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    Excerpt from On Thermonuclear War by Herman Kahn This is a 48 page summary of the 668 page book.

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    Excerpt from On Thermonuclear War by Herman Kahn This is a 48 page summary of the 668 page book.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    544 просмотров48 страниц

    On Thermonuclear War

    Загружено:

    WillisPD
    Excerpt from On Thermonuclear War by Herman Kahn This is a 48 page summary of the 668 page book.

    Авторское право:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Скачайте в формате PDF или читайте онлайн в Scribd
    Отметить как неприемлемый контент
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    ‘THE NATURE AND FEASIBILITY OF WAR AND DETERRENCE Herman Kahn Physics Division PLIRRRRE January 20,1960 (Second Printing Apel, 1960) ‘THE RAND CORPORATION Senta Monica, California Nore “This paper is «slg enlarged and eeiedvesion of an aie of the sme tle poled in the Sanford IResarch laste Journ for dhe fourth quer of 1939. 1c gursnarns me of the pos dscased in foricoming bok by Me. Kan to be pblbed by the Prinesto Un ernly Pes in 1960.1 Wap writen 2 pert vente hile he stor was oo eae fram The RAND Corporation he Cntr of Itecratonl tus, Princeton Univesity. ‘an abecvited vero of the SRI azide was printed in O's. News and World Report, Decenber 2, 1959. "Wie is pepe i ped by The na Corporation ssa comencace fo th athor and 10 fill he sequsts of the many props f0 which be has lecared on hs toi the vows expec are soley thas of the author snd do eo aces teflet the views ofthe Corporation. ‘THE NATURE AND FEASIBILITY OF WAR AND DETERRENCE Annee wars 100 bore to contemplate, to matally snnibiting to camber” Evan if bath ides blo thi, 1 poten eggeior sil ar a capably of aging at Selmited member of "Manichs” For only one side Ialieve wi, whether corey or nok might Toad Yo the sot catstophic mistake of Bitry —10 ether « Peal arr ova Armageddon ‘We are now entering the fiftenth year of the nuclear ea ‘Yet we are increasingly aware that we have a great deal to learn about the posible effects of a auclear war. We have leven mote to lezn about conducting international telations in 4 world in which force tends tobe increasingly more dangerous to use and therefore inceasingly less usable. Moreover, the basic foreign and defense polices formulated early in the nuclear era badly need review and examination. This pe Homma, sine her cui sane of te points scat teat n'a Tothomig hk, Theron! Ber Tone ‘Ker Sea nosh pa bye Peon Cey Possibly of first importance isthe casting of doubt on the widely accepted theory that the very existence of nuclear ‘weapons creates a reliable balance of terror. This theory com: ‘moaly olds tht a thermonuclear war would mean certain and ‘vtomatic annihilation of both antagonist, perhaps even the ‘end of civilization, This concept of certain “mutual homicide” has been comforting to some. It makes plausible the widely held conviction that as soon as goveenments are informed of the terrible consequences of « nuclear war, thee leaders will realize that thee can be no victors and, therefore, no sense to such a war, No sane leader would ever start one! According to this view, the very violence of aucleae war will act to deter ES “The moteaLhomicide theory has other comforting aspects. If it be granted that each side can utterly destoy the other, then expensive preparations to reduce casualties, lessen damage, and facilitate portwar recuperation are useless. Can we not spare ourselves the financial burden of such preparations? Such logic has sometimes been caried further, for some have argued that modern weapoas are so enormously destructive that only a few are needed to deter the enemy. Thus war can be deterred with much smaller forces than in the pas; in any case, we certainly don't need larger ones. ‘Maay proponents of this mutual-anniilation view believe ‘hat it is emportant to emphasize the horror and impractcailiry of thermonuclear wat, To do s0 will show that the need to settle our differences by peaceful means is urgent. Temptation will be removed from adventucers. It is clear that in order to 2 achieve success with such a psychological program itis neces sy that the fears thus generated be motual and celiable, To praphrase a remask made by Jacob Viner, As a defense against aggression, fear—lke fertilizer most be sptead evenly to be effective. ‘The mutual homicide theory can be sucessful in oretlling ‘an all-out nuclear attack only if both sides completely acept it. If only the West believes ini (and because ofthis belief dzops its guard), the resulting negligence can be incredibly dangerovs Even mutual belief in the automaticansibilation theory can still lead to trouble; the invitation to Blackmail of the Munich ‘ype is stil open. It is easy to see that to the extent that the theory may not be true—or that the Communists think it isn't “we should not weaken ouselvs to the point where we court "Pearl Hasbors" of "Munichs.” ‘The mutualannitilation view is not unique to the West ‘Malenio introduced itt the Soviet Union several years 420, apparently arguing) in the now-classical fashion that with iuclear war entaling the end of civilization, the capitalists would not attack; the Soviet Union, he std, could afford to reduce investment in heavy industry and military products and ‘concentrate on consumer goods. A different view seems to have ben held by Khrushchev and the Soviet military, They agreed that war would be orile, but at the same time they argued that this was no reason forthe Soviet Uion to drop its guard: aiven sufficient preparations, only the capitalists would be destroyed, With seme modifications their views seem to have prevailed WAR AND DETERRENCE IN 1960 ‘Much depends, therfore, on the validity of this notion of, the balance of tert. Ts it rally trve? Would only an insane ‘man initiate a thermonuclear war? Ts war, at least of the theemonucleae variety, completely obsolete? Or ate there cir cumstances in which a nation's leader night rationally decide that a thermonuclear war would be the least undesirable of the posible alternatives? Tt should be clear that if either the Soviets othe Americans ever become careless in the operation of thee alert force, i is conceivable that a war might start as a resul of an accident, ome miscalculation, or even irresponsible behavior. But the situation seems worse than this, for one can conclude that with current technology thece are plausible circumstances in which leaders might decide that war was their best altemative. To recognize such possibilities is certainly not to endorse them, ‘To support this asertion about the “feasibility” of thermo: clear war, itis necessary to describe and evaluate the impact fof a thermonuclear war and to describe the kinds of risks that ‘might cause decisionmakers to weigh the alternatives of going to war and not going to wat, The various phases to be con Sidezed in doing thie are— 1 Various phased progeams for deterrence and defense foe the United States, alles, and neuteals. 2 Wartime performance of the total system under dif: fecentpreattack and attack conditions 3. The acute fallout problems 4 4. Survival and patchup. 5. Maintenance of economic momentum. 6 Loag-teem recuperation 7. Postwar medical problems. 8. Genetic problems. Because many are particularly concerned over the last three items, we will star with them (GENETIC EFFECTS OF THERMONUCLEAR WAR “Many biologists and geneticists are worried about the genetic effects of even the peacetime testing of nuclear weapons, and some imply that the future of the human race is being jeopardized by exploding a few bombs in the Pacific Ocean oF the Soviet Arctic, One must grant that lt of bombs exploded inside a country would be far more dangerous then a few exploded farther away, Bot would it be calalyuic? ‘Calelatons inthis field ate inherently uncertain, and exper rental evidence is insufficient to be conclusive about some Jmportant effects. One study indicates that if, ina county that ‘vas hit by hundeeds of bombs, the survivors ofthe attack took modest precautions they might average about 200 or 300 roeat gens of radiation to thei eeprodacive organs before age tity ‘This i an enormous amount of radiation—one or two thousand times as much as people ia the United States would receive as A acai dconne of the gt pau of «temomaeas was an be found A Weer on «Sy of Now My eyon 322 ul 1 1958. 