Paraguay and Uruguay: Modernity, Tradition and Transition

Author(s): Paul C. Sondrol

Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Mar., 1997), pp. 109-125
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp 109-125, 1997

1
CARFAX

Paraguay
tradition

and

and

Uruguay:

modernity,

transition

PAUL C SONDROL
Introduction
Paraguayand Uruguay in the 1990s both highlight the complicated dilemmas
of consolidating democracies in Latin America. Political change in formerly
authoritariansystems takes place within the context of historical legacies,
culture,the economic environment,as well as the structural/governmental
arena.
This paper analyses the nature,underlyingdynamics and outcomes of efforts at
political liberalisationand democratisationin Paraguayand Uruguay.As part of
the largertransitionsto democracybuffeting Latin America, EasternEuropeand
the formerSoviet Union, the Paraguayanand Uruguayancases teach similarities
and differences in elite and mass efforts to blend and reconcile newer, workable
democratic elements with enduring authoritarian,corporatist arrangements.
Detailed case studies often reveal importantnuances overlooked in broader,
comparative works. Paraguay and Uruguay thus add a specific comparative
perspective and analysis to the broader examination of regime change and
democratisation;that forms the paper's major contribution.
Alternative developmental models: Paraguay and Uruguay
To educated generalists, Paraguay and Uruguay share certain attributes that
would suggest a parallel political and social development. Politically, both
countries possess traditional,multiclass, two-party systems that are among the
oldest in the world; dating back to the 19th century.Culturally,the two nations
boast the most homogeneous social structuresin Latin America (Paraguay'sthe
most racially mixed, mestizo society; Uruguay's the most European), lacking
large, oppressed indigenous populations,whose existence determinesthe socioethnic cleavages and economic extremes of wealth or poverty found in so many
other Latin Americannations. Geopolitically, Paraguayand Uruguayare two of
the smallest states in South America, and both are buffer-states historically
ensnared between the combined and conflicting ambitions of the Southern
Cone's two giants-Argentina and Brazil.
Yet, despite these resemblances, a deeper examination of Paraguay and
Uruguayreveals perhapsthe greatestdyadic contrastin Latin Americanin terms
of socio-historicaldevelopment, economic progress and political evolution. For
example, landlocked Paraguaywas colonised at Asuncion almost two centuries
Paul C Sondrolis at the Departmentof Political Science, Universityof Coloradoat ColoradoSprings,142OAustin
Bluffs Parkway, PO Box 7150, CO 80933-7150, USA.
0143-6597/97/010109-17 $7.00 ?C1997 ThirdWorld Quarterly

109

PAUL C SONDROL

before coastal Uruguaywas establishedin 1726. Paraguayis one of the poorest

countries per capita in Latin America; Uruguay, one of the richest. Paraguayan
political culture remains largely subject-centredand authoritarian;Uruguay's is
overwhelmingly participatoryand democratic.'
Uruguay's democratic experience throughoutmost of the twentieth century
was exceptional in Latin America, and light-years from anything familiar to
Paraguay's drearyhistory of despotism. Uruguay experienced at least 60 years
of democracy in this century; longer overall than Costa Rica, Colombia or
Venezuela. Yet it is ironic that Uruguay's 'polyarchyof exception' was largely
attributableto the contributionsof one caudillo. PresidentJose Batlle y Ord6niez,
who overshadowed national politics between 1903-1929, engineered the integratingcoparticipacionpower-sharingmechanismsbetween the dominant,feuding Colorado and Blanco parties.2
Uruguay's Colorado and Blanco (National) parties, along with Paraguay's
Coloradosand Liberals,3form perhapsthe most enduringtwo-partysystems that
date from the 19th century. However, a distinction having enormous consequences for the dissimilarpolitical evolution of Paraguayand Uruguay was the
developmentand institutionalisationof Uruguay'sco-participationaccord, incorporating minority interests and labour into a unified governmental hierarchy.
Incorporatinglabour peacefully through the party system and political party
co-existence allowed Uruguay to stabilise and ultimately democratise by integrating disparateparty elites, their followers, and engenderinga strong societal
consensus about the rules of the electoral game.
By the late 1930s, Uruguay seemed destined towards a bright, shining future
of social democracy. The country was enjoying or aspiring to a middle-class
standardof living via progressive welfare policies, work in the huge administrative bureaucracyor nationalised industries. Instead, Uruguay began a slow
economic and political decline beginning in the 1940s. Over-reliance on traditional commodity exports (wool, mutton, cattle and grains), coupled with
a small domestic economy worked against industrialisation;Uruguay was
simultaneously a modem, yet distinctly non-technological society, and one
dependent on a more traditional agro-export economy, subject to all the
fluctuations in price and demand in the capitalist world economy. Economic
degenerationacceleratedby the mid-1950s, when exports decreasedin response
to shrinking world demand, competition from sheep-raisingNew Zealand, and
the introductionof syntheticfibres all conspiredto expose Uruguay'svulnerable,
export-dependenteconomy. A growing trade deficit led successive governments
to borrowincreasinglyand to expandthe money supply, triggeringboth debt and
inflation.4
Economic pressures thus slowly rotted Uruguay's carefully crafted political
balance, polarisingclass conflict as workers' demandsincreasedon the Colorado
and Blanco political/patronageparties, which proved unwilling or unable to
resist escalating sectoral pressures for increased wages, services, subsidies and
public employment. The cumulative nature of this distributionalprocess inevitably collided with the limited capacities of the Uruguayan state, as the
competition for dwindling economic benefits destroyed the consensual Batllista
legacy and acceleratedpolitical disorder.
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PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION

As tradeunion strikes and riots enveloped society, a leftist guerrillamovement

(the Tupamaros), spawned by disillusionment with governmental inefficiency
and corruption,reached major proportionsin the 1960s. While urban guerrillas
battled police, the ruling Colorado party, backed by the military, responded to
the spiral of violence by moving sharply to the right. Uruguay's unique
colegiado (a weakened 'collegial' executive system modelled on Switzerland's
begun in 1952 and designed to preventcaudillismo) was blamed for immobilism
and replaced in 1966 by a uni-personalpresidentialform with greatly expanded
powers. A series of increasing political restrictions portended the gradual
militarisationof Uruguayansociety throughoutthe late 1960s and early 1970s.
By 1973, the military had assumed predominatepolitical power in response to
the absence of cohesive, adaptableprogrammaticpartiesand civilian paralysisin
the face of rising civil violence. The demise of Uruguayan democracy in the
1970s thus illustrates the type of econo-political factors that can doom polyarchy, even where long-standing social conditions are auspicious.
Paraguayanhistory and culture have been the antithesis of Uruguay's. Since
independence in 1811, Paraguay has experienced two protracted periods of
extreme tyranny (1816-1870; 1940-1989) sundered by one semi-democratic
intermission (1870-1940). In fact, even though Paraguay's founding 19th century leaders-Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia, Carlos Antonio Lopez and
Francisco Solano L6pez-were extreme despots, they are promoted today as
archetypes of Paraguayannationalism and independence. Paraguay's involvement in two of Latin America's three great inter-state wars (the Triple
Alliance War, 1865-1870; the Gran Chaco War, 1932-1935) also enhanced the
position of the armed forces, perhaps to an exaggerated degree, as national
saviours. Political leaders in Paraguayconstantly play up the historic reality of
Paraguayan resistance to foreign aggressors and the Paraguayan military is
probably more highly regardedby civilians than soldiers are anywhere else in
Latin America.
The decidedly fascist cast to the military regimes headed by Major Rafael
Franco, Marshall Felix Estiggaribia and General Higinio Morinigo throughout
the 1930s and 1940s reinforced the traditional xenophobia permeating
Paraguayanpolitical cultureand enshrinedauthoritarianvalues among elites and
masses. These caudillos buttressedthe norms of resistance to and suspicion of
'foreign' democraticideas not geared to the realities of the Paraguayanexperience.5 An extreme brand of Paraguayan patriotism, an ethos justifying an
amplified military role in politics, and a monotonous heritage of dictatorship
punctuated by only brief and chaotic interludes of open government, are
underlyingfactors nurturingand sustaining a soldierly elite vested in militarism
and a public habituatedto authoritarianism.Having rarely experienced democracy, Paraguayanscan only compare an historical record associating strong-man
rule with autonomousprogress,and open politics (as duringthe so-called Liberal
era between 1904-36) with foreign domination and governmental ineffectiveness.6

Moreover, in contrastto Uruguay's congenial two-partysystem of incorporation, co-participation,non-violent competition and power-sharing, Paraguay's
dominantColorado and Liberalpartieshave long remainedvenal and repressive
111

PAUL C SONDROL

towards one another. Whereas Uruguay's model of labour incorporationand

party co-participationhelped spawn a profoundly democratic value structure,
Paraguayanelites sought only to penetrate,control or crush organisedlabour;to
exile and exclude oppositionistsfrom the spoils system that is governmentjobs
and contracts. As a result, party hatreds are fanned along with the incessant
denunciations, conspiring and vicious double-crosses that characterise party
politics in Paraguay.7
GeneralAlfredo Stroessnerdescendedfrom this lineage of despotism,political
intrigueand militaryintervention.His political life spannedan era of Paraguayan
history characterisedby internationalconflict, civil war (in 1947) and military
intromission. Following the Chaco War with Bolivia, Stroessner watched or
collaborated with various factions of the Paraguayanmilitary as they seized
power with mundane impunity: in 1936, 1937, 1948, three times in 1949, in
1954 when he seized power, and finally in 1989 when Stroessnerhimself was
overthrown.
In sum, throughoutmost of the twentieth century, Uruguayansutilised the
stabilising aspects of an interpartyco-participationaccord, giving opponents a
power-sharing role in government, until economic crisis and social unrest
destroyed the civic culture. Paraguayans,however, historically played a much
more exclusionary,zero-sumpolitical game. Out-of-powergroups, facing virtual
monopoly party/militarycontrol over positions and patronage,could expect little
except repression,exile or execution. Stroessnerdid not invent this system, but
played these rules as he found them.

Authoritarian regimes
The Uruguayanand Paraguayandictatorshipswere discrete from one another,
and particularto the region. Many scholarshave arguedthat among the Southern
Cone tyrannies in the 1970s, Uruguay's was the closest approximationto a
totalitarianstate. Similarly, Paraguayunder Stroessner was overidentifiedwith
various military dictatorships.These portrayalsare incorrect,and fail to capture
the essence of these two hybrid forms of authoritarianism.8
Uruguay's military regime was neither a totalist movement fusing a utopian
ideology with an official party, nor a more traditional-personalistdictatorship
such as Stroessner's. Uruguayan authoritarianismwas similar to the developmentalist, non-personalistic'bureaucratic-authoritarian'
regimes (Brazil, 1964+
85; Argentina, 1966-73) and perhaps even more analogous to the extremely
repressive, demobilising 'neo-conservative' systems modelled in Argentina
(1976-83) and Chile (1973-89).9
Military rule in Uruguay focused on hyperstablegovernance;the dictatorship
was not a revolutionarymovement bent on driving citizens towards some brave
new world. The armed forces intended to demobilise and depoliticise the
political environmentin the face of civil unrest. Once in power, army officers
and civilian technocratsapproachedpolitics from the military'sperspective:with
an emphasis on hierarchy,authority,discipline and solidarity. For authoritarian
elites, democracy had meant compromise, immobilism, the substitution of
112

PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION

political criteriafor efficiency, and a myriad of special-interestlegislation, for a

rational integrated plan. 'Antipolitics' and an aversion to 'lazy and petty
politicking' characterisedmilitaryrule in Uruguay.10But the lack of participation
and representativeinstitutionsalso blighted regime attemptsto form a mass-base
of support,either throughthe existing Colorado and Blanco parties, or through
establishment of a new official, military party, as in authoritarianBrazil.
Uruguayan officers, out of mutual distrust and lack of political acumen, were
also hamperedby the absence of a clear-cutmaximumleader, such as Stroessner
in Paraguay, or General Augusto Pinochet in Chile. The military corporation
ruled Uruguay, not a caudillo. Uruguay's generals remained a rather faceless
junta.ll

