EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. V.

CA (1994)

(Compensatory, Penalty or Indemnity Interest)

Rules on Interest:
Interest upon an obligation which calls for the payment of money, absent a
stipulation, is the legal rate. Such interest normally is allowable from the date of
demand, judicial or extrajudicial. The trial court opted for judicial demand as the
starting point.
But then upon the provisions of Article 2213 of the Civil Code, interest "cannot be
recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Here, interest should be counted from the date of
the decision (when the amount of damages are ascertained).
Art. 2209, CC. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and
the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the
contrary, shall be the payment of interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation,
the legal interest which is six percent per annum.
Rules of thumb (on the award of interests):
*NOTE: The legal rate of 12% has been amended to 6%. See Circular No. 799 (amending Circular No. 905) effective July 1, 2013, and the case of
NACAR V. GALLERY FRAMES AND/OR BORDEY (2013). Therefore, there is no need to distinguish now the obligations breached as the legal interest
applicable is 6%.

1)

When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts,

delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The
provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the
measure of recoverable damages.

2)

With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of ACTUAL AND

COMPENSATORY DAMAGES, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:
Obligation breached: consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money
Interest Due:
that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due
shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded.
In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to
the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code. (amended to 6%)
Obligation breached: not constituting a loan or forbearance of money,
Interest due: may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
annum.
No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when
or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest
shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169,
Civil Code)
When such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is
made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is

a)
i)
ii)
b)

o
o

made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in
any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
c)
When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this
interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
(amended to 6%)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 116356. June 29, 1998]

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DAVAO
PILOTS ASSOCIATION, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.
In Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, i[1]
the Court, en banc, ruled that Executive Order 1088ii[2] was not unconstitutional. We
adhere to said ruling in this case.
The Case

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the Decisioniii[3] of the Court of
Appealsiv[4] in CA-GR CV No. 34487 promulgated on July 18, 1994, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the
same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against defendant-appellant.
The Decision affirmed by Respondent Court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered directing the defendant:
1.To pay plaintiff the sum of P602,710.04 with legal rate of interest
commencing from the filing of the complaint representing unpaid
pilotage fees;
2.

To pay attorneys fees in the sum of P50,000.00;

3.

And costs.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this appeal.v[5]

The Facts

As found by the trial court, these are the undisputed facts:

On September 25, 1989, plaintiff [herein private respondent] elevated a
complaint against defendant [herein petitioner] for sum of money and attorneys
fees alleging that plaintiff had rendered pilotage services to defendant between
January 14, 1987 to July 22, 1989 with total unpaid fees of P703,290.18.
Despite repeated demands, defendant failed to pay and prays that the latter be
directed to pay P703,290.18 with legal rate of interest from the filing of the
complaint; attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the principal obligation and such
other relief.
On November 18, 1989 defendant answered vigorously disputing the claims of
plaintiff. It assailed the constitutionality of the Executive Order 1088 upon which
plaintiff bases its claims; alleged that there is a pending case before the Court
of Appeals elevated by the United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines
of which plaintiff is a member[;] whereas defendant is a member of the
Chamber of Maritime Industries of the Philippine[s] which is an Intervenor in
CA-G.R. SP No. 18072; that there therefore is lis pendens by Section 1 (e),
Rule 16 of the Rules; that the subject of the complaint falls within the scope and
authority of the Philippine Ports Authority by virtue of PD No. 857 dated
December 23, 1975; that Executive Order No. 1088 is an unwarranted repeal or
modification of the Philippine Ports Authority Charter; that the fees charged by
plaintiff are arbitrary and confiscatory; and the basis of the Executive Order
1088 is offensive, sourced from Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution and
rendered inoperative by the Freedom Constitution of March 25, 1986 and the
present Constitution; and that the only agency vested by law to prescribe such
rates, charges or fees for services rendered by any private organization like the
plaintiff within a Port District is governed by Section 20 of PD 857. As regular
patron of plaintiff, defendant has never been remiss in paying plaintiffs claim for
pilotage fees and the present complaint under the foregoing circumstances is
without legal foundation. Defendant prays that plaintiff be advised to await the
final outcome of the identical issues already elevated to and pending before the
Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 18072. Defendant prays for an award of
damages, attorneys fees, litigation expense and costs.
At the Pre-Trial Conference, the only issue raised by plaintiff is whether the
defendant is liable to the plaintiff for the money claims alleged in the complaint.
The defendant on the other hand raised the following issues:
1.Whether or not Executive Order 1088 is constitutional;
2.