5 1 by-product of the test program. It fifty ta hundred times 8 mach as they would normally get fom natural sources. Iti 4 large and frightening dose It would result in much damage, but there is no evidence that it would be anaiilating If present beliefs are correct, the most serious genetic effect ofthis amount of radiation would be to raise by 25 per cen the number of children born seriously defective; that i, the rate would increase from the current 4 per cent of the total to a fnew level of 5 per cent. This is a high penalty to pay for a var, and more hocrible sill, one might have to coatinue to pay 2 similac though smaller price for tweaty or thity of forty generations. Bat itis still far from annihilation. This particular aspect of a war can be looked on at an intensification and amplification of the kinds of burdens we already ber in peace- time. Whether this extra horror of wat will deter «nation from ‘ong to war deprode on the peetuces under which it labore and the alternatives it has, MEDICAL PROBLEMS ‘There are medical problems other thin the genetic ones: the bone cancers and leukemias that might be caused by stron tium90 and the other lifeshortening effets of the internal and extemal radiation fom fission products, Hese again, analysis indicates chat while the problems ate horrible, they may ‘well be within the range to which we are accustomed For example, it is possible—as some scienttt have claimed —that 44 nut of testing lageyield bom, unknown thousands of 6 people will get bone cancer of leukemia, The true extent (oF ‘whether the claim is true at all) is simply not known. In any case, acceptance of this concept leads many to think that if a few bombs in the distant Pacific ot Arctic could case this much trouble, a lager number of bombs closer to home would be totaly catastrophic. Some military experts even assert that the socalled backlash fallout from the attacker's own bombs will be an automatic deterent. Would that the problem of deter: ence could be solved s0 easly! ‘The siration devolves to this: Even if it were tue that every time 4 megaton explodes a thoussod people die prematurely from the effets of the worldwide fllout~which would mesn that testing a single 10-MT bomb ia the Pacific would kill 10,000 people—this doesnot necessarily mean thatthe backlash from war would deter « determined dcisonmaker. Assim {or example, thatthe Soviets dropped 5000 BI on the United Sates (a faily large attack). This woold mean that worldwide, 5 million people would die just as azesul of the backlash, Less than hal€-s million of these deaths would accu in the Soviet Union, however, and even those half milion deaths would be sptead over fifty years or 0, The impact ofthese deaths would be less significant than, say, that of the annual number of deaths due to automobile accidents inthe United States. So far as the object of the attack—the United States—is concerned, the effec of the fallout would be much more seious, but it might aot be a total catastrophe. More and closer bombs cause ‘more trouble than fewer and moce distant ones—but not neces sarily that mach more, Tf the country is hit as hard as is 7 assumed, but people take advantage ofthe moderate protection that is available in existing buildings and take other simple ‘measures (that is, do things that the Russians today secm #0 be doing or thinking of doing), both the long: and shoct-trm effects of fallout are mitigated. With sach preparations and Some advance warning (the more preparation, the less need for wasning) most people can sursive the shortterm fallout affects exen though the longterm effects are ess avoidable ‘The war might shorten by one or two yeas the life expectancy ‘of those who were lucky or protected, and by five or ten yeats the life expectancy of those survivors who were not 50 lucky ‘or well protected. In any case, life would go on, ECONOMIC RECUPERATION Beonomic recuperation also Jooks more feasible than is generally supposed. Most people—laymen and some experts— looking at the highly integrated character of 4 modem ‘economy, argue that a nation is like a body: destroy the heatt ‘or other vital organs, and even though a few cells may linget briety, che body dies. ‘This view is questionable. Suppose the United States or the Soviet Union were to be divided into two countries—an A ‘country with the largest 30 to 100 cites, and a B country, the remainder. The A country cannot survive without the B country; but the B country, so far as we can see, can survive without the A country. Moreover, we estimate that B has the resources and skills needed to rebuild A in, say, ten years 4 In other words, a country should not be considered analogous to a body with vital irreplaceable organs, but rather should be considered as two semiindependent pieces that trade with each othe. ‘To continue the point, in most parts of the county it seems to be possible, by using existing construction and otherwise improvising fallout protection, to prepare the B country to fective evacuees from the A county and protect them in a reasonably satisfactory manner, If preparations have been made, then for most of the yar fallout protection coal be improvised fon only & few days’ or hours’ notice. In the wintertime both the United States and the Soviet Union might need more time ‘or better prepaction ‘Russian Civil Defense manuals (dated 1958) indicate that the Soviets are making such preparations. Ia addition, the ‘Rastans claim to have piven every adult in Rossia between 20 and 40 hours of instruction in civil defense, followed by a com- pplsory examination. Pethaps most important of all, their rogram scems to include preparations for evacuation to improvised fallout protection. How effective would such an ‘evacuation be? About 50 million Russians live in the 135 largest Soviet cites. If they evacuated, sy, 80 per cent of these 50 million to their B country and left the remainder to operate the cite, all essential functions could be maintained while exposing oaly ° about 10 million citizens. Also, having evacuated most of the ‘urban population, it would be comparatively easy to evacuate those temaining. So long as our ICBM force is small, the Soviets woulda't even have to execute the evacuation before they launched aa attack, since they would have time to do 50 before our cetaliatory foe reached te majority of thei cities. Under these circumstances, ifthe Russians should stke frst and were reasonably succesful, our retalistion attack would fot kill more than 5 or 10 million Russians and probably con: siderably fewer—unless things went incredibly badly for them. ‘Thos they might lose only a faction as many people as they lost in World War H Ina pasticulaty tense situation the Soviets could deliberately cevacate their A county in order to put pressure on us. Such fan evacuation would make it credible that they might go war unless we backed down. While tis would give us 2 sort cof warning, we might not act on it. We might zefuse resolutely to be “blulfed.” Unless we were willing to accept 2 Soviet retaliatory blow, the only practicable counteraction that we might have might be to back dowa or to put our Strategic Air (Command on alert and hope that this ation would be enough to deter them, The other posibility—to assume that they dida't mean what they scemed to mean—might be too risky. If we ‘wished to be in & good bargaining postion we would probably have to evacuate our own cities. (We have made almost 00 realistic preparations for such sep.) Evacuitiontype maneuvers are risky because they may touch ‘off an attack by the other side. But so far a5 the Soviets are 10 concerned the probability of such an attack by sis small, puticlacy because we have made negligible preparations to ward off, survive, and recover fiom even a “small” Soviet fetaliatory steke, They might acepe the risk of attack. They ‘would then be ina relatively good position to go to war if we did't atack or back dow. Thus the Soviets coud start such 12 war in any ctcumstances in which Khrushcher finds te risks (Of not going to war larger than those of going to war. Consider the bloody suppression of the Hungarian revolu tion bythe Soviets, Much pressure was applied forthe United Sates to intervene. We didn't. In fac, there are reports that wwe did exactly the opposite, broadcasting tothe Poles and the East Germans not to rock the boat since no American aid was fon the way, Asiume that we had acceded to intervention pres: sue on that orcasion, The Russians would then have been Faced with three fey serious choices: 1. They could do nothing, This could mean an almost auto matic Polish and East German revolt. Such a revolt would mean serious politcal repercussions within Russia, 2. They could fight a limited action. But that would bring its own risks, The satellites might still revolt. In addition, if we fought 4 limited action with conventional high explosive ‘weapons, we might lose just by sheer weight of numbers. 