4-MANRESA 2008 1

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

1. BALACUIT VS CFI
Facts: At issue in the petition for review before Us is the validity and
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the
City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, the title and text of which are reproduced
below
ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY
OR CORPORATION ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF SELLING
ADMISSION TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS,
GAMES, CONTESTS OR OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE
CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO
PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT
SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE SAID TICKET
Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel
managers of the theaters and they attack the validity and constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid
exercise of police power.
Issue:
Does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of
prices of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement whether
under its general grant of power or under the general welfare clause as
invoked by the City?
Ruling:
No, the power to regulate and fix the amount of license fees for theaters and
other places of amusement has been expressly granted to the City of Butuan
under its charter.
However, the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public
interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public
interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes
and means.
The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on
the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the
admission of their children. A reduction in the price of admission would mean
corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones
made to bear the cost of these savings.
The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings
but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it.
The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable
practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth
certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children.
This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is
clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of
petitioners.
Further, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the
promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
Furthermore, there is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both
children and adults. The petitioners are merely conducting their legitimate
businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur is to make a profit out
of his venture. In fact, no person is under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It
is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to
such performances
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of
petitioners WHEREFORE, a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring
Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. (Sol Andoy)

2. DEL ROSARIO VS. BENGZON

Facts:
Class suit filed by the officers of Philippine Medical Association, wherein they
asked the SC to declare as unconstitutional some provisons of Generics Act
of 1988 and its implementing order AO No. 62.
(for purposes of this case digest, the full text of the law is omitted but can be
found in the ruling)
The petitioner's main argument against paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 6 of
the law, is the alleged unequal treatment of government physicians, dentists,
and veterinarians, on one hand, and those in private practice on the other
hand, in the manner of prescribing generic drugs, for, while the former are
allegedly required to use only generic terminology in their prescriptions, the
latter may write the brand name of the drug in parenthesis below the generic
name. The favored treatment of private doctors, dentists and veterinarians
under the law is allegedly a specie of invalid class legislation.
Ruling:
1. There is no merit in that argument for it proceeds from a misreading and
misinterpretation of the letter and intent of paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 6
of the Generics Act. Indeed, as explained by the public respondent:
"x x x while paragraph (a) enumerates the government transactions
('purchasing, prescribing, dispensing and administering of drugs and
medicines') where the sole use of generic terminology has been required, the
'prescription' of drugs is further governed by paragraph (b). And the use of
the word 'all' in the latter provision emphasizes the absence of any distinction
between government and private physicians. In other words, in prescribing
drugs, physicians, whether in government service or in private practice, are
both governed by exactly the same rules, and thus, are both authorized to
include the brand name in their respective prescriptions."
2. Furthermore, it may be observed that while paragraph (a) refers to "all
government health agencies, and their personnel as well as other
government agencies" (not necessarily physicians, dentists and
veterinarians), paragraph (b) refers to "all medical, dental and veterinary
practitioners, including private practitioners."
3. The public respondent points out that the institution of generics in the
Philippines will compel physicians to prescribe drugs based on their
therapeutic or "active ingredient," instead of their well-known brand names.
Multiple medications which may produce potentially adverse, even lethal,
chemical reations in the patient will thereby be avoided. Patients with limited
means will be able to buy generic drugs that cost less but possess the same
active ingredients, dosage form, and strength as brand names, many of
which are priced beyond the reach of the common too because the high
costs of advertising, packaging, royalties, and other inputs of production
determine their pricing for the market.
4. The Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the
Generics Act. It, on the contrary, implements the constitutional mandate for
the State "to protect and promote the right to health of the people" and "to
make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost"
5. The prohibition against the use by doctors of "no substitution" and/or
words of similar import in their prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent
the circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to choose
between the brand name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is
allowed to write both the generic and the brand name in his prescription
form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a brand-name drug with "no
substitution," the patient's option to buy a lower-priced, but equally effective,
generic equivalent would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to benefit the
impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the population in a still developing
country like ours, not the affluent and generally healthy minority.
6. There is no merit in the petitioners' theory that the Generics Act impairs
the obligation of contract between a physician and his patient, for no contract
ever results from a consultation between patient and physician. A doctor may
take in or refuse a patient, just as the patient may take or refuse the doctor's
advice or prescription. As aptly observed by the public respondent, no doctor
has ever filed an action for breach of contract against a patient who refused
to take prescribed medication, undergo surgery, or follow a recommended
course treatment by his doctor . In any event, no private contract between
doctor and patient may be allowed to override the power of the State to
enact laws that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good
order, comfort, or general welfare of the community. This power can neither

