Aratuc vs Comelec Digested

Aratuc vs Comelec
G.R. No. L-49705-09 February 8, 1979
Facts:
Petitioner Aratuc filed a petition for certiorari, to review the decision of
respondent Comelec.A supervening panel headed by Comelec had
conducted hearings of the complaints of the petitioner therein alleged
irregularities in the election records. In order for the Commission to decide
properly. It will have to go deep into the examination of the voting records
and registration records and it will have to interview and getstatements
from persons under oath from the area to determine whether actual voting
took place. The Comelec then rendered its resolution being assailed in these
cases, declaring the final result of the canvass.
Issue:
Whether the Comelec committee committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
Ruling:
No.Under section 168 of the revised election code of the 1978 the
commission on elections shall have direct control and supervision over the
board of canvassers. In administrative law, a superior body or office
having supervision or control over another may do directly what the latter
is supposed to do or ought to have done. The petition is hereby dismissed,
for lack of merit.

ErnestoM.Macedavs.EnergyRegulatory
Board,etal.
18 July 1991
Medialdea, J.

::

G.R. No. 96266

FACTS:
Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 1990, private
respondents oil companies filed with the ERB their respective applications on oil
price increases. ERB then issued an order granting a provisional increase of
P1.42 per liter. Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to
nullify said increase.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decisions of the Energy Regulatory Board should be subject to
presidential review.
HELD:
Pursuant to Section 8 of E.O. No. 172, while hearing is indispensable, it does not
preclude the Board from ordering a provisional increase subject to final
disposition of whether or not to make it permanent or to reduce or increase it
further or to deny the application. The provisional increase is akin to a
temporary restraining order, which are given ex-parte.
The Court further noted the Solicitor Generals comments that the ERB is not
averse to the idea of a presidential review of its decision, except that there is no
law at present authorizing the same. The Court suggested that it will be under
the scope of the legislative to allow the presidential review of the decisions of the
ERB since, despite its being a quasi-judicial body, it is still an administrative
body under the Office of the President whose decisions should be appealed to the
President under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, especially on a matter as transcendental as oil price increases which
affect the lives of almost all Filipinos.

Malaga vs. Penachos (Digest)

Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., et.al.
GR No. 86995
03 September 1992
Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Prequalifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication
in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily
an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at
ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of prequalification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids
would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the
afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE
Construction and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their prequalification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2,
1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5,
1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as
their documents were considered late.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC
against the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept
them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders.
They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the
acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had
already been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the
project pending resolution of their complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting
PBAC from conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants
filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is
prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of
P.D. 1818. They also contended that the preliminary injunction had
become moot and academic as it was served after the bidding had been
awarded and closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied
the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to
be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the
government falling within the coverage of the subject law.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to
the provisions of PD 1818?

RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government

instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions
or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5)
Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a
special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific
constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities
and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12)
Introductory Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution
and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government
instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries
development policy of the State, a priority program of the government to
effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the
Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state
college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission
on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and
offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it,
upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus,
equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be
spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional
amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National
Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and
maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the
General Appropriations Law.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the
prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding
the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding

and the award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
Beja Sr. v. CA
Facts:
Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr. is an employee of the Manila Port
authority as a terminal supervisor. Two administrative cases was
filed against him by the PPA General Manager where the first one
was dismissed while the second one prospered. Both where for
dishonesty, grave misconduct, violation of reasonable office rules
and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and for being notoriously undesirable. The second charge
consisted of six (6) different specifications of administrative
offenses including fraud against the PPA in the total amount of
P218,000.00. Beja was also placed under preventive suspension
pursuant to Sec. 41 of P.D. No. 807.
PPA general manager indorsed it to the AAB for "appropriate
action." Beja filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. 2
Two days later, he filed with the AAB a manifestation and motion
to suspend the hearing of Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-04989 on account of the pendency of the certiorari proceeding before
the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing
of the administrative case.
Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case
below and proceeded to file before this Court a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order.
Issues:
Simply put, Beja challenges the legality of the preventive
suspension and the jurisdiction of the DOTC Secretary and/or the
AAB to initiate and hear administrative cases against PPA
personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.
Held:
Petitioner anchors his contention that the PPA general manager
cannot subject him to a preventive suspension on the following

provision of Sec. 8, Art. V of Presidential Decree No. 857

reorganizing the PPA:
(d) the General Manager shall, subject to the approval of the
Board, appoint and
remove personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.
(Emphasis
supplied.)
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the petitioner
erroneously equates "preventive suspension" as a remedial
measure with "suspension" as a penalty for administrative
dereliction.
The imposition of preventive suspension on a government
employee charged with an administrative offense is subject to the
following provision of the Civil Service Law, P.D. No.
807:
Sec. 41. Preventive Suspension. The proper disciplining
authority may
preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under
his authority
pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or
employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the
performance of
duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is
guilty of charges
which would warrant his removal from the service.
Although the foregoing section does not expressly provide for a
mechanism for an administrative investigation of personnel, by
vesting the power to remove erring employees on the General
Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, the law
impliedly grants said officials the power to investigate its
personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be
charged with an administrative offense. During such investigation,
the PPA General Manager, as
earlier stated, may subject the employee concerned to preventive
suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance
with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807. 13 Only after