1 we ‘went to atomic weapons, i is doubtfl that we would win and feven more doubeful that the war would stay limited. The Soviets might easily belive that we were quite capable of suddenly expanding the scope of the war witha surprise attack guns their suategic forces. u 3. The thd posibily might appear safer to the Soviets, Rather than wait for the satellites to revo or forthe limited war to eript into s general war at a time chosen by the Americans, they might decide to hit us right away. They could langue that this guaranteed them the all-important first strike, at leas if they buried, tis posible that 2 situation as potentially dangerous a the ‘Hungarian revolt could arise again. We could get deeply, if involuntarily involved, Consider, for example, an East German revolt ia which a searmed West Germany felt obligated to intervene, or an all-out USChinese wat. If ether of these events happen, our retaliatory capability must be so good that ‘even if the Soviets evacuate their cities they will feel that 2 strike by them would be more risky than accepting whatever tlteenative sure 0 be instore, While T do not have space to discuss the difficulties of achieving this capability in the 1960-70 peciod, it is harder to accomplish than many suppose. DAMAGE VERSUS COMMITMENTS ven if one accepts the balanceofterco theory and we doa't have t0 worry about a deliberate Soviet attack on the United States, we ae still faced with important stategic prob- lems. Ia 1914 and 1959 it was the British who declared war, ‘ot the Germans, Such a ctcumstance might arse again; but if the balance of terror were reliable, then we would be 3 likely to be deterred from striking the Soviets as they would be from striking us, and it would be doubtful that the United States 2 ‘would rior to an allout attack on the Soviets, even to cocect, ‘or avenge, for example, « major Soviet aggression limited to Europe ‘That this now is plausible can be seen by Chistian Herts response on the ecasion of the heatings on his nomination "Teannot conceive of any President involving us in an alLout nuclear war unless the facts showed clearly we are in danger ‘of allout devastation ourselves, or tht actual moves bave been sade toward devastating onrslves"™ ‘A thermonuclear balance of teco i equivalent to signing a rnon-aggcsson treaty that neither the Soviets nor the Americans will iitiate an alLout atck—no matter bow provoking the ther side may become. Sometimes people do not understand the fall implications of this figurative nonaggresion treaty. ‘Let me ilstate what it can mean if we accept absolutly the notion that there is no provocation that would cause ust strike the Soviets other than an immediately impending or an actual Soviet attack on the United States. Imagine tat the Soviets have taken a very drastic action. I dou’ care how exteme of shoeking yoo imagine i tobe. Suppose, for example, that they have dropped bombs on London, Berlin, Rome, Paris, and ‘Boon but have made no detecable preparations for attacking TERE AEB et Kace ps» feng. On Janmay 190 es ap he Serene Soe he sl" an ph ‘Sing owe mie tat we Sedy peo macy rrr weg, beth ase pen andthe ae soko sede thse wraps thee ‘yop! seer, at osl ty madman atom ot (ae rn oe Sion ster ye woul ale ely pee oy B the United States, and that ovr retaliatory force looks good tenowgh to deter them fom such an attack, Suppose also that there is 2 device that restrans the President of the United Sates from acting for about 24 hours, The President would presumably call togeter bis advisers during this time, Mos of Frese advisers would probably urge strongly that the United Sutes fulfil its obligation and strike the Soviets. (Aftec al you have to draw a line somewhere, and the Soviets have ‘Sbviouly moce than crossed ths lie.) Now let ws further sup- pose atthe President is alo told by his advises that ever though we will kill almest every Russian if we strike the Soviets, we will ot be able to destoy all ofthe Soviet stratesic forces, and that these surviving Soviet forces will (by radiation, for strontivm 90, or something) kill every American in theit retaliatory blow. T find it difictt to belleve dat under those circumstances any President of the United States would initiate a thermo Inuceat war by retaliating 2gainst the Soviets withthe Suteaic ‘Ais Command, Theres no objective of public policy that would justly ending life for everyone. Tt should be clas that we Mould not restore Europe by our retaliation; we could only Tcceed in further destroying it, ether as a by-product of ou [ctions or becuse the Soviets would destroy Europe as well as the United States. “There were two important caveats in the situation destbed the President would have 24 hous to think about his response, tnd 177 milli Americans would be killed. Let us consider the fatter fist 16177 million dead is too high a peice t0 pay for “ punishing the Soviets fr their xg aggression, how many American ded would we acetate cont of oe etaition? TThave dissed this gurtion with many Amerie, and after about 15 minutes of Saco thes eximates ofan acceptable price genaly fll between 10 and 60 milion dead. (Their Temporary fst seacton, incidentally, sully is that the Unite States would never Be deere from ling vp tits obligations by fear of a Soviet contrbow, anand that invatably doappens after some minutes of retectin) The Sry one scons fo ive a the 6 milion fire i the ite stop One takes soot one third of «county's population, © jot lie ls than half No Areca that 1 Have spoken 0 fio was at all serious about he matter beled that US relation would be jsifcl—oo mater what uF commit tents were-if tore tan alf of or population wou be tiled "The 2¢hour delay sa moc sable devi Ii the equvalet of asking, Can the Soviets fore the President actin cold ‘ood, tthe than in the immediate anger of the momen? ‘Tac anone depois no nly on the time he hast ponder the cffecs that would acre fom Rit acon, but abo bow Spl and seriously the Presiden nd his aver bd thot about the prblem in advance, Thi ater, nur, old depend Gn whether thee had been any tee stations or crs that feved the Presiden and the people to face the concept that war is smehing that can happen, rates than smething that i velably dexeed by some cevlaatry poly tat is never ced on. (The effets of the war re umualy considered 3 lnrelevant to the declaratory policy, since itis asumed thatthe policy wll deter the war) have discusted with many Europeans the question of how ‘many casualties Aroricans would be willing to envisage and sill live up to thei obligations. Their estimates, perhaps not ‘sueprisingly, ange much lower than the estimates of Americans —that is, roughly 2 t0 20 allion. In fat, one distinguished European expert thought that the United States would be deterred from tasting with the Strategie Air Command against a majoe Soviet aggression in Europe by a Soviet threst, to destroy 5010 empty US. cities. ‘Will the Soviets find the threat of US. retaliation credible? have not asked any Soviet citizen, so I lack the advantage of any introspection, But we do know a great deal about Soviet ecisonmakers; in particular, we haw that they suoogly emphasize that decistonmakers should be able to control their ‘enions. They