UNCLASSIFIED

HEAD~RrERS

APO 19

II COEPS

U.S. AllMY

In the Field
16 June 1944

353/91 (OG)
Subject:

Lessons Learned.

To

Divisions and Separate Unit Commanders, II Corps.

1. A detailed analysis of lessons learned during the II Corps advance

from the GlRIDLIANO to ROME is being made. This study will be published at
an early date. Rather than wait for the publication of the detailed compila
tion, 1 wish to give you my comments now so they can be acted upon during the
present tr~ining period.
a.

Towns must be taken from deep flank and rear.

b. The usual practice of battering towns with air and artillery

serves little purpose and is extremaly wasteful of ammunition and time.

c. The delay caused .8 by small enemy detachn:er.ts is out of all

proportion to the nUlllbers and means at oW' disposal. Among other errors
committed is our failure to leave roads ~ enou~h and to make a ~ enough
envelopment or by-pass.
d. The combined use of armored and infantry units haS been too
cautious. The over-emphasis placed on fire pewer of tl'.nk" dllring the period
when weather and terrain conditions prevented full use of ar~or haa not been
overcome and motility has not been restored to its pr.)pe1' ~.:rr9artallce ill the
emplgyment of tanks. ~oo often a column of tanks has re:ll8be'l inactive on
a road, held up by a Single 5P or A.~ gun. ~he time lost >iai t~ng for infantry
to arrive, deploy and attRck the gun could have been reduced 50% or more by
a rapid deployment and movement of the tanks or by a "ide envelopment which
would in most cases have resulted in the capture or destruction of the gun.
Likewise, relatively large groups of infantry have been long delayed by a
small enemy group with a machine gun or two astride a roe.d. Again, the tlme
wasted waiting for the arrival B.nd action of tanks co\tld have been materially
reduced by early and wide deployment.
e. Not enough use lw.s been mnde of Air Opls for reconne.iesance ::pur':'
poses. Inasmuch nS artillery targets have been rele.tively few during this
pursuit phase, there should he.ve been constlUlt Cub air reconnaissance avail
able to all leeding elements.
.. ,

f. In the long run, speed was made over the high ground, not over
the roads or flat lands,

..

g. Too often commanders of all eohelons. waited for orders. The

rapid advance ~de the mai~tenance of communications difficult ~~d result8d
in instruction.s being iasu'BdMd received based on out of Q..."lte information.
Under such cond.i ti9ns commanders mst act on their own responsibili ty, ini"'
tiative and .judgmelft. Inactivity is inexcueable.

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C 9 ?J 7

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a -, -I L
2 I *i
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2., We MUst be, prepared mentAlly and tactically for a cMn~e in the
cMracte,r of combat when we next go into the line for we may encounter strong
and bitter resistance. At Borne date or place the German may ssekto make ~
stand but our constant preuure should greatly hamper him from getting sot.
The main bo~ieB following our mobile advan~ detachments must be kept 80 in :
hand that they can be employed rapidly in ace~rdauce with Simple and prepared
plans.

3. speed, not basts,

i8 still the great factor.

/

./

K<~:;.J-

i'--~";Gt~1~~/'j
y

"

,,

Major General, U.S"':.,

COJ:llMnding.
])1STli,I1lU'rI ONI
.ri]ff

16 June 1944:

200

- 2.

! ! I _ 7!!I::::IZ! i .!)!

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HE.;J)Q,U.J'iTEr-lS '1" IFTH

~

...1.

.l.D

0 ~ IT':+V,
~I '4

~Jll',,{

u s 'oI...rmy
Il

8 October 1944

;,G 334-Y
SUBJECT:

Lessons Learned in Combat by 34th Infantry Division.

TO

See Distribution.

1., "lessons Ler,rned in Comhet, November 7-8 1942 to September

1944", published by Eead<;.ucrters :3L,th Infentry Division, is l1ereby
forwarcled for your information and interest.

2.: It should be une.'9retood tMt tl:e vieclS expressed in this

document t though interestbe, 0.0 not r.ecess2rily represent an official
sanction by this Head"uarte:'s of the principles or doctrines outlined
therein.
By

command of Lieutenn.nt Ge1'J.or.1 CL...PK:

1 Incl:
lEol #1-1138sons Lee.rnod in Ccr:~~JC!.t_ /
DISI1UBUTIOH:
.34 Inf Div.
Transp
CIS,
.:FHQ. (2)
G-l
;~.I (2)
G-2

G-3 (12)

BEF

G-4

85th Div
88th Div
91st Div .
92nd Div

..

~.rty
.

~.

Engx'
Ord
Sllrg

1st

"~rmd

Vi'IT
BocU'a (2)
Eq Repl Cmd (2)
Ti Corps
Sev3nth ~.rruy

..C]'

C",l[)

Historian
'I,M

Sig

rIC

j,f,;.

:F;j ghth

PM

13 C91'PS
Bri& Stayner

PRO
leG (Less I)lCl)

)..3~
43-3- 105

.y/'

.\rwy

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'~_'l/"

i; II

i _ !? 2

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.QOPdf"IOE Ij II Ab

~~s LEf\R}JED

LES

I~;

COIVillBl\T

NOVEMBER 7-8, 1942 ....,..,..,,~ SEPTEMB ER !944

/.

I.

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;ALGIERS - FONDOUK
//,
~I '/t:"":SSiNQ~ANZIO-~OrvE'
HtLL6C9 SfJ'JEVENTO.%iM . . ~
CIVJTAVECC~'AI
V:JLTURNO RtVER ~ l{ll;'
~f//; CECtNA-RC,ISIGNANOj'
i MT PANTANO
'\ I
\
:/
.
UVORNO
}oJ',',......'

_---.,.

......

','

"

:..

' . ._~. _ __

Ii"E /-\I)QUARTER S

3 L1thlf~PANTRYDIVISiO~J
APO 34 L.J:> ARMY

SEPTEMBER 1944

ITALY

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Thi~ summary of "Lessons Lac-rnod in Comr ..t" hf3 been written by the
iDen of the 3t,th Infantry Division f,nd is pre,sentsG. in their words.

The Divil;>ion entered co:.'bat first at AlGIERS, NCRT" ft1'RiCA on 7..8

November 1942 and elements Of the Division were engar-ed EI.llllost continuously
from tl)at dnt.e until th3 German sur:render II IIRY 1943. LAnding in Italy on
21 September 1943, the Di.vision has been coltlI!itted to action in eVflry major'
engagement of the campaign to date.
Elements of tho Division have b93n in active c~at with tte enemw
aver 400 days since the inithl landirgs in Africa. and the Division its.plf has
been in oommand of a sector for 330 de.ys,

. llany of the "Lessons L(>"-I'ned" are net presented in this

Ther were lost, unfortunr;;tely, Vlgh t.Le l;te!'oes of the Division at
FONDOUK, at Hill 609, at BEl!EVENTJ, .:l~ ~he VU:./fURNO River and MT.
CASSINO and ANZIO. at ROI"IE, CI'l':TAVECCfJ:A. CZGIN.A, ROSIGNANO, and

s1llJllllSl'Y.

ALGIE1l.S, at
PANTJ'.NO, at
LIVCHND.

CHARIE.C; L. BOLtE ,

Major General, U. S. Ar~1

Commending.

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Chapt.er I ........................................
Infantry
.1 ..................................... ..
Shock Action
b ..................................... .
Street Fighting
c ..................................... ..
Counterattack
. ..................................... .
Lountain l'iarfare
~ ...................................... .
i'ight Attack
f ........................................
River Crossings
!Z ..................................... ..
Patrol Operations
11 ......................................
Defensive Operations
1. ...................................... .
CP - OF Operations
j ..................................... ..
Air - Grot:.nd Liaison
~ ........................................
Cover, Concealment and Disperaitffl
1 .................................... ..
Infan~ry reapons
Machine Gun
(2 f'iiort.ars
(3) Infantry Cannon

(ll

(4) 57M!!J AT Gun

(5) Grenades
E). , ...................................... ..

Infantry Medical Detacl\ment

1J ...................................... ..
Remarks (Mise)

Chapter I I

.... .. ,,-It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

..

Artillery

2- ........................................ ..
Ocerations
" (1) Employm~nt of Liaison Officmrs
(2) ForrJard Obs ervers

(3) Reconnaissance
\if} Se1ection and Occup.u,ion of

Positions
(5) Observed Fires

(~) Unob~erved Fire~

(7) Tanks and Tank Destroyers for

Indirect Fire
Intelligence - Counterbattery
(1) Shellrepa
(2) Counterbattery
(J) 1-'0 Fire Line
(4) Observation
.Q ...................................... ..
Sroploymem of Artillery by the Infantry
2 .......................................
. .'.
.
;Jefens i ve Fires

12 .........

AI
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

Chapter III ........................................

Infantry-Tank-Tank Destroyer ~eam
.oJ. .................... ~ ................ ..
Combined Training
12 ...................................... .
Tank-Infantry vs Infantry-Tank
.. ..................................... ..
The Tank Destroyer
Chapter IV .................................. " ....
Engineers
~ ...................................... .
Divisional Enginee~ Operations
Infantry A and P Platoons
.2
........

.................. .

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........... .. .... ..

...........................
. .

Chapter V
,.
,.
,"[",,1 Comr.lUnicutions
iJ. ....................... ..
-~;8sJ.ge Center

:2
.
. H:-idio Communications

,. ,. . Lers Communications,
~

........................ .

D'1pply

,s. - ............... .
Eutio]js'

. . ~ _
,.
~

CLa pt or VII
~

..

lotting and Equipment

................ ,. ......... .
Transportatj.on
Forward Dumps
0

......................
........................ .

................................
.......................... .

Ar.urcunition
IntEl~liGence'

...............................

ill Interrogation

Plwto Intelligence'
. ................................ ..
Partisan Corrtr'ol
Q ..................................... .
Psychological. Warfare'
Ord~ of Battle
~ ....,
, ... -; ..., ............ .

.b

...

Personnel
................................ .
replacement
Procedure

.. ........ .......... ...

b ..................... ,.

. ~

;.,

...

'.'~',."

...... , , , , . , . - ' " . e'

:le dac ')IDe nt' .'Training
. ............... ,.,. .......... .
'J,':orale
~

........................ .
Appointment,

Promotion, Awards, Reclass

'ification

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be

1. Infantry Oill'l:~toiOl:',. No c.ttemI;t 1:1i11

m"de to discuss t8c'~ics since
the basic principles emrlo;'ed by Ghengis Khan are still in vogue today.

11- Sho.'Jk .:~ioll. T:l~ )romrt Iollo,;,{-up of

is of paramount importance.

shock ection by Inf2ntry

Uln nwny i!1Jtqn~c;:: C1.:.r 'sroops h8ve not token a.dvar~tage of

s!:.ock action ~:_nd i t b:;s c-()[rt r8 IT!El1Y cR.s"Ualties. By the terr..":
SHOel': ACTION I mean r.rt.i 11erf c:)DCentrEtions, rnort~n~ fire, bomb
inC; ctkcYs, tr.nk 8r TD fire, bazoo],a fire and ".and cc"en"des. All
rD1l.st be fol~o:.7~d_ c:.ggressively and ::d t~i no del~y. LrtiJ Ip.ry C0l1Cel1
-Cr&tiOl~s' "and bnrr~g8~, l),rfJ practically useless unless thBY .qre. fo1
lorled closely ADoUg': S,j t.~_Y:1t tt.8 rifl:~man can close with tho GnRmy
bef'ol'8 -~h8 encrr.y front lir:e soldier realizes t~at tbe fire h[',s
lifted and rl1ll2, ;)&ck to Clan h5s ,'ms. In follO'::in~ th8 artillery
closr:ly you mRY hsve saLle C.:-l.s,:'~,ltips i'l""om YOl~r OVJI't artillery, but
in tl'le J.Ol'l~ rnn ;.rOl.;:r catn:al ties ....rill be much lo1.'Jer. Fror!: my exper
iGncc in C:"~SSIl'~O I lea:"'ll.d V-:at the GeI'P.l9.ns ttook up i~he sl.3ck t
the rlOiCent he found it "las there. On3 de,yat Cr,2Srl10 r:e eccd o.
coo:r'dinatcd att.ack. p~'-anned to f~8t Company' "11' acrOS3 the m~" in street
to r;cin Q foothold on t~!~,t si(lc of town. Tanks "\'YO!'C: to Lire 2. prc
lJ~l'f:'j~ion on knmrm 2nd s~~spoct~,d t[!r~~:cts and, as a sig!J.al to the
ri~~'lemo!1 that thn tanks v.1:~re to cease firir'g, the corr;~and t::.nk 'F\rns
to firt: four rou~ds in n door1Ha:r that ',~ms "';.~isibln to aJ.l. ThE,n "eha
inf'antrymen' lN8r0 to dash across the street irllI!1ediately and g~.in
entrance to th(, o1'lildin"G ~_'eforG tn,: cnCI!!V had rcco7c;r:~,d. .Horrever,
tho riJ lemen vr.ited 10 ;'jnvtos 'opfo-ro they started L.nd by th"t time
the Germ"ns v.'erG hsck on th3ir FUns and stopped tJ:e &ttcck. Ihoro
is no fire more dov:1stat;.ng c.nd moralo shattering th'J.n '.Coll-direct
ed tank firo~ Lt C:i,sSINO tho C'-ermanG kneH th-' locati.on oj.' my bo.t
tali'on obscrvatio!l post ~.nd tried continuGlly wi~ho~Jt success t.o
knock it out \T1.th r.t".chi!:.c S":.Jn, n:ort!Jr and o.rtillory firo.
Gcrm8n tanks g8.ve 1)S "T]er:l' little trouble in CASSn;O but p_t
dnwn one I!orrinf t.bc,:v drove; up' ono TJc:trk VI and started firing G.t my
OP. Needless to 5~'Y I :,-,r~,S ~cc.rod 2.nd wns sitting in a cornor SDY
ing my praY8rs ,.nd tryi. '''c to ellll the. artillery. I st~yed in that
c0X'llur, too, until f'i.-V-~ :.i1n1J.-';/;:; 8.~.,te:r the 1r st round. rm.s firm). bo
foro I went beck '10':in t,]C t"'dl ,;ith thee phona to try to .spI icc it
on the line. i)l1r:,n,' those five minutes the enemy could hnvc come;
in the buUding 8nd fom,d ::In in tho corner \:ith very little fight
loft.
In C,~SSINO tf:C, k.tkli.cn l,'sod, on the! avenge, 500 grenados
G dr_y.
Onr' of our ill /..:.hods of ::.dv::ncing y!as to thrO~.'1 a grenade into
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a room ;'-nd ti!~,n to Get into +,:c:,-' ro:)m ",-:-ith ~" 1fommy-gun r1ght after
t~~:.. ,.;'rU1l.-J.dc 1.7(.nt. off.
If t~~, :!",'-. ~,-'r:.:~"~<:_~ :~,_ny Gcrmr :18 in th( roor:1, tLose
;:Ti-:6 \.~rrL still :.lbt" ,_;,",~-:,,~: f01U":i J~,-ir,.g 0n ttc floor r:i+,h r::o fight
J~ccft. 11

1:!.

~!:r..9Gt_fi,d~ti~).<I

T'x

"-;~-:t~nr: ::!i~C') cf

the 34th Infr,ntrv'Divis:i.on in

Itnly has ;)''-c,~ '~~1:'-'~ ~.h{.i ,~:n,mJ d.c~!'cr.,Js ~o--'ns ~.Dd ino(lrpor~,tr::s bu11diY2gs into his
defenso sys-~":];'li3 ',:"!LCl1('Ncr :;:::'()sf.ibl<;,. '~:_:hil'~-, t!:.) co.rdinl"'.l principle is to b;'fr-i)2;SS
and cut off ',:,,'j(: d8i'::,lxli.nr; fo~('cris, the D7i~;cnci0s 0":" 'tb-; s:i.twJt-ton may dCmen(1 a
frontal att,-"c];-. If trw l~:lttc:r' h:.:: t!'~:~,:, tl:.u.tG is no oas:" 8.nS";7Cr to ttl'.; problom.
Tho 8nemy cen only be uvict(;d Ly b?Td ~:~ork.

11 Aft8r one,; enc.er -;_ -l' ~~

vi ll~gc a s"t:t:.ong pofnt should -or! es~'
-Gnb1is!1Cd pith ,'-~11 --~ _ _ O' '".-] r,...;'n:t.;c;. In .the:
. . , c["so of a vlatoon yoU
.~

enD then sond Ol]t

8!"1.r

J:

(.'.J:'

l".ni.ts fron: thls strong poi.nt to l'!_C'l..:.i

date other bu:i..ld~.;:1Ei:J n::i:lr 1);,"', ~i,::'lile beir.:; covored -:)y f~T8 from

tLc ~~\tronG po:~nt. _'~s ~:,O('l: as [,11 hu:i.ldi~:;~s in the; vicinity ]~2V(~"
boon thorouch1y cJ.car~d 0:: tnt'; ("P8my '~bCD the- platoon yen rncroup
at another stro:lp;' ~o:1:'1t "'~~d ernt~nuf.' 'tho .~o'b . This '.7.;'8 tL:; method
cmployod by OHr pJ.atccm in t~l:' 2.tt:lek on ?J~G=Gn t, EO and provcll to ;)0
very sucCCSSf'll. In this ~:c:,mc (;r~gnF;cmq1t ',7.0 (.',180' found tr-r t t.~-'.0
usc of to.nl:D t:.ro 8,- 3rc..--"t ~J,~~l~:~, i::: stro(;t fightjng. A fCYT blast;:;
fro!;;. D. 75 b::to r: b:dldlne- l.-,ril} eit'Jer kill the enemy or shake '~;'-lom
up so b(~dl;:r t~lr't t.h__ ::lr c<-j.'t.'J.r(~ bCCOID(')S quit '._) L.:?SY provided r,7C 1'01
101.7 up closcl-.r. Of co'C.~rs(>, it, rf"-.st te rCnl( ~nf)crc:,d th[l'~ tre.n1::s Arc
""lury e;OOu. teTccts .Lor tJ ,:'! '_::1CTa~_1 bazqok::. m~.n, arid 80
rosult. t~'Hjy
IDnS-c. Lc given f!dr--;cj"lJ"1tn r'I'ot~;ctj or.... b:Jr tb(- infantry. 11
.

SC;rt;02r.,:~ l\P,TELJE R.

'JOR:.l:'d\T, IJ.3rd Infn.ntry.

!II Em cxpcric!nccq y.lostly in vi_l1~'_s:() fightir:g. T~1n mr'.in thi-nr,

if, not to miss a l-101..1S .....:::, i'n0. \-:l~on YOt:.. p,'o iY2. to tc,kc' it ji"O'~ 17Qnt to
b{;

cortf1.in_ not to mj s~ L '1"00:-:1, or any othar placo a p::rson Cfm bide.

t:J C :\lO;l~~n ~r01J ".'''lnt to go to tho side '.,:hers thoro
-::'Lndo _7s ':r:d-,-,j-::.or) J,'Ol: hn.vo tho most covcr. lI

a~-~(-n ~.-O-l go up
,;_J..'C! "cl,o fc:.'c;:;,~

,n:r:h'is" irlcidsnt to~}~ 1Jl;-0':~ 'le the bt?t~lc: fo~.:' C.;~SSINO eround t~G
r.rl.dc11o.. Of::'0.-C:"v;-~"y 194":". --r1 11:./t'c '.'TC'TO tncnt-;t of Uf.:' gro-J.pcd toccGr:cl'"
in ouo bl':iJ.di:~rr. It':3 f:iX!'-~ t;) h'lVi; H f:''''icl-::.d dr' t,'.70 1,7ith ~;-ou, ;)rJt
in t~:i. s C'::-~DC, t::.JY'0 1'.'?:':-; -l~.l:-=-,': too rr:.].ny for on') building.. ~to 0'~'d_ld
i:lg ~:T\S f:.:;lic.lluc. :';" t~jU \~;L"" ~)lJryir;g all of '18. I ~:.T.S poarL'}? my
hnlm<;'c, ll:cki:ly, n'C t:- t.i.:';;,. -.--Lien Sfl-;od niy lifo. r_~:r friC':'1Js
rlorcn't so fO-;,."'tl~~f~tC. e!f tl~'~ t;.-:-urty, about one-thIrd ::ot Oilt :'1lj.vc.

- :?

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the IT,:;'',ldle of -J(,_tobcr 19/..3. ~~.1r; h,:,.Q !"<..:.liIost cJonrcd th(~ toy;n ftnd
built ovr li~;; "n its no:rtb ~:I'n ":;d[fO., S OT-:(-:10~-, someone; i'r:.ilod t.o
r021izc the 'r,'1'Oortr1!1c. O~: n. ro~d block., E'lrl~T the! a,"-'xt Il0rt!ing,
tr.ro Jerry hCt:'Lf l:.:Lc'cks ,'_~rd on.:; 2-}~ ton -;:..rucl.r: ro:Ll"d ~_::-/(.O J~l1c- rr5.ddle
of to-::n 1.7i til t':1e int.~Dtio:;. of "o~:_oY~~~_ng D. bridgQ ~ TJ.-.lQ t:r"'.ck nE'S
lo;~.dcd ,l.i ~.''1 'T'~,~.~ ~
~ T.C~ iJ 7; .L.L"Y ~-:[;.s & S j;lU-Jli S"J.:::/ri. ~cd (i. G -:10 ",,'oro,
:::0 ]-:0 ;-:itbdrr,,-- :"_,-, ~o_ hi ~ h -,l-r",r"lck'"' af'ter 'f'""-' Cr:-..-'t1U'r-,~ ~-11'\ tr"rk

In my ~stim:1t-~o~,"-~~-?~jo:-~ ~.~;.~~~ "lf~oc~ ~1-Cl.lJ~j h~~vc -~r~v:'l~t~-l"tbi;-'a;ld

-::'0 opon Ut~j -',70 \iould n?vo suffored pl"nty of

if Jerry hrrl. d8(;id:~d

c2sualtiDSg.!1
Cr.ptnin REID B.

neFF J

135'::.,h I:"1.1'nntry"

nCc:at.J.ct b:~ T.'"j ~YJal 'l~:"!.l:"S '>1:' ;.~;:-.'-lio 1-s ~;8snntit;,1 in strnct
fightiLg "us ~" .T'r'::L ~'l~it;::; r1-:'.'~: -:'L{! ".:,r.ro1_" ~7il "toy"n J n (tf::""~: [''''nt sector s.
At ,~jf~~J V~'l'T,r!KS Cc:mlC'.,~~:;" Hr i l,',:;,s told "'up 4 bo:'T'S by friendly fil"e
from Company TlXI1 Ir
t

IIIn disc-JS8~_r;g 5~':':L""-:ct .'c~i:;:1t'-L1L in Tt~l~-'" t~e reo.o8I' must first

realize -:ha~ F.0:- ~ of tt,:) It.alian t.O~.7I1E' do not hav.-:' rcgl:}ar ~,.TGll
lc~id out st:,cc":.;., ~'Ld t~11'_t r~.=-l t~c ~Alil6~, n?;:..::; -:'I'G cl~se -~,o;:,ct;"'_~r 2.nd
hnvC' thick ~-)tonc ~.n' JIG il !l,G. .. s'~""lly Vr-::l-Y fe--.r drwrs 2" !:Ll '!'.(Lndor.TD ~ In
CASSINO t:ho G~;r;r~2.n[ bui '-:Vd~~"J . :1'.i:.Ciir:g :-: n -t~b8 li~() 0:::' our c'.c:. .r; '.r:.CG
f'ortifiedlol

Gun GTr.::=--l-'1cE-'")Jn<....-D"ts 8.=:..so r.T::' (

cAmDl.1fl~' ~tJd ~i,!l ::)ll-.;~~ 0.1"

rubLl,-) prosuP.1B.bl,y Gr'Jf..~t,:;c:. b;'l Our o,;-:n <r-d,l~ ~rJ ~ll1d tf;.r~-;: f_:2.~o" Their
fires f.-ere ~:;GIJ. pliJ.r.?}:X~ &nd coordi!:.'1tcd so -:',hr'.t (;r..ch gu..t1 1'i:,':'.S ~ov~',rod
by n)1othor.

':'0 gain our r'j.r8'-::~ f0ot:lcld in t!lC to:-m ,:;1'") used smo1(o dnd tcmks
support8d by inf'J.ntry. J.-~v.> i :-:-/--'o.n-':,ry unncr uno-usorv0d firo rOillovod
n:.inC:':1 Lna. fi~~l;::c.~ lL nr~t:i.-t~~Lk :::"i'tc.'r]()~; to &3sist ~he advancQ 01 tho
t(~.nkG.
On r[;,i',in~ the r'::'J~3t 'ootb..clJ ',?C got tbo men in. hailjj,nr,n
and. cons01ic.n:!>~;d OY,T po Git~_0r: ~j ~.-_-i
prxt:1_ ell: '?_r attnntion to gotting
b2~,-:ool;:ns :' ~1 1,q...~pc: nll;::b~;-:':- pl.',;.,:;--::d. it. tL3 r.o.:;t fOT:7crd p0;Jit.::l_on;::.;.
G(.n-m~.n tenks i~! t~:_~ s scctoJ' l-=. <~ c''';cn gi"',Tinq us trm.J.~)lG,. but tllO
G::;rr-'."n nrmor ,'_n_c~! t i~otr:.:- r "'..~s ~_!: :-::.l~SSlN() becr,usn ',-,TC~ h"d S:") rr~_n~r
h:1 z,coL_- S v:'32.1 fu:::""'r.:i"rl
~'h,:" ::"',~;00~:_:' rlro7c'd to be e. vGr:i c.-r'f ('cti vo
r.~c;['.pon in strc-,"-;t .r'ighti'1[',.
It 1.':".5 tIle ;3CUJG. lr-r.QC23I d:trcct fire
o.r-'~il::"()r:r n,nd -:'Ji t::-) V:-1'7' J.:.-'-.:, '1:,1~; i~':!i3tl"uction ;- nd DJq: ('~rion(!o C[:i1 to
fi-,~"~
--,i.1.h
''''''rnr",~jn,~~
, ..... -'~'r'c-,.
,C'.,l'nC( . .-.:]
~nd lO","or
v.~ir.'.do<\.'s
...
.'. v_. '-'v
J.. .... _
"'0
r. ....
..... _
,)..
__'--" 0.001"8 <,.
,
l,-.~crc covcr(:d by l'i-~" D.-:~ t.i~c;-3 ~'~':::' L:-~d to m.. . . kc':-: ot!FT cntr2ncoS t.o
t~1(;SO -~"J.ildirgs ttrc'-_:~'h ~J:ic}': stor:.::' ~:."e.l~s.
If tZiYlks coulr"} co manou
vored to shoot tc:'_._- s in tlv:c,::' '.',-.'--115 , it ';-,','J..:) d.)Jl.c.. Otb..::r;:isc.1 t.hu
b8.zooka Y,;~'-:8 u,;'Y'.d. I~;, O~'l,_, ~LL2tnrC'.t..: it, took r.il'h .['ounds to !,(:t 2. hole
big onol\;h to ;;0 :'hr.n.-,g~"l. :"_f':.cr en cr.tr,'-'TIcn -17".8 fo~md or I"'cudo a
gron-,,~do o_lrm,ys rrGc;:'l~_'d t.h,_: i::.lJ';-:,ntrymr.n i!'!to tI-:;t~; rOOD if t:::or'J rrr.s
cny 'l'Jossibility of G-C!"IT:':r:G ~':--,i~:g the'ro. 1;-1 ccso..<j ~,:huro a llOU:-:iC
cOU1d not bo ";'rroGch(d, t"rJ<: ;-i.r.; ',ins -Jsod to L;vcl tho building
to thn grounci.- Of course, this s~_~vo th,_ G0rrn.~:n8 SOr:lC \,vondurful

-cr.

'-'~_

j __'

~-,

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
rubble piles to huild c~mouflrg~d cmplncoments but thoy lost the
overhend cevGr "'or crtLllc:r:y rnd mortar fire. 710 "Iso used nn 8"
h{H7itzor on sornj buildings,.
cni!' bo fired ,"dt:b. precision 2nd
chnngos as small os ten ~>c,:'ds c".n be mrde so ',70 used it on t",rgots
uithin 50 yards of 01T 0',[; troo)'s. '10 onlloo. it sniping "lith nn
Sf! hOT;. ~':lorto.rs c-rQre not .too effoctiVa :c,gr.inst the buildings and
Horo used m,".inly ~,~ ho:cr:ss end Ld:erdict pr,ths.
Snip8rs nerc; ,jf:ploy:;d fI'c(>ly by .poth sid8S nnd sometimes I
em inclined to tl~.:~~J.~ th~ -1:.. th8 GormClns h~d morc SUCCess than v,e did.
During the lulls our mon "ot c".roless Qnd b'ec"mo excGllent targets.
On the beachhead at 1',EZrO th,c opposite soemod to hold true.
In tho house-:~o-hollse fil!?hting or room-to--room fighting most
of tho fil8n preforrod the Tomrry.gun "nO. because of its size profor
rod tho cc.rbine to thr rifL for ,.;orking in close qutcrtcrs. For
didcnso, mQchinu G11ns, Goth light tend hCC0cVy, and Bfll's '.7e1'O pltcced
'.7ith tho for'72rJ. eloments.
",ne n '.70 VI8rc in C!,SSINO the nights \Vere very d"l:'k so l it1ile
offensive 2ction 1,7CS attomptcd. At times VIe vtould have
vc,iy ..
limitod objective of S'lY the next houso. In mnny cuses 'No I,bn's
Lnnd l consisted of about n liJ-yard spewe between t",ro houses; this
YJns ic.oal for playing cntch ',lIth gronc.dos. A grcne.de th"t; oxplodos
on' in:pact could heve boon usee" tit night we r;ould make rcndjust...
ments, l"olioj's, brin!; up sU'P?lios, nnd Dv['.cunto killod Rnd \"Jourldod.
Th8)~1J'_:'1d cnrry ~7D.S onJy 8.~out 200 yr.rds.
Except in tho most fOr\7nrd
positions movcrecnt :ms compocl'r,tivcly snfe.
C1e hnd no 3,00 rocdios r,t this time end the 536 17ns usoless but
~'.ro us_ed sotmd po'::or peones to nIl pl,'ltoons and outposts,
'Hiro nuS
being knocked out contir:Clclly by "'rtillory nnd mort:cr fire so line
men end 'runnoro T!Cre; kopt busy.lI

rc

.. ~crattaclf. 3vu"J solciicr cctj voly enr,ngcd 8.gninst tho Gorm,~n

Arrrry kno"s its method of countc'rnttnck lc.t" irc ty" eftcrnoon to disorgcnizo our
forces prepc.rntory to executing n ,;,-ith;':r.i7[,l under tho covor of'darknoss. Tloo
principle of ! counternttncking t':!c cOl"~G!'(l.t';;c,ck" hr.s been ovolvod in the Di vi
sion with excellent ros'luts.
Captnin RICHl,,'W 3. ::;llG:JlS, 135tb Inhntry.
"In nUJr."rous ir.cidcnts riC hrvo boon too Sl017 in tnking c.dvnn
tngc of our onCITy". One of tt.es0 tiT;'l(;s rT"LS in tbe vicinity of
CM'IT'O LEOHE, Itnly. Tho ,3it11r:tion hrd been stnbilized by 'pito t.
number of Gcrmc.n in?ancrv nnj trnks rnd ',m hnd bc;en in QPproximntely
tho snmo position :Iur M, hours. During th"t time thero ':Tero h"c.v'y
exchr,ng8s' of "rt',llcry [.nd rr,ork,y- firo plus mf.chino gun end snip~r
firo l",rhGne:vor r 301dinr CXl')osod r.imsclf.
Just nt dl<"k on the socor:d cvenine Jerry had decidod ho h,~d
tc,kc~ enough puntsh1'lent ("-8 n() lom-ncd later) "nd ;-:,,,.0.0 [\ '.'1ithdrr.wal.
Tl"e genoral method thnt he U30S to thl'ou us off b.~lcnce is to T'lr.ko
tno or three sl'l".ll "ttncks fle cOl'lDcnio:l by r:uch artill8ry. Thi s
po,rticul~r evoning ho hit 11S 1... i th t,:!O simultaneoCls att[\cks ench

- 4

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

COr'lposc!d of cFpr':::Jx:1.:?1..~t,-~l:.~ Olln p1.~'.-toon oj infnntr~T i'nd one tC!1k. He

dTOVC in our 01Jtposts "nd tho crm,ry infsntry cnmo r~g.ht to OlIT I:ITR
boforo it rno stoppod. Th":l1 }L~ i:_1Eudi l.tcly 1.7ithdro':.: out of the
zone. of our c.c;fcnsivc fir~s. '='bc 171101e oporation did not to..kc: 15
r~.i:i.ll.Jtl:8 ['Lt th;, rnost.
T~"}(; confl:S:l..0n r.nd excitemont thnt fol1or:s
;- vory i.ttrtCK b~r the cnr.:?:lY ;.7~.S intensifiod by the darknoss, 0nd,
nGcrll~- ss to SQv, i t :-r,~.S ~-:_t this tir.w th.::"t thn lJDC!!:Y cor.ol:/ccd tis
Y.:itLdrL:.r.r[~l. In s:;.itc of' OU1~ ccntin'l~.l hoavy h,'-'rr;psmnnt* t::c: Gor)1.;:.ns
r~.-_::c:C;' U to t0kc 211 their cquipm~nt !l.nd ':roun.dod rd th thcm, n.lthoug11
thi..Y left S'~bout 100 dc:;d on tho fiold"
At tl:e t.i:-ill; tho -::;n.ttnlion hs.d .-::;lrefldy cOTr:mitted its reservo
~l1(1. dUL to th~; strCnl.lOU3 fi0btin~ in the: last fe'.; d,'"!.ys ~;JC 1:Jere: tm
~~ol() to roorgc:nizc fend p1;.rSl'.C -'c,hr: anomy vJith n. nigh-':. ettr:ck nhich
T'o'l'ld h"''18 r,ccl)'-.plisYlcd "\.:.1':0 m~,3sj.on3. FiT3t f1.ccor.::pltshm':'>:J.t -.7m}~d
bo the cc.pt"JI'i:'l[ a!' y;mc:1 Ground l:-ri.th t:1C minimum amount of off ort
duo to thn disorg' ~:i.zr't .'.0D of tt,~; CDOIT:Y. Second, fIG ',-:ould h',.\,""::,
doniod hir.1 th'J opport"n~_~~~/ of t;.s,t,';)lj.shinC p,noth0r defcmse liLC ..
I believ0 tiL' :::,Ol,;_1~:~,~:.~: of this is prior pl,:.nning by bc.ttalion
cnd regiY:1ontnl CO'TIlD:-:J.OY':":. K:,~,c;pir~s:'n nind the ?o.ssitili'c,ic3 of
this tY'P8 o.f C:1Cr.~:.'" ,'~ctior1, ~onl:'l,""nclers shotL.d hold 0. rescr18 2nd mr-.l(.G
tho noceos,',:,"'Y dc.ylig~:.t l'ccC:l'n:.":if;s:J.L~C. ~:uch cr.n bG rc~('mplishe.d to
insnre: the'! success of tl1~ to type of r:ctior, by tr''':.ininf in the com
pc.ny night "ttnck. It. ;:,J-'ou"!cl b: or::'oh~_sizcd thf'.t sm"_ll groups -must
e,ttc.ck ~,_ limi toe. o'.:;,j (::-ct:i,_-,}"_~~ :.:'r:.'.:J_t,.n-(;m..1s~.y ".nd rcorgnniz,c into thci:r-"
company orgr.nizLtion npor: r(,o.G~;.ine the ob,j",JctlvG. Th("rc ofton ,.. .ro
not:. ,~noUGh trn.inr:d ~:,!'l r:!'T'''':Gl~; of g'~i('ing gro,.1.ps nc:!:'oss st.r,~.nc:o
gr01.uld l.i.1d of re:c()j-"1nizin.:r their ob~ ccti vc in tbe dnr},,::. Conscy'w.ont
i y , 'GIlo fe-I; Me::'l tll'-~t t'.I'C 'cn~,,:,.o:tc h,;vr to do moet of the fighting
for n compD.ny "I.::hil:-: th~ ".""cs~. of the unit cC\r~h:8 along in 0. colt J'l!:D of
trms, cr~.ch rl'"',n keeping 20 clO~F! to thf: I!l"n in front of hiM th,,,.t ;-w
[,k;:,8 on his hc,cls :lor fc,cr thd, h" and nll trw Clen behind LLYn ,:,,:ill
get lost if he i:Jrc"lks c'.Jnt.rtct. 1I
r

T~',jor

r;crSD H. LIFFUCCI, 135th Ir,fnntry.

lIlt is roc()r:~cndcd th . -d~ i:::-~edi ...., tnly follo;':ing '""!ny' such spoil..
ins 2.t':c.r:ks the n!lUP'-"Y ho:, f1:r[lW:.:d -\d.gorousl:7 either by lJf'.Ssi.r:g
t!1I"ou;;h t.h(; disorg~~l:izod ,,-'ss,'.ultine troops ',':ith ,1, reserve or by C'.
r:'.~id rcorg,<:'"niz,..-,tioc.
7his!, I b-:12.cnTO, r.lill ('n",b~_c us to P('ss
thl'ouGh, in, or ~!.rol.md tho rotrc'nting enemy forcos ':.nd '.~:ill prevent
hiD f'rOl'l cstc.blish:n2' hiT"1so:'i' on r.. nt)y{ torrr,.:In i,'r)!".t"(;ro. Such
1
" " " t? 0 f iL_.':>J..
"(\0"G1I"!'"
C' ~,
l.lT,;_C~:S
m:l d 0 \oy t",,hlS ',' ror;-';" rf!C'~1 t "In ~h
..... C VlClnl
~lL "0 reS1}1'"t.re d
in our troops '__.r~~1k:i~g tt.Y'Ol"t), ,_"-,, CDC:r1Y position "'.Yld cstf'_hlish:1.ng

thatl-!solvG(J upon th(' h-ir;:t rrov...rld to the QYlC:Yl:r rC'-',r r:ithout s-L:fi'ori:'1g
one. cr:.su:clty., \':h(.~L"'~Y.G it h,'"]d :::ccn j.rlposs5_o1c to gr.,in nn:r grolL""ll~
\':h,~.tsoQvGr d'urir:g th-' h()~'-:::,;?~ of li,-S!t. 1I

g. r.tountr.in ~"l['.rr[lr~: lli.vc::vnc Yl() T1' _Y.f ';:)~~,ic principlc$ "rid in r:1ost in
stnnces in It[tl~T htl.s not required Gr(-~cj -"-~l troops. It cions rc~cp1.iro SOlJG spcc,i~l
oquipJ!lcnt - particulr.x'l;r ,.r~rr.:c:: c] ()t~-:i.nG f'_~d light Vdf~pons. The Gxtr(;~Gly
- :5

U NCLA551 FI ED

UNCLASSIFIED

difficv~ t tcr:r." in .-- r ~':J','!1t':"r .)0. in th !")0~J:t" i:cs re:l1Ji2:"OS nC'~ to vnclcrgo c}:
trono h' rdf,}!:L'~'; ."y:d r:cc:-;~JS~:.. t-:tc.G t.:!:~ ~hy~;ic'-',l c(\r.di tion.

liThe ~r tt"ll_on rc:~ j.Vi .,J. til' ~-:'!1.G01.on of t.---king Ht. P/}TT~'~:\TO ~~nd
it:. It -'<'-'s to 'l.Y
dr.~.';_: ..-~tt,~'_ck.
r',::.: oxpl."-l1&tion 1"_r:LII st.::'.rt
r~X'tLr t}.!~~ obj, Ct:i_V0 :b~d bf<:lJ. t,,:~>:nn.
Inllortr,nt f oct;] obs-;J.'v (~ ,~.:r'-'t,,~;r ob5ect,i~J:_: h,"-,d heen t".l;;:cn~
(,r:.) ,',F"':tmition ':m 8 'l( r::.r 1iY"1tc.'d~ of)r~cict:LJy hlne Grcl1':'.c1,. f: o.t:.c:
to the fc:ct th"""t, clir::oiri t; :ld "!Jr'.~n~ c'-usr~s the r:cn to lose tl::~)]".
(t) }'OClG. '.7.'":'.8 r:.ot n 7':lnjor ~.tcr_ 'ur'C,'~J.H::;C m~-n h .... d. no desire: to
o['.t in -l:::;rr"".J c:"tv,.:;:.ti-tic[) '.. :1-_iJ f:! g:hting&'
ho1d.jn/:~

(c)

W,').t~r 2~.:prlv r_:,o"1.:; V,.. I';,T J5:]jt d due to In.ck of ,::,".t:-;r c,"-x::s
:'hllJ" i."ound,....:d I:";!1 :r..,:",dcd ',7r.ter for Tlcd.lc--:.l trcv.i:.-

in 8:',ch cor.~p'''''.ny.

mont.
(d)

L-kdic:J. s,}p~=-,liu:; .;;-'-:r:;

"\t:Jl'Y J..imit(;d dno to the f,:'.ct the

",id .r:on :'.nd for;,'..-:trd ",id st~.tiol1
17hlCh Yli:S CD. thc~ hi]1 l:c:d c[1.rri(;d JOGS thnn uS:!tl,l.
Tho bi'3" problom
il'~ this liLa ',::;'0 litt,:}r bCGr~.'rs.
The tine ;}st:tJ':1Dt(;d to (!V~'.Cl;:'''l,(,: c.
pCltiC'n.t from tIL :ro~)nt.':j r: ,:":r'~3 ,---,'uo~.(G t-\,.-o prtic::~t8 l-~,nr Ii ttor sc~t1n.d
pur d::'~.T. Th-~rofore~ fW'.n:' r'(n~ "':7oro t"lkr:'n fror: rifle c0JYJp[',nics, ':.rhi.ch

torrr'in nCB vnr;:,r

r9F[;~1 ~:1C1 t~,-

ucc.kcnc;d our' line,.

(0) RfJ::3"TIT8 ;:11i_ppcrt - The ob.1cctivG '::'"'.;3 nl;;'ost lost due to tho
l . . . ck of p:cop.:;r r(;col":n.',j ~_L~:'--_r;C'--. bC'fore str;rting on tho rriist3:i.on. He
G~.oulc1 h~_v(; hed l".r!::cr i:-:0. 1_) IT!.lTS "l1d r.:tO::::'0 !'1,~p;J p:::r comp.... ny.
"'.-, ',- fJ tL:~;:rG ':,'(n"~ f,'C-.L, t:o':.") ,:';L,,)!!!Y behind th~~ objnctivu tL'"',n

f'c~ct

Tho

cs

tiELtod. In this ~~Yr:~ 0', t\-_':~rr'_in GnorlY aro concQ0.J.cQ -,:nd G:::,~,-ct
p07,rcr :'::0 nevor knO-,.m -~mt.tl cl..ose cont"'ct is g-'linc~d.
OnE' o1:s(;r"'i-:)(~ i'''"l:lt. .:':lie}l ',-_~nS navor cor}.~ectnd on thio !:Lis$ion
\7-~,S the, USc of :,(l."Cti-rl<) i;~~X.. D.
Tho h0T!Y ~:~c::rpont; comp2,ny shoulrl
i"J,~.7r',:YS h~~vc; Guft'ic:l.\:-nt r.:':, .113 for trf"I:sport'L1f t~"oir ~'1CC;V~-.f ric:.-:pons.

In this

n~if;si.on tLUlc8 -'012~:"C

L.. . '.TD

~yon

the:

:1Ds:;ur"

If

tLc~Q

is no

nCf'.l1S of tl'.:;.nsport-.~ng -:.-c- pons cxc'~mt to :-crrry tLQn, tton the: hc(t.vy
lfc::-'.l)OtlS cOrlpnny El:orlJ C~l"TI.fu \")"'lcT i'ror.--.. ~f,-t0.r cool()d gun~ to the
light J:"c1::j_!},.:; 6{,; :--':3 ['uch '~.;"-~ the rii'll. Gomprm5,(;E h~~vG. 1fl'hcn the bf'.t...

tc.l:i.CJ'r1 j S 0:1 -tb.-) defonci1/I'; i~l I~:Ol:.r.t[:.i;J. to.r~r:.in th~n hu,-V)'"" [~uns might
bo nGed ~: :,.~ _in.
T~l(; l.':-.tt~~l:,o:n 8-.4 ,s'"1orlcl ~l,'-'V':: one lieht T:l:' chino glUl p'-=.r CC"JE
pr-,n:- on n'''nd --t n.Jl t.inen" ;','lr.~'}y "1'C lest due. to CDom;? ,'-\ction e
'.r:-w ob5~J~t~.vo \,'GS t_''..k,.r, -.-.ith very littl rGsict.<'~tlce. Thio ''-;:'3
duo t.o r 3l-:rnT'irx; ;-,;t.tnck .' :r:ld tIl') C'meJ:lV Y!C;ro not in t~(;ir pon:i.tionB.
l!..bout r'_Y:. hcu~ :-:l'to~ ob.~ L'(;'~i v,.' '-.'~',n :':'0,'" ~chod. f:nd secured, ',::,h(' lX<)I-.'iJT"
cQuntorc.tt,LC1Ai t.o rep;;~i1[ th~'_ n~::,~o'!.lnd but f'"'.iled" Th,.::y :'11:-,':'.1 .;it,h
drO'.7 to tl:,_) b:-:.so 0:"" th(~ l'ji21 ""~<l -':JlJ DODn rccci-v(':d :--D nrtillory b:--.r
r~,g() follorJcd by morto.r r'j r':' , They then tricd to rCW'i!' 't;,d,r lost
ground, cur.tlnuin[i t1.1_:ir ""tt'_CY.. G Boven J.lffot',::nt t:i;r'.CD dr'I'ing tbo
dey on tho S,:1rlG P:Tt, of' o:1.r, line.
We r'lr;ost lO[it ou::, o'::;jc)cti.rc: {'or scvor."l .!.'o-;,sons: l::-r;k of
,~~T!1r:.1mition :~.l'}cl h::l'ld f!~~urc.dos ,"n.d t'~dJ.ilr:c
cc,'lT'luni~,--:tion8 to tho
.o.rtHl.ory. For niGht ',',brk 010 " Fount::cin, it is .vGry-ir.portc,nt to
hevo flo,rcs.

of

- 6

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSI FI ED

AftGr "',11 '.Jt"-,('.kG h" d f- il,'d for tnc- C;'lorrr i!'l this GC1'?,tor, tho,,;r

triad to out-fl",r2, the; 'nozt po"mt.in 'nd th',n put rnchi,;o :;un ~,nd

obsorvc~d tlorto,r fire on O.~2." .sidc of thiJ hj.J.J,

It is Y1r:;c'('so:--ry,

theroforo, to ,'_~l:-,-r;ys ::[:.v,- r.o!';-,v;et~YJZ:: files 1.7.Lth ".11 fl'"lnk uni-Gs :J.nd

close; ccnJvt~ct. ~i;.T8 h'~ld' S"lch cOY":.t c~t on thi's r::Lssion. 1l

Fi rst Scrgc.:.:nt GLl,;~LJ ~. CSYGCH, 135th Info.J:.try

!!~~ou c::tnnot sr:okc vcr7 of-:'cn cs jro'lr '.-:ind. br:comes cut.

Tl~:E n(;gloc~~

of the feet l:y:ds to t:!:'en8hfoot~ The S0C;C8 h.~,vo

to be dl'ied, if' p02C!iblc J ,!l(~. crl::::'WCc1. Even thour,b tho shbc,iJ, :-'.re
d2.;np or ':!Ot, dry 30cks "'.nd ~tJ-'D fact. drind by rubbtr;E;r.'oll. '-Tith fl.
tOluJ end n:csc.-:r,inr; ';dth J:':nCs, fuel nucb Dct:tGT 'nd blood circle
l~:.tos '~G':".in t}-j~~j tf:kir.g ttl? coJ,~~ '"'r::.d r-in (out; of thr;!?l6
HClT neD or ropl.:1C!0IT'.cnts ~'~0 tho persons ",-.rho l1rVu tile j;Ioct

troublQ .
The elo~hir:.g,. y-'h'::n -:{(!t, sl:ould be ~;rrung ou-f:. f' or. 0. d- ,::-,p picco
of clothing' is net ~:::Lr 2i~j l!lis,'T'"Li.-;lt; '-'cd disc:)?,:fort,i~g "::; n. oo('.ki~g
not, pineo.
I~or the tod, inst.c2d of 1;,'"tn:1 on the cold, dr.I"lp g:rOUD(I., ~,~OU
"l' gotb
,. -r~'
"'+ ... ~, 1_ong gra ..c,.J 0 __ . C~l.... (l)(),- .... ,.-\. lJ'l-'O~n -'-hl'
"h
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'-' '~L-'T up dv>"\~
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tlC'.r:.kots c::-:.n t.:~ pl':euL, Tt.~.3 >80~JS tbc: cold from P:~;llc~r,~,ting tho
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'c.

Corpo;rlCl CH:.RES
qCii,'; ':', 135th In1'~ntTY.

Tocbnici8.n Fifth Grc.Qo ~= r :)!'!L' C. HILLE.sT~\D, 1.35th Infnntry.

IIIn the h:.r,dl~,xs~ of "~;~l>"~~~ 1r: th~~ ffiountnins, they should. hover
bo rlwhcQ -{.'horo t:1C gOf~2:: i;] t;JP~-::l1.. Th3 r.'_ul.;~,: r.:111 'J.su:-:11:,'" slip
und '0.11, U:1scttJn,:,,' til':' ,,,,,t.ol,:, lo'J.ci ..
During- on{-) 8X!-~LTicnc,; of tti s ki!'"d, ':"JG :;:e!"e t~k~"ng P. rnulG
t.ro..i.n ,'-'.cross c.. !"1udd~" strC"'tch of grol;nc1 ':7hich, ['~t one tir.'}c, h:-f1 eGcn
r:. cord"To:r rond. r+t~~:-tj.-"-"g ;cross nt ,~ hurY'i"'rl I':'Ge, !"'. Yll~rr.1J8r of
tho 1:1U1('8 \"Jore pusl:cd of:'. 7,'1(- ::'0.:1::1 n.::xl bec~m(; I::irocl rC8\J_ltLr,,~ in
J:lll.cll t.ime boing lo~t in I'C'1.no"'d:~r.9: i,nd getting unjer Wt:l.y.H

!tCf '"'.11 t:iJo" Ie'soons l~;'~rn':-cl on tho fiol;~. ~Jf co~brtt, cr.,en only'
cm~l::',sj.Z8t': th.:.: t(j,'1(::h'"ir~gs fo"~d ire the 'field rr:~1.Lu:tl8.
EYDry tir::o ("
cr.rciinr 1 I'ul~_ _ ".i~,2 broknn .:: C:'"',3-:1'---.1t.~.r resulted.
.
!)"L~rine on,:,' r~Y'.3'G of t~l' J~ol1.nt~,in flcLting my plr,tbon (.h.~;~~in
in the v~_ci~j_t"/ (;'~ r. nroninn::t tr~il ~uneti()n. T}::.:-,t CV"mi!lE; ',Jetty
thrcF some 170":0 :-,.+, ~ h,~..:t tr,-;.il ">~rrGt i;!1 ~ r'.II~~ ul['.toon. s-;..~-f' c"od threo
C(',su~lt,iG}3. Rr.;2ults could }V-':'-.r,"]"cc!un \-.'orsc. Lecsor:. lc ..,;,.. Y'.c;c1 - ['.void
:""'Cl' "".' 'T"'o<::""'~'ol" ",,'J '-rC"IJ'V"\"l'1t lO-l,J ~.
JCr'l~-:~
hev0
<,..'.:-~
.....
;,1. ,...lrs
__..
'J ~"hich
_
0'. i-}j,((1t
C
I zcro,:::c. iIi', s\ll~l:. G'[' Grose. rc-~,.J3, trr~il. '"'.L.d ro~.d j"L:,:clctib~r:.s, 'm".in
,.L.<",1

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,on.."

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, _
,.na
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.
In mountr:in f{{-"11tinL~, .TcrY':'~ n:i n>3 ti:.::\":s out of' t'J!l:, sr::ts up hi s .

,,.,c,,... CCL1

f''-

l.c.cbino ,g.1:'.llS to cO''''<''~1d .tr'lil

:dccp i_;nllioG '-';1d T'f',V":tncs. By ~riding
the ridgoc f thOSD poi~t:= of rC:Jist~.n,::o m... ., y bc ou.tf'1"'.nkcd o.:1d r;J.pod

out. 11

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSI FI ED
Tochnic[',l 30rgo:1nt

E:LDCn~

P. SYl:'JI, 135th

Inf,::ntry~

!tIf the tcrr'dn is (.. sp':::'c1"J.l~:r stecp end the going conpIicr.tod
by ~. Duddy tr-.il, th~ DQ!l"rC 'rot to 10s8 conto,ct, This esrccinlly
npplios to r!8~~.paY.!s plo:tooY:s "'vi conpf~!lie$. Unit CODY:1D.nctors s'10uld
tccko into conciderc.tion hu,-,~n linit,to.o!lS on such difficult """rehos
0.8

thes().1f

~. ,Nir;l1t !~tt2C!s..
ISxtrorncly (~i:f'ficult to c~,rry out., G niGht "".ttc~ck is
nevertheless -c.hc only T:lotllOd "ss1Jrcd of rn6.-:;AYl'R.blB SUcCess ncrass opel:. croUllC1 ~.nd
Ggninst tho Gcrr.}:'n m'"'_stcrs ~).f't.~::!'rni!.:. Tho Division, onCQ br'ttJ.c S(;Qsonoo., ~-!['.s
nlwo,ys prcfc:!-"l'cd this type of' ':.tt,~~ck ~Jdor t~l_e ,':'.bO"J8 circumstf1:lces, Clut ec.rJh ~2n
queried onph"s:LzGs tho necessity for strict control to losson the possibility of
lost contt~ct >[/(,' "een ::::tto.cki:lf:; (::lomf;n-:'s. ~"_ttnck pl',_ns must be the 8$SSDCC of siro..
plicity. He otGr::':r concoi vod double cnvelop'.1(,nts gor.or;elly only r8cult in friendly
forces shooting i-l!=, 8~.ch ott:E]r"

Licu"Gono.nt Colanol JOE L. 3Cl8n~, lGSth Inf,"J.ntry.

liThe points conc~;r~~ Le the :-iflo bn.tt'}lion conducting nig":'t

'"'n b2V ~ 'c, ~., 'cd ...'" _.c. follono.

onc~-tio]'lO

~J

--.

