A.C. No.

6010 August 28, 2006

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL
(SLU-LHS)
FACULTY
and
STAFF, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of
the Saint Louis University-Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS,
predicated on the following grounds:
1) Gross Misconduct:
From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending
criminal case for child abuse allegedly committed by him against a
high school student filed before the Prosecutors Office of Baguio
City; a pending administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff,
Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU
for his alleged unprofessional and unethical acts of misappropriating
money supposedly for the teachers; and the pending labor case filed
by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative
Region, on alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent.
2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:
In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first
marriage; and
3) Malpractice:
In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita
Rivera on 31 May 1982 at Tuba, Benguet, before the then Honorable
Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. He thereafter contracted a subsequent
marriage with one Mary Jane Pascua, before the Honorable Judge
Guillermo Purganan. On 4 October 1994, said second marriage was
subsequently annulled for being bigamous.
On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent
deliberately subscribed and notarized certain legal documents on
different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of respondents
notarial commission on 31 December 1987. A Certification 1 dated 25
May 1999 was issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Baguio City, to the effect that respondent had not applied for
commission as Notary Public for and in the City of Baguio for the
period 1988 to 1997. Respondent performed acts of notarization, as
evidenced by the following documents:
1. Affidavit of Ownership2 dated 8 March 1991, executed by
Fernando T. Acosta, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela
Cruz;
2. Affidavit3 dated 26 September 1992, executed by Maria Cortez
Atos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
3. Affidavit4 dated 14 January 1992, executed by Fanolex James A.
Menos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
4. Affidavit5 dated 23 December 1993, executed by Ponciano V.
Abalos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
5. Absolute Date of Sale6 dated 23 June 1993, executed by Danilo
Gonzales in favor of Senecio C. Marzan, notarized by Rolando Dela
Cruz;
6. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties 7 dated 5 March 1994,
executed by Evelyn C. Canullas and Pastora C. Tacadena, subscribed
and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
7. Sworn Statement8 dated 31 May 1994, executed by Felimon B.
Rimorin, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
8. Deed of Sale9 dated 17 August 1994, executed by Woodrow
Apurado in favor of Jacinto Batara, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
9. Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties 10 dated 1 June 1994,
executed by Ponciano V. Abalos and Arsenio C. Sibayan, subscribed
and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
10. Absolute Deed of Sale11 dated 23 March 1995, executed by
Eleanor D.Meridor in favor of Leonardo N. Benter, notarized by
Rolando Dela Cruz;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale12 dated 20 December 1996, executed by
Mandapat in favor of Mario R. Mabalot, notarized by Rolando Dela
Cruz;

12. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties 13 dated 17 April

1996, executed by Villiam C. Ambong and Romeo L. Quiming,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
13. Conditional Deed of Sale14 dated 27 February 1997, executed by
Aurelia Demot Cados in favor of Jose Ma. A. Pangilinan, notarized
by Rolando Dela Cruz;
14. Memorandum of Agreement15 dated 19 July 1996, executed by
JARCO represented by Mr. Johnny Teope and AZTEC Construction
represented by Mr. George Cham, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz.
Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of
child abuse, illegal deduction of salary and others which are still
pending before the St. Louis University (SLU), National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Prosecutors Office. He did
not discuss anything about the allegations of immorality in
contracting a second marriage and malpractice in notarizing
documents despite the expiration of his commission.
After the filing of comment, We referred 16 the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference.
The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is
just a reiteration of their allegations in their complaint.
Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage
despite the existence of his first marriage, and the subsequent
nullification of the former. He also admitted having notarized certain
documents during the period when his notarial commission had
already expired. However, he offered some extenuating defenses such
as good faith, lack of malice and noble intentions in doing the
complained acts.
After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.
On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his
report and recommended that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended
that respondent be administratively penalized for the following acts:
a. For contracting a second marriage without taking the appropriate
legal steps to have the first marriage annulled first, he be suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) year, and
b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of
the expiration of his notarial commission, he be suspended from the
practice of law for another one (1) year or for a total of two (2)
years.17
On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, approved and
adopted the recommendation of Commissioner Pacheco, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent
contracted a second marriage without taking appropriate legal steps
to have the first marriage annulled, Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and
for notarizing legal documents despite full knowledge of the
expiration of his notarial commission Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for another one (1) year, for a
total of two (2) years Suspension from the practice of law.18
This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent
well taken, except as to the penalty contained therein.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a
right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of
such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only
during good behavior, and he can be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to
be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional
privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved
by a proceeding to suspend, based on conduct rendering him unfit to

hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an

attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or
disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the profession a
person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and,
thus, to protect the public and those charged with the administration
of justice, rather than to punish an attorney. Elaborating on this, we
said on Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting, 19 that the Bar should maintain a
high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing
any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
profession. Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred or
suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney
and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad
enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his
professional or private capacity.
Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not
prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members. There is no
distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the
lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a
lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another.20 Thus, not only his professional
activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect
unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and
the courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the
proper authorities.21
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant
must possess good moral character. Possession of such moral
character as requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice must be continuous. Otherwise, "membership in the bar may
be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral conduct."22
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita
Rivera contracted marriage on 31 May 1982 before Judge Tomas W.
Macaranas. In less than a year, they parted ways owing to their
irreconcilable differences without seeking judicial recourse. The
union bore no offspring. After their separation in-fact, respondent
never knew the whereabouts of Teresita Rivera since he had lost all
forms of communication with her. Seven years thereafter, respondent
became attracted to one Mary Jane Pascua, who was also a faculty
member of SLU-LHS. There is also no dispute over the fact that in
1989, respondent married Mary Jane Pascua in the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Baguio City, Branch 68. Respondent even admitted
this fact. When the second marriage was entered into, respondents
prior marriage with Teresita Rivera was still subsisting, no action
having been initiated before the court to obtain a judicial declaration
of nullity or annulment of respondents prior marriage to Teresita
Rivera or a judicial declaration of presumptive death of Teresita
Rivera.
Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the
bigamous second marriage in 1989, having been admitted to the Bar
in 1985. As such, he cannot feign ignorance of the mandate of the law
that before a second marriage may be validly contracted, the first and
subsisting marriage must first be annulled by the appropriate court.
The second marriage was annulled only on 4 October 1994 before the
RTC of Benguet, Branch 9, or about five years after respondent
contracted his second marriage. The annulment of respondents
second marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding.
Firstly, as earlier emphasized, the annulment came after the
respondents second bigamous marriage. Secondly, as we held in In
re: Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely
civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court
into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a
criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against
him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not
affect its course, then neither will the judgment of annulment of

