NEG

South China Seas Advantage

1nc SCS
1. South China Sea will remain peaceful interdependence, desire to avoid war,
accidents and miscalc are unlikely to escalate
Kim 16 - Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Studies, Bradley
University [Kim, Jihyun. "Possible Future of the Contest in the South China Sea." The Chinese Journal
of International Politics (2016)] doa 5-11-16
In this research, Chinas

rise per se is not considered to pose a threat to regional security or directly challenge
Americas interests in Asia. Also, the peace-inducing aspects of Chinas relations with its neighbours and the
United States, in line with pragmatic realism, would continue to prevail over the conflict-producing ones in the
foreseeable future.6 As aptly pointed out by Richard Rosecrance, however, there is as yet no clear answer as to how the United States and the
rest of the world will take the rise in Chinas power and astutely react to it.7 Whats more, whether their shared interests would continue to be a
foundation for cooperation and self-restraint in both the medium and the longer term is not predetermined, hence this call for the states to choose
the right policy, one that has more cooperative than conflictual elements to it, thereby avoiding the doom-and-gloom scenario that too many of
todays analysts portray.8 Among other issues, Chinas territorial disputes with its neighbours are considered as constituting a potential source of
its dissatisfaction, of the breakdown of the status quo, and even of war.
Nonetheless, one cannot automatically assume that China will indeed adopt an unequivocally expansionist

stance in the future, given that taking such a measure would be unrewarding, as the potential political, diplomatic,
military, and economic costs of controversial territorial expansion far outweigh any benefits to be gained from it.9 In other
words, a cost-benefit analysis makes conflict over territory less than desirable, and gives China greater
incentive to maximize its interests other than through blatant territorial expansion. Besides, it is hard to
imagine a war scenario between China on the one side and the United States (and its Asian allies and friends) on the other, bearing in
mind the absence of any intense ideological competition between them, as well as their complex
interdependence, which tends to have the pacific effects induced by the condition of mutual assured destruction as regards
economic damage and security costs.10 As Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye assert, complex interdependence refers to a
situation in which a number of countries and their fortunes are inextricably connected through multiple channels and various issue
linkages. This is how increases in economic and other types of interdependence facilitate cooperation among states; thus military force
as a policy tool is less likely to be used by governments towards one another.11 Chinas intensifying relations with its Southeast
Asian neighbours as well as with the United States in the realm of economics and other issue areas appear to approximate this ideal type of
international system
Given the continuing tensions in the region, one must not completely rule out the possibility of conflict flare-ups due to accident

or miscalculation. However, the chances of Beijings deliberately initiating an armed conflict are still
limited, not necessarily because it is genuinely risk-averse or peace-seeking for peaces sake, but because the benefits to be accrued through
relatively stable coexistence with other states due to complex interdependence would outweigh the expected military and diplomatic costs of a
war that overt territorial expansion would risk. Despite Beijings unswerving sovereignty claims, encompassing

virtually the entire South China Sea, and buttressed by its reclaiming of land and building of infrastructure, Chinese leaders
have so far known, as evident in their peculiarly shrewd way of dealing with these maritime territorial disputes, how to avoid
crossing the red line while assiduously publicizing their core interest and views on how to prevent
tensions from escalating into a full-scale war.
Moreover, both China and the United States have shared interests as regards cooperating on major global problems that have regional
implications, including nuclear proliferation, terrorism and other transnationally organized crimes, along with natural disasters, infectious
diseases, energy security, and environmental issues. Additionally, despite Chinas anxiety over Americas military superiority and
continuing political influence in Asia, what

the United States considers as its strategic goal of upholding freedom of navigation
not incompatible with Chinas interest in keeping regional stability, given their mutual stake in preserving an
environment conducive to international commerce. Thus, it is less likely that China would rashly challenge US interests ,
including navigational freedom, or cite the South China Sea disputes as a case confirming Beijings expansionist ambitions. Accordingly,
one can be cautiously optimistic about a relatively stable future though not in the form of positive peace12even
in the midst of Chinas increasing assertiveness, its territorial disputes with neighbours, and its rivalry with the United
States for regional supremacy.
(FON) is

2. Miscalc is highly unlikely

Stashwick 9 25 15 - graduate studies in international relations at the University
of Chicago, Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve [Steven Stashwick, South
China Sea: Conflict Escalation and Miscalculation Myths, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-chinasea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths/] doa 4-20-16
The threat of miscalculation is again in vogue. What was once a preoccupation of accidental war
theorists has resurfaced in discussions about maritime disputes in Southeast Asia and Sino-U.S. relations.
During the Cold War, policymakers and scholars worried about nuclear annihilation sparked by
misinterpreted warnings, rogue officers, technical glitches in command and control systems, or a lower-level
confrontation spiraling out of control. Absent the Cold Wars looming nuclear threat, todays oft-repeated concerns focus on
miscalculation causing a local or tactical-level incident between individual ships or aircraft (harassment, collision, interdiction, and so on) to
lead to broader military confrontation. Some variation of this theme has been featured in public remarks by former U.S.
Defense Secretaries Gates, Panetta, Hagel, and current Defense Secretary Carter, as well as Commanders of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the U.S.
Pacific Command, and was a topic of policymaker discussion going back at least to the 1996 Taiwan Strait incident. These concerns are likewise
found in too many op-eds, reports, interviews, commentaries, and articles to count (see also here, here, here, and here, etc.) However, while

history shows that strategic miscalculations can lead states to war, or dangerously close to it, evidence does not
support the worry that miscalculation may cause a local or tactical-level incident to spiral out of
control.
To understand the risks associated with miscalculation, we must distinguish between miscalculation at the strategic level and miscalculation
stemming from a localized incident between naval or air forces. At the strategic level that is, a nations a priori willingness to escalate a conflict
and use military force to achieve its objectives no country starts a war expecting to lose. Yet, most warsend in the defeat of at least one
nation which had expected victory, implying all wars result from some degree of strategic miscalculation. That may be a plausible danger in
Southeast Asia, but a distinct one. Instead, much of the discourse about localized maritime incidents in the South

China Sea conflates strategic and local miscalculation risks, focusing on the latters potential to lead to a
wider conflict.
This concern over local miscalculation nonetheless reflects a longstanding view of the danger incidents at sea
poses to peace stretching back to the Cold War. Both U.S. and Soviet leaderships were concerned that an
incident between peppery young ship captains could lead people to shoot at each other with results that mightbe impossible to
control, in the words of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations in the 1970s. Back then, the U.S. and Soviets were openly
adversarial and serious incidents between their ships and aircraft were almost commonplace. Yet despite explicit mutual, strategic,
and existential antagonism between the U.S. and U.S.SR, none of the hundreds of maritime incidents that occurred
over the four decades of the Cold War escalated into anything beyond a short diplomatic crisis. It is possible that they avoided a nuclear
spiral in these incidents through diligent diplomacy and luck. But more likely, it suggests that this type of maritime incident is
insufficient on its own to lead to the worst-case scenarios envisioned.

3. No impact to economic decline prefer new data

Drezner 14 - professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy at Tufts University [Daniel W. DREZNER, The System Worked: Global Economic
Governance during the Great Recession, World Politics, Vol. 66, No. 1 (January 2014), p. 123-164]
The final significant outcome addresses a

dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence.
During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states
to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would
lead to an increase in conflictwhether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a
ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions
of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder.

The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded
that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007 ."43 Interstate
violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most
sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent

conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past
five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed .
Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic
exclusion that might have been expected."43

4. Economic interdependence checks conflict

Ikenberry 14 - Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at
Princeton University and George Eastman Visiting Professor at Balliol College [G.
John Ikenberry, , From Hegemony to the Balance of Power: The Rise of China and American Grand
Strategy in East Asia, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies Vol. 23, No. 2, 2014, 4163]
Finally, the United States and

China are not simply poised on a geopolitical playing field .

The two countries also occupy key positions in the world economy, the world environment, and the world
society. In all these areas, China and the United States are increasingly interdependent. They
are not simply pitted in zero-sum geopolitical competition . They are also tied
together in deep and complex interdependent ways. In various areas related to the world economy, global
warming, transnational crime, energy security, and so forth, they cannot realize their objectives without
the help of the other. These are problems of economic and security
interdependence. These circumstances of interdependence create
incentives for the two countries to bargain and moderate disputes . They cannot be
secure and stable alone; they can only be secure and stable together. To the extent that this is true, the two countries will
find powerful reasons not to go all the way down the path to balance of
power rivalry and security competition. They will grudgingly look for ways to moderate and manage their
contest for supremacy.

Ext No War
Conflict unlikely tensions wont escalate
Thayer 13 - Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales, Australian
Defence Force Academy, Canberra [Carlyle A. Thayer, Why China and the US wont go to war
over the South China Sea, 13 May 2013, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/13/why-china-and-theus-wont-go-to-war-over-the-south-china-sea/]
Even before Washington announced its official policy of rebalancing its force posture to the Asia Pacific, the United States had undertaken steps
to strengthen its military posture by deploying more nuclear attack submarines to the region and negotiating arrangements with Australia to rotate
Marines through Darwin.Since then, the United States has deployed Combat Littoral Ships to Singapore and is negotiating new arrangements for
greater military access to the Philippines.

But these developments do not presage armed conflict between China and the United States. The Peoples
Liberation Army Navy has been circumspect in its involvement in South China Sea territorial disputes,
and the United States has been careful to avoid being entrapped by regional allies in their territorial
disputes with China. Armed conflict between China and the United States in the South China Sea appears unlikely.
Another, more probable, scenario is that both countries will find a modus vivendi enabling them to
collaborate to maintain security in the South China Sea. The Obama administration has repeatedly emphasised that
its policy of rebalancing to Asia is not directed at containing China. For example, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III,
Commander of the US Pacific Command, recently stated, there has also been criticism that the Rebalance is a strategy of containment. This is
not the case it is a strategy of collaboration and cooperation.
However, a review of past USChina military-to-military interaction indicates that an agreement to jointly manage security in the South China
Sea is unlikely because of continuing strategic mistrust between the two countries. This is also because the currents of regionalism are growing
stronger.
As such, a third scenario is more likely than the previous two: that China and the United States will maintain

a relationship of cooperation and friction. In this scenario, both countries work separately to secure their
interests through multilateral institutions such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus and the
Enlarged ASEAN Maritime Forum. But they also continue to engage each other on points of mutual interest . The
Pentagon has consistently sought to keep channels of communication open with China through three established bilateral mechanisms: Defense
Consultative Talks, the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), and the Defense Policy Coordination Talks.
On the one hand, these multilateral mechanisms reveal very little about USChina military relations. Military-to-military contacts

between the two countries have gone through repeated cycles of cooperation and suspension , meaning that it
has not been possible to isolate purely military-to-military contacts from their political and strategic settings.
On the other hand, the channels have accomplished the following: continuing exchange visits by high-level defence officials; regular Defense
Consultation Talks; continuing working-level discussions under the MMCA; agreement on the 7-point consensus; and no serious naval incidents
since the 2009 USNS Impeccable affair. They have also helped to ensure continuing exchange visits by senior military officers; the initiation of a
Strategic Security Dialogue as part of the ministerial-level Strategic & Economic Dialogue process; agreement to hold meetings between coast
guards; and agreement on a new working group to draft principles to establish a framework for military-to-military cooperation.
So the bottom line is that, despite ongoing frictions in their relationship , the United States and China will

continue engaging with each other. Both sides understand that military-to-military contacts are a critical
component of bilateral engagement. Without such interaction there is a risk that mistrust between the two militaries could spill over
and have a major negative impact on bilateral relations in general. But strategic mistrust will probably persist in the absence
of greater transparency in military-to-military relations . In sum, Sino-American relations in the South
China Sea are more likely to be characterised by cooperation and friction than a modus vivendi of collaboration or, a
worst-case scenario, armed conflict.

No SCS war balance of power insures it.

Li & Yanzhuo 6 19 15 Director of the Department of International Strategy @ the Institute of
World Economics and Politics & PhD in Chinese Foreign Policy [Dr. Xue Li and Dr. Xu Yanzhuo, The
US and China Won't See Military Conflict Over the South China Sea, June 19 th, 2015,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-us-and-china-wont-see-military-conflict-over-the-south-china-sea/]

In a recent piece on the South China Sea disputes, I argued that the ASEAN claimants are largely staying behind the scenes while external
powers take center stage. Based on recent developments on the South China Sea issue, it seems the U.S. will not only be a director but an actor.
We saw this clearly on May 20, when the U.S. military sent surveillance aircraft over three islands controlled by Beijing.
However, this does not necessary mean the South China Sea will spark a U.S.-China military conflict.