probably would assume that we fel the same ‘way. The Soviets do not believe in cating off theie noses to spite their faces. They write and seem to believe that one should fot be provoked into seldestucive behavior. Thos itis hard for me to visualize the Soviets believing thatthe United Sates ‘would willingly commt suicide. Infact, {would conjecture that they would feel fairly certain about this matter. They could still be wrong. In the United States, there is no tradition of controlling one's emotions. We have tended to emphasize the ‘opposite notion ("Give me liberty or give me death") and if the Soviets are cations they will realize this. However, if the Soviets were to test our resolve by instigating a series of criss, 16 they could probably find out experimentally, without running excessive risks, how much provocation we would take. No Imatter what oar previously declared policy was, our actual policy and the possibilities would then be verified by the Soviets. Most importan ofall in the war of nerves itis eff cult to believe that the Europeans would have faith in our adherence to declared policy if it were strained; basically, the problem is to convince the Europeans if we wish to prevent appeasement as well as destruction. Published unclassified eximates of the casualties that the United States would suffer ina nuclear war generally run from 30 to 60 million. If these estimates are relevant (whichis doubtful, since they generally assume a Soviet surprise attack ‘on an unalert United States), we ate already detered foom living up to our alliance obligations. If they ate not relevant, "Me ought to make selevant estimates for now and the future “The critical poin is whether the Soviets and the Europeans believe that we can keep our casualties toa level we would find acceptable, whatever that level may be. Jn such an eventuality the Soviets would be deterred from very provocative ats such 5 ground attack on Europe, Hitlertype blackmail thiets, or ‘even evacuating their cies and presenting us with an ult= ‘matuon. But if they do not believe that we can keep casualties toa level we would find acceptable, the Soviets may fel safe in undertaking these extremely provocative adventres, Or at least the Europeans may believe that the Soviets will feel safe, and this in itself creates an extemely dangerous situation for pressure and blackmail 7 ‘THE THREE KINDS OF DETERRENCE Te is imporeant to distinguish between thice types of deter: tence: Type 1 Deterronce (which the British all "passive detec rence’ on the plausible, but possibly incorrect, assumption that it requires no act of will to respond to 2 violation) is the deterence of a diect attack. Ic is widely believed that ifthe United States were diectly attacked, its response would be automatic and unthinking. Type 2 Deterrence (which the Bait ish have called “active deterrence” because it clearly takes an act of will to initiate) is defined as wsing strategic theeats 0 deter an enemy from engaging in very provocative acs other than a dec attack on the United States itself. Type 3 Deter ‘rence might be called “tit forstas deterrence.” It refees to those sus that aie eters because the potential aggrcaor in afraid thatthe defender or others wil then take limited actions, mil tary o¢ nonmlitary, that will make the aggression unprofitable, ‘These three types of deterrence will be discussed in tam at length Type 1 Deterrence (Deterrence against 4 Direct Attack) ‘Most experts today argue that we must make this particule type of deterrence work, that we simply cannot face the poss bility of a failure, Never have the stakes on successor failure fof prevention been so high. Although the extreme view that deterrence is everything and that alleviation is bopeless is 18 questionable, clealy Type 1 Deterrence must have first priority Tn spite of the many words lavished on Type 1 Deterrence, most discussions of the conditions needed for such deterrence tend to be waealisic. Typically, discussions of the capability of the United States to deter direc attack compare the preatack inventory of our forces with the preatack inventory of the Rassan foices—that is, the number of planes, missles, amy Alivisions, and submarines of the two countries are dicet!y ‘compared. This is a World War Land World War Il approsch ‘The really essential numbers, however, ate estimates of the damage that the retaliatory forces can inflict after being hit valuation must take into account eat the Russians could strike «ata time and with tactics of their choosing, Woe strike back vith 2 damaged and pethaps wncoordinased force, which must Conduct its operations ia the postatack encironment. The Soviets may use blackmail threats to intimidate our response. ‘The Russian defense is completely alerted. f the strike has been preceded by a tense period, their active defense forces have been augmented and their Gites have been at least pas- tially evacuated. Any of the emphasized words can be very important, but almost all of them are ignoted in most discus: sions of Type 1 Deterrence “The frst step inthis cacultion—analyss of the effects of the Russian stike on US. reclitory ability—depends critically ‘nthe enemy's tactics and capabilites. The question of warning is generally uppermost. Analyses of the effect of the enemy's firs strike often neglect the most important part ofthe problem by assuming tha warning will be effective and that our forces 9 {get off the ground snd are sent on their way to thee targets Actually, without effective warning, attrition on tbe ground can be much more important than attrition in the air. The enemy may not only use tactic that limit our warning, but be may do other things to counter our defensive measures, sch as iotefering with command and control serangements, Thus & is important in evaluating enemy capabilities to look not ‘nly at the tactics Ut past histo and standard assumptions lead us to expect, but also at any other tactice that a clever ney might use. We shovld not always astume what Albect Woblsetter has called “USS. prefesced atacks” in estimsting the performance of our system. We should also look at "SU. preferred atachs’—a sensible Soviet planner may prefer them! ‘The enemy, by choosing the timing of an attack, has several, Gauturs in is Gave, He ean selet s Hime cakulated to force four manned-bomber force to retaliate in the daytime, when his day fighters and his air defense systems will be much moze fective, Ta addition, he can choose the sesron 30 that his postwar agccultural problems and fallout protection problems will be Tess dificale “The second part of the calcalation consequences of the lack of coordination of the surviving US. forees—depends greatly on our tactics and the flexibility of our plans. If, for ‘example, our offensive force is assigned a large target aye tem 50 that itis spread thinly, and if because of a large oF saccesafol Russian atack the Russians have succeded in de stuoying, mach of our force, many important Russian targets would go unatacked. If, on the other hand, to avoid this we 2 double or triple the assignment to important targets, we might ‘overdestroy many targets, especially ifthe Soviets had not struck us successfully. For this and other reasons, it would be wise to evaluate the damage and then retarget the surviving forces. Whether this can be done depends cially onthe tim ing ofthe attack, the nature of the targeting process and our postatack capability for evaluation, command, and contro. ur attack may also be degraded because of problems af ‘rouping, timing, and refueling: in some instances our manned bombers might be forced to inflate in small groups into Soviet ait terstory and lose the advantage of satuation of the Soviet defenses. Whether or not this would be disastrous de- ppends a great deal on the quality of the Russian airdefense system, especially on whether it has any holes we can exploit, sand the kind and umber of peaceston aids we use, This aspect is complicated and clasified ‘Another point that may be of great importance ie that modern nuclear weapons are so powerful that even if they don't destroy their target, they may change the environment 30 85 to cause the retaliating weapon system to be