You are on page 1of 10

Musa v. Moson G.R. 95574 Aug.

16 1991
Facts:
When Jamiri Musa, a Muslim, died, he had 6 wives, 3 of whom he divorced, and 23 children. He had
extensive real and personal properties located in the provinces of Maguindanao, Davao del Sur and
Davao Oriental.
Abdurahim, one of the surviving widow, filed a Joint Petition for the Administration and Settlement of the
Intestate Estate of Jamir Musa and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership before the Sharia District Court,
Fifth Sharia District, with station at Cotabato City. That Court embraces the province of Maguinadano
within its jurisdiction but not the province of Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental. The petition averred that
the decedent was a resident of Maguindanao.
The petition was opposed by the divorced wives and alleged that the venue was improperly laid, and that
the properties of the decedent located outside Maguindano were beyond the jurisdiction of the Sharia
District Court, Fifth Sharia District.
During the hearing, Abdurahim was then appointed as regular administratrix of the estate. The divorced
wives filed an MR mainly based in the venue and jurisdiction of the court over the real properties situated
in Davao. The MR was denied.
The petitioners assert that the judge should have dismissed the intestate case for lack of jurisdiction and
for improper venue. They claimed that the residence of the decedent at the time of his death was actually
in Davao and not in Maguindanao and that the proper venue is more properly laid in DAvao RTC since
there are no Sharia District Courts there.
Issue:
W/N the Sharia District Court, Fifth Sharia District has jurisdiction over the case
Held: Yes.
The Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, explicitly provides that exclusive original
jurisdiction, in matters of settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, belong to Shari'a District Courts.
Since the disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim is, in fact, involved
herein, the Joint Petition was correctly filed before the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District.
The residence of the deceased in an estate proceeding is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject
matter but merely of venue. The law of jurisdiction confers upon RTC jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of the place of residence of the deceased. The decedent was a resident of both
Maguindanao and Davao City. Venue, therefore, ordinarily could be at either place of the decedent's
residence, i.e., Maguindanao or Davao City, but for the provisions of the Muslim Code vesting exclusive
original jurisdiction, in matters of disposition and settlement of estates of deceased Muslims, in Shari'a
District Courts.
The Organic Act also provides that except in cases of successional rights, the regular courts shall acquire
jurisdiction over controversies involving real property outside the area of autonomy. Since the subject
intestate proceeding concerns successional rights, coupled with the fact that the decedent was also a
resident of Maguindanao, owning real estate property located in that province, venue has been properly
laid with the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, winch is vested with territorial jurisdiction over
Maguindanao, notwithstanding the location in different provinces of the other real properties of the
decedent. A contrary ruling would only result in multiplicity of suits.
The Rules of Court likewise provide that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other Courts. There should be no impediment
to the application of said Rules as they apply suppletorily to the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, there
being nothing inconsistent with the provisions of the latter statute.

Ypon v Ricaforte (Succession)


Ypon v Ricaforte
GR No. 198680, July 8, 2013
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON,
WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEALOSA, PETITIONERS, vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
On July 29, 2010, the Ypons filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with
Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte. In their
complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on
June 28, 1968
Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading
to their subsequent transfer in his name
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a)
his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified
true copy of his passport. Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a)
petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of
action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no
showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdalenos lawful heirs.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC-Toledo: dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
The Court also denied their motion for reconsideration due to the counsels failure to state
the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was
issued.
Direct to the Supreme Court (pure questions of law)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTCs dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint
failed to state a cause of action was proper
RULING:
Yes, it was proper.
General Rule
The rule is that the determination of a decedents lawful heirs should be made in the
corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of
title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v.
CA, the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the
decedents lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose,
and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case.
The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that
such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.
Exception
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the
parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already

presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently
rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist.

88. Puno vs. Puno EnterprisesG.R. No. 177066 (September 11, 2009)
Facts:
Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno
Enterprises, Inc.On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an
heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiateda complaint for specific performance against
respondent. Petitioner averred that he is the son of the
deceased with the latters common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving heir, he
claimed entitlement tothe rights and privileges of his latefather as stockholder of
respondent. The complaint thus prayed that respondent allow petitioner toinspect
its corporate book, render an accounting of all the transactions it entered into from
1962, andgive petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or income pertaining
to the shares of Carlos L. Puno.

Issue:
Whether or not Joselito Musni Puno as an heir is automatically entitled for the stocks
upon the death ofa shareholder.
Held:
Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become
stockholders of the corporationand acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased
as shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs
in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be recorded inthe books
of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no transfer
shall bevalid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the
books of thecorporation.During such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable
owners of the stocks, theexecutor or administrator duly appointed by the court
being vested with the legal title to the stock.Untila settlement and division of the
estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by theadministrator or
executor.

Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor who isentitled to


exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder.
Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming proprietary rights
over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased must be ventilated in a special
proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of the latter. The status of an
illegitimate child who claims to be an heir to a decedents estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary

civil action, as in a case for the recovery of property.19 The doctrine applies to the instant case, which
is one for specific performance to direct respondent corporation to allow petitioner to exercise rights
that pertain only to the deceased and his representatives

San Luis vs. San Luis

Short Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased him,
then married again to an American citizen who divorced him, then remarried
again. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the children in the 1st
marriage contested the standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage
was bigamous since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting under RP law (can't
apply FC retroactively). Court held that even with FC not applied retroactively,
Van Dorn and other jurisprudence sufficiently provides the validity to the 3rd
marriage, thus recognizing divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the
Filipino spouse. However, as the 3rd marriage was not sufficiently proved, the
case was remanded in order for the 3rd spouse to present further evidence on
this.
Facts
FELICISIMO SAN LUIS contracted 3 marriages:
1 VIRGINIA SULIT: had 6 children, died before he did in 1963
1 MERRY LEE CORWIN: US citizen, had son Tobias, divorced him before
Hawaiian courts which was granted in 1973
1 FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN LUIS: married before a Presbyterian Church
in California n 1974, lived with him until he died for 18 years in their
Alabang residence
-when Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND SETTLEMENT OF FELICISIMO'S ESTATE, filing for a
letter of administration before RTC Makati
-petition was contested (MTD) by Felicisimo's children for 2 grounds:
1 Venue improperly laid: should have filed petition in Laguna (domicile) and
not in Makati (covers Alabang, decedent's residence at the time of his
death)
1 No legal personality to sue: Felicidad is only a mistress - marriage to Merry
Lee was still valid (Family Code provision cannot be applied retroactively as
it would impair their vested rights in accordance with Article 256, FC)
---these were denied but Felicidad still filed Opposition to MTD, showing
evidence of the ff:

Felicisimo exercised office in Laguna, but went home in Alabang - to


prove proper venue

Decree of absolute divorce by Hawaii dissolving the marriage of


Felicisimo to Merry Lee - to prove capacity to sue
RTC Makati: Dismissed petition
CA: reversed and set aside
Place of residence should be understood in as the personal, actual or
physical habitation so petition was properly filed

Art26.2, FC should be given effect, allowing a Filipino to remarry under


Philippine law
WON Venue properly laid? YES
-The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election cases.
-there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases,
"residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

19. AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA


JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 189121

July 31, 2013

FACTS

Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law


wife Ma. Lourdes Belen. When Eliseo died intestate, Elise represented by her
mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC
of Las Pias City in order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the
dissipation of its value. She likewise sought her appointment as
administratrix of her late fathers estate.
Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two
children, filed an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper
venue asserting that Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las
Pias City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners
averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed
administratix of Eliseos estate.

RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of


Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. On appeal, the
decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. In
validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was
able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by
establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992.
For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the
Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the
decedent was a resident of Las Pias City.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.
2. Whether or not Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate.
HELD:
1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at
the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far
as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the
terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In
the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the

Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is


the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special
proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence,"
in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons
actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot
be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the
settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is
evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the
venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
2. Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming
evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the
decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse
the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is
founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to
her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.Having a vested
right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise
can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the
law.

JAO VS COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. NO. 128314. May 29, 2002.

Facts:
Petitioner (Rodolfo Jao) and Private Respondent (Perico Jao) were the sons of the
deceased Spouses Ignacio and Andrea Jao who died intestate in 1988 and 1989.

Private respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in the
RTC of Quezon City over the estate of his parents. Pending the appointment of a regular
administrator, private respondent Perico moved that he be appointed as special
administrator, alleging that petitioner Rodolfo was dissipating the assets of the estate.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue. He
alleged that his parents did not reside in Quezon City during their lifetime but in Angeles
City, Pampanga. He submitted documentary evidence showing that his deceased parents
were residents of Angeles City, Pampanga.
Private respondent Perico countered that his parents resides in Quezon City and in
fact, actually resided in petitioners house as shown in the death certificate presented before
the court. Petitioner argued that his parents stay in Quezon City was merely transitory and
that the death certificates could not be deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents
residence.
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondent Perico. The CA affirmed in toto the
trial courts decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the settlement proceeding was properly laid in Quezon City.

Held:
Yes. The settlement proceeding was properly laid in Quezon City.
As provided for under the Rules of Court, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall
be settled or letters of administration granted in the proper court located in the province
where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
The Rules of Court refers to residence at the time of death, not to the permanent residence
or domicile. In the case of Garcia-Fule vs CA, it was held that the term resides connotes ex vi
termini actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. xxx resides
should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time is
required; however, the residence must me more than temporary.
In the case at bar, it was found that the decedents have been living in Quezon City at the
time of their death and some time prior thereto, and as was also shown in the death
certificate presented by private respondent. Thus, the venue for the settlement of the
decedents intestate was properly laid in the Quezon City.

Union Bank v. Santibanez, 452 SCRA 228 | Abu


FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim Santibaez entered into a
loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00.

The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and
his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual
amortizations.
On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600
and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty
Agreement for the later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced before
the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the
testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for
Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor
respectively taken by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by
and between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank.
Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union
Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the
RTC of Makati City. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he
was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines.
Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto.
Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it
was null and void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement.
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as
provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped Florence,
and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document.
In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of money from the
deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the
time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings. She asserts that even
if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the
approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.
ISSUE: W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of
the late Efraim Santibaez was pending. W/N the agreement between Edmund and Florence (which was in effect, a
partition of hte estate) was void considering that it had not been approved by the probate court. W/N there can be a
valid partition among the heirs before the will is probated.
HELD: Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased,
to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered.
The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated.
In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall be
distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my
children.

The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might
have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included
therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not
valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid,
specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late
fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim
Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for
the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against
it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The
plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of
the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any liability incurred by her late
father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty
agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner
failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent
under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty.