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British Journal of Psychology (1997), 88, 39-51

0 1997 The British Psychological Society

39

Printed in Great Britain

Illusory self-assessments-Can
reduced?

they be

Frank I?. McKenna* and Lynn B. Myers


Department of Psychology, UniverIig of Reading, 3 Early Gate, Whiteknights, Reading RG6 6AL, UK
Research indicates that people have a high estimate of their personal ability and
assess their vulnerability to personal risk as less than their peers. Even though these
judgments have been found to be resistant to change, previous research suggests
that making individuals accountable for their judgments may prevent certain
illusory self-assessments developing. Two studies investigated whether accountability modifies estimates of personal ability and vulnerability. Results indicated that
making participants more accountable for their judgments significantly reduces
positive self-assessments. There was also some suggestion that the extent of the
accountability effect is proportional to the magnitude of the accountability
manipulation.

There is growing evidence that people estimate their personal risk as less than their
peers. This finding has been reported for a large number of events including the risk
of lung cancer (Perloff & Fetzer, 1986; Weinstein, 1980), AIDS (Joseph e t al., 1987),
drug addiction (Weinstein, 1987) and road accidents (Svenson, 1981). It has been
argued that this range of results is evidence of a pervasive optimism bias (Weinstein,
1989). Although it has been demonstrated that there are limits to these optimism
effects (McKenna, Warburton & Winwood, 1993), concern has been expressed that
if people perceive that they are less vulnerable than others then there is less
motivation to engage in self-protective behaviour. The failure to employ selfprotective behaviours such as engaging in safe sex, stopping smoking and adopting
a low-fat diet can then be understood in terms of a relative perception of
invulnerability. The fact that people believe not only that negative events are less
likely to happen to them but also that positive events are more likely to happen to
them has led Weinstein (1980) to use the term unrealistic optimism.
Weinstein (1987) has argued that a number of factors could underlie unrealistic
optimism. For example, egocentrism may play a role, first by promoting a perception
that as individuals they take action to prevent harm and second by a failure to realize
that others may also take the same precautions. A second possible factor may be
through downward comparisons such that individuals maintain self esteem by
selectively comparing themselves with people who are at high risk (Wills, 1981). A
third possible factor, suggested by Weinstein (1982), was that people may use their
past experience to predict their future vulnerability and mistakenly believe that if
they have not yet experienced a problem then they are exempt from future risk. One
* Requests for reprints.

40

Frank P. McKenna and Lynn B. Myers

important task will be to determine which proposal can best account for the data, or
alternatively, under what conditions each factor plays a role. For example, McKenna
(1993) has shown that in at least one area people only perceive themselves to be
relatively invulnerable when they perceive themselves to be in control. When the
control element was eliminated so also was the perception of invulnerability. The
extent to which control is a necessary factor for the perception of invulnerability is
an interesting issue. The fact that the majority of people perceive that their homes
are relatively invulnerable to such factors as radon gas (Weinstein, Sandman &
Roberts, 1991) would suggest that control is not the only factor.
Perceived vulnerability is a key variable in a number of theoretical positions such
as the health belief model (Janz & Becker, 1984) and Rogers protection motivation
theory (Rogers, 1983). These models propose that individuals will be inclined to
change their behaviour in proportion to their perceived vulnerability. Consistent
with this proposal, a number of studies have found an association between those who
perceive themselves at risk and those most likely to engage in self-protective
behaviour (Jam & Becker, 1984; Weinstein e t al., 1991). It has often been argued (e.g.
Stiff, 1994) that public health campaigns are frequently ineffective because they fail
to change the perception of invulnerability. In examining the effects of mass media
communications, Tyler & Cook (1984) distinguish between the effects on perceived
societal risk versus personal risk. They found that mass media communications on
crime affected perceptions of societal risk but not personal risk. Similarly, it has been
found that communications on AIDS resulted in an increase in the estimates of the
societal problem with no change in perceptions of personal vulnerability (Spears,
Abraham, Abrams & Sheeran, 1992).
If the perception of vulnerability does play a role in prompting behaviour change
then an understanding of those factors which affect that perception would have
widespread implications. A number of recent attempts to change judgments of
personal risk have met with little success (Weinstein & Klein, 1995; Weinstein et a/.,
1991). The present studies explore the role of accountability (Semin & Manstead,
1983; Tetlock, 1985). It has been argued that accountability is a key feature of
everyday decision making. When people expect to justify their judgments to others,
it has been proposed that they become more vigilant information processors.
Similarly, Kunda (1990), has argued that while there is evidence that people are
overly inclined to arrive at conclusions they desire, the requirement to justify
decisions to others is a key constraining factor. As a result a number of judgmental
biases are reduced (though see Tetlock & Boettger, 1989 for a possible
counterexample). Early work on accountability has indicated powerful debiasing
effects such that there is (a) a decrease in overconfidence (Tetlock & Kim, 1987), (b)
a reduction in the primacy effect and improvement in memory (Tetlock, 1983), and
(c) a reduction in the overattribution effect (Tetlock, 1985). Although each of the
above effects are very general the one which has the most relevance for the present
work is overconfidence.
Overconfidence has been demonstrated in many paradigms (Harvey, 1994) and has
been described variously as the above average effect (Dunning, Meyerowitz &
Holzberg, 1989) and illusory superiority (Hoorens, 1993). It has been found for
example, that the vast majority of people rate their intelligence (Dunning eta/., 1989),

Accot/ntabilit_yand self-assessment

41

driving ability (Svenson, 1981) and managerial skills (Larwood & Whttaker, 1977)
as above average. Even in tasks involving psychophysical judgments and general
knowledge questions it has been found that confidence is higher than accuracy would
warrant (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff & Phillips, 1982). Although there has been some
suggestion that misleading cues may account for the latter overconfidence effect
(Gigerenzer, Hoffrage & Kleinbolting, 1991), more recent evidence suggests that
this proposal cannot account for all the results (Baransli & Petrusic, 1994; Griffin &
Tversky, 1992; Harvey, Bolger & McClelland, 1994). In principle, overconfidence
could have a number of important practical implications. On the positive side, it
could promote the active engagement on difficult tasks and foster greater
determination and effort. The overall result may in some circumstances be more
effective performance (see Taylor & Brown, 1988 for a similar argument). On the
negative side, overconfidence could lead people to make decisions in which their
personal expectations so far outstrip the actual outcome that the result is financial
disaster or physical injury. For example, Cohen, Dearnley & Hansel (1956) have
shown that drivers overestimate their ability to take a vehicle through narrow gaps.
In areas such as driving, it is not difficult to see how overconfidence might be
associated with dangerous behaviours. Two studies were carried out to test whether
accountability might decrease the overconfidence frequently observed in drivers
judgments of themselves. A further question addressed concerned whether
accountability can affect judgments that have already been formed or only affects the
process of impression formation. Tetlock & Kim (1987) argue that there are
constraints on the power of accountability. In particular, they suggest, and present
evidence in favour of the proposal, that accountability is effective in preventing but
not reversing judgmental biases. Tetlock & Kim (1987) conclude that although the
process of judgment formation is amenable to accountability, once a judgment has
been formed accountability no longer has a role.

STUDY 1
In many psychology experiments participants are assured that their responses are
completely confidential and not traceable to them. By contrast, accountability
manipulations explicitly or implicitly indicate to the participants that their judgments
are open to inspection by others who may or may not arrive at the same judgment.
Since previous studies have indicated that when participants judgments are open to
scrutiny by others then their judgmental biases are reduced, it is proposed that
accountability may modify self-assessments. In the present context, participants selfratings of their driving abilities were compared in two conditions (i) a control
condition, when they were not made to feel accountable for their responses, and (ii)
an accountable condition, when they were told that after they had made their selfratings the same skills would then be assessed in a driving simulator.

Method
Participants
Eighty-two undergraduate psychology students from Reading University participated in the experiment.
Their ages ranged between 18 and 44 years (mean = 22.00 years). Full driving licences had been held

42

Frank P. McKenna and Lynn B. Myers

for between two months and 21 years (mean = 3.11 years). Participants were randomly allocated to one
of two experimental conditions, with 40 participants being assigned to the experimental (accountable)
condition and 42 being consigned to the control condition.

Materials and procedure


The Driving Skills Questionnaire (DSQ) was a modified version of that employed by McKenna, Stanier
& Lewis (1991). There were three general questions concerning participantsperceptions of their driving.
These were: (1) Relative to the average driver how skilful do you think you are? (2) Relative to the
average driver how safe do you think you are? (3) Relative to the average driver do you think you
are more or less likely to be involved in a driving accident when you are driving? Ratings were on an
ll-point scale, ranging from 1 anchored at much less than average to 11 anchored at much more than
average. There were 17 questions relating to driving subskills, where participants were required to rate
specific skills relative to the average driver. These were also rated on an ll-point scale, ranging from
1 anchored at very poor to 11 anchored at very good. The subskills are listed in Table 2. Further
questions ascertained demographic information concerning the drivers age and driving experience
(measured in years of holding a full drivers licence).
One group of participants (the accountable condition) were given additional instructions at the
beginning of the questionnaire. They were told that those aspects of their driving that they were asked
to rate in the questionnaire would be assessed directly after completing the questionnaire in a driving
simulation task in which their responses would be recorded. The other group of participants (control)
completed the questionnaire without further instructions.

Results

General questions
Initially, group differences were explored for the three general questions and the
mean ratings for the 17 subskill questions. Since the role of driving experience has
been shown to have an important effect on judgments (McKenna e t al., 1991), analysis
of covariance was calculated with driving experience as a covariate. Mean scores can
be found in Table 1.

Table 1. Means (and standard deviations) for self-ratings for both studies
Study 1

Control

Accountable
Study 2

6.70 (1.83)
7.35 (1.75)
4.55 (2.00)

7.52 (1.55)
8.26 (1.34)
4.93 (1.81)

6.47 (1.74)
7.10 (1.86)
5.26 (1.58)

6.84 (0.97)

7.44 (1.14)

6.76 (0.89)

Accountable

Question
How skilful relative to the average
How safe relative to the average
How likely to have an accident as a driver
relative to the average
Mean rating for 17 driving subskills

Self-estimates were significantly reduced for two of the three general questions.
There were significant differences between the two conditions in the ratings for
In the present studies there was little difference between the analyses with and without the covariate, perhaps
reflecting that the groups were relatively well matched and there was relatively little range in experience.

Accountability and self-assessment

43

general skill relative to the average driver (F(1,81) = 4.38, p < .05), with the
accountable group rating themselves as less generally skilful than the control group,
and general safety relative to the average driver (F(1,81)= 6.33, p < .05) with the
accountable group rating themselves as less safe than the control. The comparison
with accident likelihood as a driver was not significant (F(1,81) = 0.34, n.s.). In
addition, there was a significant group difference for the mean of the 17 driving
subskills (F(1,81) = 5.73, p < .05), with the accountable group rating themselves as
less skilful for specific skills than the control.

Self-ratings compared t o the average. On each of the dependent variables the mid-point
of the scale was identified as average. To determine whether the participants rated
themselves as significantly better than average we used one sample t-tests.
Control condition. Participants rated themselves as being significantly more skilful
(t(41)= 6.24,p < .OOOl) and safer (t(41)= 10.76,p < .OOOl) than the average driver,
and significantly less likely to have an accident as a driver (t(41)= - 3.80, p < .OOl).
The mean rating for the 17 subskills was also significant (t(41)= 7.83, p < .OOOl).
Accotlntable condition. As in the control condition, there were significant differences for
skill (439) = -2.08, p < .05), safety (t(39)= -2.64, p < .Ol), accident likelihood
as a driver (439) = -4.54, p < .OOl) and the mean of the 17 driving subskills
((39) = -2.64, p < .Ol).

Individual subskills
Mean scores can be found in Table 2.
A MANOVA of group x subskills with driving experience as a covariate indicated
that there was a significant main effect of group (F(1,80) = 6.19,p < .05) and a main
effect of subskills (F(16,1280)= 29.63, p < .OOl). However, the group x subskill
interaction did not reach significance (F(16,1312) = 4.11, p = .14). Independent ttests indicated significant differences between the two conditions in the mean selfratings for five out of 17 subskills, with the accountable group rating themselves as
significantly less skilful than the control group on the following individual skills :
attention to other road users (t(80)= -2.03, p < .05), changing traffic lanes
(t(80)= -2.54, p < .05), judging stopping distances (t(80) = -2.85, p < . O l ) ,
changing lanes on motorways (t(80) = -2.32, p < .05), and driving in busy town
traffic (t(80)= -2.32, p < .05). Two subskills approached significance: driving at an
appropriate speed for conditions (t(80)= - 1.87, p = .062) and adjusting driving to
suit weather conditions (t(80)= - 1.92, p = .058).

Self-ratings compared to the average. On each of the subskills the mid-point of the scale
was identified as average. The comparison t-test statistics for the control and the
accountability conditions are presented in Table 3.

44

Frank: P. McKenna and Lynn B. Myers

Table 2. Means (and standard deviations) for self-ratings for each of the 17 subskills
in both studies
Subskill
Navigating while driving in unfamiliar areas
Leaving motorways
Driving at an appropriate speed for conditions
Overtaking
Attention to other road users
Reversing
Parking
Changing traffic lanes
Three-point turns
Hill starts
Judging stopping distances
Attention to road signs
Moving onto motorways
Adjusting driving to suit weather conditions
Changing lanes on motorways
Judging correct approach speed for bends
Driving in busy town traffic

Accountable
Study 1

Control

Accountable
Study 2

6.20 (1.79)
7.50 (1.43)
6.95 (2.05)
6.48 (1.91)
7.43 (1.65)
6.48 (1.84)
5.68 (2.28)
6.68 (1.70)
7.93 (1.38)
8.45 (1.48)
6.03 (2.22)
6.88 (1.83)
6.10 (1.97)
6.68 (1.97)
6.95 (1.88)
6.98 (1.80)
7.90 (1.90)

6.17 (2.32)
7.40 (1.95)
7.79 (2.21)
6.74 (2.24)
8.14 (1.79)
7.31 (2.38)
6.52 (2.76)
7.60 (1.80)
7.97 (2.39)
8.19 (2.30)
7.31 (1.85)
7.43 (1.94)
6.81 (1.97)
7.55 (1.80)
7.86 (1.86)
7.55 (1.80)
7.90 (2.03)

5.71 (2.04)
6.41 (2.34)
6.38 (1.96)
6.60 (2.08)
7.29 (1.52)
6.86 (1.83)
5.19 (2.38)
6.69 (1.59)
7.81 (1.86)
8.33 (1.66)
5.57 (1.64)
6.21 (1.39)
6.23 (2.15)
6.93 (1.61)
6.95 (1.85)
6.78 (1.69)
6.52 (2.11)

Table 3. T values for mean self-ratings for each of the 17 subskills compared to the
average driver in each condition for both studies
Subskill
Navigating while driving in unfamiliar areas
Leaving motorways
Driving at an appropriate speed for conditions
Overtaking
Attention to other road users
Reversing
Parking
Changing traffic lanes
Three-point turns
Hill starts
Judging stopping distances
Attention to road signs
Moving onto motorways
Adjusting driving to suit weather conditions
Changing lanes on motorways
Judging correct approach speed for bends
Driving in busy town traffic

* p < .05; * * p < .01; ***p < .001; ****p C .0001.

Accountable
Study 1

0.78
6.91****
2.93**
1.55
5.34****
1.89
2.88**
2.17*
8.84****
10.44****
0.07
2.96**
0.41
2.25*
3.03**
3.20**
3.27**

Control

0.47
4.67***
5.23****
2.08*

7.68****
3.58***
5.16****
5.76****
5.89****
6.39****
4.51***
4.77***
2.64**
4.84***
6.20****
5.58****
6.22****

Accountable
Study 2

-0.91
1.12
1.26
1.85
5.49****
3.04**
1.23
2.78**
6.29****
9.10****
-1.69
1.oo
0.72
3.73***
1.48
3.01**
1.61

Accomtability and self-assessment

45

Control condition. Participants in the control condition rated themselves as being


significantly better than average for 16 of the 17 manoeuvres (see Table 3). There was
no significant difference for subskill navigating while driving in unfamiliar areas .
InfEt/ence of accountabilig maniptrlation. Participants in the accountable group rated
themselves as significantly better than average on 12 of the 17 subskills (see Table 3).
As in the control group, ratings were not significantly different from average on the
item navigating while driving in unfamiliar areas . Perhaps of more interest,
participants in the accountability group rated themselves as not significantly better
than average on the following four subskills : overtaking, reversing, judging
stopping distances and moving onto motorways.
Discussion
Results indicated that the accountability manipulation employed significantly reduced
drivers estimates of their general skill and safety and decreased their overall
estimates on the subskills. On the specific subskills, the accountable group rated
themselves as being significantly less skilled than the control group on five of the 17
subskills. Although participants generally judged themselves better than average on
the subskills, the accountability manipulation did increase the number of subskills
where they rated themselves as no better than average. Whereas the control group
rated themselves as no better than average on only one subskill, under the
accountability manipulation this was increased to five. It is possible to conclude that
not only did the accountability manipulation reduce overall judgments of skill and
safety, there were in addition specific effects on a number of subskills.

STUDY 2
One possible limitation of Study 1 concerns the magnitude of the accountability
manipulation. It is possible that the magnitude of the accountability effect is
proportional to the magnitude of the accountability manipulation. In this case it
would be possible to demonstrate a more clear-cut effect by producing a more
widespread accountability manipulation. One possible method of achieving this is to
inform participants in the accountable condition that they would be taken out and
tested on those aspects of their driving which they were asked to rate. Under these
circumstances, the identity of the tester was considered to be especially important. If
an individual is to be made to feel accountable to someone in relation to a particular
aspect of their behaviour, then the person to whom they are made to feel accountable
must be a valued judge of the behaviour in question. Consequently, a preliminary
study was conducted in order to determine who drivers considered to be a good
judge of their driving, so that this person could be used as the proposed judge in the
main study.
Pilot ratings were taken from 45 undergraduate student drivers. They judged that
an Institute of Advanced Motorists (IAM) examiner would best represent as a good
judge, therefore the IAM examiner was the proposed judge for Study 2.

46

Frank P. McKenna and Lynn B. Myers

Method
Participants
Forty-two undergraduate students from Reading University participated in the experiment. All
participants held a full British drivers licence. Their ages ranged between 18 and 40 years (mean =
20.83 years). Full licences had been held for between two months and 20 years (mean = 3.12 years).
None of the participants had taken part in the previous experiment. Since participants were selected
from the same population as in Study 1 the control group from that study was able to serve the same
function for Study 2.

Materials and procedure


Participants completed the DSQ. All participants performed in the accountable condition and were
compared with the control group from Study 1. Before answering the questionnaire, participants were
told that those aspects of their driving that they were asked to rate in the questionnaire would actually
be tested by an IAM driving examiner. The instructions stated that times would be arranged for this
to take place the following week and the test sessions would take place during the term.

Results
General questions
As in Study 1, group differences were explored using ANCOVA with driving
experience as a covariate. Results indicated a similar pattern to the previous study,
with self-estimates being reduced for two of the three general questions. There were
significant differences between the two conditions in the ratings for general skill
relative to the average driver (F(1,83) = 6.76, p < .05), with the accountable group
rating themselves as less generally skilful than the control group, and general safety
relative to the average driver (F(1,83) = 10.59,p < .005), with the accountable group
rating themselves as less safe than the control, although the comparison for accident
likelihood as a driver was not significant (F(1,83) = .76). Again, there was a
significant group difference for the mean of the 17 driving subskills (F(1,83) = 9.11,
p < .Ol), with the accountable group rating themselves as less skilful for specific
skills than the control.

