A.M. No.

MTJ-92-687 February 9, 1994

ENGINEER EDGARDO C. GARCIA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MELJOHN DE LA PEA, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte [Acting Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Naval,
Leyte], respondent.
In a sworn-letter complaint 1 dated June 18, 1992, Engineer Edgardo C. Garcia charged Judge Meljohn de la Pea in his capacity as acting judge of
Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte with partiality, abuse of authority and grave abuse of discretion in connection with Crimimal Case No. 2577.
Complainant Engr. Edgardo C. Garcia claimed that respondent judge took cognizance of the criminal case without the requisite certification from the
Lupon Tagapayapa and that he should have inhibited himself from acting on the case because private complainant Dr. Melencio B. de la Pea is his
brother.
On November 19, 1992, this Court required respondent judge to file his comment and, upon receipt thereof, the case was referred to the Office of the
Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.
Records show that Dr. Melencio B. de la Pea filed on June 8, 1992 a complaint for grave oral defamation 2 against Ignacia G. Garcia with the
Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2577. After the preliminary examination was conducted, respondent Judge
Meljohn de la Pea issued on the same date a warrant 3 for the arrest of the accused Ignacia G. Garcia.
On the same day, June 8, 1992, Engr. Edgardo Garcia posted the cash bail bond and sought the approval of the cash bail bond and the Order of
Release of the accused but respondent judge was not in the office at that time. It was only the following day, after complainant secured a copy of the
Order of Release 5 dated June 8, 1992 that the accused was released from detention. Complainant was informed that before respondent judge left for
Cebu City, he entrusted the Order of Release to his wife, whose whereabouts, however, were unknown in the afternoon of June 8, 1992 despite efforts
by the Clerk of Court to look for her. 6
Respondent judge asserted that the certification to file action from the Lupon Tagapayapa was not necessary for the court to acquire jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. 2577 because the imposable penalty of the crime of grave oral defamation is not within the coverage of the Lupon Tagapayapa;

that even if the private complainant is his brother, he need not inhibit himself to "mobilize the machinery of justice" because the case has
been deferred for quite a long time due to the absence of the incumbent judge and the non-designation of a presiding judge from April to
May 1992;
that there is no room for bias or partiality in the issuance of a warrant of arrest which is both a mandatory and ministerial duty provided the
complaint and the supporting affidavit engender a probable cause;
that to show his neutrality, he issued an inhibition order dated June 15, 1992;
that his Clerk of Court was informed in the morning of June 8, 1992 that he would be going to Cebu City

It is at once clear that the administrative charges against respondent judge focused mainly on the fact of his taking cognizance of the criminal case of
grave oral defamation filed by his brother, Dr. Melencio de la Pea, against complainant's wife, Ignacia Garcia.
The Court agrees that the certification to file an action is not necessary in the prosecution for grave oral defamation 8 for the same is beyond the
coverage of said Katarungan Pambarangay Law. 9 But, the charge of partiality, abuse of authority and grave abuse of discretion as regards respondent
judge's taking cognizance of the criminal case despite the fact that private complainant is his brother a relative within the second degree of
consanguinity in violation of the rule on compulsory disqualification of judges under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court is a different
matter.
A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to
his integrity. 11 The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and
strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith
and confidence in the courts of justice. 12
The fact that respondent judge took cognizance of the criminal case, notwithstanding the fact that he is related within the second degree of
consanguinity to private complainant is obviously a glaring violation of the rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case. Respondent
judge should have formally informed the Executive Judge of the RTC of Leyte if, indeed, the case had been deferred, and thereafter sought the
designation of another MTC judge to take cognizance of the case. He should have foreseen the possibility that his actuation and motives would have
been suspect if he had ruled in favor of the prosecution as his blood relationship with the private complainant was of general knowledge.
Respondent judge likewise violated Rule 2.03, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides: "A judge shall not allow family, social, or
other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests
of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge."
From all indications, it is clear from the facts on record and, in the absence of evidence to negate the perceived bias and partiality which resulted in
undue prejudice to the accused, that respondent judge, through his oppressive and vindictive actuations towards the accused arising from his
relationship to the private complainant in the Criminal Case No. 2577, committed a disservice to the cause of justice. ACCORDINGLY, respondent
Judge Meljohn de la Pea (Acting Judge of Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte) of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte is
hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.