respondents second marriage also exonerate him from a wrongdoing

actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear
preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against
members of the Bar is met, then liability attaches. 23
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral
conduct as a ground for disbarment.
The Court has laid down with a common definition of what
constitutes immoral conduct, vis--vis, grossly immoral conduct.
Immoral conduct is "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
the good and respectable members of the community" and what is
"grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree."24
Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it
so gross as to warrant his disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a
deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage
which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act
of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still in
place, is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.25
However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to
consider respondents act as grossly immoral. This finds support in
the following recommendation and observation of the IBP
Investigator and IBP Board of Governors, thus:
The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to
flaunt the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession, to
wit:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or
for a period of almost seven (7) years, he has not been romantically
involved with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total
love for his wife, whom he described to be very intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and
child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic)
with relation to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways
when the mother and child went to Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate. 26
In the case of Terre v. Terre, 27 respondent was disbarred because his
moral character was deeply flawed as shown by the following
circumstances, viz: he convinced the complainant that her prior
marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio and that she was
legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and
respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through
law school while being supported by complainant, with some
assistance from respondents parents. After respondent had finished
his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent
abandoned the complainant without support and without the
wherewithal for delivering his own child safely to a hospital.
In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, 28 respondent was also
disbarred for his grossly immoral acts such as: first, he abandoned his
lawful wife and three children; second, he lured an innocent young
woman into marrying him; third, he mispresented himself as a
"bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land; and
fourth, he availed himself of complainants resources by securing a
plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry the latters
daughter. He did this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards,
he even had the temerity to assure complainant that "everything is
legal."
Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the
respondent himself acknowledged and declared his abject apology for
his misstep. He was humble enough to offer no defense save for his
love and declaration of his commitment to his wife and child.
Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of
disbarment upon him to be unduly harsh. The power to disbar must
be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of

the lawyer as an officer of the Court. Disbarment should never be

decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end
desired.29 In line with this philosophy, we find that a penalty of two
years suspension is more appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year
suspension recommended by the IBP is too light and not
commensurate to the act committed by respondent.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several
documents during the years 1988-1997 after his commission as
notary public had expired, respondent humbly admitted having
notarized certain documents despite his knowledge that he no longer
had authority to do so. He, however, alleged that he received no
payment in notarizing said documents.
It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a private
document converts the document into a public one making it
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and,
for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance
would be undermined.30
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public
must not be treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has
characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without the
requisite commission to do so as "reprehensible, constituting as it
does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of
public documents."31
The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a
document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when
he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be
subjected to disciplinary action or one, performing a notarial act
without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey
the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it
appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all
legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which
the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely
within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By
acting as a notary public without the proper commission to do so, the
lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs
every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession.
In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera, 32 a lawyer was suspended for
one year when he notarized five documents after his commission as
Notary Public had expired, to wit: a complaint for ejectment,
affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale, and a contract to sell.
Guided by the pronouncement in said case, we find that a suspension
of two (2) years is justified under the circumstances. Herein
respondent notarized a total of fourteen (14) documents 33 without the
requisite notarial commission.
Other charges constituting respondents misconduct such as the
pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly committed by him
against a high school student filed before the Prosecutors Office of
Baguio City; the pending administrative case filed by the Teachers,
Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by
SLU; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before
the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal
deduction of salary by respondent, need not be discussed, as they are
still pending before the proper forums. At such stages, the
presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of
immoral conduct, in disregard of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years, and another two (2) years for notarizing
documents despite the expiration of his commission or a total of four
(4) years of suspension.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land
through the Court Administrator, as well as the IBP, the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal records of the
respondent.
SO ORDERED.

[AC No. 99-634. June 10, 2002]

DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C.
MAGULTA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity
to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the
attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration.
The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any
other disciplinary action against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by
Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the
Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the
following:
xxxxxxxxx
That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta, sometime in September, 1998, in his office at the
Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building,
Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to legally represent me
in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for
breach of contract;
That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta
prepared for me the demand letter and some other legal papers, for
which services I have accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I
failed to secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested
that I file the necessary complaint, which he subsequently drafted,
copy of which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee whereof will
require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I,
on January 4, 1999, deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon
the instruction that I needed the case filed immediately;
That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that
the complaint had already been filed in court, and that I should
receive notice of its progress;
That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the
court or from Atty. Magulta but there seemed to be no progress in my
case, such that I frequented his office to inquire, and he would
repeatedly tell me just to wait;
That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to
wait [every time] I asked; and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last
May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel had not yet acted on
my case and, for my satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of
Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he
left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the
building and told to wait while he personally follows up the processes
with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he came back
and told me that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;
That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I
decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with my draft of
Atty. Magultas complaint to personally verify the progress of my
case, and there told that there was no record at all of a case filed by
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the Certification
dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;
That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I
confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his office the following day,
May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the
delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown

the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint
because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own
purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to reimburse me by
issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the
amounts of P12,000.00 andP8,000.00, respectively, copies of which
are attached as Annexes D and E;
That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to
suffer, I wish to complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for
misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct;
x x x x x x x x x.[1]
On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP
Commission
on
Bar
Discipline, [2] respondent
filed
his
[3]
Answer vehemently denying the allegations of complainant for
being totally outrageous and baseless. The latter had allegedly been
introduced as a kumpadre of one of the formers law partners. After
their meeting, complainant requested him to draft a demand letter
against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former
never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of
complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that another
demand letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by
respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the
lawyer, complainant asked the process server of the formers law
office to deliver the letter to the addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a threehour meeting, respondent drafted a complaint (which was only for the
purpose of compelling the owner to settle the case) and prepared a
compromise agreement. He was also requested by complainant to do
the following:
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainants
wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by
complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant
later on withdrew all the files pertinent to the Regwill case. However,
when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to draft a
complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had
never been paid by complainant until this time, told the latter about
his acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees amounted
to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4 million,
complainant promised to pay on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to
respondents secretary and told her that it was for the filing fee of the
Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer
immediately called the attention of complainant, informing the latter
of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees before the complaint
could be filed. Complainant was told that the amount he had paid was
a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee
later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend
for the meantime the filing of the complaint because the former might
be paid by another company, the First Oriental Property Ventures,
Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill
Industries. The negotiations went on for two months, but the parties
never arrived at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his
interest in filing the complaint. Respondent reminded him once more
of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that the
complaint be filed first before payment of respondents acceptance
and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant demanded the
return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his own
personal checks because their law office was undergoing extensive
renovation at the time, and their office personnel were not reporting
regularly. Respondents checks were accepted and encashed by
complainant.

Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or

deceived complainant, and if anyone had been shortchanged by the
undesirable events, it was he.
The IBPs Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:
x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with
the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill
complaint. With complainants deposit of the filing fees for the
Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of
respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint
within the time frame contemplated by his client, the complainant.
The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of
the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up
this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant
additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest
conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession.
The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the
money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate
the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to
impress upon the respondent the gravity of his offense, it is
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year.[4]
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Commissions recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Clients Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent
lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf of his client and
(b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee
for the Regwill complaint; hence, the formers failure to file the
complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the amount
delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for
attorneys fees and not for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and
ability in the prosecution or the defense of the clients cause. They
who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect the
interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do
honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the community for
the legal profession.[5] Members of the bar must do nothing that may
tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the
fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession. [6]
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client
relationship existed between him and complainant, because the latter
never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that he only
drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre of
one of his partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the
very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advice
regarding the formers business. To constitute professional
employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any
retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his
service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind,
consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the
consultation, then the professional employment is established. [7]
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the
close personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant
or the nonpayment of the formers fees. [8] Hence, despite the fact that
complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that
respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor
to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he
had agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest
possible time, in order to protect the clients interest. Rule 18.03 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not

neglect legal matters entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to
take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.
[9]
They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in
the maintenance and the defense of the clients rights, and the exertion
of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken
or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied.

SO ORDERED.

[10]

EN BANC
A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, complainant
vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the

receipt issued by his office to complainant on January 4, 1999 was
erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite incredible
for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client
to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment for something else.
Moreover, upon discovering the mistake -- if indeed it was one -respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct the error.
He should have lost no time in calling complainants attention to the
matter andshould have issued another receipt indicating the correct
purpose of the payment.
The Practice of Law -- a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice
of law is a profession and not a business. [11] Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is
not a capital that necessarily yields profits. [12] The gaining of a
livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration. [13] Duty
to public service and to the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of
law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the
highest eminence may be attained without making much money.[14]
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant
-- as evidenced by the receipt issued by the law office of respondent
-- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously
careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional
capacity.[15] Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and
properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross
violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession. [16] It may be true that they have a
lien upon the clients funds, documents and other papers that have
lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them until
their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they
may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and
disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of
their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their
failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. [17] In any event,
they must still exert all effort to protect their clients interest within
the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to
the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.
[18]
Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his
legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed
to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned the
amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar
respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will
disbarment be imposed as a penalty.[19]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating
Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be
furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which
is instructed to include a copy in respondents file.

PER CURIAM:
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989,
respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this
Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon
her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in
C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A.
Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of
P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that
the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the
unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984.
Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the
unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately
P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984
for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also
for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984
for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within
ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were
dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for
insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of
dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank
concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no
effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 8538360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a
decision dated 25 August 1987 which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3)
cases, and sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No.
8538359;
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of
P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of
P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in
all three (3) cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in addition,
suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent
portion of the decision read as follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to
sustain the conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to
this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a
member of the Bar, and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty
involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from the
practice of law and shall not practice her profession until further
action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections 27 and

28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision must be

forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the
same Rule.
SO ORDERED. 1
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9
January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her
"to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court,
the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this
Court a Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without
action respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of
Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and
executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for
review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the
Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal
by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal
instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1,
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary
period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not
painful penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine
considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial
on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely by
sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the
intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she
had not violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the
ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did not
intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed
by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of
Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found
guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects
public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez, 2 the Court
explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the
following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to
prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious
effects on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an
offense against public order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it
creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury
to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial
papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute
the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. 3 (Italics
supplied)
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law
because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.
Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what
grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of

any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully

appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of
First Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance
may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named
in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney
shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme
Court in the premises. (Italics supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted
also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to
"obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22
does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer;
however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of
a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this
Court stressed that:
the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be
a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law. 5
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift
Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the
practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this
Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of
respondent.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ.,
concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., in the result.

EN BANC
A. M. No. 2104 August 24, 1989
NARCISO
MELENDREZ
and
DALMAN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.

ERLINDA

PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint 1 dated 25 September 1979, the spouses Erlinda
Dalman and Narciso Melendrez charged Reynerio I. Decena, a
member of the Philippine Bar, with malpractice and breach of trust.
The complainant spouses alleged, among others, that respondent had,
by means of fraud and deceit, taken advantage of their precarious
financial situation and his knowledge of the law to their prejudice,
succeeded in divesting them of their only residential lot in Pagadian
City; that respondent, who was their counsel in an estafa case against
one Reynaldo Pineda, had compromised that case without their
authority.
In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied all the charges
levelled against him and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative complaint was
referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation.
Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal
of Pagadian City, Jorge T. Almonte, to conduct the necessary
investigation, with instructions to submit thereafter this report and
recommendation thereon. Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on the
administrative case until 15 July 1982, when he requested the
Solicitor General to release him from the duty of investigating the
case.

