LAWYERS LEAGUE VS. AQUINO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986

Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental

law of the Republic under her government.

Ponente: GLORIA C. PARAS

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR

OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON C.
AQUINO, ET AL.

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President
Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation
No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the new
government was installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is
legitimate
Decision:
As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to
dismiss the petitions for the reasons to be stated below.
1. On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the
petitions and manifested that they would pursue the question
by extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal is functus oficio.
2. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the
people have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino
3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of
the present government. All the eleven members of this

SIRS/MESDAMES:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court MAY 22, 1986.
In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs.
President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.; G.R. No. 73972, People's
Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution vs.
Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., and G.R. No. 73990, Councilor Clifton
U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al., the legitimacy of the
government of President Aquino is questioned.
It is claimed that her government is illegal because it was not
established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to
dismiss the petitions for the reasons to be stated below. On
April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the petitions and
manifested that they would pursue the question by
extrajudicial methods. The withdrawal is functus oficio.
The three petitions obviously are not impressed with merit.
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions
state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are
the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they
have accepted the government of President Corazon C.
Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so
that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact and
law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of

nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present

government. All the eleven members of this Court, as
reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of
the Republic under her government. In view of the foregoing,
the petitions are hereby dismissed.

Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a

justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people are the judge.

Very truly yours,

The people have accepted the Aquino government which is

in effective control of the entire country;

(Sgd.) GLORIA C. PARAS

The Court further held that:

Clerk of Court

It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a

de jure government; and

* The Court was then composed of Teehankee, C.J. and Abad

Santos., Melencio-

The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of

the new government.

Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas, Alampay and

Patajo, JJ

MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION VS. CUSTOMS

ARRASTRE SERVICE 18 SCRA 1120

DIGEST

FACTS: Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from

abroad on S.S. "Leoville", consigned to Mobil Philippines
Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment was discharged to the
custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the
Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein.
The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of
the consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil
Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and
the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the
undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other
damages. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that not being persons under the law,
defendants cannot be sued. Appellant contends that not all
government entities are immune from suit; that defendant
Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the
Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as
such, can be sued by private individuals.

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President
Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing
the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by
stating that the "new government was installed through a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by
units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is
legitimate.
HELD:

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants can invoke state

immunity.

HELD: Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity

performs a function proprietary in nature does not
necessarily result in its being suable. If said nongovernmental
function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental
function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign
immunity from suit extended to such government entity. The
Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of
Finance, with no personality of its own apart from that of the
national government. Its primary function is governmental,
that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from
imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees,
charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this
function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. Clearly,
therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed
proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and
governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that
engaging in the same does not necessarily render said
Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its
governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to
suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not
be denied as to the necessary means to that end.
HOLY SEE VS. ROSARIO
THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR.,
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC. G.R.
No. 101949 December 1, 1994
FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty
over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the
Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent,
Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation
engaged in the real estate business. This petition arose from
a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square
meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in
the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two

other lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty

Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr.
Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later,
Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold
to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the
parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land
of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was
the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation (Tropicana). private respondent
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three
parcels of land, and specific performance and damages
against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and
three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr.,
the PRC and
Tropicana petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to
dismiss the complaint petitioner for lack of jurisdiction
based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for
being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was
filed by private respondent. the trial court issued an order
denying, among others, petitioners motion to dismiss after
finding that petitioner shed off [its] sovereign immunity by
entering into the business contract in question Petitioner
forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner
invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own
behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal
Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its
business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity

RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the
status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its
Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic
representations with the Philippine government since 1957
(Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in
international relations. There are two conflicting concepts of
sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign
cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the
courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or
restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii
of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an
incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when
it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands
in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the
said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.
However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and
subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but
claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its
mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private
respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the
Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for
commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct
thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio.
The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or
personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and
maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the
1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 2022). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate

and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15,

1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent
disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental
character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It
merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters
living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use
it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters
have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they
stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted
by private respondent in its complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for
the redress of its grievances. Under both Public International
Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by
the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government
to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government,
through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the
Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine
government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its
claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a
determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations
between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young,
Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States,
Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign
Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine
government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases
to be a private cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the
complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is
DISMISSED.
FESTEJO VS. FERNARDO

