1

Interpretation engagement requires an ongoing economic relationship

Resnick 1 (Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States Programme at RSIS,
Defining Engagement, Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue
2, http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=1b56e6b4-ade24052-91147d107fdbd019%40sessionmgr12&vid=2&hid=24&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d
%3d#db=mth&AN=4437301)
A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT In order to

establish a more effective framework for dealing with

unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political

behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of

contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic,
cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: DIPLOMATIC
CONTACTS Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations Promotion of target-state membership in international
institutions and regimes Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state
and vice-versa MILITARY CONTACTS Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa Arms transfers
Military aid and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security-building measures Intelligence sharing

ECONOMIC CONTACTS Trade agreements and promotion Foreign economic and

humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants CULTURAL CONTACTS Cultural treaties Inauguration of
travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic exchanges (n25) Engagement is an iterated process in which the
sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating
in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions
across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material
resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign
policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For
instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender
state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the
target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate
divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the
target state. This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument.
First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense
contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool.
Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political
behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it
can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's
receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total
collapse of its national economy.(n28) Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential
source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and
institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.

This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly

conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can
either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given
instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

The plan is a one-time appeasement thats distinct

Resnick 1 (Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States Programme at RSIS,
Defining Engagement, Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue
2, http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=1b56e6b4-ade24052-91147d107fdbd019%40sessionmgr12&vid=2&hid=24&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d
%3d#db=mth&AN=4437301)
DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN ENGAGEMENT AND APPEASEMENT In contrast to
many prevailing conceptions of engagement, the one proposed in this essay allows a
substantive distinction to be drawn between engagement and appeasement . The
standard definition of appeasement--which derives from the language of classical European diplomacy, namely "a
policy of attempting to reduce tension between two states by the methodical removal of the
principal causes of conflict between them"(n29)--is venerable but nevertheless inadequate.(n30) It does not provide
much guidance to the contemporary policymaker or policy analyst, because it conceives of
a foreign policy approach in terms of the ends sought while never making clear the

precise means involved. The principal causes of conflict between two states can be
removed in a number of ways .(n31) A more refined definition of appeasement that not only
remains loyal to the traditional connotations but also establishes a firm conceptual distinction from
engagement might be: the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state by ceding
territory and/or a geopolitical sphere of influence to that state. Indeed, the two best-known cases of
appeasement, Great Britain's appeasement of the United States at the turn of the 20th century and of Nazi Germany in the 1930s, reveals that
much of this appeasement adopted precisely these guises. The key elements of the British appeasement of the US-acceptance of the Monroe
Doctrine-permission for the US to build and fortify a Central American canal, and acquiescence to American claims on the border between Alaska
and the Yukon--consisted of explicit acknowledgement of American territorial authority.(n32) Meanwhile, the appeasement of the Third Reich by
Great Britain was characterized by acquiescence to: Germany's military reoccupation of the Rhineland (1936); annexation of Austria (1938);
acquisition of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia as decided at the Munich Conference; and absorption of the remainder of Czechoslovakia
(1939).(n33) A more contemporary example of appeasement is the land for peace exchange that represents the centerpiece of the on-again offagain diplomatic negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. Thus,

a rigid conceptual

distinction can be drawn between engagement and appeasement. Whereas both policies
are positive sanctions--insofar as they add to the power and prestige of the target state-engagement does so in a less direct and less militarized fashion than appeasement. In
addition, engagement differs from appeasement by establishing an increasingly

interdependent relationship between the sender and the target state. At any juncture, the
sender state can, in theory, abrogate such a relationship at some (ideally prohibitive) cost to the
target state.(n34) Appeasement, on the other hand, does not involve the establishment

of contacts or interdependence between the appeaser and the appeased. Territory and/or a sphere of influence are
merely transferred by one party to the other either unconditionally or in exchange for certain concessions
on the part of the target state.

And, increase means to make greater in number

Dictionary.com Unabridged [Based on the Random House Dictionary, Random House, Inc.
2010., "Increase," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/increase]
increase[v. in-krees; n. in-krees] Show IPA verb, -creased, -creasing, noun verb (used with
object) 1.to make greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality; augment; add to: to increase
taxes.

Violation granting market economy status only removes trade barriers it does not
involve necessitate ongoing economic ties the aff is extra topical at best
Bulloch 16 (Douglas, Forbes, 5/17/16, China Is Not A Market Economy Yet, Let's Not Kid
Ourselves, http://www.forbes.com/sites/douglasbulloch/2016/05/17/granting-china-marketeconomy-status-will-make-the-whole-world-less-of-a-market-economy/#ea0f5c7557d3)
Market Economy Status (MES) would give Chinas competitors less opportunity to initiate antidumping measures on Chinese exports. The precise change would centre on how prices are
calculated; whether by reference to domestic prices and costs in China, or by comparison
with an analogue country.
The reason this matters is simply that in a Market Economy it is assumed that costs and
prices are determined by the market, rather than by the intervening hand of the state. By
contrast, in a Non Market Economy it might be possible for state agencies or state owned
companies to simply set costs and prices such that efforts to calculate appropriate antidumping charges are frustrated.
Removing trade barriers between two economies allows for the market to allocate factors
of production efficiently across a wider economic space. Economies of scale will be greater
providing an incentive towards corporate consolidation and greater specialisation. In due course,
this will have the effect of distributing capital and employment according to comparative
advantage, which may, of course, produce considerable upheaval for some industries and
regions.

