Intrinsic Motivation and the Logic of

Collective Action
The Impact of Selective Incentives

ajes_722

823..839

By ANDREAS P. KYRIACOU*
ABSTRACT. I integrate the notion of intrinsic motivation, applied to
economics most notably by Frey (1997), into the logic of individual
contributions toward collective goods as analyzed since Olson ([1965]
1971). This illuminates the many and various ways through which the
intrinsic motivation to contribute toward such goods can be crowded
out by the application of selective incentives. I suggest that the
crowding-out effect increases the cost to society of organizing the
provision of collective goods and argue in favor of designing selective
incentives that mitigate this effect.
[S]triving for the public happiness (in some concrete respect) and attaining
it cannot be neatly separated. Indeed the very act of going after the public
happiness is often the next best thing to actually having that happiness
. . . the benefit of collective action for an individual is not the difference
between the hoped-for result and the effort furnished by him or her, but
the sum of these two magnitudes! . . . [S]ince the output and objective of
collective action are ordinarily a public good available to all, the only way
in which an individual can raise the benefit accruing to him from the
collective action is by stepping up his own input, his effort on behalf of the
public policy he espouses. Far from shirking and attempting to get a free
ride, a truly maximizing individual will attempt to be as activist as he can
manage, within the limits set by his other essential activities and objectives.
(Hirschman 1977: 8586)

*Andreas Kyriacou is an Associate Professor of Economics, Department of Economics,

Universitat de Girona, 17071 Girona, Spain; e-mail: andreas.kyriacou@udg.es. Andreas
has published in Kyklos, International Review of Law and Economics, Journal of
Economic Surveys, European Journal of Law and Economics, and Constitutional Political Economy, among other journals. The author would like to express thanks for
financial assistance from Project SEJ2007-2010 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologa,
Spain).
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 69, No. 2 (April, 2010).
2010 American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.

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I
Introduction

AT THE HEART OF Albert O. Hirschmans argument above is the notion

of intrinsic motivation. This concept comes from psychology and is
defined as doing the activity for its inherent satisfaction rather than
for some separable consequence. When intrinsically motivated a
person is moved to act for the fun or challenge entailed rather than
because of external prods, pressures, or rewards (Ryan and Deci
2000a: 56). Alternatively, extrinsic motivation relates to activities done
in order to attain some separable outcome or instrumental value.1 In
Hirschmans account, intrinsic motivation goes some way toward
explaining why rational individuals contribute to collective action
instead of simply free riding on others contributions. Another reason
for not free riding is, of course, the application of selective incentives
(Olson [1965] 1971). These can either coerce free riders or reward
those contributing toward the collective good. They may take the form
of legal penalties (fines, incarceration), social sanctions (ostracism),
social rewards (status and respect), or economic prizes (transfers,
assets, or private goods).
Intrinsic motivation and selective incentives are not unrelated. Frey
(1994, 1997) and Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) have presented
both a theory and empirical evidence that alerts us to a potentially
undesirable effect of economic incentives; namely, that they may
crowd out intrinsic motivation (see also Jones et al 1998; Ostrom
2000a). In line with this, Frey (1997) argues that civic virtue, environmental or work morale, volunteer work, blood donations, and even
military morale can be crowded out by external incentives that ignore
the presence of intrinsic motivation. Freys discussion of this tradeoff
is not couched in the context of the collective action problem. As a
result, he talks of price or monetary incentives, not of selective
incentives, although conceptually both are identical since they are
external to the individual. This article will place Freys insights
squarely within the context of collective action. Doing so facilitates a
better understanding of the implications of the relationship between
intrinsic motivation and selective incentives for the provision of collective goods and offers some fresh insights on Freys thinking on this