FACTS: Carmen Festejo filed a suit against Isaias Fernando,

Director of the Bureau of Public Works, for taking possession
of three parcels of land she owned and causing an irrigation
canal to be constructed thereon without obtaining first a right
of way, without her consent and knowledge , and against her
express objection. Festejo demanded the return of the land
and its restoration to its former condition.
ISSUE:
Is the Fernando immune from suit for being a public officer?
HELD:
Defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority.
When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way
upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former
condition and usefulness, he must be held to have
designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law.
There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff's land
southeasterly of the right of way innocently. Surveys clearly
marked the limits of the land appropriated for the right of
way of this trunk highway before construction began.

acting under the color of his office, and not personally. In the
eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority.
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable
to the latter for damages:
xxx
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due
process of law; (Festejo vs. Fernando, G.R. No. L-5156, March
11, 1954)
Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands
34 Phil 311 Civil Law Torts and Damages Liability of the
State for acts of special agents
Political Law Non-Suability of the State Waiver of NonSuability is Not Admission of Liability

If an officer, even while acting under color of his office,

exceeds the power conferred on him by law, he cannot
shelter himself under the plea that he is a public agent.

The facts of the case took place in the 1910s. E. Merritt was
a constructor who was excellent at his work. One day, while
he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was
bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the
ambulance was proven to have been negligent. Because of
the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely
injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never
perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even
earn at least half of what he used to earn.

It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative

quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the
scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may
thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a
civil suit. If he exceed the power conferred on him by law, he
cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent

In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the

government which later authorized Merritt to sue the
government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature
(An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the
Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the
Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit). The

Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is

personally liable therefor, and may be sued as any other
citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage
results from his tortious act.

lower court then determined the amount of damages and

ordered the government to pay the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the
negligent act of the driver of the ambulance.
HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to
plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend
its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely
gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits
itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that
thestate, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not
responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the
discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because
neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the
part of the state in the organization of branches of public
service and in the appointment of its agents. The State can
only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special
agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is
one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission,
foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official) so that in representation of the state and
being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust
confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special
agent nor was a government officer acting as a special agent
hence, there can be no liability from the government.
The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any
person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs,
since that would involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be
subversive of the public interest.

VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA G.R.

No. L-26400 February 29, 1972
FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a
lot which, without prior expropriation proceedings or
negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's
counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting
payment of the portion of her lot which had been
expropriated by the government. Amigable later filed a case
against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for
recovery of ownership and possession of the said lot. She
also sought payment for comlensatory damages, moral
damages and attorney's fees. The defendant said that the
case was premature, barred by prescription, and the
government did not give its consent to be sued.
ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.
HELD: Where the government takes away property from a
private landowner for public use without going through the
legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the
aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit.
The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only
relief available is for the government to make due
compensation which it could and should have done years
ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis
should be the price or value at the time of the taking.

sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in

Subic Bay.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E.

GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER,
petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of
Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE
GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: implied consent
Date: May 22, 1985
Ponente: Justice Abad-Santos
Facts:
At times material to this case, the United States of America
had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of
those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States.
US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender
system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio de Guzman &
Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and
complied with the requests based on the letters received
from the US.
In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman
& Co indicating that the company did not qualify to receive
an award for the projects because of its previous
unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the

The company sued the United States of America and

Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert
Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S.
Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the
plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event
that specific performance was no longer possible, to order
the defendants to pay damages.
The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from
entering into contracts with third parties for work on the
projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the
purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over
the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of
defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts
and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of
defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign
which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit
for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p.
50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the
motion.
The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The
defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail.
Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain
perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
ISSUE/s:

WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise

governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity
HELD:

correct test for the application of State immunity is not the

conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the
act

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders

of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is
dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
Ratio:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from
being sued in
the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This
rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are not petrified; they are constantly
developing and evolving. And because the activities of states
have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish thembetween sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The
result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure
imperil (sovereign & governmental acts)
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of
the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the
naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the
United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of
the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for
nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

GAUDENCIO RAYO vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF

BULACAN
December 19, 1981
FACTS: At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the
respondent opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of
the Angat Dam which resulted in a sudden, precipitate and
simultaneous opening of said floodgates several towns in
Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners filed for damages
against the respondent corporation.
Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents forn
dismissal of the case and contended that the respondent
corporation is merely performing a propriety functions and
that under its own organic act, it can sue and be sued in
court.
ISSUE:
W/N the respondent performs governmental functions with
respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam.

