1

Caesar in Gaul
Diplomacy, Soft Power and Patronage
Peter Etherington

n academia, literature and even the media, ancient Rome is often portrayed as an

exceptionally belligerent and imperialistic society that rose to prominence by

bullying and massacring its neighbors.1 On such a model, Romes imperial success
was the product of a prodigiously predatory foreign policy in concert with the
Roman legions, which were at the time the most sophisticated fighting machine
the world had ever seen.2 Roman warfare was characterized by an unyielding and
fanatical pursuit of victory. Indiscriminate slaughter and horrendous atrocities
were justifiable so long as they contributed towards the ultimate triumph of
Rome. The ancient historian Tacitus reflected this sentiment when he

Paul Burton, Pax Romana/Pax Americana: Perceptions of Rome in American Political Culture,
2000-2010, International Journal of the Classical Tradition, Vol. 18, No. 1, (March 2011), Page
71. Burton states that through American films like Spartacus (1960) and Gladiator, the Roman
Empire is often characterized in a negative light through aggressive imperialism abroad, endless
and unjustified wars, and the corruption and decadence of the Roman elite. Arthur M. Eckstein,
Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome, (Berkley: University of California
Press, 2006), Page 3, which states, One theme has come to dominate modern scholarship
Romes stance towards other states, were exceptionally warlike, exceptionally aggressive, and
exceptionally violent.
2

Adrian Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), Page 26.
Additionally, Goldsworhty claims that a military force comparable to the Roman legion would not
emerge in Europe for over one thousand years after the fall of Rome; see also, George R.
Swain, Caesars Strategy in the Gallic War, The Classical Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Decemeber
1907), Page 67.

2
wrote, the Romans create a wilderness and call it peace.3 The Greek historian Polybius would
have us believe that Romans depended on little else beyond their brute strength in settling foreign
aairs when he wrote, it is a peculiarity of the Roman people to treat everything as a question of
brute strength.4 And perhaps significantly, as the historian Brian Cambell has observed, no treaties
on diplomatic method have survived from the Republican era, whereas there are many about
generalship, tactics, stratagems and military organization.5 This alone could lead many to conclude
that the Romans did not value or consider diplomacy as a viable tool. Roman writers themselves
frequently embrace and celebrate this image of Rome as a militaristic conqueror, as when the poet
Virgil made Jupiter say: Roman, remember by your strength to rule Earths people, for your art are
to be these: To pacify, to impose the rule of law, to spare the conquered, battle down the proud.6
One Roman who is often portrayed as the incarnation of Roman violence, aggression and
imperialism is Julius Caesar.7 In 58 BC, Caesar assumed proconsulship of three Roman provinces:
Transalpine Gaul, Cisalpine Gaul, and Illycirum, and was granted four legions. Within eight years,
Caesar had expanded Roman control over all of Gaul, which according to Plutarch, took by storm
more than eight hundred cities, subdued three hundred nations, and fought pitched battles at

Robin Waterfield, Taken at the Flood: The Roman Conquest of Greece, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), Page 230.
4

Polybius, Histories, 1.37

Brian Cambell, Diplomacy in the Roman World (500 BC-AD 235), Diplomacy and Statecraft,
Vol. 12, No. 1, (March 2001), Page 1.
6

George Cupcea, The Evolution of Roman Frontier Concept and Policy, Journal of Ancient
History and Archeology, No. 2.1 (2015), Page 13; see also, 6 Brian Cambell, Diplomacy in the
Roman World (500 BC-AD 235), Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 12, No. 1, (March 2001), Page
1.
7

Adrian Goldsworthy, Caesar: Life of a Colossus, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006),
Pages 2-3; see also, Paul Burton, Pax Romana/Pax Americana: Perceptions of Rome in
American Political Culture, 2000,2010 International Journal of the Classical Tradition, Vol 18,
No 1 (March 2011), Page 69.

3
dierent times against three million men, of whom he slew one million in hand-to-hand fighting and
took many more prisoners.8
However, what is often overlooked in Caesars conquest of Gaul was what occurred between
his famous battles. This paper seeks to shine a light upon Julius Caesars delicate diplomacy that
contributed towards the eventual pacification of Gaul. This is not to assert that Caesars knack for
diplomacy was the paramount reason for his success, after all, his armies were incomparably
superior to any forces at the the disposal of his adversaries.9 However, conquering an area as vast as
Gaul with eight million fiercely independent barbarians and undermining their will to resist in only
eight years defies an exclusively military explanation.10 This essay will examine the diplomatic
methods of Julius Caesar between 58 BC to 50 BC.

Julius Caesar and the Helvetii (58 B.C)

Julius Caesar infamously begins Book I of The Gallic War with, The whole of Gaul is divided
into three parts, alluding to an unrealized cohesion within the region.11 However, the region Caesar
considered Gaulbounded by the Atlantic, the Rhine, the Mediterranean, the Pyrenees, and the
western slopes of the Alpswas not and never had in any sense been united as a political, cultural or

Plutarch, The Parallel Lives, 15.5

John Henderson, XPDNC/Writing Caesar (Bellum Ciuile), Classical Antiquity, Vol. 15, No. 2
(October 1996) Page 285.
10 10

George R. Swain, Caesars Strategy in the Gallic War, The Classical Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2
(December 1907), Page 73.
11

C. Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, Translated by Carolyn Hammond, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 1.1.

4
ethnic entity.12 The idea of a unified Gaul existed exclusively in the Roman imagination.13 Ironically,
Caesars second sentence in The Gallic War acknowledges this heterogeneous reality: They all dier
among themselves in respect of language, way of life and laws.14 However, the apparent divisions of
the region did not deter Caesar from pursuing Gaul for what he wanted it to be, and eventually the
inhabitants of Gaul would accept Caesars view as one basis of their identity.15
The first event that Caesar discusses in The Gallic War is the mass migration of the Helvetii, a
confederation of Gallic tribes that lived on the Swiss Plateau. According to Caesar, the most
aristocratic and the richest nobleman of the Helvetii, Ogretorix, had been clandestinely
orchestrating the migration for the past three years in collusion with two other noblemen, Casticus
of the Sequani and Dumnorix of the Aedui.16 Apparently, the three men were each plotting a coup
d'tat in their respective tribes to establish a triumviral monarchy over Gaul.
The Helvetiian migration alone would certainly have disastrous ramifications for other tribes
in Gaul; however, the region was by no means stable previously. Upon Caesars arrival in 58 BC, the
political eco-system of Gaul was decentralized, violent and unstable.17 The region was controlled by a

12

Greg Woolf, Beyond Romans and Natives, World Archaeology, Vol. 28 No. 3, Culture
Contact and Colonialism, (February 1997), 341; see also, Michael Dietler, Our Ancestors the
Gauls: Archeology, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Manipulation of Celtic Identity, American
Anthropologists, New Series, Vol. 96, No. 3, (Sept 1994), Page 4.
13

Christopher B. Krebs, Imaginary Geography in Caesars Bellum Gallicum, The American

Journal of Philology, Vol. 127, No. 1 (Spring, 2006), Page 114.
14

Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, 1.1

15

John Haywood, Vercingetorix and the Failure of Gallic Resistance, History Today, 2009.
Page 43; see also, Thomas S. Burns, Rome and the Barbarians: 100 BC-AD 400, (Baltimore:
John Hopkins University Press, 2006), Page 135; see also, Emanuel Hoffman, Caesar: De Bello
Gallico Book I-VII, According to the Text of Emanuel Hoffman, (Vienna: Clarendon Press, 1898),
Page 105.
16
17

Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, 1.2

Greg Woolf, Beyond Romans and Natives, World Archaeology, Vol. 28 No. 3, Culture
Contact and Colonialism, (February 1997), 341; see also, Adrian Goldsworthy, Caesar: Life of a
Colossus, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), Page 204.