Stroessner's Paraguayis ill suited to comparisons with the various developmentalist, technocratic or military dictatorshipsthat descended across the far
South of Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. While exercising control and
coercion akin to the authoritarianregimes in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the
ParaguayanArmed Forces possessed no moderuising agenda. Rather, the military under Stroessner remained a regressive, repressive institution, more representativeof what Almond and Powell termed 'conservative authoritarianism':
preoccupied with the maintenance of existing social and institutional arrangements and having no transformativegoals. Stroessner had no larger utopian
vision than keeping himself in power.12Moreover, neither the military nor the
official Colorado party ruled Paraguay:Alfredo Stroessnerdid. Stroessner was
not simply primus interpares within a contemporaryjunta like Pinochet in Chile
or General-PresidentGregorio Alvarez in Uruguay. Stroessner was the classic
'strongman',totally dominating the political regime for 35 years.13
Stroessner's autocracy-like Uruguay's-certainly lacked any full-blown
totalitarianideology. But it was also an exception to the general principle that
authoritarianregimes lack ideational self-justificationsand mass legitimation, as
few contemporarydictatorshipsendurea thirdof a centuryrelying on ham-fisted
repression alone. While Stronismo never became a comprehensive ideology, a
vaguer, emotional attitudeor programmaticconsensus gave spiritto the regime's
doctrine. Key elements included loyalty to the persona of Stroessner as president, a virulent nationalism bordering on xenophobia, an almost maniacal
anti-communism and a distinctive communitarian,populist tenor. Stroessner
thus secured a popular base for his regime. Mass acceptance of Stroessner
stemmed from Paraguay's long tradition of personalist-authoritarianism,
Stroessner'smanipulationof the ultra-nationalistmyths and values of the nation,
the penetrationand politicisationof the militaryand civil society and corruption,
which glued regime elites together. A personality cult developed in Paraguay
under Stroessnerthat resembled General Francisco Franco's in Spain, and even
certain aspects of EasternEuropeanCommunistregimes (particularlyin Nicolae
Ceausescu's Romania).14
Yet the armed forces were a mainstay of Stroessner's regime and, together
with the official Colorado party, acted as interlocking twin pillars of an
authoritariansystem that nevertheless possessed certain organisationalfeatures,
impulses and leanings, found in more advanced mobilisational systems. The
1992 discovery of fastidious documentation from the regime's intelligence
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PAUL C SONDROL

agencies reveals the pervasivenesswith which the dictatorshippenetratedalmost

all social institutions, and belies the stereotypicalnotion that Stroessner's was
simply an old-fashioned, poorly organised personalistregime.'5
The Uruguayanand Paraguayandictatorshipswere differentfrom one another,
and from their more developmentalist counterpartsin Argentina, Brazil and
Chile. Yet, ironically, the machinery of dictatorshipwas much more sophisticated in Stroessner'sParaguaythan in Uruguay's militaryregime. The waves of
authoritarianhistory that have washed over Paraguaynot only eroded incipient
democratic ideals, but also sharpened the authoritariantendencies. Given
Paraguay's violent history of mass-involvement in politics (notably the 1947
civil war), the Colorado party and its ancillary organisationscame as close to
becoming a totalitarianmovement as Paraguay's rudimentarytechnology and
Stroessner's limited aims would allow.16

Re-democratisation in Uruguay and liberalisation in Paraguay

In similar and differing ways, Uruguayand Paraguayparticipatedin the wave of
political liberalisationthat appearedto sweep the globe, beginning in the 1980s.
Analogous (but not identical) variables accelerating the demise of these two
autocracies included: (1) regime failure of political and economic policy; (2)
popularmovements acceleratingregime change; and (3) the role of the military
in political withdrawal (Uruguay), or reconstructing governmental elites
(Paraguay).
Uruguay's generals proved as ill suited in dealing with the nation's politicoeconomic crisis as were the civilian political institutions, whose ineffectual
responses originally politicised Uruguayanofficers in the 1960s. Moreover, the
Uruguayan military created still newer problems that continue to haunt the
nation. The junta claimed it came to power to build a 'new' Uruguay;to cleanse
society of subversionand restore patriotismand traditionalvalues and to be the
'guardiansof the permanent'.17
Yet virtuallyall the military's attemptsat political and economic re-engineering failed. Most of the old politicos, as well as the traditional Blanco and
Colorado parties, survived the dictatorship and reemerged in the mid-1980s
firmly committed to democracy and civilian rule. Unions were never restructured, foreign debt quadrupledinstead of falling, and privatisationof moneydraining state-sponsored industries remained limited, despite the neoliberal
blandishmentsof military and technocraticelites. Instead, the military's long
drawn-outpolitical withdrawal-beginning with the 1980 defeat of its constitutional referendumand ending with the successful Naval Club pact in 1984led to a general restoration of a status quo ante (government giganticisim,
presidentialismand fractionalisedparty politics).'8
In Paraguay, adverse economic conditions also accelerated Stroessner's
political demise. The boom years of the 1970s, fuelled by constructionof the
giant Itaipuihydroelectric project with Brazil, gave way in 1983 to serious
recession stemming from the fall-off in construction activities. Thereafter,
inflation, unemploymentand debt intensified.The boom had nurtureda nascent
114

PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION

Paraguayanmiddle class and mobilised greater popular expectations. The bust

left in traina Paraguayanpopulationmore alienatedand less passive towardsthe
oppressive, seemingly interminableStroessnerregime. Institutionalisedcorruption, long an integral aspect of Stroessner's web of patronage and predatory
sultanism, began to strain political relationships within the regime. Business
elites, for example, traditionally quiescent towards-if not supportive ofStroessner in a Faustian bargain for peace and prosperity,began to resent the
enormous rake-offs and graft among military and Colorado party elites and to
hanker for a less politicised judiciary and bureaucracy.As Stroessner and the
enduring clique aroundhim aged, the regime gradually deteriorated,becoming
antiquatedand unable to conjugate more than minimal levels of legitimacy and
effectiveness.19

Militaryroles held certain similarities,but also differences in the authoritarian

breakdowns in Uruguay and Paraguay. In Uruguay, civilian opposition to
militarism was collective, organised and sustained. In a remarkable 1980
referendum,Uruguayansresoundingly rejected military attempts to institutionalise their rule via a new, highly repressive constitution.This stark defeat-and
the military's acceptance of that rejection-uncovered (even among officers)
Uruguay's latent commitment to democracy and the basic illegitimacy of
military rule. From 1980 on, opposition to the authoritarianregime, though still
perilous, was public. Thus began the long dialogue of military extrication
between officers and civilian politicians, culminating in the 1984 national
elections and democratic restoration.20
Uruguay's redemocratisation,along with Argentina's and Brazil's, left authoritarianParaguayisolated and buffeted by liberalisinggales from exiles, human
rights groups and the United States Embassy in Asuncion. Unfortunately for
Stroessner, the Carter administration'shuman rights policy had become an
essential component of US foreign policy not easily reversed by the Reagan
administration,which subsequentlysaw an opportunityfor criticising and pressuring Stroessner without fear of a 'communist' takeover, as a means of
legitimising the Reagan anti-leftist 'dictatorship'policy in SandinistaNicaragua.
Moreover,Stroessner's small and remote despotism never had the public support
within right-wingUS circles that Chile's high-profileAugusto Pinochet enjoyed.
Paraguay's pariah status eroded Stroessner's ability to suppress dissent and to
maintainelite consensus, since US support(in the name of anti-communism)had
long remained a pillar of regime legitimacy.21
Unlike Uruguay, however, in the final analysis it was not any brawn within
Paraguayancivil society that forced Stroessnerfrom power. Stroessner'sdeclining health and detachmentfrom day-to-daydecision making, a succession crisis,
and most importantly,instability within the ruling Colorado party, led an army
faction to intervene violently and overthrowhim, paving the way for a political
liberalisation.22