A.M. No. RTJ-93-1033 October 10, 1995

MARIBETH CORDOVA and CHRISTOPHER CORDOVA, complainants,
vs.
HON. EMMA C. LABAYEN, Presiding Judge, Branch 54, RTC, 6th Judicial Region, Bacolod City; HON. BETHEL KATALBASMOSCARDON, former Presiding Judge of Branch 54, RTC, 6th Judicial Region, Bacolod City; GIA L. ARINDAY, Branch Clerk of Court,
and MARIO P. LAMERA, Court Sheriff, Branch 54, RTC, Bacolod City; ARMANDO N. ESO, Court Sheriff, and EDGAR DEPAMAYLO,
Subpoena Server, Branch 50, RTC, Bacolod City, respondents.
An administrative complaint 5 filed by complainants Maribeth and Christopher Cordova, through their counsel, Atty. Sabio, against herein
respondents for disbarment, dismissal from office and disqualification to hold public office with forfeiture of employment benefits for their
involvement in Civil Case No. 7092. The administrative complaint, however, was dismissed by this Court and recommended that Atty. Sabio be
required to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for violation of Canon I, Rules 1.02 and 1103 on the ground that:
Their charge that Atty. Salvador T. Sabio "clearly instigated" the filing of this complaint is also not totally baseless.
The foregoing points to the possible violations of the Code of Professional Ethics, particularly Canon I, Rule 1.02 and Rule 1.03
The main bulk of Atty. Sabio's contentions were premised on the issue of whether the writs of execution were issued and implemented by herein
respondents in gross violation of Sections 8 and 10, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, with manifest partiality and breach of judicial trust, and with grave
abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction. In his Compliance, Atty. Sabio asserts that the writ of execution was issued pending appeal despite the
filing of a supersedeas bond and the payment of advance rentals.
The records of this administrative matter show that in an action for ejectment filed against the predecessor in interest of herein
complainants, 7 judgment was rendered on April 14, 1992 by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 6, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 18761, ordering
defendants to vacate the premises and to pay plaintiffs therein the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees plus P1,200.00 appearance fee, P18,000.00 for
rentals from May, 1991 to April, 1992, and costs of suit. On August 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court affirmed said judgment after finding that there
was no cogent reason to reverse the lower court's decision.
A Motion for Writ of Execution Pending Appeal was filed by plaintiffs on September 4, 1995, to which an Opposition and Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by defendants on September 10, 1992. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion on September 28, 1992 and the writ of
execution was issued on September 30, 1992. However, in the afternoon of September 29, 1992, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
order of September 28, 1992 granting the motion for execution, on the ground that they could not file the supersedeas bond because the court
allegedly failed to apprise them of the amount thereof and, at the same time, attaching to said motion a bond in the amount of P18,000.00. The
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Regional Trial Court on October 1, 1992, as a consequence of which the writ of execution previously
issued was implemented on October 8, 1992 and plaintiffs were ordered restored to the possession of the subject premises.
Therein defendant Luz Cordova went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari with injunction but was rebuffed therein. In a decision
promulgated on March 31, 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29102, said appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court. As a result,
the lower court granted on April 21, 1993 the Motion for Alias Writ of Execution filed by plaintiffs and ordered the release of the amounts of
P12,000.00 and P18,000.00 deposited by therein defendants. An alias writ of execution was subsequently issued on April 26, 1993.
The administrative complaint now filed before us by herein complainants, as heirs and successors in interest of the late Luz Cordova, revolves around
the validity of the writ of execution issued by Judge Moscardon and the alias writ of execution issued by Judge Labayen.
1. The writ of execution issued on September 30, 1992 by Judge Moscardon is being controverted on the ground that a supersedeas bond had been
validly filed in this case and periodic rentals had been paid, hence said supposed compliance with the Rules of Court should have legally stayed
execution pending appeal.
Sections 8 and 10 of Rule 70 clearly provide that to stay the immediate execution of judgment in ejectment proceedings, it is necessary that the
defendant-appellant must (a) perfect his appeal, (b) file a supersedeas bond, and (c) periodically deposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of
the appeal.
The purpose of the supersedeas bond is to answer for the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the judgment of the inferior court appealed from,
the amount of which is to be determined from the judgment of said court. The postulation of complainants and their counsel that the execution sought
was effectively stayed by the filing of a supersedeas bond was sufficiently refuted and justifiably rejected when we consider the circumstances then
obtaining.
First. The amount of the supersedeas bond to be posted is easily discernible from the dispositive portion of the judgment of the municipal trial court.
Hence, it was erroneous, if not altogether a deliberate falsity, for Atty. Sabio to claim that they could not file a supersedeas bond because that court
failed to determine the same.
Second. The bond should have been filed forthwith after the municipal trial court had rendered judgment against complainants, which judgment was
immediately executory, without prejudice to the right of appeal. As the records readily reveal, the purported bond was belatedly filed on September
29, 1992, more than five months later, and only after the aforementioned Regional Trial Court had already issued an order granting the motion for
execution pending appeal. We cannot, therefore, elude the impression thus created that the filing thereof came only as a dilatory afterthought on the
part of defendants and their counsel. In a vain attempt to remedy the situation, Atty. Sabio filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting
execution, but the same necessarily had to fail for being frivolous.