Self compared t o the average. Participants rated themselves as being significantly more
skilful (t(41) = 2.13, p < .05) and safer (t(41) = 3.82, p < .001) than the average
driver, and significantly less likely to have an accident as a driver (t(41) = -3.03,
p < .Ol). The mean rating for the 17 subskills reached significance (t(41) = 4.31,
p < .OOOl).
Individual subskills

A MANOVA of group x subskills with driving experience as a covariate indicated


that there was a significant main effect of group (F(1,80) = 13.08, p < .OOl) and a
main effect of subskills (F(16,1312) = 10.46, p < .OOl) and a significant group x
subskill interaction (F(16,1312) = 5.60, p < .05). For the individual subskills, the

Accot/ntabi&y and self-assessment

47

results of Study 1 were replicated, with the accountable group rating themselves as
significantly less skilful than the control group on the same five subskills as Study 1:
attention to other road users ((82) = -2.59, p < .05), changing traffic lanes
($32) = -2.53, p < .05), judging stopping distances (t(82)= -3.99, p < .OOl),
changing lanes on motorways (t(82)= -2.62, p < .Ol), and driving in busy town
traffic (t(82)= -3.16, p < .Ol). In addition, the accountable group rated themselves as significantly less skilful than the control group on five additional subskills :
leaving motorways (t(82)= -2.13,p < .05), driving at an appropriate speed for conditions (t(82)= - 3.08, p < .Ol), parking (t(82) = -2.31, p < .05), attention to road
signs ((82) = -3.30, p < .Ol), and judging correct approach speed for bends
(t(82)= -2.00, p < .05).
Self-ratings compared t o the average. Participants in the accountable group rated
themselves as significantly better than average on only seven of the 17 subskills (see
Table 3). As in both experimental groups in the previous study, ratings were not
significantly different from average on the item navigating while driving in
unfamiliar areas . Participants in the accountable group rated themselves as not
significantly better than average on the following nine subskills : moving onto,
changing lanes on, and leaving, motorways; driving at an appropriate speed for
conditions ; overtaking ; parking ; judging stopping distances ; paying attention to
road signs and driving in busy town traffic.

Discussion
As in Study 1, the accountability manipulation decreased judgments of general skill
and safety. On the judgment of the specific subskills the accountability manipulation
does appear to have produced a rather more clear shift in judgments than in the
previous experiment. This may be illustrated by considering the number of subskills
that are significantly affected by the accountability manipulation and by considering
the number of subskills where subjects no longer judge themselves better than
average. In Study 1 it was noted that there was a significant decrease in the selfratings of five subskills. By comparison, in Study 2 there was a significant decrease
in the self-ratings of 10 subskills.
In assessing those specific skills where participants considered they were not better
than average, in Study 1 there were five such skills and in Study 2 this had increased
to 10 skills. It would appear, therefore, that the effect of the present manipulation was
more widespread. Of course, it is possible that the present accountability manipulation
was weaker than intended. For example, it is possible that some of those who
provided judgments had no intention of allowing their skills to be assessed in the
subsequent weeks.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our results like previous research have demonstrated that people have a high degree
of confidence in their personal skills and safety. This result is all the more remarkable
in the present study given the inexperience of the sample. It is known that those with
relatively little experience perform poorly on objective tasks (McKenna & Crick,