inoperable. ‘The various effects of nuclear wespons include blast, thermal ‘aiation, gtound shock, debvs, dust, and ionizing radiation — any of which may affect people, puipment, propagation of electromagnetic signals, et. One might say that the problem of operating in a postaack environment after traning jn the Pescetime environment is similar to taining at the equator tnd then moving major but incomplete past (that is, 2 damaged system) to the arctic and expecting this incomplete a system to work efficiently the fist time itis tried. This is partculaely implausible if a soften true, the intact stem is bazely operable atthe equator (tat is, in peacetime) In addition to attacking the jtem, the enemy may attempt to attack our resolve. Imagine, for example, that we had a pure Polacis system invulnerable to an all-out simultaneous enemy attack (iavalaerable by assumption and not by analysis) and the enemy started to destroy our submarines one ata time 2 sea. Suppose an Ametican President were tld that if we started an allot war in retaliation, the Soviets could and ‘would destroy every American because of limitations in our ‘offense and ovr active and pasive defenses. Now if the Presi deat has a chance to think about the problem, he simpy cannot initiate this kind of war even with such provocation. Against ‘even stonger strategic postures there will sill be oppocrnites for using postattack coercion. In some cases it will cost the Soviets nothing to use tactics combined with threats which, if they work, will greatly alleviate theie military problems, if they do not work, the situation will be almost snchanged anj- sway. I donot have the space hereto discuss de timing, conte, communication, and persuasion problems involved in making differnt kinds of postattack coecion feasible, but they do not look insurmountable. ‘One of the most important and yet the most neglected ele ments of the retaliatory calculation isthe effet of the Russie civildefease measures. The Russians are seldom credited with even modest preparednes in civil defense. Analysts sometimes 40 50 far a8 to assume that peacetime cian activites will Psy continue on a business-as-useal bass, ours after Russian mis files or planes have been dispatched. The analysts may then procede to worry about conventional day-night variations in population. This is not only ridiclous iis also symptomatic Of the lack of realism and the prevalent tendency toward ‘underestimating the enemy. "A much move reasonable alternative that would apply ia ‘many stuations—that the Russians might at some point evact ate their city popalation to places affording existing or im provisable fallout protection—is. almost never cealisticlly fxamined, Ifthe Ressins should take steps t0 evacuate their ‘Gtes, the vulnerability of their population would be dsamat jaally reduced "The Soviets also know that they can take an enormous amount oF economic damage and be se back ony-a few years in their development. Not only did they do something like this after World War I, but what is even more impressive, they fought « wae after the Germans hed destroyed most of thee existing military power and occupied an area that coo tuined about 40 per cent of the prewar Soviet population— the most industrialized 40 per cent. According to Soviet et mates, by the time the war ended they had lost about one thicd of their wealth—almost the proportion we would lose if we lost all of the A country. The Soviets rebuilt the destroyed wealth in about six years. Moreover, since 1931 they have had 2 vigocous program to disperse their industry, a progeam that seems to have been stepped up since World War Il Tt is quite likely that eheic B country is at least as capable of restoring 2 society 28 ours. Much moce important, they probably now the capabilites of their B country. ‘The difficltes of Type 1 Detezeence arse mainly from the fact thatthe deterring nation must strike second, These diff ‘lies aze compounded by the rapidity with which the tech nology of war changes and the special difficulty the defender has in reacting quickly and adequately to changes inthe offense. ‘The socalled missile gap illustrates the problem. The Russians announced in August, 1957, that they had tested an ICBM. Evidence of thee technical ability to do this was furnished by Sputnik I, sent aloft in October of that year. Early in 1959 Khrushchev boasted that the Soviet Union had intercontinental rockets in serial production, We have litle reason to believe that they won't have appreciable numbers. of operational ICBMs about theee years after their sucessful test—which ‘would be in Ausgyat, 1960, Suppose that in 1957 and 1938 we had refused to react to this “bypothetical” theat, so that when the autumn of 1960 appeared we had not completed the needed modifications to ove defenses to accommodate this development. What kind of risk would we have ran? T will assume (on the bass of newspaper eeposts and Con- {gressional testimony) that we had approximately 25 analert SSAC home bases in 1957. In accordance with the proposed Inypothess of doing nothing, 1 will (incorrectly) assume that ‘we till have 25 bases in 1960, The numberof mises that che Rossians would need in order, hypothetically, to destroy these 25 SAC hases depends on their technology. Assume that their 4 missile has a probability of one in two of succesfully com pleting its countdown and destroying the SAC base at which it is launched. What would we have risked? Simple calculation indicates that our risk would have been substantial. For ex ample, if the Russians had 125 mises, then even if theit firing time were spread out over an hour oso, i would stil be possible for Mr. Khrushches's aides to path 125 battons and expect that there would be a beter then even chance that they would desteoy all of the aixcraft on the ground at SAC home bases, about one chance in three that only one such base would survive and a very small probability that two or more bases would survive. The Soviets could well believe that their air defense would easily handle any attacks launched by sir ‘aft from one or two bases. If they are prepaced to accept the tis involved in facing an attack From, any, four or ive bases then they need only about 75 missiles, each with a single shot probability of oneal; if they had 150 missiles, the single-shot probability could be as low a5 ane thied and sil be satisfactory fo a Soviet planner willing to acept retaliation from four ot five surviving bass This kind of missle atack is mach more calculable than almost any other kind of attack. It eso calculable that many people believe that the results of such an attack can be pre dicted just by applying wellknown principles of engineering sod physics. Tt looks so calculable that even a cautious Soviet planner might believe that he cul rey on the correctness of his estimates; thes he might find it the path of caution to attack while the opportunity was sil avaliable, 2 ‘Actually, even with tested missiles, results of attacks are not teally mathematically predictable The probability of extreme variations in performance, the upper and lower limits, cannot be calculated accurately. But laymen or narrow professionals persis in egarding the matter as 2 simple problem in engineer ing and physics. Therefore, unless sophisticated objections on the possibilities of intelligence leaks, firing discipline, rei ability ofthe busic dat, field degradation, et, are cased, even an inarticulate Russian general could probably force the fol Towing conclusions on group of hostile, skeptical, and busy civilians, whether they wanted to believe them or nol that in this hypothetical caze (where the Russians had 125 missiles, cach with a singleshot probability of one-half), if they were to posh these 125 buttons and also Iauach 2 supplementary cooedinated attack with IRBM's and taical bombers on US. land allied overseas bases, there would be a reasonable chance that che Soviet Union would get away scot fre; that there would be a good chance that they would suffer very lite damage; and that there would be 90 chance at all that they would suffer as much damage as they suffered in World War I Let us consider some of the caveats that this Russian general would have to