5
myriad of independent polities and hostile tribal confederations constantly struggling for supremacy
and security. This political instability was further exacerbated by the ambitious aristocrats within
each individual polity, such as Ogretorix, Casticus, and Dumnorix, who were similarly contending for
power and influence at a more localized level.18 This condition of constant violence and political
instability was the consequence of Gauls regional anarchythat is, the absence of intertribal law or
even a central power that could assert eective principals or mechanisms to enforce a peaceful, or
even a stable, political climate. According to Arthur Eckstein, because Gallic tribes existed as a
multiplicity of independent entities and actors, with each judging its own grievances and ambitions
according to its own lights, in a system lacking central authority and/or any eective international
law, tribes and individual leaders were compelled to compete with each other in the pursuit of
security.19 However, achieving security under these conditions is dicult, if not impossible. And
because security scarce, the competition for it is intense, ruthless and ubiquitous. The ancient writer
Strabo, reflecting the general perception of Roman observers, described the entire Gallic race as
war-mad..20 Gauls state of decentralized hyper-militarism created obvious impediments to imperial
designs and it is for this reason that Rome had previously avoided the convoluted chaos of internal
Gallic aairs.21

18

Adrian Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), Page 97;
see also, Arthur M. Eckstein, Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome,
(Berkley: University of California Press, 2006), Page 131.
19

Arthur M. Eckstein, Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome, Page 12.

20

Strabo, Geographica, 4.4.196; see also, Jane F. Gardner, The Gallic Menace in Caesars
Propaganda, Greece & Rome, Vol. 30, No. 2 (October 1983), Page 185.
21

Adrian Goldsworthy, Caesar: Life of a Colossus, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006),
Page 200.

6
In 58 BC, the Helvetii abandoned their homes and began their migration en masse.22 The
easiest route would take them through the Rhone valley, and thus Roman provincial territory.
However, Caesar denied their passage. So, the Helvetians took the more dicult northern route in
order to entirely bypass Roman territory. However, as the Helvetii migration progressed further
west, they ravaged the lands of Roman allies in the region. The most notably of which were the
Aedui, to whom the Roman Senate had accorded the title of Brothers and Kinsmen of the Roman
People, thereby making them the foremost of Romes allies in Gaul.23
Caesar claimed that the Aedui along with other Gallic states allied to Rome, sent envoys to
Caesar to ask for help. They had always behaved well, they said, towards the Roman people, so that
they hardly deserved to have their land laid waste, their children enslaved, and their towns stormed
almost under the gaze of our army.24 Caesar added that having such a warlike nation near the
Roman Province could have an unforeseen consequence to Roman interests, and should therefore be
opposed.25 Whether or not one chooses to believe Caesars reasons for interfering in Gallic aairs,
and implicitly whether or not one chooses to even interpret Caesars commentaries as an accurate

22

According to Caesar, tablets written in Greek characters were found in the Helvetiis camp,
which stated that the total number of migrants was about 368,000. This number would have
represented almost 20% of the entire population in Gaul. Most scholars recommend interpreting
Caesars numbers with healthy skepticism, Caesar, The Gallic War, 1.30; Estimates of the
population of Gaul in the time of Caesar are largely avoided by modern scholars as the data is
too uncertain to warrant much speculation, however the Gallic population estimate provided in
this paper was calculated by Emperor Napoleon III, cited in Emanuel Hoffman, Caesar: De Bello
Gallico Books I-VII, (Vienna: Clarendon Press, 1890), Page 94.
23

Jane F. Gardner, The Gallic Menace in Caesars Propaganda, Greece & Rome, Vol. 30, No.
2 (October 1983), Page 183; Max Radin, Inernational Law of the Gallic Campaigns, The
Classical Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1 (October 1916), Page 13.
24

Caesar 1.11

25

Ibid, 1.12

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reflection of events, is still a matter of contention among historians.26 Regardless, Caesar accepted
their pleas for help and resolved to drive the Helvetii back into the Alps.
There are two important ideas regarding Caesars line of reasoning that are worth
considering. First, the Roman alliance with the Aedui did not necessarily require Caesar to interfere
on their behalf. As early as 122 BC, the Romans had made a treaty of alliance with the Aedui and
either then, or at some later time, conferred upon them the title of Brothers and Kinsmen of the
Roman People.27 It is expressly stated that no Gallic tribe, before or after, was so distinguished. As
allies there were, of course, mutual obligations and commitments imposed by the treaty upon both
the Romans and Aeduans. The exact terms of the treaty are unknown, but there are indications that
it was largely ceremonial and consisted of honorific proclamations of kinship rather than in
substantial concessions on the part of Rome. According to historian Max Radin, It was very plainly
not a defensive and oensive alliance, and while it emphasized the perfect independence and
equality of the high contracting parties, it left no doubt in the minds of anyone that the relation was
little dierent from a clientage of the Aeduans towards the Romans.28 Furthermore, there was no
historical precedent, (something Roman senators took very seriously), to suggest Rome should

26

Roger D. Gouran, Caesar and the National Interest, The Classical Journal, Vol. 63, No. 6
(March 1968), Pages 247-249; see also, T. Rice Holmes, Signor Ferreros Reconstruction of
Caesars First Commentary, The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3, (July 1909), Pages 203-215;
see also, Alvah Talbot Otis, The Helvetian Campaign: Was Caesar Wise or Wilful? An
Examination of the Hypothesis of Ferrero. Part I, The Classical Journal, Vol. 9, No. 6 (March
1914), Pages 241-250; see also, Norman J. Dewitt, The Non-Political Nature of Caesars
Commentaries, Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol. 73
(1942), Pages 341-352; see also, 26 Jane F. Gardner, The Gallic Menace in Caesars
Propaganda, Greece & Rome, Vol. 30, No. 2 (October 1983), Page 181-189; Harry E. Burton,
Ferreros Treatment of the First Book of Caesars Gallic War, The Classical Journal, Vol. 6 No
4, (January 1911), Pages 147-157.
27

Max Radin, International Law of the Gallic Campaigns, The Classical Journal, Vol. 12 No. 1
(October 1916), Page 13; see also, A.N. Sherwin-White, Caesar as an Imperialist, Greece &
Rome, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 1957), Page 37; see also, D.C. Braund, The Aedui, Troy, and the
Apocolocyntosis, The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1980), Page 420.
28

Max Radin, The International Law of the Gallic Campaigns, The Classical Journal, Vol. 12,
No. 1, (October 1916), Page 13.

