Could Mikhail Gorbachev Have Saved

the Soviet Union?

The Soviet leader is remembered as the man who killed a
superpower. But Gorbachevs gambit on reforms could have
worked -- if only he wasn't betrayed by the Communist Party.

DECEMBER 21, 2016

Amid the thousands of protesters who assembled on Chinas

Tiananmen Square inMay 1989, just weeks before the Chinese
government sent troops to crush the demonstrations, one person
held a placard that declared: We Salute the Ambassador of
Democracy. The envoy that this protester saluted was neither an
activist nor a dissident nor from a country renowned for human
rights advocacy. It was Mikhail Gorbachev, the general secretary
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who had arrived in
Beijing on May 15, 1989, two weeks before the Chinese
leaderships fateful decision to send in troops. The type of
democracy he offered was not Western-style liberal capitalism but
market socialism. Chinese students took trains from far-flung
provinces just to see him. Gorbachev inspired Chinas protesters
on Tiananmen Square because the Soviet leaders struggle to
refashion the Soviet Unions centrally planned economy and
authoritarian political system mirrored their efforts in China.
Reformers in both countries, protesters believed, were fighting
similar battles.

Gorbachevs visit, which marked the

restoration of normal relations between the Peoples Republic of
China and the Soviet Union, had been planned long in advance.
But Beijing was unsure how to greet Gorbachev, the Soviet

superstar. His meeting with Deng Xiaoping came as the Chinese

leader was drawing his country away from central planning and
toward a market economy. Moreover, it proved impossible for
Beijing and Moscow to separate foreign relations and domestic
politics. Chinese officials were unnerved by Gorbachevs strategy
of mixing market reforms with democracy. They saw how the
Soviet leaders example encouraged demonstrators on
Tiananmen Square to demand that China follow the new path
Gorbachev was forging in the Soviet Union.
In a speech in Beijing prior to the Tiananmen crackdown,
Gorbachev told his Chinese audience that economic reform will
not work unless supported by a radical transformation of the
political system. This is why, he explained, the Soviet Union had
held contested elections the previous month, for the first time in
generations. We are participating in a very serious turning point
in the development of world socialism, Gorbachev explained, in
which many socialist countries were embracing freedom of
expression, protection of rights, and democracy. Hard-liners in the
Chinese government prevented the broadcasting of Gorbachevs
speech.
By the end of the 1980s, Gorbachev had concluded that ending
the Communist Partys political monopoly was the only way to
implement his economic agenda. But Deng and his hard-line allies
in the Chinese Communist Party leadership were unwilling to give
up power without a fight. As Gorbachev left Beijing, the
authoritarian wing of the Chinese Communist Party was already
preparing a crackdown. On June 4, 1989, Deng sent the army into
Tiananmen Square, killing at least several hundred protesters,
maybe many more. The lesson, Deng told a meeting of top party
leaders on June 16, was simple: The recent events show how
crucial it is that China stick with the socialist road and the
leadership of the party. Only socialism that is, only one-party
rule, Deng said can save China and turn it into a developed

country. China needed to focus on its economy, he argued, to

ensure nothing like the Tiananmen protests happened again.

Mikhail Gorbachev shakes hands with Chinese leader Deng

Xiaoping May 16, 1989, in Beijing prior to a top-level meeting.
(Photo by CATHERINE HENRIETTE/AFP/Getty Images)

Scholars who study Chinas government have long noted how

closely Beijing studied political and social changes in the Soviet
Union. Yet historians have generally overlooked the central role
that China played in Soviet debates about how to remake state
socialism during the 1980s. Dengs decision to crush the protests
on Tiananmen Square and to double down on authoritarian rule
placed China on a path toward a market economy without
democracy. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, embraced free speech
and multiparty elections even as it plunged into a devastating
economic depression before breaking apart into 15 separate
countries. Many people blame the post-Soviet chaos on
Gorbachevs decision to democratize Soviet politics. Russias
economy has since recovered from those tumults, but liberal
politics did not survive.
Today, Russia has a market economy and an authoritarian political
system. Many Russians wonder whether they would be better off
had they taken Beijings model of authoritarian capitalism from
the beginning. Why did Gorbachev not follow Chinas path?