Third. It will be observed that no supersedeas bond was filed after the rendition of the decision either in the court of origin or in the appellate court.
The requirement for the filing of a supersedeas bond is mandatory. 8 Defendants in the ejectment case appealed to the latter court without filing a
supersedeas bond. Such failure is a ground for outright execution of the judgment of the municipal trial court, the duty of the appellate court to order
the execution of the appealed decision being thereby ministerial and imperative. 9
Fourth. The Court of Appeals stated that the amount of P18,000.00 deposited by defendants therein represented rental payments for the period from
May, 1991 to April, 1992, and that a writ of execution had by then already been issued by the Regional Trial Court. Evidently, therefore, the amount
thus deposited could not qualify as or subserve the purpose of a supersedeas bond. Thus:
Finally, anent the prayer for injunction, petitioner contends that she had deposited with the public respondent court the amount of P18,000.00
representing the money judgment, to stay execution pending appeal. The court noted that the said amount represented the rental payments only for
the months from May 1991 to April 1992. It is for this reason that this Court, in its Resolution dated October 9, 1992 (p. 60, Rollo), ordered petitioner
to present proof of subsequent payments made pursuant to Sections 8 and 10 of Rule 70. It appears, however, that a Writ of Execution was already
issued and even implemented (par. 5. Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, pp. 98-99,Rollo; Delivery of Possession, p.
118, Rollo) that a preliminary injunction is thereby rendered nugatory. . . . 10
While it is true, therefore, that defendants deposited an amount which approximates the monetary judgment for unpaid rentals, since the same was
filed late, it could not qualify as a supersedeas bond. What is considered material for purposes of staying execution pending appeal under Rule 70 is
not only the fact of payment but, more importantly, the timeliness of the filing of the supersedeas bond. Hence, the amount of P18,000.00 was
correctly applied as mere rental payments from May, 1991 to April, 1992. On this ground alone, Judge Moscardon was perfectly justified in issuing
the writ of execution and respondent sheriffs in implementing the same. Of these legal considerations, Atty. Sabio could not have been unaware.
The records, furthermore, do not sustain Atty. Sabio's representations with respect to the application of the P12,000.00 which complainants
supposedly deposited with the court a quo. Atty. Sabio insists that said amount was intended to answer for monthly rentals falling due after the
rendition of the decision of the Municipal Trial Court. This, however, runs contrary to the facts obtaining in this case. The decisions of the Municipal
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals are silent on this point except for a statement found in the higher court's decision that "this Court, in its
Resolution dated October 9, 1992, ordered petitioner to present proof of subsequent payments made." Also, in the order of Judge Moscardon dated
October 1, 1992, she stated that "the record does not show that the defendants had likewise paid the periodical rentals." Also, in the complaint filed in
this administrative matter, it is alleged that the defendant consigned the rentals from May, 1991 until April, 1992 in the amount of P12,000.00.
In view of these conflicting statements of complainants, plus the fact that there is not enough evidence on hand, we are prevented from making a
specific determination thereon. Nevertheless, whether or not periodic rental payments were made during the pendency of the appeal no longer carries
any weight in view of our earlier finding that execution could not be legally stayed by reason of the admittedly belated filing of the purported
supersedeas bond.
Complainants further contend that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of execution allegedly because it should have
forwarded the records of the case to the court of origin for proper implementation. The argument is specious. The Municipal Trial Court may issue
execution immediately after judgment if no action was taken therefrom by defendants. But, after the perfection of the appeal, it is obvious that the
jurisdiction over the controversy had passed to the Regional Trial Court, hence the properly filed in and granted by the latter court. 11
2. Anent the issue on the legality of the alias writ of execution issued by Judge Labayen, Atty. Sabio avers that the same is void for the reason that he
was not furnished a copy of the order, dated April 21, 1993, which granted the motion for alias writ of execution. He further insists that the same was
issued despite the fact that the decision of the Court of Appeals had not yet become final and executory since it was still pending review before the
Supreme Court.
Under Section 10 of Rule 70, an appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall likewise not be stayed unless the appellants deposit the
amount of rent due from time to time. In the case at bar, no proof has been presented to show that the monthly rentals which fell due after the
rendition of the trial court's decision had been duly paid. Assuming arguendo, as claimed by Atty. Sabio, that the P12,000.00 deposited with the
Regional Trial Court should answer for said rentals, the same was not sufficient to cover rentals due during the entire pendency of the case before the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. At most, such amount could apply only to rental payments from May, 1992 to December, 1992. Of these
facts, again, Atty. Sabio could not have been completely oblivious.
The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on March 31, 1993 and there is absolutely nothing in the records to show that herein complainants made
further payments aside from the P12,000.00 and P18,000.00 deposited with the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court, respectively. In
addition, Atty. Sabio does not refute, and in fact it is admitted in paragraph 6 of the complaint filed in this administrative matter, that complainants
reentered and remained in possession of the premises, and it appears that they continued to do so despite the prior implementation of the original writ
of execution. Verily, this time for failure of complainants to make periodic deposits during the pendency of the appeal and their continued occupancy
of the premises, the issuance of the alias writ of execution was a ministerial and mandatory duty of respondent judges.
Atty. Sabio likewise claims that execution could not issue because he was not served a copy of the order dated April 21, 1993 12 which granted the
motion for alias writ of execution. He rationalizes that:
. . . The fact is that, a copy of the Order dated April 21, 1993 was not furnished the defendant's counsel.
Truth to tell, this is exactly the ground why undersigned counsel filed his Urgent Motion to Lift Alias Writ of Execution, . . . .
It is therefore clear that the Alias Writ of Execution dated April 26, 1993 issued by the defendant Clerk of Court, Gia L. Aranday, was improperly
issued, considering that the Order of the court granting the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution dated April 21, 1993 was

