CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS BSP

GR No 148208
Facts: RA 7653 otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act took effect
July 3 1993, effectively replacing the earlier Central Bank of the Philippines
(established 1949) by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. On June 8 2001,
petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc. filed a
petition against the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President to
restrain BSP from implementing the last proviso in Section 15 (i), Article II
of RA 7653 which pertains to establishment of a Human resource
management system and a compensation structure as part of the authority
of the Monetary Board. Employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and
below shall be in accordance with the rates in the salary standardization
act. Petitioner contends that the classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary
and violates the equal protection clause. The said proviso has been
prejudicial to some 2994 rank- and file BSP employees. Respondent on the
other hand contends that the provision does not violate the equal
protection clause, provided that it is construed together with other
provisions of the same law such as the fiscal and administrative
autonomy of the Bangko Sentral and the mandate of its monetary board.
The Solicitor General, as counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the
provision, that the classification of employees is based on real and actual
differentiation and it adheres to the policy of RA 7653 to establish
professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws
and policies of the government.
Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal
protection of laws, hence unconstitutional.
Held: Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade
or the officer employee status, it distinguishes between economic class
and status with the higher salary grade recipients are of greater benefit
above the law than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act.
Officers of the BSP receive higher wages that those of rank-and-file
employees because the former are not covered by the salary
standardization act as provided by the proviso.

15(c). They contend that it makes an unconstitutional cut between two

classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers as exempt class of
Salary Standardization Law (RA 6758) and (2) the rank-and-file non-exempt
class. BSP contends that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from
the SSL was intended to address the BSPs lack of competitiveness in
terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended
to discriminate against the rank-and-file.
Issue: Whether or not Section 15(c) violates equal protection right of the
BSP r&f employees?
Decision: Sec 15(c) unconstitutional. Judicial notice that other Govt
Financial Institution undertook amendment of their charters from 1995 to
2004 a blanket provision for all employees to be covered by SSL. The said
subsequent enactments constitute significant changes in circumstance
that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the
last proviso of Section 15(c). Legal history shows that GFIs have long been
recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from other
governmental entities. There is no substantial distinctions so as to
differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the
seven GFIs. The equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. Those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding
on the rest. It is clear that the enactment of the seven subsequent charters
has rendered the continued application of the challenged proviso
anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be
declared as an outlaw.

PHIL. JUDGES ASS. VS PETE PRADO

G.R.

No.

105371

November

11,

1993

CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASS. VS. BSP

Facts: The New Central Bank Act abolished the old Central Bank and
created the new BSP on 1993 through RA No 7653. Central Bank
Employees Association assailed the provision of RA No 7653, Art II Sec

Facts:Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the
Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation
through its Circular No.92-28. The franking privelege of the Supreme Court,
COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were withdrawn from

them. In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and

the
methods
adopted
prior
it
becoming
a
law.
Issue: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection before
the
law.
Held: The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1)
ruling further that it's adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying
that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act,
or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure.
However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection
clause. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary
and the grantees of the franking privilege. Therefore, RA 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

PHIL. JUDGES ASS. VS PETE PRADO

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the
franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the
Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds,
along
with
certain
other
government
offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds
that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its
purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of
Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed
among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and
encroaches
on
the
independence
of
the
Judiciary.
ISSUE:
Whether

or

RULING:
No. SC held

not

Sec

that

Sec

35

35

of

RA

R.A.

No.

7354

7354

is

is

constitutional.

unconstitutional.

1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed
by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in
the
title
thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or

to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It

has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and
reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to
mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with
the
constitutional
requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some
agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of
R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal
service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing
clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the
said
law.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering
the repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court
under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version
of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared
only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI,
Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any
bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be
settled
by
a
conference
committee
of
both
chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the
enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have
to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of
the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners'
charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill
that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final
form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the
enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution.
We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of
the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the
Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal
protection
of
laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a
government-controlled corporation, was created and is expected to
operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have
been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from
performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for
the franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages
it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the services it should be prepared to

extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that
need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-7995

connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious
use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the
means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private
interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is
applied.

May 31, 1957

Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business, filed to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal
protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without
due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and
treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of
the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a
corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate
the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the
Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of
the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of
law
Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor
and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents;
it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation
enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public
purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the legislatures purpose; is it not unreasonable,
arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real.
Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist.
The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means
for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be
tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean
license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and
property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal
protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police
power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare,
and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if
distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable
basis for said distinction.
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction
between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the
wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to
be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but
actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the
prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial
department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of
the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity
and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population
affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with
treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the
subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any
treaty or any other conventional agreement.
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take
advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in

the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen
enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when
Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the
purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail
business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the
ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which,
according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund
servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business
here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he
should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or
generally accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted
principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised
generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the
law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would
be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it
represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could
not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in
the Pasay city market.
VICTORIANO VS ELIZALDE
FACTS:
Benjamin Victoriano (Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as
the Iglesia ni Cristo, had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory,
Inc. (Company) since 1958. He was a member of the Elizalde Rope
Workers Union (Union) which had with the Company a CBA containing a
closed shop provision which reads as follows: Membership in the Union

shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent

employees workers covered by this Agreement.
Under Sec 4(a), par 4, of RA 975, prior to its amendment by RA 3350, the
employer was not precluded from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein,
if such labor organization is the representative of the employees. On June
18, 1961, however, RA 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to
par 4 subsection (a) of sec 4 of RA 875, as follows: xxx but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization.
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its
members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation
to appellant Union. The Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking
the latter to separate Appellee from the service because he was resigning
from the Union as a member. The Company in turn notified Appellee and
his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory
arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss
him from the service.
Appellee filed an action for injunction to enjoin the Company and the Union
from dismissing Appellee. The Union invoked the union security clause of
the CBA and assailed the constitutionality of RA 3350 and contends it
discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their members from
joining labor unions.
ISSUE:
Whether Appellee has the freedom of choice in joining the union or not.
RULING:
YES. The Constitution and RA 875 recognize freedom of association. Sec 1
(6) of Art III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Sec 7 of Art IV of the
Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 3
of RA 875 provides that employees shall have the right to self-organization
and to form, join of assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the
purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection.
What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and
guarantee is the right to form or join associations. A right comprehends
at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the

absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself

without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee
may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is,
therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should
join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes
up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has
joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his
membership with said organization at any time. The right to join a union
includes the right to abstain from joining any union. The law does not
enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section
3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection
granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of
law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop,
by virtue of which the employer may employ only members of the
collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be
members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their
jobs. By virtue of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of RA
3350, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be
employed or to keep his employment he must become a member of the
collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join
the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement,
RA No.3350introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of
the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: but such agreement shall
not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization. Republic Act No. 3350 merely
excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop
agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the
exception provides is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have
closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed
shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused
employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are
not members of the collective bargaining union. It does not prohibit the
members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still
leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to
affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the
members of said religious wets prefer to sign up with the labor union, they
can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to
sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does

the law prohibit them from joining, and neither may the employer or labor
union compel them to join.
The Company was partly
had with the Union of
positions. It cannot be
impairment of said union

absolved by law from the contractual obligation it

employing only Union members in permanent
denied, therefore, that there was indeed an
security clause.

The prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and

unqualified. The prohibition is general. The prohibition is not to be read
with literal exactness, for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. In
spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess
authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation
appropriate to safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate
contracts already in effect. For not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the parties, but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The contract clause of the
Constitution. must be not only in harmony with, but also in subordination
to, in appropriate instances, the reserved power of the state to safeguard
the vital interests of the people. This has special application to contracts
regulating relations between capital and labor which are not merely
contractual, and said labor contracts, for being impressed with public
interest, must yield to the common good.
The purpose to be achieved by RA 3350 is to insure freedom of belief and
religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination
against those members of religious sects which prohibit their members
from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and
constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only
means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their
dependents.
The individual employee, at various times in his working life, is confronted
by two aggregates of power collective labor, directed by a union, and
collective capital, directed by management. The union, an institution
developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus protect the
individual employee from the power of collective capital, is, paradoxically,
both the champion of employee rights, and a new source of their
frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with management, it
produces yet a third aggregate of group strength from which the individual
also needs protection the collective bargaining relationship.