(~) -~.r:_ttr.~k ~n~~ ;~~~" n:~-,;r~~' front;~~~.

(b)

Usa of ~~ut,om~_t"lc ~7ccrpons.

(c)

I'.':inG Fields.

(d) CO::lJ~.unico.tiQns.
Yh h,']ve found it sor:".;";timos ~JivC'.nt~gcov.s to lo.uncp..:} night
nttack in 8. coluFn of cO!'".p,~.:aics. TLis method h'ls been q...lito 8f
factivo whon the, roginc,Lt ho.d 'ocen stoppod in d"ylight o,tk,cko, ;end
['.ftor the en071.Y opposition h".cl :,ec~~iv(;d '\ PUT::'r.181ing from our c.rtil
lery, cr-,nr.on T'.nd mort'1r fir0 du~ing the dnyligl--.:t :"tt,'lck. L s~ocific
oxc.TJplo of this type of nttc.ck \;- s th,', .,,-ctian of' tho bO,ttc,lion
"gcdnst L!.IWVIO. The b,tkHon f'orl'cd UP'lt night, moved off using
,.., ro~'_d cs its guiding [txis for ;.dvo.ncc, sr_oulder8d it.s pry througb
opposi t.ion to tbe high grour:d in b".ck of LLNUVIO bcforo dr.ylight.
Tho r'.ction cctught tl:c cnc::-:.y :T:l surpris8, iI,nd by rapid d8plo:yr.~orlt,
1'!0 '"lora c.:-)lo to button u? the obje,ctivo rend hold it GfliJc othcr
friondly troops ~jopPQd up ,md !:loved into position to continuo the
,~.c1vc.nco upon nO!'lli.
/i!lotbcr ()xClmpl., of' this tctt-.lion using the se.r.l0 ",(,ttod oc~
clJ.rTQd in its nigr,t ilction ~.gr,inst COLLE /~LD:RTI (high eround (;r'_st
of LCR:L~HZ!~i';/~). Pric,fly, -t-,hc sitU("tion for this r.ction '.7",8 C.S fo1
101:S: The' 3rd B",tklion, 168th Infnntry RCcgimont hn.d been stopped
in its ctt[Lck on LCEE~~ZI;],'" by cnorlY opposition locr.tod in I,ORE:i.\TZf.. Hf..
r-.llct tlL; high ground or: COLLE tLBrnTI. In thi s instnnco tho h'--',ttn.l
ion gc.in ,~ttc.ckcd :i.n 0 colu",l1 of canpe.nics, shouldering its He,y
through to tl,,, obJ:,cti vc, cCltcrcing tho cnol'W by surprise '~.nd o.t
d[,yUght buttoninc: HD the ob}, ctivc~. Tho criticrl timn for both of
those: ".tt:lcks \"P"'.s" t):_~t pc:::iod. \7~1Cn lcadin~ clomonts of the b,"',ttc.lion
ly"d ro,'--',chcd tho ob}::octi ~~ -; '--l1c1 orgn.nized '_', rapid deployncnt to mop
up cGhc cncomy th~t hod h"I' b:7 -p".fJsed or th"t rrd.ght be locded iCl
ccny direction. Upor; thc' cir.'3t r,ws of sunlight thee bC,ttcclion

- 8

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

viforously stnrt',;d it3 r:10P-'.1P a.ction, c;,.tctinc mr.ny enemy by sur

prise .".Dd (!c:-r.l='J 0":'-' =.:" b ..:~, :UJ~Gi'cd. The poi~,t '-'0 ":fish. to brin~ out
is th~,t by ,n.tt,~.cki!1g ::m :': "'v~ory n,.-.rro':"J fro~"J.t8ce nnd in n column of
compr.nil3s 1.7(; r.rore ,').'016 to r"QV"G up rcC!'Uirod strength to disp0se of
enoiW oppositlon oncotl.'1tercd, or to p'lsh it '.sido flnd contLme on
to tho objective. 0:110 fCl'ry,tio:: is n.sy to control, h08 D'iOct '""pth
in the ntkck, emd, bvcn thouV11 en~ny nre by-pnssed, the cOT1plete
surprise c,nd bo-;,ilder?:lunt of the enemy y/hen vmking up in tho Dorning
nnd finding the.'" is oppClsit:lon surrour.ding then, cspcci"lly ie,
their recr, is :'jighly d()I:J.o:l.'"'nlizing, uith tho rOGult tl~...,t thc; Cl1G1UY
hns surrendored ,.".'it!lOut too fmeh of " fire fight. Tho successful
nttnck on COU,:;;; LLBERTI G~"blcd tb 3c-d IJ,-tklion to t"ke itG ob
j l:c'cive, the torm of LJREi'~Zl~lL', ,~.Ed f.Jr the rr,gimcmt to continue
on tOT:~rds its rGf,'il'10ntr:l objr:ccivc.
'i/e b-31i'Ne, by (xpLriGnce, ~. ,:ood rule to follO\', is to so pl"n
your night l".OV81'1c.nts t.h-t thoyiEeludo nttachl10nt of"t least ono
hO"Ty m,~chine gun plr.toon to thn cot,p[>.ny. It is highly imporV,nt
to get yoU!' nutorne.tic '.7C'1pom, in e~.rly r'1d koop them in l".te. 110r
k.rs should ho in pInee so t:lrt thGy ccen fire at d.-v:Tl c.nd if no co So
sc.ry. to fire "t derk oven t"!ol'gh they hnve hr.d to disp}Clce to .:cn
ontiroly nom posit.ion dl7r:lrg the night. 1I0rtnrs enn successfully be
fired from m',,!, dc:t,. Y'i ttout c.r-t'Y.l obscrvntion; Tho C".nEon cOr!pf.ny
c.l1d <:.rtillcry should be rcn<1:r to firo by rw.p dnt.C\ even though they
cr.nnot observe. If the fire of tho mort~rs, cnnnon compo.nyenel
"rtillery is re"dy on cnll to b, l"'id \"loll in front of tho obj cctive
nnd t'fpronches on tho flc.nk, countorClttncks by the enel1Y \':ill be
brokon up bofor:J they eV:T get started, l,gnin tho criticnl time
to t,"v(- c.ll t]-,is 1C""lF d,~t-. rropcrly coordir,[>.ted .-nd rcndy for uSc is
during thnt mop-up p~ric.Q .just proccdircg full dDylight.
The brst 1,,:<3. "l"ns of !'lico ,'nel ncn often run agaft no,., r.nd
then. Eino ficl(,[; f.!'d L~,"h7 treps sometimes cnuso m~ny ch-~ngos in
c. preplr'.nned night oporction. :.n "tt.'lck seldom progresses oxc.ctly
c.s plnnned; therofore, you must hwc flexibility. You "bsolutcly
co.rmot blindly disregOl:'d mine fields. You must probe end try to
got ",round, "void th8 minos if possibl". When there is no other ,-my
out they must be ro,""oved. Rcomovnl of mines in the dD.rk "t night is
not n simple little tclsk. AmIl'unition "nO. Pioneor Platoon persor.nel
o.nd ongineors ,:<_th proper equ:i.pmcnt o.re sometimes nbsoluto neces
sities. Sometir.",s the cns,.:or to thr problem is to h[\vo speci"lly
treincd men with the compcnics,
Let us '1g[\in point out tho.t th" c.ttnck on D. very n".rrO'.' front
nge, shoulderi.ng your \''eX trrough, so to spenk, is perh"ps on" of
the bost methods of paGsing through c. mine fiold. Sometiros civil- .
inn pnrtisnns he.v" provon invc.hlC',blG for tho loc"tion of 1:1ine fields.
!, specific ox"r,ple of ttis "ne tte bnttnlion I s night operCltion in
estnblishing n bridgehon,d C.cross the CECH/A River to the north of
MONTESCUDAIO, Italy. The bClttnlion I s first opor.ction ,;"s to S';/8ep
the south side of the bnnk clenr of. onCI1Y n.nd this \Jns accomplished
previous to midnight. Civilir.ns living in the ".rea informed us of
mine fields in th8 river bnnk, in the rivor 0.nd surrour,ding net,lork
of roeds. p"trols carofuJ:'y investigated nnd marked ~.pproc.ch8S

- 9

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED t hrough

~ine fields in sovGrhl~different points of thp river. The

1x;lttnlion, Ins," em,} c~lll'IY. 11".~ ~,ble to cross the r,iver, estr:blish
roadblock$ nnd IIceure bi~' g2'0Ulld to the Ilorth, qf'the rive:;-. other
eloments of the rogil':;ont '1'/61"0 \'l.blato JI(1SIl~~'jW!t,pr1or to,,"
dayligbt nncl cemtin'l.iO ~,nt:tnck,. , , ' ,
', ,'
,, ' , ' '
Thq, hea1't ,'lllciJWlelJ 'surr01.ll1d1ng, 1111 U!ghi; ,op~rnt1ons we nnvehad
to dcteis ~OI!U!',unf r:\IJ,tign" We b\ll1eve in using 'pllinty of Wire (lnd
h.",vingthe fronto-l'tne :ele~nt.s utrlrig ~r!:reo.s*'1le1 progress.' This
DI(lY tl'ke, 0. Uttle !'1oretime, ,but thE! 9vernll, ,advrin~!lge" 'go.ined, we
believe, me.kes for ~ epeed1;er ~ !!lOre 8yccel1&t"ul. qperationas 11
rrhole .."
'
'

Cl1ptnin Fat-Nt '16. coCn:TT, 16Sthlfift\ntrt~

" ":rt is 'tl'IY' l?ol1a:t:. and others share the some opinion, thnt some
men are afraid of the dark. To belei't(".lone and lout ill nerve ,
breaking.
,"
T'o estnbU...h collfidenee in personnel, sm,,,l1 ,groups should, "tart
out into the h1l1~ unfAiUlhr,to thf111'. and indi1!ciud;lybe sent oo.clt'
to 8 dU'f'erent place., this will notanly inilttil dOnfid~coin men
but will t.Fain them in 'rounding up'
the detaU;s thtit lIIl'ke for
individual trcJ.n1ng."
" ,
,

c,n

Co.ptnin

WILL~i.M

H. IL'.RRIS, 16Sth Infantry.

,"

"About the ,28th of June in the vidnity Of MONTEVmDI, Itdy,

fifteen lIIell nnd on.a'otf'ic..- f~om CoII\pnw"A" bo.d run into 0. fire
fight while at teq>t1,ng to eCltnbllBh n l:'oad blqek 1500 ytlrdll to the
north. . The rood blo,e!c' WIlS held .ott nnd ~he of'flo~r mmm'led. " "
.
Durlngtbe tiigbt Compcrq "B" tro,sgivel') the td~sion of clenrl.ng
the way for the ..road 1:>lock, nr.d ptlssingon to Po hill 1500 ytlJ'ds po
yond. We had: a heavy MMhine gun platoon tlnd tuo'guides to thO rond
block. It vISe noc~ssary:, tp move i'orwn;'d in Il singlefilo, nnd etcy
closed tlp. The ranson being, .theterro.invms ver:' rough, thick
undergrowth ruld 4itcbes p"'eydling. Severnl time:f 1't '7c.S necel/llI'lrr.
to belt, nnd wnit :for th" comp,':\ny to close tlp. The,tVeLpons platoop
and ll\nchine. g1lIIs 'qore near, the front. 1;- fel.ttho.t the reetcould'
keep up' with th"ir progress. tho only way to, kn!,w ~ben there w.s 0.
break wns to check: bnck ~ voice along th" col=" or wtl'en the reM'
p~,ssed tlp uord to wo.it we know th~e had been 0. break. Vie .,ere about
four !',nd, one-holf hours covering, the distlUlce ,to the rond,block.
Points I learned from. tl11,SI ,.
."
"

(0.) . If poasj,ble se.e the ground in. lk.yl1gbt. before ,moving over
it.

f~om

(b) If 1101'king
mo.pe, 0. l/25000is. much better tillUll/50000
. (c) It is n.ecesso.ry to a llow ample tiMe. .
.' .
(d), . The rOOl" must keep oontMtwith tho front,..
"
(e} It. ia hol'fU.y possib;Le in hetlVY underbrush. to put, out flOllk

security without ~. it.

{f) The ,536 l'adio worb. Wl!ill . 1nsOI!1G ;spota; in oth~ait \1Orke
very poorly.n
,10.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SocondLioutonnnt. SANTO LIl- BELH, 135th Intnntry.

"I UttS ordered to ~tt'lck, c, cortain hill with MY p10toon r.t
daylight. The terrain vms wid.e> open. Vie h~.d no~ovcr 17hatsoovor.
The enenv~l1o.md MY pl-.toon to proceed about half 'IIoy across the
valley floor, thenopen<:d up \lith Mortars, artillery, rnnchine gun
and 20rrJll fire. 1{V. plr:toon dis]:,ors(ld, I lost control and the plc.
toon was scr.ttereq ur.til dark.
When attacking ren objective, if there isn't C.ny cov(lred route
approaching tho objective, the attack should be held off until d~k.!
Sergeant GEORGE' P;;PROS, 135th Ini'rnt:ry.
"Th~ success of r.ight r.ttacks deponds on the indiYidur.l 60ldio!!
mrtintainint,:: contacte.nd co~l",te silence on moving Up."

First Lieutennnt.JII%IIE NCR'l'H, I35th Infnntry,

.

,__

c ,,;;rr'

-k~

"L heavy c~nceritr:ltj,on of smdl 'nrMS firo is demoralj.ztn~ c.t

nigr;t. If youeari get a man to pull the trigger, the sound or his
rifle c.nd the rifle on the right and on the loft v!ill give him
sufficient confidence to pUll him right up to.-the objoctive."

!. Riyer Crossin"'s. The 34th Infc.ntry Div:i.sionhns made four success

ful lll'ljor river crossings';(Three over the VOLTURNO, and one over the R,\PIDO).
Careful plnnning, thorou1',h recormnissance, surprisl). I1nd night attacks D.ll plElyed
their part in tho success of' these oper~.tions.
..
Captain FR.'JICIS J. KENYON, 168th Infantry.
liOn October ) ..3, 1943, the bnttalion he.d the mission to cross
tho VOLTURNO River ~nd secure the high .ground int.lodiatoly to the
North. This mission );,113 given to' the bntta:lion cO!!lID'lnding officer
throCl da~s prio'r to tho attnC:c so he could make hi s reccnno.isscnce.
I1'1l1lcdintely !lfter recching these orders the bc..ttalion comnanding
officer lllI'.de his rccor",,\{ssc.nco of the objective and then took his
conpany crmmnndin~ officers to tho ap, to observe nnd study tho tel'.
rain. He M.d this in "mpl'3 time so that the compr>ny cO!!lID,mdors
could toke their plntoon loaders to the OF mld plnn their .cttr.ck,
On thesenig:lts previous to October 13, the battalion coy,mc.nct.
ing officer hnd reconnaissance of th" river bed me,ds by tuo officerl'
and six enlisted men. On't.hesc nights t.he rliesion 'IIc-B.to find Co
crossj.ng for th-:' ir..f!lnt!"'j' nntl. the 'locnt',on to set u;:> 1J9me support
ing rlOc.ponSj Blrran mortc'!'s, hS"lV'j'lJlllchine guns, otc, ..'"
Thes., night reconnciissllllces found the J.oc:ltion for th", sup.
porting wenponsnnd 'llso decided thG best pIneo to cross the river
'.7~S r.t the, most unlikely spot, t>is being the de!"post rleter ...nd
tl18 highest bcmks. Thoy hm:>. found thnt nll t.he best crossing s;oots
wero ,COvered by enem:l' nutom"t 10, artillery nnd Mort,,:.' fire.
To rlnko the cross::tng ~.t the pIncs oh08("n the eneineers were
needed to clenr a Inne om this side. and string n rope ncross the

- 11

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

riv8!'. On October 12, 1943, tho bc,ttnlion cOlC","nding officer vms

[;ivcn the H-Ho11r ,nnd C',llr,d r,Jl officers to n moeting '1nd show:d
them Nlrit:!l ,hotos, m"ps rend fin,,1 pltmsof ntt'\ck.
Irmodintoly ,?fter drrk on Octob~r 12, lC)43 the rcconnnissCLnco
group st"rtcod fC'r th~ river. ;1ith thnm Hero tho engineers Qnd
snpporUng uap,pons. They hod the 8uP}lorting vl8npons phecd ".nd dug
into p05ition nnd these ~svl_pons . . . long r.lith riflemen covered th(; re
eonnl.issnnec ryau}' ?nd engineers .,hile they strung the rope Hcross
the river, /,11 this netio;, \1.'15 completed by 24 0 r] hours cnd Tlithout
beine henrd or obsorved b,r the cner.JY.
Tho H-Hour 17.8 0215 '1.nd the attn.ck nc.s to be preceded by a 15
minute nrtillery b o rrag8. :~t 121)0 hom's, tho bnttr.lion moved to the
river bC.nk 0.nd vrs in position bY 013'1 hours, to stnrt tl18 ,n.ttnck in
a column of eOI!'p:mil3s in a c01u:m of plntoons.
At 0200 hours the "rtillory bnrrn ge strrted nnd the l'3o.ding
platoon moved slo17ly ,ocross the river. Although the artillery shells
'Iere lc,nding on the opposite aank close to the river it wns decided
to tnke thn.t risk "nd slli" surprise on the enemy.
EvernJ m,?n, doem to the privnta, kneiJ the situfltion nnd his
mission nhen once on the other side of the river. Althoush tholoe
no.s mino fiolds, J1'[;-in 'lUtoT1ntic weapons covering thr bn.nks of the
river the bnttnlion r;cS or: ',ts objective before do.ylight nnd tho
only casun.lty wr.3 ono 'enD kEled by 111"1chine gun fire.
In my- 0l):~nion t1-is SUCCUSS PGS due to Q good study of the

terrain, det1.il.c:;d rccol1r,eiSS2nce of ths river on ooth sides CJld the

USe of sand t"blos so ttnt every man knmi drlily the situn.tion. With

nny of the :.oove missing I'm .n.lmost sure the crossing "/ould not have

uorked so smoothly '1.5 it did nith so few cnsu"lties.

On the night of Novonber 1, 1943, the br.ttnlion corrunrcnding
officer "/.".8 told th"t his bo.ttnlion PJn s to be prep'1red to nttllck,
in .'l dnys, r.cross the VOLTIIRIW Ilivor cmd secura the tm:n ,~nd bigh
ground in the vicinity of S. lamIA OLIVETTO.
T,:!,n.t seeme night he too;, bis corepnr.y comn::nding offiGors c.nd 8
enlisted mon dO'711 to tLe river honk to mnko c. roconnniss"nco. This
rocorcnniss".nce ',1".S to find" sbnllo" crossir.g for tho troops "....ld to
seo tbe objectivo. On th8 I'lClrn'l'lg of Nov8rebcr 2, the t.,tto.lion
COY.li"::'.nding officor '.7D.S told thnt H-Hour YoJi,S pushed up ;1.no the nt...
tnck ,ould t,kc pI n.ce nt 24'lrl hours Novenber 2.
:'0 14"0 hours, Novcrrb8r 2, 1943, th,, h\ttrclion co!O"v.ndlng of~
ficer k.d n. mootl.ng ';;ith "ell officers "cnd sho'!od thorn rn ~,orbl
photo nnd ",n.ps of his pl nr! 0.:' ".ttnek. It 17."lSn' t prnctic::ll for D.
roconnniss[Cnco to r.ctu~11;,' OOSGrve tho tcrrnin dUD t.., enemy obscr~
v:::.tion.
Lt 2000 hours the: b::ttcl:;.on moved to r, for\'iard nssenbly ".ron
,",nd hold up philo tho coI!'pc.n;)' con1tl,~nding officers tool: t:oo plc.toon
lenders tothc rj.v0r b~.nk r.nd sho'J:od th8rl thdr objoctivus. f.t
2400 hot;l's the nrtillery sk.rtcd end troops noved ncross tho river
in a colu..lID of compc:nios ire C\ colunn of pl,'\toons.
On ronching tbu oDposi tc iy.~k tho connClnding offIcers took up
nn att2.ck f'or"1~.tion nnd sk.rtcd cor the high ground. To ro:cch this
objoctive tho troops hn.d to cross 21)10 y'lrds of flr.t ground dotted
hore cend there ''lith orch,":'ds .
12

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSI FI ED

The le~d pl-.toon loc.d. r' d.dd.cd to usc en orchcerd to concor.l

his novor:0nt rH;q r:hfm tt t;;7 r(:,'"'<ct.,>'"'d the cor;tor of' it, sonr: OD.:.. S-COI>
pod on n series of 1'l1nes. Of this plntoon ~ll nco's ':!er" sc.rionsly
Foundod, or killed, '::ith the ,.1c:toon lc"dor c. Jitter cc.so; cpproxi
n"tely 8 m.n cnm': out 'Jnscc.tl1od.
Tho folloViing 'Olr.toor; than took tho L ,d end lXlvod crowd to
tho left of tho orchrrd. This plc.toon ".lso rnn into nines c'ounding

r d scvc~r"J_ r1E":n.
T'lC th:l.rd pl,~toon In linc t1:()n took the lc-d end s'71mg "-lry
irol:] th-.t "rece moving :l.n .' ,,):l.do circle "nd nfter moving apuroximate
lr 1000 ynrds this platoon ~lso ran into minos, wounding tiL pln
toon lerder, killin" t}".: conpr.r", 'cor:;:\~nding officer nnd rloundd
. . J:d killed !!loro T!:fn
.'.t this point, r:h\t \,,.s left of tho ".ss-.ult compnny reverted to
o.-.tk.lion roser';c' ".nd ".r.ot],er ccr.:p',r.y took t;:lC lead. Th"y strung
'Go th0 right .".nd Ggr.in oncounto:rud mlnr" ".101Ulding 3 officers ,".nd
s~voral <enlisted men.
It rinG then diy,idod to pull b'\ck 0. little
o.nd try to get through on the Lft, but once moro tho lend plGtoon
rr:n irto minos, vlOundinf mora enl ist-od m.:..-:n.
Tl1f: t.nt kHon c01:1r:lt.nd1ng officer so.\1 th~.t dnylight nns not
far off nnd docidod to du." b'.ok c.:ld try ',nother route far off to
tho ll;ft. In this "re'1 t'18 bn"tt,lion moved to the b::.se of the obo
jective cmd cnmo 1-1nder mnchine gun fire. FhE)n tho mrtchino gun nns
he~.rd Q sigh of rolief ,'E)l)t throng'" all the men e.s they kno1J the.t the
battnlion he,d clec.red tl!o mi.ned '~!'oe. nnd lias st:->rtQd.up into high
ground.
Tho b~.ttalion cont':.nucd up the hill in tho face of this mGchine
gun cnd mortar fire "nd scctJrcd its ob.iective, cD.pturing 15 enlisted
men r.1l1d 1 officer. Tho r'.;nson the bette.lion "ttcck vms so fierce
we.6 thnt nIl mon "!ore "nxio1J.s to be on the high ground nnd get into
the onell\Y's positIon, for they knrJ'CT there ,;oren't .nny' mines there.
The opinion ,;116 thnt '.f r:e had h9.d more time to prepGro for the
~,ttack, po.trols could hr.ve f'oclXd thu mined flrU1S '1nd m".rked them.
\7e could hnve then .k.d sC)mc lr,r.es cleared by the; engineers c.nd L &
P plntoon or hr,d 60110 trclcs prc-;Gcde 1:8 witl, the inff\l1try follol1tng
in tho tr.nk trr.eks, ,:itJ-; t.ho !:lined nref, cll'l1red the bntklion could
h:-o.ve s.:!ovc:d mnny of the cas1.:.oJ.tics that we rccedvod. 1I
tho pl,~toon luC'dur

l"irst Lieutenant GEOF:GE C. GR/CE, 16eth Inft'ntr'J.

"Ll'proxinr.toly fi7e drys Friol- to .".ctunl oporntion, the of
ficors v/ere notiflcd th,t th" k.ttalion "'ould force n crossiloc; of
the; VGLTT!1UW R:l.vi,r SouthG-.st of' the to"m of C:.J.hZZO and seize the
hiGh "round E'":;t of Cf,J',ZZG. Ev"x;r offj.C<Jr :in the bo.ttnlion vms
kkcn for,,'crd to tho high :;rol.c.d over-loo]~ing the ground over Yihich
t:::o D{'-.ttf'l.lion '.'J['.5 to opurc:.tc. T~'.:D ~;,ll' f~;',:iJ_i-:l.rized ourselves 0:--.8 well
::'.s possib:lc vJith the tc!"r~-:in.
f. number of pntrols were 5'2nt dml!). to tl)c i r"ver to determine
such things GS depth, spe;.'d of current, river bottom, height of
rivor bnnks r.nd to trv
to loc::.to onEJIl\Y position:;;.
...
"f,>
I

- 13

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

q-F(r~_ir -:.';-,f; """~('n '~"1.~,"f, J.." O~-tC'Xj:r ~lo43. Tho batt~-tIi "i'l :~10vod
au';::. from:::'to bi V01bC 2)..r('"j~~_ e. J.:,. c..usk 12 Octobor c,l1d rlovod ir:t ... a i"G..:'T
D.8sombly urea. Ec.re tho of':f'icors chdcked t~Gir men and (;quip-t,;o!r~~
for such t1:iT2G"S t~o-: ~~r,~t,[:;-~_;~ to a y-j.F:;ht opr;T t:ton. Rl.dios ',:,-.TQ
cl:ocl;:ud ':::.lso.

Tho r}[!:. -')f ,,:'::,t::'-.cl..:: '.~.-:t.G for 111.'~n Com:pn.ny, fol1o"l,-'cd by l1CII .z:.nd
to w<>-__ ': tf:.0 ;,:; in ,):t:,"'ort. 'IB't Company ~:'r,s to cross
$,')(1 y'i.rds sP.st of bB-t.:tJlion and cr-G8.to a disturb:.~cG

H~:[j Cu~.~-",:_:,,"d'.. :J
'~::,~)~-'oxi,!:>,tely

t:--, r:~oc~j.. 1TD the (!r-.JJ!C"".

I:~' t~wy cor~_d 1l1f:k0 t:1G crossinIT all ri~~'ht,

~..
+'- . + I ......
T.p
~U~:::l J o;u:.. ,-,_iC J~( vvB..LJ..on.
..!
not , ~.
lonoy \,"fJX'O
b..~.nl,,: !'.;nd C!':JS2 '::::",>r;:; t~c rGst . of -bhu battuJ.ion IE.a. cros;~'od"

_-0,
-co
.: -,_.

"(.'-0""

!l'"

to

Co::-;

'.l

..!-.,

.....(.

-i
s-, ......
q~

..,

f'+

..l.::.~""

.J...

oJ

;:::.::;.tt,:~J i~n, 16f~t1: Infr~.ntry '.".lo..S to supp0rt tho c..t

prov:1 ;'~.'c~.y sc10ct,y~ :::ositions.
'j-hc; 2nd ~l"tt",.= ion . s" on <'t:..'-.. r-t-:;ht flar:. Bc:t:-Jo::n 0111' lcf"-('
:;jJ."th, 3:rd Divisior:: t:bcrc ,-:'::;.8 ~l gap of approxim0..l~oly one

1f;:Ff, 3r(

c~.c; <fOD

fJ.u,n~,~

Li:I_C

III

T~c arti~llc17 c(,)!lc")ntr~;.tLjno- "_-,;1'0

~~.,.r:jrJr ~;~ivc:

to be 11.ftcd 100 yards

ronutr;s.

TriG crossir.:g ~-:e.s t<~ ~(; n:Ldo --~i th the assistance' of infan-cry
,',s::ault. bosts.
J~s it turn'_x} 0:'t, these; bOr:'l-ts :7oron 1t necessary ~ as
i":, -'-.f;-l_G fO".lnd tb::lt tLc: r::'vcr U:)').. J1 '0(; _forded.
OncD t~;() \'>j."I,r~r '.: _.s crc,s::__ ~(l t11c comro.niU8 -.-TQTC to follor: C,n
,"',zin-..: th to a prcdcsi.gnC'.t :~c. ~"1-r!:1 ~;.:juc'C), 'l".hicb ':_'[' S en [.,sscmblJ,r ~")oi2.!t.
Tille

o:~-,"~C'.c\:

to .tho ::'dC~l g.to-~::.:.~~--'~. ':;.[; to r:-an-1:.inlw from th()ro.

At ')20(: J-::Ol1'."'s, -Z>::. >_~+,-:J.~_~,n f:iOV:;2 O~1t ~-::itb l1A" COf;lpCl~'"
lcc:.c1inS. T::(; -:-~ctl).'.l cr"-: 8 ."-]-~~-'X '":--: ~'. ~:~""dL r-i.th Ii+.tlc d --i.. fficl::..lt~?" T'Qc;
ba-c,t.c.lic)n did T;,1CLiv0 SO!"E(; r:.i.i~_c .'.-,::lCt T.""::<:c};jnc gun firo, .but it did
!lot GC;J::'i0'L1s1~r hU1I1t:.ur tho cr::)s;~-ir.2'. 113" CGffinc.ny rJc.s ablu to cross
nnd il~~n0d t!1("~n~+~~'inr
...''"'~~ ~, "~~:'d
~t
v
J. JO
un't"~
l_ 0 1D[~ tt c, J"
.1.O n \:.::'$
GeroeS th~ river b;r d.{.,.:~} ic..:::~t.
T'l:c ruIn cor''1y~_ni_.8 ti1(~r :~uV. ("~ ()\~t [__.cross the flo.t grol-;.l1cl
le:'_0"il1~~ to the or-.<~(.:ct1,"1,; .: .,
'Lj '-:':r:~; c:,"G.g:__ _"7.r in .,:,_ ccmbi!1[,_tinn of :c'iflc,
Yllr~c~lin!J Z"1.l..Yl unci mortcr ~~iI'C;.
Tnc ;..':'ir:; !:.,~ .1(~ t:p th~) bntt::J.ion for
tbo bc~tcr p,-_~rt of tho d:.':.y.
CO!?lIX'IlY J/D~', 1..!l~i~J-:. c('cld :10"::' noVe forr.T1.rd duo to t~c rifJc
con :...... nics ~)oir:g hul~l iJ:t=', ~uB in :~J. on," ~ho ri,\7'Qr t:',~klll T,:'o 81lTh"'T!
J!1o:c;-,[..rs ',.'ore r;;ct up r-.nl G0mO fil~O . :'"rrs delivr:.:rcd. The comrrn.micr._tion
'....,-'.8 "~ct -::,'orkinn" vCrJ'" offoct~_v(:l~r [.nd- thi-s hamp -rcd. tho 31 fire as
it -." s n,"_.ccsE:>::ry felr the r::flc cOIn"iYni,;s tc adjust the firo. Tee
n.::;'"if;',r ;lV chine gut:::' . 'nrc ::.::.:..'t ur ,Ione th~"; rive!' bc;.nk, but did not hc~_vo
CC."'

<J

t]~c o.'~

.....

'.'

_.'

"_""'

'J' ... '__ .

.'

,_

'" ,"

.'

j:,ortrmi t;y to .fir+.).

L:" c...~lc;:::,"' CT!"',-:)~,:;: SCl'" ..r. ~f.~ld do~::n on O"Ll!' left fl~nk CC: 1.1Se:d
sor_~.O c~nCory;. ,2nd th::; ~;j ~"'rJ ~[,. ,~b-'i_f'_0 r;uns
;'To c~:nrgc;d to covor t!2is
t~_~Tr..: :-t., ;::-'fc.
c;1-;nt:.::'ru""' t~ c}: d "Il.::::lopcd.
Gor:.PQnir-~o Hi'fI ,.::}"} IJ'"r, 1--:~.'" -\'":--:,ri'1.:s llG.hc:'I"tOr's dtxiDC '~h0 day,
fGrc<;:: ':~h(_ unGutV
,.-:ithd:-.- .'.-" to -the.: hi:.~hc::, g:r'C't:!xl. This Elc.tion took
'~~itL; Dome: tl:!lC: ::',5 tlL _,n,.,r--:~r r~::-'c:-::in0 guns 1-07"0 '.'_'011 :plncod -:nd could
;~':'''\/'::"l'' iJ.is front vc'r:. T -::oll.
Durint; this period W)!l CO:!1:pany .f11.:~:3h.,d L group of (.'cbov.t 40
:In\...;!''.l\r iP":-:') tho o~c:<_:n. Th,:,;!.: th~ ~~_lf G T.Tcnt to ':.-:or!.;: and vur:l I(rt of

no

to

t:_~o Cl!U-;TI"J

got 2..::o.y.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

;'}r,on d.'-:..rkn r 's:.l fell, t}y f'ttC1~ki.ng cOl"lpnnir-,s r:!OYod up to tho

obj c,ctivo ,en,: s(,~urod it, liD" CorOP":1Y "nd Bnttnlion HOGC1U,"rters
th,)L lJov"d up on:} th~ bo,tt"':;':i on orf'~ni.zGd the defonso of the ob
joctivoG"

(/1

"I' or th.. crossing of tho VOLTUKW "i vor, Uctob:or 13, llt 0200
hO'J.rs, F got svorything .orrc'1god end drill"d th.) pl~nned ,.Vcnck
or~~Clr iLto every ;n:;n IS rlind on 12 October.
c',lJ, Sllpp0rt r.,:,.cLin~; )~l:J1S
':.'0": p)1lcod n.r:d rr,y sectior, ~ttocho,~ to the "ss"ult cmp''.llY of riflc~
r.'en. ':','"c cro3scr~ t~8 riv8r '.-,rbich 17[1,S ['.bout 15(') y[trds ~,-Tido .".nd up to
4l feet deep. It 17-\S ~lC'lrY' s',7ift c'.u'r'Jnt 'l.cI ':.'0 li,'1U to string ~ Ii:::._',:
to 'kcop from r,ottinc "il'" shed CW";",I'11 str'J'~.r.,. The M"in tiling 1.78 gninLc1.
't7r.s ~u1!2,riso.
M{'st~y by cro~'slne 'diu]"; ~TE:rry m[.snft cxpcctj,l1E;' US
,-,nee C10E:8 artillery S1l}:po"t, -,m5.cb fell ,.,ithin 10'1 y.~rds u!,strect\
fro;: us [',11 the tfhtlr: ~~;c crar,SDrl ..
It r:tl8 ver;/ succ~saf1;J. and we b~d gained the ob5ective about
1500 y:::rds on tlle otl:Jr 3'.de of th,-, d ver, "llthout Jerry getting
cor.1plot81y organ] zer1. F 1st Movement rmd very good contr01 of c.rtll~
lory uith cloDe in suprort, to kee,p Jorr~T dorm unt:tl r:e ~-.erc r~gl-.:t
on him, ';7ns mr.inly rosponsiblo for t]l,:: s'~ccc;Jsf'1.i.l I;d.soion. Tho
no.chino [(un pIe,toons' cnrrl.ed bec.vy mnchina g1lns ct t~at tiTT!C ""~ld. it
'\1::1.$ very harr.l t.o keep up to n fast movj ng f.t3SnuJt te,~n.
L~t.or "'.:8
chc.nred to lid-:t ~.ncr..in(. gvns for B8so:!11t l.nd ,.. ttnck rl07Gr.:ents
and the~l' V1L~~!'e mu~h (~D.si(;r to l:'lndle anc~ j'_~st r..S good fire parler 11
v70 UGe ther~ nIl ~,he ti''10 !}Q1,7.
Thu h:nvy m'-~chinG ,t!UTIS .:Ire co:rri-d in the clnttr lion supply
trc.in r.nc1, TIC [J,ctur'll;r }y'.vo ncve.t~ usee.. tr.OI11 sir.ce, ()}::cept on de.r cn
siv(J lCos;.tions ',C; the bCSlc!-b('rd ,".t tNZIO. ThGre ,;8 corld h,'vG 1.'Sec1
l1.g:l1ts jli.St P.S i:;nll- rLncl it seeMS th.'":! hanvy m,'1ch{ne guns PTG jns~"
e:-:eC3S lug8nge in this typu o..:~ war. n

E.. r.t,E.Qd J-rQ;:,'"',i.~~"2!l2. Th,--, I;Cl.tr:Jl in t::K, "'''ir.tr1,:_ nn'11;rs Lfl is th(: m~ j or
source of' enCJi1,\' il~forr-;"t2.o:n, l:1ti.l(~ t.l.d)Y'(; r<,re lini,!,,-,tioLs it is tlv r,...~,trol ':7no
verifi(;s tho En.' ~T,j 1'1 re'Oorts or. t,1~('; t~r01JIld. Irl the curly (:nys on t::1C .'l~ZIO
Ber~ch~efl.d, Tlho<:'c '~ILtr{Jllin~ lP"1;;; 'most G1!:"~,pn'1iv-), ;.t ~.7ns i'o'lnc.1 th~t ~\..thx:s used
18ft mFc~1 to b.~ c:ucircc1. V(jr~J f3W D:ci50!"'r::..\.-~ Il.~'i br.,'!? tr.k:-n '1nd th'3I'c ',:ore
large ~(a:~-r'O.c8 'Jr. 'tJrB di\risior:.'Y front" for ,hiC'h }';C1 ~_n.f0rmr-tion hrj b3en fortpcofIill{
for as m1l~h --'s T,l::'[,cc ':'60k,s~ :1:0 rfn~e:t\Y tL? citJ..:.F1.t:::'on r'- SpGCii'c:.. pn.tro::' ,'!I'OUP rf[,S
orgc.~ni~.,jGQ in 2r.c> :c~eg:.rn(c;t of 701~.:nt''-:'Qr [~on. GivC:D lwmC2 ;;UC!:' [\.8 t~c lC8tL
ln~nntry hct-~l(::Gn'"'.LC's, tllO l33:L"d Inf,'lnt'.~ :lad Lr:',_.ers "'Xtd thr; 13~th 1nPr.~-::.ry
BIilG Dovll.:;, t-:ll. ::tl::!J J.5v<.Jcl ;-"nd reh0nrscJ. tl1('ix' c':Ier:.itions if' ttc: rOf'..r ,:-'.re:.:::.. In
n relntiv':'l;J sllOr't time tree new or[:r,nizections rr;.wcd their r:orth end provided
tho di"is;on y,itL " ',7GL.lth of ir.i'OI'M"Ctior,.
Fh',,'::' LLoutun,mt HfJWLD C. BIGEOP, lG8th Inf::mtrJ.

!lIt j.s of err.t ir-;Fort,.. . nce in de:'cnsiv0 pOSitions to gr.in in

telligonco thro~_lgh rAcon~'''.iss~ncc Qnr1 conbrtt po.trols. The follm1
in,~ f:""ults WEJTG COE.mOll '7i tt JTI,"_:1y of 'lur pr,t: 'ols:
- 15

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
1. C'lre1ussncss in moving for;~rJ, resulting in discover;: ty

cncL'7 f'.t rlist~ nees of 'l,S T'ri.:;~h :<:l.S ;?,()O yerds.

2. Lr;ek of il.ggrcssi -1('L8SS, p'lrt17 du,;:; to f~'ar of :~p I\'Ii::l(;c, or

of "noP'.f (r:11)1.<8"., 'end purt1y dOl'. tc 1r.ck of orien'.;rtlon of pntro1
monbers by p~'trol l~-)n_dors, r081;..1-sing in doubt es to mission C'.11c1
mothn:~8!t

3. 1n:,bilIt"' to c ,.ptllre prlsonrrs, ChlL to tb- nbovo fC'ctorE'.

Recor.mendc:tior.s:
(.'1.) :=npL.. . . sis on r.ight trl1.~_ntl1g, ~,nd USc of SITU::} lor

p~~tJrols.
R,:::con~l~iss'1rlCe. pn;:"'rols of ;; to 4 men, combn.t pf:l.trols or

rdds of 10 to 1~ !!len nre sufficifJnt, ".. il considur'loly so.fer in c

mo.jority of cn~ies.

(b) Th" r01'1o','e1 of petrels fro;n fr-'nt line,s to rec.r

["r(y's t'7enty-four tours .. prior t.o the tiMO the patro]. is to dep['.rt.'iI
F irst

Liell~trJnant

";F,1C B. RO:E".'aD l JP , 16Sth

1nfan~ry.

"On 2 :pril 1944, j.n the viGir:ity of 1201,/ BELLA, Italy, a

pr,tro1 of 12 m<;1" m"ce Cl rn:Ll 01" em "nemystrong point at j'.I',Nf,CO
r::}i ch ,-TeS lO"~.trd c bo"t 300 yards in front of oux' front Uno posi
tiOES. Our "Yd. s[.ion V!t:.S to Gc~ncrQ:,ly raj.s8 hJl1 ...,d.t~ J3rry. Vie
Pl'oc()cded t" VJithtn 5;) ynrqs .of g:.;",CO ,dtl1out being detected. '],he
riflE: grcnndioX' f'::re.1, O!}0 ;,~OU"1(t ".t til. roof of' the house .c[1.UsinG n
sm:..11 1'-L..:'8 [:nd enOMY ~oafl~.aio:l. l~c ths cneITJ trird -to cxt5.ngl'!.isD
t'18 f ir-8 -nJ met!' -~'b_eiT' ".'J{:n.pe,ns, ":.:0 OT'C~D~c1 fire witl1 rifle, J ..'J'~ ,..,.nd
tonIY-f;1IDC c'-usin~ thc.:n ~-,n ~'Yldf'te;--m.ined )1U"!lf.ler of c,'lsu'llt:l.0s. At
th:L~ tirrw, dX.Vlh 't';''1C o:':'c""l.ldn,; '1.119_ ',.'8 ~.~~'ot:eedec1 1:,0 roturn ta OUl' OTjr
liy:.cs under C07e1:' of sJ'r'1kc. f:i.red by t:h;-: bnttn:ion 81r1.r.'l rnortc.rs. 1,78
slL'.fe:,:'cd no Cnsu~::2:ti,)f1 on trds r.".id nnd ~.n outpost .n-t. ISOL', EFL~
OOG;: rvr-d t.h,:~ enrm.f pir.king 'l}) p\r-,ny C,~.5u.f\lti(;s. Tr:e outpost inf'15.ct
cd t.~-'O more c~ sncJ:!,',ieo i.rith ani. pe:':'" fire.
I r8co'1lr:encl tL"t in'~81,ilpncC) of'f iGors of' e.11 'mits inforrr
p2trol_ lc;:,dGrs of L.. rnis si~n ct le:-,st f oJ.r llours in :"1odv n.nce of tho
ti:;18 th8~,'" p,ro to begin. Thie '.l1o'lld g5 va tho petrol J. 0,'~~cr time to
m:clw ;J1c.i1f', ori"n~ his petrol n:j l'rocurc nny (;xt,.~. equippnnt tLr.t
is ;'1oec1.ed. t1

"On M['.~r 13, It.'4,~, I r.ovrd ou~ \7it,. r. fiv.G-r:.:"~'1 p:'"'-:202., C~O'71'~ I"',
deep JY"['.-:; TJ.nr.ing. !Jcr"'cnrl:tcu..l~r to thr" 8:!"l8i:1:" lines. '1:1.15:::; :::x,trcl
i,"'Q.S DO+ n bntt.J. 1.io'1 O'Y'\~,J~"'" but iL,J,0"t:en(~pn~~ !"1.cttop of "the pl.. . . -;,ot)n.
r:e ~'_OV" d n ..:.t in f'"1. ~lr_"":.-_r ,,;hic'1 r:~_r: -.~ri~~i'1 rnJ Gffol"c1eJ good CO:1C6,"'.1
l.t;"_" -1..... "1" .. ':~J-_'C.i.~li_.1,
I irLe:'p- If-d Ly rtc.?l thnt OlT r-i;:!zior \/r'[; +,0 in
V8,3"~i.~~,t'J t~i:.;: d:L'(,,.' for .n.~rl'OYi..'1r_tol:f Bnp y!:tr(:s r,.nd fighc on!;l if
ne~eS3nr~/ ..
It .-:,~,C my r1csir8 to .i,...:l.P~"JrL n GO:Y'mn:r.., jf possiblG, .~~nd I b.e
lic1!od oot tb~t ~iElq of' d~.y hu ;'oul(L !:.ct -De ~1,lG:::"t 3ince there neve:;,.'
~f) 1tJW' dfl~rti;je r.ct2.vity on tL-::-~ lJG~/.::t'1o,.,d.
\"0 pI'ocoocitJd iT'. a:tnt;ID fjlc Q.o,:n tho d.rrYf for . .:pptorir.t~.toly
600 ~!'-'.r(}s until i.<le C'1me to n. Lenc: 1.r. tL,G c.rr.n,~r nfter whic'h it

- 16

U NCLASSI FI ED

UNCLASSIFIED

Btr::.i[fhtr>nod OlJt ::' :'l?:" ,~'C;01~t 15'1 ~r'"'-rds... .'.t th:)_G point, I observod n
Gormeu":. cr,.'l'_'] inr. .i.x~~o .., ~~."C~::Lll'-' G~1:1 ro,si tim: "lP on tht) side of the
bnnk rtbout 151) ;/ _:.~- :~3 r:_, __ ~.y. I J.r:.:'t three :::on be~l:i..n:t ,,,t this point
in position to p.?J~cr; fi_l'C O!l th-;.t ~~_m 8hol~J.d th<r open up. ~:ly

scrgo"nt c.nd I l'"ocncrk,i on 'lo::n t';, dr e.,:, I instnlcted the )jon I

lcrt bc:-:.ind I:.ot to ~ir:- l..J.!llr.3S the encrmy firoc.1, or unless I opened
fire. Usil1B' th,' ,"'.' '.il.-""'bl,-: CCI'V(T '" nd cc"'\nc9~-1r>Jcnt '.70 ,'"Id~l~mcod ta r.rith
i:~ 50 yr;rds of tile ~:1 'r1 nmp;. ,:_corr.G~t. .~~ t this tine, onr' of t)y msn
opened f:Lro T:,~ith f' t:)r:rr::t... glJn. I f01~nd ou.t lctol' he; h~.d done so bG
c~.nso :!8 snv; n -.:or1'2-"D rise '1Jp r_nd !'"tim ~: rifle., in thE": directior.:. of
t~1.(o sergcnnt r:Lf_~ f1Y3f~lf. nn- hit tho Germ~1n, 'U:lt ,~,t this point. Zerry
o~:;enod c:p pit!J crossing tr':~Lir:e ~n fire r'_nd , ,. rr::i!~ of potC'.to
m,"_,'7,J.lcrs. 7hc fir::::t rror.,~,jc ''.'o1.:!'i(lcd r:;,:,: in th,: Qrc ,'"'.:r..d log, ~~"cnder
inc; B.Y right arrl 1:"80J.e83. 1'h: 3c;rgnr~~}t w.. . s }"'.i t in the log '"'_11c1 could
n It '.-,-::'.lk.
'ihcre ~-:-erc ~},prc:'i~-:y\tcJ..~r J1;. Gcr~:,ns iT". this position '"'nd they
1''-Jtn{:f;sed our r;,p}Jro.~'.ch -nd .s',;.ck'-;d UE in. They cr'_~o out of their
position r1fld got in bO:1irL~ L.~ {':nr1 :lrovo off my ttree mon. ri'con
thsy st;-.rted to-.7o.rd 11S e~:.,'J.rcl:';~Jg throurrh the gr'1Ss.
-"8 (~ocidcd l.'W d:.::1n't Lcv~; i'. chf'.nco to fight OlJr l7o.y out "ncl
r'''.tbcr then s1U'rnr~091' '\'-iC 'ic.c:L::"od to t,.....ke 01Jr ch~'\nce on thoir not
find5_IlC us. The~l 1.7~lk('d tLrcl;C~1 us but dic.1. not find us. When
thoy h~(: ,0.11 :core, t, de t~ t)',coir l'osi tions co c.eci.jc"d Tie ',lOuIc'.
b'.vc to st:-~y unt.L~ d'"'.r:{ t(;(':--c!1se ~:'o Ferf) 1701.:.i.1c1od rnd could not fight
eff ccti vely if ob;'e~~",;,T("~,:l r_o"":.. . i:..p Q1,t. Too, thDrc lJ.-::'S no r:ir:d blo1;.:ing
o.nd trying to ern'.'l cut t>l'OU;j:', t<'"":,ll gr.'l.sG ',7oull h~.vc o.t"tro,ctej
r.ttGDtion. 1Ve l,"'_y still, e-.te;.1 In Of clock tl~ . . _t nigllt, f'.t l.::hich ti:1o
170 got out scfel~r c~,- ..,..(_,tnT;"~'cl ir~tC"l our 1ines. 11

First Lieuten:mt 1,:"'::3:l '::)'1)12), 135th Inf'.entry,

ITPn.trol ,'-~ct:~.CYl 12 ~~: of th~' ?i1ost iTIportf'.nt t!1ines in combc.t
['I.ne. t\-O sID'!,ll p.;t:-c'ols "_:'C :".'ot-:,cr tt-,T' one If'.l"gc onc~ i:' they ;-"rs
constantly in cO:lln::]~ic"".-~,ion --1"iC~ terr.".in pr;r::::its then to be mr,tu-'"'lly
supportins-. Eecor:.~~~,i[,J,:'::;cc 01' loY'.:~ v-::.ll,:;ys '-,r.d high ground on both
fl,ri_nl:s is pessiblr -It trJ; '::~<:18 t~ [':0.
sch I s no. 53(. n.r3 8xcnll~:nt for p,""trol ~"!ork of this ty!>o.
p t:i:'ols Or,8!'-:.ti.}":~ "lc'n:~ th:- ~1~.f,~1 gT'01mc:, on either sido of ~. v~,lle.y
cr.n ""1i~i1.1.r'11~' s- 'V(,Y ~ 11 t~c t,::..rr- in r:.nC: ~y'.sil~1' pick up ftny encr,~y
:~lOVC:T1(.nt in. the' :3cc+..or,
~~:" :1;:,;i l'}g thi S 3y stOrI prisoners DC,V:J bonn
t,'-.kC~l nithout n. shot toin~; fir\:-l. II

C;rkin HSID B. Hll"'F, 135th Inf'lDtr;i.

//
I

ilBo c'"',rcf-:_J. in CC1c:." n'--; ~J'~tt'0J.S ~'lonf5 5.'1:-'10 ::'oute. EXf'.t1plo~

~_ ..? \IITTOHS, ItC'.ly. :".ivc- or" sjx p"'."-Jrol.s '.",'c'r;: sunt into tho term
fron"! ~.'~ on diff e:~ont OCCt:.;.'Jio~ s. r~~er. n.tt~,ck T",':::'S P1::.dc .''g,<'1.inst t:1G

to:n, t~lC. !."'ight conp"''',n;; f'J~ 1,Y';cj th(; Sr:L,~; ::-outo. Tl-.e onony h,,,.d
con c(;ntr: tuc-1. m0n In th t. .'Ject, or. T~l\)Y stopp'::::d. '"'.n entire C01!1pc.ny
in <i:)1c first st"_gc. of [lttl.ck.
O~_l!" :r,ft comp,'"'.ny noved QV'Jr 110177
territor;y" ,:-dthout rcceivi!1_:.: fire or cont'"'ct."

- 17

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED Second

Licutc~".d TIT'.~ffiY E'. ~H:,NO':T. 13~c1 Ir:f".ntry.

lilt hr.s b~on !Tf ozporL.l'co th.-.t in t':!o' tYre of -ction enCOD.n
te!'ou in tho lClst phC'.so. i. G., r del ~yi.ng nction by c. snell Dedy
or 1y ". lone snipar, th"t to scouts nre not stl'ficicnt. I used
fror' thruc to five ,"on lS".n ",dVCl"CO pc.trol, pic':ed for thoir
coolnosE "-nd '::':!~T(~csi-:,~'.:n'-':'8~, in p-octic'.l:L:r e"'lcr"'j' f"I.dv".uco r.1,.... d.c ~
!Tf plntoon
. E'or ,'n :i,nstc:'lce, r s ...." cntro!'od tbe torin of. (JR'.TORIO, bordE;r~
inL; OIl the ~:HNO E:;:vc.;r, an tr,.( ?L~th of J1..J.:!.Y, '"::(~ were .in G. colunn of
plc.toons, my pl"t-oC'n, thn ")":'!G., lo"'ding. ThE,; "\f('J~cror..tionBc1 point
pO-trol of, fi'ro !"fCD, 2~rr'8d ,:,ith ~uo-mc,.chin( c:uns nnd tto rC1'lc.inder
r:ith II,'I-l ri.fles, eL'-:>jro~l tho tur:-n :':1p:)ro:~in2~tsly 40 ynr.;is. ,. . . he'J.d of <
the pletoon. /.8 "'c~':oy n'-~;:',r0d t~J; ~o-:.rn sqv.-:.re, th:.oy wore fired 1.:pon
by f'. sniper ""r:':1r.c:. . i~jh '1 p"'-;cl:i:-;c pi.st('l. Ir.T"l8ci--:.toly., they took
cover r.nd 1 ~id "r ~C.'. l-.,wy volus8 e>f fire on th8 ponition forcio:1g
the sniper to wj.tlY~r.'"':l" ~=i' th(: C'_ls:tOl:l~~' 'J. scoutc hf.'.d be-en uced,
it Trould n.ot h:-~,;ro be,.,.]"'.. :Y'Issi..!J].') .to b'.lilr1 'up s::lffi_ci911t fireporrer
d.thout duployir:g -:b p]" .tu,,~ 'ndlocin" vc,lLi""lblo time.
This fort'l"',tjo.:~ is . . lr,o tls::.yful i!l hOf'.viIy J100dcd soctions,
'.7hero t\,:o men C.""T.l1ot m;:p.iy r(;cor~noiter r9utos 'for17flrd, thereby'
c101~~,ying thu ndvr.. nce .. If
Skff 8ercennt >~IC::.'.EI, D. C')1jRTEil.'_Y, 13Jrd Inf,{ntry.
"Dur.in, tlJe perioc. of J1'ly 7 to July la, ISM, ilL" conp-.ny
WC.G moving thr'Jug~1 r.ttr.ck <"\~:Cter '1ttf!.C'lr., ~::e kert i.cv1.ng ~.S these
nCV';-.ncc~ 'r/err:; r . . . pid.
Llse 't7C 'l.!"lre c :ught"in quito 0. ferl t~:-;-.p:J.
This brings up tho point of scouts. Tho scouts, in t;l' :point of
vioi.- r,tp;r,e no"':.:f~~r .c!::")"lJ.gh out r;.ncl 1icn't rc~Jl:T t::.ke time to look

at

t~~G

terrnin.