4-MANRESA 2008 2
be abdicated nor bargained away. All contractual and property rights are held
subject to a fair exercise
7. Petitioners have also assailed Section 12, paragraphs b, c and d, of the
Generics Act prescribing graduated penalties for violations of its provisions.
Petitioners' allegation that these penalties violate the constitutional
guarantee against excessive fines and cruel and degrading punishment, has
no merit. Penal sanctions are indispensable if the law is to be obeyed. They
are the "teeth" of the law. Without them, the law would be toothless, not
worth the paper it is printed on, for physicians, dentists and veterinarians
may freely ignore its prescriptions and prohibitions. The penalty of
suspension or cancellation of the physician's license is neither cruel,
inhuman, or degrading. It is no different from the penalty of suspension or
disbarment that this Court inflicts on lawyers and judges who misbehave or
violate the laws and the Codes of Professional and Judicial Conduct.
3. YNOT VS. IAC
FACTS. RESTITUTO YNOT (petitioner) challenges the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 626-A (Oct. 25, 1980 enacted by Pres. Marcos in the
exercise of his legislative power). The said EO prohibits the transportation of
carabao and carabeef from one province to another. Any violation of the said
EO will amount to a confiscation of the carabao and carabeef by the
government.
YNOT had transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13,
1984. The carabao was confiscated by the police station commander, without
giving YNOT any chance to be heard. It was only returned when he had
given a superdedeas bond. Hence, the police confiscated his carabaos.
YNOT argued that the EO is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef. His claim is that the penalty is
invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard
before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.

reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have
been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all
the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
To sum up then, SC held that:
1. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive.
2. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated
is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on
judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. (Aisa Maunting)
4. CORONA VS. HARBOR PILOTS
FACTS:
Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of
pilots and the pilotage profession, the PPA through PPA General Manager
Rogelio Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92. Providing therein that "all existing
regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the
Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992
only" and that "all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage
districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of
effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after
conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance."

ISSUE. WON YNOT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the PPA violated the respondents' right to exercise their
profession and their right to due process of law in issuing PPA-AO No. 04-92,
limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly
renewal or cancellation.

RULING. YES, Ynot was denied due process.

HELD:

There is substantive due process, when the following requisites are

complied:
1. Lawful subject - it must appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
such interference; and
2. Lawful means - that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.

The Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard
of respondents' right against deprivation of property without due process of
law. Consequently, the instant petition must be denied.

In the case at bar, EO 626-A has a lawful subject.

The carabao, as the poor mans tractor has a direct relevance to the public
welfare. The EO will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding
and preventing their improvident depletion.
However, there is no reasonable relation between between the means and
the end.
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of
the carabaos but on their movement. SC believed that the prohibition of the
inter-provincial transport of carabaos cannot prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere.
Furthermore, the penalty is outright confiscation of the carabaos, usually by
the police only. In relation to US v. Toribio, the statute was sustained
because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed
by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged
measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the
measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which,
generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended
as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.
There are occasions when the notice and hearing may be dispensed with,
such as the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the
urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case at bar, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for
the Ynot's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even
inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no

Yes. UnconstitutionalNo due process of law.

Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the "due
process clause" of the Constitution, viz.:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, . . .
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must
concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is
done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of
due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of
procedure and matters of substance. In essence, PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced,"
while SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS "requires that the law itself, not
merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair,
reasonable, and just." PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be examined in light of this
distinction.
As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements
of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative
body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its
executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations,
an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of
notice and hearing.
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature
of a property right.
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed
individuals. Licensure is "the granting of license especially to practice a
profession." It is also "the system of granting licenses (as for professional
practice) in accordance with establishment standards." A license is a right
or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a business
or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal.
It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of
harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In
the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five
examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a