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825

important tradeoff. Ultimately, I will argue that designing selective

incentives that are sensitive to the existence of intrinsic motivation is
a cost-minimizing strategy for society.
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2, I carefully define
intrinsic motivation as a preference, to differentiate it from other
definitions adopted either explicitly or implicitly in the literature. This
allows me, in Section III, to present a probabilistic model of the free
rider problem that incorporates the idea of intrinsic motivation and
captures the individuals choice calculus in the context of the collective action problem. Armed with this model, in Section IV I revisit
Freys ideas on the crowding-out effect and point to the implications
for collective action and for Freys insights. In Section V, I consider the
impact of the crowding-out effect on the social costs of organizing
collective action, and I conclude the paper in Section VI.
II
Intrinsic Motivation as Preference in Economic Analysis

THE INDIVIDUALS I ANALYZE in this article are selfish in that they have a
preference for the consumption of the public good, but they also have
altruistic preferences in that they have a taste for the consumption of
the public good by others. Both these egoistic and altruistic preferences are instrumental or results-oriented in that their satisfaction
depends on the actual consumption of the public good by the
individual or others.
Importantly, individuals are moreover assumed to be intrinsically
motivated, such that they receive utility from the very act of contributing toward the public good. This participation altruism (Margolis
1982; Olson 1982) must be distinguished from the previous resultoriented variety. It corresponds to Andreonis (1989) warm glow
from the very act of giving. He calls this selfish altruism to distinguish it from the nonselfish type or pure altruism, which presumably
is the desire for a public good supply so that others can enjoy the
good. Selfish altruism means that people get some private benefit from
the very act of giving. Similarly, Elster (1985) identifies intrinsic
motivation as a motivation that is selfish (in the sense of Andreonis
selfish altruism) and also process-oriented (not outcome-oriented).

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Other types of motivation include selfish and outcome-oriented

(Homo economicus) and nonselfish and outcome-oriented (for
example, instrumental altruism).
As Hirschman (1977) explains in the quotation that opens this
article, it is difficult to separate intrinsic and instrumental altruism.
Indeed, Elster (1985) argues that the expected value that one obtains
from process-based altruism will depend to some extent on the
expected value from the outcome of the collective action for the
individual. In a Darwinian context, Margolis (1982) suggests that
process-based altruism may have evolved as a mechanism to sustain
a degree of results-based altruism in the face of the selection advantage of selfishness, thereby increasing a groups survival possibilities.
More to the point here, he argues that:
Smiths propensity to participate in supporting a cause is somehow contingent . . . on his perception of the value of the contribution at the margin
he might make. . . . The portion of an individuals resources and time spent
on participation can be observed to depend partly on the individuals
sense of the opportunities for socially useful participation. . . . [Resultsoriented] altruism interacts with participation. (1982: 24)

What intrinsic motivation does not necessarily mean in this article is

motivation based on some internalized moral, ethical, or fairness
norm. Ostrom (2000b) argues that social norms of fairness, reciprocity, and trust affect intrinsic motivation. Oliver (1980) states that
[a]nalytically, ideologies or norms of solidarity and equity may be
viewed as having the effect of increasing the intrinsic benefit (or
negative costs) of cooperation and suggests that intrinsic motivation
of cooperation (due to some ideology) may be substitutable for
selective incentives: a movement with a strong ideology would
require fewer selective incentives to motivate collective action than
would a movement with a weak ideology (1980: 1372).
Frey (1997) and other authors (for example, Jones and Hudson
2000) at times equate intrinsic motivation with civic duty, which
implies an internal moral obligation to act civically. The issue of
morality is a complex one that can be approached from the perspective of either moral preferences or moral constraints (see, for example,
Vanberg 1988). The difference is important since people pursue
preferences but seek to circumvent constraints (Rabin 1995). In par-

