Parochial Universalism, Democracy Jihad and the Orientalist Image of Burma: The New

Evangelism
Author(s): Michael Aung-Thwin
Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4 (Winter, 2001-2002), pp. 483-505
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia
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Parochial

Universalism,

and
the
DemocracyJihad
of Burma:
Image
New
Evangelism

Orientalist
The

Michael Aung-Thwin

Introduction

In

an episode in the South Indian version of the Ramayanaby Kamban,'

Rama, in hiding, shoots one of the monkey kings, Vali, in the back. As
he lies dying with Rama's arrows in him, Vali asks Rama, how he, the
epitome of the perfect human, the incarnation of Vishnu, the honourable
warrior, could do such a cowardly and unjust thing? Rama replies that it is
because Vali had taken the wife of his brother Sugreeva after killing him.
Vali says he did not try to kill his brother, that Rama had gotten only one
side of the story, and that, in his culture of monkeys, taking care of one's
brother's wife after his death was quite common and expected. Besides, why
is Rama imposing his human values on him and castigating him and his
kind for not following them? Rama tells Vali that he is intelligent enough to
know that there are higher ideals, and even if they are human and not monkey
ideals, he still expects Vali's kind to meet these higher standards. In effect,
Rama is saying: "don't give me any of your 'monkey values' argument, what
I'm advocating are universal values to which all should aspire." Vali finally
acknowledges his inferior way of thinking and concedes that Rama isjustified
in shooting him in the back after all; it is his pleasure to die at the hands of
such an honourable man and for such a noble cause. This single incident of
the Ramayanacaptures many of the themes contained in this essay.
Parochial Universalism2
Throughout history there have been similar, although perhaps less
allegorical rationalizations of parochial universalism. Alexander the Great
was one of the first to invoke the concept of "aUniversal Conqueror,"known
1 R.K.Narayan,trans., TheRamayana(NewYork:Penguin Books, 1977), chapter 6.
2 I owe thisphraseto my colleagueatVirginia,ProfessorBranlyWomack,who, however,attributes
it to another of his colleagues.

483

PacificAffairs:Winter2001-2002
in Indian thought as a cakravartin,to rationalize his own far-flung conquests.3
In retrospect, the "Universal ideals" found in Pax Romana, Pax Sinica, Pax
Britannia, and PaxJaponica are familiar. And now, we have Pax Americana
declaring the ideals of democracy and human rights as universal doctrines.
In all these cases, it is the conquerors like Rama (or those who were in control)
who have argued that their parochial values were universal, while the
conquered, like Vali (or those not in charge), have invoked cultural
relativism.4 Universalizing parochial values is thus not a new or unique
American strategy, but an established, predictable rationalization of the
strong, the ideology of the superpower to validate its hegemony.5 And
although that rationalization today is secular rather than religious, and the
goals are this-world oriented rather than the next, nevertheless, the zeal,
the righteousness, the imagery, and the vocabulary with which this
universalism is proclaimed are uncannily evocative of earlier religious
evangelisms.
In part, the belief that these parochial values of the superpower are indeed
universal is "confirmed" by the victims, the Valis of the world, when they
confess their "sin"of having once worshiped false gods (like Communism)
and, in return, receive absolution (and material aid). In today's context, the
parochial universalism of the most materially developed countries in the
world is similarly"confirmed"by the eagerness with which "the other" (people
living in "Third World" countries) demonstrate their desire for the same
kinds of conditions found in the former - good roads, decent paying jobs,
sanitary conditions, higher standards of living (and of course, TV sets, cars,
cell-phones).
One need not be reminded, however, that having shared materialvalues
persedoes not necessarily translate into having shared politicalor socialvalues
of a more fundamental nature. Even Singapore and Japan (and there are
others), who most clearly share western material values (along with a common
faith in the modern market economy largely responsible for those values),
still do not share their most basic political and social values with the West.6
Similarly, many years of economic (that is, material) sanctions imposed on
Burma (as well as Cuba and Iraq) have failed to produce the kinds of social
and political consequences assumed to be self-evident, precisely because the
Cubans, Iraqis, and Burmese also do not share such fundamental social and
3 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early
Modern Eurasia,"in Victor Lieberman, ed., BeyondBinaryHistories:Re-imaginingEurasiato c. 1830
(Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press, 1999), p. 309, writes that the image of Alexander as a
universalconqueror was actuallydone in retrospect.
4 Valimay have been the first culturalanthropologist of ancient India who argued for cultural
relativism.
5 EdwardSaid's Orientalism
(NewYork:Vintage Books, 1979) is likely the most comprehensive
analysisand discussion of this phenomenon.
6 By the "West,"I am referring mainly to western Europe and North America, the "Atlantic"
powers.

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ParochialUniversalism,DemocracyJihad,and the OrientalistImageof Burma

political values.7 Indeed, that they refused to turn collectively against their
leaders in political wayswhen things became economically tough individually
raises further questions about the presumed universality of western-style
materialistic individualism. That is to say, individual, material self-interest,
assumed to have a cause-and-effect relationship with grouppolitical action,
simply has not materialized. To be sure, there may be other reasons that this
did not happen, but the assumption that it should, and would, remains highly
questionable. And when the expected results of such assumptions do not
occur, rather than reassessing the validity of their universalism, cultural
relativism's"strawmen" (such as "Asianvalues") are, instead, assailed.8 None
of this, needless to say, is ajudgement about the Cuban, Iraqi, or Burmese
governments, but an assessment of how assumptions perhaps valid about
ourselves are being projected onto others.
Thus, although individual economic interests might very well influence
electoral behaviour in many western cultures most of the time, that is not
the same as expecting the majority of Burmese and (by nowwe should know)
Cubans to turn against their own leaders (whatevertheir individual economic
plight) in favour of foreigners obviously seeking their own interests and the
instigators of those economic sanctions in the first place. For most Burmese,
it would be tantamount to turning against one's own family (however
"dysfunctional"it may seem) simply to accommodate certain psychological
needs of outsiders (however euphemized as high principle) who have decided
to shut off the electricity to the house until a member of the family that they
support is allowed to take over. If anything, sanctions considered as
interference in domestic affairs inspire even more resolve for resisting them.
Ultimately, though, it is the righteous conviction that one's parochial values
are universal that prevents other perspectives from even being considered.
This belief in the universalityof select, western values is further rationalized
by the notion of "globalization." Images of a marvellous variety of peoples
and cultures of the world, with their wonderfully interesting clothes, eating
indescribably delicious looking foods, and living in exotically foreign settings,
BUT speaking into cell phones, punching on computers and using United
Parcel Service ("just like us") are meant to illustrate globalization. Yet,
according to United Nations (UN) statistics, most of the people in the world
do not have running water, most are illiterate, most have less than a high
school education, and many are malnourished. Similarly,the "SiliconValleys"
of the "ThirdWorld,"such as Bangalore, are sensationally displayed as further
evidence of this globalism, when just a few blocks away from the internet

7 Leon T. Hadar,"US SanctionsAgainst Burma:A Failure on All Fronts,"TradePolicyAnalysis,

no. 1 (March26, 1998). See also, David I. Steinberg, "TheBurmese Conundrum"in Burma:Political
EconomyunderMilitaryRule.Ed. Robert H. Taylor (London: Hurst and Co., 2001), pp. 54, 58.
8 I am here referring to Asian and other cultural values per se, not necessarilyas it has been
debated reductioad absurdumand focused primarilyon Malaysia.

485

PacificAffairs:Winter2001-2002
cafes and computer shops in Bangalore (which themselves occupy only a
few blocks), rural India in all its traditional manifestations resumes its
predominance. Thus, with the exception of the Group of Eight industrialized
countries (G8)- all of which except one are western - the majority of people
on this globe do not truly and meaningfully benefit from, nor are a crucial
part of, that globalization. Most revealing is that nearly 95 percent of the
world, according to publicly available statistics, do not have telephones, while
only 2.5 percent have internet access, perhaps the most touted symbol of
globalization. Even in the United States only about 60 percent of all homes
have computers, and of those, about 60-65 percent have internet access.
It is thus a serious misrepresentation to suggest that everyone in Asia lives
and thinks in western ways because a small, elite class of people dresses in
western-style suits, speaks English, plays the stock market, reads the Asian
WorldStreetJournal,lives in high rises, eats McDonald's, and watches Michael
Jordan play. In reality, they represent a minuscule number of the world's
population, the upper crust of a very small elite. The people who make up
the world's majority are not a part of that globalization celebrated by the
West. In other words, globalization is a perspective invented for, a condition
experienced by, and a situation largely in the interests of, a small, even if
widely dispersed elite; it is thus, arguably, a euphemism to enhance G8
economic and cultural hegemonism.
As a way of thinking and behaving, globalization is not a new phenomenon,
either. Note that both the rationalization and activities, if not the structure
of globalization are eerily reminiscent of late nineteenth and early twentiethcentury imperialism and colonialism, when the newly industrialized and
much stronger economies and polities of Europe, decentralized or enhanced
the decentralization of Asia and Africa and rationalized it with a similar
rhetoric of universalism. More specifically, what is called the "globalized
economy" today closely resembles the "colonial export economy" at its
height:9 the development and commercialization of local, regional, and
traditional economies for the "international market," benefitting solely (or
largely) the colonizer and its allies - in today's terms, the G8 powers and
their allies. And this resemblance does not appear to be mere historical
coincidence but a more recent form of imperialism, if not also colonialism,
a conquest not so much of lands and peoples, but of minds and markets.10
Such perceptions of universalism and globalism are articulated and
enhanced by those who control global information, which, more often than
not, are in the hands of western (and westernized) news organizations and
journalists (along with other "certified" disseminators of "correct"
9 I use GayleNess' phrase for describing the situation in Malaysiain his Bureaucracy
and Rural
in Malaysia(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1967).
Development
10 The distinction between imperialism and colonialism has been made aptly by many. I am
(NewYork:Vintage Books, 1994), p. 9.
using EdwardSaid'sdefinition in his Cultureand Imperialism

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ParochialUniversalism,DemocracyJihad,and the OrientalistImageof Burma

information, such as academics). With a very few notable exceptions, the
majority of western journalists assigned to Southeast Asia do not speak the
indigenous languages fluently, if at all. They therefore circulate primarily
among people who can speak English, with whom they debate issues
considered mutually important, follow procedures and logic readily
understood by both, and from whom much of their "primary data" are
obtained. Most of the latter are also likely to be western (or westernized)
academics and journalists who would, naturally, tend to confirm prejudices
about the universality of western political, social, and economic ideas. It
would be safe to say that none of them represents, in any fundamental way,
the majority of the people of Asia.
To be sure, some of the views on universality held by academics stem
from genuine intellectual concerns. More specifically, they are, in part,
reactions to earlier constructions of an "other,"a process in "orientalism."
Such stereotyping of groups of people or cultures is "essentialism,"currently
out of favour in academia. With the "essentialist other" now gone, people
are back to being the same everywhere, hence the intellectual basis for
universalism. Apart from the fact that universalism itself is a kind of
essentialism (by claiming that all humans are "essentiallythe same"), cultural
relativism does not, in any case, question the (false) issue regarding the
universal humanityof peoples; it is instead concerned with the various ways
in which that humanity is expressed: namely, in culture. And various cultures
have substantive and meaningful differences in terms of beliefs and values,
based on equally substantive differences in assumptions regarding
perceptions of time, power, legitimacy, salvation, and ultimate reality.Yet, in
the current political atmosphere, rarely are thesekinds of differences part of
the universalist discourse. Rather, the emphasis is on the other "abhorrent"
ones: such as authoritarian political systems, honour killing, patronclientelism, gender inequality, female infanticide and caste. It is but a short
step from censuring the latter kinds of cultural values (and, hence, also
cultural relativism) to affirming universalism perseand the universalist'svalue
system in particular. And since, in that system, all men are created equal ultimately a political statement, not one concerned with humanity - those
egalitarian values "must be" universal as well, an issue that will be important
in the discussion to follow.12

11 There are others who tow the "partyline" more subtly:the link between novelistsof the late
nineteenth centuryand imperialismhas been aptlydemonstratedin Said's Culture...noted above. See
also AlanJ. Greenberger, TheBritishImageof India:A Studyin theLiteratureof Imperialism,
1880-1960
(London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1969).
12 We know that this is not the case. Egalitarianism(in practice and as an ideal) was by far an
exception ratherthan the rule throughoutworld history and in most societies, whereashierarchywas
TheCasteSystemand Its
(and is) the rule virtuallyeverywhere.See Louis Dumont, HomoHierarchicus:
Trans.byMarkSainsbury,LouisDumont and BasiaGulati(Chicago:Universityof Chicago
Implications.
Press, 1980).

487

PacificAffairs:Winter2001-2002
This trend towards universalism is part of the recent critiques of cultural
relativism as a school of thought,13 and as a by-product, also earlier
functionalism as a theoretical and methodological approach in anthropology.
Social phenomena explained in cultural or functionalist terms often seem
to defend those things we currently consider "bad" (like caste), so that
functionalism, cultural relativism and "essentialism" have now come to be
lumped together. Much of the rejection of cultural relativism - and its
offshoot, Area Studies - in favour of universalism seems to have been popular
among the past leadership of mainstream American political scientists.'4
Needless to say,however, both critiques have enhanced the intellectual quality
of the debate and perhaps for reasons that have more to do with their own
disciplinary concerns than anything else: to wit, the difficulties inherent in
learning Asian and other indigenous languages well enough to better
understand those cultures on the one hand and, on the other, in attempting
to attain legitimacy as a science, which must have universal principles.
Thus, when academic treatises celebrate diasporas, boundary-less cultures
and other "crossingboundaries" themes - even if purely for academic reasons
- they indirectly "privilege" universalism and de-legitimate the validity of
nations, fixed national boundaries and central authority (or centralization
in general as a historical phenomenon). And recently, this "privileged"
framework has been imposed on Asian Studies curricula and the profession,
where more weight is given to courses or professional papers that "cross"
national boundaries than those that do not.15 The "diaspora" theme has
now become a sacred cow in academia and, more importantly, its funding
agencies.
Some of this finds concrete realization (and therefore, de facto
legitimation) in the European Union, which has attempted to replace one
of the most important characteristics of nation-states - namely, national
currencies - with a common, "universal"one, the Euro dollar. That many
countries in Southeast Asia are still in the process of becoming nation-states
seems to be of little or no concern, a path originally imposed on them or, at
least, inspired by European colonialism in the first place. Suddenly now,
Southeast Asia is told, the nation-state is passe, changing the rules in the
middle of the game, and for reasons beneficial to Europe. To this political
and economic agenda, academics contribute - even if inadvertently - the