Ey 'suggestion ls to cive: - m"n mora tr~.ining in scoutine ~.nd

.pr.trolling. CCOD.tS 1.rc ~. verry i,!!lpC'!"t;-n:" f-n'cto!" in a fCl.st moving
r:0."t'.nco. r.. men y;ho knor.rs l'.rbr.t to look for onn snv:c m...'1nJi livon. 1t

Extrr.ct Hietori.ccl

N,'1IT~:.t-!VG & ..Tourn~l,

/ C of S, G-.3,

~~pril

1944.

"Tho 34ti1 Inf Div '7[\5 ~:hoJ.ly on the defensive '~hr,'ug:1out April.
At no time in itc combc.t 'cistor" .r'.d '1.0 '':'i'!ision be3n on t:l0 defensive in
such unfcvor.':\blo torTnin. rkC.C.:l~~ o:~ th': c::;rr:"' E r.dYm:k.e8 jn obsorvction,'
movement in tho regi~ont"l nrrcc:3 'T.e .'"st-rictEd. to tho ho1:I's of dr:rkncss, und
even the most ror.:Y":'nrd ollJ1'2nt,: cf t'h8 Di"i.,i.on ,;eC'8 dug in."

"'~OT-"
16"t
.
t L'"
l.e'!vcnc,n: r..:.:..
,~, '-..I. n:"CHCP
'i ..P-' ~ ,
_ '- 1..;' T'"
r.. . . nnt z:y:..

F lrs
oJ

"The rc.com:'lcnlr.t:or.s J'":c.dc in tbo follor.'ing p:oper .Ill"e 'bnsod

on ezperionc". IPir.od
9't"l;1"C\."fensi78 position 'on thG .'NZIO.
Be;::clc.heccd bet,-;oen i!".rc"~nd llr(y,: F'44.,,".nd to n certain cxtunt, in
c. defencivc position in t"8. vic~nity of SI.iI"l;., ISric2,in !.Ie.rel,

in ".

1943.

-.le:

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

One of :'hc most negl,'c"t,Qc: rroblG!lls, r:er.;lccted out of n,:.cossity J

(l. dl1fensivu position or~ tho
individurl soldier. In o!':' :bf,ens;,veposition, the; men lUV.l3t r'orn~in
for lo~g ;loriods at thd!' nssi ,,:1 c d st".ti.;ms. In -, positio'l r:'101'o
the ov:,my is in dosE" p!'o:d"Ji,ty (3',0 y~rds to 600 ynrds) it is
nt.cosse,r'.' for th'H'C. to' rcmdn i:1 thejr tlittrenchesthrougl';out
tho hours of i>VJi;o;':t, r'nrl to sky iri tho immcdi''1.tr V'j,cinity ,.t
night. l'lv nccc:.si~y <)1 eF;g co.nstnntJ", rlort priocludes tho' pos
si':,.i=-it:,r of slr,ep n:: nj,,.,1:r:', or ')f ,nllch divo'!'s1.0n t1uring drylight
..' .:'. sto.L) G CclCCl3}'V,c ,ositIon rQ"uirts 'c,n entirol"J different
tJrp~ of t!'Hinlr:;; fln(1 or, -nizrttlonth'\n is t\ltWlredfor offensive
;.ction. Rifleru8n shcuL'. Dc trnined to' rri:'n m;chinc guns r.S it.,:ull
or'c'ir-rj,l:r J:,. Ih)<1QSSnr;' t" ol!l]',loy more thnn thr o:("'(l.inrry nunbor of
171:'c;'",1"10 f".lY's. I+, it) 'lso volur"loto hove r:Lfl" cOmouny POl'so:.mel
trc.:incd in fil'o ucl.just];lr.'nt methods. ,', 10rCGr, more cOll'prcr18J'CSivo
corr:y,unicrtir']. fYot0m 'is used: :,l] infc.ntry brttnlion mc,] 17811 usc
.'-,r; :nr.LY r.S 4'1 t31cpilo!J.e8 of v"rious tyI"'s,
Improv<omc'Lt of l'ositions' JT!1wt becontimlOU". En"h man must
h."vn c, fox ho:'.", ,( stn,ndi.ng-type) for fi.ghting puo'Poses. :. slit
trench ::s m!Jc;~ loss so.tisfc.c~or:T ~nd offers lcss protuction, '"'.1
though it is t~dvisnl;le to h:'_78 ane in th0 ~ mrncdinte vicinity 0:';:' the
fox hole, fer the finr to slsop in. In ann inst"'l~.CG, men v:erc U{'inf
slit trenches ~7hich ,:err:: c(worod, eJ>:cept for thr fOI"':lo,rd Gnd. The
pasition ',7"8, pCJnetr;',tc'd by ,"',n encnw p~trol, "!Jut our m'JfJ. '~~ounc~ thoy
could not fir) to t,,-(; rOe.:r ,7ithout gotthg out of their trencbos.
!nothor position lof3et commonly fOU110 HOS th.' dist-.nce bo
tU80n barbed 11ir,'; a11d for;;erd l)ositions. r'ire, we s somt,tlmcs 150
yards frcm for"'li"" p"s!,t.ions..,~s 75 Y'lrd8 is probntly , l"oro
off 80tiVc; f i i s t c n c o . '
.
It is of l<tmust j"lpnr'v1"l.Me th i r':;'nl1 :"ricndly mil10fields 'be
D.ccm"'o.t,;ly ch'-',rtjd, . 0.1"1 t!10 sketcbco .b..:: put JC'rln to camp':nul')s. If
t:ds is not d0no,men ~nd knkk ,!iUbe iQst."
i~ t1:o pnysic.. . l -;,nd mcnt"'J cffo"nt 0f,.

Socond Lieutenr.nt L;,'''R3''CE ;,. c:n ;.lEY; 168th Inf'.ntry.

HOn 5 Je'ly 1':44, Camp,Hiy "B" Irs mov'.ng fC!'wf'rG to some high
:cbeut 13"0 y~rcs !"outh of C:,S'i'E:'U:n.. Our :nirsion 7.'.0.5 to
oJ.':i nJ.ze I.nrl hold [,bod 1000ycrds of this hir:;hr;rounJ.
Tho cOrnpnny %;';lm',' 'cr j'ut the let platoon on: the left, the 3rd
plc.toon on the ri:;ht or l h91d : tho 2nd. p:c~toon inthc roar e.s [',
mowil" support. Theli"ht mr,tlhiu(l gm\. section WI'S put in th0 con
t:Jl' oi' tiw P0mprn:{ linn
de:~nnse and. trio Mort!1.r s8ctlon '.i<':'.S
pl:'co,.'. in ru.r' of i-.he hieh r::ro11!ld nnrt ",bout centored tiL compe.ny.
me chino' i-}J~ pi,.toon .fron Cornpcny "D" r8portetl. to us .- s we
Y.IO:"C r'.bo~'r~ f;o ~o ir:t,..., positiol).
D0cr:,\isc . it. ''1''1,'S' !"rt.ptdly bccont:.ng
d['.~"k tbe. CO;'1p~:1Y COl'!'_"")<"" r.-18r Pt~t 'eno 86ctfon 'y,rith' Dnch of t!1U frcnt
li!lC ple'toOtls (md told us to s8leet posit'ons for thom.
Tr:e first pbtoon, of rrtieD I .'1min eor.m"nd, I'm,s .'1 short di~
t[!.nc8 to' ,the; rc '.r ,--hi:'n I, -.d tl1 rr:r n')sS'31.igGl--, stnrt~Jd to solect
positions.' I tl."c1dod to ploce th squnds '.7011 fOrT.erd on the slope
nnd form OO:!lbnt streng pobte .cross tho front. The Ilror. I he'xl to
g::,oUc'1('~

of

- 19

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSI FI ED

cower "cs so :'ro[,t th"t I cou],1 r:0t 'oopo t.)

r'w', liN) of

f'ou~;'c: thrc;c pl'-~cns fr','T:~ .-.'t:'ic~ ":!c ~('l'._11:J. COYor our

~.n.

cntirG frOl'"!t ;-:.y

fire ~nc~ nft(;]" sond..r np f,"'r the G,~1;_~:~1 Ic~~rlcrs, h~~:t thr:i'1 :nl.f".CC tLoir
sq:),.. . . (~S in tl1::;~;_O rosi.tiQn~~.
~l.'~l'(. hC:n'1,-::i "1'\r'.cJ~i.:n'3 -'J,It ;::;(.ct-:~c'n' c ..... :::c f()r.1~.rd . . . nd I split it,
plr.cin:: one gun 01:. tl::, l:-Jf-t. l~,';r,-" trey cOlll_~ cross f ire ~:.it.h_ the
l;l!.it on our loft (80"':p ...-,.r:y i!111, 1../ Q t}! Irf) n.ncT CO"'lor Oil!' front. The
ot'b.or I put o:r tr(..: 'f'i :,;llt -,-,'hrn'(; it CC-U~I~,: COV(or OlIT' front '''.IlIJ ::'.180
crosr:; fire nith both -t,l..':: ~.j~~ht i1.!'c~'ll~n g'll1S'- on ny rigLt ".nd t,'::_
othor henV'J. The hill slop.,.., T,ry ur.'fo~Mly '1'.:1 I estinc.to thnt
tl::oy h:J.d ;:rrnzin~ fire for II. ,'In Y'lrdn i~l .'1~_1 'Jir8ctions but our right,
','Jlore :~~ nosn inturf orr-;d -:.~ i ;,h our fire,.
We; au ~'F03tod e.':wh of tl1n str':)n:'~ p0ints, '~r:r t1l1!"!CU visitint.;
p~,trols, ,~n., sport '11 ni.,);t rQst:;",;:; "loi ',',~i ting. f()r "n ,".tt:'.ck.
:'10 cnony :- ct ~_ vity '1.ur~.ng th~_t night.
nozt Jl1_o~;--'ning n.h01lt tY;~OO hours anery r".trols of :-!.:"1out :[ iva
or six non h0gen hittine us ::tt G<,vC'rrl points in the c')mp"n;r linG.
Tho sqUf'c"i 1(j~d8r cf' ry '(-.~i:rc1 i:3qurd c~_m'~ rllnni.ng to TTJ OP, rd.'ter ono
p".rticul.-:rly !1e;,r':v:r n.tt, .": on !Y!y l'i/S:1t n.nd repor"tcd th.. . ,t his Gqtlr,c}
rr's rin:~Gd dO': 711 hy firs <"DC: onC' of ovr li;;ht !n'1chine :~uns h~',(~, '.x~Gn
Jiri::'.:~: on it.
',:T O i:1VC-[3ti'~r-,.t-:,:j. "thr L"'chinc Z-u.TI first "'nd .fo"UD(~ tJ:-.~.t
{".n Gl1GTl"::' - pEtro].. ~Jf"'.d kr. 1c1< "il it out ':.ri th '1 hnnd gronc.de ':.nd, ~.7C
bnlieY8, fir'- c1 it for ,r,. ''-:'~-ltJ ,; ::'I.;forn bt.'inrs discovorcd I".nd driven
off.
;-"r., n('":,'X'C took b."llf nf tb0 sqy!.pJ forning the CB!lter strons

Thoro

',H.S

1'11C

POi:"l'S "n(~ pJ..::.r:sl.l tL-:;n ~7it,l-t roy ::Jr:;jE,l]np:er "',~1d rr~dio "rl,-'.n ,."..here "Ljley
C'. 11.1\.~ cover 1;.s
!lci the.: tr".pr,~d C',qyn.c1. Tho scp.J.lJ..J l,=,[+,der ~n:-1~ I
t~2("11 J:':':"OCO:)~1.C_~ c1(Y-'fl 'I-,C t,l-..:.", s:llX",-l.
Or. th'.' T~ny l.-n SL10t tv.'O JeT-Tics
r

"11('.

':!ith tllC help of fir, fro") th'

cov~rin;

force, forced tLroe

mOl~C, ::'0 sur::..'on~ler ~

(;v(":TQl Oth6TS :"~ot ~,vm.~;-. lJp0~rl lQokinf; t[~c:
S~~ . ~l;" t1 on 0\1"0")-'> I JC liov,) t~-~,nt tr . -: C~1(;m='" S.~(,D,~':{ ,J throl.l.~b tb_- [;t'p

nc I1~c:r.i.n,j guY' "1":'_ :--"c_.:r kr:ocyc::l oJ..-1...., "l:.~.J. :tit. mt

riC}}t .f'l;-,.nk.
In this C~',So thC) scrl~c('1 ler,.der's courn!30 5,n (':cn-ttLctin~ me nhon
his squad WC.s tral',-cl. prok.11:r DC.VOrl nar:y :.bros ~,,,d saved the cor.:
pnny fret) seriolls tr:n:(bl"" F ~r t"0 tJ")8 of' t(Jrrain T'8 r:ere in our
front,'J.ces ';;--oro much ~oo l.'!i:18 ..... nG.. "1.'"/6 h.-:3. [. ~;reD.t dO""'.l of c1ifficcl..ty
c::,o[<:c~d
S:.~l'-.:-

..~'r:;n

..J.::..

t~.le

J. en

c~of 8l1dinf! thcm~

Another thine; which I beHove s".ould be trtkon into consL,era

tion is that a couple 'of weeks of combc:t wenk~ns a platoon consid
erably and it i.s 'lifficl1l ~ to (:X()cvt,,) c. MisGion th"t is nJrl"~.::'ly
nssi211ed n full plotoor; ",ith it."
S~rgeant

RICELRD J(1EHSOil), 135th Infantry.

1f~7e hed l'oen . . \tt~'"ckinG (lny t"'.:~c:r (}''1..Y with our

cnsunlties

mountingl;t
The obj r.cttvo one, ""'tornoon y:r.G to attack nnd clerer three
buildings, nnc1 hold.~'hf3 atk.ck '.'lent beautifully with. su;:,port
ing light tanks an:, rnccdiums be'lLni th"m. Our objoctive ':!rlS
rec,ched in loss them 15 m4.nutcs. Our mistnko',xes In setting up
- 20

UNCLASSI FI ED

UNCLASSIFIED

a "half-baked" defensive behind the houses. V!ithin an hour a

amnll force of Germans eoTmternttecked and WIlS upon us before we
knew uhat was hapnening, which resulted in a hasty withdrawal and
a completelY disorganized unit."
Captain REID B.

HUFF. 135t.'1 Infantry.

"In temporary defensive positions be sure that outposts are

estnblished fa~ e~lOu:5h 1l7/llY f:::-om main body so that sufficient
warning ffk1Y be gi~en if ouhposts are attacked.
One platoon of Oomparl,T L was ca:.>tured at ~mNTIQUIL\. Italy
because the outposts Vlere l"ss than 50 yc.~'cls from remainder of
platoon and timely warning could not be given to alert the platoon."

i. OF - OF Qperations.The CP is the center of all operations and the

OF is a business establishment for the purpose of observing and destroying tho
ene~. Established observation posts should not be subjected to the careless
ness of commanders and their staffs.
Maj or ALLISON A.

cm:t.t'J),

135','3 Infantry.

"Control of movement in and around an OP must be continuous.

Even in a unit
as bnttle-schooled as this '.)ne, I have seen occasions when ex
cessivemovement around an OF (and in one instance, a cp) brought
immediate en~ fire which cnused unnecessnry casualties. Visit
ing firemen who i;:)si3t on d:.':"vil!g '-1' to your front door instead of
perking at a reasonnble c.istance and advnncing on foot under Clover
are the worst offenders. V'Jhicle dismounting .point must be clslI.rly
marked and guarded twenty-four hours II day. Less movement at the
DAnnsless work for the GR~
It is fatal to relnx ~his caution for one moment.

Gf

Technician Fifth Grade ERNEST J. L:.NGIE, 135th Infantry.

"',-,'hl1e under combat fire, one can never feel too safe. In
one instrnce our battalion had moved up and relieved another unit
c.nd nfter the unit hrld oriented us as to the situation ~.t h0.nd fle
settled down for the night feeling quite safe as they had informed
us that the enomy haldn' t shelled the immediate vicinity of th" CP.
Thoy he.d been there for 30 some dnys .without their CF beine shell
ed. Hell,thE next day the 1st Sel'gennt r.nd other non-corns COll'.
meneed to instruct tho men Clot to do emy unnecessary walking r.rounq
r.nd not to he.ng out their t017cls, shirts or nl:(Ything thnt could be
observed ~ the enemy.
~iG stayed in this CF for two woeks ~Iithout drnwing 11 single
sholl, but finally a fow of the men apparently forgot or disregard..
ed their instructions nnd hung out n couple of white towels to dry,
nnd swaat shirts also. As n result our OF drew ene~ artillery
fire, costing the lives of three men."

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSI FI ED

First

Licuton~.nt

H:.-ROLJ C. BISHOP, 168th Infc.r.try.

"Brttf'.lion ~'nd conpf'l.ny OP I s, in stnblo dcfcnsiv..; positions,

can ['.nd should bt_~, Dot U?J .til ";j'_"sin'-ssliko st~lc, oven if t.hey ['.rc
~ unc1cr~round.
/~de.c:..untc:: files sl1(n;1(~ be set up for th':""' nbundr:ncc of
intelligonce c.nd' opor'ltionrl m-cterir.l. such~s' p"trol reports,
overl.cys of friendly"nri .etomy ctispositions, counterbc.ttory end
ccUntcrr.,ttr:ck pInns, e-s,c. i'j IJ~.g .:)ys-!~cms must bo set up i!!J.m.ec1i[l.tely,
or vl.luuble ::lr'.teri!1.1 ',7ill be lost.!!
.
Privets First Clc,ss LIoI:.!'! "CODHOn, 135th Infnntrj'.
''From my exporienc~s.r.s an F. ,0. i.n '1n nf'antry'combr:e" bnt~
talion,- I h~vo found out 8evcrn: i~-portnnt points through sad ex
perionce First ,0;[' '111 p'e',t c,-.r:c <"'l stoe t:"'.konif rtppronchinc; en
OP in the dnyligl:t; to koop fJ"')rn being observed by tho enemy. He:
usually hns 0.1] tb O:"1-D/,vDt'Lon nyoo,,,, cTil"if he sees you he 'crill
fire on yon, no m.r:.tt.<:::c' Lo"! .:r.~\7 or m.~ ~"('l th8!"e rre in the p:1rty.
One", the OF hns bVT (",r':,-'blj.sh'jd, don't disclose your position. If
you cnn see tl-o enor,:", hi, ceo"t,'linly c"'.n see you. Do the things you
h::;ve been tc.ught to (0 r.:rh(;n ub,sorv::ne-..
.
Here nre t,,o incidents '.:hich '~lctur lly occured in eombnt.
Thr.ee men C!8reo in" 'Cn OP on tho FIde of ,0. mour,tnin.. .ThE"! only covor
wC'.s f'-. sm~.11 wn11 :-,.oou.t t~1rOQ fc(,t hish ':-"nd s:tx f'c'Ct long. One mnn
. 'stood uP'to urinp.to.' "'ittin thr88 minutes r. do'zen rounds foU in
the g8.nercl vicinity. Ho not only cnc1.l1nGcrod himself, but "lso
his :)uddics. Toclny thct m,".n is do:-v:l. You 300-, he Ilk'1do one, more
mistrJ<:e. "f. sorgonnt l"/''1S observing from Cl ,,,ir.do'.7 in n prominent
building. ,Some wise guy in tho noxt roon bOG"n to snipo "t somo
Gormc~s much too fnr"-cmy for "ny 'l1ccurr,cy, but ho caused enough
commotion to drQYY "tt"'ntion to the c.roc.. Th,; sergeant movBclll"itil
clos8 to th", "lindo',,! to 7"t " better vie17 '.nd rl,';.s shot through tho
eye. Tho' scrgo~nt '::~cc.'c fruIt for getting too close to the ~;a.n
dorT, but sniping from ~,n UP should b;', altogcther discouraged.
Use :your hoad. Informrtion is no good if the informer c~nnot
deliver tho inform"tion to tho sourco Yiho C'ln make use of it."
r

.1. :,ir - Ground Linison. Close support .~8r:Fl bOMbardment. hr.s not in
all cases proved. completely sntisfnctory, b'.lt tho pot:mticUtics' of the VICapOl1
for infdntry sUpport are' great.
LioutEinnnt C~lon81 l;l:~'lK T. Il"RTIli, JR., fcC of S, G~3. 34th Infr.n~
t").'Y Division.
"I reported on 6 [,pril 1944 for duty uith 445t.h Bonbnrdmcnt
Squadron (I'l), 321st BOl,bnrd!!lont Group (11).
.:
During tour of c:uty I 0.ttcn0.ou thr(3C 'briefings' prior to
missions, nccomp~niGd OGe mission t.o its ter;;et'16 n [llSsenger in
.tho leading' elemont of threo pl".llon, c.ccO',1p r niod th:' Squ~dron
Commc.ndor on ".. I chn.pcfon I flight to t;-,c "1o<"b S"fo Line on r second
mssion nnc1 took p'1rt in. informd disouscions \iith the SqUQdron
- 22

UNCLASSI FI ED

UNCLASSIFIED

Contl':ndor

C:~(~

tho; 3.2.1st Gr('up

Cpcr~tionG

Of,cicor.

O~.sf;rv~,ti0n3 r:~.~;.c; (~uI'ih,_~ tl-.:is ~)rj C"f por:ioc~ St;.~f.,;c3t thr.t t~c
prc~cr.:.t c;xchr!.::'l;-;'-:' .of '_ir ~-n.l (:-'-:-11.-.~.~: T'orco porsonl1"'l IX,; contl':11J.(~d ,~n(1

thct, ";hel" prn.ctic.cl; c:::'forr~, 'oe r".de to <'.ssuro th".t. afflnol'G bo

o~,~ch<rlWjJ. ('sr' ci"-J.J~/" (~1~T'i{)"" 'Pcll::(~.s ',',-!:on '~ir opor.""'t:ionD nrc ~n
Direct Supp0r-~ c:' Gr'",'.:'", J. 'ct.'tons. It if bclicN8{1 tL.. t ,"',ir c0rp3
o:L~'ic(!r~ Cd-;er"'_11~~ ::~:)~ ..: '-'I,-:r . . t u over s",lch extensive- fronts th"'.t j.t
iG ~l- possible i,',~:r t:_ ,:"' <1:.:~,.:,.8 to to fi:rdli;".r. in ~. suffici:,nt.
c1EJ~:~'~'GC ,:;j_t"Q t.he. t,~rr- :in J.)'1",:!~~(L:+[ltcl:v to tho front of ('l"1.1!' i~:~:'C~Dtj:-;,::-.
'''1,,1,
1
t rl~:J:J l'G
. , -"OU 1"u '1.p-penr, .el.Dce
.
'1'
f'1..
.L:}_S .LS (;.:fPE.:C':'~.!..._'.Y
tloS t "
i,.~y.lnc'; 01
eel'S ~.r, I;2_;u:'.;)r~nt3 or C '.pt~ir;3 \~itl~, f1. CO:r.lp[1.r~.tivoly [~bort :_'6r::'ou
<

01' ti'f'.i:i1:ine i~.l L'P "'n( ,..G)... i<~. pboto r8"'.c~ing; ". CirC1)m8tr:nce no
in. tr.8 Gro'_F:d 1Torces.. UnIikG grou'1xl officors., i":ho r.,':'.Y
81":.. nd :' cCllsidorlJ.~.-:-J. .:: :-TIOt~nt ot t:1.r"lt"C! in m.r'<p stud:! to dcrL8I'"I:d:'1.G
loc:~,tiorw, L(J'?'~J v,:1r, .Jr Co::ps ofti cars nr,. por~i tt3d C:OL:P.'''T,~~ti velJ'"
C'. to
s:;c(-~cls to rccogniz:J t~.1,::i-r' t".rr-et n"l1'::~. ;:'0 ;.;et "x:f1..y, tr,ci::;o oorr.D3.
It 18 r,!:?ri.y~i~l.t''d tlYi.t upon r.;:"'.ny occ~cior,s l].ndcr conc1it.io~l3
0-:'': f'll::.i~l. 1",-.rf.:-:~!'f; th,..: szet :ego of :.ir '1,ne: Gr01J.!ld p3rEonr.01 before
missions is i~:rr'.'"ctic~'.l. ?1'1~~ in(!.ic... to~l. m-;"::.horl is r0commOEaCc.1 for
tried, p:ej,or to rl)s-"']"lFtion "f thr offon"iv0 in the present s:ctor,
the graun;:; ,,1'.1' ).C:ViD(! :,0'''' for"1u1c.tcd c.nJ tho initir.l c,llotl'lO'1t
of ./.~2..:r. GUrI)Ort }:,,,-vj ~g tOC~l n!:':'.c:c:
It is su:::rootcc..1:
(c,). T:r,~.~ 'flie~1t L0f~(:'(~r[; Diyl Nnvir:;ntors visit tll:; :Jivision to
bo sU:Fportud prior to f"tnd -:-lll.r:_ng [''cir opor."ti~wtS r'.nr1 tl:~.t ttLis p(;r
sonnel be orier:.tcc: 02': t}:;c~ L;rOl"Jld [lnc1 b~t flig::lts in Di 7i.sion air
l(;~_is tr"Ll~"

OP!

s.

(b) That G""'OB.::lCL 0f::'cers :'rc:-1 the s'3ctors concC:l"nt';d visit

tho _'~i~ Groupf~ end .'1Gsist in briefinc fj'light Lcc.dcrs ~'.~-::j n'~~v:i ~'2torl3
r.ccoPF"m:Ting fligl",tz il1 "-'.:::1 o.Qvisory Cf.\pr.city i f th..-,."0 "be c1csiroc1.
(c) Tho.t on:'~ D ...... vir;t.tcT' "'!}::1 on"-, flight lu:.dcr fron oc.ch .." ir,
Group. vi;:.,it the clivitio~ YThic~~ is. to bo support d j)ri'Jr to bus-in
ning o"C'3ro.tior'.G.
(cl)Thct 0:'10 ~,ivi_sion s~~[~ff .officer visj t rach Group 1:.rh.ich
is to fly in m..l fPcrt; ~)--.ing presont for th(~ briofing p!"iar to
. ;i;..~i ti.~ 1 ri@f~ions"
. (o") IIr-:nt th,~ e::c:-':-'n'-.~,-' 0:: o:fficers DO' mf'.::lG
dl.u'ir: tLo J:-:::r;iod ~'-:'Jcn 0sp"~ci:::)1~r c+.ose s:1pport t'J.. ssion.s c.rc c~esir['."blc. tI
I.D ['"t'~~CF,~}t in thi-J i~1(;D-t0r b.,.s bC(J!J rl<\.clG to dovolop' clorr) liaisoYl ':Tith
tho ostr.blishm0nt of lHorsQfly', :'.. 3~:r:::.t. ",m i-n ;:Thinr, cub pl;'.l'.c's l,"mro U.SfJC~ to
orient bOLDor pi] nt{;: o:voY" t~6, tr:T::"ct ttr-c:n~. It' W""lS discardod BB 1.U'1sc.tisf~ ctory
t~ftE)r lOGil1~.: s~'v,-.r~'_l. CU~)G n,::d. ~CC.:."llSq t;':~, .'.. ir. Cc~:,ps did not cor.sic.0r t'c,~ tcr
gots :romljJlC~::'Lti v(;. :Di vis19!1 _Obf,8rvct'S. rc::;,ort th t careful t,l,"iofir.g is tbr-; koy
fo.ctor, ~\"nd th' p:!~lcts T.'c;p?rt tlJ'-'.,t 1::0 sUJ.=::?lcmert tri9flrg Goo:i.ng.,thG Ground
prior to the rrdssion T"OllJ (~ bo. T"!,c'st ~olpfcl. Tr~i8 cn~8f\.'1 b:~~;~fing couplod r.rith
visunl aids suet ['.:3 colo!"'c:.J. .,snqkn ovor 'f::be t,'}rg;?t .hn,S p:covud GllcCGs;.;ful.

- 23

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
First Lie"tenp,nt 3URTO}T E. IS;::T':r:RG, J68th Infantry.
"In January lC;44 the liSPtt Infantrv was in the vic-tnity of
CERVAIW, aft0r "'Eking SPAct'lCuler progres", l'rom just north of V8i.J~FIW.
On 11.January I was on i:1_~_1 o')serv&tion post on Hill 496, a~]Jroximately
1500 yards east of CE.:'lV,'RO. 0;: t11e Darning of the 11th, we received
y/ord tl1c:.t, at l?nn hours thp Air force ~,'r('uld strafe ~nd bomb the to'i."m
of CEHV!.;J.LtO, also th;- t frior::dJ-y art~_11pry WOL:ld Iny red smo~;:~ 111cl.r~;::Gr:3
on tbe tar(;et to aid the f~ir Corps. That morning I observed enemy
activity iI' the town of CEWT!;;:O. I adjusts,; Slmm mortsl' firn on
ene:;ry perconlCel mo'ri,ng ~ bout t'le town. I c Iso observed patrol" of
ou.1' regimelCt moving about in t,CJE' olive orchards north and e"st of the
town. At approximately 1155 hOllrs 01Jr oem ",rtillery fi~ed 1'e,2 smoko
nlal'kers on the town. FX8ctly Rt 1?00 hours the first formation of
11-3C:, 1 s Pl'peared iror1 til" south ond circled &round to OUi' rear nnd
st[w08d their dive on CERVAHD from the east" 'i:hey strafed pnd
l)om'-'ed sir",ltaneot'sly. .uter the first flight had pas sed ov,,"o the
t,,'r:;(;t they owung I1ro md to th8 south and cirded back to the east
[>~~.iDinc.~ e.ltitnde.

They

t:.. . Ch

made ~nother dive on the te,r?et, but

this time, they strafed only and did r..ot homb. Each succeodi:1()
fl:lZ"t rJp.pt trrour:h the SEem" procRdure. The closoo:lr support at
tack on CEEV~lW lasted for approximately one-t,alf h01Jr. All ~JOm0S
"FTCl."C released with cxtl1eme :!.CC:lracy and found the target wi tl1
me.ximl:rn eff0ct~ Aided by t:!is bombing, the second battalion of the
l~'~;'Gh Infantry attacked the town.
On tho fonowing day C:3P,VARO
':~as

ours."

ITAir supr-art is a vex!"y important factor. If our stTnfLc:~

effects Jerry as hie does us, onr plaDl?s do not necess.arily ne -d
to cause casl1f:.ltios" It olso boosts our mOl'ale to'see our plcnes

overhead

go

11

If. COY.cr.J.Q!!9~D.l.I!!P_~..E'p.3_T2.iF2ga~ton. ~he besic principles of tho

subject rnattor ;-lEVO been t}'crourhl~r discl.".E8CQ :1.L the field D12nl;als irrec.p6c~ive
of bra!1ch. The rclctive ebs6Dcc of tt:e G0rnan Lu.('tvmffo ar.d the ap:9aren'G sbort
age of c;1emy artillery amrcuniti_on as the ca=a~gn progr:rss0d created at t}~'es !'\
a false senso of sOCUl'it] rosul'i;lng in l(l1m"~s tina sometimes outrtght careless';'
ness 4

"It is urmsn"l for thc' <neT:('{ to call artillery or mortar; ire

on '.7011.. d:l.sporseci. troops in a ste.bilized situation. Too often e.
8e1130 of false security (ieSC8nds upon us p,fter a lull in GDcr.,y
i'ix'.n [,.nd -;18 begin to group up forming tarGots for fire "ivhich is
l1rought. dov;n r?i th

dp~\no\St.ating

off eet ~

Duringtl::p atkck at S. r%'HA OLIVETO, 4 Nov8mber 1"43, the

CN'y"r'uding officer, Company __ , __ Infantry assembl"d his pl2.toon
leaders ~nd key KCDI s to plan thE' continuance of tilE' attack.

- 24

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Short.Jy pft.pr- nssomblin~, $ hCI):'t:ry ~ncmy' mortar bcrrnge fell t1.pon

tllO position resulting in r.ll of th0 officers and the maj ority of
th(; HCO's becoming c~.su"lt~cs, '"itll no leadors th'J entire company
.
,jecr.:nc disorgf:lizDd p.nd d:':;hdrCl".'''
S0cond LieutenFlnt CL.41n~'lCE E. SPIEE, l3Jrd Infantry.
"It h"8 boen Il\)' ex;cm'j.cnce ..011 tho 'ough the Italian Campaign
that the Amorican so::'6.Lr tsinclincd to 'bunch Up' in gro)1ps. The
doughboy of this ilEr S80Il'S to think th'l.t as long ashe has D. number
of his companions close tn him he is fairly safe.
In Octobor 1943' ;,e "ere adV'ancir.g on BEHEVENTO, Ita:!.." in the
approach march. It ,:as a :"ai",J.y dark night find the men were wa1k~
ing on each otters hr.Jels l1ihr;;;.n th0Y should l1a17r- been spread out.
Suddenl", I~Thoom' - a l.,rgo c,~Jiber shell hit the column and rriped
out the maj ority of u whole platoon of Compar\'! "K". Had the men
been at proper interv[ 1 damag" vro1:ld have been a great deal less."
Staff Sereo['nt E.1c'1.0LD F. J,<I'JSCHAHP, 133rcl Infantry.
"One losson I have lCQrmd in combat iil 'there is no fox hole
bottor th!'.n the ono you nre in'."
T8chili.cinn Fourth Grs:J.o JOHN

I!AYffiCH~.K,

135th Infantry.

"Some of "V buddies and I wore injured jt tho third crossing

of the VOLTURNO. 1:1e were ar)hind a. hndgerow when Jerry opened up.
The first shell wonndod many of us slightly. I went for lrw fax
holc ~r.d some of tho othrors did .Eke':7isG, but tho remc.ind>3r took
off :.ncl in Jerry's n8xt be.rrago the majority of these ?/8ro sovers"
ly injlcr()d. A sholl landed 17ithin.6 fet of me, but 11''; fox halo
;,'c..id VE'r'J' good di vidonds."
Sorgeant SHELDON G. JOffilSTONE, 135th Infantry.
"Thoso Fho ':'81'e on tho ANZIO Beachhead soon found that unless
both men Rnd positions ,wron 't. kopt out of' sight or cnmouflngcd
so gS t.o mako it he,rd. or imDossiblo to be snon they wouldn't lest
long. 1"0 had a vc~y Good o~['.mrlo of how important cr,mo,ulc.;;o is.
Our first positions ~ro!"e s"ndlJe.gged positions on top of' the
ground because of ,fotnoss. 1'ho mon -.7ho 'fW!'o thore bofore us ho.d
takon avmy their nt;ts, vihich ~,"'G:rc tr.. c only c[',mo"tJflr--.gc possi'!,)10 in
thnt case. Ot:l' nots ,/Orn unsuitable for th" torrain End c01.~d be
usod morely to breakthr- ('utline. We received (l.irect f<.re. ktar,
rTO put our orm position in an alfalf~. fiuld. TIo used alfalfa alor,g
l:ith thE! nets and tested th" job by going only': few ycu'ds ,o.m::y.
We Horked on it until sl1tisf:iod that no obsoI'V'A.tion post on tho
Jerry sido cou.ld possibly'pick tIS put. Tl:e result w~stha~,. rcga!"cl~
less of [ \ E the sholling th.)y did at nearoy ronds, gun POSJ.tJ.OllS,
houses, etc ~, ':[0 neVGr l'ocei-vod. p~ clgse ror!ld."

- 25

UNCLASSI FI ED

UNCLASSIFIED

III livPS t:~D,pped r.dth m~l-' pl::;.toon leader in n small .1itch. I

had to l.?y flat. on r:r;,T i~t,011[lGL t" ku,"'p nnder CQ"llOr of th3 macl':ine
gun irin '!. [it 113.. J...I":,rr.;rytir:c J ;-no7r;d ~{}lilo cTa:.'J.inrt bf"!c]{n~lrds i
stuck GOTT;O p~'lrt of rw body U~j ~1.nd '.',~[~S fired upon. --'r iei~i "'in that
C:.itch for? l10urs try-in.!; to r:r2,-,-:1 b~.ck phen uri' J.)latoc)l~ sergeant
;{ollcd to ~J9 cir()ct::'lF!; mc out 0:: t.hl! trc..p.1f

p;'t Gf\.SSINO onn niv,ht '70 !11oved our o.nti-t2~k platoon lor\,'ard,
i'~"ir}-y close to the front li:!cs,
Ol:.r guns '.7oren Tt n'2oded t:12.t
n_izl_d~, so ~-.T0 01.U; in behind a si"x-fnot bnnk.
Tl1Dro ~-.~(}ro trG':s on

"COP (;f the: b~',l:lk, so "'.,T'? dug do'--n . . . !!d 1-"lndor t~lC ':;~'_r:k b(Jc[,~.J..so if sb81::,
h~:d hit i:'! the treos it ',::onlJ br.'ve 'be:::!! -tb8 snl':O ;)0 !:terial imrsts,
c'.hll by liigging thc_:t ~.''1Y 1;;0 ~lso 1"<:"1.d oV"r;rhc'ad pr0tnctior. :~:--.Gbine
e:;l;n l~~tJ_IJ ct:.c ~..rcr() bu?'zing oVe!"f.:cnd, '.ihich gr.vc 11[:, morc -.-.ril1poomr to

dig.
J~_

p[i.ssing sold_i.cr GO'!':' cllric)"u.8 to $8-:' 1.7~i.~.t -aas going on. Ho

pair of' fiolt.l glf's,]os nnd crc.',,:l.ed on tC? of tne bar'k. Ir::
stoc.cl of bcL1g c,u'o;'v]. r.ncl gQtting in n 3hr.d:r spot 0:' by " tree,
ho {~ot right in th.:; Op0j; iYl r'.:.'I.i::; sight. r:t::erc; tho sun reflected on
the glassos. SO!1CO~c"; cF;.utioncd l~iTI .'l,nd bo hr.::.d .~ust got into c. fox
bole 1Thcn <-Terry t.hro~".r .in '!, b'1r:r.~:-,c. T~lOJlks to tbe good :~ox holes
no ono ~:,ras sO:'i 0:':.31:." t,- Tt, ho' :c"'"n::r, our ';qr.. :lr-ment lying outside of
tho f o;{ boles ~":8rc t.0r~1 to s:lrods. 11
gr.~bted B.

1. Inf0ntrv Wcc::'Jor..s. T!",- - rr:p~.:'J:Tj'.c~nt. oX infantr;.r snpport ~;.TJ0.pons,

dictntcd by t~I'n:Ln r.'Wi;;:}~di ty of novc:>~1:t, hrtG ,,_l".Tl~rs beon ~'. sU:Jj iC~ of COL
troversy uithiD the Di-v'ision. T~(; GlJ.g,'3(;stio:'}s 'l.nd idoe.s submitted 1y:t"ci;J rGprs
88nt tho thougllt of' all

Y,(Q[~pOn8

;:y",n basad lJ.:[',On

:'1r'ny T:'ont!-13

of 8ct,:nl opore_tion

against tho onor.1Y.

S~:jCLff

,Serf! :r,r..t

HICH~~D ~.:-r.

FRS:JEICF30N, 13.3rd Infnntry ..

IIp,$ a f:1gchin.' :~lln sccti on l,adnr, it };8 boen ~2.ny times ~l1J1'
to 'bo f'.ttr.ch:'d to ~1. rifln unit, SOIi.Gtin::;s uEDccom~';:"'"~niQd
b' [:'1 oC-rieur, Althc)ugl) i:lt. ;cdbg to inpl.y no criticisM of the
rii Ie l..mi t! S ,h..o,C;L;r;nt or "\~W inn'Jili ty on its p2rt, I be! fOl.:'nd.
t:-:t;---:G occ".sioTl".lly Q clrtsb i2 unnvoidr.blo concernil:g cort,-d.r: dcciz
ii):-::s:, S('T'lutinc8 J:.hc rifle unit con!";l,.. . r~der is not t.hormJ;~t.I:;?' c!'cc..l~2.i:;:Y:
od l:-:l"::.h tn, tnctic:_1.1 l;m~loY'Tjj - nt of h'JQ',,,;/ 1.'.Tonpons (' .".e;c,j.n, (' cUff Lr
(;nco of opinion on ~ !:!:i_nor !:l(~ttet"; ':lsu,:,~lly QS n. Yi0n-cf'\~_TlizsiQllCd
oLI.icor ::rJ opinion holds littl(; ~-Toight in sll'cL CC.8.'J$. I bB.v,::.. lc;[;r~-,
ad t: l':l.t IJ.n NCO ':.-i th ~1. soct~:,:'on ;;.ttnc;1<,d to f', riflo unit J1Itwt JO
d.ouLl~T D.r;grrissivc, coT1e o"Li-t ~"dth l:'is docisioDS ar opinions, C'.nd
many tim:,;-s ~ct on his 0-:-.11 iLit:5.fltivc or judgment bsforo roccivins
orders, D.-S it is rir,t'Jrr~l t11.':",t Go~(;times hn '.'ill ~JQ forgottun (;n'circ~
10' or neglocted; Qsp~clul:r ic; the nttnck."
,r,Gf.;i;~p::1cnt

- 26

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

in t}F:

_~fric,':-.n C;lmp8~tgn

th'"',t if YlO
:'.1"c in cloG~) support o~ ,'1.. x'ifl'_~ ~lG.toon [.nd nrc cnllc:d on to fire G
-;'"J~.r(?ct Coucr. ,'"',S '''!. Ik~~~lltl l'~ne:':':::_'UJ gun that .not morc than 2 m:..n
carryinG tho gun erL '1 chest of rmm11ni tj.on should crrF:l- to (', svi t
Lblc positio;."! f!:"oITI. ~_-."hici"'-. to fl:r:'o to try for accu'rRcy end sur-prise.
LftL,r f'i.ripp; ~:TC th(~l1D.('lV'-_l L/,.CY SOOYl t'.S 'possible to cover fS in most
cases. tT(~)rry soon cov.--rs t21-~ r.ref~ rrith :[,1.ro. tile have dono this
on numerous OC~8rlOr:S ',"HI: good effect. Shortly before LE'~liOr'i~, '::0
pickod" up a 'kr,'1"kt 1 m'i,c:h::LU gun by sOl~nd End observ[tt:i,on that hrd
r\ rifle p12toon I=i1-J.T::~/_ '~io~-:-r:. ';\-; ,:,tntched th8 position until the
'krr,uts i GUUf'!.ed j.ntcE.l~ C!'l ;,; '~utbi:;}g 01s8 to tbei -y. front, t.~1cn
quickly S9t up our ['1'1 ",r:d:'ir~d S8v,)rnl long burst~ \:hich silenced
tho t krtJ.:tl"'c. I gl:_n. Our {~l;:nr".~rs inT1lodiatoly \}('nt ta:ck to bottor cov(:r.
In b. very short t:~mc IJLrn-,.J,t l fire r.r.qs pl~~cod on our YScs.tod posi
tion. Surprise firo on n (~ount(;r~J.ttack by 1,-,7aiting lUltil you C[.l1
firo on s.omo of
"-rClt s! f'lrthcr back first hc.s provod to bG
quite domorp,lizi.ng, ~:-L~rticularly if ::"OU arc; firing from rc fle.nk :l,S
:-r..:, bD.d occDsicn to do l_tCr: Cc::-rpc.ny !I.t." on onr loft ~7:,:,:G being cOVl:.tcr
nttacl<;:cd. ':Lh~~ qr::'-'''l~tGr 3CnnCQ r.t a 1()8G.,.~bt~tto do [nd ~:K;rG soon dis
l-';:~~:'2Ld by c~:r or:t. o.rt:tl} l~~r flr0. r1
ill:C

h-'"'v,-;

f01Ll1d

Di::;c::' c' -r1:/'

te,,,

. ,

"l

, ..

"Combine th.; lig}lt ;::1pchino gun and Bfll best-: {'~;nturos to mt.kc
r. lit~:'rt rnn,chiDc, gun (s:-:oul:ior T.70rrpon t, belt fed, cmployir g n ',Jipod)
c,-,.,t. Cf!.n be cc.:.-riud 'uy one men. Tho GermPD mo.chinc elm 43 is c
C],.':)f.iC '- nproximE1tion :".8 fC1T flG looks ~:.rG GonccrLcd but tho nen dc
ci:n sl!ould rot",in the rr:r,[,:c ccnd Ilccuracy of the light m!lcl1i.ne gun.
_~liT~li:nr,tc ths ~3.';H and L?,,~S from ttl) infantr:r comp~.ny f.1.!'d give uC',ch
scrl(~d ono L~m of the n.e':! d(".'s:ign.
FoOrf!nnize the r!onpons plo.toon t.o
:i nclvdo fotU' 60nm r'10rtrrs only. ,TI":o to be GJll.ployod on tho attack,
four to bo employed on tho defcnso."

U!)

i1ort8rs.

First LiGutoncYlt ROPEi~T 3. GCC:3FTT, 168th Ini'[,ntry.

I:' irst. Lieutonant R~\LF=-1 D.! ~-{OVDT~I~, 168th Ini'.. . ntry.
"Sight,- :,'-!,-Tr, 'iC"(:s',nt Sl:;UOl nortr:r sig':lt II-I\: i.s adocuc,tc
2nd is Pi. C;ood s:'gh~..
,~.: ,1J,-.:-""' , tl.l~)rc nro t"o p.doptatiohD ':;l"licil
r.rould be 1101pful~ F ir['t, ~~ ~irl~or nttachm;1nt tfj~rm:13r to the; GCJr
n12,n 81mm mort:- yo sigbt -1:.0 Dn1:.1.,::: .the gunno~ to sight on nil niminf,
point to his rcc_a.. 'it}:. IT:Crtur3J' just ;).:3 y:,ith etrtilJ.c3.:':::,:-, the, :_~r\":'lt08-(' GCcurpcy of fire ii_, ott'.lir:C:Jd 1.:;-11on tIE (liming stn}::o Is f~rthost
fran tho gun. Bccn.u3'~ :::a:rt",.r;,s-_ aT;;: norrn!l.1.Jy in positions in doii
lndo or 'in bnck of bu'ldillfls, it. is oft~'n .nccDssnJ"J to hnvc the
air:ting stGkns clasu -!:"'a t~1::-' f,i~T., thus cutting do::n our accurc.cy.
VIi tb tho mirror o.ttnclm(;nt: it \7oli.ld,.: -0.:, poss'ible to .plGCO the; '_ilning
st,'.kcs GO"'U dist,~ncu "'X,1 :t<!L,th, , rGnr or <cv<'n tn the flar:k of the

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

gun. Second, rt night lighting dovice, both for thcsight c.nd for
'ell, <iming stnkDs. I.t present, '.:0 nr,' improvising ,.,ith flc.shlights,
but they cut dO'.;n tho rtccur"cy "nd sp,'od of, th" gumior becauso tho
f:uni1~r nust hold ono light in his hand \7hilo opcro.ting tho gun 1',1. th
tho either. J\ 'nlght sight sir-dlnr to crmnon company would bo suit
ablo. Occasion"ll:' one of tho micromctor knobs 'slip' and do not

r/- :'-(,

~ h~-_

t:,.- _

~,~nc..LI.~. Ll,'

r ,_, ~''-' ~_~ ",, . t..h.

01.). yt-. t_,:""

J.f-:-.:t,(

:"'t.s

thn f8JJl t,\;,. si ,,,lit

bcc8,use the knob' turns '&00 easily but' som 0 times not before hn;'i.ng"
fired part of the mission. Possibly a lock washer thRt r:ould hold
these knobs secure could be made.
Fire Control -"We have been very successfully using n method of
fire contrel and direction similar to that of nn artillery fire
control center. Our' first' attempt with this method. was fln exper..
iment at AN'ZIG Beachhead ana. it proved itself so sffective that
Vie have been using it ever since. The only two items necessary to
operate thisC~P. set-up "hieh are not T/E are 1/25000 artillery
grid sheets and a 1/25000 rangefan.
As soon as our g\lIls lire in polition, the position 111 plotted
on the grid sheet lInd II base-point registered for all guns. It is
then unbelievably simple for the platoon C.P. to fire on any given
coordinate quickly and accurately Qy using the' range fan which i~
mediately gives the true range of the target and correct defluction
from the base-point. Therefore, any p",rson in the battalion can
call in the map coordinates of a'target and the' target can be fired
.E.,curately and' immediately. This method has bren extremely valuo,ble
in firing targets where observation WIlS difficult nnd even more so
for night firing. All of our NCO' 5 h.v" worked wi tb this metbod and
ATe thoroughly trCcined to tClke OVGr op6ratio~ of the C.p., if the
plc,toon sergeant should become 0 c,:sunlty."
Mouton/mt 'Colonel JOE L. BOURlm, 168th Infantry.
"It .ls suggested that at least" platoon or company of the
chemice.l morters (4.2) be provtd8d for each infe,ntry r8gimont Y'hilo
in combat in tcrr'linsuch "s ',7e hf1Ve in ItalY I And for terrain tJ:ll'.~
TiO Fill undoubtedly have to conduct, future operatione over.
-,
TIK chemical marter proved itllolf q.highlY valunble ,>,bapon on
thG /.:17IO Beachhoad. It hae gIl' atcr, rangG thEn ,our 8lrrn ma~tllr.
T:"". result of its fire is high4" deJIloN!l~zJng ta ellcmytroOpEl.
Garre,cn pri.sonor/j refer ttl tho 412 JIlori;ar a~ the ! silent doa,th!,
bcco.u.so the frngments of thee shell npPElI'cntly splinter up much'
finor than our 81mm mort"rs nnd a ~JlIf\lJ. sliver cian pass th;'>''Igh a '
man's bcicl;y nlmost Vii thollt IBrwing n mnrk, 'j'ho 'Qorrnr'.lls do no~ like
the chomioal'mortar. .
.
.,
:
Iti~rGa+izedthat the oJlOJ'lical r:ort"r i~p.n organic part
of' Qur arm,vcher.uonl, ;;:e,rfllro section" but 71e are firmly convincod
ii< ~all llo useq to g~c3t advantage tlith tho infantry rogir.lOnt
.
oithei' uttachedor preferEbl.' to bncome 0. pnrt of the TIE orgnm..
zntiQ!wl ~ct-up ot: nil, infantry regiment ,"

28 ..

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

First Lieutenant D,WID B. [,'lEES, 135th Infcmtry.

"The 60mm mortcr is c. fine, little) I7capon. It [.,Quld help if
thore nere smoke shells Flv~il":Jlo; they ,could bo issucod on the
bGsis of t',70 per !'tortar in tile be.sic lond."
Coptain HUGH S, JACOBS, 133rd Infantry.
"Mortars he,v" not b'en uSEd ns much ns th,w could be, ospoci
clJy 60mm. I found the follmdng systom grontly speeded up usc of
my mortnrs: In rifle compmw commHnd group, I always hnd tho mor~
tal' section sorgNmt find one mrm with n roll of 13d wire. Tho mor~
tan USually follo',;cd the nttacking plntoons and vlhon on" of the,
lot.dine platoons wns tGld up, vlhiL, I pointed out the target to tho
mortc.r sorgo ant , tho rdrC't'If'.n 17m3 rolling Tliro bnck to tho morte.rs.
By the time tho sergco.nt hnd figured his range to the target, the
mortc,rs nere in communication ,:ith him nnd the first round on its
nay. This savod vo.lu"b18 tine, in thnt I didn't hnvG to send bnck
for the observer.
The 60mm illuminnting nortnr shell vas found to be by far tho
best flnre for night Ylork. In defensivo positions nt night, they
should bo sighted so as to coYor the entire front nith flnres ~nd
the reserve compnny TIOrt'lrrl should be attached to the AT guns so as
to afford illul"inntion for night firing against "nemy armor. We
tried this in pr[lctice and found it to be very successful."
Sergennt GEORGE E. CHRISTm1SEN, l33rd Info.:1try.
liThe 60mm mortar is of very little value against vlell-prepared
positions. When setting your glffi up, neVer set it up on the forymrd
slope of a hill, nor in a drr,y/ "8 these nro usually zeroed in by
enemy artillery or morto.rs.
!hnte veT you do use ~ littlo common sensel"
Sorg0::mt LOWELL W. HfJlTSFIELD, 133rd Infnntry.
"During our last phase of combat, thr, 60lr.m mortcr section,
of pj1ich I nm n meTIbor, l'Ient into th", lin" under n neVI set-up 17hich
'.'JCS worked out 17ithin tho platoon by the platoon leader.
This rln8
be. sed on former combat oxperience and proved to be highly efficient
o.nd highly successful.
T!Jc first [md second sou~ds of the section were equipped o.s
they hf'd nhmys berm. Tlrt "is, they cnrried two mortnrs nnd six
bne:s of nmmunition. Thu third squad, however, cnrrirod no gun but
cr.rriod four bngs of amTIunition while the sqUad loader carried
clenning equipm;nt consisting of c. cl"nrti.ng stnff, V1aste [cnd r.g,
nnd oil. It l'Ia s also tho responsibility of the. third sqund lc"der
nnd his sqund to kOGP th" gun supplied with arnmunition during an
nction by bringing nmmunition from the supply point to tho guns
whenever it nas needed. Thus , it can be summed up b,y' stnting thnt
instead of the usunl TIE of three guns nnd nine bags of ammunition,

- 29

UNCLASSI FI ED

UNCLASSIFIED

our soct.iol:, y:;nt into' ~ction "."i+,h

tion. CP no~ cnnc fro:"; tL(' 'c,bi-::'c1

vuns

~,'-o
.,~u :d. 1I

~:l1d

tan

b1.g~

of

('.DP.1Ul1i

lI~xpcri(mc,) has tp.,ugr:t Uc tr:",t th:.-; qncIYI;:v- ~~ill C0untCyr 60r:ltl

morto.r fire T-,~tth .much lcr:;cr guns, In.'lking it n. ;-rr.v~~ to hnv::1 c~tor....
nc.to pardtions ct aJJ tin:' s. l~lr.tD.Ys Ice.vG the position ,J'Ol1 h:':\ro
just firod from im~,odi&tcly HpO~1 firii:1;r :rour nissibr:.. n.nd move to
-;:,h0 2.1 tcrn~1 t'C;. ,Th:; T!".ovPYlent ):lust ;.)0. don,] r\ridly for th'J onoD-Y is

qui.cli: to return
:.~:llcn

o~r fire.
E11_t,~;:!:"nn.t;" .f ir ~

nz posi ti on8 ~TC not IJ.vn.iln.'.Jlo, posi...

tions ,'lffording- ,G'ooc~ cove,'!"' shcm2d-"h; .found, and y,Thcn t1 fire !"rl:!. 3sion
io. ?~mplotcd. n~"iT~; ~o t~.!:l"'"'. .I_'tor ~h;:. cn:my b(l.s fir:d returr.. to Y01}r
Ol"l.~~;ln~'l pOS1.tlon ~:1.\:t ~'JX',:) t~.L D8Xt ml~[2l0n, ropontlng the f);':.rJ.o
l=,roccchu'o nf:tqr ot::ch ~.im:3ion. 'Tr.is r:-.E.-.thod hf"!s' be.cn 'l.lG,:...d v~'ry- (:1"'
f(;ctiv\.~ly, csr;coic~lly rrL:~n -re; wore in th:' to'.:n 'of CfL30T:', o.lon,,::"; the
rB~'!O '!:i vcr.
In tbrc'o c1c::tG ~.70 fiy:.:d J!!or\'~ thnL 1,000 rou.'1ds (,l1d
:coc~.;5_v( a sarno v;.~ry }:(;[1;':'I (10'1' t.:;r :firo, including- 170 1 s.
On 1_ of
O'l'.r cun5'''~''7f'.S 1:.nockr;e. out '-~ld on; s~,gh-t, ')ut ':7(:-; hj'"",d no pcrsonr:.cl
cr'.C'UL.ltic:s. "
"f:ood

Thn infantry C[1.rnor~ conp,-~11i s of this DJvision l1nvc

,').T"] {)qldrp .. d ~7ith. tb, 75mm Pr.ck Ho~.Ti tzar.
hf'.vin;; ('.
g~,:'(.;!.::tcr r[~ng:, t'.nd morl; t1f'.'1clT"'I?(:r~,.bili t:'7 t11r'n tr.:r' present l'-'5i.1D lloy,'
it.z.cr, ~,l3, it hf\;:, mudo u-s: ,ro:::' its lcc-sor P\;.~'.ch by grCF'.tcr o.CCllTCCY
f.~ld rapidity of' fir.:;.
(3)

C;~nton.

prc.fc:rI'c~c1 r'nd

UIn nw opin:l.on th,; 75!:'J':, l;~.~.ck H~'Y;itzcr is th" ?1.1n ~o:'? r.:1.1 cr.n
non cOP.1prmins. ~his f~l.ct CC'.:1 8::\sily bi~ confirmed 'oy Si:11"Jy chock
ing Ot'.!' rOGords. II

}I'irst Licuten0.nt DE ,"X: C. r-::::LLC1!?S, IJ5tl~ IrJ'Entr~r.