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interfere, but rather just the opposite. Just five years earlier, the Aedui had sent an envoy to speak
before the Roman Senate, requesting military aid, which was denied. However in 61 BC, the Senate
decreed that whomever may be the proconsul of transalpine gaul (the province bordering the Gaul
and at this time governed by Caesar), should take steps to protect the Aedui that is consistent with
the interests and duty of the Republic and the Roman people.29
The second important fact to acknowledge is that the Helvetiis migration was occurring 100
miles away from the Roman Province; their settlement being so distant makes Caesars claim that
they threatened Roman national security appear erroneous.30 However, Roman-Gallic relations had
been strained, to say the least, since the Gauls disastrous sack of Rome in 390 B.C.31 Livy claimed
that the devastation was so extreme that he could not vouch for anything before prior as all evidence
of the citys history had gone up in flames.32 According to Livy, there was no other people whose
arms were more dreaded.33 This fear was patent in the massive walls built around the Rome in the
aftermath of the Gallic sack: twenty-four feet high and twelve feet thick. Even down into the first
century B.C. the Republic periodically felt compelled to decree a timiltis Gallicus, a mass
mobilization of every single man in the fear of threatened Gallic invasion; even the elderly and
priests, normally exempt from military duty, were required to serve. Like the building of the walls,
the mobilization was serious government actionshighly disruptive, for instance, of the economy; it
is unlikely to have been merely for reasons of propaganda, but rather what Romans considered a
warranted and rational response to such a dangerous adversary.

29

T. Rice Holmes, Signor Ferreros Reconstruction of Caesars First Commentary, The

Classical Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3, (July 1909), page 204.
30

A.N. Sherwin-White, Caesar as an Imperialist, Greece & Rome, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 1957),
Page 37.
31

Adrian Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), Page 40.

32

Livy, The History of Rome, 6.1.2-3, 5.43

33

Livy, The History of Rome, 9.29.

9
The fear of Gallic military prowess did not fade with time.34 Although it had occurred
centuries in the past, the Romans deep-seated fear was not neurotic, nor was it the product of
frustrated imperialists that had been unable to expand Roman domination over their barbarian
neighbors. As Plutarch wrote, the Romans were greatly alarmed by the proximity of their country
to the enemy with whom they would wage war so near their own boundaries and homes, as well as by
the ancient renown of the Gauls, whom the Romans seem to have feared more than other people.
For Rome had once been taken by them.35 Roman fear was based on brutal realities. Even during
Caesars time, appealing to threat of Gallic warriors was a standard feature in the discussion of
foreign policy and security.
For those hesitant to accept Caesars claim that a military intervention in Gaul was intended
to protect Roman interests, it seems probable that he had selected the Aedui for his special
patronage, they constituting, alike from their local influence and flexible character, the lever which
Caesar could eectively work against their tribal rivals, and by doing so, expand Roman control.36
This imperialistic interpretation of Caesars decisions would mean that the Aedians were similarly
utilizing Rome to further their own influence in the region, rather than simply defending themselves
from the Helvetiis belligerence. It is worth noting that if both Caesar and the Aeduan envoys were
telling the truth, the temper of the Aeduans toward the Helvetians would certainly have been one of
flaming indignation. And yet it was plainly was far from being that. On the contrary, the active
sympathy of a great many Aeduans is with the Helvetians.37 This suggests that the pro-Roman
34

Jane F. Gardner, The Gallic Menance in Caesars Propaganda, Greece and Rome, Vol. 30,
No. 2 (October 1983), Page 181; see also, Norman J. DeWitt, The Paradox of Gallo-Roman
Relations, The Classical Journal, Vol. 37, No. 7 (April 1942), Page 400; see also, Adrian
Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), Page 40.
35

Plutarch, Lives. Marcellus, 3.3.

36

G.B Malleson, Vercingetorix, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 4, (1889),
Page 5.
37 37

Max Radin, The International Law of the Gallic Campaigns, The Classical Journal, Vol.
12, No. 1, (October 1916), Page 17.

10
Aeduans were seeking to expand their influence in the region rather than acting out of self defense.
Unfortunately, the evidence available today is ambiguous and equivocal to the point where either
interpretation of Caesars intentions are reasonable, so whether this intervention was the first step
of an imperialist or an act of national defense is largely a matter of debate. Rather than claim one
interpretation is superior to the other, an either, or, it seems probable that both of these concerns
contributed to Caesars decision.
With Caesars resolving to interfere in Gallic aairs he was fundamentally transforming the
political eco-system of Gaul. As we have stated, prior to his arrival, Gaul was characterized by its
regional anarchy, that is, the absence of of a central authority or eective interstate laws that could
enforce a stable political climate.38 The legitimate use of force was monopolized by Caesar; he alone
could sanction intertribal violence with the threat of Roman legions and their vastly superior
resources to enforce it. From here on out, mass migrations, resettlements and any significant
intertribal conduct or sociopolitical decision would now require the explicit approval of Caesar and
his clients states before they could be legitimized and free from retaliation. This geopolitical
transformation from an intertribal anarchy to a unipolar hegemony was enforced through the
violence of Caesars Roman legions and the benefits of Caesars patronship, that is, access to markets
and theoretic immunity from hostile tribes. For the first time, Gaul merged into the larger
Mediterranean hegemony of the Roman empire and was therefore bound by the laws and regulations
set by Caesar.39 Although it took years of campaigning to eventually pacify Gaul, the decision to

38

Arthur M. Eckstein, Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome, (Berkley:
University of California Press, 2006), Page 131; see also, Adrian Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare,
(New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), Page 97.
39

Arthur M. Eckstein, Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome, (Berkley:
University of California Press, 2006), Page 314.

11
enter the region in the first place was in and of itself a remarkably bold and risky expansion of
Roman hegemony.40
Caesar informed the Aedui of his decision to contest the migration, and the Aeduean leaders
agreed to support his campaign with auxiliary cavalry units and a significant supply of grain.41
However, such a seemingly simple and straightforward diplomatic agreement can be dicult to
implement within the convoluted political allegiances of Gallic tribes. Within the Aedui, two
aristocratic and influential brothers, Dumnorix and Divitiacus, were at odds, though not openly, over
what Aedui policy toward Rome should be. This political dispute had essentially factionalized the
Aeduian tribe along anti-Roman and pro-Roman lines, each utilizing their clients and wealth to
influence the ultimate political disposition of the tribe.42 It is worth noting that the Aedui were in a
position of some authority over other tribes, and ruled many dierent clans, so the significance of
their disposition towards Rome had influence upon the Aeduis Gallic clients. On the pro-Roman
side, there was Divitiacus, a druid and thus a man of considerable authority and influence. Divitiacus
advocated to maintain and foster the tribes loyalty to Rome, and as far as the sources suggest,
actively worked to be a good ally to Caesar. Divitiacus seems to have been aware that the Aedui
owed much to the Romans, and tried to live up to that debt. However, his brother, Dumnorix, one of
Orgetrixs triumviral co-conspirators, was aware that Roman generosity had put his brother and
political adversaries in a position of power within the Aedui. He used that knowledge to his own
benefit, cultivating loyalty toward himself through gift-giving and a marriage alliance with the