As a global hegemon, the United States main interest lies in maintaining the current international order as
well as peace and stability. Regarding the South China Sea, U.S. interests include ensuring peace and
stability, freedom of commercial navigation, and military activities in exclusive economic zones. Maintaining the current balance
of power is considered to be a key condition for securing these interestsand a rising China determined to
strengthen its hold on South China Sea territory is viewed as a threat to the current balance of power. In response, the U.S.
launched its rebalance to Asia strategy. In practice, the U.S. has on the one hand strengthened its military presence in AsiaPacific, while on the other hand supporting ASEAN countries, particularly ASEAN claimants to South China Sea territories.
This position has included high-profile rhetoric by U.S. officials . In 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton
spoke at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi about the South China Sea, remarks that aligned the U.S. with Southeast Asias approach to the
disputes. At the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta explained how the United States will rebalance its force
posture as part of playing a deeper and more enduring partnership role in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel called out Chinas destabilizing, unilateral activities asserting its claims in the South China Sea. His remarks also came at the Shangri-La
dialogue, while Chinas HY-981 oil rig was deployed in the waters around the Paracel Islands. In 2015, U.S. officials have openly pressured
China to scale back its construction work in the Spratly islands and have sent aircraft to patrol over islands in the Spratly that are controlled by
China. These measures have brought global attention to the South China Sea.
However, if we look at the practical significance of the remarks, there are several limiting factors . The

interests at stake in the South China Sea are not core national interests for the United States . Meanwhile, the
U.S.-Philippine alliance is not as important as the U.S.-Japan alliance, and U.S. ties with other ASEAN
countries are even weaker. Given U.S.-China mutual economic dependence and Chinas comprehensive
national strength, the United States is unlikely to go so far as having a military confrontation with China
over the South China Sea. Barack Obama, the peace president who withdrew the U.S. military from Iraq and Afghanistan, is even
less likely to fight with China for the South China Sea.
As for the U.S. interests in the region, Washington is surely aware that China has not affected the freedom of
commercial navigation in these waters so far. And as I noted in my earlier piece, Beijing is developing its stance and could eventually
recognize the legality of military activities in another countrys EEZ (see, for example, the China-Russia joint military exercise in the
Mediterranean).
Yet when it comes to Chinas large-scale land reclamation in the Spratly Islands (and on Woody Island in the
Paracel Islands), Washington worries that Beijing will conduct a series of activities to strengthen its claims on the South China Sea, such as
establishing an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) or advocating that others respect a 200-nautical mile (370 km) EEZ from its islands.
Meanwhile, the 2014 oil rig incident taught Washington that ASEAN claimants and even ASEAN as a whole could hardly play any effective role
in dealing with Chinas land reclamation. Hence, the U.S. has no better choice than to become directly involved in this

issue.
At the beginning, the United States tried to stop China through private diplomatic mediation, yet it soon realized that this approach was not
effective in persuading China. So Washington started to tackle the issue in a more aggressive way, such as

encouraging India, Japan, ASEAN, the G7, and the European Union to pressure Beijing internationally. Domestically, U.S.
officials from different departments and different levels have opposed Chinas changing the status quo in this area.
Since 2015, Washington has increased its pressure on China. It sent the USS Fort Worth, a littoral combat ship, to sail in waters near the Spratly
area controlled by Vietnam in early May. U.S. official are also considering sending naval and air patrols within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly
Islands controlled by China.

Washington has recognized that it could hardly stop Chinas construction in Spratly Islands. Therefore, it
has opted to portray Beijing as a challenger to the status quo , at the same time moving to prevent China from establishing a
South China Sea ADIZ and an EEZ of 200 nautical miles around its artificial islands. This was the logic behind the U.S. sending a P-8A
surveillance plane with reporters on board to approach three artificial island built by China. China issued eight warnings to the plane; the U.S.
responded by saying the plane was flying through international airspace.
Afterwards, U.S. Defense Department spokesman, Army Col. Steve Warren, said there could be a potential freedom of navigation exercise
within 12 nautical miles of the artificial islands. If this approach were adopted, it would back China into a corner; hence its a unlikely the Obama
administration will make that move.

As the U.S. involvement in the South China Sea becomes more aggressive and high-profile, the dynamic
relationship between China and the United States comes to affect other layers of the dispute (for example,
relations between China and ASEAN claimants or China and ASEAN in general). To some extent, the South China Sea dispute
has developed into a balance of power tug-of-war between the U.S. and China, yet both sides will not take
the risk of military confrontation. As Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it in a recent meeting with U.S.
Secretary of State John Kerry, as for the differences, our attitude is it is okay to have differences as long
as we could avoid misunderstanding, and even more importantly, avoid miscalculation.

Ext Sea Miscalc Unlikely

Miscalc unlikely treaties mean incentive is to de-escalate
Stashwick 9 25 15 - graduate studies in international relations at the University
of Chicago, Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve [Steven Stashwick, South
China Sea: Conflict Escalation and Miscalculation Myths, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-chinasea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths/] doa 4-20-16
Nonetheless, concerns

over maritime incidents, miscalculation, and spiraling conflict contain enough intuitive
logic to have endured. A shared Cold War concern over miscalculations led to accords that are still in
effect, such as the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas (INCSEA) and Prevention of Dangerous Military
Activities (DMA) agreement, and may be credited with helping keep incidents between the U.S. and U.S.SR under control. However, the
fact that agreements were reached at all is likely more significant than their content. Such agreements
indicated a shared belief between U.S. and Soviet military leaderships that despite their feverish preparations for war
against one another, neither wanted war to come as the result of a tactical-level incident between individual
ships and aircraft. This suggests neither would let an incident, however serious, become an independent casus
belli.
The substance of these accords (and those reached in the South China Sea) further strengthens this thesis.
While INCSEA and DMA contained rules of behavior, these were, again in Zumwalts words, little more than a reaffirmation of the [maritime]
Rules of the Road (international rules that direct how ships stay safe around each other at sea). What was groundbreaking was that in concluding
the accords, the U.S. and U.S.SR implicitly recognized their intentions to violate those rules and practices when advantageous (consider the
Yorktown and Caron). The accords created new parallel rules by which each could do so safely, as well as new communications protocols to
inform one another of their intentions. Together, this affirms that both sides were playing a (serious) game to establish

positions and assert rights more than they were interested in war . Of course, incidents intended to reinforce
maritime claims and hostile actions can look the same right up until ordnance is exchanged , but now both
sides could be more confident that if shooting did start, it was an intentional act of war .