Vote Negative
a. Ground topic links are predicated off of increases in sustained engagement there is no
link uniqueness for a one-off act of appeasement because that happens all the time.
b. Limits there are an infinite amount of restrictions that can be lifted the could facilitate
trade that explodes the negative research burden.

2
Obama and Abe are committed to deepening the US-Japan alliance, but Chinas
geographic and economic expansion are straining relations.
Oswald 2016(Rachel, staff writer at CQ Roll Call, The US and Japan: An Alliance, Redefined,
Roll Call, May 29, Online: http://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/u-s-japan-alliance-redefinedasia-pacific-defense-china-shinzo-abe-trump-clinton)

Obama traveled to Japan this week for the G-7 summit and a landmark visit to Hiroshima, but the
trip also came at a fragile time in the 70-year-old alliance between the two countries. The
partnership finds itself under greater scrutiny amid the Asia-Pacific regions shifting
geopolitics. In his first term, Obama outlined what he said would be the United States strategic pivot
to Asia, home to four the top 10 U.S. trade partners and nearly two-thirds of global economic growth. It was to be a rebalancing of U.S. interests in the new
century. And now, as China lays claim to disputed territory in the South China Sea and North Korea continues
its nuclear weapon threats, the world will see if the U.S. rebalance is up to the challenge. Central to the
administrations Asia-Pacific strategy is the U.S. alliance with Japan, one of the most important
and least understood of all U.S. security relationships. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is
seeking a greater leadership role for his country in bolstering the post-World War II global order. That order is
being challenged, particularly by Chinas economic clout and the recent military saber-rattling of Russia. In recent
years, Japan, eager to show its commitment to working with the U.S. military, has moved past the strictly pacifist security posture it adopted after World War II. A
little over a year ago, the United States and Japan finalized new defense cooperation
guidelines allowing deeper military collaboration. In September, Japans parliament, the Diet, approved legislation that
TOKYO President Barack

would, in the words of the Abe government, reactivate Japans innate right to collective self-defense, authorizing the countrys Self-Defense Forces to come to the

2015 was a
historic year for us and for the alliance, and the United States wants to ensure that
momentum continues.
defense of threatened allies, namely the United States. Abraham Denmark, deputy assistant secretary of Defense for East Asia, said

Japan has a vested interest in refusing MES status to China.

Seno 2016(Shigeru, Nikkei senior staff writer, Will China be granted market economy status?
Nikkei News, Feb 2, Online: http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/InternationalRelations/Will-China-be-granted-market-economy-status?page=1)

China joined the WTO, the Geneva-based watchdog for international commerce, in 2001. China's

WTO accession protocol contains

a provision that allows other WTO members to treat the country as a nonmarket economy.This
provision is to expire in December 2016. Some countries, including Australia, have already
recognized China as a market economy. Japan, the U.S., Europe and India will decide individually
whether to do so.To put it simply, granting China market economy status will make it difficult for
Japan, the U.S. and other countries to impose anti-dumping measures on Chinese companies for
dumping goods, or selling goods at unfairly low prices, in their markets. Debate on the sensitive issue

of granting China market economy status is already heating up in Europe. Hot topic European media reported last year that the legal service of
the European Commission, the European Union's executive arm, has come up with the recommendation that China be granted market economy
status. In response to the media reports, the European Trade Union Confederation issued a statement expressing its objection to the European
Commission's recommendation. The ETUC warned that if China gains the status, European markets could be flooded with cheaper Chinese
goods, dealing a serious blow to local manufacturing companies. Some EU members, including Italy, are also reportedly cautious about treating
China as a market economy. In the EU, the European Commission prepares legislative bills, which need to be approved by the EU member
countries and the European Parliament before becoming law. The European Commission has yet to make a formal recommendation about the
issue of granting China market economy status. But the Japanese and U.S. governments feel uneasy over the commission's move. Hosuk LeeMakiyama, the director of the European Centre for International Political Economy, or ECIPE, a Brussels-based think tank, said that multiple
European commissioners see the issue as a good chance to make diplomatic achievements vis-a-vis China. The European Commission is
specifically considering attracting Chinese investment in an EU investment fund in return for granting China market economy status, he said.
There is speculation that China might file a complaint with the WTO against countries that refuse to recognize it as a market economy. The issue
could escalate into a diplomatic one. Attention

will now be focused on whether Japan, the U.S. and Europe will be

able to keep

in step with each other over the issue. In stark contrast with Europe, however, there is almost no argument in the U.S. for
granting China market economy status. Critics in the U.S. have long accused China of manipulating its currency
to gain an unfair trade advantage. The U.S. also finds it difficult to show a conciliatory stance toward China ahead of the
presidential election this autumn. Another round Some people may feel a sense of deja vu. China has successfully driven a wedge between the
U.S. and Europe over the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a new multilateral institution. While European countries have
participated in the AIIB, the U.S. has not done so. Will the same thing happen over the issue of granting China market economy status? The
situation is now being complicated by the dispute over China's exports of low-priced steel products. The

Chinese steel industry

has excess production facilities. Chinese steel products have flooded global markets,
plaguing steelmakers in other emerging markets as well as in Japan, the U.S. and Europe.In
an attempt to curb China's dumping of steel products in overseas markets, nine steel industry groups around the world issued a joint statement last
year claiming that China remains a nonmarket economy. The steel industry groups include U.S. and European ones. On this issue, the U.S. and
Europe have forged a united front. How

will Japan cope with the issue of granting China market

economy status?China is the world's most populous country and second-largest economy after the U.S. in terms of gross domestic
product. Will Japan offer the giant dragon a carrot in the hope of giving a fresh boost to their recent movement toward improved ties? Or will
Japan, as this year's chair of the Group of Seven major industrialized nations, urge the EU to fall in line with it and the U.S. over the issue? At any
rate, Japan's final decision will be made in the prime minister's office.