40

Greg Woolf, Beyond Romans and Natives, World Archaeology, Vol. 28 No. 3, Culture
Contact and Colonialism, (February 1997), 345.
41

Caesar, The Civil War, 1.16, The actual amount of grain was not mentioned by Caesar, but it
must have been significant because when the Aedui failed to deliver it, Caesar momentarily
suspended his campaign to personally reprimand the Aeduis leaders and demand an
explanation. Furthermore, it must have been a significant episode simply because Caesar felt it
was important enough to include in his commentaries, which are for the most part remarkably
succinct.
42

Caesar, The Gallic War, 1.18

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Helvetii. Dumnorix was resolved to resist Roman intrusion in Gallic aairs. Although the ocial
stance of the Aedui were as allies of Rome, Dumnorix leveraged his influence among those with
anti-Roman sentiments, who all thought it better to be dominated by their fellow Gauls rather
than the Romans.43 Dumnorix, therefore, utilized his influence to interrupt and delay the grain
supply the Aedui had promised to Caesar, which in turn interrupted the progress of Caesars
campaign against the Helvetii.44
Dumnorix ability to leverage his wealth and mobilize his clients to sabotage the Aeduis
ability to deliver Caesars grain was largely successful and further illustrates the convoluted network
of political allegiances within the tribe. As the grain supply failed to materialize, the Roman legions
became increasingly desperate and eventually the campaign against the Helvetii was put on hold.
Caesar wrote that he had been, demanding from the Aedui the corn which had been promised by
their government Not only was the corn in the fields not yet ripe, but there was not even a
sucient supply of fodder. He was unable to use the corn which he had transported up the Saone by
boat, because the Helvetii had changed the direction of their march away from the river.45 The
Aeduis negligence in supplying Caesar was threatening the success of his campaign, and neglected
the fundamental rules of a client-patron relationship. Caesar summoned the Aedui leaders and,
reproached them severely for failing to oer assistance at such a pressing time, with the enemy so
close at hand, when corn could neither be bought nor taken from the fields; and he complained with
particular vehemence of having been abandoned, because it was in response to the please of a large
number of them that he had undertaken this war in the first place.46

43

Ibid, 1.19

44

Ibid, 1.18

45

Ibid, 1.15

46

Ibid, 1.16

13
One Aedui noblemen traveling with Caesar, Liscus, confidentially informed him of
Dumnorix anti-Roman sympathizers and their attempt to sabotage the campaign. Caesar, careful
not to oend Diviaticus and alienate the Gauls by punishing Dumnorix, placed the recalcitrant
aristocrat under surveillance. Knowing who was responsible for causing his men hardship but
prudently refusing to do much about it reveals the diculty with which Caesar will grapple
throughout the rest of his conquest of Gaul. The first part of the diculty is that, as noted above,
the Gallic tribes, let alone the whole of Gaul, were not monolithic political communities--indeed it
is not clear that it would be appropriate to call them political at all. They were more like extended
families, and subject to the disputes, blurred lines of authority, and factions that often plague
extended families.47 Therefore, if Caesar were to punish Dumnorix for his crime, it would inevitably
create resentment amongst his clients, followers, and friends that could easily percolate through the
Aedui. Furthermore, the disposition of the pro-Roman tribesmen was an extremely changeable
thing, depending on who happened to be ruling and in what capacity he ruled. The strategic
situation in Gaul was unstable at best, and required much in the way of personal diplomacy and
relationships between Caesar and the leading men of Gaul.
The second diculty has to do with the precarious intersection of strategy and moral
responsibility. Caesar is notable for his generally merciful and clement behavior.48 He was no Sulla or
Mariushis nature was inclined towards generosity, according to Hirtius.49 But the Gauls widely
attested spirit of liberty and independence meant that being a client of Rome was a short step away
from slavery. Dumnorix revealed that personal connections forged by generosity and gratitude, the
weapons of Caesar, could be used against him. This personal aspect of Gallic politics, reflected by
47

Greg Woolf, Beyond Romans and Natives, World Archaeology, Vol. 28 No. 3, Culture
Contact and Colonialism, (February 1997), 341; see also, Adrian Goldsworthy, Caesar: Life of a
Colossus, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), Page 204.
48

Cornelia Catlin Coulter, Caesars Clemency, The Classical Journal, Vol. 26, No. 7 (April
1931), 513-524.
49

Caesar, The Gallic War, 8.44

14
Caesars policy of mercy rather than cruelty, laid the groundwork for instability and chaos over the
next decade, but ultimately led to victory and the complete pacification of Gaul. Patience,
generosity, and the long view are necessary for Caesarian conquests.

The Gallic Council

After decisively defeating the Helvetii on the battlefield, Julius Caesar set about creating the
framework through which he could expand his influence and control in Gallic politics.50 The
experience of Dumnorix had made it abundantly clear to Caesar that in order to maintain control,
he would have to create a more loyal and reliable base of Gallic aristocrats. Solving the problem of
anti-Roman subversion among even friendly states, such as the experience of Dumnorix proved was
possible, would be absolutely crucial to further success in Gaul. He accomplished this administrative
feat by establishing a Gallic Counciltotes Galliae, literally all of the Gaulswhich was attended by
the leaders of each community, or at least those loyal to Rome, and was Caesars vehicle for
expanding his patronage.51 This system of patronage was familiar to both the Romans and the Gauls
as it fundamentally shaped both ancient societies.52 This informal but highly eective system of the
Gallic Council became the medium in which Caesar set about knitting together a massive network
of native integration and cooperation among the tribal elites and with Caesar.53 The council would be
the vehicle for cultivating aristocratic clients in Gaul by making them personally indebted to Caesar.

50

Caesar, The Gallic War, 1.30-1.32

51

Thomas S. Burns, Rome and the Barbarians: 100 BC-AD 400, (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 2006), Page 114; see also, Caesar, The Gallic War, 1.31
52

Adrian Goldsworthy, Caesar: Life of a Colossus, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006),
Page 36; see also, Thomas S. Burns, Rome and the Barbarians: 100 BC-AD 400, (Baltimore:
John Hopkins University Press, 2006), Page 92.
53

Thomas S. Burns, Rome and the Barbarians: 100 BC-AD 400, (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 2006), Page 122.