Intrinsic Motivation and Collective Action

827

ticular, individuals have an incentive to relax informal moral norms so

as to increase their utility, and they may do so through manipulating
their beliefs of the morality of their actions.
Ryan and Deci (2000b: 62) point out that moral norms have more
to do with extrinsic motivation, whereby one performs actions with
the feeling of pressure in order to avoid guilt or anxiety. These
authors identify the locus of causality as somewhat external, unlike
intrinsic motivation where the locus is internal. Olson ([1965] 1971: 61
fn) himself identifies moral codes as selective incentives that limit the
individual choice calculus. Lindenberg (2001) states that intrinsic
motivation in the political economy literature includes feelings of
obligation, which is contrary to the psychological definition of intrinsic
motivation as self-determined choice. Recently, Frey clearly separates intrinsic motivation from that based on internalized norms (Frey
and Stutzer 2006). Analytically, therefore, if morality or fairness can in
any way be made consistent with intrinsic motivation, it arguably
would be done under the guise of moral or fairness preferences rather
than internalized moral or fairness norms.
III
A Model of Individual Contributions to Collective Goods

HAVING DEFINED INTRINSIC MOTIVATION as a preference and not a constraint, it is now time to incorporate it into a model of individual
contributions toward collective goods that also allows for the application of selective incentives. Consider an individual faced with the
choice of contributing or not to the public good. Following Buchanans (1968) probabilistic approach to the free riders choice, the
individual would contribute to the collective good if the expected
value from doing so is larger than that from free riding (see Table 1).
The probability that others contribute when the above individual
does is gc, while g n is the probability that others contribute when he
doesnt.2 b is the value of collective good to the individual when the
collective good is provided, while c is the cost of individual contribution. First, b decreases with the number of individuals in the group
(N) when the good is rival bN < 0 and does not change when it is not.
This is the same as saying that the total value of the public good is

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Table 1
Buchanans Approach Toward Contributing to the Public Good

Individual contributes
Individual does not contribute

Others
Contribute

Others Do
Not Contribute

Expected
Value

(b - c)gc
bgn

(-c)(1 - gc)
0(1 - gn)

bgc - c
bgn

Table 2
Buchanans Approach Plus Altruistic Preferences
Others
Contribute

Others Do
Not Contribute

Expected
Value

bgc + v + sp + ap Individual
(b + v + sp + ap - (v + sp + ap contributes
c)gc
c - d)(1 - gc)
c - d(1 - gc)
n n
n
n
n
Individual does (b - s )g
-s (1 - g )
bg - sn
not contribute

fixed if the good is rival, or increases with N if the good is nonrival.

Insofar as c is concerned, I will assume that it is independent of the
size of the group (cN = 0). This is descriptive of the situation where
people incur private costs to vote: these costs dont depend on the
number of voters. Another example is an association that does not
adjust its membership fees as it expands its operation beyond its initial
geographical base.3
Time now to add to this model the concept of altruistic preferences,
both instrumental and intrinsic. This is done in Table 2, which moreover introduces some additional refinements from the literature on
collective action since Buchanans seminal contribution.
The value to the individual of the additional output (of collective
good) due to his or her contribution is captured by v and depends on
the technology of public good supply (Sandler 1992). It is important
to note that v can satisfy both an egoistic preference for ones own
consumption of the collective good and an altruistic preference for the

Intrinsic Motivation and Collective Action

829

consumption of the good by others. In particular, insofar as v is

nonrival in consumption, then it can be equally consumed by others,
something that supports an altruistic and instrumental motivation to
contribute toward the collective good. Again, for any given v, then
vN < 0 if the public good is rival in consumption and remains unaltered
if it is nonrival.
On the other hand, the greater the size of the group, the less likely
that the individuals contribution will have any significant impact on
the value of the public good provided; that is, v will tend to zero,
whether the collective good is rival or nonrival. This idea comes from
Olson ([1965] 1971: 50), who talks of how individuals in large groups
cannot make any noticeable contribution to any group effort. It is
equivalent to the concept of indecisiveness of an individuals contribution in large-number settings as developed by, among others,
Brennan and Lomasky (1993) in the context of the calculus of voting.
v will tend toward zero as the group increases. In other words, the
larger the group, the less likely that ones individual contribution will
be decisive (vN < 0).4
Olsons ([1965] 1971) selective incentives are represented by sn and
p
s for negative or positive selective incentives, respectively. The latter
can take the form of a private good made available to contributors,
while the former are represented by sanctions for free riders. It would
not be unreasonable to suggest that the probability that others contribute (whether the individual here does or doesnt) is positively
related to selective incentives in place (g cs > 0 and g ns > 0). Importantly, selective incentives are a necessary but insufficient cause for
contribution toward the collective good, since groups also must be
able to detect whether individuals do in fact comply (implying monitoring costs) and whether rewards or sanctions are properly applied
(application costs) (Hechter 1984). Such detection is likely to be easier
in small-group settings. The supervision and sanctioning of noncompliers is more likely in small communities (Akerlof 1985) or in communities with clear social categories, such as those imposed by the
Indian caste system (Akerlof 1976). Olson ([1965] 1971: 62) himself
recognizes the facility of applying what he calls social selective
incentives in the form of social rewards or sanctions in small groups
where members can have face-to-face contact with one another.