4-MANRESA 2008 3
license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by
the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have
to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be
temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance
evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with
one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of
their license is now dependent on a "rigid evaluation of performance" which
is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the
use of the term "renewal." It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which
primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm.
In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
(Liezel Cua)
5. GSIS VS. MONTESCLAROS (2004)
Facts: Nicolas filed and was approved an application for retirement benefits
under PD No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977. Milagros, as wife and designated beneficiary, filed with GSIS a claim
for survivorship pension. GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18 of
PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the
surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three
years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. According to GSIS,
Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of
retirement on 17 February 1984.
Issue: WON the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146 is valid and constitutional.
Held: It is void for being violative of the constitutional guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the law. The GSIS cannot deny the claim of
Milagros for survivorship benefits based on this invalid proviso.
Denial of Due Process. The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws. The proviso (Sec. 18, PD 1146) is unduly
oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouses claim for survivorship
pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within
the three-year prohibited period. There is outright confiscation of benefits
due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity
to be heard. The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to
assure comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance benefits
to government employees and their dependents in the event of sickness,
disability, death, and retirement of the government employees. (Karla Deles)

playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between
popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer
candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue
advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and
popularity.
It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or
agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a private individual and
had all the right to lend his name and image to these products. However,
when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring
his name and image assumed partisan political character because the same
indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well
within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the
display of the subject billboards. (Jo Anne Beltran)
7. CHAVEZ VS. ROMULO (2004)
Facts:
In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech
before the members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban
in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She directed the then
PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry
Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR), thus:
Acting on President Arroyos directive, respondent Ebdane issued the
assailed guidelines in the implementation of the ban on the carrying of
firearms outside of residence.
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR
has been issued, requested the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) to reconsider the implementation of the assailed
Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present
petition.
He contends that the PNP Guidelines violate the due process clause of the
Constitution because: 1. the right to own and carry firearm is necessarily
intertwined with the peoples inherent right to life and to protect life: and 2.
the ownership and carrying of firearms are constitutionally protected property
rights which cannot be taken without due process of law and without just
cause.
Issue:
Whether pr not the PNP Guidelines violate the due process clause of the
constitution
Ruling:

6. CHAVEZ VS. COMELEC (2004)

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be

deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

FACTS:

In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must
be whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is
that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a
property nor property right.

Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with

certain establishments to endorse their products. Pursuant to these
agreements, three billboards were set up along the Balintawak Interchange
of the North Expressway.
On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of Senator under Alyansa ng Pag-asa.
On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520,
which contained Section 32 requiring all propaganda materials such as
posters, billboards, etc showing the image or name of the candidate to be
removed otherwise the same shall be considered as premature
campaigning.
Petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by the
COMELECs Law Department. Chavez asked the COMELEC that he be
exempted from the application of Section 32, considering that the billboards
adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as
paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules.

The catena of American jurisprudence involving license to bear arms is

perfectly in accord with our ruling that a PTCFOR is neither a property nor
a property right.
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated
fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right,
but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing
restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A
licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees
fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might
be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a
contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any
property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the
Declaration of Rights. (Norliza Mamukid)
8. BELTRAN VS. SECRETARY
Facts:

The COMELEC answered petitioners request by issuing another letter

wherein it ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or
to cover them from public view pending the approval of his request.

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was
enacted into law and it . seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood
by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the
country. RA 7719 provides for the phasing out of commercial blood banks.

ISSUE #1: W/N Sec.32 is an invalid exercise of police power.

Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994,
petitioners have already been operating commercial blood banks under
Republic Act No. 1517, The law, which allowed the establishment and

RULING: NO. A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its
primary objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the