Whether or not Executive Order 1088 is illegal;

3.

Whether or not the plaintiff may motu proprio and independently of

the Public Estates Authority enforce Executive Order 1088 and
collect the pilotage fees prescribed thereunder;

4.

Assuming Executive Order 1088 is constitutional, valid and selfexecutory, whether or not the defendant is liable; and if so, to what
extent and for what particular items; and

5.

Whether or not the plaintiff is liable under the counterclaims (p.

102, Expediente).

On September 5, 1990, plaintiff presented witness Capt. Felix N. Galope, in

the course of which testimony identified among others EXHIBITS B to E-2 and
J to to I-2 consisting of documents related to the collection of the unpaid
pilotage fees; basis for such computations; Statement of Accounts; demand
letter and official recipients of payment made.
On September 6, 1990, Simplicio Barao, plaintiffs Billing Clerk testified among
others on the records of plaintiffs Captains Certificate/Pilotage Chits and
Bills/Statements of Accounts on the claims against defendant (EXHIBITS G to
H-48-A) and the details of the outstanding accounts in favor of plaintiff. The
records show defendant raised no objection thereto and by virtue of which all
of plaintiffs documentary exhibits were admitted. (Order dated January 14,
1991, p. 277 Expediente).
On March 14, 1991, defendant presented Celso Occidental, employee of
defendant shipping company, in the course of which testimony submitted
EXHIBITS 1 to 1-D which is plaintiffs Billing Rate, both old and new with a
payment of P79,585.64; and 2 to 2-G representing plane ticket paid for by
defendant for transportation expenses of its counsel and cost of stenographic
transcripts.
Defendants last witness, Capt. Jose Dubouzet, Jr. and a Harbor Pilot was
briefly presented.vi[6]
After due trial, the trial court rendered its ruling, viz.:
Plaintiffs evidence as to the unpaid pilotage services due from defendant duly
supported by voluminous documentary exhibits has not been refuted nor
rebutted by defendant. On the contrary, when plaintiffs documentary exhibits
were formally offered, defendant did not raise any objection thereby leaving the
documents unchallenged and undisputed.
Upon the other hand, while the records show that defendant raised no less than
five (5) issues the evidence fails to show any proof to sustain defendants
posture. On the contrary, neither of defendants two witnesses appear to have
even grazed the outer peripheries of what could have been interesting issues
with far-reaching consequences if resolved.vii[7]

The factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner insists on paying
pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars. Because EO 1088 sets a higher rate,
petitioner now assails its constitutionality.
Public Respondents Ruling

As stated earlier, Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.
Respondent Court pointed out that petitioner, during the pre-trial, limited the issues to
whether: (1) EO 1088 is unconstitutional; (2) EO 1088 is illegal; (3) private respondent
itself may enforce and collect fees under EO 1088; and (4) petitioner is liable and, if EO
1088 is legal, to what extent. It then affirmed the factual findings and conclusion of the
trial court that petitioner fail[ed] to show any proof to support its position. Parenthetically,
Respondent Court also noted two other cases decided by the Court of Appeals,
upholding the constitutionality of EO 1088. viii[8]
The Issue

In sum, petitioner raises this main issue: whether Executive Order 1088 is
unconstitutional.ix[9]
The Courts Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

EO 1088 Is Valid

Petitioner contends that EO 1088x[10] is unconstitutional, because (1) its interpretation

and application are left to private respondent, a private person, xi[11] and (2) it
constitutes an undue delegation of powers. Petitioner insists that it should pay pilotage
fees in accordance with and on the basis of the memorandum circulars issued by the
PPA, the administrative body vested under PD 857 xii[12] with the power to regulate and
prescribe pilotage fees. In assailing the constitutionality of EO 1088, the petitioner
repeatedly asks: Is the private respondent vested with power to interpret Executive
Order No. 1088?xiii[13]
The Court is not persuaded. The pertinent provisions of EO 1088 read:
SECTION 1. The following shall be the rate of pilotage fees or charges based
on tonnage for services rendered to both foreign and coastwise vessels:
For Foreign Vessels
Less than 500GT
500GT
to 2,500GT
2,500GT
to 5,000GT
5,000GT
to 10,000GT