13 Fora good synopsisof the complex issuesinvolvedin thisdebate, see AndrewNathan's"Cultural

Valuesand Relativism:The Example of Women's Rights," Viewpoints,
Association for Asian Studies,
http://www.aasianist.org/Viewpoints/Nathan.htm.
14 The critique of Area Studies by a past president of the American PoliticalScience Association
maybe the best example of this kind of thinking, which set off a furor of debates recently.There are
also others, such as Eurasianists,who argue for broader (if not universal) themes against what they
might call regionalism.See Lieberman, ed., BeyondBinaryHistories.
15 That this trend has been dominant in the Associationfor Asian Studies' preference for special
panels in its annual meetings for the past severalyears is common knowledge.

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ParochialUniversalism,DemocracyJihad,and the OrientalistImageof Burma

intellectual fodder with their treatises on boundary-less cultures and thinly
veiled anti nation-state studies.
But some of the impetus comes from outside academia.16 Although
academics like to think that they generate all or most of the trends, intellectual
issues and agenda in the field, that is often far from the case. As Bernard
Cohn has shown, the study of castes in India "took off' largely after Her
Majesty's Government in India decided that its knowledge was essential to
administering the colony effectively, and therefore funded it.17 The
phenomenal growth and development of Asian languages at major U.S.
universities with Area Studies programs was not primarily the outcome of
academics studying these languages for their own sake, but the result of an
overall defense funding strategy by the United States government. Many will
remember that FLAS (Foreign Language and Area Studies) fellowships to
study foreign languages were originally called NDFL (National Defense
Foreign Language) fellowships and were originally part of the Department
of Defense's jurisdiction and budget until moved to the Department of
Education.
The universalization of what are in effect select, parochial western (or
even more narrow,American) values accomplishes at least two things.18First,
since universalism is by definition contradictory to cultural relativism and
universalism is the order of the day,western binary logic dictates that cultural
relativism be dismissed. This facilitates the theoretical trivialization (or
outright rejection) of contrary philosophies, such as "Asian values" (or in
Rama's case, "monkey values"), as either disingenuous or inconsequential,19
providing universalist ideologies with moral and intellectual superiority.
Second, acceptance of western values as universal means that the institutions
they reflect - legal, economic, social and, of course, political - must be
considered universal as well. This further implies that the principles
underlying those institutions - conceptions of ownership, of individualism
and, most importantly, of leadership, legitimacy and authority - must be
also accepted as universal.
Not surprisingly, validation for these perspectives is readily found in
westernized elites overseas, which were once "the other" and deprecated,
are now "one of us" and embraced. They have become the proof par excellence
16 EdwardSaid, in Cultureand Imperialism,
demonstrates the subtle (and not so subtle) links
between imperialismand culture.
17 Bernard S. Cohn, An Anthropologist
(Delhi and NewYork:
amongtheHistoriansand OtherEssays
Oxford UniversityPress, 1987).
18 Although I may be accused of essentializing here about "Americanvalues,"my point is that
whereas universalism castigates the notion of cultural relativism (hence, "Americanvalues") as
essentialist,it also celebrates the uniqueness of individuals (individualrelativismif you will) as not.
Yet, what is cultural relativism ultimately but individual relativismwrit large? At the same time,
universalismmust claim, by definition, that everyone is the same, having it both ways.
19 As arguedbysome, it maywell be disingenuous;however,the point is that a rationaleis provided
for its rejection.

489

PacificAffairs:Winter2001-2002
and articulate spokespersons of that universality, usually in impeccable
English. For their "courageous" ideological stance, they reap material and
ceremonial rewards, perpetuating their elite political and social standing in
their own countries while becoming part of "the fold," that is, the
"international community" where all good people belong. Whether or not
they genuinely believe in these universal principles, or more importantly,
truly represent the majority of "their"constituents, does not seem to matter
much. Neither, it seems, do the extremely destructive social and human
repercussions that such support encourages and engenders: the kind of
violence and anarchy that erupted in East Timor recently. Predictably, its
two leaders, who called for democracy and human rights (along with, of
course, independence from Indonesia) shared the Nobel Peace Prize, even
though they must have known that such a pronouncement would trigger
not peace but violence and were therefore also responsible for it. Does anyone
seriously believe that this highest badge of honour awarded in the name of
peace by the West - a form of secular canonization if you will - could ever be
given to someone who did not advocate democracy or human rights, his or
her actual contribution to peace notwithstanding? The politicalintent of the
Nobel Prize is clear, and no better illustration of this point exists than
Mahatma Gandhi - who never received it.
In short, the conceptual and theoretical decentralization of states and
societies in the academic andjournalistic worlds serve, even if inadvertently,
the interests and programs of those already economically and politically
decentralizing the real world. And the ideology to affect this decentralization
most potently in recent years is what I have blasphemously called "democracy
jihad,"a secular evangelism to be discussed more fully below. But something
else gets in the way of that crusade that must be addressed first: namely,
national sovereignty.
Universalism and National Sovereignty
No nation, strong or weak, universalist or relativistin orientation, is about
to abandon the principle of national sovereignty for true universalism,
especially when one's own territorial waters, friendly skies, and sacred
boundaries are at stake, although some like to question the legitimacy of,
and in one case create no-fly zones over, someone else's sovereign territory.
It is precisely because the notion of national sovereignty creates theoretical,
legal and practical problems for a more thorough implementation of
globalization that a rationale is needed to enhance the decentralization of
the economic and political structures of the more "intransigent" states
("rogue nations" they are called) - with "democratic reform." Domestic
opposition to those governments - if it exists and, if not, is easily created - is
financed in the name of democracy, while ethnic insurgencies or calls for
independence by "the periphery" are supported in the name of"autonomy."
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ParochialUniversalism,DemocracyJihad,and the OrientalistImageof Burma