Ambiguity in the face of Chinese expansion fans Japanese fears of abandonment - that
leads to Japanese armament.
Schreer 2012(Benjamin, deputy head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the
Australian National University, Abandonment, entrapment, and the future of US conventional
extended deterrence in East Asia (part I), The Strategist, 9/21, Online:
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/abandonment-entrapment-and-the-future-of-us-conventionalextended-deterrence-in-east-asia-part-i/)

However, this invokes a classical alliance dilemma of abandonment and entrapment. A vague

commitment to defend its East

Asian allies in a conflict of lesser interest to Washington not onlycontributes to fears of abandonment on
the part of allies, it might also encourage Chinese risk-taking. A strong commitment, however, might increase
allies risk-taking during crisis and raises the spectre of entrapment in an unwanted conflict with China. The crisis over the Senkaku islands is a
case in point. Washington has urged both parties to exercise restraint, knowing that Tokyo would expect it to come to its defence should the
conflict spiral out of control. Failure to do so would deal

a mortal blow to American credibility and could lead

to even greater cycles of armament in the region. Yet, the Japanese government seems ambivalent about US
commitment; it is unsure of what exactly the US would be willing to bring to the fight. Any move to provide China with
greater strategic breathing space as its power grows thus raises critical questions about US
extended deterrence relationships with its allies: how can deterrence by punishment be crediblein

territorial conflicts

which are vital for allies but not for the US, particularly if it involves the risk of nuclear
escalation with China? What will be the tripwire for US military engagement in such regional
conflicts between China and its allies? Or will there come a time when the US will signal to
its allies and partners that they are essentially on their own when it comes to certain
disputes with China?Deterrence depends significantly on capability and credible
communication to both allies and adversaries. In East Asia, the US needs a balanced mix of both denial and
punishment capabilities. Greater investments in long-range strike have to be combined with increased efforts to strengthen direct defence of
forward deployed troops and allied territory. More needs to be done to assist Taiwans capacity to withstand a PLA opening attack. Greater

cooperation with Japan to harden bases and to further strengthening ballistic missile defence is a welcome sign. Second,
and probably much more important, is communication. Obamas pivot announcement was a
good start but it is not a strategy that sets out how the United States aims to shape
Chinese and allied behaviour, including through extended deterrence. Its odd that the last US East Asia Strategy Report dates
back to 1998. Uncertainty also surrounds the AirSea Battle operational concept, which has allies wondering if it is more about reducing US
footprint in the region than reassuring them. Just as in Western Europe during the Cold War, the United States should clearly communicate its
willingness to put forward deployed forces in East Asia in harms way. No serious Chinese planner could assume that an attack on US forward
deployed forces, fixed or moving, would be left unanswered. Finally, the US needs to clarify whether the defence of Taiwan or territorial dispute
between its allies and China are really only of reputational interest. Ambiguity

is not only counterproductive to crisis

stability since it could invite Chinese miscalculations about Americas intentions and will to
fight, it also puts into question the fundamental principle of solidarity on which any
alliance rests.

Collapse of the US-Japan alliance causes Japan nuclearization within months that
collapses global non-proliferation efforts.
Hunt 2015(Jonathan, Nuclear Security Fellow @ RAND Corporation, Out of the Mushroom
Clouds Shadow, Foreign Policy, August 5, Online: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/japansnuclear-obsession-hiroshima-nagasaki/)

With the average age of the hibakusha now over 80, and Japanese society gradually leaving its pacifist and antinuclear roots behind, however, the security alliance with the United States and the nuclear
umbrella that it affords are increasingly crucial backstops for Japans commitments to
nonproliferation and disarmament. Without them, a nuclear arms race could ensue in East
Asia. If Japan pursued nuclear weapons, it would upend efforts to restrict their spread , especially
in East Asia. With the largest nuclear program of any state outside the 9-member nuclear club, Japan
has long been a poster child for nonproliferation. Besides its NPT membership, it accepts the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy
Agency the global nuclear watchdog on activities ranging from uranium imports to plutonium reprocessing. In 1998, it was the first to sign up for the IAEAs voluntary Additional Protocol,

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs touts

nuclear disarmament, and officials of its Arms Control and Disarmament Division toil
abroad in support of international efforts to manage and eventually eliminate weapons of
mass destruction. These attitudes and behaviors are often ascribed to the bombs enduring impact on Japanese culture and politics. An estimated 66,000 people were killed
which mandated even more comprehensive and onerous inspections after the first Gulf War.