Uruguay's military thus presents a much clearer picture of praetoriandisintegration than does Paraguay's. The significance of Uruguay's prior democratic
culture, illuminated in the surging empowerment of civil society from 1980
onwards, eroded the military's resolve to maintainpower. The 1984 election of
President Julio Maria Sanguinetti of the Colorado party restored Uruguay's
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PAULC SONDROL

democracy after 11 years of military rule. The 1989 victory of Blanco party
presidentialcandidate,Luis Lacalle, furtherconsolidatedUruguay's democracy.
By contrast, Paraguay's prolonged praetorianlegacy displays no sustained
precedent of the military accepting as normal a relatively narrow scope of
prerogatives,nor of civilians governing military affairs. On 3 February, 1989,
the Stroessner dictatorship ended as it began: in a coup. Unlike Uruguay's
negotiated transitionbetween the armed forces and leaders of the major opposition parties, Paraguayancitizens played little role in Stroessner's ultimate
demise; the army revolted in a classic golpe. Unlike Uruguay's popular-based
transition, Paraguay's rupture was an elite 'transition from above' with the
military as the major,controllingactor, maintainingthe same symbiotic alliance
with the dominant Colorado party.
The major difference between these two cases is implied in the section
subheading. Democratisation and liberalisation stand as discrete transitional
processes. Liberalisationdoes not necessarily imply movement towardsa democratic polity, since it is by no means certain that those who have presided over
or promotedParaguay'srecent liberalisationefforts are seeking to transformthe
post-Stroessnerpolitical system into a Western-styledemocracy.
The Rodriguez coup was designed to correct contradictionsin Paraguay's
authoritariansystem, not abolish it. The transitionbegan as part of a strategy,
orchestratedby the military, to restore the balance of power along more liberal
lines, not to pursue a genuinely democraticoutcome. Change came to Paraguay
in the traditionalway: from the top, via an 'indispensable'military leader, and
without the participationof average citizens.
Rodriguez is a wealthy beneficiary of three decades of collaboration with
Stroessner, and a product of the authoritariansystem from which he emerged.
He-like so many rankingmilitares and Colorados-has been involved, during
his entire professional life, in a whole series of parasitic ventures, involving
rake-offs, graft and cronyism, that remaineda cornerstoneof his power. This is
because corruptionwas an essential component which bound elite loyalty to
Stroessnerfor a thirdof a century.High-rankingmilitaryofficers, partymembers
and bureaucratsenjoyed lucrative side interestsinvolving rich sinecures in state
monopolies that controlled major commercial areas, and which often served as
fronts for less respectable, but more lucrative, businesses like narcotics
trafficking,contrabandand prostitution.23The blackmarketsystem of rake-offs
and graft bought complicity, support,and a convergence of elite interests-thus
decreasing the likelihood of inter-elite conflict since so many had a personal
stake in the continuationof Stroessner's spoils system.
The decision to liberalise Paraguay was more the result of a 'Dahlian'
calculation by elites of the perceived risks in maintaining government by
repression in the face of: (1) divisions in the once-monolithic Colorado party
which threatened its symbiosis with the military, and (2) a changing international environment (democratisation,end of the Cold War and US support
for anti-communistdictatorship),than any ideal implemented by enlightened
polyarchs. In order to retain their power and enormous perquisites, Colorado
and military elites determinedthat things had to change if they were to remain
the same.24
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PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION

Authoritarian legacies
Dictatorship left indelible scars and multiple meanings across the cultural
psyches of Uruguayansand Paraguayans.For Uruguayans,the military regime
utterly destroyed the carefully structurednational mythology. The halcyon days
of the late 1980s following the democratic restorationhave given way in the
1990s to the sober realisation that the consensual welfare state is illusory.
It should be stated plainly that in Uruguay, as in most nations, civil society
helped destroy its own social democracy.The old dole system was destroyed as
much by inept political corporatismundercivilian politicians unwilling to say no
to powerful group demandsfor services and subsidies, as by continuedeconomic
mismanagementunder the junta.
By the late 1960s democratic institutions and elites reacted to Uruguay's
generalised systemic crisis and found themselves unable to contain mounting
conflict. By the early 1970s sectors of both majorpolitical parties were disloyal
to democracy. The parties abdicated responsibility in the face of economic
malaise and an urbanguerrillainsurgencyby factionalising and refusing to form
coalitions, thus leading to imobilismo.Civilians also failed to come to the aid of
PresidentJuan Maria Bordaberry,when he was faced with a rebellious military.
Most political groupsencouragedmilitaryrole expansion at one point or another,
believing they could utilise the military to their advantage.25
Currently, over one quarter of all Uruguayans are dependent on pensions
worth only a fraction of their former value. A jaded counter-imagery now
pervades Montevideo, constructed upon a rather insipid foundation that Juan
Rial terms 'inverse Hobbesiansim'.Ever-risingstandardsof living and advanced
social programmesthat once made Uruguaysuch a happy and unique nation, are
now sacrificed upon the alter of 'democracy at any cost'. Too much social
upheaval over the perennial question of cui bono might usher in a new,
revanchistmilitarism.A common commitmentexists to protectthe rathershabby
socioeconomic status quo against any societal tumult enticing the military from
the barracks.26
This societal reticence revealed itself in a 1989 referendum, to annul a
controversiallaw exempting the army and police from Nuremburg-likerevenge
trials for humanrights abuses committedunderthe dictatorship.That referendum
was defeated and army immunity upheld by a margin of 57% to 43%. Another
plebiscite (December 1992) soundly thwarted President Lacalle's economic
privatisation scheme to sell off Uruguay's state-controlled industries.
Uruguayansvoted by 72% against privatisation,despite the prevailingneoliberal
economic reforms sweeping Latin America. The defeat was an enormous blow
to the prestige of Lacalle, and sapped any remaining momentum for economic
reform during the remainingtwo years of his term. The defeat of the privatisation referendum signalled Uruguayans' overwhelming desire to reject a new
economic path, promisinglong-termeconomic goals (low inflation and balanceof-paymentsequilibrium).Instead,the nation turnedto the traditionsof the past;
inept political corporatism,complex bureaucracyand the satisfaction of more
immediate social wants/demands(health care and public housing). The process
of political and economic regenerationin Uruguay provides lessons for other
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PAUL C SONDROL