On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted Fiscal

Almonte's request and in his stead appointed the Provincial Fiscal of
Zamboanga del Sur, Pedro S. Jamero, who resumed hearings on 15
June 1983.
Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, a motion seeking to
inhibit Fiscal Jamero from hearing the case followed by an urgent
motion for indefinite postponement of the investigation. Both
motions were denied by the Court in a Resolution dated 21
September 1987 with instructions to the Solicitor General to
complete the investigation of the administrative case and to render his
report and recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from
notice.
On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his Report and
Recommendation 2 dated 21 June 1988. In as Report, after setting out
the facts and proceedings held in the present case, the Solicitor
General presented the following:
FINDINGS
Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained from
respondent a loan of P 4,000.00. This loan was secured by a real
estate mortgage (Annex C, Complainants' Complaint, p. 16,
records).lwph1.t In the said Real Estate Mortgage document,
however, it was made to appear that the amount borrowed by
complainants was P5,000.00. Confronted by this discrepancy,
respondent assured complainants that said document was a mere
formality, and upon such assurance, complainants signed the same.
The document was brought by complainant Narciso Melendres to a
Notary Public for notarization. After the same was notarized, he gave
the document to respondent. Despite the assurance, respondent
exacted from complainants P500.00 a month as payment for what is
beyond dispute usurious interest on the P5,000.00 loan. Complainants
religiously paid the obviously usurious interest for three months:
September, October and November, 1975. Then they stopped paying
due to financial reverses. In view of their failure to pay said amounts
as interest, respondent prepared a new document on May 7, 1976, a
Real Estate Mortgage (Annex D, Complaint, p. 18, records) over the
same lot 3125-C, replacing the former real estate mortgage dated
August 5, 1975, but this time the sum indicated in said new contract
of mortgage is P 10,000.00, purportedly with interest at 19% per
annum. In this new Real Estate Mortgage, a special power of attorney
in favor of respondent was inserted, authorizing him to sell the
mortgaged property at public auction in the event complainants fail to
pay their obligation on or before May 30, 1976. Without explaining
the provisions of the new contract to complainants, respondent
insisted that complainants sign the same, again upon the assurance
that the document was a mere formality. Unsuspecting of the motive
of respondent, complainants signed the document. Complainants
Narciso Melendres again brought the same document to a Notary
Public for notarization. After the document was notarized, he brought
the same to respondent without getting a copy of it.
Complainants, relying on the assurance of the respondent that the
second Real Estate Mortgage was but a formality, neither bothered to
ask from respondent the status of their lot nor tried to pay their
obligation. For their failure to pay the obligation, the respondent on
October 12, 1976, applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16, Respondent's Position
Paper). All the requirements of Act No. 3135, as amended, re
extrajudicial sale of mortgage were ostensibly complied with by
respondent. Hence, finally, title was transferred to him, and on June
20, 1979, respondent sold the involved property to Trinidad Ylanan
for P12,000.00.
When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first
week of March 1979 (see Sworn Statement of complainant Narciso
Melendres, p. 6, Folder No. 2 of case), and not having known the
legal implications of the provisions of the second Real Estate
Mortgage which they had executed, complainants could not believe
that title to their lot had already been transferred to respondent and
that respondent had already sold the same to a third person.
Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979, complainants tried to raise
the amount of P10,000.00 and went to respondent's house on May 30,

1979 to pay their obligation, hoping that they could redeem their
property, although three years had already lapsed from the date of the
mortgage.
Respondent did not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but instead gave
complainants a sheet of paper (Annex B, Complainants' Position
Paper), which indicated that the total indebtedness had soared to
P20,400.00. The computation was made in respondent's own
handwriting. Complainants went home with shattered hopes and with
grief in their hearts. Hence, the instant competent for disbarment
against respondent filed on October 5, 1979.
Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He
maintains that what appears on the two documents allegedly executed
by complainants, i.e., that they obtained a loan of P5,000.00 on
August 5, 1975 and another P10,000.00 on May 7,1976, is allegedly
the truth, and claims that he in truth delivered the alleged amount of
P5,000.00 to complainants and not P4,000.00. With respect to the
second loan, respondent claims that he delivered to complainants
P8,000.00, plus the P2,000.00 loan previously extended [to]
complainants [by] one Regino Villanueva, which loan had been
indorsed to respondent for collection, thus making a total of
P10,000.00, as appearing on said document. Respondent denies that
he exacted usurious interest of 10% a month or P500.00 from
complainants. He asserts that the fact that complainants were able to
secure a loan from the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA)
only proves the truth of his allegation that the title of the property, at
the time complainants obtained a loan from IBAA on April 1976, was
clear of any encumbrance, since complainants had already paid the
original loan of P5,000.00 obtained from respondent; that
complainants knew fully well all the conditions of said mortgage; and
that his acquisition of the property in question was in accordance
with their contract and the law on the matter. Thus, he denies that he
has violated any right of the complainants.
After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent, we
find against respondent.
While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually
obtained an actual cash of P4,000.00, they are only partly correct in
the claim that out of the P10,000.00 appearing in the second Real
Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00 was applied to interest considering that
not all the P6,000.00 but only P4,000.00 was applied to interest,
computed as follows: the first loan of P5,000.00 was supposedly due
on August 31, 1975. Complainants paid 10% monthly interest or
P500.00 on September 30, 1975, October 31, 1975 and November 30,
1975. Consequently, beginning December 31, 1975 up to May 31,
1976 (the date of the execution of the second Real Estate Mortgage) a
total of six (6) months lapsed. Six (6) months at P500.00 equals P
3,000.00, which amount plus the P2,000.00 complainants' loan to one
Engr. Villanueva (indorsed to respondent for collection) totals
P5,000.00. Adding this amount to the previous P5,000.00 indicated
loan secured by the first mortgage results in P10,000.00, the amount
appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage. Section 7, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
complaining all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, as between
the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms
of the agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in the
following cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of
the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;
(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term
"agreement" includes wills.
There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate
Mortgages covering the supposed original loan of P5,000.00 and the
inflated P10,000.00, respectively, were voluntarily signed by the
complainants. The general rule is that when the parties have reduced
their agreement to writing, it is presumed that they have made the
writing the only repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever is