Ext - No Asia Miscalc

No miscalc escalation in Asia precedent for restraint
Stashwick 9 25 15 - graduate studies in international relations at the University
of Chicago, Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve [Steven Stashwick, South
China Sea: Conflict Escalation and Miscalculation Myths, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-chinasea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths/] doa 4-20-16
In Asia, there is recent and dramatic precedent for restraint, even after an unambiguously hostile local
event, which belies theoretical arguments about the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation .
When the South Korean warship Cheonan was sunk in 2010, South Korea determined that North Korea was
responsible. Far from a mere incident of the sort worried over in the South China Sea, this was a belligerent act against South Koreas
armed forces. And yet, there was no miscalculation-fueled conflict spiral, and instead a strategically
calibrated response.
It remains unknown whether the sinking of the Cheonan was ordered by the North Koreans (they continue to deny any responsibility), the act of a
renegade, or, perhaps least plausibly, an accident. What is clear is that despite a sunken ship and 46 sailors killed, the incident did not spiral out of
control. This suggests that South Koreas political calculus did not view militarily punishing North Korea worth the

risk of a renewed and potentially nuclear war , which is to say that an extraordinary but tactical-level event did not trump
strategic preferences.

Even so, some take the miscalculation-escalation dynamic so far as to suggest that incidents between
fishing vessels and coast guards in the South China Sea might lead to war . In view of the Cold War record
and the recent Cheonan example, such propositions are drastically overstated. It is conceivable that a
state already resolved to escalate a dispute militarily might view a local maritime incident as a convenient casus
belli. But in that emphatically calculated case, no institutional impediments to such incidents would
prevent the hostility.
On the contrary, the prevalence of coast guards and fishing vessels is actually a sign of restraint . For a front so
often considered a flashpoint, it is notable how few incidents in the South China Sea are between naval assets. This is not accident or luck, but
instead suggests that regional players deliberately use lightly armed coast guard and other para-military white hull vessels to enforce their
claims. Because these units do not have the ability to escalate force the way warships do, it in fact signals their desire to avoid escalation. And
while gray hull naval vessels may be just over the horizon providing an implicit threat of force, they can also provide a further

constraint on potential incidents; their very presence compels parties to consider how far to escalate
without inviting more serious responses.

Ext Asian Miscalc Gets Resolved

Asian miscalc incidents get resolved
Stashwick 9 25 15 - graduate studies in international relations at the University
of Chicago, Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve [Steven Stashwick, South
China Sea: Conflict Escalation and Miscalculation Myths, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-chinasea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths/] doa 4-20-16
As in the Cold War, parties

in the South China Sea have sought diplomatic mitigation of maritime incidents,
principally through the perennially-stalled Code of Conduct , the year-old Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea
(CUES), and the bilateral Military Maritime Consultative Agreement between the U.S. and China . But
underpinning concerns about miscalculation and escalation , and mitigation efforts like CUES, is the idea
that by avoiding incidents the region will avoid war. This belief is dangerous insofar as it conflates the symptoms
of the disputes (incidents at sea) with the terms of the dispute itself (maritime rights and sovereignty).
Incidents and the activities that precipitate them help establish new and accepted regional norms and
facts on the ground (bloodlessly, if inelegantly). In that sense, avoiding incidents sets back the de facto resolution of the disputes. Since
the balance of these evolving norms and facts on the ground appears to favor Chinas efforts (e.g., using its coast guard to eject fishing vessels
from disputed waters and island reclamation projects), it is neither surprising that Chinas regional rivals propose institutional remedies like
CUES and the Code of Conduct, nor that China only agrees to them after negotiating away any legally binding provisions.

The record suggests that miscalculation concerns over incidents in the maritime realm are exaggerated
and can artificially increase tensions, raise threat perceptions, and justify arms build-ups . Whether an
incident is deliberate, or a true organic accident, if it occurs within a dispute context where neither side
desires armed conflict, it will not escalate at the strategic level . However, because of the very seriousness of that perceived
escalation threat, the miscalculation narrative can also motivate positive diplomatic efforts like INCSEA, DMA, and
now CUES (not to overstate their realistic contribution to resolving disputes).
Further, for all its conceptual and historical problems, and not least its potential to feed narratives of aggression, another possible advantage of
focusing on miscalculation in the South China Sea is that it allows countries to maintain ambiguity about the real terms of dispute. Avoiding
war is a distinct objective from solving disputes; war is a dispute resolution mechanism after all. But if peace is the priority, ambiguity may be
preferable if all that clarity reveals is just how intractable those disputes may be. Clarity can rob governments of the flexibility to equivocate to
their domestic audiences (and competitors) and force a choice between escalating a conflict and backing down from their claims. Then open
conflict might become more realistic. Conversely, if all parties are more or less content to live with ambiguity in the regions maritime claims,
then a somewhat mutually dissatisfying peace prevails, but peace nonetheless. Everyone wants to win, but as long as everyone

also wants to avoid losing even more, occasional incidents do not have to fuel strategic tension.

Ext No Economy Impact

There is no causal relationship between the economy and conflictthe best study
proves.
Brandt and Ulfelder 11*Patrick T. Brandt, Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University, is
an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the School of Social Science at the University of Texas at
Dallas. **Jay Ulfelder, Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University, is an American political
scientist whose research interests include democratization, civil unrest, and violent conflict. [April, 2011,
Economic Growth and Political Instability, Social Science Research Network]
These statements

anticipating political fallout from the global economic crisis of 20082010 reflect a widely
held view that economic growth has rapid and profound effects on countries political stability. When
economies grow at a healthy clip, citizens are presumed to be too busy and too content to engage in protest or rebellion, and governments are
thought to be flush with revenues they can use to enhance their own stability by producing public goods or rewarding cronies, depending on the
type of regime they inhabit. When growth slows, however, citizens and cronies alike are presumed to grow frustrated with their
governments, and the leaders at the receiving end of that frustration are thought to lack the financial resources to respond effectively. The

expected result is an increase in the risks of social unrest, civil war, coup attempts, and regime
breakdown.
Although it is pervasive, the assumption that countries economic growth rates strongly affect their
political stability has not been subjected to a great deal of careful empirical analysis, and evidence from
social science research to date does not unambiguously support it. Theoretical models of civil wars, coups detat,
and transitions to and from democracy often specify slow economic growth as an important cause or catalyst of those events, but
empirical studies on the effects of economic growth on these phenomena have produced mixed results.
Meanwhile, the effects of economic growth on the occurrence or incidence of social unrest seem to have
hardly been studied in recent years, as empirical analysis of contentious collective action has concentrated on
political opportunity structures and dynamics of protest and repression.