re-democratisingregimes where the ethics of security can overridethe ethics of

change. The intense longing for a returnto something like the pre-authoritarian
past can overshadowand obviate historicalopportunitiesfor political innovation
provided by regime rupture. The outcome of these particular, transitional
'moments' becomes the vehicle which determinesthe precise timing, style and
circumstancesof regime change.
In Paraguay,General Andres Rodriguez's coup and subsequentrubber-stamp
election as presidentin May 1989, neverthelessleavened democraticyeast buds
in civil society. To his credit, Rodriuez put some distance between himself and
his consuegro (Rodriguez's daughterwas marriedto one of Stroessner's sons)
and the patron that he had supportedfor so long. Press restrictionswere lifted,
political prisonersreleased fromjails and political exiles were allowed to return.
Rodriuez even thwarted the Paraguayanhabit of continuismo, by peacefully
turningover power to his (chosen) successor. The August 1993 inaugurationof
Colorado party candidate Juan Carlos Wasmosy saw a civilian president in
Paraguayfor the first time in almost 40 years.
Clearly, Rodriguez initiated something of a Paraguayan glasnost, as the
Stronato (Stroessnerregime) has given way to a society brimmingwith upstart
students, haranguingnews editorials and stubborntrade unions. But scepticism
regardingParaguay'spotential democraticconsolidationexists given the nature
and degree of authoritarianismthere. Democracy has never been the norm, nor
even the clear-cut preference in Paraguay, and the sheer duration of a halfcentury of military/Colorado domination makes any democratic transition
difficult. Aside from purging some die-hard Stronistas, most of the traditional
political elite remain in place-within the leadership of the Colorado party,
senior army officers, and the state bureaucracy.Most continue to owe their
positions to amiguismo (cronyism)and view these sinecuresas a sort of personal
and private fiefdom from which to plunder.A long process of socialisationmust
be sustained if a more democraticculture is eventually to emerge.
The 1993 nationalelections were the 'cleanest, dirty' vote in 48 years. But the
process clearly did not representa breakthroughfor democracy. The climate of
intimidationagainst opposition parties that precededthe plebiscite made it clear
that the military would only accept a Colorado victory. The ruling Colorado/
Military/Bureaucratictriad controlled the guns, money, patronageand electoral
machinery.The vote was not surprisinglymarredby prematureprojectionresults
proclaiming a Colorado victory, convenient communications failures and a
grenade and machine-gunattack on the only opposition television station.27
Wasmosy, a rich industrialistand political neophyte, appears incapable of
cultivating or imposing loyalty and unity among disparate politico-military
factions a la Stroessner. His weakness is evident in the constant political
re-alignments and plotting, public denunciations,power struggles and military
meddling that characterise the swirling vortex of Paraguayanpolitics in the
1990s. Paraguay's transitioncontains significant authoritarianelements and an
overlay of newer democraticfeatures. It is not fully one or the other.28
For its part, Uruguay no longer conforms to the old stereotype as a sort of
polar opposite of Paraguay.Uruguay today is more similar to Paraguay than
Uruguayansever thought in the past: indebted, corporate,underdeveloped,and
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PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION

veiled by the dangerousprecedent of a politicised military. Yet, in contrast to

Paraguay, Uruguay's prior commitment to democracy and more sophisticated
citizenry inspires a certain optimism. Whatever its failings, Uruguay's is a
'pacted' democracy; one honed throughcompromise, give and take, bargaining
and revision, between contending civil and military elites, congruent with the
old Battlista legacy of coparticipation.In Uruguay,at least, political competition
is almost always about increments; in Paraguay it is normally about wholes.
In Uruguay, politics is about something; in Paraguay,politics is about everything.
Paraguay's is not a 'pacted' democracy; it is an 'imposed' liberalisation in
which a tolerantand accommodatingcivic culture akin to Uruguay's has yet to
develop. A half-centuryof Colorado/militarydomination,as well as their almost
complete control over the transition,bolsters a naturaldisposition of these elites
to co-govern unilaterally, without any compulsion to push for greater participation and contestation.Reflecting the mood, currentarmy strongman,General
Lino Oviedo, has stated that the Colorados, together with the military, will
continue to rule Paraguay 'por se'culaseculorum [sic].. .whether anyone likes it
or not'. ParaguayanVice-PresidentAngel Seifart echoed this point, stating 'the
Colorado party's patience has its limits' if confrontedby threateningopposition
demands defying historical parameters.29
In Uruguay, the foundational pact that led to military withdrawal has at
least laid the basis for a degree of mutual trust among contending groups (the
military, parties, business associations, trade unions, etc), if only because these
groups are now socialised to proceduralbargaining. It is difficult to imagine
anythingsimilar occurringin Paraguay.Precisely because the military/Colorados
exercised such control over the transition,they have never fully agreed, nor been
compelled, to compromise. The dimensions of political space are expanding in
both nations. But in Paraguay,governmentaltolerance of and responsiveness to
escalating opposition and societal demands show less adaptionthan in Uruguay.
Harsheconomic conditions also continue to impact politics in both nations. In
Paraguay,a decade of stagnantliving standardsand frustratedrising expectations
cannot long continue without serious repercussions for political stability, let
alone democracy. A Paraguayan version of Mexico's 'Chiapas syndrome',
replete with rural protests throughoutthe country in 1994, demonstratedthat
campesinos are no longer overwhelminglyatomised and passive, and that issues
such as rural land reform can no longer remain submerged by Paraguay's
predominantlyurban politics. The government's knee-jerk reaction to peasantblocked roads and land seizures (in response to revelations that 15 million acres
had been given to Stroessner cronies) was simply to dust off the shop-worn
'communist-inspiredinsurgency' cliche and order in the police and military in
full battle-gear. Still, the peasant protests struck a responsive chord with
Paraguay'sthree umbrellalabour organisations.These unions, protesting workers' falling wages (shrunkby 42% over the last six years in the face of inflation),
coordinateda general strike on 12 May 1994; the first to be held in Asuncion
since 1959.
In Uruguay, anaemic economic growth (currentlyunder 2%), coupled with a
50% rate of inflation, now requires major cut-backs in the already emasculated
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PAUL C SONDROL

social welfare system. Uruguaytoday has one pensioner for every two working
citizens. The perennial Uruguayanquestion of 'who benefits' clouds expectations that development can be sustained without addressingfundamentalstructural reform of politics (factionalism in political parties) and economics (inept
corporatismand statism).
The November 1994 national elections brought former President Julio
Sanguinettiback to power, but he must now work closely with his rivals in the
Blanco party and a leftist coalition. Sanguinetti's Colorado party failed to
capturea majorityin the 30-memberSenate, winning only 10 seats (the same as
outgoing President Lacalle's Blanco party). The leftist Progressive Encounter
coalition won nine seats. In the 98-seat Chamberof Deputies, the breakdown
was much the same: 32 seats for the Colorados, 31 for the Blancos and 30 for
ProgressiveEncounter.In orderto preventgridlock in a congress almost evenly
divided three ways, Sanguinettihanded out six of 12 cabinet positions to the
opposition Blancos and smaller parties in March 1995. Nevertheless, these
elections-the third in a decade-confirm that Uruguayans have returned to
participatorydemocracy, enabling very different political groups to express
themselves.