and 69,000 injured in Hiroshima, and another 39,000 and 25,000 in Nagasaki in all, 250,000 to 300,000 died within 13 years. During the 7-year U.S. occupation of Japan, U.S. authorities
censored accounts of the bombings and its radioactive aftereffects on the cities populations. Anti-nuclear sentiment flared again after an American H-bomb test went awry in 1954, contaminating
7000 square miles of the South Pacific and irradiating 23 crew members of a Japanese fishing vessel the Lucky Dragon one of whom later died from radiation poisoning. The incident gave
rise to public outcry and anti-nuclear protests in Japan and was featured in the godfather of all monster movies Godzilla. One year later, Japans parliament, the Diet, restricted domestic
nuclear activities to those with civilian uses, a norm which Prime Minister Eisaku Sato further reinforced in 1967, when he introduced his Three Non-Nuclear Principles: non-possession, nonmanufacture, and non-introduction of nuclear weapons.

Yet Japanese leaders renunciation of nuclear weapons has never

been absolute. In private remarks, many of Japans prime ministers in the 1950s and 1960s asserted that the weapons would enhance their countrys national security and

international standing. (This was partly a mark of the era, when President Dwight Eisenhower insisted that he saw no reason why [nuclear weapons] shouldnt be used just exactly as you would

After Chinas first nuclear test in 1964, Sato informed U.S. President Lyndon
Johnson that if the [Chinese] had nuclear weapons, the Japanese also should have them.
He later confided to the U.S. ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were nonsense. Why then did Japan not build
atomic bombs in the 1960s? Mainly because the United States offered to share its own. Security treaties signed in 1952
use a bullet or anything else.)

and 1960 granted the U.S. military basing rights in exchange for protecting Japan. Those treaties were silent on nuclear threats, however, so after Chinas nuclear test, Johnson and his foreignpolicy team devised various schemes to make U.S. atom and hydrogen bombs available to Japan amid a crisis. In January 1965, Johnson inaugurated a tradition of American presidents vowing to
Japanese prime ministers, if Japan needs our nuclear deterrent for its defense, the United States would stand by its commitments and provide that defense. These reassurances seemed to have
their intended effect. In 1967, Sato acknowledged the importance of extended nuclear deterrence in a meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara:
The Japanese were well-protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and Japan had no intention to make nuclear weapons, he told them. Afterward, Sato announced that extended nuclear deterrence
also formed a pillar of Japans nuclear posture. When Satos former Foreign Minister Takeo Miki became prime minister in 1974, he convinced the Diet to ratify Japans acceptance of the NPT,
thanks to President Gerald Fords reaffirmation that the U.S.-Japan security treaty encompassed nuclear threats and the establishment of the Subcommittee on U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,

Optimists claim that nuclear

aversion, political checks, and international commitments will prevent a Japanese nuclear
breakout in the future. After all, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida who hails from Hiroshima renewed calls to accelerate nuclear disarmament at the NPT
Review Conference this April, inviting world leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to witness with their own eyes the reality of atomic bombings. And yet, Japan is
becoming increasingly ambivalent about its military restraint. Before his speech in New York, Kishida finalized new
where the two countries foreign and defense ministers would thereafter meet to coordinate their common defense.

arrangements with the United States that encourage Japan to function more proactively in East Asia. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is brushing aside widespread public resistance to a Diet
resolution that would authorize the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to operate overseas for the first time since World War II. During his first administration, in the wake of the first North Korean

Abe declared that a limited nuclear arsenal would not necessarily violate the
pacifist constitution. Tokyo affirmed its non-nuclear status in 2006, but with North Korea testing medium-range ballistic missiles, and China enhancing its conventional
nuclear test in 2006,

and nuclear forces amid the contest of wills over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, another review seems inevitable. In 2011, Shintaro Ishihara, the then powerful governor of Tokyo, even
called for Japan to build its own nuclear arsenal. A key variable will be how Seoul reacts to Pyongyangs provocations. South Korea is even more exposed to North Korean threats, and possesses

Tokyo invoked North Koreas nuclear arsenal to withdraw

from the NPT, which has a 90-day waiting period, it could build its own in short order. It has a growing defense industry recently freed from export restrictions,
mastery over missile technology thanks to its space program, and a reprocessing facility capable of producing
enough weapons-useable plutonium to fuel more than 1000 bombs like the one that leveled
Nagasaki. Indeed, if Japan wanted to, it could probably develop basic explosives in less than a
year and a sophisticated arsenal in three to five years. Faced with an existential crisis,
however, those numbers would plummet, as Tokyo fast-tracked a national undertaking.
an advanced civilian nuclear program of its own. If it took the radical step of nuclearizing, Japan would likely follow. And if