"Tonc:} the inf'i.nt::oy rGf"":_E'.(~t ho~~ to shoot f'.rti} lory. C:"'.nnon
company jO':l is to suppo:"t, Lut L:t tl:,' infnnt."Y 'h~lp. "'"nch FO
!:1,,;,thoc: of cond~~c-c of firu, T.~}.'8 th'.' DOl.;ghbo:r1' ant to ,'3crv5"c-.~ pr:'.c
tico, mnk~) CC1.cl~ Dr.ir of Gyc~) ::. ll~O.
fr,c'(;oT'ily n.c..j'l~:rt.{~~d by tL ~. Yrfc~rrtry
d~.lring combr,t ..

'ri:--,o -PJrc h . . is b: en vU17 ~,,;;:o.ti3officer;] in this rogi;'" :.. :at

linl~

1< i...:(;[t C~.L110n co~:rp"'.!i::": l..rhcl~,r ',-i e~ntr,J. cOlJ.trol. ".l1y ho."\te hr.lf
tho g1.1'~;3 idle, (".Thon th,.:.::),' ClOl.!.~d be l::.s{:d. ;'~ Dimple FDC '.7i11 \.:'o:rk
~..rondcrs.
Th,.~ p,'1ck 75n:m EO~.'.~itr:c-r bn~s 200() Yrir(ls [:.or~, r:-:-.ng,; ,:,nd .200
mils lJO:'.~C ,-,lcv[;.t.-Lon ~hnn t:J.:, =.05Y.1r1 !{3. 2000 y,':'!.:rds rnon:us ttrJ c1.iffer
G~CG of cov>..:ring the snctol' or not. Ttis ~,TI.S ~~ruc at MONTIQUILA,

- 30

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PANT!..l~O, C!llSINO 11M JJ'IZXO.

rho loll is lighter but you Clln CC'.l'ry

more of them. High r:ngl"s of 6ito I'\re vary frequent in tho moUJloo
to.ins. :.t PliNT/JlO they ran as high as 150 mUs. 75mm o.lso has a
fl~,sh h:!.der that florks. Wo have shot 17hon the fiold artillery
couldn't. The pack C1:'.n bo tabon down into. at' least eight pi,)cos
nOO neighs lCOO pounds loss than 105m. We ,should have spJ.it trnil
75mm hck H o v , i t z e r . , , '
'
Give us the 2i.. ton 6x6. It will go throUgh the mud end up the'
hills, , It Tlill pull out Tfhero tho It-ton vehicles rJill be left. If
you c!ln't get int,o position yO\! cnn1t shoot.
!<Irke B1;U'O the Doughboy knows' hOW to communicato ir.l.th the C['jj~
non company_ With thn redias notf in tho r"giment it is simple. Use
wire where you can. Lay doublo Unes when you can. OF lines give
a more reliuble fire serv:i:ce. Also it is better for security sNte.
Hills pIny hell with the- 31)0 series radio. Radio "ms all thnt was
used at PfJlTANO, CtSSTIIO and L1JrUVIO."
First Lieutenant HlJlFCRD C.EVE,
JR.. 135th Infantry.
,
'

liAs soon liS the battalion wit.h nhich you are working takes a
nel1 pooition it is our job to, register several points around the
position ,at once and :1;0 get eoncentrationnUlllberll on the point!!. If
you do this it will enable you to get firo on almost any'point in the
battuUoll. sector in about one,.half' the time it "auld te.kc if' you
called, for the fire by co-ordinateB~ This procedure haa helped me
quite a few times in,oounterattacks."

Corpctl'al MORRIS WILSON,' 135th Infant17'

"I have found it ;is a gOod practice tihen in the field to

ah7ays ret!l-in, oDough powder charges in n convenient phce, p:r:ofer..

ably nn oflpty shell CM!;), in order that no time be lost ana nou

'fire lJll.ss.ion.Jn, which another charge or two is req,rirod. If' \"e are

!iring say char~e onu and have tl19nty rounds prepared. to fire, I

mGke surc,llV ammunition 1l'<81;l ~f! t\7entyeharge two, three and f01.1r

poridor Pt'.gs.' woere' theyl!lP~'.bcgotten on an instant notice. Thon

ovonoh tlie da:rke.43t' night itrs asimpla mll,tter to replace thern in

tho" shell cr ~:tng if needed, ~nd get the r,ounds out there in the

shortest~possible, '\;iDEl.
',.
".',
.. '
.
,

--

I,

FirstLieM~.eIlaI\t ~DW. p.~,.o! mIEN. l33rci Inf'~ntry.

~:~~i~Q;t'tf~~i~fe~!~ 'tfhi~~:~~t~6~;~ei~e:Ii;d

poai
country '~lw1111.mq:r'l,f~v~l;ab,l'f,.,peIT~il'j~, tn the campaign bel,tipning
e.round the first p~.rt"~f "rrU:&',' -tltt-ough' 'the' hlllsto the, ple~n beo
, forotl;le IJlN(J River, I \Ws an observer for acOl!t))lll'lY of 75mm cnn
nons, Time and again units on tho right and left reported thom..
selvqa. ah,e,ed df vtherq, t.nw !lctually were. BY taking their given ,
positiollil and !lllciiving'l'
t.qUi'l'W safety miJJ;'g:!.n
for firing a lot 01'
. . .'
.
, -

31

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

enemy te.rgotll on our flanks, th~t \191'0 hllresaing

been neuu-alilled, oore rElfU50d. II
.

UII

and could have'

(4) 57rnm AT Gun.

Private First C:;'I\SS

M:~T:[N

F. VOIGm, 133rd Infantry.

liThe rlheel segments on our 57mm LT guns should be taken off as

they catch cOl'11l1Ullic'.ltion I'lires and it has beenpro,'cn that with the
br1lkes set the gun can be fired: just as aceuro.teJy."
Captain EDWD{ LEWIS, Headqunrters 34th Infantry Divisio,n.
"57mm AT guns can do II greet job on machine gun emplacements

direct support ertill'lry if we had more HE ammunition. f,bout

60% 1.1' and 4fY/. HE170uld be right."

.

I).S

First LiGut'lne.nt SIGURD OlSON , 133rd Infll.ntry.

"I believe that gun crerrs should be trainod in riding the tanks
viith the LT guns in too, ?nd the!ll!Jl!l1mi tion and 'lquipment on the
tr.nk. This nffords a means of getting the guns into position uhen
it is impossiblEl to get there vlitb a truck. Tra.ining in OUll rest.
nroas has shov.'ll us this cl:'n be done quitG ensiJy. The IGsson lias
Larned at CECINI. during the day of 1 July. Company 'iF" of this
battalion assa~ltGd the tOlTa, riding on and advancing with. tho
tQ.nks. TbGy by-passed SOmE> enell\)' mschine guns which remained si~
lent when tho tenks were nco.r, but Jrh1ch opened up aga:tn \'Jhen they
had passed. Their fire suept thG only road open into the tOml and
thon fired on any movement. If Vie had Deun able to go in l'lith thG
tanks i7e could have given tho riflE> .troops /,lome bndlY needod.' T
protection. 1,s it vms, r,;e were forced to wait ti:l the gun!? TlerG
silenced, wiLtch nas about dusk, before we could get into tho tOlm.
I believe that -ehe gun cr8WS should be trained in night fir~
ing ''lith the aid of 60rlm flares. At L!.lt! on 16 July our guns \7ero
far forward and 8ighted to cover from thDflank$the two roeds
loa<).inl'. into our battalion Be.etor. .That night enemy armor wt:\S
henrd moving along, these roads but the gunn01's were .unable to fire
because of darkness. With this thought in mind, WG worked up P,
method to enablGus to fire at night. Tho guns shOUld move into
position during daylight, if pOSSible, to give tho gunners E. look
at the terrain in front of them. Coordinate firo with one of the
60mm squads so thoy will be able to fire their :flnres diroctly over
tho tC'rget upon call. If firing at these flares is continued at
the rat" of onG every 20 or 30 sE'lcol;lde tbctargot. pre". is very Vlell
lit up.. and the gunners, during our oxerci se, were able. to see the
cross hairs 'lnd IGad me.rkings in their sight very plainl;;'. They
m,re able to pick up nnd track,suo.cessfulJy, their targot. The
disknce to the target vms I;Ibn'lt 6110 yards and tl:lC target was a
pe~l? meving across the tGlT'lin. The gunnel's and squ~d leadGrs c,ll
t'.groo that the method is simplG enough and that it is workabh. 1I

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSI FI ED

( 5) Grone.do s.
First Lirutcnnnt JOHN C. ,',rL":2, l33rd Infantry.
"It is !'V opinion thc,t moro onphasis should br plac<'Jd on the
usc of the rifl" grenc.do. On ,,'oout 28 June, tienr C!.STLGNETO, c,
right fl:crlk platoon ,;,as pnrtinl1.y surround:d l:(y nbout 50 Gormr.!ls
o.r1Kd '.lith machine funs, nachino pistols "end rifles. This plf1toon
\"ICeS in a dry rivel' bod" n!).d tho a,\lrroundl;ng cou.'1try TIaS very flat
uitl~ a netrlOrk of draillflge and irrigation ditches' thc,t ,~org somo\7hct
groml up "ith brush. Th,~ Gerf.!ClnS were abort 100 yctrds from our
positions flO thnt we were \ill[(ble to ol'lploy our mortars. Tho pla
toon hed no grenede lnt'llch'_'rs, ~,nd ,me unablo to dislodgo the Ger
r.lnnsby smell "-I'l"S firo. It is lI\V opinion that these, machinG Guns
could have been knocked out Or forced to withd:r'm7 if rifle grelli'Bes
hnd beon used on them. n
Captain /,LBE1l1' J. HOIHJELIE, 135th Infantry.
"A "hito phosphorus rifle eren!'lde can bo lI1D,de from a rcgul~r
LT rifle gr0l1cde "no. " ''1' hand ::;renade. Those "ere used to e, good
advantage at :.NZIO. TLoy should be m'lde by an ordnr.!\ce compo.ny. If

"The b"ttdion Lid ~-::."tion mr.rks tho point v:here first echelon
medic"l service erds"ud second echelon r.1edicr.l servtcr, beg:i.ns. In
;peacutime on mr,net:vers, in barrflcks 11f0 1 and during rest periods,
this is a logical definition of c.et:!.vity. In combat, hO'70v"r,
tHs &yctcm 1'11.11 not c,nd he.s lievor r;o~ked out. Collecting comprn
ics, <'s constitut0d, do not ;cerform t"e func-cion outlined for
them in thu field m,muc.ls. In ord9r 'GO SQI"TG the. traops most
offici, ntly within the frnr.e'iork of the, prescnt Tlo .'lnd tactical
doctrinos, t110 follor:ing he.s been nacoss,~_rry:
. (0.) Glose liaison bct,';ccn t.be rcgim~ntc.l surgeo:! and tho col..
l"cting cO!:1tll'tny com.'1V'nQor
(b)'.inbull'lncos rr,ew be()Bpl(jY;'d~sfnrll~ns bnttnlien dd
. ,
sk.'.;ions, or it r;lf'Y b~ j.m1Jo~s:_b!o to got ,m "rnbul'lnce to uithin
miles of the' brtklion "id sl;:-.tlon, Enoh of theso bituations poses
a difforE.nt t"cticnl prooLm nnd ch".ngc(s the rol~.tionshi,:, oDtweon
first, nnd scc0nd echLlon l'wdical ,s<Jl'vioes, and: thus c~l\nges tho
rQsponsibllit;: of tllC rogimc~tc,l SU.l'g"on n.nd the; c0JI.:cttn;:; compc,ny
con'mc,)ldol". . Tho tpctic.,,J situation itsulf che;r-goB rrpicUy 'c.nd for
o8,ch batt~lion lid st~tion, tho situction nay be difforont. Thus
it cnn be soon th,.- t thcl old d'.vi(lien b,)tw00n fi ~st Dnd second
ocholon ncdical s0rvice is ~n "rbit""l':i' one, ,In tho p';st; mc,ch .dis
ngrcomc}1t '1.nd dishnrmc..u- dovelQ1)c:d br.o':l.tlsQ o~ this. Tho reo.l
sepl'lrntion betm)~n :irst "nd S,'ce)nd ochelon medicr,l service hns
boen found to be at thi:ct point v:h~re n casualty ceases to be
- 33

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

tro.nsportcd by }1,'l.nd end ('D.n be' put, into nn f'nlml -:ncn. No nr:t'~cr c.t
uhc,t point fl2.ong tl-'.n rOute ':1i' r:vnr:un::':'ion this OCC1;:-L'S, -!.t is ~. cloer
cut n~_'lcl dcfhli"L .jl~nctioL" 'r~
cc:J J .. ct~.ng CO:JP'1:1Y thw.7J b~;co:J.CG in
ror.li ty, {'!.n tLIi.hul . . . l1cG (;(" ;p"r::;.~. It ~ringA it.s ."m(JuL1Yl.CUf:: e.o closo to

tho field of' h,.ttlc :~S ros3iclG~ rr!;c rcgimcn-Gc.l Gv:~~cr:;on ,"',~d ~!is
o.sststnnts tl,us h,'l'.cl:' t.tL" rG~1:QY1f.ibiJ5ty of c\!~~.cuD.ting tht3 1cttlc
field, rend:~r1r1[" thJ ~\;it~l ~u::"l.c;~1 o.~"d !l.ocQssr~_r:T itt th'J nid st,':'.tioYlS,
2nd t1-)cn brir;.gir:g t1108u Fot~.e!1'~'S ~o tho \"J.r:.iting ~mb~llnncos ..
In ordor to :::=,crfor rr, t,1::..L.[! job, the: reg~imentnl s,urgGon must
boyo in his cO!""1t:;--')l -:-.].2. thc"") littsr bOQrers ~orP.1,'l.lJy nss5"gl1r:d to the
collecting conp'-'~n~,~, pl"t.13 r;;:1<'J,tovor (,delitiortfll_ Iitt,'r bearers he Cnn
ObtC.1.L. Fe 1"1ust. p,'-'}::,:: [: t,hO!'C1~}?h st1Jdy of the tncticn1 situr.tion
c1d ~.n QCC"Jl~~t(; cst:;.;rt__ t,: cf' ~--'hrt r:il: be; needod ~.nd then n.et LC....
coy'dingl:,r, ,~.r.d ~':~~ rms'0 do t~lis, not c;ft,:::r.the casunltir::s occur, but
IJ.C~r,(i' l 1C 'U:'"'8 l)(;f . . n-'e

'.

.-'

?iLi (3 D'.~ vis5_o:~ h~',G :f'ol~CLt in mo:mt':!,inou8 tcrrnin during mostof t,~~1 ItclL-m Co.:--;p-":ip:n,, On mal::.:'" occ{',si.O::1S, it hr-s beer: ir:po.ssii,)lc
to Dripg f'n ,""m,__ :':l~-';'lc'_' '-n~7,:",-11nr.5 norror thnn 2 - 5 milos to tho bnt
t~lj_on ,~:id staV_ons for ":8:::>1-:'8 r',t .-. time.
It h~s been nccessQI'Y to
or.'::::-,nizo ';"l "(,~~or !';:)~ [-,Y8 c~1ns::_st:.r,~ of t'.S Jl1[1ny ns 16 rel,"'.ys, orr:ploy
in:; ~-::',1~dY'cd~;: of litt01' bCJc'Y'8rs, bctnben ttr.;: fr0ntlino t.nd tho \7r5t
in' G'Td':_;;': DO;0G. On ";V(1~":.' 'Jnc of th8S0 OCC:_'.fJiQr:s, it has boen t:1(:
r81,:,;iillo.__ ntr.1 ;3'Jr~:,~'on ~nd i'd_G ::.s~]l,~_,-:"r,_nt8 ':TflO org::'mizod 'UJC~lC relr,ys c..Dd
kept '~b8m funCt7011~.ng, u;:',inr~ t~c litter LC[,rCrs assignGd to the;
col1G8~_,inc: cor:lp--n'I v!hcn_.:"?ct' [1::: Sf'---; fitQ
Y!Q of t:'1is ref:!'iment. hevo
boon f'ort~0.to- in'" ULV,:..] or;in~; ::t. ci~sc li,,:ison '__, :it:'} o'ur ~upportir..z
collucting COfrlI""n:r so th' t "~h~ fUl}ct:~on of CGsu~'.lty ;;vncuo.tion hr.s
procooded sYJoC~jhl~r r~nd ':::dTieir-mtly.
If tbo rcg:inont:"l.l J1.1r,~.,';on tr'.d tr.k~m the E'.ttitl1doto !!',~!cll~ th~_;

F~'-l E'-:tys tL'1t th:: c911cct:'_11P,' cO!'"tpnny ""ill (!v[~cunt~ the: f1.id stC!.tionll,

end then tad S,'It beck r~n':l :::'.it,~ d for thnm, t'r..oro Y,rQ'Jld h:-,_vo been

li to:r~~ll:.r h',wdY>,._ d.s of r'~-::'iGnts stj.1J. lyi.nff on the mallc':~Clin sides

of l(>.ly or els{; ,)V;tcu.n.t.;~,d Ly tl:.f7; GT~.S. The. 3rd crossinr~ of tIlE';

VOLl'URNO, tho bntt] c of I'it. n:FRONE, tho hins

VE~'fYIW, [:nd

tho o.d"'rnnco frot'. ':}I~ CSSBT0 to tbo PJGJO ,-:;rr; il~Lustrct lons of th,:,

Eboyo.[!

,,""'18

ilIt is

f1,

dci'.:Lnitr: TJort'.lc .fr;ctor to

i.nf~.ntry troops to

knol':

rtS

tl'lcy ;;0 into corbnt t\.... t if ~_:l1C~y ~,rc ',:'oun.dcd they v.ri:l not bnvG to

}.:"1 out or: the fi.::~:l ~" ~X't';l ,', 1'01' :, long period of time.
Tho

'LVo:Cr',f;C ir,f,':'.:1tr:,~::1"'ll h:,s .-~ fco:i.'" of this '"Tbich .is so stronr: :.j,t,hin
hir:. t:-:,t t tl~' T::l_::-ll,t,:, 11C 1.;.; 1.-.;Ul)nu~:d ]-10 t.hink's only of yelling 'medics 1
or Il~. t'\JT sq'l::.D.!. fI

ilU~lKJ l:r i;-~ ",n i'.id Gt.;:-,~t.i c:. ',~;~-::nr..

ensue1,] t~l OCf!Urs conf'w:lon
o.rtscs ,:'1Q "'.b01.1.t :I::Lv~; r-~ln t:cy -en jn t}~,:.; ~ob of ;2 neD. In our ',~.id

sto,tior.. 0, c~Jrtain nl],r1~Y';r c, !:'~cr;, "'.l'e) on duty ('ct r.~ cr"rt:::5'11 ti:~IC. If

;t

- 34

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

oe c,'\rcd foY' by the !:len r.lrcudy

on juty the ot"'"r l'1e" .oro or lIed to help during th;) rU3h. In tl-J.s
':;C'.y ',-.;C ,'-'voiC. r'c'2h cor:i'usioL~!1
t~ ~c...rc c:.ro norc p1.ticnts tb'-n C:-;E

11~..'llilc n tccbnici -::.n ir ~~ bntto.Iion n:i..d stc:.tion I ho.v(; ObS01'vcd

!ni'.ny ti.r.1C'S t.1~() Dcc:")ssit.~. . 0.[' hr.viD~ n ninosV,roc;per n"!lniJQbl(~' to -t,ho
b['.ttolioL mcdies .t:o ;:,id in the. c'lC',cu[1.tion of :.301diors vlOunded in

fioldso
J', good 8xR.oplG of tr'e; oit,,,o.tion took ';)1c'co 6 Novembor 1943.
T-,;o soldiors ':.'pr,,; s(,vor01~,r '.'ioun.drd i:t1 n mir.~diold" Thr,:'B litt r
"ocnrors ViorA sent into t}-J\; I"'.ir:.p.field t.o bring them out. "'-.t1ilc in
tho ['.ct of doir:.;; to, t':"JO of tl-"J~ ~?0rC {:Iso scv8:L..... el:r "\:;ro1.mded. E8t~er
than sC'.cr:ifice more Ii tt" .r LeDr'(TS in thr "" ttr~l?1pt to bring the:n
out (~n ordor ~aa3 sc~t tc the ::',~;tt2,lion P al-:d L st,~tion for uine
S1-;GCp8rS ':,it,o ;-:~r:; 8t t>: t. ~ rT,'~ ):,_~pV'" il :1l]l-; bOCt'_~130 of oth8r rTcrk.
Thore '.-]as fl dcl,::y ai' ."':" :-j ll:T -,)c::oro p. pc,tb to thr ''ounded cocld be
cloared . ',11 of thi.c :.ct~!ic:, took pIc.ce vithin 2nD :'flrcls 01 C.n
[tid stn tioD ',":r:e:t8 tho:-. -:-'o~,nc\:d ~01].lJ. hG-:,?o 1'8coivod proT1pt p.t-:'ention
ii' there bn.d beon i!lin8R'_-;E'~cr:crs {>."',~c;ilublc.!l
rD.YW

fI~"~ ['"."'11 "tdr;inistcrirr nid j.!1 '_isur>ll:.r n'}t drm7 fire oven tho:Jgh
he '.x~ in open t,~]r:-:-o>iL.. On. tiv:,', othnr h, nd) t;1rco or four men gc:tho:c
in?; 0Vor Q, r.round .~d cOT:lpLtdon oftc:'; :-c-;su] tJ~; il~ thf', entire ~:roup bo
cC'Hi:r..g C1J..sr,['t1tios. 11

1J7t:crl3 ly,.v(: l:',-' -r.. too r:-,--_n.:r instr:r:.ccc of :r'1.}srd!1e into, :- si tw--:
tion \,tith01..:t ';ulJ._ k-,m-;J.ed,:;': of ",}bat is rnppsnjng.
',:.;(3 ha'vc cJg!(,Jri.:l!ccd 3~tun,tiorlG Y:~10re a Tittle eorc tim~ ;'..ll1d
pr!?~)nration "..,~ould npvo s,:---,v,'d tiT7Jc, r:,~tcrj ~1 !'nd lives"
F.:)r instA.nce:,. I:1plOPCr.. roc()nneisSancE) causing ~. bnttalion 011
~rucks, to dQt,r~J,r.Y '7',Ld fi,~tt f():", ,'1:!l P.sC8ITlt.ly areA::.
Or: The difL,rGlct rmDl)'C1. not: J:~ving tine to rimch their
(iGsie;nated nro[\s prGpnr9.t::-:ry to tt_: ettr:~k. Tl1cn ttG ettaci{. is
1'r
"........... T'" t.1.1..-,
~ '-.
to be sot -:Jrtck as r.r'JcY: [tG six
."'l'
, x~u'
....... 1:), ~t nd t'}
., '--.'
.J"Lu}-,-('I,_:L
1 ."t'::;
_
.

or oight hours.
Or~

'I'h~~: r.::::cklcss r.''l-y in <.7hich mined

nr08.S

:l.rc treated.

'.-:8'

hE:VG seen vch'i_clcs :"nd c>::;"1ipPlcnt oloY,'n lJ~ on ro,:'.ds Dnd trcils SD2.t

nre ~l"inly mc.rlud' '.i tIc t', 'Cc.r:c.n mine 3itn.

is tukon, it cn.n c"'; 8f"_:Jil;, d,--,t,:;.rT"~_"l.::-~G 'f.rr:c;tLcr

If "littl( cc.ution
r0ad ho.s iJ;:'8D

t}lJ

; 1 X", ,:,.dy trn '.J' 1_~'(1 it.

'
Plenty of' time for ,'T~~C()Y;~~'~.is[;'":".r:-'>3, P!'(;p:"3Tr:tio:n, . . nd pr,3Gi~g on
to tho troops nl1 ini'orIT.,",+,im' ~,,_,1_c~Ll:_ t;l~,~ ,:.ri.l~_ insure ,", bettor chr.ncc
of S1}CCess. EV8:t!. i~' t!'lC :::it:__1C.t/ on lS pre8f,inc, HLook boforo you

8TJop"I.i or vehiclcG hr .vt::

- 35

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(' ptr.:ln PICE".i'!)

r.

:7IL1{PlSON,

13_~rc1 Il1fr.,nt~J.

T1:;tc 0ki:~g s'!ivc,ls Sh01.:ld b~ roroovcd. Thc,y catch in the Grush

,.. (,;' to thn naiso in ni~tht r.ttncks.
i',:'-L"; USc of dr~l.',TS ~,S -:.. ~ut,cs of npproQcb cnuses many casuo.ltios
from ~rti.reI':.- ":101 mork,' fire in mourrtai.n fighting. By using
m01ll1t.".:'.ns O'.We hi.ll. sldee; s J.ectinr thG best cover f,,1'1 casualtics
rC:';:l~.11~. c~ lro:'rj rrti.lJ ~.lIT OX' mortr:..r fire,~
f.s T!"!ost drFlW"s arc COVG1~c:d
'i)J' n2:';:J":.>:..;ry fir,
thc:y r:~~:kt. poor routos of n~;pr(l2.ch.
It is bost to carry ",ortar begs ovor your shoulder p.s it is

or. si cr tc :]i t . tb-.... g~Ol}.l1(-l c,<),rryinG tr OM th[l.t Hay.

(}jl;.:: 1. Gl~r.IS fil"

c"nst: f, fm7 cnsualties SO look up 1'lS often QS
:)l'l:~si'ol t.) see l:rhnt is going on.
Ph~!n your head is' down you soe
11()t'1.~~r!,g -- -:"hlm it is up it is onl:,r t~.'w inches higher, you can SOG
t,~l' f,i;:'n\t:~.0:,) ';}1fl pr('lt"~et ~/ours8lf 'r.nd YOtJ.r cOIIp.'"ad:os."
~nc

.k~':;C"'.nt IT.'l\5Y C, V:J.iEREK, 13Jrd Infantry,

"1:1 ':oU'.:05 up on the; HE." I h<"'1o ,,itncss~d mAnY fellow GIl s

i:,] ,"'J.<ion. In ont, c,. SO l.~.rc: 1.~.r8Te going t,hr'''Iugh th() brush in the
m01:c.l-:-,,'i.1')S n:J !'., l:lf~chitw-pistol opcnod up Dn us from our fle.nk Clnd
'",> :,',11 l:it tlk, g"cl';:;.d.
r.'~ [:.0.':':;' '1 fa>:: n(;l,',~ r,18n r.. ith us thAt hr>.d just
C()l!1C iri.
1~(1 one lJf'::L tq t,')J.l th:t1 to get do':!n, they lust did.
I
:t8>3C. one lr.tur 11C'I':1 C'O;!l("' 11!: got dO':.:n and h(; s[_id it came natur,c> 1.
]8 ':~t:'ok CD'!C:-:- f'nd :"~o0d cover. i1'-~ Got -ochind f_:, big rock, but the
t:~0ublc 0;'1'10 'ft':;l' t:'ot.
r... Got ctO'::n end th:m stnrtedtryfng to
f:l"~ur(.; ,jl-.st ":hGr . t.:loS :f'irr) r.'''~s cor-dr.?: fran.
Ho '17cnt around tho rock
t<.:ic~, uhti.J :: fj,Lc.. ']y ,-ot close cncl1,[;h to point out tho dirco'i;ion
in ;,. . ~d,Qb t:k' ~1.1J"1,"'t8 'i'.\_;Y"l, comin,s froJ::. I, rryself hnd :the Same ex
pcrienco . . . .hr'n I ::'ir.st. c~'"":~o in t :'1--l h.-"c~ to lCQrn tly- hard Yl<'Y.
Y,:hrt I tIdn}:: i::; tt:;y ;Jb01:,l.d c'JtJ d01.-.:n on running thes0 'Keop
dOYTl1 cou..rS(';f,jl : nd five ~.r:!J fel] o~.' .. s in tho st"',tns more of r cr[~clc
G;':ui thu'l"'1,p 1 It 13 cten h::.~::-d _r"'or .- n nxpurionced ~.;oldior to pick out
t~,C srot r.;'-18r _: t~Hj :C'ir ia C.l~:1.~_g fr(~m ':"i'tr'out assuming thnt nG11
feJ10Y;s call. 1I

ilene of -Jur !Tl:-'Yl is d:'n.d ':"'odny :);)C-'1t1.S8 he pi,cked up ~. Germ,'n

m.-chinc "'UlOC,.:Ot !' " ; j hd c\,-iv,n ofF th, enr;my nnd ho c[\rri8d it to
,Y,,,',:' ,'"' SL '<_,ly poi::tt ,,'lY". o:-)po3it;,"~ .::.d[;tj of thf: hi2.1 17hcre he ."\irnd it to
S(j~, if' it ~:orkc;d.
~.~ G;.;~r:,[.'--::, '-"'1' .',P.1cricnn tcnk h'c'nrd it and zeroed
i:~ on Yir':.
Th _ sncond nhC'~ 1 "":'r.;~t C~Jne ir! exploded him r,11 over
t:'lL ~)1[,

co.

about som~ of th0

lu,t fnll~/ r:nr~{.:,d r.rith their
>"': .,;'.~ '-:nd -i.r,.)~ Tl:csc i:;~:,otc 1::crCl to.::"l -ith unmo",-x,d gr~ss, nhercus
t' L:r~'.l:2 ir 'Vh; , l]lf'";.nl'rj }:' )rt;.ons of th," s:--..m; fiolds rU1S mO\7od.
ph: ff'1 ,:Or.'!. -tin';-- thl~ -'Ol_"~U ',x; ."!. vc:11J~bl'7; :,it of knowledge for 0.
;:::!(;,,t ['c1"'.~:-',nr'~ ",,'-~ :1.. ( f~ll G::"'t;~' l.j'ldrc the:.) GorI:".D.DS hnvG )1.~.d time to re
SOY:. tLcir l.'"chb.l! ~" ~1}in"~'L I ~j~_ (Tn S n.nd barbed Tlire, rmtch out for
t.'~.ll cJ..ovc,r fi()~ ,,J. H

~j'Ur Sq1J;"'.J :1-":2';:: nDi::"2:' ,".D :i..ntc;:"-8~~r:,-: ff"'.~t

j'r-',;"8flLldf ~"tich t;-:~: Jc~r]'L.~J ;1rv,.;

- 3(

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Socond Lioutencnt DELN P. H::ULTON, 133rd Infrmtry.

v1

"r"ly cor'pany 17GS ordor,~d to "dvanco ono Ilftornoon and along '::i th
th" order came InfoI'l1l\tion thrtt the high ground to our l~ftm'.$
occupied 1:1<.( friendly troops. ,'Ie n.dvllncfld with thllt assurl1ncc, cnd
1701'0 caught in " hc'lVy fbnking fire from that supPQsedly occupiod
grot1!ld ~.nd had to dthdrm: or to trapped.
'
Tho lesson I lonrncd ;Prom th,,1; on.. sxperi8nce is never dqpond
on reports, no m~.tter hOfl off~.cir.l, for protection of your flonks.
f,lTlays tuke it for granted th,o,t both flanks aro open and occupied
by enomy."
First Lieutonant .TOHN V. PEfu"J.!lRG!.3T, 1.35th
,

Inf~.ntry.

"In severpl J.nstances ",hore nw platoon i7as adVancing through

vineyards where visibility ':!as Hmited to 15 or 2() ynrds, ,Te forced
the onenw to surrender eVOl) though we hed never soon him. After
being fired on' from positions !:ldden from our viol'l \70 1'lould open
up with every ava.iIable '.':oapon in that general direction nnd ".<1
vnnce abreast in t.h"t m'.nnc;r". On snvorp.l occnsi,'ns th, GerI!l~ns
l7v.vod \lhite flr.ge and (iilm(' out with their hands up si.!!lp1-v beceuso
ere threH ~o much lend norr his positions that he was ,fraid to ox
ilos,_ himself to fire at us. t. man also forgets ~,bout being afraid
i f you ce.n got him to stprt shooting."
.
Tccclmicd Sergoant ROY 17LLKER, l35th Infnntry.

"On'tho night of July 7, 1(1/+4, Compnny "G" ,o.ttnck"d ,md'ook

",," imlnedintoly bogc.n
'co die; in th:: hllrd roe-l{ for dn'."Il ,;ould soon ovortnk0 us. Dmm
broke and everything 1;"S quiet, too quiet.
To cur front rI single Jerry 51.l'llpcd L'Pf stnrted running Uk"
11:,;:;11' tahis lin0s. Ono of our riflemon firod nnd missed. Then
nl.eth<;r took upon himsoLf to f1.ro. Soon tho whole cO!!1pnny rlo.s
pl~.ctng its '::holo firo tJo,','o):' on t~c' single Jorry. Tho ,mole Jerry
nrrw lot 100so '::i t]:, sLnil nI';:]S 'md 88 1 s, resulting in !'l2.ny cr.slli'l
tics :;tnd d' nths just bOc!:V.SD 'TO hud ,:~.., 1:; !2way O"..lI' position,
strength mid fire po.:er on o. sir-glo Jerry.
"TC Ine.rned by experien0c to hold c.nd control your fire until
it is noeded."

Bin 163, corr,p'letoly surprip,ing tho Jorries.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CI1AFTER II - APTILLERY

1. In most instances the Infantr'J-Art.cllury tean has bean developed to a

fh,e point during current operat; ons. It has oeen ob$erved that newer lmits
coming inca combet eHher tave net teen ,-n:are of seme ph"ses of b.fantry-Artil
lery coordination or ha1re no+, )-,.,d snff'idont tr,dning herein due to ammunition
limitations. The greatest single !.'1~.ctor is tIle creation of an "s;:'Pl'i.t de Regi..
mental Combat Team", where mutual confidence and respect have developed to a high
degree. True, the l'eali2;"tion of this e"prit will come only after co~;bat where
true valu'Js o.re revealed, bolt muc}-: can be d0!~3 in training t.o ha.sten its arrival.
The lessons learned in t.rain:Lng provGd to be sOl:nd in principle and furnished
the artillery of the 3/.,.th Ini'P.lltl'Y Divis ton a workuble bas i.s for operation
against the en8JlljT. Throu,1ho'lt ()J;.!' part :.n ~J:8 camp'lign in Africa and in Italy
the varied situations that cenfront.ed us ha"e res'.!lt8o in the observation listed
beloV!.
11-

Oper~,t.ions;

Captain WOODP.OW

~i.

SMITH, 3/fth Division ;"rtillery .

J.. 1!EmploYll'er.t of Lt".tson Officers: 'In garrison too often

the selection of office,"s for Li"lison dtlty PaS not indic"tive of
the importance of that ?nrtic,,::C,!' c.ss~.gnment. In action t.'1e de
mands on the Liai~lOn ofi'k,.)rs 17E)re such that only very reliable
men Vlere cntrust.ed wit.h t.ha work. nelnftlIltry commEndors sool;)
learned to rely o.p. their qrt:_1J or:'" nnvisors f'or noceS,Stlry fire
support. Close coopernt.1.on w~c o(,tcd.ned witho'lt tiny impetus in
tho form of writt~n ordGrs, Lic..ison offIcors were cCtlled upon to
,solect dofensive fires, hc.r'.,esi.rg Ir~ssiors, preparation concen
tration concentrat.ions and to reDart Infantry dispositi~ns. At
times they wore also calJ.ed upnIl to .., djllst i'ire. Physical sta.mino.
is osscnti(ll. The Li~.ison nn.r~,ios are at t.imos obliged to operate
under the most adverso conUtiona.
2. Forward Obs(;r'v"Gr3: TLo Artillery observers rr.ust be
centrally cont.rolled. '"e found it ,"\dvisablo for t.he Bo.ttnUon
S-2' s to coordir:s.to o"bscn'v::tt j,O!1 ~~n their OWf! co;nbnt team soctors,
thereby elimi.natinf, the ;;ossi"o~_li ty of dlLplic'ltiol1 of oE:fort.
~bF observers are prone to be over enthusi~stic if not qar0fully
instr'lcted. It is a natcl.r~,l tondonc;r for inexpe:cionccd officers
to VJo.ndor off on pat.rol m~saions, to becomG .separated fxom their
support8d Inf::nt.ry and theroby fet out of touch with the situa
tion. The observers are tl'lB onl?7 tangiblo t,ouch you. havo ':Jith
the front llno .:Jlomunts. ;. l'ol'".'ard observer who inv.C\rilbly gets
pinned dOlan -by Qncrw :-ir3 j s 'l:o:rt.1:;~_es~ ~ Ono Artillery B[,!,ttalion
lost tl:ro obserV0rs to GLUWj" <'1.cticn in q:..d ck s'.lccession dv.rj.ng
th:) fig!,t o.round !ill'. PAN~'ANJ. Ipvestigo.tion revealed that the
t1'iO officers r.ad ple.eec themrel"os in pOf i ti?ns "here observa
tion we.s secondary to person::l defense. The pext obser'ler sent
out was instrv.c-ted to look for observat1.on somewhat to. the rear
of t.ho site of the two previous misfort.1IDc:l;es. The support af
forded our d8fenc.ing Inf. n:t...,-.y, ;.~as noticeably improved by this move.
J

....7

,.. 38 ..

UNCLASSI FI ED

UNCLASSIFIED

3. Reconnaissance:
Reconnaissances ":ere as varied as they

lIe"o numerous. In a rc.pid moving situation we found it necessary

,to maintain contimlOus reconnaissance by at least one officer in

the- Division Artillery. Many times the infantry pushed on just

before dark, thereby necessitating a last minute move of direct

support artillery~

4. Selection and occup.~tion of positions: The ideal Fort

Sill battery position can seldom be found. Many times the posi
tions available are very difficult to occupy. Battery commanders
in training 8hould learn to tell at 11 glance i f any given location
.Jill serve as a bat tory position. In the mountainous terrain around
COLLI, pioces "ere ,winched into positions that presented almost in~
surmountable obst'l.c.les. :Cn mnny inst,mces the pieces were spread
over ,a front coverii-'.g 4Q.J yara"" "lith each piece on a slightly dif
ferent elevation. There is no get-rich~quick solution to occupa
tion of a gun position. jTrequently the positions that presented
the most hazards 'during the actual occupation, later proved to be
tho most secure.
In It.11y, 'many of our units put their CP I S in houses. This

prQctice is fr.ovmed upon in the texts but it worked out very sat

isfactorily in action. The reason is obvious. The houses in

.Ituly are extremely sturdy :1nd are so numerous that they have lost

,the lone-house-on-a-h5.ll ~SPGct. It is essential that an artillery

CF be reasoniloly comfort:lble. }'atigue and discomf"ort breed errors
in firing datn. The artillery technician must do everything in
his power to eliminClte mi2.tCll:8s.
5. Observed fires: TI,,, for-;'ard observc<tion method of ad
,iustment vms usod nlmost o:clusively. Observers too often fired
for effect bofore :1 sure br,:ccket. 7'as verified. This practice
bElcnml3 shnrply ,2pPl'.rent'\t CASSINO, where the majority of the tar":
gets dem2nded pr8cu8sion methods. 'I'here we found it necessary to
insist on methodic0.l 0.djustmc.nts. Another pitfall "as the selac~
tion of tllrg0ts. The inoxpa:-i.3nced observer is apt to be stampeded
into shootinG at v,~guo and unremunerative locations before he has
taken time to c:lrefully nscartain the most profitable course of
action. When the ~UpPQrT.cd inr.'lntryman flro insisting on artillery
fire in front of thorn thu obeGrver must make every 'effort to lo
cate the offending r"sis+' nc~. Use harassing and area fire only
'''''-8 "::'\." l"'cs.-t; Y'Jsort ..
6 .. ''-_Tno~~'s>3~vc:l fires:

:tT::~w:'T:J.tion fires T,!hen prop3rly

solect3d cend control13cl C1.r,, ir3nlwlblc to tho infantry attack.
'7e found through pr'\ctico thrlt I, series, ofphas() lines, perpend
iculc,r to the nxis of c:dv'"nc) \:i th selected concentrations in
OGqh ph,flao, g~.VO the) b~st ro~ults. This type of preparation is
oasilycontrollcd ,'wd IY,-~y t.G chnngod rO:1dily to conform to the ad.
vanco of the, infnntry. !IoriGV(;C', a dense preparation did not pro
vide a.n I open-sesame I to tl'e im"antI"J. At LANUVIO the Division
ArtillerY shot a preparation through to completion ahd then re
ceiVed calls for f'hes in tl]8 initial phase line. The infantry
',7aS held up by- elos o-iJ' s-:.rong points "hich had weathered the
.
, .
nl'eDa."ration fire e
. ' '. T .C.T. shoots ore -;'ort" ,,1'.ile '1hen a quick and intense volume
of fire is deei:'ed. "'his t"'Je of concentrat'ioncovers an area of
considerable depth at:c1 ~:ic't': ar;d theref'ore cannot be used close in
to friendly troops.

.... 39

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

T "'j}':"
"o:d l--:"'c,['si"g fir]s 'Ire definitely 17orth17hile.
:J.t CL=1.\il-~>\ r,riticf',l points '.:,-erc s81~cted from map and ::Lir' photo
study: ~,nd from 8 -2 re"lerts. ;:l'lmps, 'mloading <points ,defiles. ,
critic",'l int"rS0ct:i,en~ dc! n',anr.td:1 rC):;d", transf,t>T points (truck
to p~c:: 'O'),Jo; were OlE qoyered. 3xper.dhures for ,the Division
,~rUllcry varied from I,ood to 6000 rocmJs' per nigt>t~or :f01:ir
nighto. P;:' s te.kon 3.fter ~orr::plction of the progra:mJ. .st:ited they
ha=:J y~,)t b".c: p,nytbing to eat fO,r severc.l days.
..
,
7. Tan::s and tan!\: destroyers for indirect fire:' Fe used'
r<ttachod tan's".nd tank dostro:;ors mainly for interdiction and'
hnrc.Gsing. ~hey '3.re excellent for tho roving-gun type of harassing.
Only limited USe 'CIUS made, of tLom for pr8paration fires because
of thoir extremely fla.t t,Y'l,i cct.Dry at the shorter ranges ,"

"

h. Id,(111;qo".cc', Coun+,crl,at+.er", .I,ll reports by battalion 8-2'8 and

.Jj7:~sion ~~Ttil2.8ry;S-2 ~~'~-;er1;-;1,-;;::jttGn re~9orts havi.ng been discarded early
j 11 tt,) campaign.
G-2 poriod:!.c'lls uhich ,,,,d '1 (;.aily di,stribution dmm to bnt~ ,
ter;,8S "'"de other nritten' r'eports a duplication of effort., 8pecial reports to
G-? "'~b~od a ,stunlllr,ry of 'enemy artiller:r 2ctivity four tirtlt,)s daily and a
. .
':''''',tl,'''r rc:'" once ada:; t,rtll:S!'litted' bo' tolio,ph.one.
'.he. dc~t.ias of Division ArtElor'J 8,-2 eV8ntuc.11y evolved to that 'of
O"T'sion 8EO, alr:lost all other duti"s be"l"'g subordimtecl. The most important,
,c:' ~i~l() i tm1 of inform'ltj on passil"'g thrGUEr, ,ois hands proved to be enemy shelling
~'C- ':-rts.
As front-l~ne troops :hcld r21ver teet'} 'indo~trin~ted '~ith the basic
'
;:r'ir.ciplGc of report.ing infDrrr,:c+.bn,,~cct enomy 8he11in:;, consider.ublc difficulty
VJaS expcriencGd' initially with gett.ing; .my 0:', ttis type of i(lformation.
A pro
l~r'JJ:l r;[18 sto.rted to rDi.:od~'" tr:iiJ C8.:8C*. d-lri~,:"g tte first rest period Clnd the
"cslJlts ~::ere nbt=-c;3T.blc .::'It once. [;qbsoq~.-..eL-:'Jy, during Gaeh rest per.iod, th!3
':roblam h<cs been attaclted from q dHfcrGl:t "ngle '.;jth good res,ults G,'lch time
' 0 t.ho closn coopcorc.+,io" c,<':ni'c.'1),r;r 3~2' s.
It \1,2s mado; Di.vision SOP that
,.IJ_ :.'1l0rn~,T sb.::;ll~ng be reported direc-'u to Division Artillery-. S-2 ,through artil

lery channels.

vi
\,

" (1) She ' ,lro]::s: ,n'ob~b1;;' 0110 of tr,'e. most uncomfortabl", son
sa-:}.;)~S ~rou '~:'ill 3VCT expor-i.s:'1CC if t.}-,:1t of' b~i~ spottod in tho
.ofcrn b~rJ crry art:'J.l:.JTY. Yo~:t f8el QS thoufSh there :i,!3'I'. n:othing y~u
C::t:~ do nbo'lt it buts'C',+ it out.
Your first rO,<Bt,10n ~7ill bo t'!l
1:.ug thE; -grouL:l Gnd pr'_-,y -l:.h'1t .nJth:.ng C0!I18S ,yo'J.r'~r~~y.",. .T'hut mistake
isfreq'10r:t1~'

fnt;::tl.

The) Lrs't tl,ing to do is. to ,got the holl

'o.'.7a.:r f:ro:n '.:her J ~. ),1 q:r.? b:::.f.Jr-::. tbc K:-:'El.ut i3 rGgistered on you. ..Hs
" is g~!for~ll:r 0. r[L"'-'t.h0di~al ..j 0(3 '.'xi pill ccntil:rll,e t.Q regis tor on tho
. ~ Q:J.O -pi.1.ce ~1hGn. [.f~u::r, tj]()1- _) .:" 3 Lotr-~ing there. , 'npe. ~SJxt thing to
do is lco11Sr for' ;c'lp." cTy:lxD YO',l h:h'e ; the ,JerrY,gun s,potted cold
.'thoro is cnl:,r O~'1b
in t; .:)- AY'I':_:/ r.:bo :C 'J.rl , heJp you sii~rlCo thiJ.=t
so-nnd-so r.lho SOG21~; t'J c.->.Y;~- '.'. IJerso:121 gr;J.dgG a,s;ainst you" That
D3.n. is the countc:r,,":b(1'tt.e:;:~,~ o:'f.Lcer...
.:1
From tho ."Q0gin!i5_ng 0.: ..>.t . CJpGr'1ticin the C.B. O. keeps' track of
,~.ll the o.htics of eLJ~1Zl .::tr:.:.:.ll.0ry by' r:Jear~s '"Of PW into~r6g.[ltion,
p:1rtlsn.n rG~)'Qrts, ~i,r"'l=-'hctos ',?r.d ,:.etG~l.:tgg roports. .~Ie ,;g~norD.lly

euy

.. 40..

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

has a pretty good idea '"h:rre Jerry has leis artillery or llbere be

has his e,lternc.te p0fJ it i'.:;np. ~ You 3.rc the cnl:.- man T.7ho can tell

hiT:. ',7Len Jc:-:ry is actlV<.), In or0_er t,o pi~ dorm the offending bat

tery the f').1.1o-,.~t::g infc-,'P";;"'rf-.io:'l i;) .,r "'J'j~t:.l.l im)ox'tance;

(a) PtE:L rJiI'C'ctlon i~~ [>0 f:l.ri.:lf '.I... o:J.? Tnis -.JJ.1.1 indicate
the e:etore.l o.rea"
('1tl5 iLfOJ.'I",t:lt; Ob ia of no value unless the
CEO knu.i's ',;rh9re ;~(2q ure). If yOl] Can see-' the flD-sh yon C(ln !'e'"
port a fair=_y eccurate d:~_roc'i:j.o-:l t.o the encm3r gun or your trainod
ear .1.1ill en~~.bl.e you' to :-:!st:_fila-:'e the direction if a flash cannot
be GqGn~ If you get a ('.l:f:i:.i.(~8 to eX:':~Iili;'10 +,he shell cr,'1ter the furrml
nay indica ~e tLP Gir8c~::"cn of ill'8 G cp-.JciallJ if tDe shell has
gone through SOE'3 fO~jC.s8 bC';OX'8 J.anr~n~.-. '~Dnds I tJill sometin.es
'give yOJ. rret'l:::r a::-::::p-r-'(;,t,e dir-actio!: of' fi.re ..
(b) l7hat tiP.lc d..t d the ror,nois _come in? T'Il e CEO needs this

dope so 1'8 Can tiE1' V~);JT re::.;ort into ot'ti8rs ho gets

ri il:O or f:1oro

reports on the S2.Le Gt'e::.J.L:,g ;:iay l~)cate- t;18 ene:n;;r gU]J,s 8,ccur,J,i'ely

enough to hCg'in f:":c_ing iJ..l~ccDe::.-'ve:.l fir9 rigbt a\",:ay. This is very

importa~t in t,he CnSC of' Sf g'..!DS becll.f1SG of their ability to char..ge

positioJ1 [-:l Of-:~E~ t:::n.t t}-'3 eBD caD~ ('. keep +beffi loca1:,edl\

(c) r;~'ler8 are tLe l'c)~lLds landing? ThG-'G.ns~.i,el" --to ttr:i,S" -keeps
tho eDO pOS~:8? on r,'h:lt. n~o 8n,"~!.'Y is .lcr:"'ing to do~' FiX'3 falling on
our frcnt~'l::_ne t:"OOpG Of+,Oi-:' r:' ')r:.:.":des 8. c011nteratiiaiJh:: and inforrna
tion a:'iou't it, rfill 811able OL;'J.' rmit CUi S to al.ert the artiD.Gry to
be preparsd -to fire in tt3.l sector... :i':'ire falJin~ on roads and
trails indic-5. t,8 t!Flt -eYe; Cl1CI[."'/ rrr'obably th:_nks onr froY:t~line
troops aTe br)i!":g t~o ",,01': 8l:TI)~,j.oc.l i7:' t"h !C i Tnti,:::ms, If the
Jorr:'r:s r at+,en-t.ion io di.X'-:J~t(:rl, t!") Ollr arti:::'Jery :rou can b~1t that
SOfie t=r8'rt dog-facG ~'Wf:, C'aJloJ 'l-lp his artill'8TY and nsked t.hem '.Jbat
in holl t_~re yO'll S()inl~ t,:) do about t:10SG SOE~ s y;no are C"l"Ltt~Dg us to

pieces" The 'an's-:]e:-:.~ p:r'J1y_t;].~,.. \'I'r's, ! :~~or: in hell do youse guys expoct

us to fi!'o if yeu C0n r t ~Ut'l: in any f.;}-je.ll-2:'GP;::?~

(cl) Hm',,; ~:<;::,~.r:';,~ r(n~nds ttl ~/e co:ao in? i::'o want to kn01'! this so ne

C8,Y' T1c.~_:T'-,a-:~ tf:JT 2. f:-:,r :_ ::=','ltio and a180 t.o fi.lld out just 11m'} ser-

i:)~LiS 11<3 lS <li~: ~,-.j~~. ~,f_:', .-.,~ ,-,=.,-:- 'L'.~~:_"J.s"

Fc-(."),nlI;y, rIG -r.;,OSD back 2.bont

.i.'lve t.ih1l3d the rr'i"l,,~_;:, c.:.~' .i.~.y[~.,,~,;; ~'~e t:'.Y(;'I':,'3 irj~

(8)
Ho\": E1CcllY gn:)s :.,ToJ .1. (i, ~1f! UL-1 1,Jla.t kir.d of guns are they?
You Can tell ho\"; m;-.;.flY g-lJ.;.J.s -'_tre fir::cg by' 'J ist<:;r:ing to the guns re
port or the rOl'i1ds stri:<:cng" If +,110:" a)"Cl rigl't tog Jtle'3r or if the
ti"'8 b8'~+";ee'1 h'u",-I--~
-'is
'l"~~'''s"u'r+
I"
l'c
1''''!
mO:'~e fbao ann
U'JU
__
'.'''0'
;1
,"
.:>
'v.L. ..','10"
__,.j
_.. . tortlJn' becat:.se yO'J. Je;.n Y:t fire Elfi n.r'sjJ.18J';.:" pioe:) like an !V~-l GV8r~ tJ:_ough it
::.:oniotiIT!88 880ms tl.:~~t 1,-.'((1_ EV'.J:('yonG kLO~-;G, tr;'Jt the round thJ.t lands
clo,s,a !:;O!J!1.d;s ljJ-':G thi) ';'~PZi0 E:V},1,t'8SS f but dO:1':t lot' t:n.t fool you.
Expc;:.ci"onc:c hc.s taught yC".1 to d~.Gt:,LG"li'3b t~3'~'.-,TGon l:lSht, mediu!u', or
heavy o.rt.iIlsr:.r ~ ~ t,~~ s i ;-:c: of t.~_:(j .'::..~r, ;:':i.~ 'or sr:elJ: fr'<::lC'10nts sent,' in
ni11 ',-~na.:-'lo th~J CT~C t.e, '-~'jt,';:::-'r:iL'3 c.iCC'llJ'''~''.;oly the, Giza nnd typ-J of
r,l0GpOn that is G~lJ,~)~,::,!':Z :-~t 7'':u~
Ii' tl:-J S'hcli comes labhing il1
s.lovdy t:te c~:B,n'~~7;~ r'~rG t'r'~-G it colee;:; f.ror.:'.,a hm-;2.tz-3:'. Fast. travol
ing Ghcl2..s cc::E-) f_:.~~,rE .~. f[tT:.. Tho !.:ind tl"v;.t. zip ovor your head before
YOli hr:ar tnG - rei-or,1.: o' t{'G Lun car: CO::~-:O frO-ffi-:'lfl ~- ,..~ -i..'J.tili:..
Ro
p0rt thoFle f;tG h:gh v01oe~~tyo ~hc r'.J,:r3)OC0 of this is to enablu tho
CEO to tio '~hG fi!'i~E~ in ~'.ith "tr:G T)fl.r'C";'culnr one of our friends (1),
so -that hG ~a!1 bl-"l p::::;pE.:r:J..y !'erriLll:lbBred i7ith e bOUqV..9t of shells ..
II

__ c

"""

,-".