The real agenda is political decentralization, for that weakens the ability of
these governments to control effectively their human and material resources,
thereby allowing the economically more powerful nations to dominate, either
by simply letting the market do its job or, lacking a market mechanism in
those countries, to entice individuals or groups (in and out of government)
seeking personal gain to work against their own national interests. And if
there is an internationally well-publicized domestic opposition that speaks
English well and requests help (for which economic and political incentives
are, of course, readily available and offered), that legitimates outside
interference even more. This is just another approach to the old tried and
true method of divide and conquer. (Indeed, one could argue that
democratic individualism, especially without safeguards, is a system of divide
and conquer par excellence.)
One of the results of pursuing this contradictory principle - the idea of
national sovereignty on the one hand and universalism on the other - is
hypocrisy. More than a decade ago in Algeria, when a democratic election
wasjettisoned by an army coup to disallow a fundamentalist Islamic group
from winning, there was not a peep from the usual "democracy advocates"
in the West, even though it violated the very essence of democracy. The
same thing happened recently in Pakistan and the reaction to it from the
United States and the West in general was essentially the same again.2 It
appears that the real motives were to disallow any Islamic fundamentalist
group from acquiring power even if it had been democratically elected. In
Vietnam, the United States prohibited elections from even taking place in
1956, although stipulated by the Geneva Agreement of 1954, knowing full
well that Ho Chi Minh, and therefore Communism, would win. In Cambodia,
it supported the ouster of Sihanouk in 1970, but when the Vietnamese
invaded the country and chased out the genocidal Khmer Rouge, United
States policy reversed itself and supported the prince,justifying it as "popular
will."The Shah, Marcos and Noriega, once in America's pocket, subsequently
became enemy number one, while the Maos and Fidels who refused to be
bought have been castigated. It is quite clear from this kind of selective
demonization and hypocritical policies that neither dictatorship nor
authoritarianism per se are primary concerns. Rather, it is whether these
countries happen to serve the interests of the United States (real and
imagined), as with Burma, or whether their leaders are malleable.
Accordingly, the United States government in its October 1998 budget
approved some $6,500,000 to promote what it calls "democratic" and other
"humanitarian"activities in Burma. (I suspect subsequent budgets continued
such funding and the forthcoming one will most likely also include such a
20 When I say the "United States"without making a distinction between administrations,that is
becausewhetherliberalDemocrator conservativeRepublican,the "consolidatedvision"(to use Said's
phrase) as a superior imperial power,and moral arbiter of the world, remains the same.

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PacificAffairs: Winter2001-2002
provision.) This is no less than official policy aiding and abetting the
undermining of a sovereign government, yet a Congressional committee
sanctimoniously admonished the attempt by Chinese-looking people with
Chinese names who contributed money to the Democratic partyfor purposes
of allegedly influencing U.S. policy: How dare those Asiatics use money to
soil our sacred and clean democracy? All this without a hint of hypocrisy.
The late Senator William Fulbright put it well when he wrote that this kind
of righteous thinking makes power synonymous with virtue.
The United States can afford to pursue such a moralistic (even if
hypocritical) policy vis-a-vis Burma without any risk of domestic or
international, political or economic repercussions because the country is
simply not important to it. (Can one imagine the United States government
apologizing - or even expressing "sorrow"for some harm done - to a country
such as Burma?) China, on the other hand, is important economically and
politically,therefore receives (real or imagined) apologies and most-favoured
nation status despite its similar (or worse) record over the same principles
hailed as universal standards for the world community to follow. Part of the
problem also is that the United States government has not honestly pursued
non-biased and current information on Burma, regurgitating from a standard
(media) "macro,"what was reported to have occurred back in 1988 and its
immediate aftermath as typical and current, when in fact it was a period of
national crisis when the very existence of the state was being challenged.21
The approach is what Edward Said refers to as using the simple copula "is,"
thereby ahistorically freezing in time an image of Burma to be used again
and again as needed. Congress has also sought information on Burma
selectively,from a vocal and economically well-connected expatriate Burmese
(and American) constituency22 with a clear political agenda and huge ax to
grind; much like the expatriate Cuban community in Miami whose opinions
about Cuba and Castro I presume we regard with some scepticism. Yet, there
is bipartisan support in Congress today for continuing the current policy of
demonizing and marginalizing Burma. It is led by not a few congressmen
who, with some righteous indignation, have taken it upon themselves to
champion Suu Kyi's cause, like Rama who championed Sugreeva's cause

21 I have been back to Burmafive times during the past four years.It is not the Orwellian 1984 as
depicted in the western media, not even close. There is a small, not particularlyvocal, but scholarly
group of detractorswho do not tow the "partyline" of the United States and some of its allies. They
do not lobby Congressmen, seek attention in the media, finance the education of anti-Burma
government students, or otherwise carry on what can only be called activitieswith a clear political
agenda. Unfortunately,this much better informed, farbetter trained,and less emotional constituency
has never been asked to testifyin Congress on Burmaaffairs.
22 This constituency, although not necessarily unified in a formal structure, is nevertheless
ideologicallyof one mind. It has the ear of severalCongressmen,both currentand retired;of several
cities and town boards in the east and west coasts that have passed laws boycotting goods made in
Burma (declared unconstitutional);and of such well-endowedfinancial organizationslike the Soros
Foundationwhose publication, BurmaDebate,is its canon on Burma doctrine.

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ParochialUniversalism,DemocracyJihad,and the OrientalistImageof Burma

without really hearing, or wanting to hear, what the other side had to say.
Burma policy, it seems, has become a blind, self-serving, personal crusade as
well.
In sum, whereas parochial universalism rationalizes and concretizes
economic decentralization with the idea and structure of globalization, and
treatises on diasporas and boundary-less cultures intellectually weaken
conceptions surrounding the nation-state and the idea of national
sovereignty, political decentralization of those nation-states is attained with
the idea of democracy, most benefiting the strongest economies, academies,
and polities.
DemocracyJihad, the New Evangelism, and the Demonization of Burma
When Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of Aung San, the "father"of modern
Burma was awarded the Noble Peace Prize in absentiaon a cold, gray and
drizzling December Tuesday in Oslo, 1991, it was the culmination (and to
her supporters, vindication) of a sequence of events in Burma beginning
with riots in August of 1988 and ending with her house arrest in 1989. The
events during that year of protests and crackdowns were depicted in the
western press as a pro-democracy movement versus an authoritarian military
regime and nothing else, thus beginning more than a decade of the
demonization of Burma.23This view of the situation was predictable, cast as
it was, in the context of other so-called "democracy"movements of the time,
particularly in Pakistan and the Philippines, also led by women, Bhuto and
Aquino; and the "victory"that capitalism and democracy were enjoying over
communism and authoritarian systems in the Soviet Union.
To all this was added, in the Burmese case, the emotionally charged image
of a young, determined woman fighting the might of the Burma Army almost
singlehandedly, armed only with her charisma and (although not
insignificant) her genealogy, separated from her children and (now late)
husband, espousing Gandhian non-violent means to ostensibly create a multiparty democratic political system that would respect human rights. In that
one person and in that one country, then, were captured many issues of the
decade: Aung San Suu Kyihad become the symbol par excellence
of democracy,
resistance to authority and human rights - and, indirectly, ethnic autonomy,
the free market, and feminism - and Burma had become the laboratory for
testing those issues.
Since then, and since the numerous self-proclaimed victories capitalism
and democracy have had over communism and the authoritarian state, the

23 I need not make a case here that Burma today has been demonized; the literature on it is
voluminous.The activityitself, however,is not new. HelenJames, ExecutiveDirectorof the University
of Canberra'sAsia Research and Development Institute, has traced it back to the missionaries that
went to Burmain the early nineteenth century. (Personalcommunication).