Case
Economic globalization spurs civil war and ethnic conflict
Ezcurra and Hidalgo 15 [Roberto Ezcurra and Beatriz Manotas Hidalgo. December 2015. Roberto Ezcurra And Beatriz Manotas
are Associate Professors in the Department of Economics at Universidad Publica de Navarra. Does globalization promote civil war? An
empirical approach. SH]

economic globalization possibly benefits the countries involved in the process in aggregate terms, it also
results in winners and losers withinthese countries. In fact, the opening of national economies to
world markets has led togreater inequality in numerous countries (Stiglitz, 2012). According to the
traditional view, economic inequality is perceived as a major driver of social conflict . Thus, as Sen (1973,
In any case, although

p.1) pointed out: the relationship between inequality and rebellion is indeed a close one. Yet, intuitive and natural as it might seem, the link
between income inequality and conflict has not yet received conclusive and definitive empirical support (Esteban et al., 2012 a,b). In any case,

other dimensions of inequality are potentiallyimportant in this context. For example, economic
globalization also contributes toincreasing spatial inequality (i.e. inequality across the various regions of a
country) (Ezcurra and Rodrguez-Pose, 2014). This is particularly relevant in this context, since a high level of spatial
inequality may lead to internal conflicts about the territorialdistribution of resources, thus
heightening the risk of secession and underminingsocial and political stability (stby et al., 2009;
Deiwiks et al., 2012). Furthermore, the positive and negative effects of economic globalization are
oftenunevenly distributed across the members of different ethnic groups . Accordingly, the degree of
economic integration with the rest of the world influences ethnic inequality (i.e. inequality across ethnic groups), favouring some
ethnic groups over others(Olzak, 2011). The implications of economic globalization on ethnic inequality may be especially
important in lower income countries, where ethnic groups that hold apolitical dominant
position are generally the most benefitted, while other groups tendto be excluded and reap
few benefits from the process of integration (Chua, 2003). In order to keep their privileged
situation and limit the degree of mobilization of disadvantagedgroups, the dominant ethnic
group usually adopts practices including thedeterioration of civil and political rights of
minority groups. This setting leads to anintensification of social unrest based on ethnic
cleavages (stby, 2008; Wimmer et al., 2009), which is consistent with the increasing relevance of violent
ethnic conflicts inthe last decades (Chua, 2003).

Multilateral trade increases bilateral and local conflicts

Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 08 [Philippe Martin, Thierry Mayer, and Mathias Thoenig. Philippe Martin is a French Professor
of Economics at Sciences Po in Paris. He currently serves as the head of the Department of Economics at Sciences Po and is a research fellow at
the London-based CEPR. Thierry Mayer is Professor of Economics at Sciences Po in Paris, Scientific Advisor in CEPII, and Research Fellow at
CEPR. Mathias Thoenig is Professor of Economics and Political Economy at HEC Lausanne. Make Trade Not War? Review of Economic
Studies (2008) 75, 865900. SH]
The objective of this paper is to shed light on the following question: If trade promotes peace as suggested by the European example, why is it
that globalization, interpreted as trade liberalization at the global level, has not lived up to its promise of decreasing the prevalence of violent
interstate conflicts? We offer a theoretical and empirical answer to this question. On the theoretical side, we build a framework where escalation
to military conflicts may occur because of the failure of negotiations in a bargaining game. The structure of this game is fairly general: (1) war is
Pareto dominated by peace, (2) countries have private information, and (3) countries can choose any type of negotiation protocol. We then embed
this game in a standard new trade theory model. We show that a pair of countries with more bilateral trade has a lower probability of bilateral war.
However, multilateral

trade openness has the opposite effect: Any pair of countries more open

with the rest of the world decreases its degree of bilateral dependence and its cost of a
bilateral conflict, and this results in a higher probability of bilateral war . A theoretical prediction of
our model is that globalization of trade flows changes the nature of conflicts. It decreases the
probability of global conflicts (maybe the most costly in terms of human welfare) but increases the probability
of any bilateral conflict. The reason for the second result is that globalization decreases the bilateral
dependence for any country pair, and this weakens the incentive to make concessions in
order to avoid the escalation of a dispute into a bilateral military conflict. This is especially
true for countries with a high probability of dispute with a local dimension such as disputes
on borders, resources, and ethnic minorities . We test the theoretical prediction that bilateral and multilateral trade have
opposite effects on the probability of bilateral military conflicts on the 19502000 period using a data set from the Correlates of War (COW)
project that makes available a very precise description of interstate armed conflicts. The mechanism at work in our theoretical model rests on the
hypothesis that the absence of peace disrupts trade and therefore puts trade gains at risk. We first test this hypothesis. Using a gravity-type model
of trade, we find that bilateral trade costs indeed increase signifi- cantly with a bilateral conflict. However, multilateral trade costs do not increase

We
address the endogeneity issue by controlling for various codeterminants of conflict and
trade; by including country pair fixed effects and time effects; and, finally, by
implementing an instrumental variable strategy. Our results are robust to these different
estimation strategies. The quantitative impact of trade is surprisingly large for proximate
countries (those with a bilateral distance less than 1000 km), those for which the probability of a conflict is the highest. We estimate the
significantly. Second, we test the predictions of the model related to the contradictory effects of bilateral and multilateral trade on conflict.