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The original Olson free rider in large groups was the result of b < c,
assuming that b = 0 (collective good rival in consumption) and v = 0
(miniscule impact on collective good from individual contribution).
No attention was paid to g cs or g ns. In the presence of selective
incentives, the individual would contribute in large-number settings if
sp > c - sn (sp > c in the case of positive selective incentives, or sn > c
in the case of negative ones).
The intrinsic benefit from the very act of contributing is captured by
ap (process-based altruism). Does changing the size of the group affect
ap? Several insights suggest so. First, recall Elster (1985) and Margolis
(1982), who argue that intrinsic altruism partly depends on instrumental altruism, insofar as peoples enjoyment from the very act of
contributing depends to some extent on the knowledge that their
contribution can have some impact on the collective good available to
others. Since instrumental concerns (v) increase in smaller group
settings, then intrinsic motivation may also do so. Second, insofar as
intrinsic motivation is fostered by the external acknowledgment of
ones deeds, then intrinsic motivation is likely to be important in
small-group settings, where communication and interaction is stronger
(Frey and Bohnet 1996; see also the review by Udhn 1993). Thus,
reducing N would also increase ap. Conversely, increasing N would
reduce but not cancel out ap: the possibility that v might tend to zero
in very large number settings does not imply that ap will do so. The
importance of intrinsic motivation in small-number settings reinforces
Olsons ([1965] 1971) result on the facility of collective action by small
groups in the absence of selective incentives.
The psychological discomfort or cost from the knowledge that
others may free ride on ones contribution is represented by d
(Tullock 1971). This cost is likely to increase with N and thus the
number of potential free riders (dN > 0). Several authors have suggested a negative relationship between the intrinsic or psychic benefit
from the very act of contributing (ap) and the psychic cost from the
knowledge that others free ride on ones contribution (d). Elster (1989:
180) states: [I]f people feel that they are taken advantage of, why
should they not rip off the system in return. Klasko (1992) finds that
the propensity to evade taxes systematically increases with the perception of tax avoidance by other persons. Frey (1997) argues that

Intrinsic Motivation and Collective Action

831

regulations that prevent free riding by others serve to maintain civic

virtue (intrinsic motivation). Jones (2004) agrees that an intrinsic
motivation to contribute depends on external signals that this motivation is acknowledged, and adds that these signals also include
others committing to collective action by contributing. Similarly, political representatives seen to defer self-interest for the public good
provide a signal that acknowledges intrinsic motivation (Jones and
Hudson 2000).
IV
Selective Incentives and the Crowding Out of Intrinsic Motivation