Rate in US$ &/or its

Peso Equivalent
$
30.00
43.33
71.33
133.67

10,000GT
15,000GT
20,000GT
30,000GT
40,000GT
60,000GT
80,000GT
100,000GT
120,000GT
130,000GT

to 15,000GT
to 20,000GT
to 30,000GT
to 40,000GT
to 60,000GT
to 80,000GT
to 100,000GT
to 120,000GT
to 130,000GT
to 140,000GT

181.67
247.00
300.00
416.67
483.33
550.00
616.67
666.67
716.67
766.67

Over 140,000 gross tonnage $0.05 or its peso equivalent every excess
tonnage. Rate for docking and undocking anchorage, conduction and shifting
other related special services is equal to 100%. Pilotage services shall be
compulsory in government and private wharves or piers.
For Coastwise Vessels

Regular

100 and under 500 gross tons

500 and under 600 gross tons
600 and under 1,000 gross tons
1,000 and under 3,000 gross tons
3,000 and under 5,000 gross tons
5,000 and over gross tons

P 41.70
55.60
69.60
139.20
300.00

SEC. 2. With respect to foreign vessels, payment of pilotage services shall be

made in dollars or in pesos at the prevailing exchange rate.
SEC. 3. All orders, letters of instructions, rules, regulations and other issuances
inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly.
SEC. 4. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
In Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,xiv
[14] the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, upheld the validity
and constitutionality of Executive Order 1088 in no uncertain terms. We aptly iterate our
pronouncement in said case, viz.:
It is not an answer to say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered a statute
because that would imply the withdrawal of power from the PPA. What
determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form
but its nature. Here as we have already said, the power to fix the rates of
charges for services, including pilotage service, has always been regarded as
legislative in character.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is worthy to note that E.O. NO. 1088 provides for adjusted pilotage service
rates without withdrawing the power of the PPA to impose, prescribe, increase
or decrease rates, charges or fees. The reason is because E.O. No. 1088 is not
meant simply to fix new pilotage rates. Its legislative purpose is the
rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of uniform
and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty
bound to comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may
not decrease them below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088. x x x. xv[15]
We see no reason to depart from this ruling. The Courts holding clearly debunks
petitioners insistence on paying its pilotage fees based on memorandum circulars
issued by the PPA.xvi[16] Because the PPA circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they
are void and ineffective. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. xvii[17] As stated
by this Court in Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,xviii[18] [t]he conclusive
effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency
may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a
grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with either the letter or spirit of the law.xix[19] It is axiomatic that an
administrative agency, like the PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the law or
not. Its duty is to enforce it. Unarguably, therefore, if there is any conflict between the
PPA circular and a law, such as EO 1088, the latter prevails. xx[20]
Based on the foregoing, petitioner has no legal basis to refuse payment of pilotage fees
to private respondent, as computed according to the rates set by EO 1088. Private
respondent cannot be faulted for relying on the clear and unmistakable provisions of EO
1088. In fact, EO 1088 leaves no room for interpretation, thereby unmistakably showing
the duplicity of petitioners query: Is the private respondent vested with power to interpret
Executive Order No. 1088?
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

i
ii
iii

LIGUTAN V. CA, (2002)

(Compensatory, Penalty or Indemnity Interest)
The essence or rationale for the payment of interest, quite often referred to as cost of money,
is not exactly the same as that of a surcharge or a penalty. A penalty stipulation is not
necessarily preclusive of interest, if there is an agreement to that effect, the two being distinct
concepts which may separately be demanded. What may justify a court in not allowing the
creditor to impose full surcharges and penalties, despite an express stipulation therefor in a
valid agreement, may not equally justify the non-payment or reduction of interest. Indeed,
the interest prescribed in loan financing arrangements is a fundamental part of the banking
business and the core of a bank's existence.
Here, the stipulated interest of 15.189% on the forbearance of money was upheld by the
court as reasonable.

ivSIGA-AN V. VILLANUEVA, (2009)

(Compensatory, Penalty or Indemnity Interest)

Interests:
a) Monetary interest is a compensation fixed by the parties for the use or forbearance of
money.
b) Compensatory interest - imposed by law or by courts as penalty or indemnity for
damages.
The right to interest arises only by virtue of a contract or by virtue of damages for delay or
failure to pay the principal loan on which interest is demanded.
Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which refers to monetary interest, specifically mandates that
no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.