quantitative effect of the globalization process of the past 30 years that is characterized by expansion of both bilateral trade flows (with a negative

that its net effect

has been to increase the probability of a bilateral con- flict by around 20% for proximate
countries. However, for more distant countries, the effect of globalization on their bilateral relation has been very small. This fits well with
impact on the probability of conflict) and multilateral trade flows (with a positive impact on this probability). We find

the stylized fact depicted by Figure 2. This strongly suggests that conflicts have become more localized over time as the average distance between
two countries in military conflict has been halved during the 19502000 period. It is consistent with the changing nature of war as discussed by
historians (Keegan, 1984; Bond, 1986; Van Creveld, 1991). The related literature ranges from political science to political economy. The question
of the impact of trade on war is an old and a controversial one among political scientists (see Barbieri and Schneider, 1999; Kapstein, 2003, for
recent surveys). From a theoretical point of view, the main debate is between the trade promotes peace liberal school and the neo-Marxist
school which argues that asymmetric trade links lead to conflicts. The main difference between these two positions comes from the opposing
view they have on the possibility of gains from trade for all countries involved. From an empirical point of view, recent studies in political
science test the impact of bilateral trade (in different forms) on the frequency of war between country pairs. Many find a negative relationship
(see, e.g. Polachek, 1980; Mansfield, 1995; Polachek, Robst and Chang, 1999; Oneal and Russet, 1999). However, some recent studies have
found a positive relationship (see Barbieri, 1996, 2002). These papers, however, do not test models in which trade and war are both endogenous.3
In economics, related empirical papers on the issue are recent papers by Blomberg and Hess (2006) and Glick and Taylor (2005). They, however,
focus on the reverse causal link, that is on the effect of war on trade. They control for the standard determinants of trade as used in the gravity
equation literature. To our knowledge, our paper is, however, the first to derive theoretically the two-sided effect of trade on peace (positive for
bilateral trade and negative for multilateral trade) and to empirically test this prediction. Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001, 2002) show in a
theoretical model that terms

of trade effects may intensify conflict over resources , a mechanism from which we
abstract in the theoretical model. We also abstract from internal conflicts between factors of production
that may be generated by opening to trade as in Schneider and Schulze (2005). The recent literature on the number and
size of countries (see Alesina and Spolaore, 1997, 2003) has also clear connections with our paper because in both frameworks, a key mechanism

globalization reduces local economic dependence . In Alesina and Spolaore, the consequence is an increase in
the equilibrium number of countries. In our framework, it decreases the opportunity cost of conflict and
increases the equilibrium number of local wars . Alesina and Spolaore (2005, 2006) also study the link between
is that

conflicts, defence spending, and the number of countries. Their model aims to explain how a decrease in international conflicts can be associated

When
international conflicts become less frequent, the advantages of large countries (in terms of
provision of public and defence goods) weaken so that countries split and the number of countries
increases. This itself leads to an increase in the number of (localized) conflicts . In our paper, the
with an increase in localized conflicts between a higher number of smaller countries. Their explanation is the following:

number and size of countries are exogenous but trade and the probability of escalation to war are endogenous.

US steel industry expanding decline in Chinese production and anti-dumping cases

Pooler 16 (Michael, Financial Times, "Global Steel Industry Expected to Return to Growth",
1.31.16, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/76cb4804-c812-11e5-be0bb7ece4e953a0.html#axzz4AjqYBaLt, [CL])
The global steel industry is expected to edge back into growth this year in spite of waning
Chinese demand, at a time when low prices for the metal are casting a shadow over producers.
World production of crude steel will rise by 0.15 per cent in 2016, according to a Financial Times survey of 18 analysts, with
renewed expansion in the US and Europe offsetting a second consecutive year of
contraction in China, which makes nearly half of all steel. Any pick-up in a sector viewed as an indicator of global economic health will come after a
difficult year that saw the first annual production decline since 2009. Output shrank by 2.8 per cent in 2015, according to the World Steel Association. However,
several of those polled predicted a continuation of the tough market conditions that have pushed many producers into losses. Ingo Schachel of Commerzbank said: It
will continue to be a challenging year for global steel companies. Profit margins and price levels [are] still very unsatisfactory and its hard to see a short-term
improvement. A supply glut and faltering demand made steel cheaper in 2015 than at any time in the past decade. Four of the worlds biggest producers
ArcelorMittal, US Steel, SSAB of Sweden and Tata Steel of India have either had their credit rating downgraded or put on negative outlook by Standard & Poors
since November, while Posco of South Korea recently posted its first annual loss. Some relief could come from a reversal in the surge of cheap exports from China,

With
Chinas production expected to decline by 2.2 per cent, two-thirds of analysts who responded said
its outbound shipments would remain flat or decrease in 2016, following a 20 per cent jump
last year. John Lichtenstein of Accenture, said: Were this to happen, the modest demand growth increases forecast for
the US, the EU and other markets should support operating rate increases and somewhat
higher prices. However, upward price movement will be constrained by continued very low raw material prices.The US steel industry
is expected to swing into growth of 3 per cent this year following an 10.5 per cent contraction in 2015. A more modest
which has been seeking overseas buyers as its economic slowdown hits domestic use and which many companies blame for the dramatic fall in prices.

uptick of 0.9 per cent is forecast for the EU, where 1.8 per cent fewer tonnes were produced last year. Seth Rosenfeld of Jefferies said European steelmakers which sell
higher value-added products were better placed to withstand import pressures. But producers of commodity-grade steels risk both market share loss in addition to

. A number of anti-dumping trade cases under way in the US and EU,

targeting countries such as China and Russia, could boost domestic steelmakers by in effect
blocking some imports. Yet such moves do not address the root cause of the industrys woes chronic overcapacity and will simply divert the
pricing pressure, he added

flow to other regions, said Michael Shillaker of Credit Suisse He added: We think 2016 could mark the start of some material [plant] closures, should banks and
shareholders begin to refuse further liquidity. It could also see the most significant wave of bankruptcies and protectionist moves since 2002.

