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G.R. No.

119976 September 18, 1995


Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and
graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree,
education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte
Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel
Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos
when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was
elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when
Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She
served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995
Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the
same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that
petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation,
wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban
City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a
resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of
the First District of Leyte.
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion
supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of
7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when
her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not
mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of
origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after
the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her
domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly

manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat
in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24,
May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995

AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,

Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of
candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm
Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo,
Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less
than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to
1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and
allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order
suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on
Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.
1. Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile to warrant the disqualification of
Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the
COC)in the district he was running in.

1. Yes, The term residence has always been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous
constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.

What is the Committees concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile
or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in effect lifted from
the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of
intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes

So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word residence to have the same meaning of domicile.
The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from
taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law
requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through assent of voters those most
cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency
mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.
2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelecs contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and
not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the
district in which he seeks election to .
Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a
registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate
indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same
district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquinos connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in
the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit
instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated
domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his
physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative
of the Second District of Makati City.
Aquinos assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly
supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next
highest number of votes in the congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent.

I. Aquinos petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelecs lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving congressional candidates after
the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the elections and the remedy
to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its questioned decision
despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming
arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelecs finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against the petitioner is
contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year residency requirement
of Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which were only existing for less than a year at the
time of the election and barely four months in the case of petitioners district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of canvassers to
determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the
petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate
is a loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers cant be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly
transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage
of existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a
oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot
be better.

Llamanzares vs COMELEC
GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that
her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24
May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before that
however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968,
found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as
American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before
assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the
RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among others,
that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or
either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of
citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for Presidency.
Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the constitutional
requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical of Filipinos.
The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a
Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is
based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to
accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is
based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers
intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitutions enumeration is silent
as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because
of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the
intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and the
general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres
to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found.


NANUD, JR. Respondents.
G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015

Rogelio Batin Caballero, the petitioner and Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr., the respondent were both
candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013
elections. The private respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy claiming
that he was not eligible eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.
However, the petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on September
13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.Furthermore, he
asserted that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a Canadian citizen.
On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution that the Certificate of Candidacy of
respondent Caballero was cancelled. Petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes, on May 14, 2013. On
May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc but the same was denied.
Thus, on December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution and private
respondent took his Oath of Office on December 20, 2013. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.
HELD: NEGATIVE. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc
canceling the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero.
Upon the numerous claims of the petitioner, the court was not persuaded. It is true that the
petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus he had his domicile of origin
in Uyugan, Batanes. Nevertheless, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. It is settled ruled that
naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. In the case at bar, the
petitioner permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Therefore, he
had in effect abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada.
Furthermore, the court held that the frequent visits of the petitioner visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from
work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.

More so, in this case, the records showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been a resident of
Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding the day of elections as required under Section 39 of the

The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 or RA No. 9225 , declares that natural-born citizens
of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law.
However, it does not mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the
current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. The petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under
RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes.

Limbona vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 186006. Oct. 16, 2009
Petitioner Norlanie Mitmug Limbona, her husband, and respondent Malik Bobby T. Alingan were mayoralty
candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte. After filing their Certificate of Candidacy, Respondent filed a petition to
disqualify the husband of petitioner for non-compliance with the one-year residence requirement. Subsequently,
respondent also filed the same petition, this time against the petitioner. Petitioner filed for withdrawal of her candidacy
which the COMELEC granted. The COMELEC granted the disqualification of petitioners husband. Petitioner filed a
new Certificate of Candidacy as substitute candidate for her husband which was approved by the COMELEC.
Respondent yet again sought Petitioners disqualification.
Petitioner claimed that she has been staying, sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20
months in Lower Kalangaan.
Whether or not petitioner satisfied the one-year residency requirement
Petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement. In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there
must be residence or bodily presence in the new locality, an intention to remain there, and an intention to abandon
the old domicile. A persons domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a
new one is established.

The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer,
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to
serve that community.
Petitioners claim that she has been physically present and actually residing in Pantar for almost 20 months
prior to the elections, is self-serving and unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the court finds no other act that would indicate
petitioners intention to stay in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The filing of certificate of candidacy in Pantar is
not sufficient to hold that she has chosen Pantar as her new residence. In SPA No. 07-611, the commission has even
found that she is not a registered voter in the said municipality warranting her disqualification as a candidate.
The court noted the findings of the COMELEC that petitioners domicile of origin is Maguing , Lanao del
norte, which is also her place of birth; and that her domicile, by operation of law by virtue of marriage, is Rapasun,
Marawi City. The COMELEC Found that Petitioners Husband effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar,
Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed that the Husband and wife live together in one
legal residence, then it follows that Petitioner effected the change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006.
Hence, failure to comply with the residency requirement, Petitioner is disqualified to run for the office of
mayor in Pantar, Lanao del Norte.

LARDIZABAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 86564

FACTS: The petitioner asks this court to restrain the COMELEC from looking into the question of his citizenship for
his office as Mayor of Baguio City.
In the January 20, 1988 elections, Ramon J. Labo, Jr. was proclaimed as the new elected Mayor of Baguio
City. Six days later, Luis Lardizabal, the private respondent, filed a petition for quo warranto which according to the
petitioner may not be valid because the filing fee was not paid yet. While the petition for quo warranto was being
argued, the question of the petitioner's citizenship was brought about. Through the records from the Australian
Embassy, it was found that the petitioner - who had married an Australian citizen, acquired an Australian passport
with the Consular ID - returned in the Philippines in 1980 for the reason that his marriage became void because of
bigamy. It was also stated that he was granted Australian citizenship in 1976. There was also an Oath of Allegiance
taken by petitioner which renunciation of other allegiance is included.

Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry about Ramon J. Labo, Jr. as the newly
elected Mayor of Baguio, considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time.
Whether or not Ramon J. Labo is a Filipino citizen.
Whether or not petitioner can hold office in the Philippines.
Whether or not Luis Lardizabal, who filed the petition for quo warranto, can replace the petitioner Ramon J.
Labo, Jr. as Mayor of Baguio City.

HELD: WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ORDERED to vacate his office and surrender
the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City once this decision becomes final and executor. The temporary restraining
order dated January 31, 1989, is lifted.

Yes, COMELEC has jurisdiction regarding the petition of quo warranto being filed against the petitioner
was paid on time. It is contrary to the petitioners claim that the court may allow the payment of the said
fee within a reasonable time. Lardizabal was able to pay the said fee within the required 10-day period.




Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is not a Filipino citizen anymore because of the following requisites based on the
Constitution: a.) He is already a naturalized citizen in a foreign country; b) He renounced his Filipino
citizenship by c) taking and pledging to the oath of allegiance of the foreign country promising to
faithfully observe the laws and fulfill the duties of an Australian citizen. He also did not make a move in
reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by doing the following modes of action: a) reacquiring by direct act of
Congress; b) by naturalization; and c) by repatriation.
No. He cannot hold office in the Philippines because of non-compliance to Local Government Code
Section 42 ( Qualifications about holding a public office). A foreigner is not entitled to hold public office
in the Philippines.
The private respondent is not applicable to replace Ramon J. Labo Jr., as the mayor because the
person who is fit to the position is the elected Vice Mayor.