not furnished the undersigned counsel, and, it is only through the resourcefulness of the undersigned of following-up this case that he came to know
of the said Order dated April 21, 1993.
Undersigned counsel found himself in an embarrassing situation, when he was confronted by his clients that the Alias Writ of Execution dated April
26, 1993 was issued without his knowledge of the prior Court Order dated April 21, 1993.
It is in this respect, that undersigned honestly believed that he has a well-grounded complaint against respondents Clerk of Court and process server
for their negligent act. (Emphasis in the original text.) 13
That bad faith attended the filing of this administrative charge was unwittingly disclosed by the aforequoted allegations of Atty. Sabio in his
compliance. No ratiocination was proffered by him nor did he invoke any authority of law or jurisprudence, since decidedly there is none, to support
his theory that execution should not issue where the adverse party is not served a copy of the order even where the grant thereof had become a matter
of right. The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that the filing of the present complaint was, at the very least, ill-conceived and malicious, and was
resorted to as a last-ditch effort and a face-saving recourse of counsel.
The Court would like to call attention again to the reprehensible propensity of disgruntled litigants, most especially their counsel, of filing totally
baseless and unfounded charges against judges and court personnel in a vain attempt to escape the dire consequences of their own negligence or
in an effort to transgress the lawful orders of the court. Judges and court personnel should be protected from unjust accusations of dissatisfied
litigants, abetted by counsel who seek thereby to camouflage their shortcomings. Besides, it goes without saying that mere suspicion that a judge is
partial to one of the parties to the case is not enough. There should be evidence to prove the charge, 15which is obviously absent in the case at bar.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer has the sworn duty to assist in, not to impede or pervert, the administration of justice. The present
administrative charge seeks to cast doubt on the integrity of respondent judges, the judicial personnel and the court which they represent, in flagrant
abdication of the bounden responsibility of a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice. Atty. Sabio thus deserves to be
punished for instigating the filing of an administrative complaint by his clients, in the guise of upholding their rights but actually to frustrate the
enforcement of lawful court orders and consequently obstruct the desirable norms and course of justice.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Salvador T. Sabio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, effective upon his
receipt of a copy of this decision. He is warned that a more severe sanction shall be imposed should he commit another administrative offense. Let
copies hereof be attached to his record and served on the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on all courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-33508 May 25, 1973