The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract

rights. In case of conflict, the latter must yield to the former.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed.

VICTORIANO VS ELIZALDE

The purpose of RA 3350 is to serve the secular purpose of advancing the

constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain
persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of
their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of
livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. To help its citizens to
find gainful employment whereby they can make a living to support
themselves and their families is a valid objective of the state. The
Constitution even mandated that the State shall afford protection to labor,
promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relation
between workers and employers.
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor
of members of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating
with a labor organization, is the protection of said employees against the
aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving
certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to
a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a
serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the
State, the Act also promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that
the exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly
advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular religion. Although the
exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that
prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the
religious sects is merely incidental and indirect.
The purpose of RA 3350 was not to grant rights to labor unions. The rights
of labor unions are amply provided for in Republic Act No. 875 and the new
Labor Code.
The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any
lawful association membership in any particular religion or in any religious
sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that
prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a condition or
qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing
from a labor union requires a positive act Republic Act No. 3350 only
exempts members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of
closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not
required to do a positive act-to exercise the right to join or to resign from
the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his
part.

Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) member, has been an

employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory (ERF) since 1958. He was also a
member of the EPWU (Elizalde Rope Workers Union). Under the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) between ERF and EPWU, a close shop
agreement is being enforced which means that employment in the factory
relies on the membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment
in the said factory one must be a member of the said Union. In 1962,
Victoriano tendered his resignation from EPWU claiming that as per RA
3350 he is an exemption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his
being a member of the INC because apparently in the INC, one is forbidden
from being a member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that his
resignation from the Union was acted upon by EPWU which notified ERF
about it. ERF then moved to terminate Victoriano due to his nonmembership from the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not
exempt from the close shop agreement because RA 3350, which provides
that close shop agreements shall not cover members of any religious sects
which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization, is
unconstitutional and that said law violates the EPWUs and ERFs
legal/contractual rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As
such, an INC member may refuse to join a labor union and despite the fact
that there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was
employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his nonmembership in the majority therein. Further, the right to join a union
includes the right not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It
recognizes both the rights of unions and employers to enforce terms of
contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers right to join or
not to join union. RA 3550 recognizes as well the primacy of a
constitutional right over a contractual right.

DUMLAO VS COMELEC
Facts:

Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed

his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming
elections of January 30, 1980.
He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection
and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has
received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under
the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of
the term of office to which he seeks to be elecOted, shall not be qualified
to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.

b. proper party
c. existence of a constitutional question
a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet
been filed for his disqualification. It was only a hypothetical question.
b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has
yet been adversely affected by the operation of the statutes.
c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for
resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity
would require that his suit be dismissed.
However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the public interest
involved and the imminent elections.

He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed insidiously against

him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely
arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.

2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The

constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification.

His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidcay
of a person who was convicted of a crime given that there was judgment
for conviction and the prima facie nature of the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes.

If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one

class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For
purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly
classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that
age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are
not so compulsorily retirable.

He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by

respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the
ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution,
which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall
be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." Apart form this,
hey also attacked the term of office and the election period. These were
Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec 6, and Sec 1 of BP 52.
Issue:
1. Did petitioners have standing
2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution?
Held:
1. No
2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted.
Petition granted
Ratio:
1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to
determine judicial review, three requisites are present:
a. actual case and controversy

The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not be

a reasonable classification. Young blood can be encouraged to come in to
politics.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already
retired, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office,
as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood
assumes relevance.
The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is
emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared
himself tired an unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by
virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again.
It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from
the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not
deny equal protection, neither does it permit such denial.

In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid
all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is
arbitrary and unreasonable. hat constitutional guarantee is not violated by
a reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of the law
and applies to all those belonging to the same class.
The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local
governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that
purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be
susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.

Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already
retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits
therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides, among others, that
retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office.
Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of
the law.

Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional
provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the fundamental law,
is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from
running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been
filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one
is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no
distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and
one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them
would be ineligible to run for public office.