~,,-,

1,

- 41

~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Report any other usoful in:formation such as the :flash-bang time,

whether he is using airburst, superquick, or delay fuze and any
thing he is doing that is unusual. These are the things to remem
ber about shell reports. Your location, dil'ection of fire, time
of firing, the place shells are landing, number of rounds, ~ber
and type of guns. Be pstient - a single shell-rep can't turn off
the enemy firing like a faue8t but it will let us knoVi you are be
ing shelled. Our flying OP's, fOTVlard observers and the CBO '!Jill
be put to vlOrk 1'lith minimum delay."
(;,) Counterbattery - Infantry-artillery teamwork in the ex
ecution of counter-battery operations was developed to the highest
degree while the Division was playing an active defensive role in
the ANZIO Beachhead. There, enemy artillery was plentiful and
room for dispersion extremely limited. In addition to a Corps
coUnter-battery section a full-scale counter-battel"JT section vias
set up in Division Artillery CP utilizing personnel from the sur
vey section to maintain 24-hour operations. This was supplemented
by the establishment of regimental counter-mortar sections. This
accounted in part for the lightest casualty rate in the division
history for a like period of active engagement. A departure from
normal counter-battery procedure proved to be very effective. To
provide maximum speed in reacting to enell!'J fire the following
policy ""as adopted: When Sllellreps indicated that the enemy guns
were active and the information reported was not sufficient to pin
down the offending battery, the direct support artillery fired
several concentrations on knovm enemy front-line installations ad
jacent to the friendly area being .shelled. This proved to be ef
fective counter-battery because it usually silenced. the enemy
artillery. PN reports indicated th~t considerable pressure flaS
brought to bear on enemy artil1ery units by their front-:-line units
to refrain from firing unless necessary. II
.
Following are the instructions issued for establishing regi
mental counter-mortar sections:
Operational Instructions

#14, Headquarters 34th Inf Div, 3 May 1944.

"I. The enemy has made effective use of his mortars on for
ward instalJ.ations, relieVing his artillerJ for other missions.
This may be duo:
~.
To a desire to conserve artillery ammunition to coun
ter a major attack.
J2. To utilize the relative mobility of mortars as com
pared to artiller-J
.. To the relative affiency of our counter-battery organ
ization as compared to our counter-mortar or~~nization.
2. Each inLllltry regiment will establish a counter-mortar
section to utilize the methods developed by the field artillery.
One officer "ill be detailed as regimental counter-mortar officer
(CIAO)
.il.. A counter-mor+ar chart (Scale 1/12500 or larger) will
be set up at regimental headquart"rs.

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12. LOC0.t.ic~ cf l;nur:_~{ n:oy'l :J.n] from all sourceS U'Iortd:r

re)orts, OPI s, Y:J.t~ol~, c,tc ~) ':?:Lll ~~~1 plotted 1:lc~ur:1tely on tho

count0r-Elortr.r, chart.

~.
A i'orL for rO!."3-;::J 1,.: .'Iort:lr Reports s~_f11ile_r to the

present Stoll-rep form ldll b:; (~'-'I.opted.

Q. A progr'lm"or idoctrinating !l12. front-lino troops

YJith the pr~:.ncip10s, pUl~.r0DG, ~;~nj imrortance of ~ounteY'-mrJlt:ll~

inforr.18.t~~_on rdlJ be ~tart-Gd"

fu A rlu.r. fo1' ed6~..tiona]. communicat5.ons to f:lcilitute

flov] of information will 0'3 dGvis8d, if fOcT-1i desirable

.f. P"rsonnel of the CT artillery B!1s ,dll E"ssist in the

establishment of counte:, ... m0rt~,r 3Gc"':.i0l1s.

3. Tho followir;g ':':'iscussio:.t o:~ counter-mort-ar t1.02SUl'eS,

prepared by the Division Counter-Batter:" Officer, is ptlbl~_.shud for
the information "nd guidanc , of infar.tr,' commandors:
R.
The counter-mortar ct.art should be a scale of 1/12500
or InrgOY-'lS a s::Ji?,11er nay lc'~.d -to j"naccu::ac2.Gs in plott-i.ng.
12. rCqpons under reGiml-'.nte.l control or direct :::nlpport
artillery genorally e.re eufftcient for all c(l1m~er-mortar miAsiO.tls.
Counter-mortar programs ,;:h6r(31n 'l D"clmbcor of active !1'Drtar pocitions
of knorm loc''.tion are ong'lged co.n be arr.mgGd through direct ccmtact
tlith Division Artn: "r;i 1L)adquao.to::s.
!!. YIhGl1 coordin~d.os of a kno 1."n or sus~,ect8d mo:::'tar J.=.osi
ti9n have b0811 det')rminc) 1-:, shonld be n1lmbered fOl' enSj refe:renc3.
A v'lriution of the s;; etc:: .'or nur.1h8ring cmemy batterios "llOY b8 "sed,
o.g., Ii:AC 9733. The lptt;:.rs idont';.fy tho positicn and t.hG num
. orals .indicatrJ tho rrid squae''', 1'1", letter lVI, in.'!~cc,ti;1g mort"ors,
should be o.ddcd to provent confusion \;ith tho' Gnem;r onttory posi...
tions. ... additio!1 :In actiyu mortar list ShOl11c< bo p:repJ.red pur
ioaico.lly em'!. distrU"I'Led to ;!1tC'r'Gstoc PfTtios. 'Thi:o: list should
sho':! tho number of the onerr" mort:lI', t.he accuro,to coordtl!3.tGs, tho
height in metor;:i CJlevO(tirn ~bovc fua lC\T81), sou!"'co of infor:;'l1o.tion,
and tho numbor and t,:rpo of mortars, i:' kno\'!n. T}":~.B -:;tll p-3rmit
missions to be o.ssigned by m:moc"r rather thnr by ropoatil'g dl ill
i'orm~tion.

,d.' A COllntde'-mortw officer and" qualified draftsm<ir,

should. be on duty ,~t all tinesC\t th0 C01Jn~.8r-mort"r cor.tro1 con-

tor,

~.
OF's must bo oql:ippc](i pith some dovicc to perait 3C
CUI'.'It.O ;r,.oasUre::1GIit of fln.s~~~, sound, or sIT,oka azimuth to ODO!:1J1"
mort8.rs. A circlo of dc["r.J6s or nils inscri.h3d on '1 s;r,Qoth ~:~urfacG
o:nd OqUi?D8d 11ith f';. movablo ~r::,on to indicJ.te di::-ection and or
icmtCld by mo"ns of direction to '.' knonn point m8:lS Ul'Ed on the] n':lp
is more n.CC1l1\1tc t1;;ln n compass. Th() :lccurncy of loc~tion of
G:1env'" i:nsto.l1ations Ynries di:-:'octly as tho a~curacy of loci~ti('D
0/ OP' '3. OP's should b" 10c ~: ,-,d by survey. Thoy may be locnted by
inspoction if sufficiont map dntn.:il is pr0sent.
f. OP loc'ltions nro nlottod on the chart. Whon 8. ;30U11d
<1Zimllth
Toccivod r.'~ short li~8 c.bout o.n inch in Ivngth is dra'lln
at that azimuth fro:n tho OF reporting. An arrm; is drmJl1 to ind
icato the dirGction of tho en',my mo-tar a'1d the number of the report

i;

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UNCLAS51 FI ED

entered above 'U!-:: line; A. hmg rae' is dralrll: fot' nt'.Sll 01' snoke
reportslj.nd tho Umo'o': r,)port :.8 ntored in addition 'b the report
numb"r. Two or lilore) rays are nJ<"dJd to locate an er."my nnctar
positbn but a."1ingleiray ofGon .. ill indicate an aetive knorm lo
cation. Generally, a ooanb:'--v)r{al' m ss:.on will not be in:.tiated
on the basIs of a S:!t,g'.6 soune repolt. A n':unber of sound reports
may iJ;ldicate 'the ar"a t;hil+, i.s active. If enemy If.o:;:t~ing becomes
serious, a ganerw. couliter-mort8l" p:ro~ram Jllay 0<:) Started.
s; TLcre is a t"l'!d.3I1c;r. for observers to 'report only the
mortEr fire .:'allir.g upon theln. Pers onnel must be trained to report
all mort-ur fir" observed, As the observer gains confid(ll1Ce in tho
pC'ssibilitJes of CO'.Ultor-mortar 1'1re the flor, of information ,Iill
become moro rogular.
h. '. The di;,~ction ot fire Or 3n el:l(lmy lllOt'ta:r O!lll be de
termined from hnexamination of thO) orater. This <will be of SORe
assistance :!,h locating mortar positions.
" i," . Patrols, PW's; 'and. civilians. furnish much valuable
information re~arding mort':r positions. Air photosand . . mosaic~
are the beet ~edfum for eztracting accur~te lqoations received
from thcseliouro;;,s.
j.Betllj,uS"b! the tendency of :nortars t;:, move frequent];\"
they rarely ar.e in tl'!e same position reported by phto interpreta
tions. !$pcrt.s fr?m PI; however, are valuable for determin!ng
Hkely' are a.s. .'
.
k. The Air' 01' can spot only :tn nctive morhr ,ma the
appelil:'ance of ai::-cn.ft often oauses theoortar to ce"lse firirg.
As enenv 1II0rt"r concentrattons are f;enec Illy of D'"01'.t c'ure.ti.on it
is not practicable to fly spedallliork;c tlls~iot'.s . Alr OP's:e,re
.at preaont Wlder Div::sicn Lrtilloty Hec.dquar"':ers control ,wd many
times it b POi,,~.w.G toc<'>l+1;a<Jt plat.es iIi th" air'to obs;)rv, by ...
calling Divis:..on Artillery lieadquarters.'
1. As enemy ;;lor(;ar cr;jVrs aro known to liye av:,ay frem
their mort"l"S .i.t 1.11 :\mport~.n,t to' eng"'J0 them ~,h5.1e tl18Y are c"ctive.
Spf)ed is es~en1:ia,1 to cO\Ulre,,-mortal" Mt.ion. Tte CMO ,Illust have
affici.,nt. ,commUnications an4cirvct call on 17ea56ns.best suited.
tC' dei!i:lwitl'.enamy ~rl;ur~; II.:; _
..
(3) A '!T6' nre Ltne',llil habitu'Il:lyesta':l:Hhed Oil th:., iiv
i~ion.f:ront~; Thil!l rer4dt~ b"tta;.iollB othar than thG i:i.1'3Ct.
.
3ttpC'ort J:)'J:tt.,,1i9lle to fir" br gGts ofopport\Ulity. beyond thflt Une
,Ii.thout obtaining a cle&ra,r,ce from 1nfr.ntry comma!\el'8. The im
portanco of maintaining ri.gid control over all artillory, c~;nnon
compnni()s. TD ~ 8 nm tanks in rS./Jpect to g~tting clearance to fire
within the 'No Fire Line' is best illnstrat<;ld by the following
incidont:
Extract, Journal, S-? 34t1'!

D1vt~ion

;).rtHlery

liTho 3rd Bat~.alion, l35th Infantry w."s in position n"ar LA"lUVIO,

Italy, on 25 Ma!v' am began to 'I1cceivefriendly ar'~illery fire. A
hur.ried oil;UtQ>D1vision .ArtillGry stoppd the fire :If divisj.on
arUUeXjT IDl'itLa,lion$ . b'.J.t f!jiled. to stop the fire f'lEing on the 3rd

- 1.4 ;.

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B,;th~ion,

Cannon compallios ~I"re chGclrod but h'ld not. t1eG:'l .7l:ring.

artU1Gry and the tllO lO-qighboring. diviSions- wero callod but
pleaded uot guilty. Tho friendl:r firec<lntirnled. Later in the
day after Air OP's I).ad eOQuted frillndly .territo~' thoroughly, an
All. battory was <;l.i/loov()redfiring and it was thoaght th'ttth<l
my~t0ry had been solved. Thp sheIle>! area re;na:lned poacoi'ul until
the following day wnon fire comm.enced again, Frant:lc cnUs '.rbln the
battalion 00 shut off all artillery in the corps sector twioe but
the fire oo~rt;:l.nued to full, Finally .. in desper~tionj patrols were
sent out to tile arc'!. from which the fil'G was eroana.Mng to see Hit
Vlere possible tbt.tt an Qn!llllY battery had been by;'iassod in the,move~
I!;ent forward.P:ltrolli dillcoV'rt'ed tho $fHID.,llt gun platoon of a
frial'ldly ('?) tarJ): bu.tt&~.lon tbat h.d OGiin firi~g ind~J?.5ndQnt~
f'or two days wi th.almoet comp-ll1t!) lMIc ot ]mo\l!i:,dge Of; the friendly
sitllatioll. Proper action wa~ t41f~.l1
. (4) . Art.Ularyol;\servlltion Wt>S ful'~shed primar:L1y by f(l:t'Ward
ol'servers and Air Opt II. Ba1:.'\;ery Of "1':\ 1iIgre rare. flash OP's Viere
sot up on the A~IO !!aaehhsad b:t ",11 u~t$ inc.luding the Division
MP platoon').nd 34th aeconnaillsanc~ Troop.' Information from theee
Opls ,\:1.\8 valuaHe in I!p$tting activ'i 1;lntteries bllt intersections
genarally Tlere no'; <lCi)l~ate eno~ to pill, dorm new. location,,',
Air OPI IS flew patrolmiliSiooll oon8tantly and pro,;,\)':' thei:rv'lJ.ue
by silencillflenem;r ~tlleJ'S by. t!\e VQl'~' tect c4 the.r prooence.
Cor.tinuu1 eO'l'enge of th" divie ion i'Nnt r!will daYlight hours by
. Air OJ:> ;\$ ~"$.~,,, ~t... 1W_i;l.te .re.l!rtl!~o~ pb.@:rvora are
stUl a problem. :tt. iac!C~ tM,'t. a lI.lj.t:!.sfMto:ry solution dU
eVer bef'ound qUO to, rapid turnO'1e:l' or ;f'onard observers, but inprove'
1'\eu1; can be gained by :l.ntal:lSive appl:l.oation ot bt;\sic principlos;:J.ur
ing trai)ling.
'"
Tha iiwmeQ] ,of tttmScrbytQR IntaptD" j,s~f primary importaD c 0.

oorps

.s..

~rl~O~ ::!g~~ t: ~fi::;:tJ~f~:~uJo~~ ~~t~~e~:Uaii~na~~!;;';'~rO~::~i\:~1me

1mltruc't <U') infant:CJ offioer Ql< enlisted !\lan on methodsClI Ildjustment.Evory

of;f1oGr must be able to adjust, every linE) N::O, \lho\ll4 bo able 'to adjust

~nt'antry

ana

for best QPoration ev{)ry man should bave some kno111edge of' the subject.
COlonel CARLEY L. MAllSHAU,

~"

"Ive got a couple

0;('

CO"l1ll~nding

Officer 133rdlm'in CASSINO.

prtva.t,os spiping with the 8"

howit~ors

at the onemy-beld 1:::ouse;;l about 75 yards dovm the street."

I .

CClptll.in NELSON F, K!BLiR, Comm(lnding Oorow,my

"v",

1.35th Infantry.

"It is kn01'ln that there Mv", beon' U1.lIllOrol.ls inetn;noes who!),

if.\only tho ari111",ry bud been called togivo el!pf>oxtin :f:tre,
muoh damage and destruction could ~ve been inflioted upon the
ene~.

'.

One special !pstnnce was in NoJ'1;h J.frica when one of my

of'tioers cllllec baolt to me bf I:'l.\dio tbat there ~Elre sl'>veTal trul'ltlJ

unloading infMt:ryme!l to hiB lett t:\.I\llk at II dj stll.nclt of sevenl
thousand ynriis. r told him that if he VI()~d adjust, artillerJ fu-6

.. 45 :"

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UNCLASSI FI ED

th"t I \'Iould CD,ll for it ~nd relay his senstng. His answer was
tha,t he didn't kn(')w ho>! to adjust fire, By the time I reached his
position, it was too l~te to call for the fire.
On nnothtlr oec!)'sil;m, I \;US able to w~thdrnw two plClto,'ns rlhich
ho.d been pinned down by enemy mahcine gun '100 mort~,r f:j.re by callini,
fornrtill~ry, fire.
The division is nt the present time scheduling
periods for of C'ice1."s Clnd non-cooniosioncd offic,Jro in adjustmont of
-r'.;illery fire ctnd I b"liovo is mO('lting 1'!ith the utmost success."
Major ARTHUR J. PETEIlSON ,

s-;a,

34th Dtvision Artillery.

"It is unnecessary to tell an experienc,ed foot-s.logging dog..

face how important nrtillery support is to him when he needs it.

When he run/l up .flg~5,mlt a Je7JTY strongpoint tbt is too to~h

to crnck with infantry weapons the proper thing te de is yell for

artUlery, He's got to be sure, however, that the target he SElBS

is worth toasing a 10t. or cannonO.G1.ls at because cannonbe;lls are

, the oillY reserve, tbe art'ill-ery has an<:Lthe',r CQst sweat and blood.
A single Heinl.e 8unningMmself Cl"r an Eyetie mule and cart is not
wo;rth B,n artillery conoentmtion. ' There' will: JllQst likely 'be an
artillery forward obServer somewhere' in your oompany area who is
in contact with the g'~' Look him UP, giVe ~imyourmtssion and
he will fire it fOl: you if it is htUnanly possible. Remember, he
is just as interested tn -k!1lil'g Krauts as you an~. Get acquainted
with :Your art~llery FO aY!d his detail, Keep yeurself posted as to
his location f,t all times so you can find him when y,ou needbim.
He will fire fer t':1elo1'lliest dogface as quickly as for t,ho ragi
mentd CO Or allJloet, If sometbing has happened tohiu ,r you can't
find hiln:mq you c~m get. to your battlllion CP by radio or telephone
the nrtiUery lia;i.son on-ieer there oan get fire on your target for
you.
.,' '
Back in mediev,.l days when the artillery man wC,s ' iJ. civili(Ul
mechanic with an eye for W'lr loot th"y tried to keep out;liders out
of their union by covering up their activities with a lot of senrl.
scientific mumbo-jumoo just like some professions still do. Artil
len- singe thot day has become still morE) complicated and there are
some teohnical problems that need special truining to h'lndlG.
This need no'\; bothe. YO'lbec").tUlG 9.11 you want to do is 'loy :l lot
of' scrap-iron on tl:ie pre'tizc,l-bEinders 100 you can qo it.
The first th:!,ng to do is get a few rounds out in front of
you where you can see them, The easiest '!lay to do th"t is by giv
ing the artillery 11 point on the way at which to sheot. ('l'nis i"
where the maF re':lding you le'lrn'3d in busic-training would come in
hrcndy). The. nrtillar1 will com;;> oloser t,o hitting thr;t point
than you thf/lk; S9 if the !rounds suddenly o.ppear about two milss
to the right den' t !I'l5S out those SOB' s w~o can't re"d 0. map
better take another look at your ewn mup. If the rounds l~nd close
but still not wh",re you wllnt them try to put yourself where you
thinl; Ue gun position is and sense th" ronnds accordingly - over
e1' short, rIght or left. If you are using the battalion in direct
support of your outrit it will normally be right behind you soIte
wheN but it' your target is fln enemy gun or something that re

- 46

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UNCLASSIFIED

quires medium or heaver ca".iber artillery the chances are that you
'lion't kno", wherE' they aro f~.ring from. If tha-t is the case or i f
for any reason yo'.1 are not sure of the gU!2 location:, the safest
thing to do is ce.ll for a rnnge change. This. will do two tl:ings
for y()U - first, by l'ell'Sl;lbsrj ng '!Illere the prev:!.ous r()unds fell
. you v/ill have an .idea of tl:le direction of fire, and s ecotluly,
you will have a unH of measure out tter", by remembering how much
of an increa.~e ~"n ::ange :rcu as1--:ed for. When you tel::!. the gunners
thA.t you are within 50 Y2rds of tbe targ@t, the fire dir _,ct\.Ol1
Hill most lilcely" orde.' fire fo::- effect. IT:lless you are tmcom
fortably close to ;r01J.l' t :"..::;:,+. it. is going -to be h"lrd i'01' you to
judge hO\7 closs yOU!' adjllftir.g rour.da are. Ulnd'.ng. It is very
important th~.t you \;r".cket tl':e target; get rounds that are over
Elnd short, of the t(trget. Y->u will Jrncm then t)",at the correct
l.'unge is somewhere betwe()U your over ahd e!lorl rounds."

2. The inclusion of artillerr defensive fil:es tr. all infantry attack

plans is axiomatic. In It.aly, tl-:.e Cermanl"I'ecti.ce of sill,,-ll scale c01mterattacks
against the 34th Infantry Divisj.on has almost nroved abortive. Etrery objective
is carefully chosen to invite 0:mnteI''ltt"ck ov()l'terrain faV"orable for com')leta
artillery coverage.
Colone: WILLIAM H. SCEILDHO?F, C01!ltla!1ding Offlcol", 133rd Infantry.
It! cJ?ll it the m-..l.rde:r apaco.n

Maj or HOBERT E. !1.cGMW, 135t:t Infalltry.

tI~':hen . operating in t.orre.in th'lt is

fl'lt and rlOoded to any

e}(1:.er..t, the obser'Ve:tio:r., .-:i.nj thiJl'a.fo:tc tile effectiV'enes:s of artil

lery support of the FO a,nc: 15.:d,80n officer becomes very limited.

To make up for tLis lacJe of obscT,,,"tion, . prominent points along

the axis of adv:tnce c'lr, he :\"'lgi~t81'ed by th-9 Air OP in advance.
These points call t~]en he us :;ci1s successive base' points "-S the
advance prcgrGssGs, and '.,ill give ,-,aequ"te artj.llery suwort and
"lll02nS of rapid 'l.d~Ul3tment in t.erra:i,n gi..-ing limited Obser'lation.
This sarno method c~n be ~p~lied to the objective, enabling
unit c0mmn.nders to lEl"Y dm-;n fin5.1 defensive fires iwmed1.ately on
occup;~.tion of a pOi! i tion .. 11

- 1.{1

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UNCLASSIFIED
CHI:PTER III - IN!' rNTP.Y - T;,KK - T'.NK DESTROYER TEAM
1.
n.gG.in.

Th~ offcctivenos'" of tLis t0~m \'0.S been demonstrnt"d ti'1c c.nd tin"
F~..l..rs t

L'1.eut onnnt .T"I"'~

~~
L .;,

__ ,

-"'R"Y
G _:.J, 1 33rd I'"
11~ an t ry.

.:'

"On 8 Juno at 1<;3n n in th.- TiillQUINlf. aren our company l8nrn~d

t;,c vC\lur of corobi"Gd inf,uitry 'tnd tu.nk op8rntions.
Our ilm'lodintc objective ""s to cllpture " hill which ,-,as epprox
L.,c toly 5ClO yr.rds to our' front. Betneon the hill ~.nd the point
ft'Jffi rrhich TTC ;n.:.shGd off the; ter~!"\.in ';78.5 flp.t o.nd was covered i:JY'
TJ'h":;O,t fi.- 1ds.
'.:(; nttnck,,,)' lato in tho aftc'c:noCln .. i thout ~.ny support fire ex.
C()pt 9ur aIm cO!1pj"Ir..y 1.ight f"1flc!'"!,in(: gtms. The nttack vms made 88
tl"'icL.G [' :rrtilronc. ,..,hich split our sector.
The second platoon Ff',S
or, th"; left side of tLo -trc.cks, the first platoon on the right.
'ife ~.dvanced IOn YClrds ovr ';.be, flct terr!).in towards our o;ojcctivo.
At this poiEt otT sconts worG "irL'lt'd dmm by E;Deroy mo. chino gun
fire. The first ulatooh vms n:r;cci on frr:!!l threee directions lJy
machino gun fire, - the' second. p] r::t.1on likc..wiso Ylas fired on by cross
ed oochine ~un fit"o. The, CJj:rr;(~ny ,70S . unable to "f1dv2.nce.
The company cO"1'7l'.ndor :i'O;l.11o~ted tank support. !,t le30B three
tanks e.rrtved. The pl.ot'oo11 l"1d"r or tho f:i.rst pJ.nt00n was able to
poil1t out tho onoll(\' -;'tro'-16 pdntr> to the tnT'Jc com,mder bofore the
attack Y1J:1,8 rcsuI:lod.
,~t 193% the ntt~ek "n~ r3smed with the tnYJks on lim 17itb
tbo platoons. Tho t',mk'1on rir>.,d their turret guns at every anemy
strong point shifting tbuir firr from one t&rget to "nother as
tbey advanced.
The rifle plr,.toono ".dvc:r..ci"g 'cdtb the tonks in a skir!11ish
formation held thecr fir;} ,,!!til -dtbin effective range of the to.r
e;ots; tben thc,y o!C~ncd fir", er,ch pl~.toon using its full firE; pO~ler.
, Tho tpnks Ylere s"J.cCGf~sful i.n neutr8.1izing the enc!!t)f fire. Tho
rifle platoons g"'inr.,.d fi)."() supo:*i.ority so that the; encm;y- cOl::ld not
rctqrn th" fire r.nd OV(,rr::n the posit' ons in a l"inil'l1lTJ of time,
This Obj6ctivo couJd hove bOlon t::ke11 07('" sooner h"d tho tC.n;'s
\)C''CY' ''lith us in tbe ndt "tte::>pt to t~k" the hUl.
Tbo t~.nk sup
;)ort c.lso Minimized t:1" ,,(\sUD1tins. Thor" m,ro nono in the; first
})li'.Goon end trco in t,ho al3cOlld. 1";18 third pl::toon ,.,hieh nas com
Ilut';;"d on rigLt of thfJ fi~st in tb" Sr)cond c.ttnek h~d one cc.sunlty.
This p~rticulcr opcr. tiu, :1"8 givnn this compc,ny confidence .;n

tnllics. 1f
.!l;~. Comoir;od tr~ininG is " l'rnrom:isito to the suc~ess of an infnntry
tn,rlk opornc:::.on. It connot be oX?oct..cd thnt inf""'.ntry, kno':ring r..rmor draws encmy
fire, r;j,ll rcork successf"lly Tlith tc.rill:s "i tbout being femiUrr ';;itb tbem.

- 48

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

il'ft Liel'ten'cnt LE'SLH: K. 11 ";,SBL, :;'35th Infantry.

"At AH7IO there was .cD onemy strong point at house ';['. S8verel
hell. "Deen rJ1Bde to +." 1<:e prisnne'Y's from this house ~:.:y ii.:f'bntry
action alone without SUCC8es. The CO d<'c'-ded to use tan'(s and my
platoon being cb05en to O:9cr;g,tp '''lith them, I W~_8 dosignl3.ted force
commcnder. We were to USG 8. phtOOll ,.,f mfdium tanics (5 t"nl(s)
from th'J 751st T,'lnk ~e.ttali.on~ 2 0:' t1.er: to act as i:-ase of i'ire,
the other 3 carrying fonr il'..:fentrywp.T. on 08Ch. Also D"si.des thc 1~
men ridin;; tanks i t ~.'i8.S .J.c:cldr-d t.o send an acteii tional 12 1:le...l'l UD a
ditch to the 10ft of' ho',:, 'Y' ".ith trw m5.ssion of cuttir,g off' an"
en6Iilf nttern.pt to OSCarG ., 'rom tlV; stron.~ point. ?end also of blc.cl~il1g
ilL:. cner.:y nttmrrpt to reini'orr::e the st!'"oPg po1_nt d".lI'ing t~ D !'8.id.
No one ill. t~le comp~n:l p::'ior t,,) this tl;ne had hR.o Eny cxreriencQ
,~th t.9.nks so wo ,~:ere giVHr. a 3-day PGri~)d to rehearse the opere
~:'ic.': fI'orr, begir:J.lir.g t ; ) ~nd.
Dur:.ng this period thr-: men J"lr':c.J~icE.a.
L"lo1..n-:d":,:Ll1f; and dismo'U!lting tanks at vO.rious spueds, and takin:~ p(;si
t:1.on on the> bACY of the, tonk - tlJe mos-C 8ffici8nt positi on ;: olmd
uraS prone. T') dism.n~.r..~ m.:D did H ",:,ush l':p and vav.lted off in such a
m~.n~1(,r e.G to present a rri~r~ ffiW.' siJ :'10U~~ttG.
CtiD strfl.ps of !'Flmc-"'lis
t.'J0J.. clp.s~.:od under th~ chIn i'nr it lYas fonnd t>:ny 81wIJYs fell off in
vC.lutijlg unless so ti: d. r~iD pick-3d out A.t: "'1.rep, thr,t ~orrBs})oncl.0d
V(;:r" much "dth th& sit~.le.t.;_on on thr~ li.ne f:.nd rrn.cticod atta{;ki~':r, ~\
simu:-;'2t"d 1100.130 '1"'. The:; dct:.F:.il~d pJ9.n '7f.S for one tank c8l"'r.. . :,ing
?"0.C, [I. Ge:t'mn speakii.lf! ser-gee.nt, ani t'~ro oth0r men to lead til';: c:.t.tack
~:nld hit t.he hOEse, frnntnl1~T.
T~1P otb;)r tr:ro atta.cking tanks :7eTQ
to ;novc in (;olmnp. until -th,:y bed arriv'-',d to ""'."it~;in 5'1 ya.rd.s of -Ghe
1""101:30, tto 2ncl tp.nk to rigLt of. hOllZG end 3rd to left OI hcm.o0.
Y..:len
OL tl.. c J..st tank w~re t.o cl.' or t~t; fr0nt of t~Wl :'~OU3(; "'nd th,.; house
pro};.kr, thD m.:'n on '~~h,' 20.1 tn.~ '~/t~1":0 to clear all area to right r:1d
ruar of th" hll'su, and the] noon on tLc last tank were to clear "GO
left c:.nd ronr of th0 hous..::. .'\lso a squ.r::.J. was to ~ji) Ufh:~d HS f'" O~,S8 of
firG to the Ii"ft of thr, ho~-:?o in a dttcb to -cover our ~ttt.ck, tJ:c
oscapc of the enmny c:.nd our !111.tha.ra"';"~el. Th(:}"~i had ?rith th_rn ' 536
radio and n saun" p0wer phone 'lit 1..0 "!hleh -Ch,::" hnd direct CO:1t~,CG
w:;' th the, battalion !JP.
Tho:)' 1'1(;"'6 al$o to fir" (; rud fla:ce "hI"h
WODlci bo a signal to t:12 ter.ks to '7";i thdraw aftlJr the ppt:rol hau
returned on foot rJi t.1:. th,e ":~.riGonors Gnd takon cO'''"er. r.rhe te.!'~fS
YJu:ce to romr,in anc: cover t'hc ~.nf~r.Lt.!'yl s 1\T:i.thdr~'i.fal "L:.ntil the fltxa.
W2'.S fireD.. D1lring this +Y"~'.ining i t waG f')und t"he.t ~!!lfs n.nd tom;"~i
ctt~;mrts

r~~,.ms '."1(;:':'e -the most. suttb,'~;lu WGe,pons to usc.

A J8,yonet on t:'10

!n

mcdc it difficmlt t:J cbtc.in C ",ood p(1siticlD on the back of~hG Gi:.nk
"r.d:'ll [: trav0r;3ing turrwt. :.~."3aFons ~,.:ere h(:;:.ld tOl"mrd tly'~ center of
tilL k.lli<: to minim:Lz8 loss i.n trc,nsit. t, tgrpaulin fraIl'. n 2-lr-ton
t:;~",.-cl.: 1.iyc 8 tb.r"';7n 0VOl" the: :"JR,c}l: of t~G t[.nk
m.~.k0 it <..8s'::er t,o st~.'::lY
on" '.dtLout th0 tarpn.ulin, '?lstO},"' ~3:nd :zrt".n?S8 II1:"do thlj metE;]. BurL,.. " '000 diffiCc'lt to hold to. On the, 3rd and fin"l ciao' of train
i:"1.r; -~1),-, ccmpl,..;tt.: dr~].ss r'-.~~1(A3.rsa.1 ':"it.}1 ",... 11 tho trirn;nings WP-.S mE.c~v.
1"1:, 1"fap, l;d tnc'.ss.:::d by re:giIl.3ntal and ,mttalicn com!'1anr:l~3rs ",'Tho c1f1.imod
t:.:~t rt that t'.m8 (mnrntng's first light) the infantry cOll1cl not be
S(; . . . D on oack of t[tn}~3 pl"'oviddd t:-to..,.:y r,:~m[:dnc.(l motionleSs.

t'o

- 49

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSI FI ED

The morning of the attack tho souad th".t '7D.6 to act as baso
of fire moved up u!1der cover of darjnless, took up their position to
left of tho house, "nd cstaolished commuriication with the b&ttalion
Ur. At 0540B, the tanks 17armcd up t',eir motors, At tho same time
thero VISS a 10-miilUte crtillory proparation to sofkn tho eno!1\)'
position and covor the no:1,se of our tanks. Smoke was a.160 firod
to mask enomy observation~ At 0550B, the tanks movod out through
friendly Y4ro that had boen proviously cut qy the A & P platoon
and over a route that had b"en s,""pt for mines to Viithin 200 yards
of the house. The instant that hOllse 'Y' came into vicw the tanks
opened up 17ith 75' sand LllG' s and continued firing through the whole
operation. Upon raising my head, just onough to take a look around,
I could see a perfect semi~circlo of smoke laid by .our artillory end
mortnrs that hid hOllse 'Y' frem view of main onnmy line. The 1st
t.nk "loved acrose an anti~porsonnel mine field detone.ting several
0;1.' same cnd cloe.red a path tl'l.rough a heavy barbc..q wire onto.ngloment
that ht\d been expected in the front of the house. Within aboclt 50
ya:;.'cls 0;1.' the flOuse tho load tank hit an AT mine which caused it to
throF a 'to'eck e.nd tor~ out tho trnllsm:ission, but nopersonllel were
i;ljUl'cd. Tho possibility 6': tl?l.s accident occurring had bean 'cx
pockel f'.nd plans had boen [~'1de e,ccordingJy. The crew of the tank
continued firing with 75' sand 30' s while Vl'3 jumped off the tnnlc am.
skrtGd looking for tho OP0llT'J'. Tho 2nd Hnd 3rd knk3 CrlmG up a.s
T,lo,mooel even though the '-ncl tF:nk had become wlmpor8rily stuck in a
sboll :'010 and a man fell off. This man, hm:evor, recovored his
pcsition on tho tank. From the timo Vie got v;ithin 100 yards of
thQ houso thore rras a continual enor.(\' concentration of mortar firo.
Tho tank killed anD en,;my who triod toescapo, one of our men killed
>:motber with a hand grenade and six wc.re talwn prisoner. Tbo:'
appeared to oe completely domoralized, undoubtodly b cause of the
noise and fire power of tanks. Whon ,.'0 were certain that all Gnomy
wore cloared we gave the signal for the petrol to nithdrcw \"lith tho
prisoners. Whon thoy reached tho ditch 300 yards from ttlG bouso
tho squad acting as baso of fire guve tho sign~l for th~ tquks to
1".1. thdr3,w. 1'11.J crew of the tEnk which vms disabled by thf) min~ got in
tho otllOr tanks and. Lt. LIl'GLE, tho tank platoon commnnder, des
troyed tbo disabled tank nth thormito grtnadps and thon witbdrew.
Wh~n tho patrol got in th<e covol:' of tho ditch the squad acting as
b~,so of fire 1~as wi thdra':m. Durinz tho entire operation tbis. squad
kopt up constant comnnmic"tion ,'dth battalion giving thorn "- nord by
'.70rd do scription of the asss:ult. 7he ontiro operation from tho time
17e 10ft and the. tanks mdirod through our front lin" until tho red
siS'nd for tanks to withdrcri ',',as given took ,1lm;i.nutGs. Spoud, flO
foul suro, T7aS onoo! tho mninfnctors in making this a succ()ssf1)~
rcdd c.na which coUld 'only .havG been obtfl.ined,through cerqful r0- .
h"ars21. In unde:rtukirig this "p0ration the first tbing ,-;e thought
of '"ie,S teet tho t"nkl'!i'lOuld drc,v/ a lot of firo "'nd that no, riding
on tb0 b[.ckS, rmuld. havo nochanc6.' Whilo ,thut feeling was nOVGr
comp10tdy ovorcomo, .incr(Xs:tn~'C6nfid()no,j inuach.othor camo as
O'L1r cssocic.tion gro\"!. n
- 50 _.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

12. It DUst bo definitely understood 1'Jhether"(l conternplrlted (lctionis to.

be undertakon m th infantry supported" -r:;;I tcIJ1:.e or wi_th tanks s'l],po"ted by in
f.'lntry. In goneral, terrain wi.I1 dictate tn.) an~VJer < HO\,Jevor, in c~rtain in
stances the strength of enemy l'0si_ttons will be the crit"rion ~ en outstunding
eXllmple of 11hieh is quoted be] ow:
Extract, Journ,J, AC of S, G3, 34th Infantry Division.
"Ini_tially the '756th 'Cnnk Ba+.ta'_ion was ordered to sDpDort tho
16$th Infantry' El at,tack te crOGS the RAP IDO Rivor at dexm on Z7
Janudry. Li'-tJ_o ,;as ga~ned ane!. at dawn 29 Jqnuary tho 2nd Ba-,ot.'llion,
168t]-, Infantry "as cornmitbd to support &n attack by the 756th Tonk
B:ottnl:iol1o E'1gL1lJOrS finallY pr,'p"red a suitablecrossinE( .'lt 160eJB
to 8~_10w tho m.'lss of tanks to roll .'lcross the river, throngh tho mine
fiuBs to t)w foot of thu hills where: the inf~.ntry passe[ threugh,
tL" tcn)(s remaining in sl,pportpositions."
Li(m'Gc;nnnt Colonel JOHN L. ?OTIERS, I68th Infantry.
"Tho morning of J.'lnunr"J 25th, th" B.'lttaFon CO "nd Batt.'llion
S-3 ~"uported to regiment"l hco.dqur.,.rtDrs nnd roce1.ved orders to move
thu bo.t'l;"lion to the vidn;'C"! of nc 893237. The batta.lion closod
in 'l;h" now "ree, nt 2605'1'1 .~nun1'7. At 1500 hOl'rs tIle Battalion CO
recoivod tho rugimn'l;el ott')ck ol'ders as follo,;s: 3rd Batta.Uon to
att.'lck on tho right, 1st 'Jattli'.ion on thc loft with :<nd B.'lttalion
in reserve. LD - Rl\l'IDO River. Timo - 27rY700 JnnUr1ry 191),. Ob
jective ~ Hill 213. The 2nd Bc.tklion 1ms to occupy present 3rd
Battalion assembl.v a:t'otl vicinity LTC 890235, 17hen th(J.t urell w.'ls vn
c.'lted,
At 270600 JdD11.'lry th Battalion moved dnd olosed in new ass:,m
bly a!'8.'l vicinity l'C 8<;'0235 at 07~D hours. Bnttnlion CO roported to
rogimontr,l for~.7Grd CP at n(}?0 ho'l1!'s, wbore h', wcs info:rmed tD<:;t -t,b:;
butt[!lion wns to he preD,~rx, to move to nOll arD.'l vidnity 1''10 $74';35.
Th" "ttuck :umped off on timo at ()?'lO h01~:t'S nnd -oatil 1st nnd 3rcl
Bn"::'talions ran in-:'o hoc.vv small '1rms firo nnd intense mcrtel' end
Qrtillory fire. !loth bntt.lions olso oneountcrGd (lnborQtc .'\1' mino
fiolds<.l Cnsuo.lt.tcs poro hurv;,,-., 8!'}d thu a.tto.ck nns stoppod about
200 ynrds west of tho RArmO R'.var.
Petrols woro sent out '.dth the' mission 0.:' roconnoitoring

.'lppro.o cb';8 to tho RAPIDO River, and (}.lso tll, crossin" sit~s us ,d ::.y

th~ 1st ,~nd 3rd Il"tklions. Addition".l p'J.trols contr ctcd cOln:r[nj-~s

:cd (cm"Ocnd posts of th0 [.ssr,\)~t Gr.ttclions to deterrrino ttoir 10

cn-GionS 1 rnd nlso"locr,tions of knm~n mine [trolls. At 1730 hou:;~s, tho
reck lion mov,od by infiltrntion to nn nss(lmbly D.rcn vicinity 1:C
UI,::35, closinE( in c.t 2(')30 hours.
Orders YiO!'O roc::)ivcd th:".t tho 2nd !3c.ttQlion nould ntkck y:ith
knks 290730 J,lnunry. Ordor of :\tt'lck of th bc.ttrtlion to be ,.
colt'TIJ,J."1 of compr..nius, F., F, G. Cor.tpo.ny irE" 17[1.8 to doliv~)r Dvcrhoo.d
mnchine grn, nnd also give supporting mort'lr fir'_' from positions
Qt F:iC 872238'. Fatrols '.7~~r,.; sent to Sorr.po.nif S HAn and "B" to (:.otcTrnine
thoir locntions.

- 51

UNCLASSI FI ED

UNCLASSIFIED

At 290530 J"nu,ory, t 11G fO!"'7!'.rd CP rlOvod to !'C e65~4(). 1:t 0645

hourp Comp'lny "E" liJft i ts ~,~sblnbl:j' area '1rid eros sod tLe LD .',t lf730
hours. At !J?25 hoUI's, r,OI!!J"'''~' "I~" hud t,o plntoons o.cross tIW rive!'
Ylhich 1701."3 pinLed dO'.7!l by bC/lvy !"io,chino gnn firo from tho vicinity .
of thE: G0motory (nc .C55;'4~). On0 liti;ht find th:t'oo modium tanl<:s had'
bean nb10 to get (lcross th", ::-i vc.'r, but pt tho time ,.";1."0 un!l01o to
[',Bsist in thE mo-rom.mt of COClpa!ly "E". ~.~ortar fire on tho cenwtory
y/2.13 cpll~d for_ by the Cp o.ft, CompEtlJ1' "Z". By 1130 hours, COr.lpe,n~w "Elf
had terce plntcollS ~crOflS the riYer,
At 1730 hourE, tho tanks ;;egan their crossingUi'1!llllla' nn:'l
folloning closol;' b(lhincltho aasnulting olem,mts, Company "2"
skrkd mO"!ing tOHa~d Hi!', 213. It "'ss necessary to folloH in the
k.nks r trecks since tb ,ltiro aro" boing passod tLrouch VlD.:;l hc,,"vily.
minod. ThtJ tl"'OOPS i"'QCOiVDQ 'vel--y 11ttlr- enemy machine E~un 1 ~1.re,
sir;ce for the cn~r-:r tQ fir,. Y10uld me'an disclosing his position to 'the
tunles. By 1840 hours, Campa.nj' "E" '.'as at the Dl'ISe of Hill 213,
closoly follCl':md 11 CO"lpcmcs 'IF" p.nd "G". .'Lt 193'1 hours, CClIll,'2t:y
nEtt GP.S ruporti-d on tlL~ objcctive i 8-1:'1(1 e.t 2300 hOl'lTS t\,fO comp;':~l1i_(;8
':1('1'8 consolidating their positions.
TO" thu early morning hours of the 30th, connterattacks '."lerO
1", ,tar of'.
These ..,:':.tl1cks wcrG ~.'rinoipnlly from G"rm~nstrapllod ,'.nq
CD,;irc.lcd by the rapidly r.. dvancing troops. llttnj' p:'isoncrs ,ron takon
:.!1d "~ch cqd.pnent :lnd n!l''llunition cap.tured. Patrols ,Iere sent 011'"
to "".kc contoct
,:''lits on 0UT l,ft ~.nd right. Tho p"trol that
v::x,t to Hill 56 to contact t:10 1st Buttf,lic\n 'i:ent to the top D.nO
rOl.'ne! ",iro cont"ngJ.oments and v~.cP.t,,1'i enoll\V posit:i,ons. At 13,~.5 )lours.
the; 3rd Eattalion ';,":?S rcpo~t,~.:d to h:"t.v("' occupied thr tovm. of C:~_I.t1 ..A.. ,
and 1st Battalion ems consolidating on Hill 56 to protect the l"ft
flenIc of the ~<lgim"nt.
The> "bOVil is strictlY t, i'CCtl'"l account of orders receivod,
action tebcn, nnd rOilults ".chi.oved.
F or a noro comp='.ut.} p~,ctlu'e of tho action ropo::ted Hoove con
siderable elaboration o~ tho facts sta":.ed in tln r'lport is roouired.
I sh'Olll el"oorate ''Pon thr>In, be.sod an lrty obs,)rvo,tton of th.:; :'ction
2,3 tho battalion comJ]p.nd~r of th" inf[.ntry brttO-lion conc8rn,cd.
First of ~ll, ":'. doscripti('fl of the encITlY d~fel1siv~) posi=t:i,.on is
essontial. Th" first oos.tacl" to overcome vms th,~ nAP:!]):) Rlver' , a
swift flov/ing str,'am, .,hieh vms fordablG b"; L::f'l:1tr:7 o.t most points,
but which rms dofini':<eIy p,n ll:1ti-te.:1k obstacle. l~"st of '.;hE: R!:?IDO
River anti-porsormol rni:1o :helds paTrillelcd tlx rhor to a dopth of
thr<lo hundred y,,!'de. Fr(.., th" RAPIDO River to the base of Hill 2.13
ley e,n nbpolutely fId c 'cin fro!:! wh;.ch 1111 vG,!otation had b en re
movod in ordor to ..r!)yid._ ,". perf"'ct fiold of fire ["1." tho nt.'!'ULrous
me.chin,; guns o!:1pl,}ced in pnrt"lJ10 etuel pillbuxDs PDd ole,boro.toly
pr~Fc.:od bunkers ct th". bl1so of tIl{! hill . Thoro Y'e::'o c. for,; 'Juilding1
0'0 this phin.
\~()st of t.h,"m contniMd SP guns, urti-tnrk [luns, or
,; 2.cti!K gr:ns.
P.bo\1t one hundred 711rds from thr' b"sc of the hill
tlmrc, r:~s a cont:i,m:.ous knd of hieh bnrbed ,,;t"c o.pprc.xilc,nt',oly fif
teen ;'crds in dCJpth. J'.lSt b<lhind th" pillbox:,s n bnrr;,or cOlls1~r"c-c
cd of brush c.nd trues c,1)prr"~n.tly clv:,red froll'. th.. hill i tsolf form
ed <' dond ,'''ntis. Just bolO1\' tlc T"ili tnry crest of the hill 8. bc,nd

'it"

- 52 ..

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

of' double> npronwire protected a line of' individual foxholes which

~~d overhend Cover. Each foxhole had a small sign sunk in the

ground beside it. Som" of the n".mbers I recall 'irere G-23. G-24
On the crest of the hill was another band of doublo cpron
wJ.re. On the west slope of' the. hil], were numerous dugouts, nppr,r
cntly used for sleeping quarters for the garrison.
The first lesson I learned from the operation was the neces
sity of adequate enginear support for tanks in an action of this
kind. Attempts were made by the tanks to get across tb,e river by
their own means. At one point oVer one thousHnd 75mm HE shells
VlGre fired point blank by various tanks in an Httempt to brosl, down
the far bank sufficiently to form a ramp. This was unsuccessful. .
The final crossing was at last prepAred by improving an old ford
with rocks dumped in the stream. This work uas done by the 235th
Engineers under heavy s.rtillery and small arms fire.
As I see it, there were three main functions performed by the
tanks of the ?56th Tank B~ttalion. The first was to provide a pas
scgeway through the anti-personnel mine fields by driving through
t;1Cffi s.nd exploding the AP mines.
Tho infantry cOlUd follow the tank
trTcks without setting off more minps. The Germans had apparently
plQced considerable confidence in the ~APIDO as aR anti-tank obstacl~
8.nd ,-,hile some anti-tank mines wore encountered and some tanks dis- '
abled, many of the tanks which succeeded in reaching the river,
crossing it under artDlery fir". and escape bogging down in the
marshy ground~ alsp succeeded in reaching the base of Hill 213. The
second main function of the tanks was to get the infantry through
tho high barbed wire. Tho third and probably most important uas
to scare 'hell' out of the Jerry machine gunners to such an extent
tbey fired little for fear of' catching a 75mm shell at point blank
rt.nge The1I)f'al1~ry In.turn aide~ the. tank.s by,giving..thqnpro- .
tection agai~t.Sf'. gun.8 ~nd AT gUnF. Once an SP .was. <}efinit",ly
lo.cated and foot. troops clolledinitdid not stay in tpat lo?ality
.1'..$ SI rf>llult .. of thecomPined, i.nf'antry-t!lnkaQtion~ coinpeny "Eu
liaS I'lt8,rting up ttJ.e.~11 just,aeti;,Oecamedark. Compapy "En rras_
closoJ followed.by Company "F ". . Company." I" follow0d Coinpe.ny !IF If
with 8. com!llBn(j. group of fourtern ofi'icers alld )ll"n: By that. timo..
J"erryvlas well. zeroed on thr. crossing ll."d: ",sS pIe.ciug . considcr.cble
artilleI"Jfire. on :the .flat gr9=d at the base of the hill. Of the
fourteen in th",. command grqup, fiv.e of us rell.cha the bill, Com
pany "G", the. reserve COmpllny, fo1lowedth" cOIlllll8J?d group. By mid
night, wehad.tlie hill.pretty'~ll oran~zep.altho1.lgh tbere wore,
still quite a few Germans still in. their. bupkers and holes "Iithin
tho position. lboutan hour before daylight the. Jorriesskrted
comit:tg ol,1't of their liOles, throwing hand grenades,!,nd doing some
firing, $lld fo~ the next.two or throe hours wewereprotty bv.sy
round.ing them up.ShQrtlyafter.daylight the tanks kn~?ked out o~!'
or tuo SPguniS rtl1ich>rere til buildings on th~ plain b('h~nd us.
',''hilettose things were going 0;0 Jerl""J added to the. gene:-91 fe~-
tivities .by dropping plenty of artiU.ery fire on th" plnJ,l1 behwd
us - ~pparently dire.cted at the numarousdisabled tank.~ sprel!d out.
a~d G-25.

