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D. A. Allport
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1973) as the basis for certain fundamental choices, at the 'computational theory' level, about the overall organization of the visual
process (Marr, 1981).
Equally, it can be argued that the neuropsychologists' separable
functional components correspond-or at least ought to correspond-one for one with distinct representation systems, i.e.
distinct attribute codes (e.g. Allport, 1980; Monsell, 1983). Hence
they belong to the next level of analysis, the level of 'representation
and algorithm'.
At either of these levels of analysis, however, we find little help
in understanding what it might mean to 'lesion' -to injure rather
than to eliminate-one of these abstract components. Where physical injury results not in the total abolition of some function (or
representational ability) but in a reduction of its scope and efficiency-for example in diminished vocabulary, slower, unreliable
and errorful retrieval, etc.-then the box-and-arrow notation of
current functional-component models (e.g. Morton, Ch. 9) offers
no obvious way to accommodate these changes.
To understand these behavioural effects we need also to have a
model of functionally separable components at the (neural) implementation level. The principal aim of this paper is to motivate, and
to provide at least an introduction to such a model.
Even to suggest such an enterprise evokes responses of dismay,
even of abrupt dismissal, on the part of many cognitive psychologists. Clearly there is a yawning theoretical gulf here. On one side
of the gap there is a vigorous, even flourishing cognitive psychology, applied to both normal and pathological language processes,
operating almost exclusively at Marr's third level (symbolic representations). On the other side of the gap there are dramatic and
continuing advances in the neurosciences-, almost entirely at the
'basic components' level. Between these two, however, questions
at what Marr called the implementation level appear to have been
very largely ignored by those on either side3
In spite of this, if we are to press our question To which level
of description does the analysis of modular sub-systems or 'separable functional components' properly belong? the correct answer
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Distributed memory
To get a better idea of what this might mean, consider the following
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already familiar (Le. that stably recur), and thus can have potential
significance, from unknown or arbitrary configurations. Our intitial
question thus gives rise to two, more specific questions:
1. How might such a network be arranged so that each of a number
of different activity-patterns can be stably reinstated at different
times?
2. How might new, reinstatable activity-patterns (new 'units') be
learnt?
To begin to answer these questions, imagine now a network of
hardware elements, in which every element is connected to every
other, including itself, as in Figure 2.2a. Assume also that each
element can be active in a graded amount, rather than simply 'on'
or 'off'. Each interconnection transmits excitation (inhibition) from
one element to another, with a given positive (negative) weighting,
or 'strength' of transmission. The same weightings can be shown
also in the form of a matric of interconnections, as in Figure 2.2b.
(Naturally for any psychologically plausible application to human
memory we shall need to think about a matrix of many more than
just four elements.)
Most of the suggestions about learning within such a matrix of
interconnected active elements are variants of an idea put forward
originally by Hebb (1949). The idea is that the strength of connectivity between any two elements (neurons) changes as a function of
the amount of concurrent ('pre- and post-synaptic') activity in that
pair of elements. For example in Anderson's (1977) matrix memory
model, the basic learning assumption is that the weightings of each
interconnection are changed in proportion to the product of the
receiving units
A
Source
units
(a)
aa
B
ab
ac
ba
bb
be
ad
bd
ca
cb
cc
cd
da
db
de
dd
(bl
Fig. 2.2 (a) A completely interconnected network of physical elements. (b) The
same system shown as a matrix of interconnections. Each interconnection may
have a different variable weighting.
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1. Stability
Once evoked, a learned pattern-but not an unlearned one-will
tend to maintain itself.
2. Part-to-whole retrieval
The activation of only some elements of the learned pattern will
tend to evoke each of the remaining elements of that pattern, since
all of its missing elements receive positive connections from each
of the elements already present, while currently active elements that
are not part of the learned pattern are inhibited. As more of the
missing elements are activated, they also begin to assist the recruitment of the remainder of the auto-associated pattern, until the
network settles into the completed pattern. Some dramatic illustrations of this auto-associative forcing of missing pattern-parts are
given by Kohonen (1977; Kohonen et aI, 1981).