This paper helps fill that gap by rigorously re-examining the effects of short-term variations in economic
growth on the occurrence of several forms of political instability in countries worldwide over the past few
decades. In this paper, we do not seek to develop and test new theories of political instability. Instead, we aim to subject a hypothesis common
to many prior theories of political instability to more careful empirical scrutiny. The goal is to provide a detailed empirical characterization of the
relationship between economic growth and political instability in a broad sense. In effect, we describe the conventional wisdom as seen in the
data. We do so with statistical models that use smoothing splines and multiple lags to allow for nonlinear and dynamic effects from economic
growth on political stability. We also do so with an instrumented measure of growth that explicitly accounts for endogeneity in the relationship
between political instability and economic growth. To our knowledge, ours is the first statistical study of this relationship to
simultaneously address the possibility of nonlinearity and problems of endogeneity. As such, we believe this

paper offers what is

probably the most rigorous general evaluation of this argument to date.

As the results show, some of our findings are surprising. Consistent with conventional assumptions, we find that social unrest and civil violence
are more likely to occur and democratic regimes are more susceptible to coup attempts around periods of slow economic growth. At the same
time, our analysis shows no significant relationship between variation in growth and the risk of civil-war onset, and results from our analysis of
regime changes contradict the widely accepted claim that economic crises cause transitions from autocracy to democracy. While we would hardly
pretend to have the last word on any of these relationships, our findings do suggest that the relationship between economic

growth and political stability is neither as uniform nor as strong as the conventional wisdom(s)
presume(s). We think these findings also help explain why the global recession of 20082010 has failed thus
far to produce the wave of coups and regime failures that some observers had anticipated, in spite of the
expected and apparent uptick in social unrest associated with the crisis .

Military-Military Advantage

1nc Mil-Mil
1. Economics make relations inevitable
Goh 14 - Professor of Strategic Policy Studies at the Australian National University
[Shedden. The Modes of Chinas Influence Cases from Southeast Asia Asian Survey, Vol. 54, Number
5, pp. 825848. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. 2014 by the Regents of the University
of California. http://www.ou.edu/uschina/gries/articles/texts/Goh.2014.AS.Influence.pdf]
Beijing has used policy action to substantiate its claims of being a benign status
quo state, including efforts to negotiate outstanding border disputes; increasingly adept diplomacy;
highly publicized restraint during the Asian financial crisis ; disaster relief; and promises of large investment
and aid packages to East Asian neighbors during the global financial crisis. Furthermore, Beijing has tried to persuade
the world that it will not disrupt the existing international order , by signing onto
key international norms of arms control and disarmament .46 Similarly, Chinese officials worked to gain entry
into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, partly to consolidate the notion of China as a huge economic
opportunity.47 Beijing has successfully used ASEAN forums as a demonstration precinct for its
socialization, and Southeast Asias reciprocal responses to Chinese participation and proposals such as ACFTA, a defense ministers
dialogue, and a regional bond market have all boosted Chinas claims of peaceful development.48 Leading Chinese scholars have drawn on
Chinas participation in ASEAN institutions to develop constructivist theories of socialization with Chinese characteristics, emphasizing power
as relationships and the importance of process for the sake of process.49
Be that as it may, normative persuasion and material inducement are often co-instruments of influence, and Chinas reassurance drive

has included selective easing of barriers to trade and investment, using the promise of access to the
China market to induce policy change. For instance, Beijing used the prospect of bilateral free
trade negotiations to gain formal recognition from individual countries as a market economy, gradually
challenging its WTO status as an economy in transition. China has concluded trade agreements with
ASEAN, Pakistan, and New Zealand, and is in negotiation with Australia, India, and South Korea . Its Early
Harvest Programs with some ASEAN countriesthe partial lifting of trade barriers on selected goodshave been portrayed as favorable
treatment whereby China gave more and took less.50 Such policies that combine inducement and

persuasion amount to a strategy of pacification, harmony and

enrichment toward neighboring countries.51 Bilateral economic inducement is also a placatory tool that
Beijing uses selectively vis-a`-vis Southeast Asian states at important junctures, most recently toward Indonesia and Malaysia in 2013, in the
midst of the government shutdown in Washington and renewed tensions with the Philippines over the South China Sea territorial disputes.52

2. Benefits are small need larger structural changes

Kamphausen & Drun 16 a. Senior Vice President for Research and Director of the,
D.C., office at the National Bureau of Asian Research, b. Bridge Award Fellow at the
National Bureau of Asian Research [Roy D. Kamphausen & Jessica Drun, Sino-U.S. Military-toMilitary Relations, The national bureau of asian research, nbr special report #57 | april 2016, Edited by
Travis Tanner and Wang Dong, http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_USChina_April2016.pdf] doa 5-11-16
In some respects, the

agreements on mil-mil CBMs reached during the last two presidential visits are a
template for the way ahead in finding the right set of mil-mil activities. These CBMs address major concerns on each side,
including Chinas concerns about the U.S. militarys close proximity to the Chinese coast and the United States concerns about the safe
operations of its aircraft and ships anywhere, but especially when they are close to those of the PLA. They also address both countries desire to
know more about the policy and operations of the other.

However, these are really just very basic first steps. Indeed, the CBM agreements indicate
that each country still judges success by the limited ways in which it gets what it wantsthe

epitome of a self-referential relationshipand not by whether some greater good is accomplished.

Ultimately, effective mil-mil relations may have only a limited effect on resolving the core political
and security concerns that the United States and China have with one anotherand this might be
the wrong metric by which to judge the relationship anyway. The structural challenge embedded
in the engagement of a rising and an established power simply cannot be solved through mil-mil
activities alone. The quality and improvements in the trading relationship, the development of even
more enhanced diplomatic collaboration on global foreign policy challenges, and the deepening of
people-to-people ties also play important roles in managing this process of power transition.