gathering sufficient facts may the PPA General Manager impose

the proper penalty in accordance with law. It is the latter action
which requires the approval of the PPA Board of Directors.
It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by the
PPA General Manager to the AAB was premature. The PPA General
Manager should have first conducted an investigation, made the
proper recommendation for the imposable penalty and sought its
approval by the PPA Board of Directors. It was discretionary on the
part of the herein petitioner to elevate the case to the then DOTC
Secretary Reyes. Only then could the AAB take jurisdiction of the
case.

EUGENIO vs. CSC et al

G.R. No. 115863
March 31, 1995
FACTS: . Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the
Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied
for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and
a CESO rank,. She was given a CES eligibility and
was recommended to the President for a CESO
rank by the Career Executive Service Board.
Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed
a Resolution which abolished the CESB, relying on
the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book
V of the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly
conferring on the Commission the power and
authority to effect changes in its organization as
the need arises. Said resolution states:
Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service
Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career

Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission.

Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget,
properties and equipment of the Career Executive
Service Board shall now form part of the Office for
Career Executive Service.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative
relief as the Career Executive Service Board which
recommended her CESO Rank IV has been
abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to
annul, among others, said resolution.
ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the
office of the CESB
HELD: the petition is granted and Resolution of the
respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set
aside
NO
1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created
in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974. It cannot be
disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created
by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature.
This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the
creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a
legislative function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not
enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the
CESB. On the contrary, in all the General

Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the

legislature has set aside funds for the operation of
CESB.
Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section
17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its
power to abolish the CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the
Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together
with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates
the offices under the respondent Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is
that respondent Commissions power to reorganize
is limited to offices under its control as enumerated
in Section 16..
2. . From its inception, the CESB was intended to
be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively
attached to respondent Commission. As
conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee
the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to
view the problem of building up executive
manpower in the government with a broad and
positive outlook.
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is
not negated by its attachment to respondent
Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not
made to fall within the control of respondent
Commission. Under the Administrative Code of
1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally
inter-related government agency to another is to

attain policy and program coordination. This

is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7,
Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral
relationship between the department or its
equivalent and attached agency or corporation for
purposes of policy and program coordination. The
coordination may be accomplished by having the
department represented in the governing board of
the attached agency or corporation, either as
chairman or as a member, with or without voting
rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having
the attached corporation or agency comply with a
system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the
progress of programs and projects; and having the
department or its equivalent provide general
policies through its representative in the board,
which shall serve as the framework for the internal
policies of the attached corporation or agency.
NOTES:
Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of
its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Each office of
the Commission shall be headed by a Director with
at least one Assistant Director, and may have such
divisions as are necessary independent
constitutional body, the Commission may effect
changes in the organization as the need
arises.

Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. The

Commission shall have the following offices:
(1) The Office of the Executive
(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of
a Chairman and two (2) members
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs
(4) The Office of Planning and Management
(5) The Central Administrative Office.
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records
(7) The Office of Position Classification and
Compensation
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and
Placement
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards
(10) The Office of Human Resource Development
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs
(14) The Office of Retirement
(15) The Regional and Field Offices.
THEPRESIDENTIALANTIDOLLARSALTINGTASKFORCEvsCOURTOFAPPEALS171
SCRA348StatusandCharacteristicsMeaningofAdministrativeAgency
FACTS:OnMarch12,1985,StateProsecutorJoseB.Rosales,whoisassignedwiththePresidential
AntiDollarSaltingTaskForce,issuedsearchwarrantsNos.156,157,158,159,160and161againstthe
petitionersKaramlImportExportCo.,Inc.,P&BEnterprisesCo.,Inc.,PhilippineVeterans
Corporation,PhilippineVeteransDevelopmentCorporation,PhilippineConstructionDevelopment
Corporation,PhilippineLauanIndustriesCorporation,IntertradeDevelopment(AlvinAquino),Amelili
U.MalaquiokEnterprisesandJaimeP.LucmanEnterprises.
TheapplicationfortheissuanceofsaidsearchwarrantswasledbyAtty.NapoleonGatmaytanofthe
BureauofCustomswhoisadeputizedmemberofthePADSTaskForce.Attachedtothesaidapplication
istheadavitofJosenM.CastrowhoisanoperativeandinvestigatorofthePADSTaskForce.SaidJose
nM.Castroislikewisethesoledeponentinthepurporteddepositiontosupporttheapplicationforthe
issuanceofthesix(6)searchwarrantsinvolvedinthiscase.TheapplicationledbyAtty.Gatmaytan,thea

