KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L.

MORATO
G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.
FACTS:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein
PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the
gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is
allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and
responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the
equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because
it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the
Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding
public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no
longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is
different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if
ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have
funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal
standing because they were not parties to the contract
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?
HELD:
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the
petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no
constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since
the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The
parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply.
An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be
drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause
of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated
claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction
identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the
Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal
matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude
determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and
here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether
the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING, INC., petitioner,

118509
vs.
1996
COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL., respondents.

G.R. No.
March 29,

FACTS:
Phil.Remnants Co. constituted BPI to manage, administer and sell its real
property located in Pasig, Metro Manila.

BPI gave authority to real estate broker Pedro Revilla Jr. to sell the lot for
P1000 per square meter.
Revilla contacted Alfonso Lim of petitioner company who agreed to buy the
land and thereafter was allowed to view the land.
Lim and Alfonso LImketkai went to BPI to confirm the sale and both finally
agreed that the land would be sold for P1000 per square meter.
Notwithstanding the agreement, Alfonso asked BPI if it was possible to pay in
terms provided that in case the term is disapproved, the price shall be paid in
cash.
Two or three days later, petitioner learned that its offer to pay on terms had
been frozen. Alfonso Lim went to BPI on July 18, 1988 and tendered the full
payment of P33,056,000.00 to Albano. The payment was refused because
Albano stated that the authority to sell that particular piece of property
in Pasig had been withdrawn from his unit
An action for specific performance with damages was thereupon filed
on August 25, 1988 by petitioner against BPI. In the course of the trial, BPI
informed the trial court that it had sold the property under litigation to NBS
ISSUE:
WON there was a perfected contract of sale between Limketkai Co. and BPI.
HELD:
There was already a perfected contract of sale because both parties already
agreed to the sale of P1000/sq.m. Even if Lim tried to negotiate for a
payment in terms, it is clear that if it be disapproved, the payment will be
made in cash.
The perfection of the contract took place when Aromin and Albano, acting for
BPI, agreed to sell and Alfonso Lim with Albino Limketkai, acting for petitioner
Limketkai, agreed to buy the disputed lot at P1,000.00 per square meter.
Aside from this there was the earlier agreement between petitioner and the
authorized broker. There was a concurrence of offer and acceptance, on the
object, and on the cause thereof.
The phases that a contract goes through may be summarized as follows:
a. preparation, conception or generation, which is the period of negotiation
and bargaining, ending at the moment of agreement of the parties;
b. perfection or birth of the contract, which is the moment when the parties
come to agree on the terms of the contract; and
c. consummation or death, which is the fulfillment or performance of the
terms agreed upon in the contract

Sixto Brillantes, Jr. vs. Haydee T. Yorac, G.R. No.

93867, December 18 1990
Brillantes vs. Yorac
G.R. 93867, 18 December 1990
FACTS:
In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact finding
commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate his
chairmanship of the COMELEC. Yorac was temporarily placed as his substitute. Brillantes then
questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution in no case shall any
member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity:.
Brillantes claimed that the choice of the acting chairman should not be appointed for such is an
internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the
president violates the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional commission.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence of
the COMELEC.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in
nature, they are not under the control of the president in the discharge of their functions. The
designation made by the president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded on the
quote administrative expediency to present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such
justification, it found no basis on existing rules on statutes. Yoracs designation is null and
unconstitutional.

Cayetano v Monsod
G.R. No. 100113
September 3, 1991

Facts:
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC on April 25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsods nomination, petitioner filed a petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment
of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void
because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having practiced law for the last ten
years.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent posses the required qualifications of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
HELD:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he: . . . for valuable consideration engages
in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights
under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings
pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee,
or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated,
one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to
their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying
his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsods past work

experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry,

a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor,
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
National Press Club vs Comelec
207 SCRA 835
Facts:
R.A. 6646 was enacted which prohibits any newspaper, radio, any person making the use
of media to sell or give free of charge of space or time for political purpose except
COMELEC Petitioners who were representatives of mass media assails its
constitutionality on the ground that it amounts to censorship because it singles out for
suppression only publications of a particular content and it abridges freedom of speech of
candidates.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 6646 is valid.
Held:
Yes, the law banning political ads has since been repealed but the court made important
observation which is still pertinent.
The technical effects of Art. IX (C) (4) of the constitution may be seen to that no
presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercise of supervisory or regulatory
authority on the part of the COMELEC for the purpose of serving equal opportunity
among candidates for political office, although such supervision or regulation may result
in same limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. The applicable issue is the
general, time honored are that statute is presumed to be constitutional that party asserting
unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and convincing, proving that
assertion.
Section II has not gone outside the permissible brands of supervision and regulation of
media operations. During election period Sec. II is limited in duration of applicability and
enforceability. Sec. II doesnt purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers
and radio or TV stations on news events relating to qualified political parties.
SWS vs Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout
the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as
publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election
survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without
any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.
Issue:

Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the
dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional?
Ruling:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on
the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of
public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but
be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. GERTRUDES MADRIAGA and ANA MARIE
BERNARDO
503 SCRA 631 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
The Ombudsmans authority to impose administrative penalty and enforce
compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory but mandatory within the
bounds of the law.
FACTS: The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman charging Gertrudes Madriaga, school principal of San Juan Elementary School
and Ana Marie Bernardo, Canteen Manager of the same school, with violation of Section 1 of
Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. They were subsequently found guilty of the offense charged. Consequently, they
were meted out the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared that the six-month suspension meted out by the
Office of the Ombudsman to Madriaga and Bernardo (Gertrudes) is merely recommendatory
to the Department of Education, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose
administrative sanctions over public officials
HELD: Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution grants the Ombudsman administrative
disciplinary power to direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to the Ombudsman of the
power to recommend the imposition of penalty on erring public officials and employees
and ensure compliance therewith.
The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend, demote,
fine, censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee akin to the questioned issuances in
the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an
order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary
action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not merely advisory

in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted
as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer
concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and
prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a
shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the
Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the
provisions in the Constitution and in R.A. 6770 intended that the implementation of the order
be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID.
The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in conjunction with the phrases
"ensure compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21"
of R.A. No. 6770. In fine, the Ombudsman's authority to impose administrative penalty and
enforce compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is mandatory within the
bounds of the law. The implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be
coursed through the proper officer.