15
The patron-client relationship was essentially infinite, as it was a hierarchal stratum, where one
could be simultaneously a patron and a client. By extending his patronship to aristocratic Gallic
families, Caesar would therefore attach himself their own local clients and bases of support.54 The
Gallic Council would allow Caesar to stand at the apex of this network of patronage, and therefore
direct and influence Gallic aairs by ensuring the upper echelons of the regions aristocrats were in
his control.
So, instead of what we would consider the quintessential colonial technique of divide and
conquer, Caesar went quite the opposite direction. Because Gaul was so fractionalized, there was no
more dividing to be done that could be beneficial. He instead united the noblemen of the region
through the Gallic Council, which was composed of hand-picked pro-Roman aristocrats, under the
watchful eye of Caesar. This, he believed, would be the key to the regions pacification. Replacing
hostile aristocrats with those of a more pro-Roman disposition proved to be a minor setback, as
Caesar found that in each community some of the leading families were always in exile awaiting their
turn to take power.55 Such exiled groups provided a readymade rallying point for the opposition
within the community. Once a tribe came under the attention of Caesar, he was able to force the
elevation of his major local supporters. Sometimes Caesars candidates received a very hostile
reception, however, once those with Roman backing were established, they proved to be much more
dicult for their traditional opponents to oust.
Gallic councils were summoned from time to time and accomplished a myriad of goals for
Caesar: ensuring the loyalty of client states; integrating them into his plans; securing accurate
information; and establishing trade relationships that increased their economic prosperity but was

54

Greg Woolf, Beyond Romans and Natives, World Archaeology, Vol. 28 No. 3, Culture
Contact and Colonialism, (February 1997), 346.
55

Thomas S. Burns, Rome and the Barbarians: 100 BC-AD 400, (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 2006), Page 60.

16
dependent on their further clientship of Caesar. Gallic aristocrats and their families would be the
first to profit from Roman peace.
Access to Roman markets essentially became the adhesive element that maintain loyalty. The
Romans entrance meant that they inherited the trade routes from those whom they conquered and
they encouraged trade and market as phenomena of acculturation and a method of cultivating
allegiance.56 The aristocrats would then be indebted to Caesar as he was the lynchpin of trade, and
their status relied on his continued support of them. Hence forth, their positions within Gaul were
secured and enhanced by their being clients of Caesar, and such visible honor carried with it many
local rewards.57 Furthermore, the Gallic peoples had received a taste of Roman prosperity: cities and
roads had been constructed, commerce had been enlarged, a Roman army was installed on their
frontiers to defend their homes from marauding Germans.58
When Caesar gave the Gallic council the opportunity to express to the complaints of its
constituents, he was not only tightening his lines of control and management of the aristocrats, he
was simultaneously providing them an opportunity to make changes in the politics of Gaul. Caesar
acted frequently on behalf of complaints and often the wishes of, say the Aedui, were much more
likely to materialize through Caesars patronship than acting independently. Caesar used the full
force of his legions on behalf of his clients. Furthermore, the Gallic assembly allowed the Gauls to
satisfy their aspirations for national union and identity. However, the Gallic Council was by no
means a legislative or even an advisory branch for Gaul.

56

George Cupcea, The Evolution of Roman Frontier Concept and Policy, Journal of Ancient
History and Archeology, No. 2.1 (2015), Page 13.
57

Greg Woolf, Beyond Romans and Natives, World Archaeology, Vol. 28 No. 3, Culture
Contact and Colonialism, (February 1997), Page 346.
58

A.J. Christopherson, The Provincial Assembly of the Three Gauls in the Julio-Claudian
Period, Historia Zeitschrift fur Alte Geschichte, Bd. 17, H. 3 (July 1968), Page 354.

17
The Second Half of 58 BC: Expelling the Germans

Following the decimation of the Helvetii and the establishment of the Gallic Council, Caesar
turned his attention to the major tribal rival of the Aedui, the Sequani. The Sequani, also allies of
Rome, had recently defeated the Aedui in battle but had done so by enlisting the aid of Germans
from across the Rhine. Led by their king, Ariovistus, the Germans had upset the balance of power
between the Aedui and the Sequani, securing victory for the Sequani. Ariovistus, like the Aedui and
Sequani, was yet another ally to Rome. But after participating in the Gallic dispute, he rewarded
himself and his German troops with a sizable portion of Sequani territory. This was not tolerable
turn of events for either the Aedui or the Romans, and so Caesar moved against Ariovistus, no small
task.59
In many ways, Ariovistus and Caesar were in many ways equivalent actors in Gaul. They were
both interlopers within Gallic aairs and were therefore further distorting the natural balance of
political power in Gaul. Caesar tells us that he was determined to expel the Germans for two
reasons. The first is that the subjection of the Aedui and the Sequani foreign rule was an aront to
the honor of the Roman people. We see that as far as Caesar was concerned, allies must be treated
almost like Romans themselves. The word and honor of Rome must mean something, and people
must be persuaded of the worth of aligning themselves with Rome rather than some other power.
The other reason was a fear of Germans crossing over the Rhine too easily. The Rhine remained a
kind of unocial border between Roman imperium and the barbarism outside it, although both
Germans and Romans would cross it form time time, keeping the other on its toes. German invasion
is a specter throughout Caesars writings. Caesar defeats Ariovistus, striking fear into the German
world.

59

Caesar, The Gallic War, 1.31

18
Caesar made it clear that Germans would not be tolerated in Gaul without risk of total war
with Rome. What is most strange about this is the ambiguity of the Rhine as a border. Beyond the
political fragmentation of Gaul, it was similarly culturally diverse and not in any sense culturally
bounded, with various Gallic groups often having more similarities with groups outside of the region
than within Gaul itself.60 This is especially true of Gallic communities along the eastern and western
peripheries, who were typically more Iberian or Germanicethnically, linguistically, and politically
than they were Gallic.61 Despite such variety, there were certain cultural elements that
transcended most barbarians of the European interiormost notably, a fierce and proud warrior
culture. This is likely to have arisen as a crucial adaptive response to the pressures of the turbulent
and anarchic system in which Gallic communities themselves existedthough the eventual
characteristics of the warrior culture came, in turn, to be a powerful contributing element to the
violence of that anarchy.

Expanding and Enforcing Roman Hegemony (56-53 BC)

With the defeat of the Helvetii, the Suebi and the expulsion of the Germans, most Gallic
tribes had resolved to enter the Gallic Council and come under the patronship of Caesar. However,
the Belgic people of northern Gaul were concerned Caesar would attempt to conquer all of Gaul,
and therefore began assembling an anti-Roman coalition.62 In 57 BC, Caesar heard a host of rumors,
confirmed by Labienus, one of Caesars most trusted lieutenants, that the Belgic people were going

60

Greg Woolf, Beyond Romans and Natives, World Archaeology, Vol. 28, No. 3, Culture
Conact and Colonialism, (February 1997), Page 349.
61

For eastern Gallic communities being more Germanic: Henry H. Howorth, The Germans of
Caesar, The English Historical Review, Vol. 24, No. 96, (October 1909), Page 626; For western
Gallic communities being more Iberian: Emanuel Hoffman, Caesar: De Bello Gallico Books I-VII,
(Vienna: Clarendon Press, 1890), Page 91, cites Strabo 3.1,
62