3. They have it backwards good relations cause military ties, not the other way
Kamphausen & Drun 16 a. Senior Vice President for Research and Director of the,
D.C., office at the National Bureau of Asian Research, b. Bridge Award Fellow at the
National Bureau of Asian Research [Roy D. Kamphausen & Jessica Drun, Sino-U.S. Military-toMilitary Relations, The national bureau of asian research, nbr special report #57 | april 2016, Edited by
Travis Tanner and Wang Dong, http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_USChina_April2016.pdf] doa 5-11-16
The dimension of military-to-military (mil-mil) relations is one of the long-standing components of the SinoU.S. bilateral relationship. In recent years, the relationship between Washington and Beijing has been marked by not only
growing cooperation but also increasing competition. Mitigating the effects of spillover from the latter
into the former is a key factor in advancing the overall U.S.-China relationship . Consequently, the National Bureau
of Asian Research (NBR), in partnership with the Institute for China-U.S. People-to-People Exchange at Peking University, has undertaken a
two-year project that seeks to identify challenges within key strategic domains and put forth pragmatic policy recommendations on how to best
manage tensions and enhance bilateral relations. The mil-mil domain is growing ever more consequential in light of

recent developments in the Asia-Pacific. Increasing militarization in the region and Chinas assertion of its
claims in the South China Sea through island-building and patrols by military and paramilitary vessels heighten the need for
mil-mil contacts as a means of defusing tensions, ensuring stability, and communicating each sides
respective objectives and interests to avoid miscalculations . As Chinas military expands its breadth and reach in
the region, and increasingly beyond, addressing the disconnects between the two militaries will become all the more
critical in the years to come.
This essay contributes to the debate over the optimal formulation for a bilateral U.S.-China mil-mil relationship. The topic has been addressed
from a variety of perspectives to date. An examination of the existing literature on mil-mil relations finds that there is

agreement on the utility of this dimension of the bilateral relationship for risk reduction and conflict management, but
that barriers exist and certain limitations are necessary in order to safeguard U.S. capabilities and interests.
For instance, Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz stressreflecting a general consensus among expertsthat conditions for
mil-mil exchanges lie largely in the state of the overall bilateral relationship, and thus any expected
progress on the mil-mil front must be preceded by improvements in the broader U.S.-China relationship .
James Nolan finds that personnel exchanges neither have much operational value nor contribute to trust-building, but nonetheless have benefits
for diplomacy and deterrence. Kevin Pollpeter argues for a security management approach to mil-mil relations over a security cooperation one,
which would mitigate risks associated with imbalances in transparency and reciprocity in the relationship.1
Scholars also note that there are inherent structural and cultural constraints particularly divergent worldviews and
institutional barriersthat

must be recognized in order to manage expectations of the relationship and focus on

areas with the most room for cooperation. Scott Harold suggests a dual-directional approach to engagement, both top-down and
bottom-up, in order to address challenges and raise the cost for China of severing mil-mil tiesas Beijing is wont to do when expressing its
discontent with elements of the bilateral relationship. Finally, Christopher Yung calls for increased cooperation on nontraditional security threats
as a way of expanding the relationship even further.2

Ext Relations Inevitable

China will continue to cooperate
Monteiro 14 - Dept. of Political Science, Yale University [Nuno Moneiro, Theory of
Unipolar Politics, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, pp. 130-132, Cambridge University
Press. Kindle Edition]
Beyond mere numbers, China

pursues a national security policy that is defensive in

nature and regional in scope. 61 China's geostrategic goals focus on sustaining a security
environment conducive to China's national development . 63 This aim requires avoiding a
crisis over Taiwan as well as furthering Chinese maritime territorial and economic interests in the
South and East China seas. China has implemented a strategy of offshore active defense, assuming a force posture aimed at
regional anti-access area-denial (A2/ AD) goals, capable of denying U.S. access to its region for a limited time in
case of a conflict. Yet, U.S.-China relations, although varying in tone, have consistently
been positive, reflecting the high potential costs and risks of a competitive relationship between
them. During the first two-and-a-half decades of U.S. power preponderance, Beijing's leadership has adopted an overall
cooperative posture toward U.S. global leadership. 64

Ext Need Larger Changes

Mil-mil is only a part of the larger dynamic
Kamphausen & Drun 16 a. Senior Vice President for Research and Director of the,
D.C., office at the National Bureau of Asian Research, b. Bridge Award Fellow at the
National Bureau of Asian Research [Roy D. Kamphausen & Jessica Drun, Sino-U.S. Military-toMilitary Relations, The national bureau of asian research, nbr special report #57 | april 2016, Edited by
Travis Tanner and Wang Dong, http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_USChina_April2016.pdf] doa 5-11-16
Conclusion
Elements of cooperation and competition have been inherent in the Sino-U.S. relationship since its inception in the
early 1980s. Moreover, the history of the relationship reveals that political dimensions have all along interacted with
military operational dimensions in ways that complicate the effective implementation of a mil-mil
program. In part, this reflects the natural dynamic of two great powers that do not always have common interests but are not committed
adversaries. And to be sure, suggesting that all would be well if only the political constraints were to be
removed is wishful thinking; rather, the complexities of the Sino-U.S. mil-mil relationship are what make it
challenging, but what also introduce opportunities.

Solvency

1nc Solvency
1. Military to Military engagement happening now and will continue
Kamphausen & Drun 16 a. Senior Vice President for Research and Director of the,
D.C., office at the National Bureau of Asian Research, b. Bridge Award Fellow at the
National Bureau of Asian Research [Roy D. Kamphausen & Jessica Drun, Sino-U.S. Military-toMilitary Relations, The national bureau of asian research, nbr special report #57 | april 2016, Edited by
Travis Tanner and Wang Dong, http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_USChina_April2016.pdf] doa 5-11-16
Recent Developments
Since mil-mil relations were restarted several months after their suspension in January 2010,15 the type and sophistication
of ties have markedly increased. New types of cooperation include Chinese participation in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2014 naval
exercise, with an invitation to attend RIMPAC 2016; a first-ever naval exercise involving cross-deck helicopter landings (2013); and army-army
collective training for disaster management in Hawaii (2014), with follow-on reciprocal humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercises in
Haikou and Seattle in 2015. Significantly, the mechanism for notification of major military activities was

strengthened in 2015, and an air annex for the rules of behavior for the safety of maritime and air
encounters was completed.16 Moreover, the institution of bilateral army staff talks in June 2015 offers
promise of a new mechanism for high-level and strategic dialogue , perhaps taking on more importance
with the establishment of a new ground force service in the PLA in January 2016 .17 The number of highlevel exchanges in both directions are also at or near an all-time high , perhaps epitomized by the fact that before his
retirement in September 2015, U.S. chief of naval operations Jonathan Greenert had met with his counterpart, PLA admiral Wu Shengli, five
times in the previous three years.18 And perhaps portending well for future relations, the two sides have found ways

to continue their bilateral relationship, despite existing tensions . For instance, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command
(PACOM), Admiral Harry Harris, visited Beijing in November 2015, just days after the USS Lassen conducted a freedom of navigation operation
in the South China Sea and held high-level meetings with PLA leadership, including the chief of General Staff, General Fang Fenghui, and the
Central Military Commission vice chairman, General Fan Changlong.19 In previous years, such a visit would have been postponed at such a
point of tension, which suggests a level of maturity or a new learned ability to manage the tensions in bilateral mil-mil relations.