- 53

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

on it,

T11u live tnnks ':I"r,' h"ddl;,fI leT' n,t the b,-s," of thu hill d1"rt
he coulon I t q'_"!i t\~, get ~,_t t!h-:-~.. EO--'Gv',-:r, he aid d1:"op co~sidGrc.~~ll()
Hort,.. r firo or. th; cr,_ st ,- nd ......, r_~t, :"31opo of tho hill.
COf.1Jl1.unir:c.t ions to tb r:... ~_r '-.. Ol"o (P'i. tc diffi. cu] t.. 3,-;t, ,'c,:..::1
fri, ndly t~I:~(S "'.Let -er,r;r1Y ;~rt-.~' 1,::ry, ',-drc just didn r t Gt~.l in. Th~;
511 ..r...,::Uo
d-id
-:'10t
""i"t(.'r t;'-,jr
r'c."nkin,...rr..;
n,
_. ...
oJ
-~~~t"1'"Qc""i'"Y'
~- .v
""-~ ,~"'"-., w..
~,
.... e,
.... n .,t.hu ,::! nl'''IDO
~\. r'_
...
.L J'
t.~:_;o p rtil:,.cr:'" rr-.di.oL .-.( TO l~-rine; soncplr-,ce out on tho pl,: in
'~cgeth(;r ':":J_~.h their cpc::-.'"1.torr (Y:~ t~:c~' '.,odios of th,: opor.qt.ors. For
Be,,?",' r'"l hr.l'~rs tb-' anl,v !Yl\..JlY.:S of cO'!Y'1unicr:ting t.o tho Toa!' :.IC D tl:o
81 . '.. .' T<tC.r pJ'1tor:m lord.url ~ SGP, ::;..05 tb bis guns. MCS3n.~;OS l.'CI'l; re
layed .:X'n'-<1 t:1e 'lort.~r positlor.. by snund p0.'{.'cr phone to COnp~!1Y ;<HiI
. '1: .... ~,d from t:re~'e ~r t,":lcnLo!;r: to b[~ttD.l::Lon r.~.!J.r .CF or rG.(?i.1"~811~.
:("l0j r . . rt of tJ;, ::tlTlQ t~, l,rirn frOM bn.ttHlion ra:-.r to r\~'~::ir:,U2 .. t '..'0.
orc.. . .-:'10n thr:t '.':0S so, th'" ~,L'R 51,1 r;.'-'s used to commlmice,tQ r.:i.. th
::u;)_r,~'.8nt.. .
'That rfter'1oo'1, light tonks crossed t.hc river carrying ~'P.s ('nd
;".T,1T"''nition for the r.1cdi1;InS. Jorry still heG thi: c:,ossin::~ COViT0d
r.ftt~.l ~'n !"--T gun :JC'!1l.0 pIreo do':rn to tl-::.~ south of Hill 213..
T',,'o l_ight
trn!:~ ':;cnt up in fIc.mos i!!. P.b..,ut thirty soconds..
!l"hr:.nks to th - SCR
1S' 5 "'0 Leld the crossing snok0d by nur 81 mortars in 'ClbnClt threG
T"!<., impaT't~_ricu of c0:1rr.'.1J;.~.cf'.tion b8t~:T,;en thc~ sppporti..nc; t:~.nk
unit c;,r.not ~JC over strci3s,-:-.d. In this pnrt:tculn.r .e.ction, r-, lii",ison
officor cq1'iprod "ilth r, sen 510 roport,~d to me fror; th,. tnn;:'x.:t..
tr.lion. Whorl I r.1ov(;d out ~J"\t~7<.:;.:m thr- n.ss".ult. qnd rOSG.rvc cc!,"~p''''.nL:.' s
I loft him Dt the bnttr'lion :!:'"cc:-,r C? ~;tit}:; ITOr S-3 for twp rc.r:so!ib
one, to h~)ld doym the 3i z(:: of the: CO~)"'1.f".nd group End" to :n~lkc f;,UrG
th~.t hD c.~d obis redia h[:d IJ. i'nir chrnco of cr1ntinJ.inG'to rom";il}
operationn,l. S,')cGDcll:r, I L'd .~,lr"od;r providod mys:.li' 'lith r;y',m
511, tj'y mort:--.1' Sell 1~?5} t~-o f:t-ti11crt seE ()l nT S f1,nd 'tYJO '.:.'ir,-:, :.~(;,~,!:-!S
lr.yi:r:C 130 '.-:ir() folJ o':.;(:d
P..

'~.lj

"8y lJ{)'

~,'TirD,>

In

t~is ~7P"'T

obi.,ncc; .of f':lf:i.in-7.fdYlini~ 8om~; ki:~il' of -:-;o!Y':::lUnication 1.,.-[.'(.h

f81-~,

1" h?,d

(t:.'} r,~;::.r

.DirQ,fJ-G COTtllWno. lirdu':n bct"!~'8.:,'n mysclf B.nd the tan]: hIt -1:.:;.11.0':1 COli:...
n:'::T.C!.cr pe3 o,lso or.played i~t !'!.~J f'1ry,:;>d tis COrnIflf.'1rld t:.. r,i': a~:.:(}:-.t fj.J~ty
~~r'r(':J froL1 trfJ C? on t~" bstSG of EilJ. 213..
D~.rect r-ontact u ;t",:C0~,}
pJ.c:tCLO}) end c0IDppn:;r cOJ"'JGf'.::c:.ers J1nd in(ii vidu~l te.nk 3nd tcn:.1< UL_~'~
cc,r:r'~lr,ndc:rs r:ae 3: co ('mpl07"nd .. "
.. 1:tl tOfl.n oporati01l t:'10 -(,~nl\ dostrC0,T.-)r shouJ.d DC-.'7C! ,~s its prii1~;:.'ry
mission - ~]1.~F "urt oJ' tho tnrJ:s. p;";C[,'J80 of tt.e essig:C~Gd priMO,:!;';.' :nissi.on it, is
Glll~~'.lJ.y f'-,1}.a~5_ou0 ;. or th.) tank Qc.strovcrs to assume t~Gy cr.rr,ot 9.ct ir. 0t:.2~;'L"
r'Jl S D.S i'c i(~: J, 'I' .;~:~(; inf,~~t""Y corn:m!"",ndLr to G.isrogtTd th,. primu:;! I;li~jsion .. (JD
tLi.>n-:"JT~
If in~Ci~: oPf'ra-:-:ion ann elc.!"lect clf t~1(:: te"rm is r::bSO:1t or is forced to
wit,hl~:'(J.~7, t:~o b:;'~1g:1~. :'f cnary pressU1:'e Inl1st be tnken up b~,T the other e1e!t1onts
reg&!'d':;',~3.S of l.'~in:r!'Y' role.
It"'. tr~9 LAl'JUV:LO [:'..ction the.191st Tank Be.ttr-:,lion
and 894th T,::<.~~.: Dos'T,royor Ee:ttalioll were at.tnchod to. the ,Di7iB,i''")ntlt !hH 191st.
lJ'ank Bat-Gali-on b3.75_iJ:SI lost r,,:-)st of its :"ff:i.cers 'o.!ld 8Y.'~:viqPpedc tt~n1~ c!:'o'.":~
in :'. previous notion "DeS unt.\b'l ;:-1 t.o. f1_1n~ti[)r. r,..m daring the 894th, ~n.pk' Dostr-oyer
B;3.tt"'tllC:~l ::illc1 "tho .34tth fJnv('.l;""'J: RUC(:rll1[J.iss::,,~nce Troop tp.Q ,o.nly ~v:).i~.ll)10' fore OS
in 2 situc.ti-on dc:nnnding he:.IiTJ .armor..
.

- 54 ..

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

r:On

t~e

':'!

/r~:niY>~~

'-"'T"

0~':'.9:L:3 V!pre t3~~ued '~':'

",'7

tbe

~V+tl, c,~

H:Jco!'l:.~,(::.sra],:1r:~) 1\-oc.n t"J '>:0';<-" th,'" Jiviston r s J.eft f'J..;:-.n1:: o.PQ 1-.'0
develop (;l"'HEly rs~i ::;'~'P!i'~::-' '_!1
L,:-_-;-. 'uhi~~b anpea:'("3d :l1i.l'inC tLe C.c_;,' 27

ve,lr:--

?-:ay bet';7W;~, t.; ;~- I-ft fIF"r..~_~ ":'.l;':-~_ c}'r:; i)-5th I:r:.f~1ntr~,'" Di,1: lsion", Kht.le
not ~J,-cle -:'0 ao:>;.:-<:;nr'-8 ( ..:.'T ... ~~< th~'. (i:-::r ?~'- ~':e.;r,r ;;V0r ter"ain Et"jboltrcr;ly
. . OJ. I"',(JVFI' +;
Co

+
t
.,
. .
d- ev():-',G.
,.,;-~() .i.:rooi"": eLIe'. 09,:0:"1:"7 0'10 l'S De~-;'r]_\,y ill") S;..lJ.O::l, 3:;~
POS8(-1_, ;":!.nd in th'-~ ':JC;:---:-, 0:' IT;?:..:- ~.1E-~e,yy C'1.8r1:i seJf-propel] ed, C:f,_-t.i

"cc.nk Hnll a::otj,3.J 8:-.::- ~-irfJ.

1.;'.7i~:b_ ,sJ 1. j Y',-~f':rl"-~'r::.r .:;l~;',:t?ilts
(r,a/~''3-::l

t.:

and

G::':.8 m.;-

lil':;:, ul: c

it

t.o r-'" ~;:n

~f

0.r~y :,"~ i!:l

t.h:-; DIvision \t:"r:' h(S'"'lvil"'" ,,:IJ_

Et;}1.inst "t.:}'"' S1:;l;.~; '. C.t-n d0i'0'"::1Se (~f

C8GULe ref"<.(~i.!.._,- [I~ rfl_~"":ln-t, ty~t

.~,E.:.ll;_ - .).f;C0~S2~:':"Y"

ar:~'Or"'~(l

~'_:u:_'=~,or..l-J 'rrf18 vj.

':,h:: ~:r:Jo:r:

I~ --::.~'lC, r>-,-3,::;LCp of s\tfi'iGie,~t llc'3'iY .:),r!Il('!'

':"-'.s cI\inrs,j t . : 3'-~.n:/;:'~(. t.n,:l a~~l;3.,~k of +';.,8 3rd P~-Lta=-i.on, 1?3i'l'::. .:Ln
(:'ar=.:/ ;-::9 ;1t.cy. :rell 8'.H'-I'::' 0:"" i~,:,s vulner"')t:.dlity, it moy::..d
'~.;_.(-'l.c oi the irf8.nt:L"'~'" ~.r.d. succeecled i~ destroyin~~ four t.o s:b: e~:.emy
'~k- c"-;:',_]_,-: g~2HL' EL.:1 J ::ll'~ tct.:::d ::-,.n estil:1Fted I':?f-J::,~" CP,sur',lt1_8s lr~ Id.:.led
[-1",(: c-)L,urecl.
It, f'~1.rtJ-.,3~, lE.d t.he infan~ry ba:,t(-~lio~ t(.1 i-::"8 o~.,_
j('C-~,jV8 ~,~d. \'1]"[1_[;, tb'~s, ~:,irf.;ctly respons:i.ble for th.; only substan
tJal :: d~.rr':r.GA ,~[,d0 t2- tro -:1&\'3.
e,Y": ]n ~""":/ t:-:,-" ~ro':JP ';;:::8 3.::o;;omblG::!. on the- In'-:' flnrk 23 8:jcrrit:y
:i''--'_:::rl~.,y-

aiLd 61:-:0 ['8 a rec,E'rVt"; ~ C'l!, cOi_;!"".t',;r[~.~:,tacl< 9,lTpns08.

T:'; ;",;..f tsrYJ)')n. of ':;.1 ;"ky 2~'T\T the 1':oop arc,in o:-de:,:",Bd to le-?d
-e)-r ;l1:J P[J.ttuJ.ion, 1';);- IrSantr::- i1: o.n nSSRrJ:G in tho s'~',me C/cnerc-.l
r,r~ r;$ on :::'9 r-,:~,:.r.
I"rn '.eGG:!.-'g in the fn~8 0),'--' o0sel'v~'d d::'r5::t rire
hst:.vy c-,neJJY 8c.:_i ->ro:'..',e] ;.td g'"l)::1S -1:.1"18 ~lroor ''n,'1.~;J.0d t!1G
ntr;{ to move;; f O;.-->l!T", :,_~c, ,~Yld :.trnpro','-e its pcsitions end -e.o }~oJ d the
gro~Jnd gained.
~.fct\;.r:til'2tf!~~i:i:ng ,.. l:r10Ert fQ1.;r d-::-~:lR of cOEtin'....lOl':.S cc
-):,iol1, tho 34 tYJ Cr:V,_}lr~r :=-: '<'C('.l'1m'.ifj;::B.n~e 'rY'00p ".Tl.S di..... ectly 1'8 spon
s:l_bl,,,; for thE' o_::l:tj m,..,.~,:,oli:.::,: 8'Lin m",,-':e ;i.cros stile: D:" vL:;iq:n L::-o::Jt J~
0.:':.

J 1. Ve

i~'1f'-

Er:,d .31

!~ay. If

IITL8 LtrJ1.iVIC act ion ::ol3.s

:],usenCG

1
c.(' +
,.,,'lL-S,

.:J

'Blu It:;;:.

F8.r-I~ic-;11&r intE.::.-'('G~1

'+ +"
S:",~U(.'..,_,lO-n

i:'1 thn,t, in -'cL::-:

~
~'n'''\"'(
Q.f)ma?"JQ.l.
_i..!::;8.,.r:;:r

""111
8,I;.Lr,

'-h,...
C.-, "';:

C94th Tarle r: 0stro~Tei:-' ~D t tn.} 1.0Y' i.'!:: S r;mp~_oyr' :'. ~ n p tpnk role. T}:c:
Sl'.ccpss vrith ,.thiel: tLe 89L-~h ':'8.nk DGstrn7l:r =,atte1~.on pl~~'{:-~ i-ss
pert 8.i(l,ed m&-~',er5_al!,-y i.e trit; c,~,~tu.Te of tl~8 7~iy:;.sion obl:=~ctLI:;O-.
Conti,l'll.).::~llr C!.i;jpoG~d in th'_' f""ont lines r s clos0 sUi)port iJf
t.r.e inf <.:r:try , tho bdtt(;:i.J iO::l J...""1dDrt,)ok ma::'l-Y smtlJ. 'Un~.t cpor,--:-.. t~_or:c
cun:pJ.ot81;r foreigT: c(' it.s !':orma.l roJ.e. r.Y! t.he ir.l ~i;::l as,sc.l1:::':iJ en
VIL~I\_ CRCCE~i:'A, T'lc..y ;:S, or-; c~ atoon of Corr:pany "C n cr5"ss-cI"'lGSC;cl
r.n 0r:1.~;rr Z:i_,S-~o.6 trrn.ch ~"rft"T. ,f:.ri..rlg :.ts I!1,q~~bir~n J;UTIJ dOlNn "Lt,:;
t,:~2iJ'_'~h ;~1"'id ki~li:1,7 ~'n ~"stir,;8-t:.(;d 8 il (I20;JV for th:; loss of on:; _C-10
t..::..r\ dcstTOYSl' r,it!1 crs1r .; EleJY.'.:mts of Comr-any liP" on Jun(~ 1 movc;.,J.
for-:":-:..rd. cf the f::"r)I;.t line.:; 01: thf: }'~ft fl~,r.>: of tIl'" Di"",;-ision :'~1:J. .
-St. ~c ~-;,''',ct dir.rt fire_ on nnerrr:/ g-"(lns, 'Obse~v;:'ltion post,s -n(~ oi'lb'.'.r
i::,::-,t,[1_11::.,tions. Or.;: .hine; 3,' Co~'::!''';;' HE;'.,; _d~.S.!)OSl~d 'rlan::; 2. liYle '.'lith
8,"'~'1."',}::;.:i::1rtGly 4(1 Y[lI'G.f', ',jet'ij0r;n T,_qr"'lIJ tn::r.k destro~lf~r;J, cr.Tric:'.-1 t>.o
8.c~:->&ncc elcme:"lts of it,,; .1 33rd ._InCi 8.n~r:..' on th0 destroyers to th~,

- 55

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

regimental objective. The Rec()nm~ssance Company ""CIS GTDployGd

durinG' th) entire ~ction on th" r1ght fhnk i:1 tho gnp botuoon
tho 34th :;:nfm"try Div:i.si,ml'ld thJ 36+,h Infll.lltry Divisi':'ll, c.nd by
conat".nt pctrcll:i!liz, o:"t:. djs;,'-'mtod, provented infiltration of
enemy groups :;'c7,i-vo in tL t "'v... t~inity."

flEerly ~'l!ly _~ the $G.'~th 'J:D BGttt.lion Das clispoSGd to block

all roc.ds lor.,di~ south :'n+,,, t:,e SolwtY F'J.ctory "rco. ;,hilo tho
Roconnaiss2nce ComjX'IlY, ?76~b Tn D~.ts,"li011 blucked to tho north ".00
north'3,~st en tho rieht f.J.cnk.
B0th br,t,e.1iolls, oporcting fir3t one
than the otnor, , it1 the 34th CeTclry R8connniss'Inco Troop in support,
coverod 0. fr"'nt of 8:l:n(. 3 kilorr,otors. The l'o':lli "lets, lx,rticulr.rly
.
jn the 80,~.th 1D Battn!iG::1 scct",r 'Gre; effEctivel:' bloc'wd by oxtot:~
sivo domolH5.c.ns I'ihich nooGssit~t"dJPcl'."tion on fOJt to .1ccclInplish
the missi0n of pr')tectin<.S the t'b.nks of th" 'livis1.on.

- 56 .

UNCLASSI FI ED

UNCLASSIFIED

CHf,!':'ER IV EHHNEER OPEIU''IOi'l:l

In Itnly, a country criss-crossed ,d.th streams, nounta~.ns, dry '~Ia/lhes
and marshland, the solutio!" to the problem 0': moving a .division mo:.'e 'i;baIl ever
depends on the enginoer's ability and his resources, Over such diffict'lt
terrain two distinct ro;.sstuus of divisional onginaors must be x-ecognizod
(1) Close i3upport entailing Tee :>ru:ais sanee, mi no clearing and domolitiona in
the assault and (2) !!laint'Jnance and c.evclopl\\Btt of' cOlilr.lunic"t.ions 6l;r~ailil1g
road repair and bridging. In the attack bad weather at times has forced div
ision ell&!ineors to the laM,er roias ion ontirely leavin!l the fox-mer to be carx-ied
by the alx-eadY ovox-ly-bUX'dr.med infantr;.
.
Major CARL J. SI'JHIEFEl'tSTlJ::m. Executive Officer, I09th Engineer
Battalion,
"Bridging.
'.!1. It has beco;r" :lncrsae~.ngly apparent that bridging
operations by divisional engineer$ should be kept to a minimum.
rtten bridging operaticlllS are necessary the divisional engineers
should prepare approaches luld exits but the actual bridge con
struction ShO'lld be done by special brid.ging units, thus releas
ing tile divislonal engineers for supporting the advance of the
division.
2. DiviSional el!!gin0ersshould choose by-pass sights
so that the by~pass rill not hinder future bridgine operations :of
higher echelon engineers.
~.
rt has bee~ found tha~ heavy portable cu:verts con
str..lctecl in a rear n.re:'3. and then l:a:ulsd to the crcs@ir~ site a~
then laid in place by the usa of the M-2 tank retriever is a
very satisfactory method of making II crossing under direot er.smy'
obsorvation. The t-Jt'e culverts usee:' '/Iere 4 "eet 6 inches wide,
6 feet high and 14 feet lor.g consist,irig of four be:;ts of S inch
timbers anf flooredl'lith .3 inchpl'l.rJrs. It is ?oSGj.ble to lay
these culverts side by side to obtain ary desired length crossing.
TUs type of' croasing 1I'e.S used at CASSINO.
Roads.
li. Traffic circuJ.atioll is very 5.tr.portf'.nt and it has
been found that in Ital,' .wl:ere 1;l:,erc> are r::any o'1e-~ay ro"as th'l.t
tTIO one-way. rClads wi.th pr01'6 . ' traffic control is just as good CIS
a two-way road.
h. ~he old maxim of' drain off th'3 water and throll on
the rock' has been reaffirmsd b".lt 1,t has been found th.t the entire
road surf'l.ce must be rocked ana not just the ruts and pit holes.
Also, bypasses sl:ould be rock~.
~. ROads should be marked clearly by the use. o~ signa
such as mi!'le cleared algi';, dirMtional si~ns and.town signa.
Colllll!1Ul!cationa.
..
"J,'; It haS beeni'ound that the 284 radio is not too sat
isfactOS!1 for engineer cperations as th.e range is' not great enough.
Also tll.y are not too dePelidable and it has always been the policy

57'

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED oft~ia

battalion to uti1:i:/:e both radio and field messages in

a message.

Miscellaneous.

lie.
In a static sitw,tion I,7hGreby mine fields are used
in a. ~tensi"e position it is nec3ssary that inf~ntry security
parties be obtained for. (ingine'lr working parties. On the A;<IZIO
Beacr.hed. it n.S found th",t it "las necess".;t'7J to obtain both Security
and carrying parties from the infantry as the amount of work WaS
so grent that enginoer personnel alone could not have accomplished
the work .in the allotted time.
12. The; bull-'dozer is a valuable piece of equipt\GntJ1~
great,. care must be ()xercised in the UBe '1l1d maintolmnce of it.
Spare p~rts should be mad" a'!ailable hy higher headquarters so
that in ellse of damage to tho b'ul-dozer it Can be readily re
paired. Each compaq), sbould haye a loast three good bull-dozer
oPerators so th:lt .the buU-doz'lr can be worked constantly.
c.
By-p.'lsSNl should never be constructed ;l.i.thout
culverts. It is much mere difficult to put a culvel'~ in a by
paSS that has been \?ashed out than it is to put one in originally."
send~ng

iiJ,.
"hile no startlingly new methods of engineer proceduro,lerD evoivod
during the campaign many 1iffic1ut probJ.9ins presented themselves. The solution
to the following enabled the 34th Infn>,try Division to emplo;)' armor with a
mimimum exposure to AT fire in CASSn,C without which the position gained in the
town could not hairs baen held.

Lieutenant Colonel nOBill}' E. COFFE!, Comman(:\ing, 109th Engineer

Battalion.
"During the month of February we were confronted "ith the
problem of making a le\'81 crossIng for tsnksin the town of
CASSINO. The normal demoliti.on method could not be used because
tanks using the by-pass would be subj scted to close range anti
tank fire.
The Problem: To construct a Class '30' bridge across a
drainage ditch 15 feet wide snd6 feet deep. The bridge site 'i'as
under observation .and subject to all types of fire i.e., s11'.1.;11
ar:ns, mort.r and artillery. The origi.nal crossj.ng Vias a concrete
slab supported by five re::nforccd concrete stringars. About six
feet of the origin'll slab was usable, in sr;ite of t.t,3 enemy <la~
molition "hieh had cut all except six feet of tre sl"b on the
near bank. .
The Solutior.: To construct the bridge in sections in a roar
arOa and move the sections to the site by truck 'and tank wrecker.
Bridge section plans and construct.ion were com?leted during day
light hou~s and ilie sections vlere en\plP.ced under cover of dark
ness. Tho act,ual bridging operation Vias completed in t'IO hours
after the sections were delivered t.o the ,assembly area Qne~half
mile from the site. Cover for operating personnel was provided by
old slab bridge and the only casualty Vias one soldier ,Ino suffered
a slight fleSh wound. 'i'he woodon st;ructure rJas pla:c3d alongside

. 58

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

tbe shb bridge making (l totnl !lsa.HG >lidth of 19 feet. Flooring

,:as plQcun. on th~ bottom of th~' sGction to insure adequate bear

ing."

. h. ,Tnf, 1'E:z :.

z, P.11 ato~.

In Itdy the A & P Platoons have had to

in the advJ.nce. From
ttoroughly trained ,::tS

n!1c.~)rtC'~F:8 cngll'l::'-:Qr o:'--::rc.tl0!:lS t.o rrta7_ntctn the reginent

obsarv,_~ti;-)ns made it is b~lj_iJved tllrJ~ s. sold=.G!, can be
:J.n inL~.ntr:,Tmo.n or .1~ o.n ongJ ncar b...rL not nS both.

l,'!t 11.;.:;~.rt..~';'1J?nt !RVIF 1:... !-::'!l'S~J, 1:~5th Inff.!ntTy.

2r.'1 L:'.Ql't,)wmt '.'IAYNE E. ;,;: [J;:IJ.,N, 135th Infa.ntry.

StD.f'f Sec-p;oant KSmrr::'I.c: F, hcAr;j)J.E, l3~th Infantr!,

Scrg(:;,i.nt :jAK!:l.~ J:. LEErr, 135tL Iufar.tr:)':".

Tc.::bnician Fifth Gr9.(k :,T..E::rtT J. FHANGHI, 135th Infantry.

t1~'~.'tb t.he A &, r Sllot:!.OIl it je thll same old story - attempt

ir:g to CO toe' nmch v:i tr too liO:.tle. W5.th reeards to this one of
ovr greatest d~.f.f~ c~::lt.~.~")G ~l': St:JS \~.lr~n thE; s:i.tuation calls for
i",J.~1-f.<).ic.r ~)~~:",~ ~:,~T" t:T'Ed21'Bd.
:L:o bil Inere s'pacific: i'lo.ftDr crossing
-rhe VJItraRNC hiver tb0 t}:i.T.'l t,-i.:;;c, our ~att!~:.lion had trouble ':dth
t.l m.i.ne fic~.d, 01~G of tJ-.:; _l'l:",g-3=t ':"8 havo e-o:t0r oonta~ted.
IJaturq,lly,
tte ery- -:,-!ont ".1"0, I': b~~:'G ';.~.}-_o l;~~:'l' s the A & F 3ection? I
I,~ tr.~t t.iJ,lll r;e .. er,: t"n:.bly hcll'dica?jJeJ,
Out of 19 men
""ly ';lT~'e ~:Or3 sllf':flcj,mtl;v tr.imKi to tackle the job. Some
of tt!:, ll,~n hed be."n tT,,,o.,,,d rrevioc.sly bl-'t they had long been left
bo:li.nd, liTe ('lee".!,;:" t,j'at fbld; t'x,k our tudnine right thore, toot
Pe \:GI'c:: f( rt1..~.n':.~e thA.~ +:.t.'-.;. Oth;::!' ~{;c-l:.io!'lS having the salnG trouble
\:.;eJ:'L' !"l.(lt E"' fortun~:,.t.8, t c'~ ~nd 11 v'S.; v.'G:r>e lost.
The point is this:
F.u)'C.C"'""llct". n:l(:k:U.I X:.,liLt:'"- t,led for such technical and dangerous
1,-:6::'1-:::, shonl:...~ r,'Jt be n.ssigi::Gd to s"'J.ch 'i:~Ol'l,:.1I

J3t L::'cut~r,.r:t JE.rl.OME L. FL%T3R, I331'd :thfantry.

"OnG 0f the th::'ngl> t;"lt I hay,", ,l.wnrood in actual comb,rt is

.:,'" "", "CS'"](JC:l8r is 1'cl"tj.ve1.i inoffectj~ve crossing fields
at rj~~L:.. ~he :")L!_Y 3af"~ f,;]C; posit.:vG Ylay' .is to probe and ~.'eel
t.'i.~,h :,ho [',1'C' :,r!',' :m] 1:,,<',
To jo this r~quires :attle technical
s1::.11, b;.;t it (,03,' 1';:001)''''8 "em P"l'\etice and a groat deal of pa
t.tcrce, LiDe comnc,ni"s ~ho\,ld ha'r" special members of each rifle
tT~,

pl:"t.';In21 -f~o:..:lgL~ to GO t}]:i.s

It is 8xt',ero'lly cosUy to lJse pat.hs through ",ine fields if

there is nn~' Jther poss'.l)lG route to reach your o[,jective. It
is i',l))os",iblo to Jeploy ., n c,cse of a fire fight or an artillery
0:" TJl't,,: barrage. ;,:'yonG (',nGht in a mincfiGld during a fire
fi.ght 0-::' 0. bc.r:c.ge is stuc;c ti:cre, eJ'posed and helpless, until tbe
firing iG lifteli.ll

"Some 0.' m,; Q':1X:/~S: .":" i" :,.ctU:lJ. combat lire that'men, or I't\1'.rols
mine fields shoUld give :l""1J1C1:'G detuiled

c:~ o'!';'YC!1iJ ',-:~_c i":. !lds ;.,;.::'::;':33 : .. ;'~d

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

'/

report of theJir findi.ngs. lif, men and I have at times gone on

detnils to c.'.c;nr minos i.cd minD fields that have never been there.
Thic hcp'~'ons becQuso GaIT.eor:') has seen tin cans or bottles and have
not tc,:wn ti;ne to invost'.gc.to before sending their report.
A,~C!tt8r thing is th1t I don't think fie got adequate pro
tec~ic!,. ::O'or crr !Cork Ul:cder onomy action.
At times we have had to
bo our o',:Yl prvtoct5.on, cTI:.od only l:.ith carbines and trying to use
a L"dno detector at tho sC\me time. I think we should have at least
one B1-..R Qnd 2 riflemen. Tl:is ",auld give protection for our mine
squad in .:'ront of our troops .. "

(D

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLA551 FI ED

1. 'l1his su'bj :)ct 'i~ill hi') 3pbd~,virl.c.d into tLrn0 si.:.ct.io~~. T!10Si:? C.Y'C ffi0SS. ~go
cO!1"Gcr, ~ l.io, ';Fd ':.'ir.:: corrlimUlic'1.t~'_onft tll1(~ "11'0 furth',]l' subdivided to bri.ng out
sp'Jcific lessGns loarnod by

~,bo

vflrious diV2sinnal c()mponc:=1ts.

~. ~':D.J1U:~..
Sig!1tJ. CO~ll.tJc.ny oper:.lt.i',-~,:)s ~.'ero pn.tt~"'!rned quito
cl0301:/ o.ftor princip,_os se':, fori 11. in B:wic Fi.u]d Fcnuo.l Flvl 24-5, ISigml
C0n11111:-nic'l.-t,i0n t No pnrtieul"'r pI'ob18PlS ~oro unColUltnred and tL-: succesci\l.l
ol')ro:tic-ns crm best bG oxpla5,ned by er:uInur"t,ing t.he; specific tLi,'lgs ~ho.t be
c"c'() SOP .",S oJl3l'-ticns prcceeded.

First Li"ukrm:1t JOFN A. orR SGOI,U3o;. 34th Signal Compnny.

itA: 1 nG\l replacGlt.8rJ.ts
end :not-or !nossorgors evon
CouEtor el:.::1"l~s. Tb5"s b'ls
kn0nir,g more of thE.; h,:,s';.c

",;f'r-3 trn:itKtd. first [tS foot llGSSOUg'Ol'S

tb0-lCh +.hoy welre to lutGr becomo eouo or

n.:.sul.torl in thG toc:-:nicin!ls :J.l1d non....c')ills

Tlk;SS ....;l:1g~r routin~."

canst-nnt ct'1nf:"'"J.ng of relief d'l"i'l:Tcrs on niotor m0sscng-;r runs

l:'~f:ul+ed in nlJ. dr::'v JJ s ~:!'o;:inG unit loc(!t~,ons for next schejulGd
or spOCit,l runs. Our 0..)[; ~H.g- ;rs hc:'1!c 'll"r:ays ~.'[ttc}.<~d clos.Jly for
D.1'l.::r troop mOVC:'18I:ts '~nd ~r.; .i:'1ct"'::"'~cted to stop and. Ul,".k0 inquirius
of h.o ..lclqur~.rtor:J !1.101~g their rO~Jt..::s. T~is ir1o!'m~rtion is ~cported
t,'" tho mosso.gG C,.C.l.:3r' cL~ uf l.lt"x'n rct"rn. Tt.. is mothod hi..s l:cpt oux
I!'.:)8S~"\r:O oontsl." bot;t:)r pOE't.:)d on loc[tt.io!1s than VJI).S possiblo if they
d,Jpondod up0r~ ~-:',:-::: SGctiO.'1E or lo~:''::~~ unitd to roport~ ".
,::0

Li.(;ut(;I'.:\:lt Colonel 3':'"FLEY L. EURGHCFI'T, E"dqnllrtors 34th Inf'antry

Division.
"Durine r3rj.'Jds of co:~b ,t, pr5.'Jr:i.ty '":,Oc1 UTF,oJnt mossn.gos :,lero
deJivc'T..)d irnrldd:: 2.t.l;T upon :r8CU:tp~. Ro~.l.tinG tr3.:'fic W::lS doliv(3:'Gd
evory hO~lr on tJ,Q t~our. FJ:.on not in cO~)lb'1t priorl'tj" '3.no. '..lI'g.::nt
tr,-:.ff:'c '"\7as de:~v,')rcd. irn..rtledi.';,tely 1.1)01'1. I'oceipt but. r0utino T::'"' .::?:tc
~1.S d01ivor,:;d OVC!'7,T bo~.;.r 0::1 t:1\j h01:_T frOF.. 0600 to ,2000 )'}OU)l':;" .
OrigiYId.l1:r ',;"0 kopt all m(:ss~g,j c-:;nt.:;r r;jCoros fOT .J, pcr:'od c~'
. S("3von dQYz. Th:'s :t~s nC'1f coon incr,:)i-~~:.:.,d. to thirty duys 2$ S ]'7Gr:"-,1
DliJ8 G"fes, pflrt:lculc,rly of ~n "C;ministr:ltivo ntur". hlld to be) trnced
after tPo soven d"y p'jriod.
",ho encodc'_ng of :\11 moss"-g(;S is chocked for cOJ;'roct.nGss.
Urgan,. mOss:.g0s ,,"'0 pllssod to t,r'lnsmitting e.guney '\nd tYee chocKod.
Priority i'nc rO'ltip$ m8SSrJ,g"S 'r.Td ~hockod oven be foro transmission
star:.ts. This. unuses r~ slight ielny in the indiv1du,~l I!l8r.s~tg.e hut
1:.o..s saved much tim,"] on tL~ tDt'""'.l :]1' IJncodcd traffic. A~l CTy~t0gr~cphic ;rl'ors th~t COP'8 to OU;'" o'cto:'ltiop
ca,llcd to tho att3'l~
tian of +,hG, ono lC'1king the "bt"ko :'1" 'soon .'l.S' possible.

:,.0

- 61

UNCLA551 FI ED

UNCLASSIFIED

No other. communiC'l.tion c.gcncy makes the usa;e of Signc.l

Opor,')tio?1s !nf> t;:1.:,::tiO~JZ t:~-... ~ ;:'_'~,:'5:-1ge cen~-,er does ," The Div'ision
mGOSD,ge C8rr:.'?-r }:.:.:e/-"B QU.... "_-, "It iJ ')~ .. '8 of" 81..L llJ"lits l.~ith r;hich C8n
cer:ned
':l_'be DlC")S':'; -~,:7e t,...oS~~-:'t;;:r c.fii::Gr c-113cks ('o~1t;tantly to see that
the curr(Jr:~ ~.~ld r)I~-:..- "<18 CJ.."rl'C'l~t .tt(~}Jd llTe in 1.:.se.~ All s1iperseded
iteu:.;, c::,j ",c'}:'Lcd ec'les ,".:1(: vJjW:;;: c</?~(')gr"lPhic oquipment are
prompoly d.J3ttOy:.d .q{Jd ropl)rts ren(8)"ed,"
Captain L1O:'O 17. REISER, 3!,th Infantry Division i.rtillory.
"Divisci-on ""tillery reports no dep"-L,ture from nO!'ll1al pro-'

cGdures -til tt3 oper--.tion of their me~snf:e ~~eiltGr and Dlcss'e11ger

personr;ol, Due 'GO the ir,'idcq'A:.i,e pe"f;or.nel boing allotted on tho

T/O for sus~,niYlc;d ope::'T~ions. (11 L uniLs ~vlVe tr'?ined reldio oper~

'?tors as code c_erks

'.chis !1'lS helped considerClbly.

1:~3rd

GCtptain lIILLIAf,j D. PASKE,

Inf:lntry.

"All infa'ltry xeg:iJ:lents hw@ pl'lccd much import(1nce on the

trc.im,ng c/ gOld foot mClbs8clg,,~'S, p,,-.'tieu:!.nrly on the bnt\,;ilion
and CGiil(J~~1Y 1G";81 ,rF.hcse ~\:Ul~.lG...:'S t \VO ~Gl1 3l.Ven tra.ining in
compass'rclI1dlng and on repo.'tlng "hat thL;f see, All ;'nfnntry units
havo usod and pl:leod nlu'.lh Lonf1,QGllCe in '\.h~ir runners. 1I
First Lieutennut EDGA.1't T> ADLEr.> 135th Inf"ntry.
"Our r3g:'Jllonth~s "ttnched '1 1/4 ton C 8: R and tnC? lIlotor

mossengers 1'l'om o:lch bn l;t.n:ie,l to the regiment. These mes,c.engers

c[lrry tho trn.ffic to thQ2 r 'respectivG units,"

Lieutonant GolonGl STANLEY L. BURGHARDT, Headquarters 34th Infantry"

Division.
"Tho AFCODE Nr'plied by hip:J:or headquarters for use r:ithin the
Division isdi.3kicilt,cdto, romjxiny a.nd hG.tcory lovel of all aSfligned
units, 'I'~G s.i.gc,C').'_ :,t'ficG 'epl'OS'l<:!Jfl ri oode sj,IllUar to digr:lph
fal:" all u':'to.GLc{i ':uM''': ~ 'tJ<J, ~.';':. d(J~ t'?;J.,ye_~ c:..~ ("1':'l1e.: 8".lllporting troops.
This is o.J>_O\I'(''''~ riG '0:) d.:>:~t:"~~':l"L"d drl'l;:n 'i:.o ~;b1.Lo;""oj,'" lov~l the ind..
ividu~l llili t d:,:)ti.i~8S
Cr.'ll'l/~ ~-'''ii::'''S'l of t.hJ.s ~~oc.~ ';7ill tn no' y}ay
o.ffcc ~ tho :Jl-;r:i iJic)_"; A~'C ::;:.YE" r\,'J.1F Vi\,Tj fi lOi: cC.il no.J.1d net UEGS l. .rc
produuca. C0C~C r.0t t(~:Jd OJ' ;3.J,):' {yt~1Fi1.' l1lii'IJ,' Liko1idse'r:. similar
code if,; :fl:~'G\}Grf)c. {01' :~~13 ~:.{ ':;~~UG i7"J Ube of +..hc reconno.isso.nce. troop
.S1ight:lj:~OJ;.Cl.c1 GlIS ",,'0 mc:dc. 1il thG YUc'):'-"'ulariGs of 1111 theso cop-os
to includo \,'or~,,: mOr."'G n.ppl i':Tl.c:""e "Go '~ho OpGco.'tions."
1

First LiolJ.tencnt :\OBEltr J.

emp,];,

34tr. Sigml Comr".ny.

"In rf.lpid moving situntJ.ons lIluch use is m'lde of AFCODE. 1Jhon

tho front is skblo Qnd tlOVJment slo.: such QS CIt GASSINO and .i.NZIO,
"'0 phce very little nust in the security value of AFCODE and ro
sort :lImos t ontirely to tho 1!I"Z09. 11

- 62

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UNCLASSIFIED

12. R:teJ.:l.Q..Q.c..J:,!!!nt.s:rt;il}. 'iho signal compr,ny operated in four nets.

Th,:,)S0 wot'G tho Corp:) n" L, Di-ris ton C(Ytlrc~~.'1d nut I AI whicb. comprised thG infan
try regiments nnd d:'vioion 2!'ti.~lery, Di7:'Lsion command net "B' which covered
~tt",chod ur-its and Ij.a~son not,
T:,o '.i"~S011 11et W'1S comprisod of stations "t
ene', infJ.ntI"J rsgim(;l't, flunking divisions 'lnd the Commanding General. All
nets fl'lllctionod nell fro," en olJGr~tion skndpoint. However, the fact that wire
con:~~lUnic:~.tion waS virt~lJ.y ClIYJays r in r rosulted in very little traffic being
,:""'.8sod by ra.dio. Tho Divis:.:m liaison not "as veT'J a.ctive at all times and
~\::sSGd 2. l:~rgo (~-:"'lc.ntity of traffic of inform..~tive valuo.
LiclUtcno.nt Colonol STA1UY L. BTJlGEAPJlT. HGadquorters 34th In
fantry Division.
"Quit,,:,::"-- ,,'l'c)Lt,l;r, r,e>tnJ)le on tho ANZIO Beo.chhead, an SCR-193
radio can bo used siltisf:.cctoril)," in the Corps command net. A
single SCf-J,,9 is sufi'ic~8nt for the signal company. The radio
link to Cor?s pr0ved vc.lu0,bl(), especit\lly during very rapid opera
tions Vlhon Corps could not keep wire communications in. In one day
+,128 Division COmrr-l'1r: Post mO-"'3d from 0. point slightly north of
Rm!iE ir.to CIVITAVECCF:cF., c, distance of forty-one milos. On this
day COTILlJ1ur!ic"ti l~S to Co:'ps wore maintained by a Division 1.ire
linG plus Co""PS radio. (J"r foZ',~arC' com"land group nore in the
hO,oit cf m[>.k~,-ng long :i:.DV:)S ':i~__ ti1.out tho Corps redia link. When
thoso jl'1OVGS ~!cC8.r.le so long ttat rlire contac+, wn.s lost it became
nGcos3~r,7 th~;t tho Corps l'::"j.(UO Qccompany them also.
T1--e I'i'l".si'Jn comnari\ nC)t '1..' and liaison net resulted in a
duplic::ctLn of sets "nd ;xrsonnel at all infantry regiments. The
tr".ffic lo~d of both nets c auld -"ell be handled by a single net.
Th:,sQ n:-:ts hio.V8 not..! been C:-QLi.binod, pursonnel increased in number
n.rlcl 2::Jili.-ty, d-~iplic<.:ti on e:lir::inated
.t~l]. TJ.dio ope1',~,tors h'.::~v~,; boen given concentrc.ted training in
the use of Gophor Dev:i.c8 ;/'U9 and AFCODE. The combined net will
Landle nIl Cryptogrnpl;,e r:n:l mns $,lg0 center dc:tbs to include de
livering tnf'fic directl:; to Skff scctions. This will eliminate
th:! i'1Gvitnblo 'rr3SS"l[,;0 c'~ntC'r! do~..'lY. PJ:l tr'lffic <lill be filed
clith the unit m,]ssngo C,]y,t,~r e,t tho and of each t17enty-four hour
P8I'iod. Th:..; t-,),r.n~s \;'ill 1;.0 ~(,m:noSGc1 of' four operators 8o.ch at
out stC'.ticns. Lt tllf~ D~_~::rs~.cn 1':C~~ it is cOIil.posed of additional
m0~So.~c center end c.rr;~n~:raph:"c p<..:r..:':"S-ODl.lc.:', _.
Origir~l1y SCf-l'13 Joi:'.os mO'mt3d in 3/4 ton vehicles were
attnchod to tL8 in-'mILry regi'!'.onts. V'hen the fOI"?ard cOl(lffi8.nd post
is initially OGtc.~Ol03),G:l gJnc-":111y nothing J.arger than a 1/4 ton
V0il~~ el,::; ie' J..._I.~,,-;,,~
,_"
,1:1. ~~i.; 'l,' r3sci ~ 1.:7h8n wire did f~il and radio
eomrr,unic'ltio:_~ \,:"',8 n830cd.:; c;:.l::,~ the r".2.T (;O~l".r;"/l::J.d post could be req.ched.
1

7hG rogim'J~t'.-J

C8tS

h':0.l"::'; l:u ...;n ::_.;1sto.l2.cd in

.;../4 ton vehicles and now

-cr-lvol di::,,'cctly 1".'itl; '~tre S-2/8-3 acct.ions, giving us the deSired

OntJl'gor..c y C:H.4:,"lni~;\}A:.or ".-:1' ";i1 T.~JiTG fails.
Staff off jeers . eoL'!;iLu<l to be qnito umware of the capnbil
itioscr:::l lil'1lto,ti8u{ c'f redia comrnunic3.tion and equoJ.ly ignorant
!'cr;;-:rd::i..ng socurit:r ~ VlTt'''_".lly ;.\11 s;)curity breaches ~1:'C made by
o':':,cc:;:'s atj :in mn:::}y (;::.3~.S '-)VUr thE: advice of radiO operators.
It :'s boJicv,-,ct tr:.!t tnc' ~..:!'c<~cd-u.rcG ywuld correct the above failings.

- 63

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UNCLASSIFIED

First all officors ShO'lld racdvo more trc.ining of the sub;! act hefore
coming ~_nto _:lction. T!'is shcm1d be live and practical tr".ining and
not thoClry or a 1ec+,urD. Socon:ily by Commnnd Action they should
bo m:-_do to US3 tho r_1dio during trcd_ning periods and at regular
intorvC\ls so th,-,t ':J10n the emorgency arose they lIould be prepared.
Tbis should D0 fo110,cod UD c1cso1y by disciplinary _:lotion for
SGouri ty bru,'J,r:< '.;,3.;1
First Liouton:-nt HOBERT J. CORR<;, 34th Signal Company.
"Division oOT;1r''1nd net 'B t is not. normnlly operated oxcopt Ylhen
-:ir-::hUs or t!-o r()c_r echelon is out of range of field ,lire. A
:lOtC1blo USe of t:'is r.et c:aE from the ANZIO Beachhead to the NAPLES
n.ro~:..
T,::o SCH-193 1 s ~'_'DrC used 11ith Iflo.t top1 ~Lntcnntls. An ::tvor:J.gc
of ton r.!esc~1gC1::~ ;-:Gr:3 h[',nd~Jjd OVer 1:.;1:i8 not per day, for u period
in 'J:-~CCSS of tl!O months. 'lhJ only other method of communica.tion ViTaS
a t,,',-~t.Jr mossc;ngcr' r8q!~irlng thro0 daj-T's to make tho round trip.
Tho not lias continued during tho breakout from the Beachhe"d and
actuall:T ~\1ndj.onod lie11 bot'"ic;en ROfJE an,d NAPLES, _'1 distnnco far in
o:::".eoss of th,-; sot.s !1crmal r::ttings. t1
Crlpkin LLOYD F. REISEE,

~lL,_t::

Division Artillery.

"Div:'s-" en Lrt-il1c-IY r:O:'Di-"t the nec8ssity for keeping radiO

sets S~F-2S4 ~H)m-.n\:fl'lt :t'cmo'.. ori. from gun positions as concussion
bro2.1:s certnin tube.::: used if! tr.i~l 30t.
A ~--,di8 rel:w Gyst:oc- LC_J l;"x;~ Qoveloped nnd oPerators given
trc.:Ln.ing in r01 -:':ling 011 tll('~ 2h voice sets. In mountainous torrain
much r,)l.,;.yi~,:r t'1S hlld to be l.!CD.8 ..
fhon a for-:!'lrd observer is unable to carry his SCR-609!610 due
t-, -:'IlTr,,-in or other lin:;' t'_Lg C:! :<"icu1ties, h", uses an SCR-536 to
conk.ct his b"8e sot. Yr~'" thoro it is !'e1ayed to the fire direction
c0ntc'r, It

":Iho infa.:1tr:' is m"k; "r-- -:_xi:"n t'3U 0;: the SCR-300 1 s. All
attached t,nlc, t:mk destr0Y:-:::, ~);e'llical battalion or other support
ing troops must bo -3~Uj_l);: lc1. "lith thdr own SeE-300 1 s for infantry
-support. ';:ho ;_lli"_n-try T/:' Gor,s not a11e-., sets boing. supplied by
thorn. t1
First Li.out-cnoht LiJr};,n 1'. i.DL:J', 135th In:'c.ntry.
"Th3 SSh-JGOt S :111VC} '_-"~!-i:J(\ oxcclJ ently bctt/cen tanks and in
fnntry. 'l-;10 SCR-~09 rclTLisl:8d by the: tenk bc.ttalions to the irfan
try is tC'o he'I'_'Y nnd have !'_ot lwrksd out nell. Onc regiment opor
at-cd on S:;R-3'!O not CQmpos}d 'Of inf"ntry, tanks and a Cub plane for
obs~rvation. haS'Ll] ts y} . . . r.;; V"Jed.
In m:J' rogiment thruc_ of tPG SCR-536' s in the heavy \7ec.pons com
p~ny arc oach on 3 cliffel' )rrt frequoncy (thf'.t of [1. rifle comp"ny).

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

'lInus 'TJhen r'~ 1'Tl.i,:_ch~ t",:} gl1~l p~_ :toon is .:?t-l-':1.ched to suppo:-t ,:"ny one com
P=-l1Y, it dr:l.1iS tl:..a ~ ~R~ 53{ to -\;wyk i-}i-"'~h thc.t c0mpnny., This in
sures much closP1' sl~p:?Ort.. lJ..'he other three SCR-.. 5'-::6~:3 of tho hon-vy
~'-oapons COIr.j9.'1DY ar;:; ',:.50:3 ~)y thn m01.' [9.:1' sections,.!1

itA

5Y

~J) +'

i~c-a\.iY ~n,'ch::lJG

grG.l p::"stQOO is very' -50oc1 bocause

t.l.'.ore ',-,;ilJ be C:liilin;::.nie;'.lt:!.IAl \,i"i~ll the !.~dYo.rl~_ng n5SEult platoon or

by CO -Lo ~.'31~ t~~0 m~:c;-::j.~':J g'lll platoon cf:t':~ CGr j pllen to givo support
fjru 01' Ct;f,iS0 fire ~,S t.hG S-~'hL1tion mrty cz,ll i'or. This company
Uf":X). tl is syst .) ,~l in 1-l1C ~1:~t::.'.('1~: :l_~ron GECI}:A to tl'lG ARi~C RiveT, cnd
Vie hf1C~ IX ::.tCT Cr;:;IJ~yO_:. Q"Tler OtT!"
s<?~q~_1.ently, \'It., ljOr'3 ~...~l.1.lG to g8t t!.>:3:J into

I'uJ.nd ttat

30 Dim;::tcG 2:)(\"r--)r t.:bau

3.~~

Q-::t:,_~.r:hed W'38.pons.

Qctio!l f::com
tim3 py.:....vious1y. II

Con

5 minutes to

IlThc; cmn.TIlon SCii - 3nc cr'1m:cl fer ~,-1 8.ntj.-t-'J.n.l{ compani38 has
viit!-ont dift' :_clllty
COT:7i.., ve::.', ':: 9.ch rCJ!inont. shou:td ~la.v3
:f'i'T,-; chal1'.-:"!el:-.~"
C;ui to l'rCOI1..Jllt.].J- q:Ll tbrLO t8.f-,"~,al~ons aTe com~nitted,
tl-::(; c '_:' _Don C;~'i-;-I'pJ.ny ITt" Jt 11:-,,"\:"",;; n S Cp.:1:r:J.-i.:e Or'8 !?nd ?lJ regiments OX8
usin[ the SeIi.-3CQ ler an A_dJ.~tior~:3.2. ~orrc.:1and tl3t,lir::kl'n
~-'C:. 1. ~d

Lioutennnt Colonel
Division.

STa:~ItG'Y

Lo

B~IRG~~.A.?Dl,

lieRdquarters 3!+th Infantry

"The in::'.l;1.tr:i :"-::,gj j:lOT"::'

-;n ;?Tcfor tho l;.Sd of tho DCR-300 to
tho 8CH-2ol:. ~'or t,}10 r8gi:-l0r~t,~=- CC;IF'lund net. It ha~ g5_ven oJ:ccllont
rrnp.;c and ~ts light we_':_gh1:. m--:J~u8 it, much casior to t:rE~nsport, ,..:spcci-
,':,~J.13T 1n motill"tr::.l.i2.1CUS t..n~r'=t~:.n.
i:"]:or'J d~st'l.nc:J or intervening terrain
mukos the 5CR-3 0 0 inCl"pOr.'1.7j.vc, "thc ~)C?~"'2gL~ has b'.:- :H) 1150::1 e.nci 1'esu1. ts
he,vo b,:HJn satisfHcsor-y. ~:l:.c 28,~ is u3cd cont"'ist.:;lltly h2t;;-~Joen regi
mcn~ ano Bervic0 c::r-"l::3r'.: ~
Many inst",nc~' 3 ,:()~" bro"f'.:'" UD i'lc'icGtl"g cnomy r:hoJ.ling due
'--1"

to d<,I'oction fin(Ll(.' .J1U:i:)~:L:,T~ ''It'vi 0.'1 o~"!r T'D.d~,o tl'ansmi':..-..tcl's. In

oV0ry 81.nr::; '..0 en-' _,; i:1V8::J-~.
t,_~d.:t ':e~"'. fc~_md ~t:.l.t the cause l~las not
DoF. Cor;-:mtJTI ca'lS(.'S ,".'~~rc~
CJ 'i/lsuLl si.gtt of t.l-:J 0P':"!'.'_:.tor!l ::.~:~.t'2YU-:;~1 or t.roop concontra

tion.
(::,) I.oc:'.tior.. nE:.aT" a \i:)r-thr,lhll..:: target :::.:3 ::: gun position
or prominerlt croGsrc::d"
. (c) ~r?.nEmiss=-o!l in t;-F:' C2.C f 1::' of frie::c~~y locat:~on;3 OJ:' mOVG

ments,"

lIfo~ir8 ,'":.nd T'1r:1.io men a:':"c, h'1rrpCTed :::'o.'ltIv \,rh:?n carrying tho
a'.f,}1orizGd M-2. rifle. :it is r.8~o:rrT:,<t.. :-::ied th'1t carbines 3.110 pistols
h,; i':'s"Qcd as suboti tutGS ~ Also tJ:-J use of 3. rr:usset.tc baG il1St8Ud
0:( tlco full field p::tc:{ ",auld ccid the cOlnIDunic.st'Lons men who l1suc\lly
h:Y"I"lC morc: equipillent to cG.rry than thv rii'lBmen.ll

- 65

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

.Q. Ril'_C0.!!1!El1'2:j.~;;t'V."
Tho sig~.11 col'lpa~ywiro personnel followod basic
principles for ',liro conml1.:11icnti,ou. rtot.c,'mr,. itwB.s. loarned thnt ilidoly varying
practices l'-nd to be ut3.cr~';";0d cLe'pQnd~J1g upon th0_ :~<...e2:':t8.:LD) rate of movement, number
of units being sorvod end tnG r"ad n'l ~"ilo.,.k. This reu1l1tGd in tho I'.Gcessity for
the devo~.\)pmont of c. v."):r:7 :C.iex.i'cle rtl!,J. <'i.zgras-Dive orgrn.i7Jo..tion. The no)d for
very C].OB .. C00r,,;Tntio'{} t<;',~7':CiO~: l,j ::"0 ccn2 GTuc'tiol1 ~TI8n ,',nd srd tchbo~rd oporators
was recogniZCld at rtn G~1.r:ty (i'Lt3~ IJ'bo 'Icnlint. G,-"'r:J.~'Yj_::;n to do.te has offorGd us
four quito distinco tYIc~ oft w::'1'8 p1'obb:.1S. Those lIill be ha!ldled by phQSOS and
the rrobloms "ill be dcs0rl: j .,,;od then tr"e Ill0 ~hod ,,;od to 801.\Ie each will be
explained. In all casas good ',=-re C08!ll'mic.,tion rescli1;ed, although our mthods
wero quito di.fforent in cnch,

LLntonnnt Colonel STAGEY L.

Bl,:?GEAi~T,

Hendquarters 34th Infantry

Di\T~"s ion.