A file photo shows students from Beijing University during a

massive demonstration at Tiananmen Square on May 18, 1989
before they start a hunger strike as part of the pro-democracy
protests against the Chinese government. (Photo by CATHERINE
HENRIETTE/AFP/Getty Images)

The crackdown on Tiananmen Square transformed Chinas

politics, and it marked a turning point for the Soviet Union, too. In
1989, at the very moment China was forging anew its
authoritarian system, Gorbachev was freeing the press,
liberalizing political speech, and introducing competitive
elections. In just two years, Gorbachev tore down the Soviet
autocracy and began building the foundations of a democratic
polity. Yet this political change was accompanied by a series of
shake-ups that undermined the Soviet state. Local elites began
mobilizing ethnic minorities in the Soviet Unions far-flung regions,
from the Fergana Valley of Central Asia to the Caucasus. The
growing power of regional elites meant that Gorbachevs writ was
increasingly ignored outside of Moscow. The Soviet media
newly freed by Gorbachevs reforms took aim not only at
Gorbachevs enemies but at his own failings, too. Never since the
Bolshevik Revolution had a leader been subject to such public
criticism.
The Soviet leaders greatest problem, however, was his countrys
economy. After crushing the Tiananmen protests, China suffered a
brief economic slowdown in 1990 but quickly rebounded. The
Soviet economy, by contrast, spiraled inexorably downward.
Gorbachev implemented a series of measures to introduce market
incentives and legalize private businesses in industry and
agriculture. Many of these changes at least in aim, if not in
execution were broadly similar to the economic reforms that
Deng instituted in China. Amid these policy changes, however,
the Soviet Union faced a growing budget crisis that Gorbachev
was powerless to address. Unlike in China, Soviet politics were
gridlocked, and Gorbachev had little room to maneuver. The
budget deficit continued to spike upward, and because Moscow
had only limited access to debt markets at home or abroad, the
deficit was financed by creating credit and printing rubles. This
caused a surge of shortages and inflation that exacerbated the
countrys economic difficulties and eroded the governments

authority. By the end of 1991 just two years after Gorbachevs

visit to China the Soviet economy was in tatters. Factories
ceased production, transport ground to a halt, and bread lines
grew ever longer.
Gorbachev was powerless to resolve the crisis. The desperate
economic situation meant there was no money with which to
appease separatists or disgruntled ethnic groups across the
Soviet Union.
Meanwhile, Gorbachevs weakness vis--vis the military, powerful
industrial groups, and the countrys vast network of collective
farms meant that he was unable to impose budget cuts. His only
other chance of balancing the budget and defeating inflation and
shortages was to hike consumer prices as post-Soviet Russia
would eventually do in 1992. But Gorbachev knew that price
increases would eliminate whatever popularity he retained. Any
attempt to balance the budget, either by cutting spending or
raising prices, could easily cause his downfall. Political paralysis
produced by the powerful forces who opposed economic reform
was the ultimate cause of the Soviet Unions collapse.
Confronting these entrenched elites, Gorbachev hesitated, fearing
the political forces arrayed against him and hoping that the
economic reforms he pushed through would spark economic
growth. This was a gamble that Gorbachev did not win.
The military coup he long feared finally arrived in August 1991.
The security forces, who conspired with big industrial lobby
groups, locked Gorbachev in his Crimean dacha and seized power.
The coup failed after just three days, but not by Gorbachevs
efforts he remained stuck in Crimea but because of Russian
President Boris Yeltsins skill in mobilizing Moscow against the
coup. Gorbachev watched impotently from his vacation home as
Yeltsin defeated the putsch. Four months later, in December 1991,
the leaders of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian republics
met discreetly in a forest lodge and declared that the Soviet Union

 the country Gorbachev governed would no longer exist. The

Belavezha Accords were signed on Dec. 8 and began the process
that effectively dissolved the Soviet Union. As the clock rolled
over into Dec. 26, 1991, the worlds largest country officially no
longer existed.
The abolition of the Soviet Union and the emergence of an
independent Russia did nothing to resolve the countrys economic
problems, however. Yeltsin, the president of newly independent
Russia, inherited Soviet shortages and its gaping budget deficit. In
response, he freed price restrictions on consumer goods,
eliminating shortages but creating rapid inflation that wiped out
most families savings. Yeltsin also slashed military spending,
threatening to put former soldiers and defense sector employees
out of work. Farm subsidies were cut, pushing agricultural regions
into poverty. Some industries fared better; several, such as
Gazprom, the state-owned gas company, managed even to
increase their influence. Yet the 1990s were, for most Russians, a
period of tumult and tragedy.

