12.

91 Phil 35

Philippine Railway Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue

FACTS: PRC was granted a legislative franchise to operate a railway line pursuant to
Act No. 1497 Sec. 13 which read: In consideration of the premises and of the
operation of this concession or franchise, there shall be paid by the grantee to the
Philippine Government, annually, xxx an amount equal to one-half of one per
centum of the gross earnings of the grantee xxx.
Sec 259 of Internal Revenue Code, as amended by RA 39, provides that there shall
be collected in respect to all existing and future franchises, upon the gross earnings
or receipts from the business covered by the law granting a franchise tax of 5% of
such taxes, charges, and percentages as are specified in the special charters of the
corporation upon whom suc franchises are conferred, whichever is higher, unless
the provisions hereof preclude the imposition of a higher tax xxx.
ISSUE: WoN Section 259 of the Tax Code has repealed Section 13 of Act 1497, stand
upon a different footing from general laws.
RULING: Once granted, a charter becomes a private contract and cannot be altered
nor amended except by consent of all concerned, unless the right to alter or repeal
is expressly reserved.
Reason: the legislature, in passing a special charter, has its attention directed to the
special facts and circumstances in the particular case in granting a special charter,
for it will not be considered that the legislature, by adopting a general law
containing the provisions repugnant to the provisions of the charter, and without
any mention of its intention to amend or modify the charter, intended to amend,
repeal or modify the special act. The purpose of respecting the tax rates
incorporated in the charters, as shown by the clause.
13.
251 scra 42
Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA (Environmental Law)

Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA

GR No. 110120
March 16, 1994

FACTS:

The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of
Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first
securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree N o. 1586, and
clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act N o. 4850 and issued a CEASE
and DESIST ORDER (CDO) for the City Government of Caloocan to stop the use of
the dumpsite.

ISSUES:

1. Does the LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain
the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in
Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan?
2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

Executive Order N o. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus: Sec. 4. Additional
Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and functions:
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution
specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be
accomplished

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the

Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases w here the special law
provides for another forum

RULING:

1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA,
as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory law s to carry out and make effective
the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of
Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and
Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances,
deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the
LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the
inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants
emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.

2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is a fundamental rule that an

administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law ,
it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as
are necessarily implied in the exercise of its ex press powers. In the exercise,
therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasijudicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the
authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied.
NOTE: HOWEVER, writs of mandamus and injunction are beyond the power of the
LLDA to issue

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals

Posted on November 18, 2012
G.R.No. 120865-71
December 7, 1995

Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in
order to execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable
development so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have
shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same.

EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and
enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term Laguna de
Bay Region.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the
municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges
within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides: Municipal
corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal
waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish
cages to the consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen
operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore
municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the
current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other
aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are
declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the
Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners of those
declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as
amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle
their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.

Issues:
1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?

Held:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2
of EO No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or
affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the
municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges on municipal

waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the
LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake
region.

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should
prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute.
The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of
special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored
and, as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature.
A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law
by mere implication.

The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On
the other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and
other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating &
monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake control and
management. It partakes of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive,
least limitable and most demanding of all state powers including the power of
taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of
police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de
Bay.

2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect
to pollution cases with authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters
affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture
structures in Laguna de Bay.

Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA
4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for
enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities
situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter
vested on it.

14. 23964
Gaerlan Jr v. Catubig

Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1966/jun1966/gr_l-23964_1966.html

Facts:
Gaerlan Jr and Catubig were registered candidates for councilors in 8-seat City
Council of Dagupan in the 1963 elections. Catubig was proclaimed one of the eight
elected councilors while Gaerlan lost his bid.
However, Gaerlan went to Court to challenge Catubig's eligibility for the office on
the averment of non-age. Catubig was below 25 years of ages as of the date of the
filing of his certificate of candidacy or date of election or date of assumption of
office. Catubig claims that the question of age-eligibility should be governed by RA
170 which provides that the elective members of the Municipal Board shall be
qualified electors of the city residents therein for at least one year and not less than
23 years of age and not RA 2259 which provides that no person shall be a city
mayor, vice mayor or councilor unless he is at least 25 years of age, resident of the
city for one year prior to his election and is a qualified voter.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 12 of RA 170 (23 years of age) should give way to Section 6
of RA 2259 (25 years of age).

Held:
No. Section 6 of RA 2259 (25 years of age) should prevail. RA 484 amending Section
12 of the Dagupan City Charter (RA 170), took effect on June 10, 1950 whereas RA
2259 became law on June 10, 1959.
The question whether or not a special law has been repealed or amended by one or
more subsequent general laws is dependedt mainly upon the intent of Congress in
enacting the latter. The discussions on the floor of Congress show beyond doubt
that its members intended to amend or repeal all provisions of special laws
inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 2259,except those which are
expressly excluded from the operation thereof. All cities not particularly excepted
from the provisions of said act are subjct thereto. Hence, the age-limit provision in
RA 2259 is continuing, because Dagupan City was not excluded. Therefore, its
charger provision on the age limit is thereby repealed. This is because the last
statute si so broad in terms and so clear and explicit in its words so as to show that
it was intended to cover the whole subject and therefore to displace the prior
staute.

Gaerlan v. Catubig
ISSUE: WoN Sec. 12 of RA 170 as amended, the City Charter of Dagupan City, which
fixed the minimum age qualification for members of the city council at 23 years has
been repealed by Sec.6 of RA 2259
RULING: there was an implied repeal of Sec. 12 of the charter of Dagupan City
because the legislative intent to repeal the charter provision is clear from the fact
that Dagupan City, unlike some cities, is not one of those cities expressly excluded
by the law from its operation and from the circumstance that it provides that all acts
or parts thereof which are inconsistent therewith are repealed. The last statute is so
broad in its terms and so clear and explicit in its words so as to show that it was
intended to cover the whole subject and therefore to displace the prior statute.
15. Bagatsing v. Ramirez Case Digest

Bagatsing v. Ramirez
G.R. No. L-41631 (December 17, 1976)

FACTS:
The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, An Ordinance
Regulating the Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing Fees for the Rentals of
Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violation thereof and for other Purposes.
Respondent were seeking the declaration of nullity of the Ordinance for the reason
that a) the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
has not been complied with, b) the Market Committee was not given any
participation in the enactment, c) Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act has been violated, and d) the ordinance would violate P.D. 7 prescribing the
collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products.

ISSUE:
What law shall govern the publication of tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal
Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code.

HELD:
The fact that one is a special law and the other a general law creates the
presumption that the special law is to be considered an exception to the general.

The Revised Charter of Manila speaks of ordinance in general whereas the Local
Tax Code relates to ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges in
particular. In regard therefore, the Local Tax Code controls.
Bagatsing v. Ramirez

A charter of a city, which is a special law, may be impliedly modified

or superseded by a later statute, and where a statute is controlling, it must be read
into the charter, notwithstanding any of its particular provisions.

A subsequent general law similarly applicable to all cities prevails over

any conflicting charter provision, for the reason that a charter must not be
inconsistent with the general laws and public policy of the state.

Statute remains supreme in all matters not purely local.

A charter must yield to the constitution and general laws of the state.