''t'om tho point whero tlee Cliv~sbn rlUS first conmlittod south of
BE\iEVlGi,l'O, through throo CY.:J3J::'ngs of the VOLTURNO River and on up
to COLLI thGre VleTG :er good ro~.d3. Us,",,~lly not more than ono good
road rlas found in t1:3 ~ntire Cli '."islo!} aTcn. Ofton this waS supplo
mOlft3u by t.co.ils a:nd E.':::J.g:tn\1Gr~b1:.ilt Ioads. BGcause of mountainous
tG~I."rain 'I!.d ['11 gr:)unc. 8~:S.,::;~:-,t T'oar1.s being D. mire of mud (from heavy
rainfalls) r)::'.'8 l'lYlllg l.J~~'1r.le '.-ery roadbound. IV'h"3S \Jsre cncountered
in gront quant'.ty ani ro,'c u8ua:' ly cleared only from t:1e MSR. It
is os~im"ted that 90% of tho "irG construction wns confinGd to the
rondside.
'-'ben tho si.tu"tion "CiS sloy,' r.loving 0.11 lines \7ere ovorheadod
1iJhonevor possible:. '2. his t,ini..!l2.zed tro1.1.ble from vohicula.r traffic,
road ropuir "ork, E'ho~'t, cj.rc';c.~s 01' lino 108sos due to howy rains.
F.h;:;n ~if'.o permit toe. thf.: origirLi] ipsc;,1~t_ti0n '7u.S ovorbeGded o.S
laid but Ylhon ti.'llJ did not aJ.lm7 tris prnctico it "ss overhoaded
at tho fh's t opportun.i.ty.
Orly wiro ~'~IJ03 o;"s used by the cot8~ruction platoon. This
type ui=o !Hope:i.'ly cons t:,,'uilted c.nd u%d II.\. ell r"'ilclllte:rS lJll!;..89 gave
sufficient r"nge fc.>r overy problem that was encountered. On Jlk~ny
occasions lines from tt"ont.y to t.w,inty six milGs long were made to
t8..lk satisf'1ctorily. The ~lpO D.+: Spir{l.l :f:'Ol..U' 0J' long range field
wire, ospociall:" in h(~r.vtly she::'led '1"8".8. is considered not practi
cal bcco.usc of -',:,he difficulty ?f t;pl.ici:.lg ~s camp2.red to Y'!-J~OB.
The J./4 ton '"ldele WIG used to 10J virtu"lly all the '"ire
during tr'is phase. It woe,S tl,) ol"'~Y vel:icl(l that c',uld ope):"te on
the highly congost.od and narrow roaqs ,iithout. causing trLCfi'i.c tie
UpD, cenfus ion and I:cc:'.dents. Etlan"' L"rroW ruads rlOre mude ono way
excopt for 1/4 ton ':,ire and mesEenger vehicles.
Throughout this "nt"ire phase it was possible to maintain two
liner to ",ach o~ the infantry r()gimon~s and to Divis ion Artillery.
As tho Division Command Post, moved fon;ard the two trunks bost lo
cated und thut hud given tha lenst trouble wore usod to connect a
reur s,liten to handle . servico elemonts.
Tho sO"0~,d phnsa c.nd 0.08 Bhich presented different problems uus
that from CEPFAGNA thro):lghS;,N KIE~HO, SAN VJ;T'IORS, CBRVARO and into
CAL'RA and CASSINO . In 'this-' sector ~. good road was available only
1

- 66

UNCLASSI FI ED

UNCLASSIFIED

pc,rt

~7ny~

~.fu."l.G J-,,~"~'-;.113

",,'1"!1'8

conve~t8d

into peep trajls by the

eY'.tgin8a:r'3 "buG ~::, "c- l::.].:~ ~_'::rgee 'Grs.ll a i'ec:}J could travel these;)
tr.::!.ils.. Or_';! '-:;.:,:it(]8~: ;:. '~.. ,:~rt ri..:;h-t-, c-;cr" u _r~_,I_ Gh ani rnE,'ged mountain
rr:cn;;8., TLI:~' QD,i~;- t "[!,,-U. 11-.-: ~.\..~ '~'I;3.S A. ~j'J(~Ol:'~'t "["2, te ).r.~.le pack onB
DL'(,-~TI\. i-<ln (r '~'.'1.:.;; pr-,:::'.: f_'d. -U~,8 D:~v::.i.J~_(j.~:; :'1dd ~n additional reginent
a"" ene"n6d J-J':) J:IJ '"
':\-~3 r',:';-i.~,~,.l "":;.~.ile f :.H:.. d_~") 1I'1(n'8 6JK::oU1l'(,;ered.
.At the
b0,~ir:ni!:!g '.... t' J,):, '.8 }J:~2";;~ P.,:.. ::'~-'e'.' .IJ,:.'J.i.~1i.'~_~1 Vt'Et8 I'ulj,G7ed and an
ill

8..tten"'1Y r, ;-1::,., ;~ld""

tl_~ te,ke O~,;',-~:: T.~le e:t-iS-~I_-~:;'1fS rilr~'8 ;syst.em ..
1o('! .~L.l~.:i ;8..1;:E~ n over f'':: om t.ne -o.1ni. i.. l'Gl:i.(-? riPe gave much trouble.
ThiE\ "VJ8.S C'. J!:J ~'."fl .-':' _..... t,:; -i.:,r.l" . . i:-- ~laviL~ 0(; .;;21 CD. "t~Y0 gJ'o'I:~nd dur~.ng
1";et 1.'"l(~at,hcl" :::"'or i'J0~1 ove;-- e ~".J:.":~"th..
AIHO an eXC8SZ ~...,e. numbc~~'

of lines h~~d c0Bn irs-ballc~t e:'ong th:-, .,: route and c&.bled togo~,hor~
'Ir,;11 jJ.:.J shootiLg ~'Ja8 li2""('Y s.L'':;~"i r.:.nd d' ~.ficul't,.. Ne~,," l::1.nes r~Gl'e in',:,
S-'':;H' i..~;d to OU.i"? !!lb.jOl' :;:\uborlj,;"lRv(;:;: l.:'i1:L~B~ d:::'essed 1(1811 aw3..Y from. the
o::.i.gL"'ll ir.:s::2~la"ti(l~j~ F02"G"ULately t.hiti YJa,:3 d~":.l'ing a sloY\l moving
opeI'r !.,ion Bnd we "{w! .~! abJJ.3 i:U d.,ras8 :lP and re::labilitate some of
tha o:6c;ioal system for '~3" (,.r S(J'CvJ_ce elellents and a-ttacl:od units.
~he 1//, -:"J)n vehicle C0J:;tJ. ."~1':~8d to b,::; ti1G only practical one
for vdre 18,JTing., ii~l.:Lch ';~.ire r."1"1.5 J.8,~:.d. ,;..c...2'3B cou:r..t~~r b:T ha.nd ~':;'l1d
gave good sen1ice ci'"Le1" heir!g ili.S-+.Js.i.J.6CL Tr:-ubJ.e $ho:Jting on font
'cre.S slo',:} bUi.:, the abnen:.e of VS'l.i.cu.ti.r t:raff:!.c ~er'1sQ to keep -;-dre
1

l'ailurc.:~! 10;,.1.,

Appr09.ehi'1g
SL~")l:':~-

C~,.sS~:J\jO t~'I~:J

1:1f8.:ntl"'Y positj.ons

ITG;'S

se!JDr,.lted from

e0fr8J.I... ns &){'l "t1.1(J D;.vi~io}"~ :_jorFn~.:.nd PO&-t by a th:ree ... m.Lle

val.ley Vl_~'tjh the RAP=::00 R.i.\~~JY' runc:L:~g through it,) '!'here \";~ere fre
quen't a:r~~1..1J.o:::, y CO!1'~et:. tT~:l';"lf)L3 c:-~ t certain poJ.r~ts }~n the valley.
Tbese criticeJ. flPO-t< . .'or. E,Dr i.e!::.!'nod a.~l:' the i'::l.re rG""Tou-ced
uriay frcm t.b\.:m TO,:: .1.lt:")Q ~n :::::"~~ ".:.:_;.).t:L1g' muo~ troL"'.. ble, The re-rout.
ing ~ 'f) don8 on ::.:'0;,.,
,,,,~sL1f. :c'c(:.i -:"':".. . --2'7 ..
Com'TIul;ieat -: .~n. ~y r:,-~ i'C 8,C ros 3 t,ha vp..l].8;f 'i-/ns 8xtremely difficult.
F~.ve ~"!"C11u.:~ ::"~~ni..::i r:.. cri7~ :.0: 1.'1 frcn U:.a ~jv:i . .J ir::;'[l Co:yeYland Post near
C]j:s.~r.L.i.l.C to C~!t acl.vane.) DJ.-Jis:i.cn S"l7i':,::Jh:'ng c(;:n:.r0.J. locatod in CATIL!.\.,
one and onG hal:' IT, '.lu8 Il()rt~ o.f (;:.~,S I~JG, :Sach line folloTIed "the
samG gO!l8:;:'al :t:~ute cu-:;) ";.".13 se~:},ratcd fiVG to t1;:enty ygrds from the
nC1.:ces t one of the fi'Tn. T8St polnt3 l.":erc ir..atalled in th:ree places
alo.r.g thooe "t,l'1.P!ks r::' "G:t a ~.',dY'o ::hl'~'f, t.r~:ub:J'; ,,:",OO~?S and '[,ire :?er
a

sOTInel at <-J:..;.r:.h ;;. -tho

J.....

,hrco :;;:la c: oS "

Bacl:.. t,:")st po5_nt ma.intainod

"7ir0 1:'-~J t,h rJ8Ys .'roi:'! that po.L1.t a i."lrl aded -:J:"on8.1 -tro:'lblo porso:nnel
Tlor-}:oa from ihe .!..l_",.;.~:::U_on Cc.~:J;~;and PO.3t ;::.. _:"d t~le a,-=l. v &nco s1~it'J~1 ..
After the fi~,:-e 1:Ll:38 ~ler:.; i:1f:t,:119d C()):'illlmicaticD 'J our ar}-:;J.ncG
s"f..d.tch VIas IJst ohly OlJGO d.lt:'i.ng a. po:,,-:.od cf n0arly thirty days"
Tb'.'j ~78.S for a pcr.Loc1. of less the.!J ti '.J hOU."(,B~ O::J.c test po~.r:.t
Fa::.; ].o.2:a.tcd nalh75,Y be'hlGOn tile CClr.m.;.;.yld Post anel th8 advc.ricG
S;JJ-(ch~
At t):.i$ 10c2,i.io';1 r-elJenteTs KS-89 \1GTe il:stallod and mon
itc}r,~.1 for CC!'"['l)(";t [_i,justLl8J:1.te
l'his onqblsi.l tho Di\T:'sion Staff to
t8:~~;: to tho advilHco R0gime~~a.1. CO!!L:2.~1d PO&'Gs of the 14.2nd, 135th
and lcCth Inf:";.;tr:tt?s, 3.11 t"'lI'eO 0:: 1.7!lic!1 'r-GTe tlac. into tho CAlM
bon,rd.. Wi.:::'Q distances of these uaits c.ver1.ged t",;enty millJs'l After
8. pG'l::'iod of a ~,"Jcok i:~lG fenTe' most sui-c,.:.ble Ii.nos woro continl.18.d and
tno rel'l(l:ining one abc,'lC.'jo-yL '['n,'oq,;hout th~ entir8 pGriod three
lines r:e;.3 kt.~pt in L:}S"C of' th3 timo.
.1

- 67

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Tho usu of .!~hc) tf""::it ~oLTts ~ T.""riro chi8fs;1 ~nd trouble teams
mr.d8 the di.:fe:'C"-;;llCG bu::'r:r.'< ~ :~El.i~::U:"3 ~L1C. 3-~-_ece,ss C!1 this operation.
I:.~uch t:':'('Iuhl3 Eh~:.:tL1\:; ",JW: dGiie 0:) fuo"L f.t:'cTii these rojpts as oven
the mO"'lo.fl)']11r, of u
_ t
Iloh~_c:J8 -,,'0'L::"C (lr9X.1 riTe.,
W~_~e W-IJO
~.a.s :30~_r1.c ti:,"'~3 U:::I":" f.t J:'l~~, t t,() l'6p.: nco 0')01:1 d0;;'lH?;od sections in
n 11", ).. :!t ',',i:~
i'.',LC:(~ a:' ti:Cl f.i.:t:'},;:; o:ur.;or";:,u;lj.ty 'by Vl~llO ..
In

ttis i,.-"\st

:,~_cu "',1 i

.-~~'-i~.C; ~C01_-.t,-s

-:.:81":) ~:ot. ne:::.o::;,s:;.J"y~

'rhe avoidance

of sr)GC~."::"
..C).:C"; J[
"""J."-,
. .',:'1:I.e 1.::1d1' t1'3.f:'1_:; &ud a sl1ull amount o.f
s:racin," -tJ:.~ f,.} :::>(.!\l ~.::;.~\-,;_, r,'o~:"l,~cd "'/8'l"Y .~oJ.:, ri'-~-:-c18 tho Same troublo
toans c:tLd ~;oilit 3 CJuLl -t;,; '.13L~:d 011 3l.1 J..;.!:lCS ~
TJlC! 1'~S..l.-::-_"'H1i<1~:" t~>-T':1;,3 '"0"!"C ",y[:..)Y'c.:ting 0V0r very rugged torrain
brt by' il:~_GT',J2.E i;:;t": ~;-Jl-'8(il to ~-, ~~.t'.h (J lI!en o:l.ch and pUHhing the advanco
s'..'itC:1 up to CAIF.A -L>J;Y- ;,\'C:"3 8'-:-~2.0 to k88~) ~:.i~:_!'8 in at all times. n

Firct

LiG"c.~tenc.

nrrho advfJ.YlCc ,:xi one :".':'S' :_!""c:1.t for

and o""v'"or a dirto.r.co of fi:i~,ser. !"',iJ.--,s

period of n.-:"--Qut ton days

foJ.lo;iJed 'oy a mulo equipped
~.T1L~:? tOD.;TI"
A.t D='o.::;OS '~ho tl'c.il 'i.7a~ - .'.fficult 8"'v-eD for the mulos.
It, :-~8 lO'l.rrnd in thi3 i!lst}..n~e t~lwt, thoGr: ;:-J:LrG lines h:l(:i. to bo
1,,.:;,::1 ".'811 or:=- 'he ~f'~_ ~ls to avoid. +,rouble i'rcji1 the mules hoofs and
shGJ' i.l'lg'J On P1o\..~nt .in t:::'nJ.ls it :i1(l.S fOlr.ld t03t to construct
Ij;~os ,Jf1. the high 2:,de of tlY' tYf:.il as mC's'~ E.ny a0cidont or trouble
th'lt QOI)"ol,Tfjod affected tl-o ~o"~~3r side.. Fr 3quGntly n. mv~e ~-;ou1d
slip :f~om "LIJ.0 t""'Clil or su;:.r-.l::'08 -r;o"lJ.d be drODpGd o Naturally the
fall would bre'l~' t'w -.-,ir3 E it h'lQ boon Installed bGlon."
.q

:..1.,s

Lic}uton, ,;t CU:__ on ,1

fc.ntry Divi.sion.
1

;~TA1"C-:i

~~

J JfCIE;a?.DT, Eeadquartors 34t.h In

HAt tho ANZIC Bi..,[tcl-,-h,:?~.d ':.l8 '..'orD f:l.vored 1,,;d~r., 0; good road not
dry \/8"11::.t en' ~ .::'I;..... . -.-,h(j h8.'~2.rQs '1'0'::1 rr::~!l<:-' fiolds "..:ere min

'i"~orJ{ n:~1d

imized af"t-Jol' th:} r8;~ ~ -:'ir.-'.; !1c:..c1 ~,.c'rJLl occu!Jj ':Jd for Q S~lort poriod.
'1'1-.0 Divjsion took JVCI' :7_~1'r~r::.ct, "t.;'lC '.,':::ro sVft(~m 0:," tho nnit ro
li'3"TJ("'2,., It '.1"8 ~',." '-,-,5 to h',:; "_A,::; -~:J:1,\'3 fa:!:"' 01:(1' needs o.nd l1carly
h,'.).lf or tho 108R r;J~~.iab18 ~~~;.~8S trn:,:,o '-:rJ!1'-lG8;-"};;C~) Tho o.reJ.S of he,1.VY
sholling hH\.."_i'l C1\:.-' r(x~d ::1...... ti~)n8 3n] g-m l)CS_~:~~ions soon bec:)IDo ap
p2xont to \,;:i;~8 nC:-'30~~~',)1. ~~nd J L.lGS 1.:3:CG .)5,t~'lGr re-routcd or buried.
llIany O~""" the _~OT",-:,':U~il :.. ',DCS coaId rot bo mu,iYlt.cinc2 during d-l~Tlight
dvo to cnor1Y Obi3Gi: ']~,tj.cn 1.L:1 firo.
Un0.0l'rrOl.'!ld or Qvr'i'3d l~',nes ;,'QYO l.~scd for ths first t5.::10 J~nd
rJorkcd very '-'pJ l~ Lftcr i:'. s\ort poriod ~rouLd8 do--,:'olopod which pro
hitdted t:-.l_~~,:,:, :,Ging :~impl;)Aad .r'--~'l~ teJ,OiIJ:"!~r41 "t":'lt they iiorlcod vary ;Jel'_
lor tolGpIlYQ8
'.i.-oct pointa "..'el~;J inst1,11ed eVGry q"x~l'tGr L!ilo c~nc1 T~', ,.
I&:. Tcrnin".l S ,,-'J'-'_~:J;J ne ed. 1l1:' s p::rGQ.tJ." r f:l.cili i:,-:::ted tr(~ub10 shooting ~
Burial l.-;r'lS "~',-~omp15_3.t,_c:d b;:r 1..:3 ....; of 3. cable p] O~'T borror:G~:3. from
tho Corps Rigr!9.l battalion. It pr0\:"t~d 3. very .'3.rd-iJ.":)us and ttE10
CCT1Sl.1mir:g t.~s~\. Ot~t p{:lid divirlords cc-.---~idor1-n.F the tiY.l8 tilcl.t '.:0.8
r::'iJ~' . t. -';.n t,l:..o pos:."..ti','DS"
Lll li:108 t~~_lt could!:"l.! t bu ro-rO"ctod
,~.- ':~~.,. f!"om sJY3c'~:f'ic t~=,rgct3 ,-;cr'a b:..ried.
Or~l;r i~port':',nt t<:;.cticnl
lin~:';;:: -.1Cr3 b:..rriod:t

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UNCLASSIFIED

An advance s"itch WicS installed about three miles ahead of

Division Command Post, Luri.ng on'o"hase treffic to the two regi
ments in tho l:',ne was e:ctr'3we:y ::eavy ".nd three lines were in
stalled to ead,
On the Beac:1head elrr'cy per'c""t of l"ire fai:l.urs was .caused
by shellfire, bO'"bs and falling fht. In one inste,nce all locals
at Division Com~Dand Post ",ere lost by an A? bomb landing '.'ithin
a few yards of the srdtchboard dngout. The locals had been buried
to within a fe,.' feet of the s-:il.tchb08.rd, but were above ground
just 8.S the~' Gntered the dugout. l'J::e AP bomb scat.terec'. s,,;t'ficiently
to get this one STIls.ll vulnerable sont. 1iihere burial is needed
henceforth it 1';i',l be~oIT-:Jlete.
During t1;e breakoJt "'rom AFZIO Beachhead, follo"!ed by the pur
suit through ROlfE to L2GhJPK e.nd FISA, we W8"'e favored "ith c, ;;ood
road netcork and a well defined axis except in one brief instance.
Artillery shelJ..ing ,"1\8 nil b'l't vehicular traffic plus tank .w.d tank
destroyer moven;e~t ~reater'l a ha3ard to our lines, The chief ob~
staeles wer" the speed of movement required, mine fields .and snipers.
During the latter stag,lS 17ire SUTJply stocks became v3ry 10111 and
much recove:;,y rad to be eff.;d,ed even durtng operations.
Line const:ruction must be especially good when operating
with tanks. Every concci7'lle crossing must be well overheaded
or buried. Bl.rrial at CT()F' '.ClgS should exceed eigh.t inches to
protect the wire from tan': 5. A,-l 'lj.re must be dr9$sed uell off
the shot:lders and pref'2ra.:Ole up on ledges and banks.
Wiremen in tt'elr' o.A.3:~a to COYlft:rr.ct good lines' often enter
mine fields. Goad "iremen ct:'1't ':>0 replaced easily and it is Lest
to Iteep them away from such. practicEs; The rlire cun be laid along
the mine we.ruing siens for g:'ea,.er"a~et:', Gspc;cially in trol'hle
srooting. .
FreIn the BSB.chhead to ROME +,h 3 Dace was so rapid thf'lt 1:!e
had to disca1:'d our .sOP of twa lips" to each regimdrct and reduce
it to one each. Also additional use WI:;S made of a fOl'VClrd switch~
ing central to tie in attnc:J8d 'lllits. Dtvision wire personnel laid
wire as closely hehind the ac:va"lce conbat elements as tbey cculd.
After leavjng lJ\'.JV:::O and un to RO;'}<, :orantically nO "ire ,:'as laid
within the ir.::-antry regimdnk and Division Ar'ti1l8ry .
As the Division left ROi,], ard l:eac"ed north til fourth regiment
"!as added. Due to the rate of move and the number of subordinate
units 'Lt ,las decided th,,-t if "ire 1iJ2,8 to be maintaineC: at all it
Twuld he.ve to be on a reduced scale and by the USG of an advance
sV.'itchilOg central. Wire teams ';18N r.'ith euchregiment. The signal
company installed t,,;o "~110B c;i.rcuit.s up Highway tIl trl8nty miles
north of ROME. Tho signal cO!!'.palOy t.eams ",ith the four regiments
'cere instructed to tr,)vel c:tth the Regimental Command Post and edch
time they set dOTm this team ,;ould tee-splice the Division cir
cuits on highvlay and extend it into the :t'ogimental board. 'By
close liaison and instructions t-,oo regiments v:ere kept on 8ach of
the two lines. At any spot t'at Fl regj.. ment st.opped for even an
hour they had wi,e communication to Division. As Division movod
up they would morely cut a 3",itcl:bo<'.rd into the trunks and have

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communication both ~iays. j,t this time it became imposRible for Corps
to keep their circu~t.s up to us so v'e displac,,-;d forv!ard using our
oCin 1!~110 lines b",ck to ?\ll" re'1r Command Post and from there on into
Corps on their circuit.
At n !Joint .-:bout t 1:.;enty IlljJ.GS north of Rom3 the 17ire short
age devoloped and t!1e pace of adv.3.nce increased. It rms decided
to lay only one circuit for.7Qrd abng Higrl1'~Y #1. At this ti.me tl70
regiments rlore adv'Incing in colLlllln ahead of the Division Commcmd
Post and the other t,-:o r': '0 located ne"r Division. The ti70 le2,ding
regiments '/ere tee-splic~d onto the single trunk and the two nOflrby
regiments uere 12id to by a Division "iro team. At 0600 bours
one morning wo U0ro told the,t tho Command Post Hould movo fiftoen
miles that morning. By h~ving aggressively pushed our'"irehead foro:
ward along pith ti'e TD nnd tal"k lmits ne had t'ilenty~siX mileD of
17-110 laid M01:d of us. lis it dovoloped t.ho Command Post that day
moved forty-one miles and right into CIVITAVECCHIA. Communication
\ms maintained during this snit!'D day beti1een Corps, Division Command
Post, four infantry rog.Lmsnts and the adv~nco Division Comm.cmd Post. :
Prior to moving into CIVITAVECCHIA the advance Division Com.mrmd Post
nas tnent.y-six miles f'roDl chG min Command P.-,st. An EE-89 repeater
17[1S installed on this c~r'Ouit anC. it talked well.
The Deputy Corps
Commandor talked over this t,'lonty-six r.li:J,e Division circuit back to
our main Comm:md Post then through Corps circuits to tbe Corps CDm~
mnnder nnd reported the ilivi sian! s capturo of CIVITAVECCHIA. Af'ter
the.t the advance group moved into town' completing a forty~on8 mil a
movo for the day, actually the time inv0lved \Jas from 0700 hours in
the morning until about 1500 hours in the fifternoon - ei"ht hom's.
1,"hile tho town Has bdl1f: cleared the DiVision wire team com?lotod
the last f:iteen miles Clnd whon the Commanding Goncn'al arrivod an
EE.8 telephone was waitine for him and cOll1l"unic::ltion tins still in
to all four r3giments.
In constructing this circuit each regimontal kam had a 1/4
ton and 3/4 ton vohicle. These 'Jere used to mako the tie-ins. Tho
actual forty-one mile circuit \'las laid by fOllr 1/4 ton poops f'rom
the signal company gr()up. Tho highrmy t'as divided .into t7JelvG mile
s3ctions and each peep assicned three miles. The Division wiro
officer and his assistant coordinated the joining of tho circuits
and the tying-in of ":hoY )giments
A wire dUl'lp of tVJenty-five to
fifty miles Has kept as ",0ar to the wirOO83d as possible. The linos
wero ,Jell dressed, as laid and very little trouble developed.
Trouble shooters were stntirned at test points along tho line 1>8 1181]
as at both ends. This enabled them to roach any trouble in :J. mini
mum of time. Tba Division .!ire officer kept his reconnaissanco as
far fornard [lS possible so th'lt he would bo porsonnlly infor::lGd of .
movement, by-pass8s or anything thnt might alter tho wiro plan.
From CECI~m through LEGHORN and up to PISA the Divjsion had
five infantry regiments 1 t ..o t.nnk and two tcnk dostroyer bGttr.lions.
One tr'\lrlt Has insk,llod and maintainod to o1lch of theso units in
addition to artillery nnd service tmit comnmnicat.ions. During this
period IIire supply bocaIne criticnl -end recovery ~as reqlured.
0

70

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UNCLASSI FI ED

During Ju1y tho signal company recovered 897 miles of W-llO.

The artiEery- recovered an additional 300 miles."
First Lieutenant JOHN BONFORTE, 3/.th Signal Company.
"In taking over lines from other units they should be re
drGssed, prop~r1y tagged, bad s(lctions or W-130 replaced, re
rcuted auay from target of traffic areas.
Wire construction along roads has proved highly satisfactory
by comparison to an attempt to lay it cross country. It is in
stalled and maintained much more rapidly."

ttIssUIj nf

In'lpS

to l:o:r

~'iTe

non...coIDS and keeping them oriented

on the situc:tion hJlpod very much. All 1lire personnel report

Command Post changes or locat.ions as rapidly as learned. Recon
nS,issance must al',:a;Ts be made ,'.'ell ahead of wire laying."
first I,lentenant JOHN EONFO?:IE, 34th Signal COtlpany.
!lBy using the same p3rsonnel to maintain a line that has origin
ally installad it, the bitie.l pork ';las better inasmuch as the men

kneri it 1101].16.. directl:;~ a,1:"':;'ect t1:e amount of nark tr..at would follow.
Using tL,) 83.1:',,, men for a considerable length of time to maintain
a group of c5_rcuits resuJ,tei 1'1 their becoming very familiar 17i th
every -,'ea'-ners, nnd l1':ely trcu'?le point. Thus they could easily
lociote tr,.. uble 'Lha-c did c,(Jv,Jlop e.n d they made ilnprovements each
time 3. C'~"G of tro'clble apf<oQrej. After a fe\7 days, the ,circuit
rmuld
~,?"8' trovblc freo .. U

Captain LLO'LD W. RE:I3:Sf., 34th Division ArtillerY.

"Arti:lery units -clS(": Tcry Ii ttlG W-130 except for formcrd
observers. Glose cooper2.tion he'c.~een Division Artillery and signal
cO'llpa'1.Y helped reduce the nclrtboT' Qf c:;r'c'~its and kept all units
better i.,ied-in. HhE;r-, a "03~, point is i:1stulled by one Wlit all
lin's rUlming past th'lt pvht 11p to the capacity of terminal strips
should be cut in. Artillery D!'lcie "ide use of simplex talking
circuits ::"or FDe and thus eliminated much wire laying."

"Infant",.' r~girtents :or',~cr,"od to use Vi-lIO as much as possible

",nd laid :"-130 0nl:' Olf> Et Let resort. When they moved up on H-130
liDOS ~:..be:r replaced them ,:/'itI-.. ~-110 as soon cs possible.
It is not at all pr3.ctical for infantry units to recover
,;ire. The personnel r8QJj_T3d to i),stall and maintain their wire
system is far gr81ter than t.Le number allotted on present T/ol s."
- '/1

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UNCLASSIFIED

First Lieutenant RAUB H. HARAlJEN, 31.th Signal Compal'1Y.

'lTn.e use of sr'itcning centrals often sllves communication
from a con,plete failure. Most Staff officers do not understand
the necessity ~or or reason behind the use of these switches.
T1Ese officors be-::ome quite disgusted when two or three boards
arc in the drcuit. Ho':evJr, there are times when IlJ.l subordinate
units can bo tied into a for-.lard board and if only a single line
romains in to the &dvconc8 switch all units can be contacted. It
s~;ves grently on wire construction and facilitates trouble shoot
ing, testing and maintenance toa high degree. It further allows
certain elements to be y.opt in the wire system that couldn't
possibly be kept in othol"l1ise. u
Technician Sergeant RALPH J. OISON, 34th Signal Company.
"Repeaters ~9 "er3 often loaned tq artillery for use on long

circuits. Repeaters Viere kept in roadiness at all major switch

board" and tier" plugged into the circuit to boost calls from dis

tant points.1I

First Lieutenant P.ALPE H. HARADEN, 34th Signal Company.

UI,lonitoring of' c'.rc:IHs rovealed a tremendous .level of un
c'1113 1\'ld io.13 c:;rJ_ter. It is recolllJ:lended th'lt an officer
monitor pericc;..:cally and co;-tr01 cOlwersations of this type by his
action or the action of Lis cm,.rfJ:~r:der. u
r!-300S~8.r;

Technicirw Fifth Grade ASP1):E GERECHT, l33rd Infantry.

the

"r08 found in tbe mO'.lnt~in fiction before CJlSSnrO, in

RAPIDO River cross5nf;c, b tha LANUVIC action,. and at lAT. MAGGIORE
t>[,t th" rrSG3nt b[.ttalin switchboard, BD 71 is unsuitable for
batt.cclion fighting movGmcct. It .:lS most cumbersome, and easily
da'~Qgcd.
g co.nnot be o.'si'vl to any good advantage in the moun
t'lins. 'iTe havo found t:,e G8r:!k~r. SViitchboard to be exceptionally
noll-suited for action, i t being far simpler and lighter, one-fifth
d,8 hGliv:..j t:-lG.P ours. n
First Sergeru,t C;UFI.li'.'i V. BEEKHAN, 133rd Infantr,{.
"PrC1 o::perie;,ce in carrying tlJe SCR-300 radio I have fotUld
th(c;t tce ",rness.lhich sup:;;or~s the sot "hile carrying on the baok
allo,'S the srarp -Lmdor edg) of the case to dig into the back of the
opor:ltcr . r r . order tc icC2? t:1r, sot from shifting and thrm7ing the
operater off balance thG c,n-rJ:'ng straps must be made vel"J tight.
My (lompa!lY h&3 n,med5.ed tr')28 faults by mounting the set on a pack
board ,.nd socuring it b;l rQPcG. 'X-hG 170ight of the set iacarried
on the shoulders c.s beforo but tho car.'IUS on the inside of tho
b0rird diifltr:;'butcs tho lord -to tho buck nnd the balance of the
ojoro.tol' is F..oro e&sily Ir.ubtcSned. This is especially important
in mount8.inous torrail:. 11

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UNCLASSIFIED

First Lieutenunt JACK

r..

PARr,ISE.

133rd :nflll'try.

m.",11ilc T::) wore o:pGr'~lt:Lng in the :nountnins nortr~ of SAN LUGE

rl'e had to supply the troops b:l p;~c~,:-mulG tl'nin. ,],h8 mGn returning
to their compnnics. 38 "Jel1"s r'J,nmJrs 'l!'ld li-tter be"re::'s. uS1lally
follo-.-md t.ha t'21~_'p'18ne ;:~i:C'G fj,nd pulled. tho ~;;iI'G ii1tO the trail.
The mu2.e tro.tn~ f0J.ln-r;Jng C~lt th.~ .dre to riboGns ~ Th.] best method
T.'O round to remody this -,-.:'.1S to put the ,~ir..J 0.8 high as possib1e
und string a,rk0r tap" in pln,cGo C,ihere 0. POl'S on could. got off the
tr3il. If

73

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UNCLASSIFIED

CHAFTER VI - SUPPLY
Std'f Sergoant LEWIS E. McKENZIE, 135th Infantry.
Staff Sergc6nt JAMES R. GAV'.:3KE, 135th Infantry.
"On tho first crossing of the VOLTURNO River '.Ie cnJr.e up after
dark to the regimental CP end fOl'nJ thoro was no ',1ny to cross the
river by truck, but r'ltions, Hater and ammunition hnd to get
across. First ne tried a peep to carr;l a cable ovor, but the
peep ,'mnt down stream,
The next thing we tried nas '1
ton 6x6 cargo truck by its
winch, It ,"Jorked OK so we loo.dod a peep ".nd supplies 011 anel then
dragged it across. l"8 kept that up until rle held four peeps across
to haul the supplies out to the companies which l"'ere nbout n. mile
auay. ~Te moved all of the r",tions and ammunition that night by
the same process. "'e dsc took all of the casualties back across. 1I

2t

~. R"tions. E1mry effort should be made to augment the 'C' or 'K'

ration Which must of necessity be fed to the front line soldier. The 'C' or 'K'
type r",tion is an emergoncy ration ailc: is not dosigned to feed troops over
long periods of time. During January 'md February 1944 the 3rd Battalion, 135th
Infantry established an improvised fiel,: bakery in the kitchen bivouac nroa and
made doughnuts, fruit turnovers, cakes and cookies, ecnd in addition made sand~
wiches of jellies c.nd jams and frosh meat vlhen it \1aS obtainablo, and made spreads
for sandwiches froll canned meat. These "ore packed into r'ltion boxas, ammuni- .
tion boxes and sent up to the troops by pack rllUlo. This aidod greatly in re
ducing the monotony of tho ration, n.dded the necessary calories in tho diet
which was deficient in the 'C' or 'K' ratio~. This food being moro palatable
the troops ate more of it and their morale and physical condition l1as much
b3tter than that of troops which Viero fod a steady diet of emergency r[ltions.

Staff Sergeant JOHN DIAVASTES, 133rd Infantry.

"While troops are on the line, kitchens should be able to draw
materials to mnke pastry such as doughnuts, cookies, cake, otc.,
to go with the men's 'K' or 'C' rations, whatever it may be. It
builds up their morale and tells them that their kitchen ere" is
thinking of them and not sitt:'.ng on thoir beds. II
Technician Fourth Grade

ALF~

G. BLACK, 133rd Infantry

."A bottor rat5.on should bo given t'1e f:."hting mon r;hen they
. are able to get a hot moal instead of the usual hash or stew menus.
Pork and gra~- o~ beef and gravey takes no more time to prepare
and is much better."
Staff Sergo,,-nt DELBERT F.LEET, 1:;3rd Infantry.
"When bringing ratif)"s up to the company al\lnys be sure not
to bring fire down upon ,.ne ar<Ja, or vicinity of the company, by;
pulling in too fast \lith the vehicles. Al",,-ys pick a secluded spot
where the enemy cannot observe your moveIilent."

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UNCLASSIFIED

LieutQTh".nt Co1onel D:A.N G. "'ALZ, Headquarters 34th Infantry

Divi-"ion.
"Roserve rc.tions - At present the r:'jviljion is using the fol
lOWing pl":;'l) \7~.i~h is satiBf.)c 4.:ory.
le Et.w kltc'i'l(:n ~::G.r:-i88 one day I s reserve of h3.rd ro.tion,
e!.ther lC'; 'K! or -:n somo U1ltS 10.1, and the Division quarter
m.'l.stG~ m2.illt -~':.ns Q :;.'esorV0 of o:ne day boxes l"s'Gion for the entire

divisinn.
G. ~'J'3 r3sec:-ve 'e' cr 'K' rat.ion cel'ried in the infantry
kitchens eli;n:inated c:mfusion in cas" the unit is ordered into combat
after a IB' rcti~n r."s t: ' j l i.53',,,d to the companios f~r the ne:,t
dey's consnmption 0' the 'c81'Jh~",m has g0'18 in for the IB' r:ltion.
111 such C1.S0S tho uui t us ,lS its reaerve ration and puts tho nonper:'. 'h'\b18 portic., "f tre ''3' rdtion in :'os"rV3, When the unit is
again out of cC1.1bnt tho c,~'r-_pG.ni8r:; aro r.bIo to serve a 'B"' rntion
even if the uni L hClc' dI'& c" Cl LJrr.al issue of h.'1rd ration.
b. The r8~erve r4t~0n is ;.,130 to be used in emergency

if for any reGs on tl"t(: uni-:' is lL'1ub2.e to riraIV t!:t8ir daily ration.

C", ..I.t tim3S -.;Then tiler3 is a kn'Jiiln possibility of units not

boi!Jg' abb t::> dra>; rc.ti()ns for a da:r or tno d3.Ys, the reserve is in
creC\~eJ in the unit to cOVer t,;e atltic5.pated p"riod."

P:riV[lto First.,hss WILLIAl,; E. ViOODhO"I, 135th Inf,antry.

"The ihfantry soJdior ",hGTI going on an attack, usun11y ~C\rriGs
either 'e' rations or 'K' r~ti'ms, r,nd sometimes a combination of
tl:c thO. As for the 'c I uni tG all r ~an say is exporiment on dif
ferent methods of carrying t.hora. 1've fo'cmd th."t three units fit
nicely in a combat prcck. As for the 'KI retion, I suggest you open
the r,OX3S ar'd break the cont8nts d:mrc. There may be things en
C1030<': you "on't eat so wh~' carr;\' them. TtG r;ax box \,i11 hec.t
a cup of coffee nicely. A 'Dr o(!r is always 11 good thing to c8rry
in case of an emergency. Carry your rations in the most convenient
place. ThElY can cause a lot of gri8f dv.ring e. long mlrch i f not
packed ~1011. to

Li.outonllnt Colonel IVAN G. r!ALZ, Headquurters 34th Infantry

Division.

"Durir.g tho Italkn co.mp"icn th8 carrying of barracks bags

for ')orsonnel h,co ;r~ve'1 inl:r"ct,i~o.l, especially for combat in
f'lntrJ" pcrsonn~l. T;lO Inc~c of transpork,tion to transport the bar
racks bag m.'l?8G it necc8sn:r;r to stc:re thc~. under guard until such
time IlS tho unit is not in combat, and then send transportntion
bo.ck to them. By thio time the distanc0C'" the placo of storage
is Gxcoodinc:;ly groat. This denies the inJividunl tho use of any
clothing or personnl equipmont that he may need during combat
~

75

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UNCLASSIFIED

,;hich mrw be for poriooa of two to th'reG months. In nddition to

this diso.dv:J.nt:1gc ~to f tOT-3d ba:!:'r'CH'"':ks (:HgS c(,,:tl'z,ain lQ::-go -nr:tounis
of clothing YJl~ ich couJ.ci. he usod by hlgbGJ:' oc:helons for roplc:.cOf!lOl1t
or for tho oper".tion of clotl,ing O:::2:'1Qllse units
Ttis d_-f..-,,'is '_on c~~~ 3(';on-::i -.l\:toc1 tl:0 use of I:JTrrE' cks bngs in 0.11
excopt IY) :,,':.: ... ~7.ed c:::..c.. U
. '-1rlts ~ ~!l. 0, t, ..Ibci' 1':;1:3 arJ.d. r~a.s oporf'.ted YJithout
tbl.~!G. S-1.Jclf:>i'"1'::l~ "il,V f)'v'2r sL1..:;e th.n"..iu{-:;l1 -the USa cf 2.rrny storili r:C!.
tion, boo t,11 Tl'ld c.: . . : .I.ng G;::\~.h"'-_ Y!~~s "!..l!.5 ts~, f:.r..d n sy stem of clo'thil~g
oX8}l,2~1ge 0f!-~:'[1, tC'~ 1::-:1 the (>;_v::.,:; lUn qunTterm1.G tor ~(J-:_}-J. in con~~ unc
tion -rdth t!10 d~:lJision sh:JLlc:!:'s and on l.ii.rc,:~ exe;na>cge rdth units~
Th'.c syst,c!", rel.co',,:s ," S'Cl'cl.:'n on the "lrea1y oVGrtnxed transport'~
ti'JD -:7it~lin t!J'3 di',J~i.sior.c
:.:T;l s-;jcrJ.l":';[!~.lC'".:!.' Dcrh .~,nrJ" clotJ.15ng e-{-.J'A..t.:.se vnits have proven
tl grc It mora.lo l.Y)J8"~)!, ~IJd n. grcaG [.i8.~p ~_n the suppl;:r and nu-tinten
r.nco 0::' indiviJnal ,.'}.t.<-.:r~.jl~ 'Plese u~1its Toiel'C: firftt used bythe 34th
Infent:.-'Y Div:i.sion ,'"1.t P1E'")LV;I)i,tE D' J~LIPE t:..1 Dqceillhor 1943 after
o.n oxtendod PC1:. :',00 of ""/CI or:-./s . .:L.;. cor;b,J.~. At" thr-.. t tine the faci.l...
itios offered by the nJ.:i~ Cv!13:l.stod. of "b[l.tn, t01';'el, a cornplow
ch:J.nge of unif-'Jrrn L':"ola tbu s}~il1 o-.1+,.? Utd.ct"~;0ar, socks., '.}oolen
uni'oY'In;o fi0Jd 2c.. ci":(;
if' rk1c,~8c::., Si.1:OG'S c.nd leggins) if noodod"
Tho unit {1,c.;0('IW".1odA.~6d i'rou l,('JO to 20CO r.le~l 0. o.~.y"
If QM .3teril
iZ"l.ti"on, bo:t,'~., -..n3 cl,~\l:.b~.r"g ('xrh9J.!:;8 units c.ro m1,j,ntE:dnGd 0.8 close
l"'.8 pO~js1.b:e.J no:riU8.;"ly f,L"'om ~. ';:":i l'J rr:'~.1~es behind tho front lino q ,
it eliminates the noc8ss:-'-"r of -cho ~oJ_dj~er ca~ry~_. g nny oxtro.
clothj.ng oxcept r.Jrh~ps r: c;l."-'n[;C" of UrdG.!:TJGnI' n,nJ. socks, as -:thon
nll..'1it or Fccrt of '1 unit :'3 j .. n F, 1'~s,"r'i8 position and hilS nn op
portr'~_ty to clo'JJ~ t.:.PJ t:1Gt t.J'l';.. '~ ~"n :_:e tJak:8n -:-,0 the S & B unit
nnc1 giv~n Ci hot shY,;G~ c..1.d. "-'l0'l.r" r.:i_Q~~.nos and is bettor fit to go
b9.ck into cco';in'"" ','1 :.' S.'. Uf".cr ti'Je, t):::>n ,:ould. be possible if'
ll..l1it hnd to Te-equip ':.nroDg:l normu) SUP1Jly channels. i1
Q

t;

C01'po:,,,1 RCLA}'D DX'SON, 135tt Ir.:antry.

"Th(]ro is 0:16 pa!''tic~u~l'~ i +em ~"lhicb is :::leVGr mentioned back
home 2nd is nevor iSS':.lGd in sufficie:::tt qucntity
I u:n spoc;'" ~_ng of thG s:Llo.11 gJ.so':in3 Stov3 -v:h.ich Qnybodj~ wco
spent a ~7i:tter ';'r: tra l;.ills of Italy Fill '~el1 you are .1. very
def'inito impr:lV8m:jnt to life 'ilhich, at bost, is n"'~olutcly rw
good."
fI

LiGutonant Colonel JOE L.

K)u1<~'E,

l68th Ini'ar;t:,:,y.

"8xperi3nCG in c'cmb:1t to date "ould in1ica'!:o th.lt the In

t.re~c':J..~.:cg Set, Irli'clnt:c-;{ ifJ.. J :.8 o:.rCOSS:'va to O~ nueds except
~hon 'the b2t't'[J.lion 1'1.'1$ to p:rJp:11'e ~ dQfsnsiv9 posit.ion.
Our ex
porience te dn teo hc.s iIldic,'tad thc.t tho tr.:msportltion allotted
for this purpOS;J CD.n be pu~ to [!, bet ter use cnd service to tho
bo:ttallon by helpinrs out l.;!ith the n.t:munitio!l i:1 n.ddition to cnr
r:yiug th,;, TI,,1r::::::-tJ eqFi;n:-cent ll8eded for the A (.C ~:J pl.J.tocD, Tho sot
should boo c:"lt'.:'ied. \T:th regim.~.nt, or un n.rrc.ngeffiGllt ';:orkod out ~:!h<3ro
by battGlion cOI,lld ar'1\i r::. P'J..~t of this set should circumst::tnces
iLdicnte G defensivo position."

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UNCLASSIFIED

St~ff So?go~nt C!l~L

C. RODDY, l35th !nfantry.

nr'CV8 ~,
[1 ;:.:C'3:~C

,/

rog'll.1? iss Y 0" socks a'ld underwear at least once

foX' tLs troops ";";h:.;n -:,he:r are on +,,he line. II

"DiSlJOS8 01' tho b1r:nJeot roll In tic.8 daytime and let the kitchen
force bring 1.]:"" u at nigh":.. 'fhe blanket is too bundlosome Gnd
. p",vidcs Cc l:lrgcr target. Tho roll hinders movement going donn
11')T017trr.lls flud thrOllgl; b:~sh8s. 11
Li..)lttJno,::lt 8obnol JOE L. "lQL'Ri!.1E, 16"th Infl'cntry.
";'1'02.1"" ,'.' '--::;:. 1:. ,.,-.DC>, Clen r:ith fl rif10.
It is be1ievGd
t,h-'.t n. 1Jistol for tho r~-'s~"')o=':i !':l::'D'is much moro desir[~ble. Y:-c hl1ve
:-:ctllccl::'j' C;.:"'l -:::lcc bCJsc'<;l~c. ;X:D pl.JtOc.s to cnrry fr= time to time.
'l'l18 oojGcti',)ll of .tho ri.fle :,:_8 .!0h1. t it is a little too cumbersomo'
to be C':1.::".i:'i"JCt ~'Y "J. r'1n ",11:0 ir .'lJ..sa c'~rrying tho b~zook8., ~nd, cs..
:coci,nlJy so rhJn you cons::'j"r thnt the bD.zoeka lll"ln has a little

(Ufforont nmnunHion

pI'o"lo~l

from

t,'18

ordinnry rifleman."

n::bo rTC: c,L,~or or s,r-;'pl:, sorge':n't should stay with the COHl
}Y\ll:r C? ~:o l~,s:::. itot.3 c..osir-::c.1 for tho next ovening's distribution.
T:.:oSG itOLS CQ.I~O forr;'2.rd frr)J::. -1:,1'18 \i":.chan l.reQ with the folloHing
Q,,"S r:,t;,c::B.
r,~tionJ "d. 3up;>lLs for' detached pIa.toons should
1:8 sc,nt :'):.th tho r,tion t.o".:,] 0:: the compllnyto which they are at
tncbed. 1h'.s ?elf,S '003n o"r st'Ondal"d eperating procedure since 1'Ie

first n:r-rivad in It'lly-.1t

"?ac;: If.Clle t.nins - Dc:rilcg the fighting in Italy it has fre

C;1Bnt::';r b'?COf'3 ,.,scoss.o.ry t) sunrly by pack t'.ule. The .34th Div
j slon has had vc.ric-d cx!rrir.'nc,} YlitJ1 mulGs, using both organic
Cll'~ attached pack rmlG t:'o.i:1s,
In November 1943, it first became
neoossa~T to "l.:':Sv m~~l':l;2 b'J.t ~hera \7er~ n'Jne c.vailable :from highop
eC:lOlons and \';0 I,ore fcrc(ed to ruqllisiti.~n such J.ni:nals as could be
found from d vi',l:l:',c auJ. cco-:;Bnize p;Dvisional paclC trains within
L . . . ~) ':.1:-~:. t...:. r'. -; '" "-',;~ ,j_T'>3H. ',~2,: nf o:!:'genic pe:rsonnel which ~ere
rCGc.ed elee~-;~ .:<>,:.:~ ana ~-'-='~'-I:v~ _G -:'::"a "1::.i ':1(:; ::.f 8.J_,iD:o.] bandlers, transr.. Q~t:.at::"cn of !:':::.~_-!";,-;~.)':">~,,:a '... nJ, ~~,.L:. 7.~" :::'~l:). nO';'lsidbr~blo supervis;Lon,
ths p8::t'Sf)rr')~ :-11.:.0 ":1':::'~1,~ l~:)2:'-!: ::,:~:,ion for p!:li~h ia not available in- an
iI:.fc:r:try i:."th.8 ~or. T:c:.8 C~T\J l:,Jnl .~aS not .2.t a::!..l satisfactory.
In J anu:,r:,r 19j~.i:._ iJ_,.r>:~;(: .Lt,~,li3.n pc]ck r:~ulo groups '-.lero attached
to tho divi3i.cn~ rr:ce~T :.C:) '.-,011 t;'3.~~!::ed, VJGll officered bu~ a.t .
fir2t poorly equL',JZ:d, ('~D!b "!as lntGr remildiod). Duo to dif
:'Cl~G!J.CB i:.: 2.~:_[!;::~gG8, c:.<..~,tcnc, an] tompar~ment, there was consider...

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UNCLASSIFIED
able trouble at first in handling and use of the foreign pack
trains. E~perience has shown that these Italian or other foreign
pack kairrs can render valu~ble service i f handled properly and in
turn Oew ;,e a lot of trouble i f not. The follol"dng ~ystem is used
in the 34th Division.
1. Upon attachment of a pack train, an officer is sent to
the train "s liaison and if it is a foreign organization an inter
preter is sent ,lith him. All dealings between units and pack train
commanders are transacted through this liaison officer.
2. These pack mule trains are commanded by competent officers
and non-commissioned officera and are organized as any other unit
into sub-divisions of squads, sections, etc. and work best uhen
oper6ti~g under their own co~anders.
Orders and instructions.
therefore "re given to th" co=mer of the detail and not to ind
ivid~~ls.
Unsatisfactory rosults have occurred in almost every
instance TIhere units attempted to take command of the mule leaders
individually and not go through the cOlDl!iander as would be the case
of a normally attached American unit.
3., AWl generous act on the pert of units using attached fol'
Gign pack trains, such as giving surplus candy and c~;rettes to
the train, pays dividol'.ds.
4. The pack train commander should be informed of the tact
ical situation, just us any other attached unit, to enable him to
intelligontly plan tis opcratiol'~."
Serge!:\nt

.hLE:':~~

;:L'"CIOLA, l33rd I!lf'antry.

"In tl:.e past W<l hilYC beon marking and breaking trails, hours
before the ration train leaves the ration dump. This is a.very
good idea, and sr.ould be used in the future. 11
LieutOllant Colonel IVAN G. 'i'ALZ, Headquarters 34th Infantry

Div5.sion.

HIt has frequently happened t.'l'lt tactical plans' are adopted

which reqUire motorization of units from organic division trans
portation beyond the ability of the division to support. In each
such iust~.nce the follo,ring reactions occur:r8d.
1. k,tion and ";,,ter supply 17ere insUfi'1c.,el:!.t.
<iII>......
2. Gas01ille ~upply t>ecnmo crUical"
,.,
3. Drivers were overworked ana unduly fAtigued, anc, ihoO
effici,ll,t \~h,m rclec,sed to norml functions.
4. '.'oh"_c18 1lIainten:mco deteriorated. For any e~cept short
definite mov.JS of not to exceed one regiment, vehicles for motor
ization s~ould be ~xrnis~ed Crom sources outsid~ the division."

,S. . lror!7,!,ll;d

DlX!i2.

Lieuteu[cnt Colonol IVA:J G. WP.LZ, Hoa 'quarters )4th Infantry Div.

ision.
"During the .campaign due to terrain and traffic difficulties it

- 78

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UNCLASSIFIED

boc,nme nGCGsso.:~y for the division sLpply services to Gstccblish

forT rcl d=I*'" Tl1e .,IOs1; ::reqUEmt of thosu nero CIn.ss I n.nd tn
t:'l~'~~;_. :o.ds established by t~3 qua.cte:cl.1aBtor..
When road nots bc
onma ccng'J,s'L r3d ani br1.d~e$ G_nC'. fO::""'js ~}GT'e u..'rlcortain thoso truck
honds 'Fe"!:::.) 0~J'~--a~JJ5,s:n8d in Q~e,:ts T:'i-d,::h ~ t.hough in .'ldvnncG of 85.fe
lo~at~i.,Jn8 ,~,f Yl'j;:'f<1i..I.:L supply in?:;taI1o:Lie>ns, reliovod congo,st.io.:.:. on
reads a~1.::! :.l1S11Ted U~G sr,,/ith ::-101.;; of' s-cpp~ies in caso of bridges
-:.l1d f cr;' t-:-~:.;:.. r.'!_~ ' ?" .,.Ii1.i.J,'::t':"'; ~:..G L).,. ;.-.ili...-:h QLa. s'~',:a,,:r-\II
1xperler~ee. l-LaS p(."oper.. hO~\'G fer -t111) inndvis3.b:ility of n.ttempt...
ing to pl'lf':'c- d:;vis-lor.: du.T~)S too far fO!,1jJ:J.:['d~ An inst8.nce is given
:l,fl 0XamplJ
1" ut:riJ1g th0 nttn.~l OIl CF.3SI::O in Jm1l'.a;:-y :~944. n forward
q1J3Xterl:J,'1stor d:..cl:p '."''-',8 8;: L_5.0:'_:;:' .~-, od [~t rl~~ VILLA, -::].S intended to
bo Q roservo dua:p (~0r06S the EA:-'ITJO Rlvo-r. This dump y~12s within
Ion?: r\.nge mor{,::y.i; ';.~: .",.,:j }:c'hol~'iI~1.:C,:;r ,il~0f' Th3 ,,::nemy covered this
drunp by fire Tlh3:0.e ~;G,~' .-;.,ny :' ,:di=-vl t.y t,ook l):aco in tho vicinity
of tno d"!1~JP +,bu-:' d.c,~_d_r(; :1. tJ vse ,";.G a suvrly poj,nt
The officer
in charge r:',nd th::"tJo fiG_a ",'~(j::'0 ki.i.latl by ensmy fire., The dump
p

T!~~S u.b~1:ndo:r18~.L.