concede if somebody raised them, and try to judge how serious Khrushchev or the Presidium would find them. ‘The frst is that there be no intelligence leak. Given the small numberof missles involved and the tight secuity ia the ‘Rossan empit, this might look like a reasonably safe assump. % tion, But whether the Rusians would be willing to eely on ove lack of intelligence is very hard to say. The Russians might think ie posible for us to have a very senior spy of, even more ‘wortisome, for them to have a defector ~possily in the Presidium itself ‘The second caveat concerns firing discipline, that i that nobody fires ether prematurely or too late If we work oo ovr foriginl assumption that ehe US. posture remains unchanged since 1957, when alerts were measuzed in houts or 50 this is not 2 rgid requirement. However, if we give ourselves credit for a 15-minute alert, this would mean that the Russian misile is 90 reliable that when they press the buttons the majority of the mistils are actually ready to be fted. Ifthe Russian mis les have a “hold” capebilty—that is, if they can be ceady nutes ot touts easly and then maintain this seedy post tion, this may not bea dificlerequiement, although i could decreate the effective reliability. (We ate defining a missle's reliability here as incding the probability that i€ takes off Within # few minutes of the asigned fring time. Given that the Soviet missiles have a “hold” capability, this may aot be a ‘uch smaller number than if we define selibiliy as the probar bility that the missile takes off within a few hours of the as signed fing time) A small seduction in elibiliry would simply mean thatthe Russians would noed s few more ICBMs ‘A large reduction would most likely put the Soviets out of bosines ‘There isan interesting interaction between firing discipline and measures designed to reduce the possibility of intelligence n leaks. If the Soviets trained with vexy realistic exercises 50 that even the people involved in the exercises could not dis- tinguish until the last mint the exercise from the real thing, then sich exercises could be used to disguise preparations for ateack, But there would be a tendency for somebody to fire prematurely, pethaps causing an accidental war. If, on the ‘contrary, the Soviets try to prevent this breach of firing dsc pline by the use of severe threats and indoctrination 50 that ‘nobody will fire prematurely, then they run the opposite risk that people will refuse to believe the order when it comes, un less alerted ahead of time ‘The thizd caveat is that ehey must have accurate intelligence about the US. military posture. Given US, security practices ‘orrently in vogue about the postion and use of ovr SAC bases and the ease with which information could be obtained about last minute changes, this aso could look feasible, Probably the ‘only requirement ist try to ge the information ‘Much more important, they need accurate data about them selves—the yield, accuracy, and reliability oftheir ICBM's, for ‘example. While is surprisingly hard to get celiable estimates fof these quantitics, nly very sophisticated people will koow this Ifthe Soviets have some extra margin of performance for insurance—that is, if they have a much beter technological capability than they need-—then they do not cequre extremely accurate estimates of this capability. On the other Band, if thet equipment is just marginally satisfactory, then even though they have an adequate capability they ste unlikely to know this. 28 Last and most important is the question of field degradation. Let us go back to our Russian general's persuasion problem 1 is perfectly posible, for example, for this genecal to take the members of the Presidium out tothe tenge and show them, sy, 3 or 10 ICBM's lined up, and ask them to select one and make a cross on a map. The range personnel could pro- ‘eed to fire that ICBM and hit nese entugh to the coss 0 imake the general's point. Or even more convincingly, they ‘might fie all 5 or 10 ICBM's at ance. ‘This would be an impressive demonstration, bat a question ises. What happens when the mises are operated in the field by regular military pertonnel? While the Russians have 4 tradition of at Teast intial incompetency (for example, in the Crimean, Japanese, and Finnish wars, as well asin World ‘Wars I and i), they have, since World Wat TI, emphasied reliability of equipment, sometimes at the cost of other pee formance, One would assume that if they could obi accuracy sand yield at all, they could obtain it reliably, Nevertheless the ‘worry might remain, How far off from range performance will we be? It should also be noted that so long a8 our strategic bases ate soft, missile attacks present the Russians with possibilities forthe use ofa postattack blackmail strategy almost a extreme 5 the one mentioned previously. If the Russians concatiate heir attack solely against strategic bases and aliburst their ‘weapons (which is the most efficient way t0 use a weapon against a sft target), there will be no local fallout effets ‘Then unless one of the weapoes goes astray and hits a major 29 city, deaths would be limited t0 a few million Americans as the result of blast and thermal effects, The Soviets could then point out (unless we bad appreciable levels of aie offense, air defense, and civil defense surviving) that they could totally destroy ovr country (while we could only ber! them), and did ‘we really want to pick this moment to initiate the use of nicest weapons agains open cities? ‘While it would take a moderately secklese Soviet decison maker to pres the 125 ICBM buttons even if the assumptions were a5 favorable as orginally hypothesized, it would be even more reckless for the United States to ely on extreme Soviet caution and reponsibilty asa defense, In any case, our Type I Deeectence can be stained, and in some moderately plausible sitvations even a cautious Soviet govesnment might prefer pressing butloas if the oda were 20 much in its favor. The rete recognition by U.S. and Baropean decisionmakers of the possibility of such an attack could dominate or dstrt all ints: ‘atial relations. ‘The actual situation differs from this hypothetical one. AS ‘our newspapers report, we have taken many messes to alle: ate this problem. It would not be appropriate 1 discuss here hhow adequate these measures are and the risks we may or may not be running. The measures we have adopted may of may not give us an adequate factor of safety. In any case itis neces: sary to react rapidly to changes inthe enemy's posture ‘The need for quick reaction to even “hypothetical” changes in the enemy's posture is likely to be true for the indefinite foture, in spite of the populaiy of the theory that once we 30 et over ue curten difficulties we will have #so~alled mini ‘mum nucleae deterrent force that will save the Type I Deter tence problem. Some even maintain that it will solve all strategic problems ‘A last point will be made abost Type 1 Deterrence. When people evaluste the quality of our Type 1 Deterrence they ‘usually ak if i is sufficiently stoong to prevent the Soviets from attacking us in cold blood. This is probably misleading As I tried #0 point out when discussing, the posible conse ‘quences of our intervening in Hungary, Type 1 Deterrence cn be srtined, Thus i is probably best to evaluate the quality of ‘one’s Type 1 Deterrence by asking how much straia it could accept and sill be depended oa, The next topic will indicate that plausible circumstances may arse in whic we may wish to indulge inact that would strain our Type t Deterrence. Type 2 Deterrence (Deterrence of Extreme Provocation’) [A quite different calclation i relevant to US. Type 2 De terrence, although itis stil a Soviet ealelation (but this time 2 Soviet calculation of an American calculation). The Soviet planner asks himself, If 1 make this very provocative move, will the Americans strike us? Whether the Soviets then pro ceed with the contemplated provocation will be influenced by thet estimate of the American calculation 25 to what happeas if the tables are reversed. That is, what happens if the Ames ‘ans sike and damage the Russian strategic ae force, and the Rasstne strike back uncoordinated in the