In Re: Saturnino Bermudez (G.R. No. 76180 )

Posted:
August
Tags: Immunity from Suits

10,

2011

in Political

Law

0
Immunity from Suits

Facts:

This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by the petitioner Bermudez seeking for the
clarification of Sec. 5, Art. 18 of the proposed 1986 Constitution, as quoted:

Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall
be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.

Petitioner sought the aid of the Court to determine as to whom between the incumbent
Pres. Aquino and VP Laurel and elected Pres. Marcos and VP Tolentino the said provision refers
to.

Issue: Whether the Court should entertain the petition for declaratory relief?

Held:
It is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.
(Note: ROC provides that the jurisdiction for petitions for declaratory relief is with the RTC )

More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of
the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent
Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure.

It

being

matter

of

public

record

and

common

public

knowledge

that

the

Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and VicePresident Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their
term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of election

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, v.

THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,
respondent.
G.R No. 192935. December 7, 2010
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B.
ALBANO, RR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG,
and
REP.
ORLANDO
B.
FUA,
SR.,
petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND
MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
respondent.
G.R. No. 193036. December 7, 2010
MENDOZA, J.:
FACT:

E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC)

of 2010 was signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere
branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by
third-level
public
officers
and
employees,
their
coprincipals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration
and
submit
their
findings
and recommendations to
the President,
Congress
and
the
Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards
in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate,
collect and asses evidences gathered and make recommendations.
It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if
probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the
grounds that.

It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the

power of Congress to create a public office and appropriate
funds for its operation;

The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the

Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power
to create an entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth
Commission;

The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made

the Truth Commission and vesting it the power duplicating and
even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ.

It violates the equal protection clause

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.

RULING:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the
equal protection clause. The Chief Executives power to create

the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having

been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive
Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as
mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such
validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating
team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the
former used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry.
G.R.No.15808806July2005
PIMENTEL vs EXEC SEC
FACTS:
1. On 28 December 2000, the Philippines signed the Rome Statute through
Charge d Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United
Nations (PMUN). The Rome Statue establsihed the International Criminal
Court which provides shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes of international concerns. However,
the treatys provisions require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance,
or approval of the signatory states.
2. Petitioner/s filed an instant petitione compelling respondents to transmit the
signed text of the treaty to the Senate for ratification. It is on the theory
that ratification of a treaty is a function of the Senate. Hence, the duty of
the executive it to sign the same and transmit it thereafter to to the Senate
for concurrence.
3. The OSG, representing respondents, contends that the executive
department has no duty to transmit the said treaty to the Senate for
concurrence.
ISSUE:WONRespondentshavetheministerialdutytotransmitthecopyofthesubjecttreatytothe
SenatesignedbyamemberofthePMUNevenwithoutthesignatureofthePresidentforconcurrence?
RULING:
1. No. The President, being the head of the Sate, is regarded as the sole organ
and authority in external relations with foreign nations. In the realm of
treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other
states.
2. Although it is correct that the Constitution, in Article VII, Section 21,
provides for the concurrence of 2/3 of all members of the Senate for
validating a treaty and is deemed essential to provide check on the
executives foreign relations, it is not absolute. The power to ratify does not
belong to the Senate.
3. The process of treaty making: negotiation, signature, ratification, and
exchance of th instruments of ratification. Petitioners arguments equate
the signing of the treaty by the Phil. representative with ratification.
However, it should be noted that signature and ratification is two separate
steps. Signature is for authentication, on the other hand, ratification is the

formal act of acceptance. the latter is generally an executive act

undertaken by the head of the state.
4. Moreover, under E.O. 459, issued by Pres. Ramos, provides for guidelines in
the negotiation of international agreements and its ratification. The said
Order provides that a treaty, after it was signed by the representative of the
State, shall be subject to ratification by the President. before the Senate can
concur it, the President must ratify it first.
5. It should be emphasized that under the Constitution, the power to ratify is
vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role
of the latter is limited only to giving consent to the ratification. Hence, the
President has the authority to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate,
and/or refuse to ratify it.

Monsanto v. Factoran
Facts:
Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the
crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. She was found guilty
and was sentenced to jail. She was howevergranted pardon by Marcos. She then
wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for her to be reinstated to her former
position since it was still vacant. She was also requesting for back pays.
The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President and
Factoran denied Monsantos request averring that Monsanto must first seek
appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. Also,
Monsanto avers that by reason of the pardon, she should no longer be compelled
to answer for the civil liabilities brought about by her acts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post.
HELD:
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the
past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has
been suffered. Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings,
that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to
have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be
required. This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled
to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil liability
arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It subsists notwithstandingservice of
sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or
commutation of sentence. Petitioners civil liability may only be extinguished by
the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the
thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation.
GARCIA VS COA

FACTS:
Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal case of qualified theft was filed against him. The
president grated him an executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for back payment of
salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do
not show whether petitioners reinstatement was to the same position of Supervising Lineman.
ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated
pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

HELD:
The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was
forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally result
in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not
entitled to back wages.

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes
him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged. 7
When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon
relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him
his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to
him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for
his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioners innocence is the primary
reason behind the grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable
recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to
be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the
issuance of the clemency.