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PacificAffairs: Winter2001-2002
correctness of the ideologies and systems enjoyed by the "freeworld"appears
to have been confirmed. Indeed, the establishment of democracy has become,
virtually, a sine qua non for legitimate government per se. It now resembles a
jihad, a holy war, backed by aggressive and confrontational rhetoric as well
as economic sanctions or support. The most recent example can be found
in the declaration of the Summit of the Americas in Quebec, which includes
a "democracy clause." It stipulates that any country that retreats from
democracy will be banishedfrom the Summit meeting process (in the case of
Cuba, not invited in the first place);24 thereby restricting the congregation
to a holy brethren of nations who have been "saved."And those who "fall
from grace"are forbidden to remain in - or in the case of the "nonbelievers,"
enter at all -the Garden of Eden. Thus, not only does the word democracy
today evoke images and employ vocabulary of ideological purity, it has also
become a kneejerk, convenient, "catch-all,""cure-all," "end-all" term for
simple solutions to complex political problems. It marks good from evil, the
latter usually reserved for the Islamic Middle East and non-Christian
"undeveloped" Asia, and provides a blanket (at least public) rationale for
the West's God-given right to interfere in virtually any situation. It is the
"white man's burden" and "manifest destiny" all over again.
Indeed, any power struggle in Asia or Africa nowadays is automatically
associated with democratic reform and, therefore, considered desirable. In
what must have been a case of sheer absent-mindedness, CNN characterized
the burning, looting, raping and killing in Indonesia in the fall of 1998 as
the activities of "pro-democracy" forces. That was only exacerbated by
comments from a representative of the U.S., who virtually condoned those
same activities while visiting Southeast Asia as a guest of the Malaysian
government. More recently, the United States government actually sent a
congratulatory notice to the new "government" in the Philippines, in effect
praising its circumvention of the Phillipine constitution by turning to mob
politics to effect political succession. In countries such as Burma, even
instances of commonplace grousing is interpreted within a democratic versus
authoritarian framework of analysisby democracy advocates, so that ordinary
complaints by ordinary Burmese citizens (say, of annoying, standard
bureaucratic snafus, found anywhere) automatically become antiauthoritarian, pro-democracy statements. All this tends to encourage the
western public to accept simplistic paradigms, so that complicated events
are viewed as struggles between the forces of good (western-style democracy
and the free market) and the forces of evil (Third World-style everything
else), in which the Burmese situation is easy to "locate." Dialectic-ladened
analyses produce only sharply divided polarities with clear-cut categories
that are artificially placed in opposition to each other.

24 HonoluluStar-Bulletin,
April 21, 2001, p. A 10.

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The entire scenario, at least in the Burma situation, has become an either/
or choice, whereby if one does not (for example) support Suu Kyi'spolicies
in toto (such as her unsuccessful stance to block Burma's entry into the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN) then one must, surely,
support the government's policies also in toto.This kind of forced polarization
is illustrated below by an unsigned death threat I received during the height
of anti-Burma government sentiment, post-marked Seattle, Washington,
which (here translated by me) reads:
Dear KoAung-Thwin,25
Even though you are a teacher of history, partial to the military
government,andwroteand talkedof the economicsuccessof the military
government,one day,on the victoriousdayof the students'revolution,
you are going to repaythe blood-debtof the students. [Thiscan also be
translatedas "youwill repayin blood."]You have also betrayedyour
mother'sKarenrace.All of this is going to be recordedin the students'
historicaldocument.Victoryto the students'revolution.
And this is from an "advocate of democracy" in Burma.
The dangers that this sort of ignorance about democracy (and ethnicity)
fosters - exacerbated by western media and political leaders - are obvious to
those living in societies where freedom of expression and exchange of
different views are not simply a case of giving lip service to the process, but
shared, honest beliefs in their value. That this is not well understood,
especially among many of the same expatriate Burmese advocating
democracy in Burma, is obvious. Many are cut from the same cloth and are
as authoritarian and intolerant of alternative views as those they are
denouncing. Suu Kyi's plea for democracy in Burma should apply to her
own supporters as well, many of whom are actually liabilities rather than
assets to her cause. She may have realized this early on; in part, it accounts
for her concerted appeals for more discipline and responsibility among her
own supporters. (The current dialogue in progress between her party, the
National League for Democracy or NLD, and the government - and the
good faith shown in the process - is encouraging and suggests that cooler
heads may have finally prevailed, although there appear to be recent attempts
to sabotage the process by third parties whose interests are not served by
peaceful resolution.)
Still, the obsession with propagating democracy amongst the "political
heathen" continues, reminiscent of the zeal and piousness found in the
literature of imperialism. Only now, the latter's "superior"religious and racial
25 The "ko"means "elder brother"and is used here as a fictive kinship term because of the
unknown social relationship between us, but the contents of the letter suggests a subtler kind of
reverseingratiation.

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ideology (Christianity and the white man) has been replaced by equally
"superior" secular political and social ideology (democracy and human
rights).26The message may have changed but not the righteous assumptions
held by the messenger; that is, neither his belief in his own cultural-intellectual
superiority, nor, therefore, its rationale (the claim to universality) is
substantively different. In one recent case, it seems that neither the message
nor the assumptions have changed at all. The Pope, visiting India about two
years ago, appealed for religious freedom, targeting a religious culture that
is doctrinally and historically one of the world's most tolerant (Indian
Hinduism), by a religious culture that is doctrinally and historically one of
the world's most intolerant(Roman Catholicism). The Fourth International
Conference of Great Religions in Asia saw the Pope's visit as nothing less
than "aggressive proselytizing" wherein he "has declared war on Buddhists
and Hindus..."27 More disturbing, the Pope's message directly linked
Christianity to human rights, so that any non-Christian country ipsofacto
becomes suspect with regard to its human rights record. Similar to the
association between Christianityand European imperialism of the nineteenth
century, the Pope's religious crusade is now ideologically linked to the West's
secular political crusade. Thus, in much the same way missionaries during
the late nineteenth century declared that belief in the one and only true
God would bring salvation, today's advocates of democracy (and, since
Quebec, of "free trade" also) - the new evangelists - proclaim their doctrine
as the one and only true ideology that will save a society from hell-fire and
damnation of a worldly kind.
There is yet another questionable assumption found in democracyjihad:
that this "essentialized" notion of democracy is desirable to the majority of
the Burmese in the first place. We hear time and again that the outcome of
the 1990 elections in Burma is evidence of this desire, but neither the
elections nor their outcome necessarily suggests that the people were voting
for democracy per se or that they understood or anticipated all that it might
entail. Like people elsewhere, most Burmese probably voted for a variety of
reasons: personal, economic, political and psychological, and least (if at all),
ideological. If anything, it was more a vote for economic change after thirty
years of the "Burmese Way to Socialism," than an unequivocal plea for

26 I am not referring to the motives of genuine human rights groups and their stated goals,
which I presume are honest. I am suggesting, however, that the United States and other western
governments have used human rights as an ideological pawn for their political and/or economic
agenda. Is it merelya coincidence that Iraq,Cuba,Afghanistanand Burmaare singled out once again
for "egregioushuman rightsviolations"for 2001?The reasonsgiven for the decision, at least regarding
Burma,are transparentlypolitical,although perfunctorystatementsgivinglip serviceto "humanitarian
concerns" are included almost parenthetically.Indeed, the "rights"aspect of the phrase "human
rights"has taken far greater precedence over the "human"aspect of it. Thus, the recent ouster of the
U.S. from the UN Human Rights Commission comes as no surprise.
27 HonoluluAdvertiser,
November 21, 1999, p. A21.