4-MANRESA 2008 4
operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood processing
laboratories.
In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation released its final
report of a study on the Philippine blood banking system. It was revealed that
the Philippines heavily relied on commercial sources of blood. It was further
found that blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks are three times
more likely to have any of the infections or blood transfusion transmissible
diseases than those donated to PNRC.
On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing for the phase
out of commercial blood banks took effect. On April 28, 1995, Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of said law was promulgated by DOH.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7719 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER;
Held: The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise
of the States police power. Therefore, the Legislature, under the
circumstances, adopted a course of action that is both necessary and
reasonable for the common good. Police power is the State authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare.
It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds and/or issues
raised by petitioners, namely, deprivation of personal liberty and property,
and violation of the non-impairment clause, to be unmeritorious.
In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of
the law, the Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out commercial blood
banks. This action may seriously affect the owners and operators, as well as
the employees, of commercial blood banks but their interests must give way
to serve a higher end for the interest of the public. (Sol Andoy)
9. CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO
At issue is the constitutionality of the City Ordinance of Manila entitled:
entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT
OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN
FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES
AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors,
karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques,
cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In Section
3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are
given three (3) months from the date of approval of the Ordinance within
which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the
Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business
allowable within the area. Further, it states in Section 4 that in cases of
subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the premises of
the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
Held:
The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every
sentence thereof violates a constitutional provision. ()
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions
has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not
contrary to the Constitution and to the laws. The Ordinance must satisfy
two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of
constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws.
That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the

supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not
violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units
are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a
delegation of legislative power from the national legislature.
The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat (N)o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. . . .
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes
though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. This
standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice, and as such it is a limitation upon the
exercise of the police power.
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment
against the life, liberty and property of individuals; to secure the individual
from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by
the established principles of private rights and distributive justice; to protect
property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from seizure, forfeiture,
and destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial
procedure; and to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the
benefit of the general law.
The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private
corporations and partnerships are persons within the scope of the guaranty
insofar as their property is concerned.
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on
government, usually called procedural due process and substantive due
process.
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures
that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what
kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it
takes a particular action.
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the
government has an adequate reason for taking away a persons life, liberty,
or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is
a sufficient justification for the governments action
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
(TEST) To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale
for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure
and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection
of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of
argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the
City Councils police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment
thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as
venues to further the illegal prostitution is of no moment. We lay stress on
the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in
the most innocent of places
While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot
for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of illrepute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.
If that were so and if that were allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area would
not only be purged of its supposed social ills, it would be extinguished of its
soul as well as every human activity, reprehensible or not, in its every nook
and cranny would be laid bare to the estimation of the authorities.
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues
of morality. Try as the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster

4-MANRESA 2008 5
the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a
thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men.
Means employed are
constitutionally infirm
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the
achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes
on the constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental right to liberty
and property.

Section 12-B(d) which deprives the petitioner and those similarly situated
dependent spouses of retired SSS members this opportunity to be heard
must be struck down. (Jazzie M. Sarona )
11. CARLOS SUPERDRUG VS. DSWD
Facts:
On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was
signed into law. Section 4 (a) of the Act states:

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to

include the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of
man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator,
subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare.

The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:

(a)
the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all
establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar
lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of
medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior
citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;

Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to
autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the
motels premises. Be it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does
not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution.
Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with others in the
confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.
The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to make
this choice. Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the
full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government,
as long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and
restraint the exception.

The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h)
as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services
rendered.

Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful
government restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository
of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedoms. t is the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
10. DYCAICO VS. SSS
FACTS: Bonifacio became a member of SSS in 1980 and named Elena and
their 8 children as his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. He retired in
1989 and began receiving his SSS pension. He married Elena on January
1997 and he died on June 19997.
Elena filed for survivors pension but said application was denied on the
ground that they were married after Bonifacios retirement. According to the
SSC, it has consistently ruled that entitlement to the survivors pension in
ones capacity as primary beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of
relationship with and dependency for support upon the deceased SSS
member during his lifetime.
Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282 provides that the primary beneficiaries who
are entitled to survivors pension are those who qualify as such as of the
date of retirement of the deceased member.
HELD: The proviso infringes the due process clause. In a pension plan
where employee participation is mandatory, employees have contractual or
vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of
employment. Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility
requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the
due process clause and retirees enjoy a protected property interest
whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law.
The mandatory contributions to the SSS under RA 8282 form part of the
employees compensation. The proviso as of the date of his retirement
runs afoul of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving
spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS members were
contracted after the latters retirement of their survivors benefits.
There is outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses
without giving them an opportunity to be heard.
By this outright disqualification, the proviso qualifying the term primary
beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension has
created the presumption that marriages contracted after the retirement date
of SSS members were entered into for the purpose of securing the benefits
under RA 8282. This presumption, moreover, is conclusive because the said
surviving spouses are not afforded any opportunity to disprove the presence
of the illicit purpose. The proviso, as it creates this conclusive presumption,
is unconstitutional because it presumes a fact which is not necessarily or
universally true.
Standards of due process require that the petitioner be allowed to present
evidence to prove that her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted in good faith
and as his bona fide spouse she is entitled to the survivors pension accruing
upon his death. Hence, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in