Caesar, The Gallic War, 2.1

19
to resist. Caesar called upon the Beglaes neighbors to inform him of their movements and keep him
informed of developments, which they did loyally. They reported that gangs were mustering, and
army assembling one place. From this report alone, Caesar resolved to strike against them. He used
his allies to secure immediate supply of food and within a fortnight reached the borders of the
Beglae.
Upon his arrival, the Remi tribe immediately declared they were entrusting themselves and
all their possessions to the good faith and power of the Roman people. They informed Caesar that
confederated tribes of the Belgae could muster an army of 170,000 warriors. He also took hostage
the leading familys children.63 Caesar then called for Diviciacus of the Aedui to plunder the Belgaes
flank. This accomplished two things. First, to keep the enemy groups apart, so as to avoid having to
engage with such a huge force all at once. It would secondly reward the Aedui for their staunch
loyalty towards Rome and allowed them to enrich themselves at the cost of anti-Roman tribes.
However, as night fell, a Remi town came under siege by the Belgae for betraying them. They sent a
request Caesar for help, and Caesar immediately relieved the town, demonstrating his ability to keep
his clients safe he was solidifying his good faith as a patron.
Caesar successfully operated against the tribes, and often when Caesar arrived the towns
would immediately surrendered. The Gauls had little acquaintance with siege-works and the mere
sight of such monstrosities of engineering were often enough to intimidate the barbarians into
submission.64 Caesar tells us that, ..on the walls, boys and women with outstretched hands pleaded
with Romans for peace, which it was Caesars custom to grant. Following the defeat of tribes,
Caesar would allow members of the Gallic Council to vouch for them and request clemency.

63
64

Caesar. 38

George R. Swain, Caesars Strategy in the Gallic War, The Classical Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2
(Decemeber 1907), Page 67.

20
Although there was to be considerable military activity in Gaul in 56 BC, the operations
were on a significantly smaller scale than in the previous years. With the Helvetii, Ariovistus and the
Beglic confederation defeated, it was with some justification that Caesar felt Gaul was at peace.65
There was no obvious opponent left in Gaul and it may well be that he was once again considering
diverting his attentions to the Balkans.
At some point in the spring or early summer of 56 bc the mood of these western tribes
changed. Roman ocers despatched to the tribal centers to arrange for gain to be supplied to the
army were seized and a message sent to Crassus saying that they would only be released when their
own hostages were returned. It may simply have been that the locals had not at first appreciated that
the Romans expected to stay and make continued demands for food, and that reliztion swiftly
turned to resenment. The first tribe to act were the Vdneti, living in what is now southern Brittany.
They were a maritime people, deeply involved in trade along the Atlantic coast. Dio claims that they
had heard rumors of Caesar;s planned expedition to Britain and feared that this would disrupt their
trade with theisland, or throw open the markets there to competitors. To Caesar, and doubtless to
his Roman audience, this was a rebellion, the tribes breaking the treaty that they ah so recently
accepting and taking his ocersseveral of whom were equestriansas hostages. The rebellion had
spread rapidly and he was afraid that other tribes might be tempted to join if they judged that the
Romans were weak. This was because the Gauls as a race were inclined to revolution and could be
readily stirred to war.
Caesar strikes against the Veneti himself, believing them to be the heart of the rebellion. In
the face of the highly trained and disciplined legions, they surrendered. No tribe allied to Rome
seems to have come forward to plead their case and Caesar decided that his punishment would be
harsh. Their entire ruling councilprobably numbering several hundredwere beheaded and the
rest of the population of the tribe sold as slaves. Caesar justified this terrible punishment by claiming
65

Adrian Goldsworthy, Caesar: Life of a Colossus, Page 264.

21
that it was necessary to show that representatives or ambassadors ought to be accorded proper
respect. This attitude was probably shared by most contemporary Romans. His ocers had been
seized while visiting peoples who were supposed to be allied to Rome, he makes no mention of the
mens fate whether or not any or all of them were recovered. The severe punishment meted out to
the Veneti was a warning that no Romans, particularly senior ocers and equestrians, could be
mistreated without risking appalling consequences. Taking hostages from the tribes was an
important way for Caesar to retain their loyalty, which was something demanded both of the
communities who welcomed Rome and those who were defeated. The attempt to overturn the
system by taking Roman prisoners could not be allowed to succeed. Therefore, the punishment of
the Veneti was deliberately appalling as a warning to others. The Roman attitude to such brutal
measures was entirely pragmatic. Cruelty for its own sake was condemned, but atrocities that
brought practical advantage to Romes position and were inflicted on foreigners was accepted. 66 The
next couple of campaign seasons consisted of solidifying Roman hegemony and peace in Gaul.

52 BC: Vercingetorix and the Gallic Rebellion

Now that Gaul is pacified, begins the commentary of 52 BC, Caesar set out for Italy.67 It
was winter, and Caesars legions were stationed in northern Gaul. Unsubstantiated rumors began
circulating among the noblemen of the Gallic Council that a revolt was occurring in Rome and that
Caesar had been detained. This rumor percolated throughout the winter and for the resentful and
proud warriors who had anguished their loss of liberty, now was the time to strike.
The Gallic leaders called an assembly in a remote forest location. There they deplored the
execution of Acco, and declared that the same fate could befall them. They bemoaned Gauls

66

Goldsworthy, Caesar: Life of a Colossus, Page 264-270

67

Caesar, The Gallic War, 7.1

22
collective lot, and oered all kinds of pledges and prizes in the search for people prepared to start a
war and risk their own lives to set Gaul free. First of all, they said, a strategy for cutting Caesar o
from his army was essential, before their secret negotiations were revealed. This would be simple,
because the legions would not dare to leave winter quarters without their commander, and the
commander would not be able to reach his legions without an armed escort. Finally, they agreed, it
was preferable to die in battle rather than fail to recover their former military reputation and the
freedom which they had inherited from their ancestors.68
This pang of resentment, indignation and patriotism is exploited by Vercingetorix of the
Arvenri. Caesar speaks of Vercingeotirx as a young man exercising considerable authority and
influence. He was, in fact, the son of Celtillus, a chief of the Arverni, a considerable member of the
Gallic Council, and who, elected year after year to the be the chief magistrate of his tribe, had
caused their capital, Gergovia, to be regarded as the headquarters of the Gallic Council and regional
politics in general. On the accusation of a brother, who was jealous of him, to the eect that he was
aspiring to become a monarch, Celtillus was tried, condemned to death, and burned alive in 60 BC.
Therefore, the new leader of the Arverni and their representative in the Gallic council was Celtillus
brother and Vercingetorix uncle, who was staunchly pro-Roman in his sympathies. His rise had been
favored by Caesar. Ultimately, a consensus among the Gallic elite had been reached that they would
revolt. Dozens of tribes began forming a military coalition and resolved to attack Caesars legions
wintering in northern Gaul.
Upon receiving the news, Caesar raced north to rejoin his legions. Once there, Caesar tried
to goad Vercingetorix into open battle by laying siege to one town after another, massacring or
enslaving their inhabitants if they resisted. Vercingetorix countered with a scorched earth policy,
intended to try to force Caesar to withdraw for lack of supplies. As the hostilities continued and
Caesar was unable to quell the revolt, more Gallic tribes joined, until late in the year even the Aedui
68