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democracy.28 Similar to those who convert for economic reasons - "rice
Christians" they used to be called - one could perhaps call many of these
"rice democrats."
However the elections of 1990 is interpreted, democracyjihad'sassumption
that the electoral process is the sole criterion for determining legitimate
authority everywhere is self-fulfilling and tautological in any case. According
to this argument, since elections are considered the only valid procedure
for determining legitimate authority, only one kind of government will ever
be considered legitimate anywhere in this world - a democracy - thereby
excluding a prioriall other kinds of political systems, their procedures, and
the principles on which they rest. At the heart of this premise is what Marshal
Sahlins has called the "quantification of legitimacy,"29 the belief that
quantification persehas now become the ultimate criterion for the legitimacy
of virtuallyeverything. Issues as important as the death penalty or the election
of a president can be determined by a single (or few) vote(s), cast as much
for, and determined by, reasons of principle as for political, social and
unknown personal and psychological motives. But as long as the correct
numberispresent, so is legitimacy and, with it, authority. The implication, of
course, is that anything not quantifiableis also not legitimate.In other words,
the electoral process in and of itself automatically disqualifies Burmese
(indeed most non-western) conceptions of power, legitimacy and authority
from being even considered.
Perhaps the most destructive aspect of democratization is that it invariably
means decentralization. In a place like Burma, that is not a matter of (say)
allowing states other than the federal government to have more control over
federal funds earmarked for education, to set speed limits for interstate
highways, or to decide if same sex marriages should be allowed. Far from it:
decentralization in the Burmese context - and I would extend it to other
parts of the world as well - means social and political anarchy. And in Burma,
especially,anarchyisfearedfarmorethan is tyranny,a value not shared by modern
western society, where instead, fear of tyranny is all consuming. Burma's
modern history has shown, and the current geo-political situation shows,
that political decentralization (even the perceptionof it), has erupted in
anarchy, as illustrated time and again: Burma in 1988, Yugoslavia in 1999,30
28 Evenstudent leaders duringthe riots of 1988,who carriedsigns that read "democracy"(written
phoneticallyin Burmese), had to look in the dictionaryto find out what the word meant. I wasgiven
this informationpersonallyby a westernjournalistwho claimed to have been on the spot, and who is
also a most vociferous critic of the Burmagovernment.
29 I owe the original insight to MarshalSahlins, "OtherTimes, Other Places:The Anthropology
of Today,"American
vol. 85, no. 3 (Sept. 1983), pp. 51744, and to my colleague, Barbara
Anthropologist,
WatsonAndaya,for bringing the work to my attention.
30 The irony here is that in the 1950s under U Nu's parliamentarygovernment,Yugoslaviawas
Burma'smodel of nationhood, preciselybecause of its similarethnic problem and the waythe country
had "resolved"it. For a thoughtful essay,see Helen James, "Myanmar:The YugoslaviaFactor,"mss,
2001.

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Indonesia in 1965, 1998 and currently. Precisely because democracy is
regarded more often a causeof than a cureforanarchy, and because anarchy
is of paramount concern, many nations are reluctant to adopt seriously a
democratic system without first substantively indigenizing it; Sukarno's
"guided democracy" and Mao's "democratic centralism" are examples.
However, such adjustments are lamented by the west as a "corruption" of
"pure"principles, a reaction not dissimilar to the way the "localization" of
Christianity in Asia and Africa was viewed.
Yet, decentralization by democracy is naively perceived to be the same,
good thing, without a second thought to what that might mean to the people
and society being decentralized - quite revealing as to whose interests are really
being considered. Realpolitik or moral principles, the human consequences
of decentralization that democracy brings, especially in the form of anarchy
and civil war, are much too high a price to pay for those who have to do the
actual suffering, while behind the safety of our SWATteams, we wax eloquent
about the higher moral principles and righteousness of democracy, praising
God (and western civilization) for all the "sinners"who have seen the light
or, like Vali, martyrs who have died happily in the process.
On a less dramatic and more practical level, one wonders whether a
western-style multi-party political system with its inescapably linked market
economy, uniquely western notions of individualism and related secular
attitudes, as well as the infrastructurethat it implies - the legal, administrative,
and intellectual baggage that are invariably involved - are, in any case, in
the best interests of most of the people of Burma presently. That is to say,
even if a society such as Burma wishes to democratize (whatever that means),
its very short experience with,31and total absence of, traditional institutions
and conceptions even remotely resembling western-style democracy as we
know it (there is no equivalent indigenous Burmese term for it) raises some
serious infra-structural difficulties, especially if an American version were
imposed on Burma today.
For example, an entirely new and different legal code based on foreign
principles of law, along with its juridical apparatus will have to be installed.
This means, invariably,the creation of awhole new class of lawyersandjudges
trained to think and act according to those principles, who, whenever legal
judgment is pronounced, must cast aside indigenous legal precedents that
have been institutionalized for centuries and in their place substitute western
ones - precisely what happened under British colonialism. Why is this
intrinsically more desirable? The scenario also implies the creation and
building of new law schools to train lawyers and judges in these new ways,
money from somewhere to build the physical plants, equip and update the
libraries, and to pay the new (inevitably foreign) faculty for at least the first
31 There were, in total, approximatelytwelveyearsof experience withformal democracy,between
1948 and 1958, and 1960-1962.

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generation to concurrently train the next. None of this mentions a whole
new constitution that will be needed to uphold, reflect and support these
new (read western) principles of law, society and politics, and discard those
that have been derived from 2000 years of Burma's interaction with its own
history and institutions.32
In the meantime, in the economic sphere where presumably the market
will reign supreme, as there are no oversight organizations in place (the
numerous private consumer protection and government agencies, such as
the Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Union, National Association for
the Advancement of Colored Peoples, Federal Commerce Commission,
Federal Aviation Association, Environmental Protection Agency, and a host
of others) meant to insure that the public is not exploited by the most wealthy
and powerful without some legal recourse, the potential consequences are
likely to resemble the Russian experience when its political and economic
institutions were suddenly dismantled. And all this assumes that those
individuals and classes who will be most negatively affected by such changes
are going to sit around and watch the whole scenario take place without
doing anything to stop it. Or in contrast, that those with the most to gain by
such decentralization will not capitalize on a weakened central authority
and create the kinds of criminal syndicates that allow the pursuit of money
and power with impunity, a hallmark of Russia's new-found "freedom."
Such pervasive "reforms"- the word itself implies the superiority of the
message - also mean the westernization of Burmese society to such a degree
that English (or perhapsJAVA)will become the linguafranca, that the needs
of a few powerful and wealthyindividuals or corporations will take precedence
over those of the numerically larger but less powerful and poorer community,
and that secular (and western) ideas and values will invariablyreplace deeply
held religious Burmese ones, a process that has taken the west nearly seven
hundred years and is still not yet complete, while Burma is expected to do
the same in approximately a decade. In any case, the ultimate outcome is
for Burmese society to look more and more like the West in the twenty-first
century. Again, why is this intrinsically more desirable? In the final analysis,
underneath all the egalitarianrhetoric of universalism and democracy is an
indisputable assumption and the sine quo non of evangelism: namely, the
ideological superiorityof the message.
Conclusions
If there is to be any serious understanding of Burma, this evangelistic
"good versus evil" paradigm must be discarded (along with attempts to
32 Not that the Burmese cannot accept a writtenconstitution as ultimate authority;after all, the
Buddhistscriptureshave long been takenas ultimateauthorityin deciding the correctnessof behaviour
and thought. The issue here is whether or not a secular, political written code based on western
principles evokes the same kind of loyaltyas would the religious Tripitakas.