Conclusions
The Uruguayan and Paraguayan cases teach broader, comparative lessons
regardingthe vexing question of democratisationin the ThirdWorld. One lesson
cautions against the temptation to apply concepts (democratisation,military
dictatorship,totalitarianism,etc) to a broaderrange of cases than is warranted,
leading to a stretching or distortion of meaning associated with the original
construct. The Paraguayancase suggests that civil-military elites in Asunci6n
are overseeing a controlled liberalisation from the top down, as a means of
maintainingthe military-Colorado-bureaucratictriad that has ruled the nation
for 50 years.
Certain special characteristicsof the Paraguayanexperience also suggest a
proto-totalitariantone going beyond the usual authoritarianmode. Paraguay
hints that non-democratic regimes vary in direction, intensity and totality.
Stroessner's dictatorshipimplies that the larger taxonomies are more ordinal
than nominal;not final, immutableforms. Paraguay'scurrenttransitionalsystem
likewise defies normal categorisation.To put it awkwardly,Paraguayis somewhere between a less-than-democraticand less-than-truly-authoritarian
regime.
Empirical understanding of comparative politics requires the use of more
discrete categories. Simply to term all systems as 'authoritarian'or 'democratic'
obscures important distinctions.30Paraguay is 'liberalising'; perhaps even
'democratising'. Paraguay appears to be attemptingto blend newer tenets of
liberal pluralism with older authoritarianelements. Appearances,however, are
far from meaningless, as they sometimes create opportunities for further
changes.
Thus a second lesson from both Uruguay and Paraguayconcerns the interaction of social movements and elite reformers in shaping newer democracies.
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PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION

While liberalisationis a cosmetic exercise in grantingselected concessions as a

means of preserving the status quo, liberalisationsometimes provides strategic
apertures for social movements to force democratisation well beyond elite
intentions.31

In the Uruguayancase, a military dictatorshiporganised a plebiscite it hoped

to win in 1980, was shocked to lose it, but found it impossible to set aside the
election. Instead of provided a controlled, limited opening, Uruguay's generals
acceded to the vote count and returned power to civilians. Political scientist
Samuel Huntingtonasserts that these 'stunningelections' are becoming a pattern
in the breakdown of modern authoritarianregimes. Other recent examples in
Latin America include the votes in Pichochet's Chile (1988) and Sandinista
Nicaragua (1990).32
The whole notion of culturalexplanationsof national differences in political
practices emerges as a third lesson from these two cases. The cultural variable
evokes almost violent debate in academic circles. Cultureexpresses the uniqueness of each nation, thus limiting generalisability across cases. Perhaps most
damning, 'culture'becomes an easy residualtautologicalcategory when no other
seems convenient, implying a certain fatalism regarding change. Research, for
example challenges the notion of a fundamentallyauthoritarianpolitical culture
in non-democraticregimes as 'natural'to the milieu.33
If Uruguay's polyarchy was exceptional and thus not to be compared with a
more Spanish-American, Indian, authoritarian,or 'backward culture' as in
Paraguay,what, then, led to the 1973 democratic breakdown?The Uruguayan
case reminds us that more is at work in the demise of democraticregimes than
simply culture. A crucial factor in political development and decay remains a
political system's response capacity in relation to demands.34
Clearly, culturalexplanations,utilised sloppily, can lead to gross stereotyping
and oversimplification.But the importanceof culture cannot be ignored. Carefully utilised as one among several importantvariables (political institutions,
class, exogenous factors) political culture illuminates other societies, non-ethnocentrically, by examining patternsof orientations.
Utilising the Paraguayancase as an example, one can argue that clientelism
(interpersonal,dyadic 'contracts' binding individuals in asymmetricalrelationships of faithfulness and obligation) is both a cause and effect of authoritarian
caudillismo; at least partly responsible for creating an intellectual and political
environmentconducive to the steady ascendancy of executive-caesarism,at the
expense of countervailing institutions (congresses, courts, pressure groups).
Lower ranking members of a camarilla (political clique) anticipate aid, protection and patronage while higher status individuals (patrons) expect loyalty,
deference and service from their clients. Paraguayansociety is composed of
generally interwovenchains linking thousandsof patron-client relationshipsthat
are organised hierarchically.In this way they cut across class lines to separate
the peasantryand other lower-class sectors from one another,while reinforcing
the status and power of elites. Moreover, distinctive to Paraguayanclientelism
is the syndrome's linkage to the nationalpolitical party system. This effects the
politicisation of the masses, yet directs their support to reactionary elites not
acting in their interests.35
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PAUL C SONDROL

In the end, any understandingof Paraguay'stransitionmust take into account

the nation's sustainedlegacy of extreme tyranny.Its culturedictates circumspection regardingthe short-termhabituationof newer democraticnorms in the face
of long-standing personalist, militarist and elitist structuresand routines. The
cuartelazo by Senior Army Commander,General Lino Oviedo, in April 1996,
only highlights the fact that the Paraguayanarmed forces may not govern at
present, but they are never far from power. Since at least the Chaco War, no
Paraguayanregime has remained in power without military backing.36
A fourth lesson drawn from these cases concerns the issue of defining
civil-military relations,unresolvedin Paraguayand Uruguay,as elsewhere in the
developing world. As a matterof definition,what, precisely, constitutes 'successful' or 'permanent' military disengagement? Like the larger authoritarian,
totalitarianor democratictaxonomies, the case studies imply that 'demilitarisation' is more or less militarisation,rather than either civilian control of the
military, or military interventionin politics. Does a shift from overt military
'participation'in governmentdecisions to intermittent'influence' mark successful withdrawal?In the Paraguayancase, how does a 'civilian' regime operate
that is characterisedby near-completemilitaryjurisdiction over certain policy
matters, with the army as a permanentfactor in any calculus of power?
Lastly, Paraguayand Uruguay teach us something of the issue of corruption
in developing societies. Corruptionin developing countries is misunderstoodin
the First World; there exist functional attributes to corruption as a crucial
mechanism in politics. By allocating spoils, corruption buys complicity and
support from elites with a personal stake in the continuation of the system.
Corruptionis utilised as a purging mechanism and scapegoat device; displacing
blame for systemic, governmental failures and assigning culpability to less
destabilising individuals ('a few bad apples').37
But corruptioncan become dysfunctional if it assumes an ever-heightening
spiral beyond all rationalboundaries.Corruptionis pervasive in Paraguay.The
Paraguayanform of corruptionclosely approximatesthat found in Mexico, but
differs completely in magnitude and nature from that found in Uruguay. The
Uruguayan variety is a malodorous lubricant for local political bosses and
entrepreneursthat get public housing, highways, resorts and shopping centres
built. Paraguayancorruptionis incapacitating;a malignancy that poisons an
entire political and social system in which people rapaciously prey upon one
another with little thought of ultimate consequences.38
The Paraguayanand Uruguayancases clarify and suggest new questions and
crossnationalcomparisons regarding such diverse issues as civil-military relations, personalistrule, clientelism, corruption,reformismand liberalisation,and
how value orientationsshape social structures.These are all universal phenomena, but their meaning is infinitely variable across time and space. At present,
no consensus exists among scholars as to which conditions, variables, or
characteristicsare most essential in understandingpolitics in the developing
world;no single, universaland teleological 'grandtheory' of developmentexists.
But this shifting focus in the literature,brimmingwith eclecticism and 'islands'
of middle-rangetheories of change, representsless fractureand more a vibrant
maturation of development studies. Paraguay and Uruguay illuminate the
122

PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION

changes afoot in the Third World and the paradigms with which to better
understandthose changes.

Notes
1Kenneth Johnson, 'Measuring the scholarly image of Latin American democracy, 1945-1985', in James
Wilkie, ed, Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 26, Los Angeles, UCLA Latin American Center, 1988,
p 198. Johnson shows Paraguay ranking either 18th or 19th out of 20 Latin American states in nine
successive surveys of democraticdevelopment at five year intervals.Uruguay,however, consistently ranked
as the most democratic nation in Latin America from 1945 until the mid-1960s.
2Thus, to one degree or another, an underlying currentof authoritarianismand personalism may be found
throughoutLatin America, but its incidence and permanencevaries across time and space. Viewed in this
light, Paraguay'sGeneral Andr6s Rodriguez and Uruguay's Battle y Ord6fiezare not particularlydifferent.
The more formal name for Uruguay's Blancos is the National Party. Paraguay'sColorado party is formally
termed the National Republican Association, or ANR.
4See Herman Daly, 'The Uruguayan economy: its basic nature and current problems', Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs, 7, 1965, pp 316-30; Luis Costa Bonino, Crisis de los partidos
tradicionales y movimiento revolucionario en el Uruguay, Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental,
1985.
5See Alfredo Seiferheld,Nazismo y fascismo en el Paraguay: visperas de la II Guerra Mundial, 1936-1939,
Asunci6n: Editorial Historica, 1985, ch 4.
6Paraguay had three strong dictatorsbetween independenceand the Triple Alliance War in 1865. After 1870,
the next 80 years brought dozens of cuartelazos (barracks revolts), overt threats of coups and seven
successful ones. Between 1870 and the 1930s Paraguayhad 32 presidents,two of whom were assassinated
and three overthrown.In the decade 1901-11 Paraguayhad 10 presidents, including four in 1911.
The parties emerged from the ashes of Paraguay's crushing defeat in the Triple Alliance War (1865-70).
Those claiming to be the heirs to Francisco Solano L6pez formed the Colorado Party. The Liberals,
fashioned from survivors and descendants of exiles who fled Paraguay during the father/son L6pez
dictatorship,constitute the main opposition. As a result of their collaborationwith the occupying Brazilians
after the war, the Liberals suffered from an anti-patrioticstigma applied by the Colorados. See Harris
Gaylord Warren, Paraguay and the Triple Alliance: The post-war Decade, 1869-1878, Austin, TX:
University of Texas Press, 1978.
On 'totalitarian'Uruguay, see Alfred Stepan, RethinkingMilitary Politics, Princeton,NJ: University Press,
1988, p 14; and MartinWeinstein, Uruguay:Democracy at the Crossroads, Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1988, p 56. On Paraguay's 'military' dictatorship,see Roy Macridis, Modern Political Regimes, Boston,
MA: Little, Brown, 1986, p 216.
9 On distinctions between bureaucratic-authoritarian
and neoconservative military regimes, see Hector E
Schamis, 'ReconceptualizingLatin American authoritarianismin the 1970s', ComparativePolitics, 23(2),
1991, pp 201-20.
10 The term 'antipolitics'comes from Brian Loveman & Thomas J Davies, Jr, eds, The Politics of Antipolitics:
the Military in Latin America, Lincoln, NB: University Press, 1989. The quote was translatedfrom the
militarycommunique,Juntade Comandantesen Jefe, Las Fuerzas Armadas al Pueblo Oriental: el Proceso
Politico, Montevideo: Las Fuerzas Armadas, 1978, p 247.
1 Paul C Sondrol, '1984 revisited? A re-examinationof Uruguay's military dictatorship',Bulletin of Latin
American Research, 11 (2), 1992, pp 187-203.
12 Gabriel Almond & G Bingham Powell, ComparativePolitics: A Developmental Approach, Boston, MA:
Little, Brown, 1966, pp 280-84.
13 See R Andrew Nickson, 'Tyranny and longevity: Stroessner's Paraguay', Third World Quarterly, 10 (1),
1988, pp 237-59; Paul C Sondrol, 'Authoritarianismin Paraguay: an analysis of three contending
paradigms', Review of Latin American Studies, 3 (1), 1990, pp 83-105.
4 Stronismo should not be confused with Coloradismo. By 1967 Stroessner had completely converted the
century-oldparty into a personalistvehicle to develop a mass base of support.To the preexisting Colorado
'mentality' (traditionalhatred of the Liberals, a contempt for formal procedures, rather populist in party
appeals to poor farmers), Stroessner melded authority with control and representationinto a leadership
principle (Ftihrerprinzip)and absolutist regime (Ftihrerstaat).Stroessnerthus became 'El Continuador',in
the tradition of Francia and the L6pezes. See Robin Theobald, 'Patrimonialism:research note', World
Politics, 34, 1982, pp 548-549; FrederickHicks, 'Interpersonalrelationshipsand caudillismo in Paraguay',
Journal of InterAmericanStudies and WorldAffairs, 13, 1971, pp 89-111.