I WILL NOW ADDRESS the tradeoff between the application of selective

incentives and intrinsic motivation. Drawing from Deci and Ryan
(1985), Frey (1997) points to three underlying psychological processes
explaining the crowding out of intrinsic motivation, namely, selfdetermination, self-esteem, and expression possibility. A priori, external incentives that are perceived to be controlling crowd out intrinsic
motivation since they impair self-determination (persons no longer
feel responsible for doing something), impair self-esteem (intrinsic
motivation is not acknowledged or appreciated), and impair expression possibility (persons are deprived of the chance to express or
exhibit intrinsic motivation to others). Crowding in of intrinsic motivation would happen if external intervention were seen as supportive.
In the context of a principal-agent model, Frey (1997) makes a
series of propositions about the impact of rewards or sanctions
applied by the principal on intrinsically motivated behavior by the
agent. I will first apply these propositions squarely within the context
of the collective action problem just presented. I will then indicate
possible extensions of Freys ideas, as suggested by the framing of the
collective action problem in the previous section. Again, my overall
aim is to better inform the design and application of selective incentives that are sensitive to a possible role of intrinsic motivation in the
provision of collective goods.
First, Frey (1997) recognizes that intrinsic motivation is more likely
the more personal the relationship between agent and principal and,
as a result, argues that the application of external incentives in such

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contexts is likely to have a large crowding-out effect. In the context of

the collective action problem, this points to the possibility that the
application of selective incentives may generate an important
crowding-out effect in small-group contexts where, recall, personal
relationships are more likely and where, moreover, intrinsic motivation may be enhanced by the perception that ones contribution may
be socially useful. Conversely, the application of selective incentives
in large-number settings may generate less crowding out simply
because there is not as much intrinsic motivation to reduce: intrinsic
motivation may be dampened by the increasing impersonal relationships that characterize such settings and by the perception that ones
personal contribution is insignificant.
Second, Frey points to psychological evidence that supports the
idea that intrinsic motivation is positively related to the individuals
interest in the activity. Ryan and Deci (2000a: 59) emphasize that
intrinsic motivation will occur only for activities that hold intrinsic
interest for an individual. Insofar as contributions to collective goods
are concerned, the implication is that selective incentives are more
likely to crowd out intrinsic motivation to the extent that the context
within which their contribution is made is interesting to potential
contributors. Thus, for example, if individuals are intrinsically motivated to vote because they find politics interesting, then making
voting mandatory may crowd out such motivation. Alternatively,
obligatory voting is less likely to crowd out an intrinsic motivation to
vote in people who find politics, and voting in particular, to be dull
and repetitive.5
Third, rewards crowd out intrinsic motivation less than sanctions
do since the former are less restrictive to a persons selfdetermination than the latter. Frey (1997) hypothesizes that the previous psychological processes are more intensive when individuals
are confronted by strict commands or sanctions since individuals do
have some choice with positive incentives (can reject reward and
maintain self-determination). A related argument that he advances is
that hard regulations involving enforceable commands that punish
noncompliance are likely to crowd out intrinsic motivation, especially by impairing self-determination. Soft regulations in the form of
nonenforceable directives implemented by agreement and without

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threats of punishment do not crowd out and may even crowd in

intrinsic motivation. In the context of collective action, these ideas
find some support in Schmitt and Marwells (1970) experimental
evidence, which points to an asymmetry on the effectiveness of
negative and positive selective incentives, such that individuals
respond more effectively to the latter. Consequently, we would
expect positive selective incentives to crowd out intrinsic motivation
by less than negative ones do.
Fourth, intrinsic motivation is crowded out the more a reward is
contingent on the performance desired by the principal (compared to
simply giving the reward after good performance). In relation to this,
Frey (1997) suggests that the monetization of rewards emphasizes
performance contingency and thus is likely to crowd out intrinsic
motivation (for example, blood donations). This has potentially strong
implications for positive selective incentives. Insofar as positive selective incentives become more monetized, they are more likely to crowd
out intrinsic motivation. Moreover, it qualifies the by-product theory of
collective action such that individual voluntary contributions in largenumber settings are simply a by-product of rewards such as private
goods (Olson [1965] 1971). Experimental evidence suggests that individuals do not attach much importance to private goods in their
contribution decision toward nonrival collective goods (Jordan and
Maloney 1996). Individuals may contribute for intrinsic reasons, and
the monetization of positive selective incentives is likely to crowd out
such motivation, with potentially negative consequences for the
outcome of the collective action.
Finally, recall the possible relationship between the intrinsic or
psychic benefit from the very act of contributing and the psychic cost
from the knowledge that others free ride on ones contribution, as
suggested by Frey (1997) and others. Thus, it seems, ap may be
inversely related to d. If this were indeed the case, it would have
implications for the crowding-out effect brought on by selective
incentives. While selective incentives may dampen intrinsic motivation, this negative effect may be checked, to some extent, insofar as
they are able to reduce free riding by others. In other words, increasing sp or sn may reduce ap, but insofar as it reduces d(1 - g c), it may
also increase ap.6