not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and
abandoned.
However, the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions, as
aforequoted. One of the exceptions, that is, failure to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties, applies in this case. From the
facts obtaining in the case, it is clear that the complainants were
induced to sign the Real Estate Mortgage documents by the false and
fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the successive
documents was a are formality.
While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate,
respondent, being a lawyer, should have at least explained to
complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the real estate
mortgage, particularly the provision appointing him as the
complainants' attorney-in-fact in the event of default in payments on
the part of complainants. While it may be conceded that it is
presumed that in practice the notary public apprises complainants of
the legal implications of the contract, it is of common knowledge that
most notaries public do not go through the desired practice.
Respondent at least could have informed the complainants by sending
a demand letter to them to pay their obligation as otherwise he would
proceed to sell the lot at public auction as per their contract. This
respondent failed to do, despite the fact that he knew fully wen that
complainants were trying their best to raise money to be able to pay
their obligation to him, as shown by the loan obtained by
complainants from the IBAA on April 8, 1976. In this connection, it
may be stated that complainants, per advice of respondent himself,
returned the proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank immediately on
April 30, 1976, considering that the net proceeds of the loan from
said bank was only P4,300.00 and not enough to pay the indicated
loan from respondent of P5,000.00, which per computation of
respondent would already have earned interest of P2,500.00 for five
(5) months (December 1975 to April, 1976).
Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan
of P5,000.00, and that this was the reason why complainants were
able to mortgage the lot to the bank free from any encumbrance. This
claim is incorrect. The reason why the title (T-2684) was free from
any encumbrance was simply because of the fact that the first Real
Estate Mortgage for the indicated loan of P5,000.00 (the actual
amount was only P 4,000.00) had not been annotated at the back of
the title (see Annex B, p. 14, rec.).
Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount
of Pl0,000. 00 as payment of the loan, alleging that if the offer were
true, he could have readily accepted the same since he sold the lot for
almost the same amount, for only P12,000.00, a difference of a few
thousand pesos. Respondent's denial is spacious.
Indeed, complainants made the offer, but respondent refused the same
for the simple reason that the offer was made on May 30,1979, three
(3) years after the execution of the mortgage on May 31, 1976. With
its lapse of time, respondent demanded obviously the payment of the
accumulated substantial interest for three years, as shown by his own
computation in as own handwriting on a sheet of paper (Annex C,
Complainants' Position Paper, Folder No. 2).lwph1.t
In view of all the foregoing, the observation made by the Hearing
Officer is worth quoting:
In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with
respect to this particular charge is whose version is to be believed. Is
it the version of the complainants or the version of the respondent.
In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the
complainants in filing the present complaint against the respondent
must be carefully examined and considered. At the beginning there
was a harmonious relationship between the complainants and the
respondent so much so that respondent was even engaged as counsel
of the complainants and it is but human nature that when respondent
extended a loan to the complainants the latter would be grateful to the
former. However, in the case at bar, complainants filed a complaint
against the respondent in spite of the great disparity between the
status of the complainants and the respondent. Admittedly,
respondent is in a better position financially, socially and
intellectually. To the mind of the undersigned, complainants were

only compelled to file the above entitled complaint against the

respondent because they felt that they are so aggrieved of what the
respondent has done to them. It is for this reason therefore that the
undersigned is inclined to believe the version of the complainants
rather than of the respondent. In addition thereto, the respondent as a
lawyer could really see to it that the transaction between the
complainants and himself on papers appear legal and in order.
Besides, there is ample evidence in the records of its case that
respondent is actually engaged in lending money at least in a limited
way and that the interest at the rate of ten per cent a month is but
common among money lenders during the time of the transactions in
question'
Going now into the second charge, complainants alleged that
respondent, who was their counsel (private prosecutor) in Criminal
Case No. 734, for estafa, against accused Reynaldo Pineda,
compromised the case with the accused without their consent and
received the amount of P500.00 as advance payment for the amicable
settlement, without however, giving to the complainants the Id
amount nor informing them of said settlement and payment.
Again, respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable
settlement was with the consent of complainant wife Erlinda Dalman
Melendre[z].
We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants.
It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the
accused Reynaldo Pineda to jail but rather in merely recovering their
money of P2,000.00. At this stage, relationship between complainants
and respondent was not yet strained, and respondent, as counsel of
the complainants in this case, knew that complainants were merely
interested in said recovery. Knowing this, respondent on his own
volition talked to accused and tried to settle the case amicably for
P2,000.00. He accepted the amount of P500.00 as advance payment,
being then the only amount carried by the accused Pineda. A receipt
was signed by both respondent and accused Pineda (Annex M, p. 34,
record). However, respondent did not inform complainants about this
advance payment, perhaps because he was still waiting for the
completion of the payment of P2,000.00 before turning over the
whole amount to complainants.
At any rate, complainants saw accused Pineda give the
abovementioned P500.00 to respondent, but they were ashamed then
to ask directly of respondent what the money was all about.
On June 27, 1979, barely a month after May 30, 1979, when the
complainants had already lost their trust and respect and/or
confidence in respondent upon knowing what happened to their lot
and, more so, upon respondent's refusal to accept the Pl0,000.00
offered by complainants to redeem the same, Narciso Melendre[z]
saw the accused Pineda on his way home and confronted him on the
P500.00 that had been given to respondent. Accused then showed
complainant Melendres the receipt (Annex M, Id.) showing that the
P500.00 was an advance payment for the supposed
settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants against him.
Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them, complainants
then filed a motion before the court which was trying the criminal
case and relieved respondent as their counsel.
The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the case and saw the demeanor
of the witnesses in testifying, had this to say:
With respect to the second charge, the fact that respondent received
P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda is duly established. Both the
complainants and the respondent agreed that the said amount was
given to the respondent in connection with a criminal case wherein
the complainants were the private offended parties: that Reynaldo
Pineda is the accused and that the respondent is the private prosecutor
of the said case. The pivotal issue in this particular charge is whether
the respondent received the amount of P500.00 from Reynaldo
Pineda as an advance payment of an amicable settlement entered into
by the complainants and the accused or the respondent received said
amount from the accused without the knowledge and consent of the
complainants. If it is true as alleged by the respondent that he only
received it for and in behalf of the complainants as advance payment
of an amicable settlement why is it that the same was questioned by