His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr.
These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan
are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52
regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the
campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from
running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the
mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation
would already disqualify them from office.

A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges
have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a
person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which
carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold
office during the term of the sentence.

HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this
case should have never been merged. Dumlaos issue is different from
Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the
requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards
that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review,
namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal
and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to
decide the case.

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie

evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present
danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time constraints will
prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to
overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to
be substituted for a judicial determination. Igot's petition was meritorious.

DUMLAO VS COMELEC

ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of

action.

In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.

The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for
crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints
against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify
them from office as null and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is
neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the

laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on

reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and
regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service,
employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from
younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to
compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require
that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they
assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a
reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a
good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger
blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that
persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be
retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be
reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be
a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has
retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired,
as provided for in the challenged provision.
ANG LADLAD VS COMELEC
FACTS: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who
identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for
registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation
was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial
membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition
for
registration
with
the
COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity;
that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that
because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their
sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point
guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party

v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership

base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and
outlined
its
platform
of
governance.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the
COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds,
stating that: This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner
defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT)
Community, thus a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity. and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which refers to
a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual
attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a
different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines
nuisance as Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which (3) shocks, defies; or disregardsdecency
or
morality.
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties
may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides
that Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy are inexistent and void from the
beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and
indecent
shows.
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, three commissioners voted to
overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y.
Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three
commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration
(Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph).
The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in
his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list

system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation

and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual
orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs
is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still
males and females, and they will remain either male or female protected
by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim
religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious
groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral
parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are
possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its
more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some
moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society
and
these
are
not
publicly
accepted
moral
norms.
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court
annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang
Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance
ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC,
which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final
ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
ISSUE: Whether the Application for accreditation by Ang Ladlad should be
granted.
HELD:

The

POLITICAL

decision
LAW

of
:

the
equal

COMELEC

is

protection

overruled.
clause

The lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political
parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally
burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal
force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on
the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating
LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned
does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals
and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. The
Court disagree with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in

themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause. It should not
single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or
differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this
effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner
itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as
all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made "an
unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the
circumstances
of
the
case."
POLITICAL LAW : freedom of expression and of association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda
and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through
normal democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply held
convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon.
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is
distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every
prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the
public square where people deliberate the order of their life together.
Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or
espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the
public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited
from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be
proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed
process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary
principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on
moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect
the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median
groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a
constitution and the limits it specifies including protection of religious
freedom "not only for a minority, however small not only for a majority,
however large but for each of us" the majority imposes upon itself a selfdenying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride
roughshod
over
the
dissenting
minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are
favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any
restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the
COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise
stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no

better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a

disfavored one.
ANG LADLAD VS COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a partylist organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the
latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited
certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that
since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are
considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the
Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant
Petition
on
Certiorari
under
Rule
65
of
the
ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified
the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional
guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed
that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as
well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations
against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and
that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for
the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by
the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful
statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to
actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the
Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and
legal grounds.
Held:

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands
for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the
law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under
the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized
and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the nonestablishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action
must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be
prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has
the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably
damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal
and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil
Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code,
on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a
criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation
of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public
morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a
judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads

registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of

dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest.
TATAD VS SECRETARY OF ENERGY

2. Whether or not E. O. no. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable.

3. Whether or not Section 5 of R.A. no. 8180 violates Section 26(1), Article
VI of the Constitution.
4. Whether or not Section 15 of R.A. no. 8180 constitutes undue delegation
of legislative power.