On May 28, 2004, the DSWD approved and adopted the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9257.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) of the Expanded
Senior Citizens Act on the ground that: it violates the equal protection clause
(Art. III, Sec. 1) of the Constitution.
Issue: whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special
group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of
partly subsidizing a government program.
Held: The Court believes so.
The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution
of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to
them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an
integral part of our society.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power
of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Accordingly, it has
been described as "the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power
vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same."
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general
welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted
considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of
earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in
the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the
provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the
presumption of validity which every law has in its favor.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the
senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because
petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up with a
financial report, so that they have not been able to show properly whether or
not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage.
While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the
realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can
intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment
of property rights in the process.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
MMDA VS. VIRON TRANSPORTATION
[G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007]
Facts: In 2003 to decongest traffic in the MM, PGMA issued EO 179
(Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System),
which designated MMDA as the projects implementing agency.

4-MANRESA 2008 6
To implement the same, MMDA issued a resolution recognizing the
need for the following:
1. To establish common bus parking terminal areas, and
2. To remove the bus terminals located along EDSA and other major
thoroughfares of MM.
The constitutionality of the EO was questioned on the ground that it
transgresses the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land
transportation units over their respective terminals.
Issue: Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose?
Ruling: No; hence, the EO is null and void.
As in Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., this
Court fails to see how the prohibition against the existence of the bus
terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic
congestion in the metropolis.
On the contrary, the elimination of the bus terminals brings forth the
distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the
common parking areas, a case of transference from one site to another.
In the same case, the SC also noted that bus terminals per se do not,
however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright
proscription against the existence of all terminals can be considered as
reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been
enlightened.
If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to
load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals,
then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted,
with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the
specifications.
Hence, the elimination of the terminals does not satisfy the standards of
a valid police power measure. (Felai Puerto)
GEROCHI VS. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
July 17, 2007
Facts: Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule 18 of its IRR were alleged as
unconstitutional on the ground that the imposition of the Universal Charge on
all end-users (of electricity) is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to
taxation without representation as the consumers were not given a chance to
be heard and represented.
Issue: Was the law a valid exercise of legislative power?
Ruling: Yes, it was; hence, Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and its IRR are valid and
constitutional.
The establishment and maintenance of the Special Trust Fund, under
the last paragraph of Section 34, R.A. No. 9136, is well within the pervasive
and non-waivable power and responsibility of the government to secure the
physical and economic survival and well-being of the community, that
comprehensive sovereign authority we designate as the police power of the
State.
This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that
the same is an exaction imposed primarily in pursuit of the State's police
objectives. The STF reasonably serves and assures the attainment and
perpetuity of the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed, i.e., to
ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry. (Felai
Puerto)

SECTION 34. Universal Charge. Within one (1) year from the
effectivity of this Act, a universal charge to be determined, fixed and
approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users for the
following purposes:
(a) Payment for the stranded debts[4] in excess of the amount assumed by
the National Government and stranded contract costs of NPC[5] and as well
as qualified stranded contract costs of distribution utilities resulting from the
restructuring of the industry;
(b) Missionary electrification;[6]

(c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to indigenous or

renewable sources of energy vis--vis imported energy fuels;
(d) An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one centavo per
kilowatt-hour (P0.0025/kWh), which shall accrue to an environmental fund to
be used solely for watershed rehabilitation and management. Said fund
shall be managed by NPC under existing arrangements; and
(e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period not
exceeding three (3) years.
The universal charge shall be a non-bypassable charge which shall be
passed on and collected from all end-users on a monthly basis by the
distribution utilities. Collections by the distribution utilities and the TRANSCO
in any given month shall be remitted to the PSALM Corp. on or before the
fifteenth (15th) of the succeeding month, net of any amount due to the
distribution utility. Any end-user or self-generating entity not connected to a
distribution utility shall remit its corresponding universal charge directly to the
TRANSCO. The PSALM Corp., as administrator of the fund, shall create a
Special Trust Fund which shall be disbursed only for the purposes specified
herein in an open and transparent manner. All amount collected for the
universal charge shall be distributed to the respective beneficiaries within a
reasonable period to be provided by the ERC.