I. Hence, payment of monetary interest is allowed only if:

1) there was an express stipulation for the payment of interest; and
2) the agreement for the payment of interest was reduced in writing.
The concurrence of the two conditions is required for the payment of monetary interest.
Thus, we have held that collection of interest without any stipulation therefor in writing is
prohibited by law.
Monetary interest is due only when these requirements are present.
II. However, there are instances in which an interest may be imposed even in the absence of
express stipulation, verbal or written, regarding payment of interest. Article 2209 of the
Civil Code states that if the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the
debtor incurs delay, a legal interest of 12% (now 6%) per annum may be imposed as
indemnity for damages if no stipulation on the payment of interest was agreed upon.

(Compensatory interest)
This interest may be imposed only as a penalty or damages for breach of contractual
obligations. It cannot be charged as a compensation for the use or forbearance of money. This
applies only to compensatory interest and not to monetary interest.
Solutio Indebiti
Under Article 1960 of the Civil Code, if the borrower of loan pays interest when there has
been no stipulation therefor, the provisions of the Civil Code concerning solutio indebiti shall
be applied.
Article 2154 provides that if something is received when there is no right to demand it, and
it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises. We have held that
the principle of solutio indebiti applies in case of erroneous payment of undue interest.
HELD: It was duly established that respondent paid interest to petitioner. Respondent was
under no duty to make such payment because there was no express stipulation in writing to
that effect. There was no binding relation between petitioner and respondent as regards the
payment of interest. The payment was clearly a mistake. Since petitioner received something
when there was no right to demand it, he has an obligation to return it.

v
vi
viiUCPB V. SAMUEL AND BELUSO(Finance Charges, R.A. No. 3765, Sec. 4. Sec. 6)

*better read the full text

Validity of the interest rates
The provision stating that the interest shall be at the rate indicative of DBD retail rate or
as determined by the Branch Head is indeed dependent solely on the will of petitioner
UCPB. Clearly, a rate as determined by the Branch Head gives the latter unfettered
discretion on what the rate may be. The Branch Head may choose any rate he or she
desires. As regards the rate indicative of the DBD retail rate, the same cannot be considered
as valid for being akin to a prevailing rate or prime rate allowed by this Court
in Polotan. The interest rate in Polotan reads:
The Cardholder agrees to pay interest per annum at 3% plus the prime rate of Security Bank
and Trust Company. x x x.
In this provision in Polotan, there is a fixed margin over the reference rate: 3%. Thus, the
parties can easily determine the interest rate by applying simple arithmetic. On the other
hand, the provision in the case at bar does not specify any margin above or below the DBD
retail rate. UCPB can peg the interest at any percentage above or below the DBD retail rate,
again giving it unfettered discretion in determining the interest rate.

Liability for Violation of Truth in Lending Act

RA 3765, otherwise known as the Truth in Lending Act.
Section 6(a) of the Truth in Lending Act which mandates the filing of an action to recover
such penalty must be made under the following circumstances:
Section 6. (a) Any creditor who in connection with any credit transaction fails to
disclose to any person any information in violation of this Act or any regulation issued
thereunder shall be liable to such person in the amount of P100 or in an amount equal to
twice the finance charge required by such creditor in connection with such transaction,
whichever is greater, except that such liability shall not exceed P2,000 on any credit
transaction. Action to recover such penalty may be brought by such person within
one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation, in any court of
competent jurisdiction.
Rationale: to protect the public from hidden or undisclosed charges on their loan
obligations, requiring a full disclosure thereof by the lender.