Facts:
In December 9, 1992, the Department of Energy was created (through the
enactment of R.A. No. 7638) to control energy-related government
activities. In March 1996, R.A. No. 8180 (Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Act of 1996) was enacted in pursuance to the deregulation of
the power and energy thrust under R.A. 7638. Under the R.A. No. 8180, any
person or entity was allowed to import and market crude oil and petroleum
products, and to lease or own and operate refineries and other
downstream oil facilities.
Petitioner Francisco Tatad questions the constitutionality of Section 5 of
R.A. No. 8180 since the imposition of tarrif violates the equal protection
clause and bars the entry of others in the oil industry business. Also, the
inclusion of tarrif violates Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the constitution
requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its
title.
In a separate petition (G.R. 127867), petitioners Edcel Lagman, Joker
Arroyo, Enrique Garcia, Wigberto Tanada, Flag Human Rights Foundation,
Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition and Sanlakas argued that R.A. No. 8180,
specifically Section 15 is unconstitutional because it: (1) gives undue
delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of
Energy by not providing a determinate or determinable standard to guide
the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry; (2) Executive Order No. 392,
an order declaring the implementation of the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry, is arbitrary and unreasonable because it was
enacted due to the alleged depletion of the Oil Price Stabilization Plan- a
condition not found in R.A. No. 8180; and (3) Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180
and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a de facto cartel among Petron,
Caltex and Shell in violation of constitutional prohibition against
monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

Held:
1. No, R.A. No. 8180 is unconstitutional. It violated Section 19, Article XII of
the Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade
and unfair competition. The deregulation act only benefits Petron, Shell
and Caltex, the three major league players in the oil industry.
2. Yes, Executive Order No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable and
therefore considered void. The depletion of OFSP is not one of the factors
enumerated in R.A. No. 8180 to be considered in declaring full deregulation
of the oil industry. Therefore, the executive department, in its declaration
of E.O. No. 392, failed to follow faithfully the standards set in R.A. No. 8180,
making it void.
3. No, section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI
of the Constitution. A law having a single general subject indicated in the
title may contain any number of provisions as long as they are not
inconsistent with the foreign subject. Section 5 providing for tariff
differential is germane to the subject of the deregulation of the
downstream industry which is R.A. No 8180, therefore it does not violate
the one title-one subject rule.
4. No, Section 15 did not violate the constitutional prohibition on undue
delegation of legislative power. The tests to determine the validity of
delegation of legislative power are the completeness test and the
sufficiency test. The completeness test demands that the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions such that when it reaches the
delegate, all it must do is enforce it. The sufficiency test demand an
adequate guideline or limitation in the law to delineate the delegates
authority. Section 15 provides for the time to start the full deregulation,
which answers the completeness test. It also laid down standard guide for
the judgement of the President- he is to time it as far as practicable when
the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are
declining and when the exchange rate of peso to dollar is stable- which
answers the sufficiency test.

Respondents, on the other hand, declares the petitions not justiciable

(cannot be settled by the court) and that the petitioners have no locus
standi since they did not sustain direct injury as a result of the
implementation of R.A. No. 8180.

Decision:
The petitions were granted. R.A. No. 8180 was declared unconstitutional
and E.O. No. 372 void.

Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. no. 8180 is unconstitutional.

TATAD VS SECRETARY OF ENERGY

FACTS:
The petitions challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 entitled An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes. The
deregulation process has two phases: (a) the transition phase (Aug. 12,
1996) and the (b) full deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997 through EO No.
372).
Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power to the President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide
a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in
determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry, and the law does not provide any specific standard to determine
when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be
declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is
considered stable.
Issue:
w/n the provisions of RA No. 8180 and EO No. 372 is unconstitutional.
sub-issue: (a) w/n sec. 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue
delegation of power, and (b) w/n the Executive misapplied RA No. 8180
when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as factor in fully
deregulating the downstream oil industry in Feb. 1997.
HELD/RULING:
(a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. RA No. 8180 provided that the full deregulation will start at
the end of March 1997 regardless of the occurrence of any event. Thus, the
law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation.
Sec. 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the Presidenthe
is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate
of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
Webster defines practicable as meaning possible to practice or perform,
decline as meaning to take a downward direction, and stable as
meaning firmly established.
(b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor
to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. The
Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by RA No.