Caesar, The Gallic War, 7.1

23
had joined. They had been convinced by false rumors that Caesar had massacred Aeduan cavalrymen
in his service. The defection of his most important ally was a major blow to Caesar. With no secure
base or allies left in Gaul and the countryside denuded of supplies, largely due to a scortched earth
campaign of the rebellion, Caesar gathered his men and began to march south towards Roman
territory. Six years of war and Caesar had achieved nothing.
In the summer of 52 BC, 100,000 Gauls under Vercingetorix attacked Caesar, resulting in
heavy Gallic loses. Caesar had regained the initiative. Vercingetorix and his demoralized army took
refuge in Alesia. Caesar arrived the next day and famously circumnavigated the city with two
ramparts, each about 14 miles in circumference. Vercingeotirx sent cavalrymen out by night, carrying
messages calling on all Gauls to come to his resuce. Forty-four dierent tribes from across Gaul
raised a relief army, claimed by Caesar to have numbered nearly a quarter million. Caesar successfully
repulsed the relief army three times, shattering their morale and leading to their retreat. Seeing that
all hope was gone, Vercingetorix surrendered where he would spend the rest of his life imprisoned in
Rome.
Caesars attempt to create a community of elite Gallic clients workedtestified by the
dissolution of Gallic resistance. However, perhaps the strongest demonstration of Caesars success in
creating a community of Gallic elites is when it failed. Once begun, the idea of assembling the
leadership of Gaul found other proponents, in particular Vercingetorix, who summoned a general
council at Bibracte to rally support and troops for his rebellion against Caesar. Thus Caesar
expounded and promoted a sense of Gaul as a community of elites, and it is unlikely that such a
group had previously existed. His desire for accountability superseded their parochialisms.
Previously political alliances in Gaul had been conducted through marriage and gift exchange and
had at best linked a few great families into regional confederacies and had made only limited
progress in linking regional into supra regional alliances. With the raising of rebellion under
Vercingetorix in 52 b.c., Roman encouragement of Gallic unity helped create a unified enemy. By

24
seeking clear avenues of control over barbarian societies, Roman policy led to the establishment of
higher levels of political and military cooperation in Gaul. However, assessing this rebellion as a
failure on Caesars part would be disingenuousa more accurate assessment would be that it was a
momentary relapse. For once defeated, the Gallic elites were largely replaced and the network of
patronage would continue to operate as intended for decades.

Caesars Clemency

One historian who is particularly critical of Caesar, Max Eichheim, once remarked that
Caesar must have had more hostages than he did soldiers.69 Of the more than 100 Gallic, German
and British tribes mentioned in The Gallic Wars, 37 of whom are specifically recorded as having
rendered hostages to Caesar. Most of these hostages were submitted in conjunction with formal
surrender procedures, and although Caesar occasionally records the surrender of tribes without
mentioning hostages, generally the delivery of hostages, or at least the promise of them, was a
standard perquisite of the granting of peace.70
Throughout the Gallic War, Caesar typically maintained a policy of clemency and fairness to
his defeated opponents.71 Although Caesar often appears barbaric and cruel to modern eyes, relative
to his contemporaries in the ancient world, he was actually quite lenient. In a letter written to
Cicero, Caesar wrote, that nothing is more foreign to my nature than cruelty.72 Comparing Caesar

69

M. James Moscovich, Obsidibus Traditis: Hostages in Caesars De Bello Gallico, The

Classical Journal, Vol. 75 No. 2 (January 1980), Page 122.
70

Ibid, Page 123.

71

Cornelia Catlin Coulter, Caesars Clemency, The Classical Journal, Vol. 26, No. 7 (April
1931), Page 515; see also, Caesar, The Gallic War, 8.49.
72

Lester K. Born, The Art of Command, The Classical Journal, Vol. 23, No. 2 (November
1927), Page 104.

25
to other generals operating against tribes may not be amiss in contextualizing Caesars strategy of
clemency in his management of defeated tribes.
One practice that many Roman generals employed following a siege was brutal and relentless
pillaging, a form of compensation for the legions hard-work.73 According to Polybius, when towns
are taken by the Romans one may often see not only the corpses of human beings, but dogs cut in
half, and the dismembered limbs of animals, and on this occasion such scenes were very many owing
to the numbers of those places. Many of the townspeople who managed to survive the onslaught
were often sold into slavery, along with all of their possessions, to the procession of merchants that
often trailed behind Roman campaigns to take advantage of such the lucrative business
opportunity.74
One Roman general who was operating against a tribal society similar to Caesars Gaul was
Lucius Licinius Lucullus, who was campaigning against the Cavvaei tribe in 151 BC. When Lucullus
and his two legions arrived at the city of Cauca, the Cavvaei immediately surrendered, which
Lucullus accepted. However, his temperament soon changedas soon as the legions were inside of
the city walls, he ordered the massacre of every male.75 Lucullus deceptive brutality was amoral,
even by ancient standards, as it undermined the Senates belief in the good reputation of the
Republic.76 Regardless, Lucullus pathological and deceptive violence was not unique. At almost the
same time in Further Spain, Servius Sulpicius Galba promised a migrating tribe land to settle. When
taken under custody, Galba reneged on his promise and massacred everyone of them. Like noted
earlier however, these atrocities were not uniquely Roman. In 88 BC, the King of Pontus,
73

Adrian Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), Page 81.

74

Adrian Goldsworthy, Caesar: Life of a Colossus, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006),
Page 190.
75

Adrian Goldsworthy, In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won the Roman Empire, (London:
Phoenix Publishing, 2004), Page 195.
76

Ibid, 197.

26
Mithradates, invaded the Roman province of Asia and conducted a genocide when he ordered the
massacre of every Italian in the region. Greek and Roman writers suggested that up to 150,000
people had been slaughtered.
These gruesome scenes are dicult to even fathom despite being relatively common in the
ancient Mediterranean. In the light of these sadistic generals, Caesars campaigns in Gaul begin to
look like a philanthropist's good-will tour. Obviously an exaggeration, however, the fact remains that
Caesar, judged by the standards of ancient war, was quite tame in his treatment of his opponents.77
Caesars first opportunity to administer justice following his decisive victory over the
Helvetii illustrate a pattern of clemency, steadiness and fairness that would for the most part
continue throughout his conquest. Prior to engaging the Helvetii on the battlefield, Caesar made
three basic demands: that they return to the Swiss plateau, that they give hostages as a guarantee of
their good faith, and that they should recompense the Aedui and the Allobroges for the injuries done
to them through pillaging.78 When the Helvetii rejected this ultimatum, Caesar initiated hostilities.
When Caesar defeated them on the battlefield, his demands remained the same, illustrating an
agenda of steady policy, fairness, and clemency. He even supplied them with corn. Restraining from
completely exploiting the despondent tribe was Caesars attempt to reduce resentment and facilitate
cooperation. The historian Mary Beard laconically summarized Caesars policy towards Gallic tribes
as prioritizing, negotiation rather than bloodshed.79 Following a successful siege against the Belgae,
Caesar withdrew his forces from the city so his soldiers did not harm any townspeople.
However, Caesars clemency only went so far. The one thing he did not tolerate was the
treacherous renewal of hostilities after terms of peace had already been agreed upon. This was the
situation when Caesars punished 6,000 Helvetii who tried to evade Caesar despite suing for peace;
77

Cornelia Catlin Coulter, Caesars Clemency, The Classical Journal, Vol. 26, No. 7 (April
1931), Page 515.
78

Caesar, The Gallic War, 1.14

79

Mary Beard, The Roman Triumph, Page 50.