davitanddepositionofJosenM.CastroarealldatedMarch12,1985.
Shortlythereafter,theprivaterespondent(thepetitioner)wenttotheRegionalTrialCourtonapetitionto
enjointheimplementationofthesearchwarrantsinquestion.OnApril16,1985,thelowercourtissued
therstofitschallengedOrders,andheld:
WHEREFORE,inviewofalltheforegoing,theCourtherebydeclaresSearchWarrantNos.156,157,
158,159,160,and161tobenullandvoid.Accordingly,therespondentsareherebyorderedtoreturnand
surrenderimmediatelyallthepersonalpropertiesanddocumentsseizedbythemfromthepetitionersby
virtueoftheaforementionedsearchwarrants.OnAugust21,1985,thetrialcourtdeniedreconsideration.
OnApril4,1986,thePresidentialAntiDollarSaltingTaskForcewenttotherespondentCourtof
Appealstocontest,oncertiorari,thetwinOrdersofthelowercourt.InrulinginitiallyfortheTaskForce,
theAppellateCourtheld:
HereinpetitionerisaspecialquasijudicialbodywithexpresspowersenumeratedunderPD1936to
prosecuteforeignexchangeviolationsdenedandpunishedunderP.D.No.1883.Thepetitioner,in
exercisingitsquasijudicialpowers,rankswiththeRegionalTrialCourts,andthelatterinthecaseatbar
hadnojurisdictiontodeclarethesearchwarrantsinquestionnullandvoid.Besidesascorrectlypointed
outbytheAssistantSolicitorGeneralthedecisionofthePresidentialAntiDollarSaltingTaskForceis
appealabletotheOceofthePresident.
OnNovember12,1986,KaramlImportExportCo.,Inc.soughtareconsideration,onthequestion
primarilyofwhetherornotthePresidentialAntiDollarSaltingTaskForceis"suchotherresponsibleo
cer'countenancedbythe1973Constitutiontoissuewarrantsofsearchandseizure.TheCourtofAppeals,
onKaraml'smotion,reverseditselfandissueditsResolution,datedSeptember1987,andsubsequently,
itsResolution,datedMay20,1988,denyingthepetitioner'smotionforreconsideration.
Insubmittingthatitisaquasijudicialentity,thepetitionerstatesthatitisendowedwith"expresspowers
andfunctionsunderPDNo.1936,toprosecuteforeignexchangeviolationsasdenedandpunishedunder
PDNo.1883.""Bytheverynatureofitsexpresspowersasconferredbythelaws,"soitiscontended,
"whicharedecidedlyquasijudicialordiscretionaryfunction,suchastoconductpreliminaryinvestigation
onthechargesofforeignexchangeviolations,issuesearchwarrantsorwarrantsofarrest,holddeparture
orders,amongothers,anddependingupontheevidencepresented,todismissthechargesortolethe
correspondinginformationincourtofExecutiveOrderNo.934,PDNo.1936anditsImplementingRules
andRegulationseectiveAugust26,1984,petitionerexercisesquasijudicialpowerorthepowerof
adjudication."
TheCourtofAppeals,initsResolutionnowassailed,wasoftheopinionthat"thegrantofquasijudicial
powerstopetitionerdidnotdiminishtheregularcourts'judicialpowerofinterpretation.Therightto
interpretalawand,ifnecessarytodeclareoneunconstitutional,exclusivelypertainstothejudiciary.In
assumingthisfunction,courtsdonotproceedonthetheorythatthejudiciaryissuperiortothetwoother
coordinatebranchesofthegovernment,butsolelyonthetheorythattheyarerequiredtodeclarethelaw
ineverycasewhichcomebeforethem."
InitspetitiontothisCourt,thepetitionerallegesthatinsoissuingtheResolutionsabovementioned,the
respondentCourtofAppeals"committedgraveabuseofdiscretionand/oractedinexcessofitsappellate
jurisdiction,"