8180 when it co0nsidered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF

fund. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or
addition the standards set in RA No. 8180 for it has no powers to make
laws.
GARCIA VS DRILON
Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of
Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus,
pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be
a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence,
being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another
application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a
modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment
on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to
answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it
would be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for
violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of
the modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied
the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings
before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this
petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the
issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that
the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs
counter to the due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of
the state to protect the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and
unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to
Brgy. Officials.
Decision:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and
jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it
may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not
be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the Court ruled
that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply
equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring
women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate
extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.
The essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense. The
grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to
due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners
contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of
the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it
ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a
mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any
branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce
and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the
prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true
with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
BIRAOGO VS PHILPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with
the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed
by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to
submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a
quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to
cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a factfinding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists
as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the
PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority
of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to

achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to
create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the
Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it
vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not
superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the
1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of
1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets
for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be
indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners
and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the
Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include the
inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for

public
offices,
agencies
and
commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must
be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress
as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of
Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate.
Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which,
to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds
because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already
appropriated by Congress.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger

of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the
implementation of E. O. No. 1.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of

the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a
quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the
latters jurisdiction.

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in
interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause
because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and
question
E.
O.
No.
1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the

plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official
action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show
that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of
relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in
Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific
powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The
purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an
inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can
be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of
existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of
the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no
need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the
Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the
commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety
in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission
will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining
probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the
courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to
investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the
President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause
enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities

imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated

individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause
is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a
statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted
authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.
The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the
same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class
are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate
and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out
the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation
clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness
and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at
least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not
conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby

declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
BIRAOGO VS PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
FACT: E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010
was signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed
under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their coprincipals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration
and submit their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between
parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and
make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to
cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if
probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts
of law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.

It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of

Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation;

The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the

Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of
the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not
include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like the
Truth Commission;

The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth
Commission and vesting it the power duplicating and even exceeding
those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal
protection clause. The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc
Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally
granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents
belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive
officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as

mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not

affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the
same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the
latter in conducting the inquiry.
RUBI vs PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
39 Phil 660
Sufficiency of Standards
Delegation of Legislative Powers to Local Governments
FACTS: This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other
Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are
being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that
province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said
to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at
Calapan for having run away form the reservation. The Philippine
Legislature has, by the enactment of Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code, conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro to be exercised by
the provincial governor and the provincial board.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision in question is an unlawful delegation
of legislative power
RULING: No. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an
executive department or official. The
Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate
official thereof, to which it has committed the execution of certain acts,
final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to give
prominence to the "necessity" of the case. In the case at bar, the
Legislature merely conferred upon the Provincial Governor, with the
approval of the Provincial Board and the Department Head, discretionary
authority as to the execution of law. Who, but the provincial governor and
the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are
better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order." As officials charged with the administration of
the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better
fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for
improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward
state.

RATIO: Delegation of Legislative Powers to Local Governments. An

exception to the general rule against the delegation of legislative power
sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to
make such delegation to local authorities. "Necessary in the interest of law
and order" is a standard held sufficient.
Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court
GR No. L-74457, March 20, 1987
FACTS:In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A
which orders that no carabao and carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another; such violation shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit for the carabeef and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit in
the case of the carabaos.On January 13, 1984, Petitioners 6 carabaos were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for
having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He
issued a writ for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of said EO. The
trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on
the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its
decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence, this petition for review filed by
Petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not police power is properly enforced
HELD: NO. The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police
power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the
slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court
said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the
Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one
province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province
will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to
another province will make it easier to kill them there.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the
police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The
police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to
regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. As
long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public