27
the execution of 4,000 Aduatuci and the enslavement of 53,000 others; the execution of the Veneti
aristocrats and the enslavement of the population; the annihilation of the Eburones.80
Perhaps most cruel was in 51 BC, the last year of Caesars command in Gaul, when the rebellion
flamed forth again, when the garrison of Uxellodunum had all of their hands cut o as a warning to
future rebellions. Many of Caesars prisoners are similarly said to have become victims of the co
colleseum. Howver, all of these occured only because they were acting treacherously after suing for
peace. Caesar always treated his enemies kindly if that had not reneged on their alliance.
Hirtius tells us that Caesars chief aim was to retain the friendship of the Gallic tribes and to
leave them no hope and no reasonable ground for war. He therefore laid no new burdens upon them
but treated tribes with honor and bestowed presents upon the chiefs, thereby winning over the
country, which had been exhausted by so many wars, to loyal allegiance.81 The strength of his hold
upon them appeared at the outbreak of Civil War a few months later, when not only did the legion
of Transalpine Gauls whom he had enrolled stand by him but thousands of the noblest and bravest in
the land volunteered for service under his standard.82

Policy of Non-Interference

Caesar generally left the internal aairs of the tribal states alone, and intervened only when
requested or when their loyalty was in question. When he thought that he had been betrayed or
served ill he never hesitated to interfere, and he claimed the right of personal jurisdiction over all of
Gallic nobility. Thus after the revolt of the Senones was put down he held an inquiry into its causes;
and the notable Acco, who had instigated the explosion of Caesars friend Cavarinus, was sentenced

80

Caesar, The Gallic War, 1.27; 2.33; 3.10-16; 6.34-43; 7.11

81

Ibid, 8.49

82

Ibid, 1.39; Cicererro Ad Atticum 4.13.4

28
to death. The treatment of Dumnorix, who in 58 had preferred Helvetian to Roman domination is of
interest. He was placed at that time under the surveillance of his brother, but in 54, when serving as
a cavalry leader with Caesars British expedition, he was suspected of treachery. Caesar authorized
his arrest, and his execution if he resisted, as happened. But such extreme measures occur only in
times of crisis or brazen disloyalty. It is remarkable that Acco was given a trial at all. Caesars general
Gallic policy is one of non-intervention in local aairs.
The most revealing instance of Caesars conforming to native custom appears in Book 7. His
arbitration is needed to settle an election dispute among the Aedui. Although pressed by events
following the revolt of Vercingetorix, Caesar still journey to the territory of the Aeudie rather than
force the magistrates to violate a religious sanctioned law by leaving their territory. Caesar
investigated the customs surrounding the elections and selected the man who best conformed to
tribal law. Such cultural accommodations had not been universal among other proconsuls. However,
this is not to say that Caesar was not concerned with their political ambition. When on the eve of
the second British expedition rivalry arose between the principes of the Treveri, Caesar supported the
one who was openly pro-Roman.83

Conclusion
The triumph of Caesar in Gaul reveals much about the limits of Roman imperialism and the
political power of patronage. Despite the Roman contempt for barbarian societies, it was actually far
more dicult to conquer and pacify the decentralized tribal region compared to states. With a
centralized state, once the ruling class had been defeated or eliminated it is possible to use the
institutions of the state to control the rest of the population. This typically cannot be done in a
decentralized society like Gaul with a plurality of elites, but Caesar managed to create a network of
patronage that was incredibly eective in pacifying th region. Both Vercingetorix and Caesar

29
believed that disunity was a weakness for the Gauls but really it was a hidden strength. Had Gaul
been more united, that is more centralized, than it was in 58 BC, it would have been easier, not
harder, for the Romans to conquer it. Vercingetorix centralized the Gauls and eectively made it
easier for Caesar to end resistance once and for all.
It is highly probable that the Romans would at some point have conquered Gaul, although
perhaps not with the speed, intelligence and fervency that Caesar brought to his campaigns. Caesar
was not responsible for Roman imperialism, although he was certainly a passionate and arguably the
most eective agent of it. Although Caesar had under his control the best fighting force the world
had ever seen, it was ultimately the force of Caesars far-sighted diplomacy that pacified Gaul. His
ability to create, maintain and manipulate his clients is what ultimately subdued a fiercely
independent people of eight million and initiated the process of civilizing western Europe.84

84

George R. Swain, Caesars Strategy in the Gallic War, The Classical Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2
(December 1907), Page 73.

30

Selected Bibliography
Paul Burton, Pax Romana/Pax Americana: Perceptions of Rome in American Political Culture,
2000-2010, International Journal of the Classical Tradition, Vol. 18 No. 1 (March 2011), 66-104.
Mary Beard, The Roman Triumph, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2007).
D.C. Braund, The Aedui, Troy, and the Apocolocyntosis, The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 2
(1980), Page 420.
Lester K. Born, The Art of Command, The Classical Journal, Vol. 23 No. 2 (November 1927),
94-106.
Thomas S. Burns, Rome and the Barbarians: 100 BC-AD 400, (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 2006).
Harry E. Burton, Ferreros Treatment of the First Book of Caesars Gallic War, The Classical
Journal, Vol 6., No 4 (January 1911), 147-157.
Paul Burton, Pax Romana/Pax Americana: Perceptions of Rome in American Political Culture,
2000,2010 International Journal of the Classical Tradition, Vol 18, No 1 (March 2011), 64-104.
Brian Cambell, Diplomacy in the Roman World (500 BC-AD 235), Diplomacy and Statecraft,
Vol. 12 No. 1, (March 2001), 1-22.
C. Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, Translated by Carolyn Hammond, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996).
Cornelia Catlin Coulter, Caesars Clemency, The Classical Journal, Vol. 26, No. 7 (April 1931),
513-524.
A.J. Christopherson, The Provincial Assembly of the Three Gauls in the Julio-Claudian Period,
Historia Zeitschrift fur Alte Geschichte, Bd. 17, H. 3 (July 1968), 351-366.
George Cupcea, The Evolution of Roman Frontier Concept and Policy, Journal of Ancient
History and Archeology, No. 2.1 (2015), 12-22.
Norman J. Dewitt, The Non-Political Nature of Caesars Commentaries, Transactions and
Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol. 73 (1942), 341-352.
Norman J. DeWitt, The Paradox of Gallo-Roman Relations, The Classical Journal, Vol. 37 No.
7 (April 1942), 399-406.
Michael Dietler, Our Ancestors the Gauls: Archeology, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Manipulation
of Celtic Identity, American Anthropologists, New Series, Vol. 96 No. 3, (Sept 1994), 584-605.

31
Arthur M. Eckstein, Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome, (Berkley:
University of California Press, 2006).
Jane F. Gardner, The Gallic Menace in Caesars Propaganda, Greece & Rome, Vol. 30 No. 2
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