MES increases dumping and disincentives fixes to overcapacity kills domestic steel
turns the aff
Brotherton-Bunch 6/6/16 [Elizabeth. China Says It Cant Cut Steel Output Because Its a Market Economy. Alliance for
American Manufacturing. http://www.americanmanufacturing.org/blog/entry/china-says-it-cant-cut-steel-output-because-its-a-market-economy.
SH]
Not surprisingly, China wasnt having any of it. Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei told reporters that Beijing is already confronting the issue, which weve heard
before. But he also said something that caught our eye: Some countries in the world want China to set up a quantitative target to ease overcapacity. I want to say that
China is no longer a centrally planned economy, actually 52 percent of the steel sector are private companies. They are not going to take any instructions from the

says it is a market economy and therefore cant do anything about the

overcapacity problem.Lets get this out of the way China is NOT a market economy, and its steel
industry does not operate in a fair and open market. As the Wall Street Journal explained, most Chinese
steelmakers are government-owned or closely linked to local governments. Chinas statebacked steel mills provide jobs and tax revenue, and the government is unlikely to close or
cut production because it fears a backlash.Chinas steelmakers also benefit from a number
of other unfair government interventions, such as having their loans regularly rolled over
government. So... China

or refinanced, the WSJ noted. On top of all this, China often manipulates its currency, providing its
steelmakers with yet another unfair advantage. And Chinas communist party and
government still play a major role in critical aspects of the economy, including the financial
system, resource and energy sectors. But theres a reason why China is pushing this market economy
message.When China joined the WTO back in 2001, it did so under the condition that it would be labeled a non-market economy for 15 years. This gave the
United States and other nations additional remedies to deal with Chinas trade cheating. During the 15-year period, China was to take meaningful steps to move

and really, really wants that

status, since it will make it easier to dump its goods into our market (and without any
meaningful consequences).China isnt likely to do much about its industrial overcapacity; it
has broken numerous promises to do so . But Lous remarks on Monday suggest that we can expect the debate over Chinas market
toward an open market. It did not. But China still thinks it is entitled to be automatically named a market economy,

status to only intensify in the months ahead.

Ensuring domestic access to steel for military manufacturing is key to military dominance
cant rely on China and Russia
Bunch 16 (Elizabeth Brotherton-Bunch, Digital Media Director for the Alliance for American
Manufacturing, 4/15/16, Its Not Just the Economy. Steel Imports Also Threaten Our National
Security., http://www.americanmanufacturing.org/blog/entry/its-not-just-the-economy.-chinassteel-imports-also-threaten-our-national-s)

Steel equips the military. Dependence on China and Russia would be a huge
mistake . Weve written pretty extensively about the devastating impact that Chinas steel
overcapacity is having on American workers and steel communities nationwide. But the steel
imports crisis also is putting our national security at risk.Steel is essential for Americas
military, as it is used in the construction of everything from ships and tanks to armaments.
Its also a key component of our infrastructure (including in the energy sector). If America
was no longer was able to manufacture its own steel and as we learned at multiple hearings
this week, the industry is at a make-or-break moment right now we would have to
depend on other steel producing nations for our steel supply.Countries like China. And
Russia. You know, nations with whom we have zero disputes and so there's no chance

we'd get into conflict with them at all. Simply put, it is in Americas best interest to
ensurewe maintain a robust domestic steel industry , as Brigadier General John Adams,
U.S. Army (Ret.) noted. We cannot sit idly by as our most dangerous strategic competitors
rob us of the capability that ensure our weapons and equipment have a reliable source of
steel for the future, he said. The time is now to address this national security challenge to
our domestic steel production capability. Adams also outlined these concerns in an email sent
to Alliance for American Manufacturing (AAM) supporters, in which he urged them to tell the
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and Commerce Department to implement a plan to address
the steel imports crisis. Like our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, our steelworkers stand
guard in our steel mills, our mines, and our assembly plants, ensuring that our warriors have the
weapons and equipment they need to win on the battlefield, he wrote. We cant let them or
our country down. Adams isnt the only person sounding the alarm. Witnesses at the USTR
and Congressional Steel Caucus hearings this week also noted that steel is essential to our

national security, including company executives, union leaders, industry experts and Members of
Congress. Steel is used in our ships, armor plate, submarines, and countless other types of
military vehicles and equipment, said Rep. Pete Visclosky (D-Ind.), the vice chairman of the
Congressional Steel Caucus. Twenty-two tons of steel plate are used in every Abrams tank.
Fifty thousand tons of steel plate are used in every aircraft carrier, and half of that steel is made
in Northwest Indiana. Rep. Tim Murphy (R-Pa.), the caucus chairman, said: We can never

fall into a position of relying on foreign government-owned enterprises to meet

American steel needs .