teth of an alerted at US. air defense and possibly against an evacuated US. popu: lation? IF this possibility is to be credible to the Soviets, it rust be because they recognize that their own Type 1 Deter- rence can fail, I Khrushchev is a convinced adherent of the balanceottertor theory and does not believe that his Type 1 Deterrence can fail, then he may just go ahead with the provocative action Te is important to cealize that dhe operation of Type 2 Deter ence will iavolve the posilty that the United States will obtain the Firs strategic strike o¢ some temporizing move, such fs evacuation. Many people tall about the importance of having adequate civil and aie defense to back our foreign policy. However, calculations made in evaluating the perfor: ance of a proposed civil and airdefense progtam invariably fesume a Russian surprise attack and—f0 make the problem ven harder—a surprise attack directed mostly agunst civilians “This is uanecessacly pesimisi, for the calculation in which ‘one looks at a US. first strike in retaliation for + Russian provocation is probably more relevant in tying to evaluate the fole thatthe offense and defense play in affecting some im- portant aspects of foreiga policy ‘Under this assumption, if we have even a moderate non rilitary defense program, its performance is likely t0 look impressive to the Russians and probably to most Europeans For example, the crucial problem of obtaining adequate warn ing will have been greatly lessened, at least inthe eyes of the Soviets, They ace also likely to think that we have more fre- dom than we will have, The Soviets may believe that we are 32 not worried by the possibilty that they will get strategic oF premature tactical warning. This could be te in site of the fact that in actual practice such an attack would probably javolve 4 considerable risk that the Soviets would get same waming. Aay planning would have to be tempered by the sobering telization that a disclosure ot mistake could bring 4 preemptive Russian attack "The possibilty of augmentiag our active and passive defense js very important. That i eather than acing the Russians if they do something very provocative, we might prefer to evac ste out city population to fallout protection, "bet up” our aie defense and sr offense, and then tll the Russians that we had pet ourselves into a mach stronger position to initiate hos: tilites. After we had put ourselves ia a position in which the Rusia retaliatory sre would nfl much less than 8 tot ‘catastrophe, the Russians would have just three broad classes of alternatives: 1. To initiate some kind of strike 2. To prolong the crisis, even though it would then be very credible that we would strike if they continued to provoke us 3. To back down or compsomise the criss satistactrily. Hopefully the Soviets would end up prefering the tied alter native, cause our Type 1 Deterrence would make the first choice sufficiently unattractive and our Type 2 Deterrence ‘would do the same for the second. 3 Type 3 Deterrence (Deterrence of Moderate Provocation) ‘The most obvious threat that we cold muster under Type 3 Deterteace would he the capability to fight a limited war of some tort. Because this subject is complicated and space is limited, I wil not discus this particular Type 3 Deterceace capability—although itis important and necessary. Instead, 1 shall consider some of the nonmiltay gambits open to us Insofar as daytoday activities are concerned, the things that scemingly regulate the other mas's behavior are noneilitary. For example, among other things, « potential provoction may be detezed by any of the following effects or reactions 1, Internal cesctions or costs 2, Lossof frends or antagonizing of neutrals 3. Creston a strengthening of hostile coslitions 4. Lowering of the reaction threshold of potenti op ponents 5. Diplomatic or economic retaliation 6. Moral or ethical inhibitions 7. An increase in the military capability of the potential ‘opponent Space pexmits discussion of only the last subj, which is both very important and badly neplcted. It has become fash jonable among the more sober military experts to regard mobil ization capabilities as examples of wishful thinking. And indeed, in the few hours of few days of a modern wat, large seale production of military goods wil aat be posible Mt PROVOCATION A SPUR TO MILITARY CAPABILITY ‘What deters the Russians from a series of Koreas and Tndo- ‘Chinas? Ie is probably les the fear ofa direct U.S. attack with its curtent forces than the probability thatthe United States and her alles would greatly increase both theie military strength and ther resolve in sesponse to such crises. The detsreat effect ‘of this possibilty can be increased by making explicit prepara. tions so that we cin increase our strength very capidly when fever the other side provokes us. For example, in June, 1950, the United States was engaged in a grat debate on whether the defense budget should be 14, 15, o¢ 16 billion dollar. Along came Korea. Congress quickly authorized 60 billion dolls, an increase by a factor of four! No matter what successes the Communist cause had in ‘Korea, that authorization represents an enormous mulitary de- fest forthe Soviets. However, it was almost three years before that authorization was flly translated into increased expendi tures and corresponding military power. Iti very valuable to bbe able to increase our defense expenditures, bt this ability becomes many times more valuable if authorizations can be translated into military strength ina year or so. Ifthe Russians ‘kaow that deterioration ia intezationa relations will push us into crash program, they may be much les wing to let international relations deteriorate. The problem is, Would we have time to putin a vsefol program? Afterall the basic mi tazy posture (incliding installations) must be of the proper sort if it isto be possible to expand & within a year oF #0 89 3 the point where iti prepaced to fight & was in adtion to being abl to deter one. Our corent posture (1960) i probably far {rom optimal (oe doing this. If preparations Like these were at least moderately expensive and very expt the Rosians might find it credible thatthe Tinited States would initiate and carry through soch » program jf they were provocative even, say, on the scale of Kores or fess The Russians would then be presented with the following, thee alternatives 1. They could stk the United States before the buildup got very far. This might look very uattractive, eect: tly since the buildup would almost certainly be accom: nied by an increased ales! and other measures £0 Feduce the vuluerabaliey of SAC. 2, They could try to match che US. program, This would be very expensive 43, They Could accept a position of inferiority. Such a0 acceptance would be serious, since the United States vould now have a “fight the war” capability 26 well asa “deter the wae” capability. In each cave the costs and risks of their provocation ould hhave been incensed, and it likely thatthe Soviets would take those extra costs and risks into account before attempting 2° provoraton, If they were not detered, we could lavach che een program. Then we would bein postion to core the fesults of their past provocation or at least to deter them ia the farice from exploiting these cess 6 Te might be pasticeanly valuable to have credible and ex plicit plans to insite crash programs for civil defense* and limited-war capabilities. Te seems to be puctiulaly feasible to maintain inexpensive and effective mobilization bases in these two Fields, and the institution of a crash program would make it very credible o the Russians, our ais, and neutrals that ‘we would go to war at an appropriate level if we were pro- woked again Tes important to understand that we have this asset: the abil ity to spend large sums of money rapidly. Let us, for exarple, sume a new Berlin crisis in evo of thee years Assume aso that the United States has done nothing to improve its Type 2 Deterrence capability, and very ltl to improve ite limited-war capability, but it docs have a first-rate Type 1 Deterrence (one that could punish the Soviets if they attacked, at ane that could not protect the United States). Under these circum stances it would be most improbable tht we would initiate either a thermonucleze of linited wa if the Rusians gradually pput the squeeze on Bein. Nevertheless, State Department ‘egoriators would try in all likelibood to get the Soviets to back down by thecatening that we would do something very ‘iolent—that we would use our military forces. But out nego tiators would be afraid to spell out our threst, for nothing that they could present would be both credible and effective Ti Tin of te posites ee Homa Kaba. Some Spc Sstcsion for abiniag atl Now ey Dees ape dang 1G ous se ay 37 ven today the Russians have told us that any talk of our maintaining ovr poston in Berlin by force is "bluff." 