welfare,its regulation under the police power is not only proper but
necessary. In the case at bar, E.O.626-A has the same lawful subject as the
original executive order (E.O. 626 as cited in Toribio case) but NOT the
same lawful method. The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is
not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive
CORONA VS UNITED HARBOUR PILOT GR NO 127980 CASE DIGEST
FACTS: IN ISSUING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 04-92 (PPA-AO NO. 0492), LIMITING THE TERM OF APPOINTMENT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ONE
YEAR SUBJECT TO YEARLY RENEWAL OR CANCELLATION
ON AUGUST 12, 1992, RESPONDENTS UNITED HARBOUR PILOTS
ASSOCIATION AND THE MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, THROUGH CAPT.
ALBERTO C. COMPAS, QUESTIONED PPA-AO NO. 04-92
ON DECEMBER 23, 1992, THE OP ISSUED AN ORDER DIRECTING THE PPA
TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PPA-AO NO. 04-92ON
MARCH 17, 1993, THE OP, THROUGH THEN ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS RENATO C. CORONA, DISMISSED THE
APPEAL/PETITION AND LIFTED THE RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED EARLIER
RESPONDENTS FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND
INJUNCTION WITH PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND DAMAGES, BEFORE BRANCH 6 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
ISSUE: WON PPA-AO-04-92 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
HELD: THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 WAS ISSUED IN
STARK DISREGARD OF RESPONDENTS' RIGHT AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE SUPREME COURT SAID
THAT IN ORDER TO FALL WITHIN THE AEGIS OF THIS PROVISION, TWO
CONDITIONS MUST CONCUR, NAMELY, THAT THERE IS A DEPRIVATION AND
THAT SUCH DEPRIVATION IS DONE WITHOUT PROPER OBSERVANCE OF DUE
PROCESS. AS A GENERAL RULE, NOTICE AND HEARING, AS THE
FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, ARE
ESSENTIAL ONLY WHEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY EXERCISES ITS QUASIJUDICIAL FUNCTION. IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS EXECUTIVE OR
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS ISSUING RULES AND REGULATIONS, AN

ADMINISTRATIVE BODY NEED NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF

NOTICE AND HEARING
THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT PILOTAGE AS A APROFESSION HAS TAKEN ON
THE NATURE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT. IT IS READILY APPARENT THAT PPA-AO
NO. 04-92 UNDULY RESTRICTS THE RIGHT OF HARBOR PILOTS.
Nuez vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Information were filed against Rufino V. Nunez before
Sandiganbayan on 21 February and 26 March 1979 for the crime of estafa
through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in
connivance with his co-accused, all public officials, in several cases.
Thereafter, on 15 May, upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on
constitutional and juridical grounds. A week later, the Sandiganbayan
denied the motion. A motion for teconsideration was filed a day later, and
was likewise denied. Nunez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Supreme Court, claiming that Presidential Decree 1486, which
created the Sandiganbayan, is violative of the due process, equal
protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether the trial of the accused, a public official, by the
Sandiganbayan unduly discriminates against the accused, in light of the
difference of the procedures (especially appellate) in the Sandiganbayan
vis-a-vis regular courts.
Held: The Constitution provided for but did not create a special Court, the
Sandiganbayan, with jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving
graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public
officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. It
came into existence with the issuance in 1978 of a Presidential Decree.
Classification must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member
of the class. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of
a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, i.e.
dishonesty in the public service, the urgency of which cannot be denied. It
follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have
been aware as far back as 17 January 1973, when the present Constitution
came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein,
whether petitioner is a private citizen or a public official, is not necessarily
offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the
omission of the Court of Appeals as intermediate tribunal does not deprive
protection of liberty. The innocence or guilt of an accused in the

Sandiganbayan is passed upon by 3-judge court of its division. Moreover, a

unanimous vote is required, failing which the Presiding Justice shall
designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit
temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the
concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering
judgment. If convicted, the Sandiganbayan en banc has the duty if he
seeks a review to see whether any error of law was committed to justify a
reversal of the judgment.
Ang Tibay vs CIR, 69 Phil 635
Facts: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company
which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather,
Toribio caused the layoff of members of National Labor Union (NLU). NLU
averred that Toribios act is not valid. The CIR, decided the case and
elevated it to the SC, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But
Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.
Issue: What is the function of CIR as a special court?
Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the
CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the
law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the
nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government.
Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by
the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of
its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only
exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting
employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farmlaborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements, but this not
mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones cause
and submit evidence in support thereof;

(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing;
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;

under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte
orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima
facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or
wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible
standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Solar, on the other hand,
contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte
order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat
to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life" and
argued that there were no findings that Solar's wastewater discharged
posed such a threat.

(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate;

ISSUE: Whether or not the Pollution Adjudication Board has legal authority
to issue the Order and Writ of Execution against Solar Textile Finishing
Corporation. YES.