LEON UMALE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ONOFRE VILLALUZ, HONORABLE BENJAMIN AQUINO, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, EDUARDO
FELICIANO, ANTONIO DAVID, CECILIO CHICO, BENJAMIN ESCANDOR, ROLANDO SAMSON, and ALFONSO CO, respondents.
Petitioner Leon Umale impugns the validity of the order dated April 15, 1971 of respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz of the Circuit Criminal Court
sitting at Pasig, Rizal, disqualifying or inhibiting himself from trying the robbery charge against sixteen (16) accused.
Petitioner Leon Umale is the complainant in the said robbery case, the robbery having been allegedly committed on September 21, 1970 in his
warehouse in Pasig, Rizal from which were assorted textile materials valued at P229,659.904. The case was filed by the acting state prosecutor, who
conducted the preliminary investigation presided by respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz.
However, on April 15, 1971, without any party moving for his disqualification or inhibition, respondent Judge Onofre Villaluz voluntarily inhibited
himself from trying the case "for the peace of mind of the parties concerned and to insure an impartial administration of justice" on the ground that
before the criminal case was filed in his court, he already had personal knowledge of the same. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order of
inhibition was denied on April 16, 1971 by said respondent Judge.
OUR resolution dated May 18, 1971 required respondents to answer and authorized the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon posting by
petitioner of a bond of P1,000. Petitioner posted the bond and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued on June 21, 1971 enjoining respondent
Judge Benjamin Aquino from taking cognizance of and exercising jurisdiction over the criminal case.
Only respondent Alfonso Co, thru counsel, filed an answer.
In a motion dated September 20, 1971 and filed on September 22, 1971, private respondents Benjamin Escandor and Rolando Samson, two of the
defendants in CCC-VII-660 and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2729 on the Court of First Instance, Branch VIII, Pasig, Rizal, prayed for the
modification of the said preliminary injunction so as to allow respondent Judge Benjamin Aquino to act on their motion for bail.
The issues posed by the petition are:

(1) whether respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz of the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, can voluntarily, inhibit himself, without any motion
therefor by the parties, on the ground of his personal knowledge of the case even before the same was filed; and
Undoubtedly, personal knowledge of the case pending before him is not one of the causes for the disqualification of a judge under the first paragraph
of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court which took effect on January 1, 1964. But paragraph 2 of said Section 1 of Rule 137
authorizes the judge, "in the exercise of his sound discretion, to disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reason other than those
mentioned" in paragraph 1.
Herein respondent Judge, because of his personal knowledge of the case, at least had conducted a careful self-examination after hearing some
incidents on the criminal case wherein petitioner is the complainant, because such personal knowledge on his part might generate in his mind some
bias or prejudice against the complaining witness or any of the accused or in an manner unconsciously color his judgment one way or the other
without the parties having the opportunity to cross-examine him as a witness.
It is possible that the respondent Judge might be influenced by his personal knowledge of the case when he tries and decides the same on the merits,
which would certainly constitute a denial of due process to the party adversely affected by his judgment or decision. It is best that, after some
reflection, the respondent Judge on his own initiative disqualified himself from hearing the robbery case filed by herein petitioner and thereby
rendered himself available as witness to any of the parties and therefore maybe subject to cross-examination.
Having thus voluntarily inhibited himself from trying the criminal case in which herein petitioner is the complainant, the respondent Judge has the
discretion likewise to transfer the case to the regular courts of first instance sitting in Pasig, Rizal where he holds court, since the regular Court of
First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Criminal Court over this case for robbery (Sec. 1, R.A. No. 5179).
Consequently, herein respondent Judge committed no abuse of discretion..
WHEREFORE THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, complainant,

vs. Judge FRANCISCO D. VILLANUEVA, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36, respondent.
The administrative charge before us was triggered by a letter 1 from then Director Santiago Y. Toledo of the (NBI), recommending the prosecution of
Judge Francisco D. Villanueva and three others for illegal recruitment under Republic Act (RA) 8042 and white slave trade under the Revised Penal
Code in relation to RA 7610. The letter also charged respondent with immorality, alleging that Marian Herrera was his live-in partner.
At the recommendation of then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, the Court in a Resolution dated June 8, 1999, resolved to suspend
respondent until further orders.
Three girls were brought to Manila t work as GRO. The promise was that they will work in Japan. Marian and Judge Villanueva are the ones ordering
their work.
Respondent Judge denied having any amorous relation with Marian Herrera. According to him[,] she is but his distant relative on his mothers side.
He was but a business adviser to her[,] which his wife Violeta confirmed. He did not have anything to do with the three girls (Jobet, Janet and
Juvylyn) stay at the condominium owned by Marian and their employment as GROs. Neither did he sleep there. 2
Recommendation of the OCA Consultant
In his Report to the Court dated April 19, 2001, the OCA consultant said that respondents denial could not prevail over the positive and clear adverse
testimony of the three young women. He recommended that respondent be held administratively liable for serious misconduct arising from violation
of RA 7610.
The OCA investigator also found a clear indication of an illicit amorous relation between Marian Herrera and respondent, who was still married to
Violeta Jarra Villanueva. He pointed out that such extramarital relation constituted immorality -- a serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the penalty for which is dismissal from the service.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of Justice Ramirez that respondent is administratively liable for immorality and unbecoming
conduct, but not for gross or serious misconduct.
Respondents Administrative Liability
The evidence shows that respondent is not the owner of any of the establishments involved in this case. Moreover, there is no showing that the three
alleged victims were being forced to work as guest relations officers (GROs) or that their private parts were fondled by customers.
Though he denies encouraging the three young women to apply for jobs as GROs, his actions loudly speak otherwise. By his acts, respondent clearly
facilitated the employment of the three young women as GROs. Furthermore, by his careless acts, respondent opened himself to the charges of white
slave trade and violation of RA 7610. Such acts are unacceptable, because no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and