However, the specter of unpredicted interruptions in the bilateral mil-mil relationship still looms,
and a concern about this go-stop-go history reflects a number of factors . First, mil-mil engagement
has always been closely linked to the overall quality of the bilateral relationship , which has included varying
amounts of cooperation and confrontation. Mil-mil relations have not been immune from these broader trends , and
indeed in some cases military interactions have themselves been the source of broader bilateral tension. Second, as noted earlier, the
institutions in each country that are asked to carry out meaningful mil-mil activities are also the institutions that
must, at some level, prepare to conduct military operations against the other if so ordered by national command authorities. This
too is not an entirely new phenomenon; certainly in the latter days of the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet forces faced a similar conundrum. But it is
worth remembering that both militaries know this problem, and this awareness inevitably affects their interactions. Finally, despite the
uncertainties in the political dimensions of the relationship, both sides have shown the ability to adjust . For instance, they
eventually adapted to a new environment after Tiananmen in 1989. In addition, the tensions arising from the cross-strait crisis in 199596, the
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the EP-3 crisis of 2001 were mitigated over time, and mil-mil relations moved forward
after arms sales announcements without fundamental adjustments to policy in either capital. This suggests a level of durability in

the relationship and the promise that current obstacles have at least some possibility of being managed.
That a similar go-stop-go pattern can be observed in the U.S. mil-mil relationship with other countries as well (for example, the Philippines and
Indonesia), which halt and then later return to productive and consistent relations, further supports the notion that this pattern in the U.S.-China
mil-mil relationship can transition to a more consistent approach.

2. The aff appeases Chinaencourages aggressive behavior

Newsham, 14 Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies (Grant, 9/8. China,
America and the "Appeasement" Question. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-america-theappeasement-question-11226?page=1)
US policy towards China over the last 30 years, and particularly in recent times, seems familiar. The

United States does its best to

understand the PRCs concerns and its resentments going back to the Opium Wars and the century of humiliation, to

accommodate these resentments, and to ensure China does not feel threatened. Defense and State
Department officials enthusiastically seek greater transparency and openness especially in the military
realm as such openness is perceived as inherently good.
In return, the PRC is expected to change, to show more respect for human rights and international law and
to become a responsible stakeholder in the international community.
We now have several decades of empirical evidence to assess this
concessionary approach. It has not resulted in improved, less aggressive PRC behavior in the
South China Sea or the East China Sea, or even in outer space. Indeed, it seems to have encouraged
Chinese assertiveness as manifest in threatening language and behavior towards its neighbors .
Nor has the PRC regime shown more respect for human rights, rule of law, consensual government or
freedom of expression for its citizens. Serial intellectual property theft continues unabated, as does support for unsavory dictators.
Nonetheless, we invite the PRC to military exercises and repeat the
engagement mantra expecting that one day things will magically improve. Some argue that
letting the PRC see US military power will dissuade it from challenging us. Perhaps, but we are just as
likely to be seen as nave or weak. From the Chinese perspective, there is no reason to change since they have done very well without
transforming and the PRC has never been stronger. Indeed, the PRC frequently claims that human rights, democracy, and the like are outmoded
Western values having nothing to do with China.
This is also demoralizing our allies, who at some point may wonder if they should cut their own deals with the PRC.
Some revisionist historians argue that Neville Chamberlains 1930s era appeasement was in fact a wise stratagem to buy time to rearm. This
overlooks that even as late as 1939 when Hitler seized all of Czechoslovakia, the Western democracies still had the military advantage. One can
appease oneself into a corner. And the beneficiary of the appeasement usually strengthens to the point it is too hard to restrain without great
sacrifice.
One worries that the Chinese seizure of Philippine territory at Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and the US Governments unwillingness to even
verbally challenge the PRC - might turn out to be this generations Rhineland. Had the West resisted Hitler in 1936 when he made this first
major demand, there would have been no World War II, no Holocaust, and no Cold War.
Our choice about how to deal with the PRC is not simply between either appeasement or treating China as an enemy. Our policy must
accommodate options ranging from engagement to forceful confrontation.
Who would not be delighted with a China that stopped threatening its neighbors and followed the civilized worlds rules? While ensuring we and
our allies have a resolute defense both in terms of military capability and the willingness to employ it it is important to maintain ties and
dialogue with the PRC and to provide encouragement and support when it shows clear signs of transforming to a freer, less repressive society.
We should constantly stress that China is welcome as a key player in the international order but only under certain conditions. The US and other
democratic nations have not done enough to require China to adhere to established standards of behavior in exchange for the benefits of joining
the global system that has allowed the PRC to prosper.
Human nature and history are a useful guide to where appeasement (by whatever name) leads. And they also show that

a strong defense and resolutely standing up for ones principles is more likely to preserve peace .

Ext Mil-Mil ties now

Mil-Mil ties now
Kamphausen & Drun 16 a. Senior Vice President for Research and Director of the,
D.C., office at the National Bureau of Asian Research, b. Bridge Award Fellow at the
National Bureau of Asian Research [Roy D. Kamphausen & Jessica Drun, Sino-U.S. Military-toMilitary Relations, The national bureau of asian research, nbr special report #57 | april 2016, Edited by
Travis Tanner and Wang Dong, http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_USChina_April2016.pdf] doa 5-11-16
Both Washington and Beijing have acknowledged the importance of the U.S.-China relationship for maintaining
stability in the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, some have argued that it is the most important bilateral relationship for the
21st century.20 To that end, stability in the mil-mil dimension is critical for providing crisis stability between
the two militariesclearly both sides want to avoid military tensions or armed conflict because they recognize
that conflict would be disastrous for both countries and catastrophic for the region. In order to achieve this end, the United
States and China need to mitigate the likelihood of any strategic miscalculations and establish means of deescalation if a conflict were to arise. Simply put, an effective mil-mil program could contribute to conflict
avoidance.
As such, Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping have jointly advocated for a more mature and robust mil-mil
relationship between the United States and China. Indeed, at the state visit of President Obama to China in November 2014, the two sides
agreed to an agenda of increasing mil-mil confidence-building mechanisms (CBM), including notification of major
military activities (with annexes on notification of policy and strategy developments and observation of military exercises) and rules of
behavior for the safety of air and maritime encounters (with annexes on terms of reference and rules of behavior for encounters between naval
surface vessels).21 When President Xi visited Washington ten months later in September 2015, the CBM agreements were
further enhanced, with new annexes on air-to-air safety and crisis communications, and new work was done on the major military activities
agreement. Moreover, Presidents Obama and Xi made friendly statements about each sides contribution to
international peacekeeping, suggesting new areas for cooperation .22