Either the status quo solves or the aff doesnt China has already agreed to cut steel and
the plan cant force them if they dont want to
Geewax 16 (Marilyn, NPR, "US Workers Are Skeptical, But China Says It Will Restrain Steel
Output", 6.7.16, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/06/07/481136907/u-s-workersare-skeptical-but-china-says-it-will-restrain-steel-output, [CL])
Say you are one of the roughly 15,000 American steel workers who have been laid off or received notice of coming layoffs in the past year. You and your boss
would cheer any reduction in China's massive steelmaking capacity. Chinese steel has been flooding global markets and hurting profits for U.S. companies. But on

after U.S. and Chinese officials announced plans to reduce Chinese steel production
capacity, the applause from American workers and companies was, shall we say, restrained. "I would
love to believe it will lead to something, but I won't until we see evidence" that China has
actually cut production, said Holly Hart, legislative director for the United Steelworkers. And Thomas
Tuesday,

Gibson, CEO of the American Iron and Steel Institute, issued a statement saying companies in this country "welcome the new commitments by Chinese leaders to
adopt measures to strictly contain steel capacity expansion, reduce net steel capacity, eliminate outdated steel capacity, and dispose of 'zombie enterprises' through

these commitments will only be meaningful if they lead to

real results." Such skepticism stems from the futility of past efforts to trim China's huge
production at a time of weak global demand for steel. U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew said Tuesday at the end of talks held in
restructuring, bankruptcy and liquidation." Then he added: "But

Beijing that China has agreed "to actively and appropriately" shut down unneeded steel mills through "a range of efforts, including restructuring and bankruptcy." In

parties
tried to reach a comprehensive multilateral agreement to cut global steel production, but China
was uncooperative. The OECD, a forum for countries to work out economic issues, says only 67.5 percent of the steel produced last year was actually
being used, down from 70.9 percent in 2014. In other words, mountains of metal are piling up around the world,
hurting prices and leading to steel worker layoffs in this country and elsewhere. Now the U.S.
Treasury says China will participate in the OECD Steel Committee meeting, scheduled for Sept. 8-9, to
discuss creating a "global steel forum" to help tamp down excess production. Lew was at the annual U.S.-China
April, officials for major steel-producing countries met in Brussels for talks hosted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The

Strategic and Economic dialogue, a platform that allows the world's two economic giants to discuss differences. Secretary of State John Kerry and China's President
Xi Jinping also attended. At Tuesday's closing ceremony, Lew said that although

the talks "cannot resolve our concerns, they do

represent progress."

China war impossible

Wu 13 (Zurong, China Foundation for International Studies Center for American Studies
executive director, 2013, China and Americas Innate Goal: Avoiding War Forever,

http://watchingamerica.com/News/217271/china-and-americas-innate-goal-avoiding-warforever/)
China and the U.S. are currently constructing a new kind of relationship
between major powers, with several aims. One intrinsic aim is especially worthy of attention, namely
that China and the U.S. will not go to war today, nor in the future, and will forever maintain
a peaceful association. The Chinese and American governments and people are striving toward this goal
unceasingly because it is in the best interests of the people of China, America and the whole world. To avoid
conflict, to keep from fighting, to be mutually respectful and to embark upon a path of mutual cooperation acting
in these ways would benefit everyone. First of all, the globalization of the economy, information and other essential

their
interests are intertwined and neither can break the inseparable bond each has with the
other. The global financial crisis of 2007 once again made clear the great extent to which the Chinese and
factors have created a global village, and the U.S. and China live and work together within this community;

American economies are linked and mixed, for when one sinks into a recession or depression, it is almost impossible

When it comes to international security, climate change,

energy, counterterrorism, oceans and all sorts of other unprecedented areas, China and the U.S. share
more common interests every day, and cooperative negotiations are unceasingly
strengthened. Within this sort of atmosphere, discussing whether the U.S. and China want to go to war seems a
for the other to recover and flourish alone.

little bit untimely and excessive. Second, the current period is fundamentally different than the era of the Cold War,
for the development of peace is the theme of the present. People from countries around the world are all
concentrating their energy on revitalizing the economy and improving quality of life. After the end of the Cold War,
America launched several localized wars in smaller countries under the banner of the fight against terrorism, in the

Perhaps it was upon

consideration of the fact that large-scale conflicts could yield a level of
suffering and destruction that would be difficult to endure that America has not
launched any wars against the great powers that are in possession of nuclear arms. Even in
process bringing upon itself a heavy financial and economic burden.

the Cold War, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, America and the Soviet Union did not go to war. The
experience of history tells us that the inherent goal of this new form of Sino-U.S. relations will have the support of
the strength of the entire ranks of the worlds great powers; thus as long as both China and the U.S. have

Third, for over 40 years, China and the U.S. have

promoted a strategy of mutual trust, of the expansion of cooperation, of controlling
differences of opinion. These lessons from experience are the U.S. and Chinas most valuable treasure. Since
Nixon visited the Chinese, Sino-American relations have gone through wind and rain but have
always developed onward; moreover, the speed, breadth and depth of the
development have far exceeded everyones expectations. Indeed, Sino-U.S. relations
unflagging perseverance, it can be achieved.

enjoy a great vitality. And since the foundations were laid fairly recently, Sino-U.S. relations continually make

The highest leaders communicate freely and military leaders exchange

visits often. The two militaries are in the process of issuing plans for Chinese troops to participate in the 2014
Pacific Rim joint military exercises. Both sides have decided to actively investigate
significant military activities, report mechanisms to each other and continue to research matters of
significant progress.

security and issues regarding standards of conduct, which are relevant to the Chinese and American navies and air

These collaborations will give rise to a significant and far-reaching influence on world
peace and international security and will vigorously promote the actualization of the
inherent goal of the new form of Sino-U.S. great power relations.
forces.