3. Retrieval dynamics
The process of reinstatement of the complete learned pattern is thus
extended over time. Where the input is related, in some degree, to
several different engrams (see below), the network will take longer
to 'settle' into one, stable pattern of activity. Ratcliff (1978) has
put forward a mathematical model of memory retrieval dynamics
that is formally equivalent, in several important respects, to that
of Anderson (1977), and which provides an impressive fit to a range
of experimental data on memory retrieval times.
5. Many engrams
Suppose, now, that the input forces a different activity-pattern in
the same population of interconnected elements. If this pattern
recurs, or is sustained, it too will come to be auto-associated.
However, the-at first sight-really surprising feature of matrix
memories of this kind is that the learning of this new pattern need
not disturb the memory for (i.e. the recoverability of) the previously learned pattern, even though both patterns are stored in the
same matrix of interconnections. So long as the different patterns
are orthogonal-that is, so long as they are not correlated with one
another-then many different patterns (engrams) can be literally
superimposed on the same matrix of interconnected elements, without mutual inteference. 4 The requirement for interference-free
recovery of stored patterns, that the different patterns should be
uncorrelated, is intuitively obvious when it is appreciated that the
process of retrieval of any stored pattern is essentially a process of
correlating a given input-vector (a 'retrieval cue') against the matrix
as a wholes. To the extent that the retrieval pattern correlates
with-overlaps with, resembles-more than one engram that has
been stored in the matrix, retrieval will inevitably be distorted by,
or suffer 'interference' from these other, related patterns.
The same principles apply to associations between activitypatterns in different sets of hardware elements. Imagine that the
group of elements, <x, in Figure 2.3, is completely connected to a
second group of elements, ~: every element in the first group is
connected to every element in the second group. Suppose further,
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MATRIX OF
INTERCONNECTIONS
U
T
N
P
U
T
P
U
T
SET OF
ELEMENTS ex
SET OF
ELEMENTS
Fig. 2.3 Two groups of physical elements, a: and ~, representing two different
domains of attributes (after Anderson, 1977). Every element in a: projects to every
element in ~. Every element in ~ receives an input from every element in a:.
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Written word-forms
The immediately preceding discussion has been in terms of a store
of spoken word-forms, as one possible example of a neuropsychologically dissociable, functional component. A similar case can be
made in respect of a store of written word-forms. Allport & Funnell
(1981) reviewed a variety of evidence for the independence of these
two functional components, which they referred to, respectively,
as the phonological and the orthographic lexicon. Each one of the
empirical consequences, listed above, of injury to the phonological
lexicon, based on our assumptions regarding distributed representation, can be re-stated, mutatis mutandis, as consequences of injury
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to the orthographic lexicon. Here, of course, the increased confusability in retrieval will be in terms of orthographic (letter by letter)
similarity. Again, according to the model of distributed representation advocated here, there are no orthographic word-units
physically distinct from the representations of (positional) letteridentities of which they are composed. The model, therefore,
predicts that impairment of the (receptive-expressive) orthographic
lexicon should be invariably accompanied by increased confusability among (non-lexical) letter identities, and/or, perhaps, letterpositions.
Most importantly, if this model is correct, what should never be
observed is the selective, permanent loss of orthographic knowledge
regarding any individual written word, while its orthographic
neighbours-sharing many of the same letters, in the same (approximate) relative positions-are unimpaired.
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attribute- domains
\\
--
The essential idea is that the same neural elements that are
involved in coding the sensory attributes of a (possibly unknown)
object presented to eye or hand or ear also make up the elements
of the auto-associated activity-patterns that represent familiar
object-concepts in 'semantic memory'. This model is, of course, in
radical opposition to the view, apparently held by many psychologists, that 'semantic memory' is represented in some abstract,
modality-independent, 'conceptual' domain remote from the mechanisms of perception and of motor organization.
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1. These examples are all lexical (Allport & Funnell, 1981). Acquired
disorders in other aspects of language-syntax, prosody) semantics-can similarly
be thought of as disorders of memory retrieval.
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