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I will now turn to several possible extensions of Freys (1997) work

as suggested by framing the tradeoff between selective incentives and
intrinsic motivation in a collective action context. An additional proposition by Frey (1997) is that external incentives are likely to crowd out
the intrinsic motivation that emerges from the possibility of participating in the principals decision process. Frey presents empirical
evidence indicating that tax moralea proxy for intrinsic motivation
to contribute to collective goodsis higher in Swiss cantons that rely
on direct democracy and lower in those that rely on representative
democracy. As a result, he suggests that tax auditing undermines tax
morale by more in a direct democracy than in a representative one.
Unfortunately, Freys empirical study does not control for group size.
As a result, we are unsure as to whether the positive and statistically
significant relationship reported between intrinsic motivation and
direct democracy is distorted by omitted variable bias. A worthwhile
extension of Freys work here would incorporate canton size, which
should moreover be interacted with the democracy-type variable
(direct or representative). We would expect tax morale to be strongest
in smaller cantons that employ direct democracy and weakest in larger
cantons that employ representative democracy.
Those individuals with above-average intrinsic motivation are likely
to be negatively affected by uniform external intervention (Frey
1997), feeling that their motivation is not recognized and so adjusting
it downward. This is closely related to a further proposition by Frey
(1997) such that the more strongly an external intervention implies an
acknowledgment of the agents intrinsic motivation, the more it fosters
intrinsic motivation. Clearly, uniform external intervention does not
acknowledge such motivation and so will crowd it out. The implication that emerges here is that, where possible, positive selective
incentives should be differentiated in such a way as to acknowledge
above-average intrinsic motivation. For example, an association could
provide some private goods to all subscribers and afford the possibility of special recognition to those who are willing to contribute
above the minimum subscription level. But again, the discussion in the
previous section would suggest that group size is relevant here, since
it determines the facility of detection of free riders or contributors and
thus of the applicability of negative or positive selective incentives.

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835

Small groups are likely to have a relative advantage in applying

nonuniform selective incentives and may thus be better able to reduce
crowding-out effects.
V
Does Crowding Out Matter?

THE PREVIOUS IDEAS help us to design selective incentives in such a way

so as to minimize the crowding-out effect on intrinsic motivation. This
said, it must be acknowledged that while selective incentives may
indeed crowd out intrinsic motivation, the ultimate effect on collective
good provision may be minimal since the crowding-out effect is
compensated for by the very presence of those incentives. So, insofar
as the provision of collective goods is concerned, the crowding-out
effect may be irrelevant. But this assertion ignores the social costs of
increasingly depending on selective incentives for public good provision, to the detriment of intrinsic motivation.
In particular, the design and application of selective incentives and
external incentive structures in general can be costly, while intrinsic and
internal motivation implies no such comparable cost. Recall Hechters
(1984) monitoring and application costs. Olson (1982) himself has
argued that the initial application of negative selective incentives is
likely to be resisted by free riders, while the design of positive selective
incentives, which generate a surplus that finances the provision of the
collective good, is not an easy task. Since intrinsic motivation does not
by definition depend on such external incentives, it avoids these costs.
Thus, substituting selective incentives for intrinsic motivation may
increase the social costs of organizing collective action.
A related problem emerges if the crowding-out effect spills over into
other areas. Frey (1997) presents the example of housework:
The boy paid for mowing the lawn has not only less intrinsic motivation
to do that work, but is also unwilling to do any other housework for
free. . . . If this applies, intervening externally has higher costs than if the
Spill-Over Effect did not exist; it is then advisable to apply external
intervention less intensively, or not at all. (1997: 35)