1f we send soldiers, they say they will kill them; if we send tanks, they will burn them; f we send bombers, they will destroy out cites. The Soviets are saying that a any level of violence we cate tose they can either meet that level on the spot or prom- ise such a severe punishment that we will be deteed. The ‘Russians also point out chat Been is a chess game, not a poker ‘game, and that everybody can See what our capabilites are If the Soviets are right—that out only alternatives are vio- lence or defeat—where defeat would be an aceptance of some ‘new and unsatisfactory status of Berlin, then the Soviets could probably succeed in talking us into adopting a facesaving ‘method of losing Besin rather than one that would make it clear tall that we hud suffered a sesious defeat. In actual fact we do have some very stiong cards to play, Ibu if we do not know what these cards are, we may be tricked ‘out of playing them. If we refased to accept a facesaving de feat and the Russians persisted in rubbing our noses inthe diet, then it would be clea to all in NATO that ualess we did some- thing spectacular to recover the siation, these nations could ‘no longer rely on us for any kind of protection. Under such acumstances the United States might order an atack. It is much more likely that it would authorize enormous defense budgets, probably atleast at the 100illion dollasayear level ‘These fonds would be designed not only to improve our current posture but also to buy large limitedwar forces and such things 48 civil defense and the corresponding military forces that 38 ‘would give us a credible capability for initiating wae at some appropriate level of violence if a humiliating cisis should be ‘tepeated. There would also be enormous presure under there ireumstances on the NATO nations to combine into an even tighter allince and to mobilize their sources for thet de- {ense. This would mean that asin Kores, even if we lst Berlin in the military sense, the Russians would have lost this pac ticular campaign, While Berlin is important ethically and politically, its loss would not compare tothe gretly increased power and resolve on the side ofthe West “This i one of the major thzeats we can bring to bear on the Russians. If we are not aware that we have this threat, if we believe that doubling the budget would rally mean immediate bunkruptey or other financial catastophe, then the Russias ‘an present as with alteratives that may in the end saul in ther winning the diplomatic, politcal, and foreign policy vie tory. It is important that we understand our own strengths as wel as our posible weaknesses. ‘CONCLUSIONS Even if we have acquired the highest-quality Type 1 Deter. rence capability, we must still be able to fight and survive wats as long a itis possible to have such capability. This is true not only because iti prudent to take out insurance against 4 war's ocutting unintentionally, bu aso because we must be able both io stnd up to the threat of fighting a war and to eedibly threaten to initiate one. We must make i risky for 9 the enemy to force ws into situations in which we must choose between fighting and appensing. We must have an" to peace,” 0 long as there is no world government and itis technologically and economically possible to have such an altemative. It is most likely that this “alternative to peace” must include a generalwar capability as well as limited-war capability. ‘Under curcent progcams the United States may ina few yeas find itself vawilling to accept a Soviet retalistory blow, n0 matter what the provocation. To get into such 2 situation would be equivalet to dsowning our alliance obligations by signing & non-aggcesion treaty with the Soviete—a_non- ageression treaty with almost 200 million American hostages to guarantee performance. Before drifting into such an “alli ance," we should ask ourselves, What does it mean to live with this now-aggression treaty? Can we prevent it from being "signed"? Can we delay it "tification"? Those who would ‘ely on limited means to control posible Soviet provocations must ask themselves the question, What keeps the enemy's ‘counteraction to acceptable limits if there are no credible Type 2 Deterrence capabilites? Those who thiak of very limited ‘apabilities or mutual-bomicide theats either separately or in ‘combination as being sufficient to meet our Type 2? Deterrence problems are ignoring the dynamice of bargening and conflict situations, When two men of two nations are arguing over something that both feel ro be of moderate importance, itis ‘common for things to get oat of contol, for prestige to become ‘committed, and for threats and countertheats and actions and 0 counteraction to increase in almost limitless intensity that i unless there are internal or external sanctions to st and enforce limits ‘These remarks will distress all who, very propely, view the thought of fighting 2 war with so couch horcor that they fel uneasy at having even a highqualty detent force, much less a credible capability for initiating, ighting, and termina ing all kinds of wars. While one cin sympathize with this azide it is, elieve close to being icesponsble ‘The threat of force has long been an important regulatory factor in intenatcoal affairs; one canaot remove or greatiy weaken this Uhzeat without expecting all kinds of unforeseen changes—not all of them aecesaily for the better. True, many of the measures that preserve our ability to fight and srvive wars may tur out to be temporary expedients that will fot solve our long-run security problems, but this doee nat mean they are not important. You cannot reach 1970 oF 1973 Jf you do aot succesfully passthrough 1960 and 1965. If we neglect ovr short-term problems, we ate bound to ran secous risks of a disastrous deterioration in the international situation ‘rin our own posture. Ths, in tun, may make it imposible to aurive at a reasonable, stable state. In fact, insofar as the balanceof terror theory is correct, if ‘any nation actually is miltacily provocative, thea, ao matter ‘what our previous threats have been, we must meet that behav ior by using limited means or simply allow that nation to get away with whatever it is trying to do. The aggressor will lize this too and gain confidence from the realization. For this a season any attempt to use threats of mutual homicide to contol an aggresow’s behavior (short of trying to deter him from an steack on one's own countsy) ie ill advised, Even if one means that that seriously, it wll sill noe be credible to the enemy ‘or ally particulary if the challenge is in any way ambiguous. Since it now seems most unlikely that the Sovier menace ‘wll go away of ite and since we have eachewed preventive ‘war a5 a possibilty, we must seek the solution to our problems along the path of some degree of coeristence or cllabocation. ‘To do this effectively we must appear extemely competent 19 the Sovie leaders, They must fe! that we are putting adequate attention and resources into meeting our military, politcal, and ‘economic problems. This is not a question of attempting to bargain from strength, but one of looking so invulnerable to blackmail and aggressive tactics that Soviet leaders will fet it 's worth while to make agreements and foolish not to. We must look much more dangerous as an opponent than as a callabo- ator, even an uneasy collaboratoe. have the impression that up to about 1956-57 the average senior Russian had an enocmods respect for US. planners and

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