the complainants? Why is it that it was not the complainants who

signed the receipt for the said amount? How come that as soon as
complainants knew that the said amount was given to the respondent,
the former filed a motion in court to relieve respondent as their
counsel on the ground that they have lost faith and confidence on
him? If it is really true that complainants have knowledge and have
consented to this amicable settlement they should be grateful to the
efforts of their private prosecutor yet the fact is that they resented the
same and went to the extent of disqualifying the respondent as their
private prosecutor. Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an affidavit
belying the claim of the respondent.'
Clearly, the complained acts as described and levelled against
respondent Decena are contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals for which he may be suspended. The moral turpitude for
which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in
either his professional or non- professional attitude (Royong v.
Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). The complained acts of respondent imply
something immoral in themselves, regardless of the fact whether they
are punishable by law. The doing of the act itself, and not its
prohibition by statute, fixes the moral turpitude (Bartos vs. U.S. Dist.
Court for District of Nebraska C.C.C. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722).
A parting comment.
All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are faultless.
Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent
too much. They did not bother to keep a copy of the documents they
executed and considering that they admitted they did not understand
the contents of the documents, they did not bother to have them
explained by another lawyer or by any knowledgeable person in their
locality. Likewise, for a period of three years, they did not bother to
ask for respondent the status of their lot and/or their obligation to
him. Their complacency or apathy amounting almost to negligence
contributed to the expedient loss of their property thru the legal
manuevers employed by respondent. Hence, respondent's liability
merits mitigation. (Emphasis supplied)
and made the following recommendation:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Reynerio I.
Decena be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five (5)
years. 3
The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals Almonte and
Jamero, held several hearings during the investigation of the present
administrative case: City Fiscal Jorge T. Almonte was able to hold six
(6) actual hearings out of twenty-five (25) resettings 4 While only five
(5) actual hearings, out of forty (40) resettings 5 were held under
Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero. In those hearings, the
complainants presented a number of witnesses who, after their direct
testimony, were cross-examined by the counsel for respondent;
complainant Narciso Melendrez also testified and was accordingly
cross-examined. Considering the long delay incurred in the
investigation of the administrative case and having been pressed by
the Solicitor General immediately to complete the investigation,
Fiscal Jamero posed a change of procedure, from trial type
proceedings to requiring the parties to submit their respective
position papers. The complainants immediately filed their position
paper which consisted of their separate sworn statements, (that of
Narciso Melendrez was in a question and answer form), their
documentary exhibits and an affidavit of one Jeorge G. Santos.
Respondent also filed his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his
witnesses, with several annexes in support thereof In the healing of
28 October 1987, which had been set for the cross examination of the
complainants and their witnesses by respondent, the complainants
refused to submit themselves to cross-examination on the ground that
the order of the hearing officer dated 17 December 1986 declaring
respondent's right of cross examination as having been waived, had
become final and executory. Respondent questions now the
evidentiary value of the complainants' position paper, not having
passed through any cross-examination and argues that the nonsubmission of the complainants and their witnesses to crossexamination constitutes a denial of his right to due process.

We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and

their witnesses against him has been violated, Respondent in fact
cross-examined complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the
witnesses which complainants had presented earlier. As pointed out
by the Solicitor General, the record of the proceedings shows that
respondent had all the opportunity to cross-examine the other
witnesses of the complainants (those whose affidavits were attached
to complainants' position paper) had he wanted to, but had forfeited
such opportunity by asking for numerous continuances which
indicated a clear attempt on his part to delay the investigation
proceedings. Respondent had in fact requested a total of twenty three
(23) resettings during the investigation proceedings: he had eight (8)
under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. There
were also instances where respondent asked for postponement and at
the same time reset the hearing to a specific date of his choice on
which neither he nor as counsel would appear. That attitude of
respondent eventually led the hearing officer to declare his
(respondent's) right to cross-examine the complainants and their
witnesses as having been waived in his order of 17 December 1986.
Respondent can not now claim that he had been deprived below of
the opportunity to confront the complainants and their witnesses.
After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as
the evidence presented by both parties, we agree with the findings
and conclusions of the Solicitor General.
The following acts of respondent:
1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that
the amount loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of
P4,000.00;
2. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest;
3. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976
that the loan extended to complainants had escalated to P10,000.00;
4. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage
documents and inducing them to sign those documents with
assurances that they were merely for purposes of "formality";
5. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from
complainants before effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgaged property; and
6. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that
the real estate mortgage had already been foreclosed and that
complainants had a right to redeem the foreclosed property within a
certain period of time.
constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar. We agree with the Solicitor General that the acts
of respondent "imply something immoral in themselves regardless of
whether they are punishable by law" and that these acts constitute
moral turpitude, being "contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals." The standard required from members of the Bar is not, of
course, satisfied by conduct which merely avoids collision with our
criminal law. Even so, respondent's conduct, in fact, may be
penalizable under at least one penal statute the anti-usury law.
The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his
professional capacity, that is, done at a time when he was counsel for
the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused
Reynaldo Pineda. There are two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is
that respondent Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning
the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent and
approval of the complainants; the second is that, having received the
amount of P500.00 as an advance payment on this "settlement," he
failed to inform complainants of that advance payment and moreover,
did not turn over the P500.00 to the complainants. The facts show
that respondent "settled" the estafa case amicably for P2,000.00
without the knowledge and consent of complainants. Respondent
informed complainants of the amicable "settlement" and of the
P500.00 advance payment only after petitioner Narciso Melendrez
had confronted him about these matters. And respondent never did
turn over to complainants the P500.00. Respondent is presumed to be
aware of the rule that lawyers cannot "without special authority,
compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge
of a client's claim, but the full amount in cash. 6 Respondent's failure

to turn over to complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as

partial "settlement" of the estafa case underscores his lack of honesty
and candor in dealing with his clients.
Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for
misconduct committed in his personal or non-professional capacity.
Where however, misconduct outside his professional dealings
becomes so patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to
remain in the legal profession, the Court must suspend or strike out
the lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys. 7 The nature of the
office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good
moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent
to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of
privileges of members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a
lawyer, although not related to the discharge of professional duties as
a member of the Bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt,
renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. 8
In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent
attorney upon the complainants in his private transactions with them,
and the exacting of unconscionable rates of interest, considered
together with the acts of professional misconduct committed by
respondent attorney, compel this Court to the conviction that he has
lost that good moral character which is indispensable for continued
membership in the Bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby
DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken from the Rollo of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Resolution be FURNISHED each to the
Bar Confidant and spread on the personal records of respondent
attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., in Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Gr;no-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR
EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS
MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs,
one of which is ripe while the other has been rendered moot by a
supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed
with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition[1] to disqualify
Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations
and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a
member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his
Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3)
pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and
15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case
No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred
on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words
against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and
other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of
Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title
Attorney in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of
Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that
Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been

