, 134-137, 145, 147-150, 152-154,
160-165, 174, 179-182, 184, 187, 190, 191, 195
20, 63, 66, 67, 69-72, 74-76, 78, 79-89, 93, 95, 100,
101, 116, 123, 126, 128, 132, 135, 148-155, 157,
163, 197
4, 88
82, 117

Jabotinsky, Zeev

12n2

Kant, I.
Kaplan, Mordechai
Karelitz, Yeshaya
Katzenelson, Berl
Klatzkin, Yaakov
Klausner, Joseph
Krochmal, Abraham
Krochmal, Nachman
Kurzweil, Baruch

Our New Literature

Continuity or Revolution?

55, 132n102
12n2
27
12n2
14, 28, 29, 37, 50, 52, 56-60, 197
56, 57n11
56
56
10;

language

25, 31, 35, 36, 42, 102, 60, 110n49, 113, 114, 118,
150, 151, 163, 191n3
30, 37, 52, 175
20
56
56
30, 31, 171, 173, 175, 176; Culture War 30
56, 58

imagination

Leibovitz, Yeshayahu
Lenin, V.
Letteris, Meir
Levinas, Emmanuel
Liebman, Charles
Luzzatto, Samuel David

10

Maimon, Solomon
56
Maimonidess Guide to the Perplexed 57n10
Marx, Karl
21
211

------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Index------------------------------------------------------------------------------McShea, R.
Mendelssohn, Moses
meta-finite
metaphysical secularism
Mill, J. S.
myth

104n31
56
88, 122, 161, 183
64, 65, 96, 105, 146, 149, 157,-160, 197
55
30, 60

Nachman of Breslov
39, 42, 46
nation
12, 19, 23, 25, 27, 29, 32, 33, 37, 80, 110, 185
nekhonut
135, 145, 159, 164, 179
New Age
38, 43, 194
New Jewish Time (Zman Yehudi Hadash) 26, 27
Nietzsche, Friedrich
40, 41, 42, 55n1, 85, 132n102, 195, 196, 197, 198
Ofir, Adi

The Work for the Present
Ornan, Uzi
Oz, Amos

30-33, 35, 37, 47, 52


31
29-30
15, 24-26

pale god
Pascal, B.
Plato

The Phaedrus

The Republic

Symposium
political secularism

3, 177, 179, 183, 196, 197


42
63, 64, 70n3, 75n31, 173
71n13
63, 64
57n10
65, 96, 103, 105, 106, 108, 110, 111, 122, 123, 138,
139, 147, 159, 160, 165, 166, 186, 187, 195

Rabi, Yakov
Rabin, Yitzhak
Ram, Uri
Ratosh, YoNathan
reflexivity
Rosenzweig, Franz
Rotenstreich, Nathan

On Jewish Existence

at the Present Time
Rousseau, J. J.
Rubin, Shlomo

The Ethics
Russell

17, 28
31
33-35, 37, 38
29
76, 145, 176, 181, 191
58
10, 12n3, 22-24, 26, 28, 46, 190n1;
10, 22
55
57, 57n11, 58-60
57n11
36
212

------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Index------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sadeh, Pinhas



Aneni

Life as a Parable

Masa Dumah
Samet, Gideon
Schechter, Oded
Schechter, Yosef

The Phylacteries from

a symbolic Point of View
Schweid, Eliezer

Judaism and Secular Culture
secularism

13, 39-42; 45, 48, 51, 52


41
39
39
31
58, 60
13, 42-45, 48, 51

theology
tradition

143-147
10, 12-15, 17-24, 26, 28-31, 37-39, 41, 42, 45, 47-49,
52, 57n11, 58, 59, 61, 62, 65, 66, 75, 94, 96, 104,

44
21, 22, 24, 28, 51n71, 190n1
21
10-13, 27, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 45, 47-50, 55, 5961, 64, 65, 96, 103, 105, 106, 111, 122, 123, 138,
139,146-149, 157-160, 165, 166, 170, 175, 186-189,
190n1, 194-199
secularizing 143
Shapira, Avraham
51n71
Shlonsky, Avraham
20, 21, 26, 29
Shohat, Orit
31
Shokeid, Moshe
169-171
Socrates
146
Sokolov, Nachum
56
Spinozas

Ethics
57-60, 63, 64, 69, 70, 73, 73n23, 75-78, 78n41,
84n65, 86, 86n67, 88, 93, 94, 99, 107, 110, 122,
125, 148n13, 149, 151, 155, 184, 197

Grammar of the Hebrew Language 57n11

Political Treatise
63, 78n63, 86, 94n3, 99, 100, 102, 123, 124, 135,
136, 164, 184

Short Article on God, Man

and his Happiness
69

Theological-Political Treatise
56, 63; 72, 84n65, 93, 94, 97, 99, 101n23, 102, 107, 123,
133, 146, 147, 153, 154, 159, 161, 164, 180, 181, 197

Treatise on the Improvement

of Understanding
61, 61n23, 62, 69, 71, 72, 75-77, 125, 130, 155
Strauss, Leo
56, 56n2, 146n8
subjectivity
73

213

------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Index-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tzaban, Yair

106, 110-119, 122, 123, 125, 128, 138, 146, 151,


157-160, 162, 164-166, 170, 175, 180, 185-199
12-14, 38, 42, 48, 51, 59, 88, 89, 108, 113, 155, 183,
184, 187
10, 11, 41, 48-50, 73, 74, 80, 88, 113, 118, 133n105,
135, 144, 145, 148, 149, 151-154, 159, 193
27

Weiler, Gershon
Wittgenstein, L.

30, 34, 35, 37, 38, 52, 56


114n60

Yadgar, Yaacov
Yehoshua, A. B.
Yizhar, S.

The courage to be secular
Yovel, Yermiyahu

171, 173, 175, 176, 181


15, 25, 26, 46
17, 22, 190n1
17
57, 58, 59, 60, 84n65

Zeitlin, Aaron
Zionism

56
13-15, 25, 31, 47, 50,-52, 56, 60, 195, 197

transcendence
true

214

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