uprightness than a seat in the judiciary. High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in
the judiciary so indispensable in an orderly society cannot be preserved. 10 In sum, his actions show conduct unbecoming his office.
The Court does not agree with the OCA consultant that the said acts of respondent constitute serious misconduct in office. In this case, the acts
complained of are not connected with the performance of respondents official duties; thus, they cannot be considered serious or gross misconduct.
However, such acts are violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Canon 2 which states that [a] judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities.
In the matter of immorality, we agree with the findings of the OCA consultant. First, the evidence clearly shows that respondent and Marian Herrera
were lovers because respondent was found sleeping inside the same bedroom occupied by Herrera at No. 1 Hanna Street, Fil-Invest, Batasan, Quezon
City. Second, they were cohabiting in the same house in the aforementioned address. Finally, respondent never denied that he was the husband of
Herrera when he was introduced to complainants witnesses. The testimonies on this point were spontaneous, clear and consistent.
In contrast, respondents denials and explanations were hollow and unworthy of belief. If indeed he was merely the business consultant of Marian
Herrera, he would not be so free and so comfortable sleeping in the same bedroom as she or waking up and then having breakfast with her in her
house. This is taking business consultancy much too far.
In an administrative proceeding, as contradistinguished from a criminal case, only substantial evidence -- that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion -- is required. 19 Here, the existence of extramarital relations between respondent
and Marian Herrera is substantially supported by the evidence on record.
Considering that respondent has already retired, he can no longer be dismissed or suspended. Hence, the appropriate penalty is a fine.
WHEREFORE , Judge Francisco D. Villanueva is found GUILTY of immorality and conduct unbecoming a judge. He is hereby FINED in the
amount of P40,000.

JESUS CABARRUS, JR., Complainant,

vs. JOSE ANTONIO BERNAS,Respondents.
On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed and administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas for alleged
violations of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and Code of professional Resposibility. In his complaint-affidavit 1 dated August 12, 1996,
complainant alleged as follows:
A.That on April 16, 1996, respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., subscribe under oath before Marie Lourdes T. Sia Bernas, a notary public in Makati
City, wife of lawyer jose Antonio Bernas, a verification and certification of non-forum shopping which was appended to a complaint for
reconveyance of property and damages, denominated as Civil Case No. 65646, filed before the Regional Trial Court in National Capital Region,
RTC, which case was raffled to RTC Branch 159 in Pasig City. A photocopy of said complaint is hereto attached and marked as Annexex (sic) A, A-1,
A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-6;
B.That as basis for the instant complaint for falsification of public document, I am hereto quoting verbatim, the test (sic) of Annex A-6, the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping which states:
Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., under oath, depose and states:
He is the plaintiff in this case, and certify that he cause the preparation of the foregoing pleading, the content of which are true to his personal
knowledge and that he has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in any court, including the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency. If he should learn that a similar action of (sic) proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court or any other Tribunal agency, he undertake to report to (sic) that the fact within Five (5) days from the notice to this notice (sic) to
this Honorable Court. Underscoring supplied.
C.That the cause of action relied upon by the respondents in Civil Case No. 65646 is fraud, facilitated by forgery as gleaned from paragraph 15, 16,
and 22;
D.That contrary to the tenor, import and meanoing (sic) of the allegation under 1-B of the instant complaint, respondent and his counsel Jose Antonio
Bernas caused the preparation and filing of a criminal complaint for falsification of a public document on April 11, 1996, (three days before the filing
of the aforecited Civil Case) at the AOED of the National Bureau of Investigation if (sic) Taff (sic) Ave., a xerox copy of said complaint is hereto
attached and marked as Annex B.
D-1.That as stated in Annex B, the gravaman of the affidavit complaint of the respondent is forgery, the same legal issue in Civil Case No. 65646;
D-2.That as early as August 14, 1995, respondent counsel, Jose Antonio Bernas filed a written complaint at the NBI for the same cause of action
which was reiterated in another letter submitting to the NBI standard specimen signitures dated October 1995, copies of said letter complaint are
hereto attached and marked as Annexes (sic) C.