W/N the power of the respondent to sue and be sued under

its organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort.

for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop
for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

HELD: The government has organized a private corporation,

put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any
court under its charter. As a government owned and
controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct
and separate from that of the government. Moreover, the
charter provision that it can sue and be sued in any court.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay

for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17,
2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran
aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the
Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan.
No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no
reports of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and postsalvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue
to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to
affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras,
Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del
Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ARIGO V. SWIFT
MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners, vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
PONENTE: Villarama
TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit
FACTS:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures
ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in
the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said
vessel to enter and exit the territorial waters of the
Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and
crew liberty. On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for
damages caused by USS Guardian.
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA
applies in this case.
HELD:
First issue: YES.
Petitioners have legal standing
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on
a given question. Specifically, it is a partys personal and

substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will

sustain direct injury as a result of the act being challenged,
and calls for more than just a generalized grievance.
However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which
this Court has relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the
controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized
the public right of citizens to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history,
is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. We
declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like
other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners
minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary
citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of
environmental rights, they can do so in representation of
their own and future generations.
Second issue: YES.
The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and
supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged
act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the
USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were
performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US

government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US

itself.
The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents
Swift, Rice and Robling. During the deliberations, Senior
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the
conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a
restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused
damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within
the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while
historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates
an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply
with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding
passage through the latters internal waters and the
territorial sea.
In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they
continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following
exceptions:
Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State If any warship does not
comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards
any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the
coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea
immediately.
Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused
by a warship or other government ship operated for noncommercial purposes The flag State shall bear international
responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State
resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with
the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning

passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of

this Convention or other rules of international law.
Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government
ships operated for non-commercial purposes With such
exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30
and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of
warships and other government ships operated for noncommercial purposes. A foreign warships unauthorized entry
into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine
resources is one situation in which the above provisions may
apply.
But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the
UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not
ratified theUNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the
US considers itself bound by customary international rules on
the traditional uses of the oceans as codified in UNCLOS.
Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that the US refusal to
join the UNCLOSwas centered on its disagreement with
UNCLOS regime of deepseabed mining (Part XI) which
considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by
mankind, pointing out that such has nothing to do with its
the US acceptance of customary international rules on
navigation.
The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpios view that
non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US
will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State
over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect
the US to bear international responsibility under Art. 31 in
connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely
affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been
actively supporting the countrys efforts to preserve our vital

marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to

compensate the damage caused by its warship while
transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend
a Government exercising leadership in international affairs,
unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations
to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the
marine environment as provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS
Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis States
shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a
regional basis,directly or through competent international
organizations, in formulating andelaborating international
rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures
consistent with this Convention, for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment, taking into account
characteristic regional features. In fine, the relevance of
UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond
dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of
warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while
navigating the latters territorial sea, the flag States shall be
required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout
the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will
be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other
government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes
under Article 31.
Third issue: NO.
The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to
criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as
the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In
fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules
that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation
of an environmental law is to be filed separately. The Court
considered a view that a ruling on the application or
nonapplication of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to
US personnel who may be found responsible for the

grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and

beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine
whether
such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the
same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted
from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows
the recovery of damages, including the collection of
administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil
suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action
charging the same violation of an environmental law.
Sanders and Moreau, Jr. vs. Veridiano II
10 June 1988 G.R. No. L-56930
FACTS:
Rossi and Wyer were advised that their employment had
been converted from permanent full-time to permanent parttime. Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to
institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent
rules and regulations of the US DoD. Moreau sent to the Chief
of Naval Personnel explaining the change of employment
status of the two from which Rossi and Wyer filed in the Court
of First Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for damages
against the herein petitioners claiming that the letters
contained libellous imputations against the two. Due to the
failure to appear in the court, Moreau and Sanders were
declared in default.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were performing their official duties
when they did the acts for which they have been sued for
damages.

RULING:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for
which the petitioners are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of their official duties.
Sanders, as director of the special services department of
NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel and
had a hand in their employment, work assignments,
discipline, dismissal and other related matters. The same can
be said for Moreau. Given the official
character of the above-described letters, it can be concluded
that the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United
States government. There should be no question by now that
such complaint cannot prosper unless the government
sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be
sued.
MARIANO E. GARCIA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE CHIEF
OF STAFF and THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES and/or THE CHAIRMAN,
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BOARD and/or THE AUDITOR
GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES,defendants-appellees.
Tiangco and Millosa for the plaintiff-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for the defendants-appellees.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of dismissal. It appears that
on December 1, 1961, the plaintiff-appellant, Mariano E.
Garcia, filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an
action to collect a sum of money against the Chief of Staff
and the Adjutant General of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the Chairman of the Philippine Veterans Board
and /or the Auditor General. The complaint alleged: that
sometime in July, 1948, the plaintiff suffered injuries while
undergoing the 10-month military training at Camp