123

PAUL C SONDROL
15

The totalitarianfeel of Stroessner's Paraguay was evident in the Colorado party's systematisation of
traditionalhatredsinto a kind of ideology, mass-line penetrationof societal life, and the politicisationof the
military. What is particularlyinteresting regarding Stroessner is that his personalist rule rested upon no
charismaticelements. See Paul C Sondrol, 'Totalitarianand authoritariandictators:a comparison of Fidel
Castroand Alfredo Stroessner',Journal of LatinAmericanStudies, 23 (3), 1991, pp 599-620. On the recent
release of secret-police files, see R Andrew Nickson, 'Paraguay's Archivo del terror', Latin American
Research Review, 30 (1), 1995, pp 125-129.
16 See Paul Lewis, Paraguay Under Stroessner, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press,
pp 225-30.
17
General Luis Queirolo, El Soldado, 74, August 1980. (El Soldado is a monthly periodical and unofficial
voice of the officer corps published by the Centro Militar in Montevideo).
18 See Charles G Gillespie, Negotiating Democracy: Politicians and Generals in Uruguay, Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversity Press, 1991.
19Corruption,as Stroessner once said, was 'the price of peace'. See Carlos Maria Lezcano G, 'Lealtad al
General-Presidente',Asunci6n: Investigaci6nesSociales Educaci6nComunicaci6n, 1986; Tomas Palau, ed,
Dictadura, Corrupciony Transici6n, Asunci6n: BASE/Investigaciones Sociales, Programade Estado y
Sociedad (ISPES), 1990. On the Paraguayaneconomy, see Bejamin Arditi, Recesion y estancamento: la
economfaparaguaya durante el periodo post-'boom' (1981-1986), Asunci6n: Centro de Documentaci6ny
Estudios, 1987; Melissa H Birch, 'El legado econ6mico de los atios de Stroessner y el desaffo por la
democracia', in Diego Abente, ed, Paraguay en transicio'n,Asunci6n: Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1993,
31-52.
2 pp
0 For analysis of the cronograma of military withdrawal,see Luis E Gonzdlez, 'Uruguay, 1980-1981: an
unexpected opening', Latin American Research Review, 19, 1983, pp 63-76.
21 See Thomas Carothers,In the Name of Democracy: US Policy TowardLatin America in the Reagan Years,
Berkeley, CA: University of CaliforniaPress, 1991, pp 163-66. On Paraguay'sinternationalisolation, see
Jose Luis Sim6n, 'Aisalmiento politico internacionaly desconcertacion:El Paraguay de Stroessner de
espaldas a America Latina', Revista Paraguaya de Sociologia, 25, 1988, pp 185-243.
22 A more detailed examinationof backgroundfactors leading to the 1989 coup is providedin Paul C Sondrol,
'The Paraguayanmilitary in transition and the evolution of civil-military relations', Armed Forces and
Society, 19(1), 1992, pp 105-22.
23 The Cox newspapergroup, citing a classified US State Departmentreport, said Rodriguez was considered
by US law enforcementauthoritiesto be Paraguay'snumberone narcotraficantero.See The Arizona Daily
Star (Tucson), 5 February1989, p 11.
24 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971.
25 Gillespie, Negotiating Democracy, p 239.
26
JuanRial, 'The social imagery:utopianpolitical myths in Uruguay',in Saul Sosnowski & Louise B Popkin,
eds, Repression, Exile, and Democracy: Uruguayan Culture, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993,
85-86 (uncorrectedpage-galley proofs).
27 pp
See Jan Knippers Black, 'Almost free, almost fair: Paraguay's ambiguous election', NAcLA: Report on
Democracy, 27 (2), 1993, pp 26-8.
28 Paul C Sondrol, 'The emerging new politics of liberalizing Paraguay: sustained civil-military control
without democracy', Journal of InteramericanStudies and WorldAffairs, 34 (2), 1992, pp 127-63.
29 Latin American WeeklyReport, 13 May 1993, p 213; 27 May 1993, p 1.
30
In LarryDiamond, JuanLinz & SeymourMartinLipset, eds, Democracy in Developing Countries,Boulder,
CO: Lynne RiennerPublishers, 1990, p 8, the authorsoffer terms to indicate the mixtureof democraticand
non-democraticelements that can be found in the developing world. One generic hybrid regime is termed
'pseudo-democracy',given the existence of democratic institutions and procedures (multipartyelections,
new constitutions, etc) enshrined in law that often mask a de facto authoritarianregime as a way of
legitimising it. Paraguay's system, along with Mexico's, closely resembles this typology. But Paraguay's
military occupies a far greaterplace in politics than does Mexico's, thus Paraguayalso parallels the less
institutionalised, typically more personalistic and unstable Central American systems of El Salvador,
Guatemalaor Honduras.
31 Shahid Qadir,et al, 'Sustainabledemocracy:formalismvs substance', ThirdWorldQuarterly,14 (3), 1993,
32 pp 415-22.
Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, OK:
University of OklahomaPress, 1991.
33 See, for example, John A Booth & Mitchell Seligson, 'The political culture of authoritarianism
in Mexico:
a reexamination',LatinAmericanResearch Review, 19 (1), 1984, pp 106-24; and Susan Tiano, 'Authoritarianism and political culturein Argentinaand Chile in the mid-1960s', Latin AmericanResearch Review, 21
(1), 1986, pp 73-98.
3 At the same time, one could add that a militarycoup would surely have occurred-much earlier-in the long
process of economic deteriorationand political delegitimation in any number of other Latin American/
African/Asiancases that lacked the depth of Uruguay's democraticculture.

124

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PARAGUAYAND URUGUAY:MODERNITY
35 Hicks, 'Interpersonalrelationshipsand caudillismo in Paraguay'.
36

On General Oviedo's attemptedputsch, see Wall Street Journal, 29 April 1996, p 1.

Stephan D Morris, Corruption and Politics in ContemporaryMexico, Tuscaloosa, AL University of
Alabama Press, 1991.
38 This observationis not empirical, nor universal;clearly there are many honest, dedicatedpublic servantsin
Paraguay.But low salaries commonly justify utilising one's office to 'supplement'one's income, if for no
other reason than, 'everyone else does it'. These impressions were gleaned during extended visits to
Paraguayand Uruguay in 1989, and a year in Paraguayas a Fulbrightscholar in 1994 (including a month
in Montevideo).

37

Contemporary

South Asia

EDITORS
GowherRizvi,NewYork,USA
Robert Cassen,QueenElizabethHouse,Oxford,UK
Thereis a growingrealizationthatSouthAsia has to be bothtreatedandstudiedas a
region.Contemporary
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importance
not only to the statesandpeoplesof the region,but to the worldas a
whole. It also addressesthe majorissuesfacingSouthAsia froma regionaland
interdisciplinary
perspective.
Contemporary
SouthAsia focuseson issues concerningthe regionthatare not
circumscribed
by the nationalbordersof the states.Whilenationalperspectivesare
not ignored,the journal'soverridingpurposeis to encouragescholarswithinSouth
Asia andin the globalcommunityto searchfor means(boththeoreticalandpractical)
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confrontation
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