A picture taken on Aug. 19, 1991 shows Soviet Army tanks parked
near the Kremlin in Moscow's Red Square during the coup attempt
against Mikhail Gorbachev. (Photo by DIMA TANIN/AFP/Getty
Images)

t the time of Gorbachevs visit to China in 1989, few people would

have guessed that a decade later Dengs policies would look
smart and Gorbachevs reckless. In the late 1980s, Gorbachev
was widely hailed for his liberalizing policies. He won the Nobel
Peace Prize in 1990 for reshaping the Soviet Union and ending the
Cold War. Meanwhile, Chinas decision to crush the Tiananmen
protests was not only condemned worldwide by governments and
media; it was also interpreted as evidence of Beijings
backwardness.
But by his death in 1997, Dengs decision appeared vindicated, as
world opinion had turned decisively in his favor. Deng had seen
enough of Russias tumultuous politics to know where he stood:
sacrifice political liberalization for stabilitys sake, because the
alternative was chaos and collapse. Chinese analysts of Soviet
politics continue to fault Gorbachev for abandoning central
planning too rapidly and in a disorganized fashion. Rather than
liberalizing politics, they argue, Gorbachev should have focused
on the economy.
Today, top Chinese leaders cite the Soviet Union as an example of
why Chinas Communist Party must keep its fist clenched on
power, even as it casts off the last remaining vestiges of the
Maoist economy. Jiang Zemin, who succeeded Deng as Chinas
leader, argued in 1990 that the Soviet Unions main problem was
that Gorbachev was a traitor like Leon Trotsky, the Soviet
revolutionary who was found guilty of betraying Marxism-Leninism
by then-leader Joseph Stalin. That was an ironic charge coming
from the official who first formally welcomed Chinas business
classes into the supposedly communist ruling party. Yet in
December 2012, Chinese President Xi Jinping echoed this
analysis. Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? he asked a
group of Communist Party members. Their ideals and convictions
wavered, he explained. Finally, all it took was one quiet word
from Gorbachev to declare the dissolution of the Soviet
Communist Party, and a great party was gone. Yet it is Dengs
logic that has come to dominate most interpretations of the

Soviet Unions collapse. My father, reported Dengs youngest

son, thinks Gorbachev is an idiot.
In Russia, many agree. Russians regularly rate Gorbachev as one
of their worst leaders of the 20th century. A 2013 poll found that
only 22 percent of Russians perceive Gorbachev positively or
slightly positively, while 66 percent have a negative impression.
By contrast, Leonid Brezhnev, who presided over two decades of
stagnation, is viewed positively by 56 percent of Russians. Even
Stalin, who managed a murderous reign of terror, gets positive
marks from half of Russians. It is not surprising, then, that Dengs
reputation in Russia has risen. Many Russians see China as a
model of what their country should have done during the 1980s
and 1990s. Liberal politics cause chaos and economic distress,
many Russians have concluded, and only a strong hand can
deliver economic growth.
Given the growing appeal of market economics combined with
authoritarian rule, it comes as no surprise that dictators such as
Russian President Vladimir Putin criticize democrats like
Gorbachev. The Communist Party was the institution that held the
Soviet Union together; it ensured that laws were obeyed and
taxes were paid. Once Gorbachev began his assault on the partys
authority in the late 1980s, is it any surprise that the country fell
apart?
Lost in this explanation is the fact that the Soviet system gave
power to a new ruling class of generals, collective farm managers,
and industrial bosses, all of whom benefited from economic waste
and inefficiency. Deng managed to compromise with other elites,
letting them retain their authority in exchange for their support in
pursuing economic reforms that allowed China to grow. But in the
Soviet Union, economic reform meant destroying the power base
of the special interest groups, leaving a potential military coup
lurking in the background and hanging over Gorbachevs head.
That was a threat Deng never faced.

The reason why Gorbachev lost out is not because the Soviet
economy was unreformable. Chinas example proved that the
transition from a centrally planned to a market economy was
possible. Rather, the Soviet Union collapsed because vast political
power was entrusted to groups that had every reason to sabotage
the efforts to resolve the countrys decades-long financial
dilemmas.
In the end, the political clout of these interest groups proved far
greater than Gorbachev anticipated. In his quest to reform his
country and steer it away from calamity, Gorbachev brought
about the very process that would eventually lead to the Soviet
Unions collapse.
This article is adapted from Chris Millers new book, The Struggle
to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse
of the USSR.
Top image credit: Getty Images/RPS/Ullstein Bild/Foreign Policy
Illustration
Chris Miller is the associate director of the Brady-Johnson Program
in Grand Strategy at Yale University.(@crmiller1)
Mikhail Gorbachev shakes hands with Chinese leader Deng
Xiaoping May 16, 1989, in Beijing prior to a top-level meeting.
(Photo by CATHERINE HENRIETTE/AFP/Getty Images)
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