4-MANRESA 2008 7
4. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION,
INC., vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA
Facts:
On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760.
Ordinance No. 4760 has the following provisions:

1.

It would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized

representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining
or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to
any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby
open to public view at all times.
2.
3. It also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels,
motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City
Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives.
4. It prohibits a person less than 18 years old (minor) from being accepted
in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless
accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian.
5. It makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours.
With this, Petitioners who were operators of hotels and motels filed a petition
against respondent assailing the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 4760.
Issue: W/N Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due
process clause.
Ruling: No.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes
though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order
that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
The standard of due process which exist both as a procedural and as
substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance or any governmental
action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity, is responsiveness to
the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted
precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of
rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It
would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would
amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an
admitted deterioration of the state of public morals.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the act of Board of Manila was an
exercise of police power for the said ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. Due to this, the mantle of
protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover
petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being
specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such
imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by
anything of substance.
Also, the prohibition by the ordinance cannot be considered unreasonable
and oppressive because the petitioners are not prohibited by the said
ordinance to stop their operations. The law simply imposes restrictions to
serve its purpose. It would be different if the law prohibits the operation of
motels and hotels. (Teen Pague)
5. TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., vs. THE BOARD OF
TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND
TRANSPORTATION,
Facts: Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a
domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of
Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of
Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.
Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two
of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such
certificate of public convenience.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, providing for the Phasing out and

Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis. Pursuant to this policy, the Board
hereby declares that no car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi.
On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted.
Issue: WON the memorandum Circulars did not afford petitioners procedural
and substantive due process, equal protection of the law, and protection
against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard.
Held:
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
It is clear from the provision of Presidential Decree No. 101 however, that
the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering
necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or
program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require
the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or
persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the
Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot
justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due
process.
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is
neither violative of procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon.
Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972): It is not essential to the
validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct
of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise."
Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is
arbitrary and oppressive. As public respondents contend, however, it is
impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not
to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple
standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable
standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly,
and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard.
On Equal Protection of the Law:
Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal
protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila
only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be
pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42.
The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that
taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to
heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. Thus is of common
knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city,
a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection
clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other
transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal
protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all
and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It
permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided
classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make
for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform
operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar
circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege
conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the
foregoing criteria.Bhing doquilla
6. VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS
A city ordinance prohibiting barbershop operators from rendering massage
service to their customers in a separate room is a valid exercise of the police
power.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from an order of the lower court
dismissing a suit for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based
on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it
amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means
of livelihood without due process of law.
HELD:
Attack against validity cannot succeed. It is a police
power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to
impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage
clinic; and, (2) To forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the
construction of separate rooms for massage of customers.

4-MANRESA 2008 8
This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the
general welfare clause. There is no showing, therefore, of the
unconstitutionality of such ordinance.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed. No costs.

7. BALACUIT VS. CFI

8. DEL ROSARIO VS. BENGZON
9. ERICTA VS. CITY
10. YNOT VS. IAC
11. LUPANGCO VS. CA
FACTS: PRC issued a resolution directing that no examinee for the CPA
Board Exam shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like
conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from
any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any
reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned
or similars institutions during the 3 days immediately proceeding every
examination day including examination day.
HELD: Such resolution is unreasonable. The unreasonableness is more
obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even
without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations
conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the
Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every
examinee during the three days before the examination period.
Administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules
and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in
view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they
are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.
PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to
how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations, as this
will infringe n the examinees right to libery.
Such resolution also violates the academic freedom of
the schools concerned.
The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a
guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be
eradicated or at least minimized. What is needed to be done by the
respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there.
(Jazzie M. Sarona )
12. DEPARTMENT VS. SANDIEGO
13. CORONA VS. UNITED HARBOR