Ext Appeasement Bad

Appeasement guarantees larger conflicts
Jacobs, 15 emeritus professor of Asian Languages and Studies at Monash University (Bruce, 11/1.
Appeasement will only encourage China. http://www.theage.com.au/comment/appeasement-will-onlyencourage-expansionist-china-20151101-gknz2l.html)
World attention has again focused on our region of the globe, with the American navy asserting its "freedom of navigation" near Chineseconstructed artificial islands in the so-called South China Sea.
In less than 80 days, in the midst of threats from China, Taiwan's voters will vote for their president and legislature. Polls suggest the opposition
will win, thus giving Taiwan its third transition of power from opposition to government in the six presidential elections since democratisation.
The tensions in Asia today have only one cause: China. On the basis of false "history", China claims the South China Sea, the
East China Sea and Taiwan. Yet China has no historical claims to the South and East China seas.
Historically, south-east Asian states conducted the great trade in the South China Sea. China had almost no role. Furthermore, geographically, the
contested areas are close to Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines, while they are more than 1000 kilometres south of China.
China's claims for sovereignty in these areas have no historical basis and its constructing of "islands" on submerged reefs only demonstrates
China's expansionism.
Similarly, in the East China Sea, China's claims to the Senkaku Islands (which China calls the Diaoyutai) have no historical foundation. The
People's Daily of January 8, 1953, stated that the "Senkaku" Islands belonged to the Ryukyu Archipelago, and a World Atlas published in China
in 1958 showed that these islands belong to Japan.
China's claims that Taiwan belongs to it also have no historical basis. Mao Zedong, in his famous 1936 interview with Edgar Snow, stated that
Taiwan should be independent. Only in 1942 did the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) and the Chinese Communist Party separately
claim that Taiwan was Chinese.
In Taiwan's history, a Han Chinese regime based in China has only controlled Taiwan for four years, from 1945 to 1949. These four years were
perhaps the saddest in all of Taiwan's history because Chiang Kai-shek's government killed tens of thousands of Taiwanese in the infamous 2.28
(February 28, 1947) massacres.
The dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek and his son and successor, Chiang Ching-kuo, ruled Taiwan from 1945 until the latter's death in early 1988.
Their rule was a Chinese colonial project that privileged Chinese who had come with Chiang Kai-shek and systematically discriminated against
native Taiwanese.
Only with the accession of Lee Teng-hui to the presidency after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988 could Taiwan begin its democratisation
process. Now Taiwan, a country with a population the size of Australia, has become a democratic middle power.
The so-called "one China" policy of many countries including the United States and Australia is a relic of the old Chiang Kai-shek/Chiang Chingkuo dictatorship, which pushed a "one China" policy without consulting Taiwan's population.
All the major Western democracies, as well as Japan and India, now have substantial if unofficial diplomatic offices in Taiwan. And, although
these nations do not publicise the point, all have de facto "One China, one Taiwan" policies.
The arguments of people such as Age columnist Hugh White are dangerous. They ignore the cause of tension in Asia and say we have to be careful about becoming
involved in a war. History

has taught us that "appeasement" of such expansionist powers as China does not stop
war. Rather, it only temporarily postpones armed conflict and ultimately leads to a much larger war later .
Appeasement of China only enhances Chinese perceptions that the US is a toothless paper tiger. It creates
a sense among China's generals and political leaders that they can pursue expansionist policies without
international protest.
The pretence that Taiwan's vote for its own president and legislature can lead to war is false. Both main candidates, Tsai Ing-wen and Eric Chu,
want to maintain the status quo that Taiwan is de facto an independent state but that it will not announce this. Australians would be appalled if
we were told by a foreign power that voting for either Malcolm Turnbull or Bill Shorten would lead to war and that we should vote accordingly.

We must be clear that China is the only country threatening anyone else in Asia. The close talks between
leaders of such countries as the US, Japan, India and Australia demonstrate that Asia's democratic
countries have become aware of the risks.
In classical balance-of-power theory, the rise of one expansionist power creates a coalition among other powers. China's expansionist actions
have already created a substantial democratic coalition in Asia prepared to prevent China from starting a major war.

China seizes on weakness

Branigan, 15 China correspondent for the Guardian (Tania, 3/19. China crisis: west riven by ageold question - to appease or oppose? http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/19/china-bind-is-theuk-accommodating-or-ceding-too-much-to-superpower)

China

assumes any accommodation from a foreign country comes from weakness and they do not
respect weakness. They will bully those who let themselves be bullied, says Jorge Guajardo, formerly the
Mexican ambassador to Beijing and now senior director at McLarty Associates in Washington.
You acquiesce on human rights and China assumes you do it for economic reasons; they make more demands
and you start acquiescing in other areas.
India is probably one of the last countries to accommodate China on anything and at the end of the day, they
work very well together.
Some go further, suggesting complaints about meetings with the Dalai Lama are strategic attempts to exert power through a symbolic issue in the
first place.
It is easier for some countries to take a tough stance than others. While Angela Merkel has in some ways been firmer than her predecessors, that is
also possible because of the strength of the German economy, Kinzelbach points out.
If you accept only sticks and carrots work on human rights, what sticks and carrots can we use? We dont have any left that are attractive or
impressive enough for China any more, unfortunately, she said.
She argues that the US itself has given ground on human rights issues, particularly at the beginning of the Obama administration.
There was a real desire for partnership and China didnt step up and deliver; it took advantage, said Bonnie

Glaser, an expert on Sino-US relations at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies , in a more generous
assessment. It was the time of the financial crisis and China saw the US as weak.