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"domesticate" and thereby control Burma) and issues fundamentally closer
to Burmese society and history addressed. And what are those? In brief, the
present situation is a complex mix of remote and immediate, internal and
external, historical and cultural factors.
It is, first of all, a consequence of British colonial policy and practice that
turned Burmese society upside down over a century ago. One might be
accused of whipping the dead horse of colonialism, but the horse has only
recently died. We historians are partly to blame for this by the way "periods"
in history are used: inviolable boundaries that cannot be transgressed. With
Burma's independence in 1948, all the consequences of colonialism were
thought to have been eliminated. They had not; they were still with Burma
until very recently, in much the same, emotional way the effects of the
Vietnam War are still with American society after the last helicopter left the
Embassy roof over a quarter-century ago.
Second, the current situation is largely a power struggle between and
among the Burmese elite, including some of the same actors, their heirs or
their representatives that began in the 1930s and 1940s. It involves personality
conflicts among the once-united leaders who had fought together against a
common foe, as well as against each other for over forty years and longstanding vendettas that have outlived virtuallyall the main players themselves,
but are nevertheless perpetuated by kinfolk, friends and followers. This
explains, in large part, not only the recent conflict in Burma, but the
immediate cause for dynastic upheaval in the precolonial era as well. Now,
as before, the relatives and loved ones of those who have become casualties
continue the struggle, not for ideological but personalreasons. And this kind
of personal vow for retribution is far more long standing and intractable
than commitment to an ideology, which can always be rationalized or
persuaded to change.
Third, it is a socio-economic and political tension between market and
non-market forces and institutions, government and non-government,
military and non-military, Burman and non-Burman, urban and rural, the
powerful and the powerless, that has been going on for nearly a half-century.
There is also a generational tension between younger and older, particularly
between officials who have retired and those still active, and possibly an
educational one between western-educated and Burma-educated people.
Fourth, the unique problems, histories and agenda of several minority
ethnic groups are also involved. The past fiftyyears sawlittle actual agreement
by these groups on the kind of nation to build, despite a formal "consensus"
arrivedat hurriedly and under duress and expressed in the 1947 Constitution,
borrowed from five different western models. Only recently have all the
insurgent ethnic groups of Burma, except one, the Karen National Union
(KNU), signed peace agreements with the central government that they had
been fighting against for about half a century. At least on paper, then, it is
the beginning of the end of that half-century of civil war. Nonetheless,
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ParochialUniversalism,DemocracyJihad,and the OrientalistImageof Burma

continued external support for the KNU - to demonstrate that opposition
exists to the central government, therefore justifying interference - as well
as profits made from the drug trade, have mitigated some of those efforts.
In addition, totally unrelated external political events in neighbouring
countries since Independence have shaped the situation: events such as Mao's
victory in China and the resulting flight of large Kuomingtang forces into
Burma, making the golden triangle their home; the Vietnam War and its
spillage into nearby Laos and Cambodia, which encouraged Burma's policy
of non-alignment and isolation even more; as well as more recent, economic
patterns and trendsjustoutside Burma'sborders,especiallyin adjacentThailand
and westernYunnan, that exert significantpressureson the economy and society.
Furthermore, certain traditional institutions and the political and religious
values they reflect continue to shape the nature of politics in Burma today.
Patron-clientelism is still dominant at all levels and categories of society;
authority and power are still intrinsic and not extrinsic (that is, ascribed
rather than prescribed); loyalty is still given more to the person than to an
idea; persona, genealogy and the manifestation of karmaare still important
ingredients of political legitimacy; and the place and well-being of Buddhism
in society is still a yardstick for determining moral order and, hence, sociopolitical legitimacy. Democracy,in otherwords,is not even an issuefor mostof the
peopleof Burma mostof the time.
Returning to Burma five times during the past four years, I have noticed
certain other new issues that have become important as well. That the
government changed its name from SLORC (State Law and Order
Restoration Council) to SPDC (State Peace and Development Council) is
indicative not only of its priorities but the changed conditions in the country
as well: that is, from a need for law and order to one of economic growth.
During the years following "the crisis of 1988," as ordinary Burmese still call
it, law and order was the highest priority.Once that was obtained, particularly
vis-a-visthe insurgencies, the government turned to economic development.
It sought and gained admission into ASEAN in 1997, which gave it some
regional legitimacy, while an annual GDP growth rate of approximately four
to six percent for the past decade or so has not hurt its domestic political
standing either.33 In other words, economic growth has become more
33 Asia Weekrecently ranked Burma fourth in GDP growth rate for 2000. Indeed, I would argue
that it is this economic growthduring the last decade that has provided the primaryincentive for the
NLD to conduct talks with the government. It appears, therefore, that the NLD is negotiating not
from a position of strength, but of urgencyand weakness,for this economic growthnot only threatens
to leave it behind, but has created a class of people who have benefited from it and do not want to
upset the statusquo. For the most recent book publishedon the currentsituation,see DavidI. Steinberg,
Burma:TheStateofMyanmar(WashingtonD.C.: GeorgetownUniversityPress,2001). See also Michael
Aung-Thwin,"TheMakingof Modern Burma:An InteractiveCD-ROM,"Center for SoutheastAsian
Studies,Universityof Hawai'iat Manoa,Honolulu, 2001, chapter 11. The most reliabledata on Burma
can be found in readilyavailableand current atlasesof the world on CD-ROM,whose statisticshave
been garnered mainly from UN sources.

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important than ever before in determining legitimacy, especially since the
immediate problems of the vast number of the Burmese people today, in
the most important ways- religion aside - are economic and infra-structural.
But as noted above, economic sanctions will remain ineffective, particularly
since other nations are willing and continue to trade with Burma. Now that
the country is part of ASEAN those sanctions are even more meaningless.
As for resolving the problems between the government and its domestic
political opposition,34 that issue is far more a preoccupation among
individuals and political groups outside the country, both Burmese expatriates
and foreigners, than it is among the majority of people inside it.35Peaceful
resolution could certainly improve the government's "international" and/
or regional image6 while allowing external advocacy groups to claim "victory"
for their efforts, but any solution is unlikely to change the nature and shape
of Burma's power structure, de facto or dejure, in the immediate future.37
Clearly, the power structure of any country will remain primarily an internal
issue,a perception, I believe, shared by the majority of the people of Burma
regardless of their political persuasion and in spite of the "spin"given it by
outside opinion that it is an external,universalissue. Besides, there is no real
incentive for the SPDC to make concessions to external pressures, since no
matter what it does to rectify the situation, either the ante is raised or the act
is simply ignored and previous policies continued. Thus, for example, despite
Burma's genuine efforts in interdicting heroin production,38 which Interpol
recognized by designating Burma host of its Fourth International Heroin
Conference in 1999; despite permission granted to Borje Ljunggren, one of
EU's key representatives to visit Suu Kyi and the NLD in early 2001; despite
continuing the negotiations for a peaceful resolution with the NLD, stopping
state media criticism of Suu Kyi and releasing members of the NLD from
detention; and despite permission given to the new UN envoy on human
rights39to visit the opposition in early April, 2001 (a first), upon their exit