48

Frank P. McKenna and Lynn B. Myers

1991; Summala, 1987) and have a high accident rate (Maycock, Lockwood & Lester,
1991). The issue of overconfidence assumes a considerable degree of importance in
the light of recent findings that indicate that confidence judgments are related to selfreported risk-taking behaviour (Hall & West, 1994).
Although previous research has indicated that existing self-assessments are
resistant to change (Fischhoff, 1982; Weinstein & Klein, 1995) the present work
would suggest that some degree of debiasing is possible. The significanceof this issue
has been noted by Arkes (1991) and Fischhoff (1982) who argued that clarifying the
processes underlying debiasing represents one of the major theoretical and practical
challenges ahead. The primary area we selected for investigation, driving and road
accidents, was chosen on both theoretical and practical grounds. Since it has been
argued that there is an important question of whether the illusory biases will
generalize to areas with high degrees of familiarity and realism (Smith & Kida, 1991)
it seemed appropriate to embed our work in a task such as driving which
incorporates both these features. The second general reason for choosing driving
relates to the high societal impact of driving. In terms of life-expectancy there are
more pre-retirement years lost through road accidents than any other factor (Evans,
1991).
The results of two different manipulations indicate that making participants more
accountable for their judgments significantly reduces their reports of positive selfassessment. Although both accountability manipulations produced a significant
reduction in participants judgments of skill and safety there was no effect on
judgments of accident likelihood. One possible explanation of the latter finding
might be that individuals estimate that their accident likelihood is considerably
affected by factors external to themselves. In other words, individuals may perceive
that judgments of skill and safety are personal evaluations but judgments of accident
likelihood are significantly influenced by non-personal factors such as environmental
conditions and the performance of other people.
The extent to which the accountability effect observed here is mediated by intrapsychic versus impression management processes is difficult to ascertain. Indeed
Tetlock & Manstead (1985) have argued that attempts to distinguish between these
positions are fraught with difficulty. They argue that none of the strategies designed
to distinguish between these theoretical positions will yield decisive evidence. As a
consequence they conclude that greater effort should be exerted on overarching
theoretical issues that are common to both classes of explanation. In the present
context one such issue might concern the extent to which accountability effects are
dependent on the temporal presence of an overt accountability manipulation.
Consider for example, the contrast between obeying the laws concerning speed limits
and seat belts in Britain. It is known that drivers will obey the law limiting speed in
the presence of a police car and disobey in the absence (Shinar & Stiebel, 1986). Seat
belt legislation has provided an interesting contrast. Although the majority of people
did not use seat belts prior to legislation their behaviour changed following
legislation and continued to conform to the law even in the absence of overt
enforcement. An important issue might therefore involve determining the conditions
under which the presence of an overt accountability manipulation is required. In the
present case the accountability manipulations affected self-assessments even though

Accotlntability and self-assessment

49

there were no formal sanctions. However, the extent to which the change would
continue in the absence of the manipulation is unknown. The more widespread effect
found in Study 2 is consistent with the proposal that the magnitude of the
accountability effect is proportional to the magnitude of the accountability
manipulation and raises the possibility that even larger effects may be obtained. (It
should be noted that in the present experiments there was no independent
manipulation check on the accountability conditions.) No doubt there is a limit to the
magnitude of the accountability effect, but whether this limit is a decrease in
overconfidence or the introduction of self-doubt and insecurity would be an
important issue to determine.
Tetlock (1983) has argued that one important limitation of much of the heuristics
and biases research is that in the laboratory, in contrast to real life, individuals rarely
expect to account for or justify their decisions. In a series of papers Tetlock has
argued that manipulations of accountability can make individuals more vigilant and
self-critical information processors. Although successful in reducing a range of social
psychological biases, Tetlock & Kim (1987) have identified one major limitation on
the utility of accountability manipulations. They have found that accountability is
more effective in preventing than in reversing judgmental biases. In other words,
they argue that accountability has a marked effect on the impression-formation
process but relatively little on the recoding of information already stored. Whether
the present research bears on this issue depends on the plausibility of the premise that
individuals had already formed their self-assessments. If that premise is correct then
Tetlock & Kims limitation would not hold and accountability may have more
powerful effects than was originally thought. The present research would suggest
that this issue should be reconsidered.

Acknowledgements
The support of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) is gratefully acknowledged. The
work was funded by ESRC award number X202252006.

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Received 31 March 1995; revised version received 1 October 1995

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