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

Section 4 of the Truth in Lending Act clearly provides that the disclosure statement must be
furnished prior to the consummation of the transaction:
SEC. 4. Any creditor shall furnish to each person to whom credit is extended, prior to
the consummation of the transaction, a clear statement in writing setting forth, to the
extent applicable and in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Board, the
following information:
the cash price or delivered price of the property or service to be acquired;
the amounts, if any, to be credited as down payment and/or trade-in;
the difference between the amounts set forth under clauses (1) and (2)
the charges, individually itemized, which are paid or to be paid by such person in
connection with the transaction but which are not incident to the extension of credit;
the total amount to be financed;
the finance charge expressed in terms of pesos and centavos; and
the percentage that the finance bears to the total amount to be financed expressed as a
simple annual rate on the outstanding unpaid balance of the obligation.
Rationale: to protect users of credit from a lack of awareness of the true cost thereof,
proceeding from the experience that banks are able to conceal such true cost by hidden
charges, uncertainty of interest rates, deduction of interests from the loaned amount, and the
like. The law thereby seeks to protect debtors by permitting them to fully appreciate the true
cost of their loan, to enable them to give full consent to the contract, and to properly evaluate
their options in arriving at business decisions.
The promissory notes, the copies of which were presented to the spouses Beluso after
execution, are not sufficient notification from UCPB. As earlier discussed, the interest rate
provision therein does not sufficiently indicate with particularity the interest rate to be
applied to the loan covered by said promissory notes.
ADVOCATES FOR TRUTH IN LENDING, INC. AND OLAGUER V. BS-MB
(Usury)
Relevant Laws:

Act No. 2655, or the Usury Law of 1916.

R.A. No. 265 - created the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines on June 15, 1948,
empowered the CB-MB to, among others, set the maximum interest rates which banks may
charge for all types of loans and other credit operations, within limits prescribed by the Usury
Law.
P.D. No. 1684 Amended the Usury Law was amended on March 17, 1980, giving the
CB-MB authority to prescribe different maximum rates of interest which may be imposed for
a loan or renewal thereof or the forbearance of any money, goods or credits, provided that the
changes are effected gradually and announced in advance.
CB Circular No. 905, Series of 1982 issued by the CB-MB, effective on January 1, 1983.
Section 1 of the Circular, under its General Provisions, removed the ceilings on interest rates
on loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits.
RA 7653 established BSP to replace CB. Repealed RA 265.
CB Circular No. 905 did not repeal nor in anyway amend the Usury Law but simply
suspended the latters effectivity. By virtue of CB Circular No. 905, the Usury Law has been
rendered ineffective and legally non-existent in our jurisdiction. Interest can now be charged
as lender and borrower may agree upon.

1)
2)

Effect of PD 1684 and CB 905 suspending the effectivity of the Usury Law
Lifted interest ceiling.
Upheld the parties freedom of contract to agree freely on the rate of interest.
The BSP-MB has authority to enforce CB Circular No. 905
Under Section 1-a of the Usury Law, as amended, the BSP-MB may prescribe the maximum
rate or rates of interest for all loans or renewals thereof or the forbearance of any money,
goods or credits, including those for loans of low priority such as consumer loans, as well as
such loans made by pawnshops, finance companies and similar credit institutions. It even
authorizes the BSP-MB to prescribe different maximum rate or rates for different types of
borrowings, including deposits and deposit substitutes, or loans of financial intermediaries.
The lifting of the ceilings for interest rates does not authorize stipulations
charging excessive, unconscionable, and iniquitous interest
It is settled that nothing in CB Circular No. 905 grants lenders a carte blanche authority to
raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a
hemorrhaging of their assets. Stipulations authorizing iniquitous or unconscionable interests
have been invariably struck down for being (void) contrary to morals, if not against the law.
Nonetheless, the nullity of the stipulation of usurious interest does not affect the lenders right
to recover the principal of a loan, nor affect the other terms thereof. Thus, in a usurious loan
with mortgage, the right to foreclose the mortgage subsists, and this right can be exercised by
the creditor upon failure by the debtor to pay the debt due. The debt due is considered as
without the stipulated excessive interest, and a legal interest of 12% (now 6%) per annum
will be added in place of the excessive interest formerly imposed.
BPI V. IAC AND ZSHORNACK
(Voluntary Deposit)

Zshornack delivered to the bank US $3,000 for safekeeping. BPI argues that the contract
embodied in the document is the contract of depositum (as defined in Article 1962, New Civil
Code), which banks do not enter into. Zshornack demanded the return of the money on May
10, 1976, or over five months later.
Article 1962, New Civil Code:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing
belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the
safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no
deposit but some other contract.
Since the mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without selling them to the Central Bank within
one business day from receipt, is a transaction which is not authorized by CB Circular No. 20,
it must be considered as one which falls under the general class of prohibited transactions.
Hence, pursuant to Article 5 of the Civil Code, it is void, having been executed against the
provisions of a mandatory/prohibitory law.

viii
ix
x
xi
xii
xiii
xiv
xv
xvi
xvii
xviii

xix
xx