(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

RULING: Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue
ex parte cease and desist orders under the following circumstances: (a)
Public Hearing. . . .Provided , That whenever the Commission finds prima
facie evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate
threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or
exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner
may issue an ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or
the temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the establishment
or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a
prior public hearing The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory
and shall remain in force until said establishment or person prevents or
abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or modified or
nullified by a competent court. The Court found that the Order and Writ of
Execution issued by petitioner Board were entirely within its lawful
authority Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and
regulations in situations like in this case. The relevant pollution control
statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in
the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety,
health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the
protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police
power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power.
Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for
certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial
court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal. The Court gave
due course on the Petition for Review and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals and its Resolution were set aside. The Order of petitioner Board
and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court were
reinstated, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness

(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely

attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the
motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the
entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction
that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and
otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) vs. CA
[G.R. No. 93891 March 11, 1991]
Facts: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation is involved in
bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with untreated wastewater which
were being discharged directly into a canal leading to the adjacent
Tullahan-Tinejeros River. On September 22, 1988, petitioner Pollution
Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order based on 2 findings made on
Solar Textile Finishing Corporations plant, directing Solar immediately to
cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations
as they were clearly in violation of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984
(Pollution Control Law) and Section 103 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations. Solar then filed a motion for
reconsideration which was granted by the Pollution Adjudication Board for
a temporary operation. However, Solar went to the RTC for certiorari and
preliminary injunction against the Board but the same was dismissed. On
appeal, the CA reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and
remanded the case for further proceedings. Petitioner Board claims that

of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing
before the Board.
NON VS. DAMES [185 SCRA 523; G.R. NO. 89317; 20 MAY1990]
Facts:
Petitioners, students in private respondent MabiniColleges, Inc. in Daet,
Camarines Norte, were not allowed tore-enroll by the school for the
academic year 1988-1989 forleading or participating instudent mass
actions against theschool in the preceding semester. The subject of the
protestsis not, however, made clear in the pleadings.Petitioners filed a
petition in the court seeking theirreadmission or re-enrollment to the
school, but the trial courtdismissed the petition. They now petition the
court to reverseits ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in
thecase. The court said that petitioners waived their privilege tobe
admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college whenthey adopted,
signed, and used its enrollment form for thefirstsemester of school year
1988-89, which states that: TheMabini College reserves the right todeny
admission of students whose scholarship and attendanceare unsatisfactory
and to require withdrawal of studentswhoseconduct discredits the
institution and/or whose activitiesunduly disrupts or interfere with the
efficient operation of thecollege.Students, therefore, are required to
behavein accord with the Mabini College code of conduct anddiscipline.
Issue:
Whether or Not the students right to freedom of speech and assembly
infringed.
Held:
Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech andassembly
guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly availabletostudents is well-

settled in our jurisdiction. However thereare limitations. The permissible

limitation on Student Exerciseof Constitutional Rights within the school
presupposes thatconduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for
anyreason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behaviorshould
not materially disrupt classwork or must not involvesubstantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others.
SUBIDO (editor manila post) VS. OZAETA
(sec of justice)& Villanueva Register of DeedsFACTS:Petitioner was the
editor of the Manila Post who sought theinspection of real estates sold to
aliens and registered withthe Register of Deeds (RD) who was given the
authority thruDOJ Circular to examine all the records in the
respondentscustody relative to the said transactions.ISSUE:What is the
extent of the discretion of the Register of Deeds(RD) to regulate the
accessibility of records relating toregistered lands in its office.HELD:What
the law expects and requires from the RD is theexercise of an unbiased and
impartial judgment by which allpersons resorting to the office, under the
legal authority andconducting themselves with the motives, reasons and
objectsof the person seeking access to the records. Except when it isclear
that the purpose of the inspection is unlawful, it is notthe duty of the
registration officers to concern themselveswith the motives, purposes, and
objects of the person seekingto inspect the records. It is not their
prerogative to see thatthe information which the records contain is not
flauntedbefore the public gaze.Upon the foregoing considerations,
mandamus
is theappropriate remedy, and the petition will be grantedcommanding the
respondents to allow the petitioner or hisaccredited representatives to
examine, extract, abstract ormake memoranda of the records of sales of
real properties toaliens subject to such restriction and limitation as may
bedeemed necessary not incompatible with his decision, withoutcosts