ISSUE:WhetherornotThePresidentialAntiDollarSaltingTaskForceisaquasijudicialbody,andone
coequalinrankandstandingwiththeRegionalTrialCourt,andaccordingly,beyondthelatter's
jurisdiction
RULING:No.ThisCourtndstheAppellateCourttobeinerror,sincewhatthepetitionerputsto
questionistheRegionalTrialCourt'sactofassumingjurisdictionovertheprivaterespondent'spetition
belowanditssubsequentcountermandofthePresidentialAntiDollarSaltingTaskForce'sordersof
searchandseizure,forthereasonthatthepresidentialbody,asanentity(allegedly)coordinateandco
equalwiththeRegionalTrialCourt,was(is)notvestedwithsuchajurisdiction.Anexaminationofthe
PresidentialAntiDollarSaltingTaskForce'spetitionshowsindeeditsrecognitionofjudicialreview(of
theactsofGovernment)asabasicprivilegeofthecourts.Itsobjection,precisely,iswhetheritisthe
RegionalTrialCourt,orthesuperiorcourts,thatmayundertakesuchareview.
Aswehaveobserved,thequestioniswhetherornotthePresidentialAntiDollarSaltingTaskForceis,in
therstplace,aquasijudicialbody,andonewhosedecisionsmaynotbechallengedbeforetheregular
courts,otherthanthehighertribunals,theCourtofAppealsandthisCourt.
Aquasijudicialbodyhasbeendenedas"anorganofgovernmentotherthanacourtoflawandother
thanalegislature,whichaectstherightsofprivatepartiesthrougheitheradjudicationorrulemaking."
Asmaybeseen,itisthebasicfunctionofthesebodiestoadjudicateclaimsand/ortodeterminerights,
andunlessitsdecisionareseasonablyappealedtotheproperreviewingauthorities,thesameattainnality
andbecomeexecutory.AperusalofthePresidentialAntiDollarSaltingTaskForce'sorganicact,
PresidentialDecreeNo.1936,asamendedbyPresidentialDecreeNo.2002,convincestheCourtthatthe
TaskForcewasnotmeanttoexercisequasijudicialfunctions,thatis,totryanddecideclaimsand
executeitsjudgments.AsthePresident'sarmcalledupontocombattheviceof"dollarsalting"orthe
blackmarketingandsaltingofforeignexchange,itistaskedalonebytheDecreetohandletheprosecution
ofsuchactivities,butnothingmore.
TheCourtseesnothingintheprovisionsofPresidentialDecreeNo.1936(exceptwithrespecttotheTask
Force'spowerstoissuesearchwarrants)thatwillrevealalegislativeintendmenttoconferitwithquasi
judicialresponsibilitiesrelativetooensespunishedbyPresidentialDecreeNo.1883.Itsundertaking,as
wesaid,issimply,todeterminewhetherornotprobablecauseexiststowarrantthelingofchargeswith
thepropercourt,meaningtosay,toconductaninquirypreliminarytoajudicialrecourse,andto
recommendaction"ofappropriateauthorities".Itisnotunlikeascal'socethatconductsapreliminary
investigationtodeterminewhetherornotprimafacieevidenceexiststojustifyhalingtherespondentto
court,andyet,whileitmakesthatdetermination,itcannotbesaidtobeactingasaquasicourt.Foritis
thecourts,ultimately,thatpassjudgmentontheaccused,notthescal.
IfthePresidentialAntiDollarSaltingTaskForceisnot,hence,aquasijudicialbody,itcannotbesaidto
becoequalorcoordinatewiththeRegionalTrialCourt.Thereisnothinginitsenablingstatutesthat
woulddemonstrateitsstandingatparwiththesaidcourt.
Inthatrespect,wedonotnderrorintherespondentCourtofAppeal'sresolutionsustainingthe
assumptionofjurisdictionbythecourtaquo.
RATIO:Aquasijudicialbodyhasbeendenedas"anorganofgovernmentotherthanacourtoflaw
andotherthanalegislature,whichaectstherightsofprivatepartiesthrougheitheradjudicationorrule
making."

DE LA LLANA VS ALBA
Posted by kaye lee on 12:18 PM

GR No. L-57883 March 12 1982

FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action
implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior
courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and
the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act,
would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of
their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being
alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has
been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices
and judges as provided for under the Constitution.
RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges
and justices from their services. What is important is the validity of the
abolition of their offices.
Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an
illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the
abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of
the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition,
there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from

the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of

tenure does not arise.

Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs Jose Pao

21 SCRA 895 Political Law Delegation of Control Power to

the Executive Secretary
Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used
for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest zone which
was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then
ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of
which he is a co-owner.
Jose Pao was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same
piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paos request.
The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition
hence it was elevated to the Office of the President.
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC
averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He
also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is
an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts,
does not contain any provision whereby the presidential
power of control may be delegated to the Executive
Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the
President to act personally upon the matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be
delegated to the Executive Secretary.
HELD: Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must
exercise his constitutional powers in person. However, the
president may delegate certain powers to the Executive
Secretary at his discretion. The president may delegate
powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to

perform personally. The reason for this allowance is the fact

that the resident is not expected to perform in person all the
multifarious executive and administrative functions. The
office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which
assists the President. The rule which has thus gained
recognition is that under our constitutional setup the
Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by
authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to
affirm, modify, or even reverse any order that the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of
Lands, may issue.
The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of
the President, shall remain valid until reversed, disapproved,
or reprobated by the President. In this case, no reprobation
was made hence the decision granting the land to Pao
cannot be reversed.