STONEHILL vs DIOKNO

Citation : G.R. No. L-19550

Date of Promulgation: June 19, 1967
FACTS:
Petitioners, who have prior deportation cases pending, and the
corporation they form were alleged to committed "violation of Central
BankLaws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the
RevisedPenal Code, to which they were served 4 search warrants,
directing any peace officer to search petitioners persons and/or
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences for: books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements
and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
The items allegedly illegally obtained can be classified into two
groups: (1)those found and seized in the offices of aforementioned
corporations, and (2) those found in petitioners residences.
Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and injunction and prayed that,
pending final disposition of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued against the prosecutors, their agents and representatives from
using the effect seized or any copies thereof, in the deportation case
and that thereafter, a decision be rendered quashing the contested
search warrants and declaring the same null and void. For being
violative of the constitution and the Rules of court by: (1) not
describing with particularity the documents, books and things to be
seized; (2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized; (3) the
warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed
against the petitioner; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an
illegal manner; and (5) the documents paper and cash money were not
delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in accordance with law.
In their answer, the espondent) alleged; (1) search warrants are
valid and issued in accordance with law; (2) defects of said warrants,
were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) in any event the effects are
admissible regardless of the irregularity.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the search warrants issued partakes the nature of a
general search warrants.
2. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to assail the
legality of search warrants issued against the corporation of which
they were officers.

3. Whether or not the seized articles may be admitted in court.

RULING:
1. No. The Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional

mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.
Search warrants issued upon applications stating that the natural and
juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central
Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been
alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible
for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a
given provision of our criminal laws.
General search warrants are outlawed because the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers.
To prevent the issuance of general warrants this Court deemed it fit to
amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing
in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court that "a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added
thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for
more than one specific offense."
Seizure of books and records showing all business transaction of
petitioners persons, regardless of whether the transactions were legal
or illegal contravened the explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that

the things to be seized be particularly described - as well as tending to

defeat its major objective the elimination of general warrants.
2. Officers of certain corporations, from which the documents, papers,
things were seized by means of search warrants, have no cause of
action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the
seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct
from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations,
and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well
settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed
of by third parties.
Officers of certain corporations can not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above,
since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
3. Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in
court as a fruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be
returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.

ADIONG vs COMELEC
Citation : G.R. No. 103956
Date of Promulgation: March 31, 1992
FACTS:
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.
2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election
laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decal. Provided, That decals and
stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas
provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any
election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or
stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or
billboards.
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong is a senatorial candidate in the May
11, 1992 elections. Adiong is assailing the Resolution. In addition,
Adiong believes that with the ban on radio, television and print
political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics
stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of
decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limit
their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it
fixes.
RULING:
NO. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the
COMELEC providing that decals and stickers may be posted only in

any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of

Section 21 hereof is DECLARED NULL and VOID.
The COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on
mobile places whether public or private except in designated areas
provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional
grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizens
fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution
(Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed
by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or
the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an
individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to
convince others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646)
and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The
restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so
broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property, which in
this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing
regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of
decals or stickers in the privacy of ones living room or bedroom.) In
consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by
the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of
Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a
greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a liberty
interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government
must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not
met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate
and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as
regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and
Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the
Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and
other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals
and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving
vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the
preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election
propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on
mobile places whether public or private except in the authorized
areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot
be justified by the Constitution.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLAND vs BPI

EMPLOYEES UNION
Citation : G.R. No. 164301
Date of Promulgation: August 10, 2010
FACTS:
The BSP approved the Articles of Merger executed on January 20,
2000 by and betweenBPI, and FEBTC. This Article and Plan of Merger
was approved by the SEC on April 7, 2000.Pursuant to the Article and
Plan of Merger, all the assets and liabilities of FEBTC were transferred
to and absorbed by BPI as the surviving corporation. FEBTC
employees, including those in its different branches across the
country, were hired by petitioner as its own employees,with their
status and tenure recognized and salaries and benefits maintained.
Respondent BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of
Unions in BPI Unibank is theexclusive bargaining agent of BPI rank and
file employees in Davao City. The former FEBTC rank-and-file
employees in Davao City did not belong to any labor union at the time
of the merger. Prior to the effectivity of the merger, respondent union
invited said FEBTC employees to a meeting regarding the Union Shop
Clause of the existing CBA between petitioner BPI andrespondent
union. The parties both advert to certain provisions of the existing
CBA.
After the meeting called by the union, some of the former FEBTC
employees joined the union,while others refused. Later, however,

some of those who initially joined retracted their membership.