34 As most observersof Burmaknow by now, since October of 2000, Suu Kyiand the SPDChave
been negotiating secretly,the contents not yet availableto the media and described as "delicate."
35 At least I sawno indication that this concern wasforemost (or even important) in the minds of
everyone I talked to during my visits in the past four years. I spoke to people from all walksof life,
especiallythose who do not speak English.
36 Japan has already provided some 28.6 million dollars in aid recently for opening these
negotiations.
37 For an insightful treatment of this view, see Robert H. Taylor's"StiflingChange: The Army
Remainsin Command,"in RobertH. Taylor,ed., Burma:PoliticalEconomy
underMilitaryRule(London:
Hurst & Company,2001), pp. 5-14.
38 By the way,the United States and Burma have been cooperating for eight years now, since
1993, in makingjoint annual surveysof opium yields.Yet, the country continues to be placed on the
list of "uncooperativecountries"in terms of drug interdiction.
39 Paulo Sergio Pinheiro is the first UN human rights envoy to be allowed into Burma in five
years.Accordingto the government,it is because he is willing to be open minded and not predisposed
to the same biases as the others have been. Accordingly,his report is ratherrefreshinglymore honest,
even if the UN subsequently (for 2001) went ahead and "excommunicated"Burma nonetheless.

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from Burma, the European Union almost immediately brow-beatthe country
and reimposed sanctions, while the UN, notwithstanding some moderate
language for the first time in years, nevertheless proceeded to lump the
country with the "other three" also being "excommunicated" - Iraq, Cuba
and Afghanistan - insisting, in effect, that Burma continue to do penance
and be punished until democracy is accepted "as its personal saviour."
Although this kind of verbal pressure may be standard modusoperandiin the
politics of the West, it is also precisely the kind of strategy that is likely to be
misunderstood and perhaps taken personally by Burma's leadership and,
hence, be counter-productive to the West's stated objectives in the long run
- assuming it even cares. Besides, the very notion of punishment assumes
the inherent superiority of the punisher.
These, then, are the internal and external issues, past and present, closer
and more important to the majority of Burma's people than those prescribed
by outsiders to be topics of discussion. This is not to say that other issues are
unimportant, but that these indigenous concerns should be the primary
focus of attention, not those imposed on the Burma discourse that the West
happens to consider important and universal, most or all of which have been
extracted anywayfrom western history, western society, western institutions
and western conceptual systems.
Having said all this, what are the political prospects for Burma?It is unlikely
that Burma's current leadership will adopt fully (if at all) any western model,
given the way it feels the country has been treated, particularly the wayit has
been demonized by the western press and several western governments mainly, it seems, for refusing to kowtow to them. Moreover, the latter's
uncritical support and near-deification of Burma's domestic political
opposition leader also does not sit well with the leadership. The government
feels that its opposition seeks power for itself rather than what it purports
publicly and internationally. This was aptly demonstrated by its self-serving
appeal to ASEAN and the "international community" to reject Burma's
application for entry into the organization, knowing full well that rejection
would nothave been in the peoples' best interests. In any case, this is staunchly
held to be a domestic concern to be decided internally. It is regarded as no
one else's business, particularly the United States', when it shows little or no
interest in the country in any other way or at any other time, except when it
thinks it can gain some moral mileage. Apart from the leadership, one must
also remember that for the vast majority of rural Burmese,40 traditions have
a very strong hold. Their daily lives and concerns are substantively different
from those of policy makers living in Washington or London, or those
meeting in the air-conditioned boardrooms of well-heeled, anti-Burma
foundations.
40 At least 68 percent of the people of Burma are in agrarian occupations and fewer than 25
percent of the total population of some 47 million live in urban areas.

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If not the West as model, who then? China has alwaysbeen regarded with
some degree of respect but also fear, while Japan has been perceived with
cautious admiration and some ambivalence. Within Southeast Asia itself,
there are few to emulate: Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and the Philippines are
not considered as models for anything in particular. Indonesia, however, is,
even (or especially) after recent events there. Its constitution is regarded as
a model for Burma's new constitution (particularly,the reservation of a fixed
number of seats for the military in its governing body) but not without some
misgivings about the country's Islamic makeup, its unique geographic
arrangement and its population density, none of which even remotely
resembles Burma's. Burma gets along with Malaysia and probably approves
of Mahathir's anti-western rhetoric and stance. But like Indonesia, Malaysia
is, in some respects, too different: Muslim, maritime, and market. Singapore's
socio-economic success is probably the most admired, although Singapore's
small size, its city-state configuration, its relatively peaceful transition to
independent nation status, its comparatively homogenous society (of mainly
three, well indigenized, ethnic groups) - and, hence, its relatively fewer
serious problems in this regard - hardly compare with those Burma has had
to face (and to a certain extent still faces) in the modern period. Singapore,
therefore, is simply not a realistic model overall for Burma to emulate.
Thailand is admired, even if grudgingly, because of Burma's domination of
it in the past, recent border incidents and rhetoric notwithstanding. It is
considered a fellow Theravada Buddhist country that knows how to deal
with the modern world effectively while still retaining the important place
in society of its sangha, its king, and its army.Yet, when the interior minister
of the previous Thai regime stated publicly that the occupation of the
Myanmar Embassy in Bangkok last year by Burmese gunmen was not a
terrorist act because their cause was democracy, it does little to enhance
relations. The implication of his statement is that the alleged goals, not the
actual behaviour of gunmen constitute terrorism, so that if the goal is (say)
Islam, then the perpetrators are terrorists; if their cause is democracy, they
are not.
In the end, because an incomparably powerful West has marginalized
this small country41 at virtually every opportunity, is largely ignorant of, and
therefore unsympathetic to, Burma's devastating and extraordinary modern
history, but also because there is an inner strength within Burma derived
from Theravada Buddhism, a fierce national pride stemming from significant
and obvious cultural and historical accomplishment as well as from a
recaptured identity once severely impugned by colonialism and, admittedly,
also because of some bravado and stubbornness, Burma will once again do

41 The annual GDP of Burma (1999) was approximatelyone half of one percent of the United
States' (0.6 percent) while Harvard'sendowment equalled that of Burma'sGDP in 1997.

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ParochialUniversalism,DemocracyJihad,and the OrientalistImageof Burma

what it has done before, and choose a "Burmese way"into the twenty-first
century.
That leaves one final question. Why is Burma, like Vali, such an issue,
particularlyto the United States?Rama did not have to shoot Vali (especially)
in the back; he was already the epitome of power. I think it is because the
arrogance that usually goes along with power requires more thanjust having
it; it must also be validated by the powerless. Much like the white slave owner
whose actual power over the black slave was simply not enough, he also
needed to have the slave admitthat the unequal relationship was the "correct"
order of things; Burma - small, poor, weak and (to the U.S.) insignificant
(like Cuba) - by not kowtowing to the most powerful nation on earth, has,
in effect, refused to acknowledge that desired link between power and virtue
that is so important to the American self-image.
Universityof Hawaii, Honolulu, August 2001

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