Floridablanca, Pampanga; that sometime thereafter he filed

his claim under Commonwealth Act 400 and in April, 1957,
he submitted some papers in support of his claim to the
Adjutant General's Office upon the latter's request; that on
May 2, 1957, he received a letter from the said Adjutant
General's Office disallowing his claim for disability benefits;
that on November 24, 1958, after further demands of the
plaintiff, the Adjutant General's Office denied the said claim,
alleging that Commonwealth Act 400 had already been
repealed by Republic Act 610 which took effect on January 1,
1950; that by reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff he
was deprived of his sight or vision rendering him
permanently disabled; and that by reason of the unjustified
refusal by defendants of plaintiff's claim, the latter was
deprived of his disability pension from July, 1948 totalling no
less than P4,000 at the rate of P20 a month and suffered
thereby moral damages and attorney's fees the amount of
P2,000.00.

Without need of discussing the various questions raised, We

have to uphold the order of dismissal, not necessarily on the
same ground as found by the lower court; but for the simple
reason that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter, it being a money claim against the
government.

The Philippine Veterans Administration and the Chief of Staff

of the Armed Forces filed separate motions to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint; that the plaintiff
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before coming
to court; that the complaint states no cause of action; and
that the cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitations. Acting on the said motion, the court, on March 2,
1962, rendered an order dismissing the complaint on the
ground that the action has prescribed. Motion for
reconsideration of the said order having been denied, the
plaintiff has interposed this appeal.

SEC. 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the

Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim
may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an
appeal in writing:

This Court has already held (New Manila Lumber Co. Inc. vs.
Republic, G.R. No. L-14248, April 28, 1960) that a claim for
the recovery of money against the government should be
filed with the Auditor General, in line with the principle that
the State cannot be sued without its consent. Commonwealth
Act 327 provides:
SECTION 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts
or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the
Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty
days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their
presentation. . . .

x x x x x x x x x.
(c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines, if the appellant is
a private person or entity.
The well established rule that no recourse to court can be
had until all administrative remedies had been exhausted
and that actions against administrative officers should not be
entertained if superior administrative officers could grant
relief is squarely applicable to the present case.
In view therefor, the order dismissing the complaint is hereby
affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes J.B.L.,

Barrera, Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Garcia v Chief of Staff

the statute of limitations. Acting on the said Motion, the

Court of First Instance, on March 2, 1962, rendered an order
dismissing the complaint on the ground that action has
prescribed. Motion for reconsideration of the said order
having been denied, the plaintiff has interposed this appeal.

Facts:

Issue:

The plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance of

Pangasinan, an action to collect a sum of money against the
above defendants. He suffered injuries while undergoing a
10-month military training at Camp Floridablanca, Pampanga.
He filed a claim under Commonwealth Act 400 and in April
1957 with the Adjutant Generals Office which later disallow
his claim for disability benefit. After further demands of the
plaintiff, the same Adjutant Generals Office denied the claim,
alleging that the Commonwealth Act 400 had already been
repealed by RA 610 which took effect January 1, 1950. That
by the reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff, he was
deprived of his sight or vision rendering him permanently
disabled; and by the reason of unjustified refusal of
defendants on the claim, plaintiff was deprived of his
disability pension from July 1948 totalling no less than P4,000
at the rate of P20/mo and suffered moral damages and
attorneys fees the amount of P2,000. The Philippine
Veterans Administration and the Chief of Staff of AFP file
separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the complaint; that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies before coming to court; that the
complaint states no cause of action; and that the cause of
action is barred by

Whether or not the lower court is right in dismissing the

complaint.

Makalintal, J., took no part.

Held:
The SC uphold the order of dismissal for the simple reason
that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, it being a money claim against the
government. It was already held in the case of New
Manila Lumber vs. Republic in L-14248, 4/28/60, that a claim
for the recovery of money against the government should be
filed with the Auditor
General, in line with the principle that the State can not be
sued without its consent.
Commonwealth Act 327 provides:
Section 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or
claims, other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor
General shall act and decide the same within 60 days,
exclusive of Sundays and holidays after their presentation.
Section 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the
Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim,
may within 30 days from receipt of decision, take an appeal
in writing to (c) the Supreme Court, if the appellant is a
private person or entity.
The well established rule that no recourse to court can be
had until all administrative remedies had been exhausted

and that actions against administrative officers should not be

entertained if superior administrative officer could grant
relief is applicable to this case. The order dismissing the

complaint is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to

costs.