received
by
the
Sangguniang
Panglungsod
of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts Resolution[2] dated December 3, 2002, Meling
filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer,[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal
cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy
Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the
case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy
over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law,
Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single
incident and involving the same parties as closed and
terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the
acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of
his communications really contained the word Attorney as they were,
according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated December 8, 2003, the
OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this
wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed
against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are
ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent
jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law
professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were
already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the
Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar
Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by
an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this
case. What matters is his act of concealing them which constitutes
dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is,
as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in
the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term
but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as
it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal
law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him
makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a
material fact in connection with his application for admission to the
bar.[5]
As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters,
the explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a
member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as
attorney whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice
of law, the fact is, he is signing his communications as Atty. Haron S.
Meling knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by
the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation
attorney may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court. [6]
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to
take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that
he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that
Melings membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until further
orders from the Court.[7]
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the
OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar
Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent
Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys, moot and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to
impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the Sharia
Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not
a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals
who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character.[8] The requirement of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.[9]
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take
the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or
she has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law,
rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative
body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal
of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any
pending case or charge against him/her. Despite the declaration
required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending
criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done
under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine
whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the
applicant.[10] The nature of whatever cases are pending against the
applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed
with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the
existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness
even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or
insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the
applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending
criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good
moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed
upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that
he is not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,
[11]
the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of
the title Attorney by members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise
members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive
clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City, used
the title Attorney in several correspondence in connection with the
rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private
capacity. The Court declared that:
persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Sharia
courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one
who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
counselors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title attorney
is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the
study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.[12]
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as
Meling in this case. The solemn task of administering justice
demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein,
from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be
competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of
honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish
the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the
constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his
marriage in his application to take the Bar examinations and made
conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the
respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of
law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the
imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a
member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.Accordingly, the membership of

Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED

until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect
immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling
from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a
member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having
become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing
attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for
short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 7565 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B.
Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and
approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the ByLaws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June
29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the
continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for
the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail
to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment
on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his
comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the
membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP
Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24,
1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the
hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in
amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth
submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings
would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the
Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent,
however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A
(hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 in accordance with
which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated and to the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
(hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the
Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the
Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP
By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the
order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which
reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions
of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for
six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for

the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP
is stated in these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official
national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,'
composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter
be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following
words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall
pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with
the approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he
is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of
the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to
strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said
matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative
body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating
to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the
surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law,
define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted
for the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a
previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No.
526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court
exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution
ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated
on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous
pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all
the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative
materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive
Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of
the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer
must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by
individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member
of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out
the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement
of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of
the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional
ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause
appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the
offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by
overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to
such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and
personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing

the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally
sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a
privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer
owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren
in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in
one of the most important functions of the State the administration
of justice as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being
clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit
to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the
interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr.
Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public
interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police
power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it
shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power
of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the
Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration
of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973,
and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of
the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181
dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of
public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of
pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with
and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus,
31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme
lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental
principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should
not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall
into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted
power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and
all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality
and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit
unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section
5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which
reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro.
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of
the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration
of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the
enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the
language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme
Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law,"
it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration
vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding
the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession,
his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which
affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the

body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might

be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to
the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish
to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he
should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now
concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is
without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom
to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer
to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which
he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he
passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to
provide an official national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a
member.8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual
dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of
the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We
see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine
Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power
the respondent acknowledges from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the
objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty
provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its
being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession,
we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to
the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise
law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject
to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce
its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is
not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of
Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized
as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities
holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report
of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was
confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar
Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct
and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional
or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a
court appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration
of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the
court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real
because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment
upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the
facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only
with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an
honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and
fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power
will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973
Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to
"Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission
to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec.
5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the
Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court
139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the
Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is
hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma,
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ.,
concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19450
May 27, 1965
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna,
charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief
before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said
accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced
by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was
represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having
entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the
permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his
appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial
of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and
that he would not receive any payment for his services. The
appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was
questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case
of Aquino,
et
al.
vs.
Blanco,
et
al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney
had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or
City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to
engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP
Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case
is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP
issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City
Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a
"Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in
this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule
138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from

practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this
limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of
Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually
enagaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI
of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered
judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which
read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no
reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil action
was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The
offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be
represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil
liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a
justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in
the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended
party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that
his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever
in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of
Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming
from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and
not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible
conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case.
On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this
criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to
protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted
together with the criminal action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney
Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of
Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an
agent or a friend of the offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace
Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D.
Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without
merits.1wph1.t
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge,
heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy
of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of
Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules),
which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage
in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice
to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private
prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe
that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules.
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind.
In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127,
p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within
the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not
conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of
law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must
have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional services are available to
the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had
been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of
Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision
appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with
costs against appellant..
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.

[A.M. No. P-99-1287. January 26, 2001]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,
vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M.
Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L.
Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin,
Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885,
entitled People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladagafor Falsification of Public
Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 40.[1] While respondents letter-request was pending
action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in Criminal Case
No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator, dated September
2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard to respondents
authority to appear as counsel for the accused in the said criminal
case.[2] On September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator
referred the matter to respondent for comment. [3]
In his Comment,[4] dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted
that he had appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior
authorization. He reasoned out that the factual circumstances
surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle the defense of
his cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the services of a
counsel de parte; while, on the other hand, private complainant was a
member of a powerful family who was out to get even with his
cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the
criminal case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of the public
since he did not take advantage of his position. In any case, his
appearances in court were covered by leave application approved by
the presiding judge.
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a resolution denying
respondents request for authorization to appear as counsel and
directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges
against him for appearing in court without the required authorization
from the Court.[5] On January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed
the instant administrative complaint against respondent for violating
Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.- Public
officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, Provided, that such practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to
comment on the administrative complaint.