E. That respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., on the basis of Annexes A, B, C, D, inclusive of submarkings knowingly subverted and perverted the truth
when he falsify certified (sic) and verified under oath in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, that:
He has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in any court, including the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
any other Tribunal or agency. Where verification-certification was placed under oath and was conveniently notarized by the wife of the counsel of
respondent in both cases at Branch 159 of the RTC in Pasig and at the NBI, an agency within the ambis (sic) and purview of the circulus (sic) of the
Supreme Court prohibiting forum shopping.
F. That Jose Antonio Bernas, the counsel on record of the respondents in Civil Case No. 65646 is the same lawyer who instigated a criminal
complaint at the NBI for forgery and respondents themselves conspired and confabulated with each other in facilitating and insuring the open, blatant
and deliberate violation of Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code which states:
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents.- The penalty of prison correctional in its medium and maximum periods
and a fine of not more than p 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or
letter of exchange (sic) or any other kind of commercial documents; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of the third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or the damage of another or who, with the intent to cause such
damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article, or any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be
punished by the penalty next lower in degree.
G. That Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas should be disbarred for having instigated abetted and facilitated the perversion and subversion of truth in the said
verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Contrary to Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, Canon 3, 3.01, Canon 10 of the code of Professional
responsibility for Lawyers, the pertinent provisions of which are herein below quoted and a copy of said code is hereto attached and marked as Annex
E;
CANON 1. A. LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW
AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in lawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful (sic) conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities simed (sic) at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 3 A. LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND
OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OF (sic) STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualified (sic) or legal services.
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
In his Comment, 2 respondents Jose Antonio Bernas avers that he has not committed forum shopping because the criminal action is not an action that
involves the same issue as those in the civil action and both suits can exist without constituting forum shopping so long as the civil aspect has not yet
been prosecuted in the criminal case. He emphasized that forum shopping only exist when identical reliefs are issued by the same parties in multiple
fora.
In his Supplemental Comment,3 respondent further contends that neither he or his client Pascual has commenced any criminal action. Pascual merely
requested the NBI to assist in the investigation or prosecution, and left it to the NBI to determine whether the filing of an endorsement to the
prosecutor, who would determine probable caused, would be appropriate. It was only upon request of the NBI the he assisted Ramon Pascual in
drafting an affidavit-complaint for falsification of public documents against complainant. Likewise, respondent by counsel reiterates that the letter
transmitted to the NBI cannot constitute an action or proceeding because the NBIs functions are merely investigatory and informational in nature.
NBI has no prosecutorial functions or quasi-judicial power and is incapable of granting relief or remedy. The NBI cannot be an agency contemplated
by the circular.
The core issue to be resolved here is whether respondent Atty. Bernas transgressed Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No. 28-91, and
administrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping.
After a careful scrutiny of the records, we find the administrative complaint bereft of merit and should be dismissed.
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal
orcertiorari) in another. Therefore, a party to a case resort to forum shopping because by filling another petition involving the same essential facts
and circumstances, xxx, respondents approached two different for a in order to increase their chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action, 4 In
this case, there is no forum shopping to speak of Atty. Bernas, as counsel of Mr. Pascual, Jr., merely requested the assistance of the NBI to investigate
the the alleged fraud and forgery committed by Mr. Jesus Cabarrus. 5 The filing of the civil case for conveyance and damages before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City does not preclude respondent to institute a criminal action. The rule allows the filing of a civil case independently with the

criminal case without violating the circulars on forum shopping. It is scarcely necessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 must be so interpreted and
applied as to achieve the purposes projected by the Supreme Court when it promulgated that Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an
instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert and
legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure-which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Explicitly, the function of the National Bureau of Investigations are merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasijudicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to a party. It cannot even determine probable cause. It is an investigative agency whose
findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative and as public welfare may require. It renders
assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes which precisely what Atty. Bernas sought in order to prosecute those person
responsible for defrauding his client.
The courts, tribunal and agencies referred to under Circular No. 28-91, revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 are those
vested with judicial powers or quasi-judicial powers and those who not only hear and determine controversies between adverse parties, but to make
binding orders or judgments. As succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI is not performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The NBI cannot
therefore be among those forums contemplated by the Circular that can entertain an action or proceeding, or even grant any relief, declaratory or
otherwise.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.