Respondent union then sent notices to the former FEBTC employees
who refused to join, as well as those who retracted their membership
and called them to a hearing regardingthe matter. When these former
FEBTC employees refused to attend the hearing, the president of the
Union requested BPI to implement the Union Shop Clause of the CBA
and to terminate their employment.
After two months of management inaction on the request,
respondent informed petitioner of itsdecision to refer the issue of the
implementation of the Union Shop Clause of the CBA to theGrievance
Committee. However, the issue remained unresolved at this level and
so it wassubsequently submitted for voluntary arbitration by the
parties. Voluntary Arbitrator ruled infavor of petitioner BPI. Respondent
Union filed a motion for reconsideration, but the voluntaryarbitrator
denied the same. It appealed to the CA and the CA reversed and set
aside the decision of the voluntary arbitrator. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not union security clause isa violation of the
employees constitutional right to freedom of association.
RULING:
NO. The rationale for upholding the validity of union shop clauses in
a CBA, even if they impinge upon the individual employees right or
freedom of association, is not to protect the union for the unions sake.
Laws and jurisprudence promote unionism and afford certain
protections to the certified bargaining agent in a unionized company
because a strong and effective union presumably benefits all
employees in the bargaining unit since such a union would be in a
better position to demand improved benefits and conditions of work
from the employer. This is the rationale behind the State policy to
promote unionism declared in the Constitution, which was elucidated
in the above-cited case of Liberty Flour Mills Employees v. Liberty Flour
Mills, Inc.
In the case at bar, since the former FEBTC employees are deemed
covered by the Union Shop Clause, they are required to join the
certified bargaining agent, which supposedly has gathered the support
of the majority of workers within the bargaining unit in the appropriate
certification proceeding. Their joining the certified union would, in fact,
be in the best interests of the former FEBTC employees for it unites
their interests with the majority of employees in the bargaining unit. It
encourages employee solidarity and affords sufficient protection to the
majority status of the union during the life of the CBA which are the
precisely the objectives of union security clauses, such as the Union
Shop Clause involved herein. We are indeed not being called to
balance the interests of individual employees as against the State
policy of promoting unionism, since the employees, who were parties

in the court below, no longer contested the adverse Court of Appeals

decision. Nonetheless, settled jurisprudence has already swung the
balance in favor of unionism, in recognition that ultimately the
individual employee will be benefited by that policy. In the hierarchy of
constitutional values, this Court has repeatedly held that the right to
abstain from joining a labor organization is subordinate to the policy of
encouraging unionism as an instrument of social justice.
Also in the dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio, he maintains that
one of the dire consequences to the former FEBTC employees who
refuse to join the union is the forfeiture of their retirement benefits.
This is clearly not the case precisely because BPI expressly recognized
under the merger the length of service of the absorbed employees
with FEBTC. Should some refuse to become members of the union,
they may still opt to retire if they are qualified under the law, the
applicable retirement plan, or the CBA, based on their combined
length of service with FEBTC and BPI. Certainly, there is nothing in the
union shop clause that should be read as to curtail an employees
eligibility to apply for retirement if qualified under the law, the existing
retirement plan, or the CBA as the case may be.
In sum, this Court finds it reasonable and just to conclude that the
Union Shop Clause of the CBA covers the former FEBTC employees
who were hired/employed by BPI during the effectivity of the CBA in a
manner which petitioner describes as absorption. A contrary
appreciation of the facts of this case would, undoubtedly, lead to an
inequitable and very volatile labor situation which this Court has
consistently ruled against.