In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are

close blood cousins who belong to a powerless family from the
impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte.From childhood
until he finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported
and guided him while he looked up to her as a mentor and an
adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought
respondents help and advice when she was charged in Criminal Case
No. 84885 for falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo
Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said criminal case was to
seek vengeance on her cousin. He explained that his cousins discord
with Ms. Andres started when the latters husband, SPO4 Pedro
Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During
the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot
three (3) children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is the
subject of the falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent
stated that since he is the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be
his duty to accept Ms. Ladagas plea to be her counsel since she did
not have enough funds to pay for the services of a
lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7) years of
untainted government service, initially with the Commission on
Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he had performed his
duties with honesty and integrity and that it was only in this particular
case that he had been administratively charged for extending a
helping hand to a close relative by giving a free legal assistance for
humanitarian purpose. He never took advantage of his position as
branch clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where
he is holding office. He stressed that during the hearings of the
criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his approved leave
applications attached to his comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondents
comment and referred the administrative matter to the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina
Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the
following findings and recommendation:
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for
and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in
Criminal Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public Documents
before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the
appearance of said respondent in said case was without the previous
permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that
the respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon
City, he was on official leave of absence.Moreover, his Presiding
Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was
handling. That the respondent appeared as pro bono counsel likewise
cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively
declared that the respondent did not receive a single centavo from
her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the
family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and high
regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent
ever handled a case for a member of his family who is like a big
sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the
case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his
appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the
years that he has been in government service, he has maintained his
integrity and independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent
appeared as counsel for his cousin without first securing permission
from the court, and considering that this is his first time to do it
coupled with the fact that said appearance was not for a fee and was
with the knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully
recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that
any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.[6]
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.

Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and

Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits
civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their
profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from
engaging in the private practice of their profession. The said section
reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice.- No judge or other official
or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or
give professional advise to clients.

A.C. No. 5738

February 19, 2008
WILFREDO
M.
CATU, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot 1 and the
building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate,
Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu,
contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu 2 and Antonio
Pastor3 of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands
for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated
against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79
of the 5th District of Manila4 where the parties reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the
parties to conciliation meetings. 5 When the parties failed to arrive at
an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing
of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment
against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for
the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the
instant administrative complaint,6 claiming that respondent
committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer
when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he
presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants
as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong
barangay was to hear complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong
Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and
Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he
performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality
towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to
amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the
ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance.
He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she
was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission
of a patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no
factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers.
After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found
sufficient ground to discipline respondent.7
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong
barangay, he presided over the conciliation proceedings and heard
the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor.
Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the
ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the
course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the
answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of
appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,

accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he intervened while in said service.
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the
prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:8
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands employee
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public
officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized
by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis
supplied)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition
constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON
1.
A
LAWYER
SHALL
UPHOLD
THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE
LAWS
OF
THE
LAND,PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern
warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely.9 This was adopted and approved by the IBP
Board of Governors.10
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of
respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only
to Former Government Lawyers
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies
only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection
"with any matter in which he intervened while in said service."
In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits
former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had
intervened while in said service."
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he
committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by
that provision.
Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs
The Practice of Profession of Elective Local Government
Officials
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees,
during their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of
their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
their official functions." This is the general law which applies to all
public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA
716012 governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and
municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or
engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions
as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in
any occupation, or teach in schools except during session
hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the
Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a
local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or

employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings
involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when
the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during
official hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided,
That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation
therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of
profession by elective local officials. As a special law with a definite
scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it
constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general
law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public
officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.13
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays are the following: the governor, the vice
governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for
provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the
municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for
municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of
the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang
kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and
municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or
engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions
as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render
full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and
attention to the performance of their official duties.
On
the
other
hand,
members
of
the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayanmay
practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours. In other words, they may
practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors
and
municipal
mayors,
members
of
the sangguniang
panlalawigan,sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are
required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week. 14 Since
the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions,
engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours,
there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or
authorization from any other person or office for any of these
purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like
governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are
expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their
profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made
on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang
barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are
excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are
allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason
because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact,
the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only
twice a month.16
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to
practice his profession. However, he should have procured prior
permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as
required by civil service regulations.
A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To
Practice Law Must Secure Prior Authority From The Head Of
His Department
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not
require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can
engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission

of the head of the department concerned. 17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of

the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or professionor be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a
written permission from the head of the Department: Provided,
That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire
time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if
an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities,
time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency
to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the
officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee,
which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the
discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management
of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors.
(emphasis supplied)
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the
prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for
Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of
the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis,
men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law
and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance
of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required
written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach
of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the
exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to
comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he
disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal
profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.18 Every
lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. 19
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oath 20 and/or for breach of
the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby
found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a
lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this
resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the
meaning of the word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant and entered into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G.
Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to
all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

However, it should be clarified that private practice of a profession,

specifically the law profession in this case, which is prohibited, does
not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,[7] we explained the meaning of
the term private practice prohibited by the said section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of
the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists
in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768) Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily
or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not
conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of
law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must
have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional services are available to
the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had
been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of
Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.[8]
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when
respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal
Case No. 84885 does not constitute the private practice of the law
profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondents isolated court appearances did not
amount to a private practice of law, he failed to obtain a written
permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this
Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules, thus:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertakingwithout a
written permission from the head of the Department: Provided,
That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire
time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if
an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities,
time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency
to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the
officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee,
which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the
discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management
of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. [9]
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings
on numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13,
1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is
true that he filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he
appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a prior permission
from the head of the Department.The presiding judge of the court to
which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department
contemplated by law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael
M. Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any
repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.