In the context of individual contributions toward collective goods, the

author cites Graetz et al. (1986: 2), who state that tax non-compliance

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may be creating a nation where citizens disrespect for tax laws will
expand to disrespect for other laws. Conceptually, this motivational
spillover effect is a negative externality: it is not taken into account by
those applying the selective incentives. Insofar as such a negative
spillover effect occurs, it will require the generalization of selective
incentives to other areas, something that will further increase the cost
of collective action.
A parallel can be made here with the literature on rent seeking
(Tollison 1982). An individual rent seeker generates social costs for
society, but a related and important problem is that his or her activities
may inspire similar behavior in others, not least in the form of the use
of scarce resources in an attempt to neutralize the costs to them of the
others rent-seeking efforts. The initial rent seeker may therefore set in
place a spiraling of rent-seeking activities to the detriment of social
welfare. Similarly, the application of selective incentives for the provision of one collective good maybecause of the spillover effect
set in train the need to generalize these external incentive structures
to provide other public goods, something that generates additional
costs for society.
VI
Conclusions

THE PREVIOUS ANALYSIS highlights the role of intrinsic motivation for

the provision of collective goods. It also points to the many and
various ways in which intrinsic motivation can be crowded out by
the application of selective incentives. If we acknowledge that
crowding out ultimately increases the cost to society of organizing
the provision of collective goods, then care must be taken when
designing selective incentives so as to mitigate the possible crowding out of such motivation. In particular, those designing selective
incentives should consider that intrinsic motivation may be crowded
out, especially in small-number settings, (a) insofar as individuals
find the collective action personally interesting, (b) to the extent that
they are able to actively participate in the collective decision
process, (c) if no recognition is given to individuals who are
strongly intrinsically motivated, (d) if negative rather than positive

Intrinsic Motivation and Collective Action

837

selective incentives are favored, or (e) if the latter are increasingly

monetized.
Notes
1. I will refer to extrinsic motivation as instrumental motivation. For a
discussion and taxonomy of human motivation, see Ryan and Deci (2000a,
2000b). For an older but more comprehensive review of the psychology
literature of intrinsic motivation, see Deci and Ryan (1985).
2. In this article I also assume that individuals perceive these probabilities
without bias, in order to set aside the issue of biased beliefs related to the
impact of ones own behavior or regarding the behavior of others. For an
extension of Buchanans model (1968), which focuses on the impact of belief
manipulation on the individuals decision to contribute toward collective
goods, see Kyriacou (2009).
3. It is important here not to confuse group size with the number of
contributors. The latter is a function of the former, in that N indicates the
number of potential contributors. Obviously, c may fall with the number of
(actual) contributors because, for example, of a degree of lumpiness or
indivisibility in the provision of the collective good (Buchanan 1968). Or c
may rise, as for example in the case of calling into a radio program to support
a cause: the more congested the lines, the more time to get through (Elster
1985). Assuming that c will rise or fall with N would be the same as saying that
all individuals in a group will actually contribute something, which obviously
ignores the very problem of free riders. Assuming that c varies with N would
not alter the main findings in this article, which depend on how group size
affects the other variables of the model.
4. One exception is a best-shot technology, where an individual contribution can have a decisive impact on the provision of the public good
(Hirshleifer 1983). Examples are discovering a cure for a disease or achieving
a research breakthrough (Sandler 1992).
5. Hill (2006) leaves intrinsic motivation out of her otherwise comprehensive analysis of the convenience of compulsory voting in the United States.
6. Remember that the application of selective incentives may reasonably
increase gc. If this is accepted, then applying selective incentives may make
contribution more likely insofar as it reduces d(1 - g c).
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