2'l

It. ~as b2,)~ fOlJl1d th-:-.t TIDCn 7eS:3rvo d'.lLlPS f;.l1.".1st be ostab

15 shed fo"(' e;:r;; r8['.sc;r: In f().r~,-ard 8:~oas ~ t is adl7isnble for unit to

build up snaIl for',iar:.1 durtlFS e-i. trGr by 7.'8giment or bQ:ttD-lion", il

Cnptnin HAltOLD W. RODE,IT{J,::ER, IJJrd Inf'1ntry.

UFrom thQ stal':d.pcint of proc::;dUT~. in sEp~~Jying nmnnmitior. to
unl'u8 of nn infnrj'~ry roginont thoso principles Got forth in Par.
211- I'~\J1 7-30, snt'vJ.ce company .'1n~ mod1.0nl dotacbmullt:s QrG busi'Jsl..q
SOUJI'l"
Ho'evor, an;" prococ1~0 in the supple' of Class V items !Just
bo L c:dble.
In the Garly sto.ges of the c2mp.~ign in 1tOlly the IJ3rd 1n
fo.ntry co,aont team had the mission of pJ.r'suing n.nd lllQintaining
conto.ct with the' enemy }_n a fla.ih::ing m~.118UV6:r~
During this ph"lse, 8:'rpAndi turos of a:mDllmition T:,oro ver.l
light r.:., -" trw 2~, ten." bx6 t.:':-'\l'Jks lo,'lded 1,-:ith the nmonrrtr "~Qd typos
of n.l1UlIlL1ii;ion prese::ribed ':lOrs releClsed to b'1ttnlion control.
Duri.ng ,(;,10 fol].owing rh[\S0S of the Mmpnign n.:l six of tho
2~' ton S OYV-lCO camp ;:i.::::y tr~J :ks rere rett"lined U~1(!8r regimental con
t~c'olo
The regim'1n"t~l munJ~ti()ns offi0er pursorw~~ '"~. . sU!Jervisod th,G
movement ~nd bi"vollncing of ~ 308 ,:wli as- th.3 load1~!.g n.na loads t,o
bo cCLrried, He -:Ja~ 8_S3~ .:: t;3. by T.b:; ~1.L~i tion3 surgGnnt, the 881'
go~nt truci.:"TI1ast.::'-' 3.:::-3. 011C pr1.-,-'!;;.t,G, (t~\o priv'"':itc being an undor
s-GEdJ -:~or possib:i~!~) r0.plBceI!1cl1l: of :Ji.-~:-;er sorgeCtllt) ~ Tho 1"Jarrn.nt
officor 51 TIll:,_:i.ci _ ~8 and Ord~1.9.11<;e, ~x:d the ;:,rl}.(;~{ driver T:ith the
3/4 'ten r;eD.p.J71B C,'11'J.... lcr l.k'v3.11y stayed at thi"J sOl'vice company
kitchC' n CC:0r:. ai1U h!:~ndled all ordnance. i tc.::::u:~ for Tepa ir, roplacG
m8nt 01"' sal"J"agof' no TID.S Q}J;3istGd by a technical sel'gGant, smtlll
fl.:oms Gyp31"C 9 poII qut'3.1i:~.ed to make naj or repairs on all sm3.11
::rms. 'Ibis technic"l se!'j!oant .,as in excess of the table of

- 79

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UNCLASSIFIED

organiz9,tion, but preycd exaoedinG}Y v,'\luable to the rr)giment in

Lf?l~U:h]g rOPclj:r rJero qui.f.:};.:;',? returned to combat l.lnits
beco.uso eya~':.c" ,:_on to higher echolO'l.1s for rcpal.r r:as oliminv.tcc1. by
[',n ostim..'1"l:ccd 9:..J;;<
.G.'~tl()2: c.J.."" -~~~:mpRe
Up,:;~ ont3J'inz ,combat, n:l veticles cC'.rried
basic loQ':.s.. (h'f:t.Ll~ 3ati:)nr:...L "'Y(:i.hi~:,1e3 .,1- ton l;:rt:.ck) i ton t::'a.Jlcrs
2n..1 p:.r:..t:~iS- mo"~e;:'8i aGI_.or:.pD,~iod -G_'lrJ 'L':':- .. ops as fa::- fon-;r'].rd as possible,
:'~,::rC"~,li:g :t.o !J[:I.':ta-;.~,c:'l 0or..trol [.s soon as woapons and hnnd-carriGd
[:.nLl'.Jnttio~l c.'tO -\-,al-:::er.. ~'or1,7[';.rd b;:T h~nd ..
A't th5.2. tiT19 th..3 ba'.;t~.!.i:io:1 mo-to.'i:' pool becomGs the lcic':.tic;n
of th3 h'lttnl.ion r:\mmllni hon QILJP. LO(1ds of armnunition "re MD
solid:,tod and empty vehicles m.th tI"uibrs p.re rJturned to the
rogimGntal (dYi./fa fo:;." rGf~.:"l ~o bas j".c load 3.1jd. roturn to bo:t.tctlion
pool. Th~lS tho ":JJ.ttdlion is nS3urad a reserve of anunu.nition '..:hich
is e.dequn~ie, mobi18 and ,'-:'l'::':.~ls ,1811 forr.:~lrd~ This motor pool nnd
nmmi.Jn:t":.t;Jil' d;";jJ!}) '::'s . (;un~.r,):::"l'JQ rJY the battalion t-ransport,,?-,tion officer,
assisted by JJ31'SOr:Ul01 from tne A & P plat.con of b8.ttnlion hG,:td
qUJ.rtors CO!:_l~o.:::ly"
The regimental n.mn~u...'Tl__ticn trf'_in;o or dump (ri1obile) in this
regimont is tJ.'.Jr:ys lo::,::'tou. ~.iell f~'-;. ..-.'o.nl inj;ti~J.J_ly. gUIlG:c0.11y l1(3RI""
the rear CF T.lhore t(..'!_op>~):~G CGt.L:'~u'i::c;,tion is ~vn~U.nble!i
Juring the b'1"i}'t.Le llDD:t AL~Yii: nh8J:l the VGTJJ'Pl1NO Riiler formed
D. no. ~"'::r'cl b3)',Tio('., ;:.:~lO :"c~r?i.jjlO!l:~,<l f'.ilLJ1'l':nj:ti')n train -:J(.l.S moved across
th3 :rive~' us soon' flS u b:~idGe V![:S J."2. At this time the fOTl'ard
olomel1ts cf tllC .cGf.':~.mont 'i-:,J::'~O r.PPT'C'xir:13.toly 1500 :'"o.rds ;-.'ost of
ALIFE cnd the ummu.':l:i.t,-;on t""'"in moved into 'I grove of trees nbc'ut
500 yards east and 7GU y.crdc S o',rth of ALII<'E und no"r u good roo.d.
This D.ss\;red El. rO['L:;:!'VG of G.Eli1Yn~li tion in GV0nt the bl'idge :irlS knocked
out.
GoneI'Gl1y spoakIllg the nmrlUnH,ion dump of this rogiment is
loc,~ted fl'c;n t\1u to ton mnes bch~nd t.he t:coops; moving fOTDard
~~s often flS mD.~ be re quir.od ~
.
In static sitc.atior.. s such as tho l"1ttlo pf CASSIr!O, the !'<'Jgi
montal dWllP shou2 i be es tIlblished well fori1n:rd and Clll 2t ten t,rucks
unloE'.ded and sent back to the sC'rvi.co ("Of,1puny nrGU under tbG centrol
of' 'the trarlBporta tion sergear.'t.
During the night prior to tho ascault on tho RAPIDO R:vol', ,Ie
mo't,Hcd the reg1.!llont.o.l. c-su:n:Ziit.ion tl"ain to a pGir.:t about 600 yards
south of SAN r'iJ.FJBELlS and unlo?,ded it, m2kl.~Jg n ground -dump. ':rhG
tr'~,"(}KS rot\tr-r:.ed to the sorvice ccmI)any bi"t/oUG.c area which ".!?S in the
vieinity of 0.i~.H V.~.CT0~{E. S t:"cks ~;J8re built up the follo~:ing n:.ghts
~nd uointained at the fo]~o~ir~:
150,000 to 200,000 rounds caliber
.30 uochino gcill; 75,000 rounds 8-rQund clip; 35,000 rou!lds c,o,rbine;
25,000 Iouc.ds cnlib8:" ,45; l,500 rounds 6Gimn mort'1I'; 1,500 Iounds
to 2,000 :;:'01~i,-is 8LTJ:J m.orr.(~.L 1:.:;11t.; 680 rOl1nds 81mm mor't.J.r omoko;
1,000 rounds .hand. gl"'en['.do fr:-,. gmnn:t~t1_on; SCl0 ro"'.."l.nCl.s hand gren2de
offensive; }')O smo.,zQ pot.s ~:;~,.P.; 300 -r-ounds hand 'gJ.~ornde smoke r~.p.;
200 lounes hn..nd g.r-er.ndc ye llon; ,300 r(luuds sig'10,1 air crt.. f't, each
eelor; 500 r~flo g:reM.d9':;';; AT ]1,,91'.2; 300 X'Clunds l::lcket HE AT I'll
A-2. This stockr:\go prov,.,d Qdeq1liTce to supply this rogimen't by h,t
to.lions os't3blishing f01'>;Jo:rd durnps [lnd to ,,-ssist othor regiments
in supplying thoi." lmits
ti,~()S ,ihen thoir trnins wore

ch:1t iWa.P0T"i'3

.,t

So

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

doplotod or un ~ble to get f'arc;axd.

Differont typos of . 11111itinn 17i11 be 'wod while in differont
t.errain. In rolling COUll.' r:' nore Llort':'r 1'Iill be used while in
m01mtaino11s terridn Jn0st:c:,>:",ondi tll1'es nill bo sDall aT':lS ".nd
grenndes. Likc;',:'is0 fj.ghting i::. t-:jpns and citics will rGquire
moro gron"des ",nd c,",libcl' .45:tnd SLID nort?r HE heon''Y th:1n fight
ing in opon ccuut~v~
This rogimer.t cwriGs tr.8 ~'BA pr,;scribod lond Vii tb tho YJeapons.
On tbo ro(!imentc.l trn'.n, tho six,
ton service oompany 6;:6.
Follorling is tho lond carrbd:
ch~bor of Rounds
T7IQ
33,000
Cnl 30 carbil'1.G
Gal. ;30 Ball 8 ro olip
61,824
30,000
enl. ~30 Bull 5 rd clip
72,000
Gnl. ; 30 iii 011 ino Gun
Olll 50 M~ch:i.ne Gun
1,325
10,000
00.1'. .45
60 111M HE
972
81 l:IM HE light
900
81 L'IM EE ho.'J,"tty
150
81 IIIH liE sr<oke
150
G:rono.dG, hand .of:'ene i vo W/fUS6
250
750
G"'011.,\de, h'aJd frc.gl:\(nk.tion
300
GronndB, rifle HE AT
200
Rocket, HE AT M,2A2
Signal Air Ornft, 120 rdG each color, r8d, .,)ereol: o.nd wh1ts.

2t

This lo~d h'\s proved adequ,:;to at all ti::1011 nnd in' OVGr 300
dJ.Ys of actual comb"lt tho troops of this rcgir:tent helve nover b~on
OUt. of" unrrl.Ll'lition of any t7J)G.
It j.B reCOIlllllGndnQ t1l-' the

2rr

tor aml'mnition vohiclos bo

retained under rGGiment~l control c.t all tilW8. This si:nplifies
tho supply of all Cbes V itOl:lS by nnking nll six 1,,-:;3.8 cer.trdly
locr.tod \lnd avo.il'1blG for issue to anyone or t,1O b"ttClli"ns.
R3gi:1en'tnl control also I:lo.kcs r:-.oro trucl:s c.vnilnble for use in re
supplying tho rog;_mont:cl dur.:p."

- 81

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UNCLASSIFIED

1. Ex-perience ha.s sheJ':m t,hc;,t not on1y m1l2t the intelligence ar..d operations
officers work in close cooperation, but t"cey MUS+' work at the same desk for best
results. This applies to divlsion, reg5,mel't3! .',no. ~)"ttalion stnffs.
!!. f.lLJ:J:l:!&r.r,o,aatiqp"
Much he.s been le"rned in the employment of in
terrogators and by the ;nterrogation p<3rBonnl'll ia the performance of "their
job. In this division it has be~n i'etognizeJ that the closest cooperation must
e7.ist between the comb'!t elements for whom informat:i.on is obt.ained and t.he
interrogators obtaining that ir..format.ior... To be of the mnst value the ir..ter
rogator must at all times be well inforL,ed as to the t"ctical situation and
haye a good knowledge of i'utu:re plans. He must be able to seCUrO information
as sreedily as possible and sse that it is promptly diss31ID.nated. The sooner
the PW gets back to the interrogator the faster information ce.n be gotten and
disseminated. This is comddered so impol,tant that lectures on this subject
to all troops in this division are included in every training program.

First Lieutenant F..ANS G. ,LAPPER, Headquarters 34th Infantry

Division.

'v1

"While fighti"gonHill 593 northwest of CASSIN0 1 our troops

were cohnterattackedby a c8mpanY in the early morning. This
counterat'~ack was beaten back and only one pn was taken, a first
lieutenant, who .ISS le'\di ng the attack. It "as evident that he
was suffering fr,~m shocl,. He was :,:,ushed back to the regimelltal
interrogator and was interrogated about 30 minutes after being
oaptured, still under s}1ook. It is important to note that he was
given no chance to relax, drink, eat or relieve himse~f, but was
forced to'keep on the go tmtil he got to the interrogator. The
interrogator, recognizing theconditioll the prisoner was under,
did llOt waste much time wIth him, but &.slr.ed hi'1l some direct ques
tion" which Were answered promptly. The prisoner stated that the
com:oany msking this counterattack .,'ss a new unit in this sector
which had becn slated to be committed against the AliZIO Beachhead,
but suddenly was ordered to come south to the aid of the 44th
Division Which was receiving it heavy beating. In fact a new bat- ,
talion was thus i.denti:'ied, the II Battalion, 36l6t IR of the 90th
light division, a motorized unit. 11e "ere able to learn from him
that another company' of his battalion was going to make anot1er
coullterattack the samB evenLlg, should his fail, also t.h:lt the I
Battalion, 36l8t IR "as on its way down. He WaS finally evacuated
to the division eage. By then shock had mostly worn off and he ",as
on his "lay to regaining the 'station ,becoming a proud and stubbcrn
member of the master raoe. !!ad this officen been given a' chanoo
to recover from his shook'prior to:being interrogated, it no doubt
would have taken much time to extract the information received
and rle v!Quld have been Ul.,ble to obtain a good portion of it.
Initially, interroglltion .ms performed b~' a 6-11'.an team at
divisional and corps lovel. Hoo::evor, much valuable time nas lost

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

n.f ~'S r:::.d t,o br: (~VQcnu.tcd to di v~.sion beforo being interrogated.
It ,7ail also ,,'GCElcl tk:t in t><s SGt-UD much detailsd information of
tactic,'),l '\ral '.~'? tn rogih8n-{' -J.~ld lovwr -.wi ts -~-Je.s not exploited. An
int(Jrror:t~_~-:r ~.:ork~::1g '()l' or] !,8gim~)nt only, can certainly do a more
6Gta.:i.100 ,-'.T!d nccura.te :lc'2.~ C:1 the tacttcal situation in his regi
mantel [,Gctor ,t~e"r:. a d:Lv':'f.lio~l interrogator ".7ho handles PFI s from 3
r8gir.:.:3nts t'~.nd SOLlctimos 3".~EJn 5 rer;;::l.I!;9~ts" In our present set-up
r.c hc~v'J 1 offic,er vri t.~:'l 2 :Clon-co;~uniGsiGned o:'ficers interrogating
2~t o~.c!"'~ r3gj.-~n~t. :?~nd 1 or 2 ufflc'3r~ YJ5.t:h 2 non-commissioned officers
at tbo di7ision cage~ 'I~e il1terrogc,tor at regiment YJorks strictly
fer r".3.CO 2,'1d is dirGe'll:, respor.sitle to 3-2, Tho interrogator
cL eli vis ion :.8 u:1der G-2 .' rid ,lOrks on all information of interost
at tris lGV8J,. The"re ;'i.E bo some duplications and overlap, but it
ht.;d knr. :i'u::nr..' tha,t th::,s ; appens rfrther seldom, and if it does a
clouble-cD..')e;\: never hurts ~ The :i.r..formation obtainGd at regime'nt
1:ill i,l1!;iG Untol:' b3 diss'3m:i.ndod. first to the battalion "ho cap

tUT8d tto I'articular FW, t,,)n to the other battalions and to div

ision. T:""c.lJ;' by ~he tiJ19 the P7' s get to division the interro

gator ';t ',~ v:,sbn h"s

:~nforrr.ej of t.'1e information gotten at

rGgh'le~t 'Jr,ich "ill givo him an idea of riha:; else that particular

PF can knon. T'1is sys"':",m ,;o::ck>3 out very well as long as 3-2' s,

S ...Jt s, G--2, G-3 ar_./J t~:c i:::t:.rrog~.ctors at regiment and division work

closely togeth3r. ThQ cihisi.on in~;Grrogator should make it a habit

to nco at tl-e civ:'csion C'P r.t leaDt onc') a day and preferably more

o:['ton.

];11.i19 b the begiDring ;:lOS:, interrogators worked with maps

rIS :1<)"' in this dlvisLr: ':'ork ..ith all sorts of photos v;henever
feas5.bJel' It is rE~l.ch ea,:l~_Gr to orient a FW on a photo especially
on an oblic:u8" C10:..0 cO':)~'8rn,tion bctr,leen ~hc air photo interpreter
.:,::::1 'tho PYF i::J~ err.:)' ;':. tol' >.25 prove!} of rr,uch value. When T.le do get
so~netbiLg u':' -.;"-._~ '-:.:(, eftan h~-,-.-o ~ ji10t0 interpreter present during
5.ntorrogatio!"1 \7110, [.rr.1":::O 1:i:5:~:1 the lat.est sc:ctiG flown, ";il'hich usually
is c,ess t:Lrr t\ d~,y o.ed, aLecks the inforrr.a1:ion obtained immediately.
ifany profitable targets .~or the artillery and the air corps have
beGn obt3.ined in tI1,3.t, mQ.!2ner"
At CASSn;O 0~)C pho Lr, i"te"Preter fO'..1nd an unidentifiable
obj ee t on th6 s rY:.<.th 62.opo 0 -C ;i~o~as~~ry Hill. Interrogation of
various pds"me~s fx'om tJ."j,s sector finally ident;,fied it as a very
tlell-caLo;,ln~ged S? g'm, ,U.ch rillS r:o-c firing but being kept ready
:::'l>e h:>.tte,Ho,1 C:J, II 3D, 132;'c IR nho pas very security conscious
o::-rlL0"Dod Or'e i.<hoi:o r,r.~G;:e. '1. b'.:.tch ';,')0 ShO'?lCd him just A. little too
long. Tbel'o ,,as onc.y one bowe on this oblique which TIe had sus
pected t .:~ };i:~ CP.. 'l''h.is 0:: C'Y.TSe confirmed our suspicion. When
,-'0 fin:-.~l::l (;.)jJ.froLtOG l~~ LJ. ": i~t all the_ illformG.tion WG had of his
pas :'ti:)l.S :-:..1':.1 his :-ogh c. nt ~ iJe ric,s EO sur-p-;.:iBed t:2Ln.t he:, Dade some
cor:.~ec ~:i.Ol1S and also ga.v-o t:s r:_is battali-:>t.l is boundary rJhich we
d:i_d:: ~ t :., 870.
..
c~ .~:.,-~t~L)':r oc C::-.C _"'.
~ J:'3-0rter pho '30.5 unable to orient him
self on C"I. r;:;e,p fir;alJy ;18 .'(Y,; ,;~rcc1 a f'a:niliar loc~ing tree on air
photos and 1"CiS ,'luI" ::'r'c':' ."C'," to le:td us to his compar.yl s strong
,Joi'1t, s!:,O',J ,13 " Li 1.] :":':.~ c. -'.J". ;'rant- of it and the ditch their
petrels nS'Jd '~o get tl"'C',lC;L ttis mir:e field, and vc.rious other

"'"iL

-.j

.. 2-3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

installations.

~e

have orten been omazeQ how much ot the informa

.,:iOll got:':.e1'l from PW's g'1d air photos ohooked. A comparison of the
1.!lE. r,ll tt.e ANZ:() Beach"leac. an gotten from photos with the one ob

te.ined from PVi l s "bowed hClrdly any variation.

Another person lnth whom closest liaison should be maintained
is the Order of a"ttle man at division. Most of his information
comes from i.r'~."I'uga-;,ion of PW'.s, at the same time he will supply
the interroga"tOr with much of tl,e information he needs in order to
interrogate, It is the intsrrogator's job to supply these missing
links for the O/Bls p:i.cture and he oan only do that i f ho. knows
"hat is missing. Captured documents, too, are used to great ad
vantage for this purpose. In fnct so much information has been
attained from documents that all unita are reminded at every op
!)ortunity to turn in imm9diately every piece ot paper found. Many
Gorman gll.'l positiona have boen neutralii/:ed due to some seemingly
obscure pieb of paper found on a dead German'or in an abandoned
OP. Unfo.tunatoly, wo are still having occasional trouble uith
sOlNenir htmi'.ers keeiJing enemy diaries an/! overlays.
.
Inton-ogation technique could only be improved by actual
practice and much gas learned in this respect, especial~y after'
1.e got /l. cle:tr pictur(l of what information 8-2, and G-2 are after,
and just ~7here and hO\1 fie fit into the picture. We found that i"t
very oft.en works out better if 2 interrogators nork on one Pi'I at
the 8:lnlO til1lo, The ma~,n ~_dv:>ntage .being th."t it keeps the PiVon
the top, net giving him too much time to think, and also 2 inter
rogators can think of more than one. On the other hand we. found
th:lt it o.ften lmrks out very "ell to interrogate 2 or more men from
cino company at the same time. At SAN Vl'r'TORE one of our patrols
brought in 4 PW's and, "hile their stories checked, every one of them
gave us different loC,':!tions. We finally got all 4 Of them together
nnd by letting them argue among themselves obtained the correct' ..
information, 'lh1ch"as later confi.rmed. On another occasion 2 PW1e
from tho 7th Company, 211th FGR .'ere brought in togetl:or. Sinca
both had Polish nawes Vie took them on together. It turnod out that
oro rlas a Polish Pole, hnti!1: the Germans and was forced to fight,
'7hile the O"\od:' ,; ,nc::'dGl'ed himself German a:1d was art ardent Nazi.
Our fea.rs 1.10::." tl;e J.!azi w')\lld ("xi L O,JT "'11::.11ng PW proyed unni9ces
aary as the t"o wanted to show each other up and tried to out-do
each other on the alJvunt and exactness of inf'oTI!lation they had~
Only tmtncd inte:c'!ogatc!'s shadd be pe:rmitted to interrogate
PWI S In 'one instance a PF, betng inter.roga'Led at a battalion OP
by a German-speaking soldier/'said that he hea:rd the Germans tlere
3:xp3cting our c.-te,,", !'.: any t:iJT,(l. The s'JJdier, 'knowing Germo.n, but
not being l',~mil:Lar n~tn r.uEtc.l'Y eXP-'"Ol'J.]iOl.S, reported tlmt the
Gerl:1cns ';Gre goin!i: to 'l~t[t"k. Since om' troops actually planned
an attack (it "CIS thon n1EUt r:-2ClU'l" minus 6) it was cnll.ed off. ~
WLen tho P? r'Alched re65n,cmt the irrcerrogator detected the mistake
and aftar 'hig;ler ho:vlq'~"..r :;srs TIere notified. plans' for' our attack
'Jore r"",,;I.lOQ. . Mu~;h va2.";"o:"le time 300 effor t could have been saved,
h:;,d this Pl1 been immedic.t.'1.y evacuated, as directed. On another

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

occ:u~ion, a PEt s p:!;r"0.ook r!0,S cxar:i.r-E:d an~ the P.'! was rop0rtod ,~s
be1.onging "GO a di;]j.:ii;-~n ",~;hi8h n t. -the t.:i.:n(;! "7aS sup:)osod to be in
=ilis rIe,: idG2"ltif:1_c'~i.'t.:i6n ~'lbd e'rJ81'~!l:oj;T UD to co:r-ps c:'.nc1 h?-gher
h02JJjl 1.fli."'':'''',_ '''1 J ~: 0:,";"-;_ t-~;,..~.:,. '.I,Jl.. ~;~'- -)-,he 28e~_j~F-jnt.sl intel"""'rcgJ.tor found

RlfSSl.t1...

out "ella s

..l,-,.:.~~.:;

95 :;th IR

'1r'~C''''

",J. '~"'j:l
_

-'

l:).-t:1 ;1[:,(1 ';,b __u:c.l(-.r.Ctl

J.~

.'J-:-.
.........,
, ~.'--J.l

to this uni+,

b-.:t.

~.'ms

"!'''''.':>''~~7
1-.~ -Tn 'h"~t -.-Jor~'l'nu"!=!'"
............
r-c.;.
.....
~-c

,"c;.)

'._~

.L~,...

nOiJ in the

sector"
~

h. Eg0+:.;~,~}Jt.,':~~~)L?~~-<1'=:':-' , ':'}--e:; "" ,)]3 .1.E8.:"'rl'.3J in rho'Go :.Etel1.igence

embrace, for the pUt~:;r);J2 (J"{ ;~:,~s ]' 'l='.) " tHO tr ~.31s ?nd e",:'" aI'S directly af
fecting interpxot'lti0r:.. :.~~ a di,ri::L.cn" Lt. is folL th'"'.t sUl"i'ic~.ent rJOrk has been
done to permit recolTUJ1endaticns ~.-8 to r::~):--..,t '1S J::~l:"l omolo;,r:i:'lC:Tt of ~orsonnel ~.nd of
aerial photos.
Lioutenant Colonel H'J,j3},';'
Division.

n, 1)::::S 11kR,~IS,

H:3adquarters 34th Infantry

I1Aerl.::l phO-G'::'3 -viers not. 6xt.sD-"Jively userl by this division until

the Italie.n, Cro\)rJt:3Jgt:, 'dU'3 to a~ SC',~t'0~ty 0";:->' trained grour).d force in
tG1"pro-t'G':C3i~
L-~tc.rpreti;'~ ~s ~,;,\~l'a:1 (~~:l' :':;ig -c:Je beg:iL"::l;i.ng of the ca,m
ps.:i.:-gn,; af!3:\?;.'~'.:d -C') diylsiop.s, 11r!t1 .9.t- ri' l'7t8'!' uat3, by this div
i.~ion:.

Q:3sj.gned

r.:lg:',,:nC),"2ts i:l ~11 i,~~te:(I:r1~~ to fulfil tho aim of'

phot.o 'i'ntolJ";.go'nce :!'_'1 .i!J.:-uin'5' at, tt.3 ,I?,,1,.XiJlI.lIIl amount of rru1:it:~ry

ini'crs~2tion ,i il" tho ;:i1rtimuEl {~l:.r:~~
'r1;,lO." of:(~{!GI'S 2.n21 t~V10' enttf6t{3d ID8n '~l.ro' rcqulrod, 8.t division hGad
qUo.rl-,0Ts~:. .7hose' duties ni'c't'o '~,HiG1J.re u;:, all ti!TO th:::.t'su'!Jcrdin:".te
1L.V}its h.l'~,ro ,-::r..o F::'op,or';'J?hoto cever.:.:.go at .tho '.righ~, tirlo", They 'provide
such ~;.n~C)r!1rot":~ion ~nr~. st~lc:iJS 'is rG,:~uirG,d by:r a,mT
divisional unit,
'.".1
organi,_ o!' [',:tt~,ch~d~ \'i'l10 have 110 ~,~h PGrsonnel~,' Division artillBJ."Y
hEm.dquo.Y't0rs req'ulro~ the sQr:!?c--,:~~'0f ,:1,n officor of sUDorior ability.
hiE ;'lOrk "ill \Je,coordinc.tod ,;;th'divtsio:l hcc,dqnarters and 1"ith thE)
couD,ter-bc:t;'c~:,;r section of co:-:rs .~91' ~o:cfirnntion ,9,71d corrGct:;d 10'
cntlons. ClosfJ liaison ookenn Air D1" and photo officor should be
SOP.. In ;}:.1S manner m'anr Uni:10n-tified objocl,;J on p1:~otos U?y pr:ove
to be target,s cf ~.J:~luec
In groat d8marld bj", the J.l,tillarY are 6-inc~1 v3l"'tic::tl photos,
blor:l1 'T? 1:.0 0. L~~l';"G of ':/25/';00 i. ~h 3n o.rbi tr2.r~" grid$ These phot,os
provo very vo.l-J.l.blo ;s f:i ~'L.l~ ch '1r ts.
Each inf'~iT~":-Y reg1.;1et1.~ /1"'.8 "!. r.l'1n of suff:i.c::ont Gbilit.y to do re
cognition, genoral tc,,",i;1 nt,xlios, aad h'lnd18 nhotos fo~' tho join
i,tig of mosaics ~ As -:,0 ~..lh~Jt11GJ,'" tL~,_,'3 ::J1.n should be ~':'!1 officer or n
9

,.;J.

I ]

non~'CCL _.i~si0nf;d oi,~': '.:";1'

i3

c'.~b:-::t.::!:le ~

DU"C hd shculd be of sufficient

Ga'4 h['l,b us,~d "V-';Y i. c;.l.D ;3;" ~dio8 to very good ,;,dv.~.LnCrtge. in detor
mining '..'1--31".1'.18,(' ~15"8 SI1-Pp\y 0~nd' EY~7"~,cu:..tion ;-iill b9 D;!" truck, rule or
mo.n. PF ir..-tf1:!.70g.. ~\:-,.:s n.ra oh'Co::..inj1.1g o.c0ur~,;.to iufo:'lYJ..':1.tion bo;y"'ond bG-'
I'ief b:cT tho liS'3 0:' '1i..:' ph.:.:p~os, ,'J:id 5.n par-(,ie.-111.1!' the US;) of obliques.
Tho use' of ''lir I11-:otot~, bv t:h -Vcyt:"cJ,l o.nd- oblique j 1,'!ith our o':Jn
p.':'.trols c::.t.-:1;1.C"1t 1:-e over3~!lfhnsi3ed" ',TlJ.3Y p-::oovi,i2 b!y~h :J. good r.:ediu~'l

for the rU0St::,oni' " of' tho p'l'crol upon its roturn, 'end for d'Wlight
pe.trols to rccorc th.9ii.. routo Q.nd observ'ltions 1,7hilo on their f!:is;:1ion .. ,i

- 85

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Major ARTHL'RJ. I'ETERSON, 31+th D1.vision 'l.rtillory.
A tr'1""nod air cor;:>s photo int8rprGter ':lns uttnched to divisi,:m
c.rtillor" hoadqu"r'c,ers uJr1.ng t.ho oporatior.f, at, CASSINO. This in
nov.:.i,tior:, .]Ol"~,\.(~d :-. ce.11C'lltJ.y T:com it.s i.nception :::nd definitely r-,roved
tho V,"1'-'0 of }-;::lYing the plato ir:t81'pr(,tor in r:,ysical cont .'.ct c;ith
t..~_O i:'-)opln ',;~~o GCGTd rC:lCt r.':~"'th mi~lirl}llir. del::::.y on his intorpreta.,.
tions , A!'o,,,.,q m"'.0.8 susjJ8r;T.. by shellreps lJero r(~fc::rr8d ').t once to
- the ph0to intoriJrotGr an-4 i~1 s-:)mo C'1SGS fir8 :72,S urought to bCQr
on the onorrry b~'(:" tG.l~,T (Je.t\; "-8 it :~<ld c0'1.s;Jd firingn Tho intGT
FcotGr \7 '.c nls0 of gN.ot \''111'3 to t.h3.S-2 in sclocti1'lg harf\ssing
miSG~~ 'Jns, locat.1.~'.,; r. ')rt~).rs > (-:n,'.~_ in m:"l,k.ing torro.in studiGS for
futur:J positiol1F .. !J

Maj or EARFS C. KAL, Be'ltlq"arturs JI,.'ch I!!f:mtry Division.

j
f

"Ever sirJce the ,,?'try of the 3!.th Divis:'on into ROME it bocnx.1(l
npP2rJht tL l"t tl'8 Ptlrtisl'.r..s r.:ero n. probl~ to be dealt ii'ith if SGCu:r
i ty :1.nc lex; [',.r.J" order f\lere to be t'.uintnined in di visional ~rClflS.
Very little \,!l~ k~1'::~";,:1 of th0Jl1 ''l.t -the ti,,1G. They r.. erG ~n ovcrz0,,11ous
group} CtlrrY'ing v'.ri0us seyts of arr.:18 ::~Yld without propor h'J.r:d.ling
might be a Y:1en::tce to our s:)curit J" cor":unico.tions o;~ suppl)! as woll
C'.S R. SOUTce of ter:::-or to civilians. .'.t becun'io necesso.ry therofore
to d:.nl vith thorn 'cS suer.
On or '1bOi~t 30 Jme 19M. t.ho CO'.lffia!'lding C:encr'l.l, 34th Infantry
Diitisic!1, "Q.tL,:t~hod A"<Jnt GEL'RGE IV1E}GiI?~A.~J cl t:lO 34th Division CIC
as 1Li~30n t'liGh MID Section, 34th Division, both to r.'ork dir(lctly
nitl: the P'lrt.iJans through C;-.2 and Q-1 m:d to deal \Iith them ~s nn
ind.ividuQI cU.I'isionalproclom. Tho method ~nd plc.n of procedure ,IUS
l::lid do-m 'It 'l conference b0tY,een G-2 ::Ind G-1. It ~I:"S considered
thr.t this urr::lngomcnt \1ould help t'.3.inta:.n security '::ithin di'.risional
bour..d"'_ric~!< ri':1~.d: :"-"'18 Il'"'.t'Cl,l"'[,:.J..::l.: n. GIG function, o.nd would Q$c:;ist in
m,int~injl1g l'",",nd ordor ~ruo:1g th" civil popul'ltion, Vlhich ;Jrs a
nl1turlO.1 AUG f"Inct5.on. The Si,ihrity of coverage between AEG and
GIe made 'Lhis an idec.l ::~T'r:.111g:-1ent"
As soon as '] COF.;J:une .:.5 t .....'ken by our inf.. .ntry J :1nd in many
c,';.ses sop3r~t8 frr.c't).ons :::~ corrrr'.1Jr..Js, rye hC':ld a TJ8eting '.-:ith 0.11
re!C'lining offit'ia.ls '"s \"ell ClS ;,ith profess,ior,::\l men and othor 1cnd':'
ing c i tiZOllS of .(,~.. .. u:-J[~u.n'J ~ Ii1c~nded in this twet.ing etra the
leGdo,"G of the Pnr~i8,"ns '1r.d the CL:.T to whoM pe express the Commnnd
ing GGnOl'~l' e ,'1Pl. .J.'G\..~i3tic1. fo:."' their o.ssist'1nco rtnd the hope th.':l.t
they tJill co:rcinuo to 'lssi;::;t. -JS.. r'G explain our rasp8ctive mis
sions, solicit t~'1eir c'.')op:3r;~,tion .'!nd tJ.k(~ the necessary d~.ta re
quisit.o to the propoS/." functlo'1ing of hot:1 LiVe 1:nd GIG. 170 oxpl:.::.in
th-.t tho C on"lu'1(~:;'ng Gener"l em} th" h11ied lJi1.li'cary Government ClrG
responsible for tLe Government of thail' pe[>p'Q ".t this time and that
tho P,'J.!"t,is."cG arq to 1 ny down th8il' a.rn~ in ordor th:\t penc3 rr,'lY
bo rostcrGd once' :\gain to th'Jir peopl'3.. It is recognized 1 hOPGver,
thnt in all ins ..:tnC3S in which 110 enter :l town there arE) eitl10r
Gormnns in the urol] in hiding or Fascist enemies. Conscquently, wo

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l:e.vo kken '\ prr'octical vie,v Clf the problem rndh~ve permitted tho
l' .'.rtisc.ns, for tactic,""l and military roasons, to retain their nrns
u.ntil our CP moves be,'ond their town; On 9 July we inspectod tho
entire roar bound,..ry of the LIVORNO Province nccompaniod by the lea..
der of the P~rtis~ns and h'\ve found the Parti~ans in the rear arona
dis2.rmed nnd without insignia, leading fairly normal lives, yet re
taining their org::mizntion '."Thich enn be called into exiatence 2.ta
moment's notice. However, most of their arms have been taken up and
t,hoy do not ho.ve nccess to them. We have found, though, th~.t in
communes closer to our fory,ard CP the Pr'ortisans in many instances
rotc.in their r'ome in spite of the proclamation and the notices to
tho contrc.ry. This should ]x, no cauae for nlarm, aince lllc".ny of
'~hese l'r.rtisans nre c:ll18d upon for tactical missions with our
combat troops or to mcJ<:c security nrrests. Moreover, the armed
PC.rtis;cl1s J;!ove forrrrd ns tacticnl troops advance leaving merely a
,3!ne.ll skeleton policing g:"oup "Ihich IGys doml its nrms when the
Carabinieri nre cstablishod.
Aid given.us qy Partisans.can be divided into two phases:
(1) Civilian; (2) Military. Under the civilian phase the Partisans,
n:i. t;l the cooperation of the CLN, maintain an intermal police force.
They make security e~rests ,and report known Fascists and suspects
dan:;erous to the security nftha division. They sen4 squads behind
our infantry or 1'Iith our infantry into embattled towns to prepare '
the T:ay for us. In many instances they inf'iltrate into the towns
under cover of darkness before the infantry arriveo, assist the
infantry in their tactical mission, and thereafter maintain inter
nal order. 'I';~e Pertisans and the eLN maintain offices in the com.
J1ll.Ules'l.nd in eacn tOlm, for it is a rare occasion when the regular
. officials are present. In short, the only government we meet as
we enter newly fallen cOlD)Jl1.Ules is tbe goverruaent created by the
Partisans and the CLN. The Committee of Liberation aelects the
:nayor and supplies .us with t'Ce essential dnta. The Partisans
assist ,dth the evacuation of civilfans fl'om embattled towns; they
disinfest the civiliens; they bur,r the dead; they distribute food
s>Gores and aid in the resettl?lTl13nt'of refugees. They assist in
taking Care of thdr O"n: i';~unded and infirm by establishing and
maintaining emergel"!.cy ini'irnari.es. They check on all refugees
within a tOml rpr securHy purposes; they maintain lists of refu
gees so that they rr~y be properly housed, fed, and given modical
attention. While most of their 1"IOrk is not a highly finished type
17hich l.s mtural to cont8lr.platc ina .\1e11 organized group, they
successfully perform the set-vices we ,ask.
From thfl mili+;ar:r sknrlpoint thoy. have boon of recognil!!ed as
eis'i;anceto our dtvisiol1. TLo Partisans are selected by US to con
tact their groups in ter:'itor;<r oc oU:;',i.vd by the Germans and inci
dentally to gather positivo jnteEig~nce for our division. They
~,dvil3e the' :for':lprd PartisLns t.o, e;wect the coming of the Allied
1'ili kry Government inth, fu.ture und they explain our mission so
tI12.i; thEN n,.." preparciJ. ..'h',n '.".'e arrive. The Partisans h(lve
..gona 1'6ruaJ:'d u:1.th our tacticnlunitl): "I) ;3cQ1lts"fl-nd gtUtl~,
nndmany np 1l"!.terProters . They 1!l!lintain gu,ei.'!illa, utdts itr
tho mO\W.'tnins all, Il1!ss~or~ npo.rt i"rcm our otlO .d1visiontl3.

UNCLASSIFIED

t~ctical mission.
to!J!lS'1g~inst the

UNCLASSIFIED

They maintain units for ~ighting in

GormnllB. In PIOMBlNO, for example# i t ws
estimated by their leaders that as a result of a pitched b~ttle
betl1ee'n the Partisans and. the German forces over 150 Gerllians >"Iere
killed. As previously stated, they maintain units for the internal
poliCing of t01V1lS newly taken 'by' our troops and trose already oc
cupied. Thoir sqUD.ds go fOrl"'l.I-d into areas uithin our divisional
boundary, combing the territory for hidden Gerllians and wanted
Fascists. ~e have found the Partisans of GUARDISTALLO, in VADA and
in RESIGNANO SOLVAY in search of Germans and Fascists. They' ell:
plained they were a Part of a roving !Squad. The Partisans are also
used by our tactical units as anti-sniper squads and mopping-up
squads. In CIVITAVECCHIA, for example, the. Partisans were put into
cur i.n.fa~try ~~:w.ds to P:Ol' -lP :rel".a1.ning German elements. TlI!a Part
isans beside<! scoutillS the countrYllio.e constantly, bring to us
enemy prisoners of war and,return escaped Allied prisoners of war.
Limitations on aid to be expected can be outlined as follo1'lsl
a. They ,:ir" not highly organized so 'far as delegation of
pm,er is concerned. Theil' leadors do -most of the work.
b. The~are usually poorly clothed.
c. For tactical missions they are inadequately armed and
generally.short in 'ammunition.
d. Their food supply is inadequate to maintain their organ~
ization. For example, in VENrURINA their leader explained to us
on 9 July that his ,organization disbanded not so much for lack of
arms but because they had'no food source.
0.' The tactical infornntion they bring to us is often
tardy. This may be due to lack of transportation facilities or
communication. The lack of transportation can be -said to hinder
the entire organization as it no" exists.
fo' Most le_aders of tho Partisans andCLN are not accustomed
to municipal administration, and though therare eager to help us
and their people they grope in confusion.
g. Tho fQct that Germans hold civilians as hostages is
a deterrontto the functioni!)g of thePa.rtisans~ For example,
in MC1NI'ESCTJDAIO tho Germans Massacred 65 civilians . Vie saw the
doad and four cameTP,S from G-l sect.ion recorded the scene of the .
dead. The Paramount News c,meraman JOHN DORED, photographed the
dead, and war correspondents on the scene have a record of the
sarno. tt

g.

Psychological Warfnre.
Major ARTHUR J. PETERSON, 34th Division Artillery.
liThe division was comerned roth psychological warefare
through the distribution of 1J'{'opaganda leaflets by light artillery,
British 2-inch mori;nrs) Air- OP, and 9~tr,ols. Beginning shortly
after the first -crossing 'Jf 1o"e VOL'! URNO hundreds of propaganda
filled shells were directcd~t enemy positions with ,not'iceable re
sults. A good percentage of P'J's had leaflets in their possession
':hen c3.ptured. In addition to direct!\ppeal leaflets, a weekly

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UNCLASSIFIED

nC'.'SF'.D,.. r, Fr' ntpost, for G"rm'l'l sDldiors 1'.'"1S firod wcekly.

The
.fol'.o"h,g Lotos are a ;'08,,1 t of experience gained from firing var
ious types of p:'op~.;:a21da sbBl1s;
a . Ob:::;erTT!~d f:TO ShOtlld be used for firi.ng propaganda
shells ).1' at all poss:tble because vari.able winds in the target
area '11al:e it diffie111t to predict the area in TIhieh leaflets will
fall.
b~
If it beeoro0s nGces~ary to fire propaganda shells 1.i3ing
umobserved fi.re, the follo.-:ing -fadors,' gained fron observation
~."-' c 'y'~ ",-1-: n. :1f ,:: ex::t:ri :;"3Et a1 :'ir:ing, ]'!lay be used with a reasonable
eoc)8cto.tbn of succe36 and i.n any case should be considered in
prJparir.g ~nitial dda for observed f~r8s.
(1.) The c1if:"ercnce iI, "eight between propaganda shell
and norrcal shell must. be t,,'(on into 0'YC :'c'eration. This can be done
by alloviing a dHference of cine square for each 6/10 pound dif
foronce i~ .':eisht. Usnally ttis "'Iil1 vlork out to be minus 9 or
1C sql1.s.rps for l05rrlTI shell. Tbts nppears excessi:ve for accurate"
shoot.ing but has ';iorked o,t very satisfactorily' in practice. Shells
must be weigtcd at the filling point for different sized..leaflets
,md the infor;~at.ion trivento tha 'mit f i r i n g . . .
.
(::::) Ir,itial cla+s. for shell fuzed Bith M-54 fuze may
.
be con,"ute:1 b:r apsl;rbg data for normal time shell for a height of
.burst of 100 c'ards and using i'uz() setting from firing tables. Be
yond time r&'llge fuze ill-54 ls.s bU3n fired on impaot .,ith varying
J::osuJts, g011<)::'.qlly U!!s"tisfactorily. If the angle cif fall is steep
enough leaflets are SO!.:-3tl:"NJ U,rocm into the air and an area about.
50 yards i'n diru~eter covered. Ire one case tho leaflets failed to
.sopar'lte and Vlere thro"n cut 'n a 8jngle bundle. The M-67 fuze has
-l'Dvod sati s fl::ctory for l~ng range firing and it is believed that
a large percentage of propa,J,p.rda shell packed should be issued
r:ith !iI-67 fuzo. 1.5 se,cod" ad(ce>d to time of flight will give a
fuze sotting that 'cd 11 "!ork for alr:lOst all ranges. Care must be
uS2d in setting ',I-t7 :f'u.,s to insure good results.

S3rgeant DAVID J.' JONZS. EEladquarters 34th Infantry Division.

":> ':':',:--r of pdtl8 3:,eci3H~~; s;oends all his" working t.ime learn
in;:: '/;Y:'J.t th3 -cner:-;:r, ~)ut in. tl"<3 31~t:h Division the chief lesson
]:G,rnod by tha.t earnostst:ldentconceI'rling his metrods has. beon
tho obvious one - namel:', tS focus. all intelligel)C8 sources on him
.. ~JGlf :.:!.7.1d then to chcc~ onb. a~-::ai.nst: anctb8r~.'' "The second most impor
t,:;.. :'lt J.3S8 on bas bea!~ t.o'l'l-:alize nO"':1 nbc,::ssai7' .it- is"; on occasion,
to 812..:1 I I dontt kh~'!!i' ~ ;
",.' ....
. ...
.~t tha A}'ZIO B<:'achhead it is considered that the high degree
q~' accuracy in the final !,ict-brG sho.cel'lthe soundness of these state
~10',t". start-tng .'dith th" information 'tl!ikenover, f:rom the relieved
d:vkion ever;/ item vrt:'.ch could amplif,y 'our cknoViledge of. the enemy
on 01];:" :'ror't r:as studied. F'rom th:> first, the closest contact lias
kopt.:! b tb~ ;;hoto ~ntor2TGtors. Tho offices of tho two sections

UNCLASSIFIED

U NCLASSI FI ED

adj oinod and the pel's~nal frien,dship of the persons ooncerned "as
a great help. A cheerful yell from- the photo man' I've found tuo
very h8fl-V;)" mortell's!' \lOuld at once stillll.llate the OB man to ans\"ler
(if ho cou:I,d), 'Yeah, I told 'you the 8th Company of the 956th GR
just mo-,:ed intb that aTea I . If he could ~ give ,such an answer,
it u-,s un to hiE to find out, so he Vlent to see his pals in tho P1'I
interrogation tG(\l1S, who 'Ciore frequellt callers, and briefed them on
the dosired infon:::1tionagainst ,th8 time when the infantry c",ught a
:->i80n;,r from tl:l<':i sector concerned. Radio intercepts, agent I s reo
,nr"i;n, inform tioll from 'pc;trols ,',nd 'deserttl"Swero sifted '"nd, by
,~H:mination, the gGpS in allr ltnowledgowere est{l.blished.
In the couree of mnny conversations with G-3 personnel, missions
rere arranged to find the m:i,ssing' items, and it 'ilas during th"," e
talks that the phrase 1 I don't kmm' came most frequently from the
OB man. Finally, as the time car;,3 to prepare the plans ~for the
breakout, from, A:1Z:tO, the gaps had beon narror;od. 'I"donlt knOYi l
had become 'I tilink so', and tbe final estimate of the f-inal esti
mate of the sH'latiori ,;"8 publicbod.
.
,
Puzzles were plentiful - ,chiefly, that furnished by, a drunkard
from tho 9th )"GR, 26 J'G Dj'Tision phose statements, 'under interroga
tLm, on the movc;';~nt of his unit r1y,coda question mark on the map
for Y'eeks.Y Jt on tJ::(l stre:Jgth m2rGly of' such' a report. it ,"auld
have been hig\Jly dangero'.ls ,to nss;me as some did. that a Panzer
division- h~vJ..on+.,::!'ed the line. "
By good luck, tll" fir;',l result obtain0d Came very near t,he ,
true pj.cture. as shown incQ ptured documents after the attack. E:ach
sktemcnt or estimate mnde had S0::13 ovidence to support it and
GuesserJ "~lore plainly stated to be 3'.1"h;
Undoubtedly the most encQur,igitJg feature of the mole, phase
,-'as that, 'by. CO'1stant sr:appiDg of informatipn and b;y-frank discus
sions ~'Jith all sorts of people', for example, ,battalion COl:llllanders
and patrol leaders, some not fntellige'nce special-ists at all, it was
pospible'to fallaH-up leads andqu'ite often, to arriVe at the cor
roct ansrJer.
By contrast with the jJg-saw puzzle method, outlined, above,
at TJi.C(QUH1'lA 11e had adomomtre:ti<m of- the sudden death method.
Eero, the origin 1;'lS a ";arning from higher hc"dquarters based on
secret information, that the 20th Luft,laffe Division (a nel"; arrival)
",3 expectud to 0ppOS8 us.
1"::thin a fo'il hours, prisoners had been
.,)mn from almost 'every' cOJ:l::tpn,' in the one. regiment which was oper
,"ting in our sector and the Order of Battle picture ',Jas completed
soc.ely from PW inter~og'ltion rJports overnight."

.. SJ ..

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UNCLASSIFIED

CFJtPTER VIII - PERSONNEL

1. The lessons prosented in the previous chanters have to do with operations
and technique employed in fic;hting the war 'vlhilo this f1:1d ')':'lpt8~' has too do
-;dt.h t.he individunl fip,hting rj',~n and h:i.s problecl~
O:j(j of {lc r,':i.,jrcst lessons
learned by the individual is th~t C0IJ"lrJ.:t1UOd disc0mfor "Li.; n-:;"t, e !\Ou8f:),k'::'"""
requisite t.o g[lin tho status of a ')ut"'J.e-hardcnec con.bat ,~o:;i:i(Jl', T;,0 ad"ant
ages of 0. feather bed in 0. villa over a pup..cent en the grouild arlO "onn 18<oogn
ized as tho soldier loarns to pres ()rWl himse.Li for the period in whicc klrd
ships are unaVOidable.
,il..

Replac3mont Procedure.
Lieutenant Colonol HfffiOLD L. 8T IPP, Headqunrters 34th Infantry
Division.
"Just prior to the st,"rt. of t.ho offe!lS',":,'1 to break out of the
ANZIO Be'l.cbhead an ()ver-streagt:l of 150 officers and 750 enli~ted
men was ass~gned to tho Diyision ine>nticip8.tion ot' fu1"i.tro lGf'ses.
The purpose ,WetS to qeter:ni!:.3 1:co+lur this would ftlcilo.ta'c,e ):'c.pid
repln.c8ment of br::.ttlo :.tosses ;-l21:1 t'1 dote,r'Y:::i.ne ,inet}-~e".:" cl1sh '1 mGt-hod
of replacement rwuld bo nrnTe effGc'c,iv,~ ratllGI' ~hD.n reC:E;:i)t ai' ;;.:wall
shipnents of green recrui+,s, Viith the resulting imme6,;,e to u:cili:OEl'
tion in combC\t 'mits. Tho 750 onlistod. men >:ore nss'lg!l.ed G'{h".:~y to
each infantry regimGnt ;:i th il)structions thC\t they be pl:\ced Ina",n:;.~'
in rifle compnnies to insure battle innocubtion du:r:ing the Q(,foJls::'ve
phasG, uoo just prior to the opsnl.ng of the offcnsi,0, inskuc;',ions
wera issued to e'lch ragimentnl cotnmnndar to form El replacam':n+' co.:!..
pany. Thosa replacoment co!opanies consisting of ap"roxim"t0Jy 25Q
!Jon ,:ore withdra'.1n to regir.3nt L'').r ochelons, to bo held in redd
inoss for L~ediate replacement of battle losses. Vhen bc.ttla losses
occurrad, the regi::l8Ltal c cmr;u-,ndcr then drew upon his re'}lilccments,
alwll;'s l'laintaining t.ho fiS'ht.ing stron"th of his regimont at or very
noar tho authorized tabla of organiza.tion st"ongili.
The extrn officors, consisting of about 40 per infantry regi
mont, Vlor8 not a. prtrt. of tho reple,cement compc,ny but. were assigned
to comp::tnics a.nd c..ct1:ally ntJ'+i3:Jd r.rith the companios in COrtlDc''j ..
Th1.''!'ty "dditional offic8I'3 ino:'.uOing 20 arcillcrym3n, "Jero ,,-ssigned
on tho basis of 5 f~:. 'J cutt<,bu; the otbor 10 being utiJ.b3d ::'n
sorvice 01mnent.fl of '\~r:3 >:'CIL"!!~'1d -.Jt:cro thG need n.:J.d becoELo GVldo~lt.
T110 numbor of u:Jliti,):l:,i oiY i 'lCl'S assig;:!ed to riflo cO!Jpani,)s should
3 :frG~)~.rod,.
::f cr.Tlc:~v"'~_~.,'; .}~~Q i~;di~Tid'J~,l in D.ct"L:.o.l c0nb<1t for
0. short period vlhor3 t~:J' +,~TPG of ,:tc+,l'Jn permits and then 'i.dtb-~:"a1J
ing him to the regi'1c:~kl n,r ochelons for 'cltiliza,tion CIS loss ro
pl~\corllB:1ts J; provGc:1. :)xt:ror,"'Jly s'].tie f;:l("toT.r and secIDGd to bo an iI::
p:::rto.;J.t ndV[li1CG in rG:[lnc.JIDcnt p.rc,coduc.
First, i-" is an i.w"ln'1blo 'l':'tl in tho training of roplacements
in thGt. it providos then tr(\il'j,De ',1nd conditioning in the p:rusonco
of bc.ttlG itself, co,:J!]on to t.he, conditions in lvhich thoy 1/ill fight.
be 2

(IS

n.

triini'".1.l'l[} --;;":""1;..,1

~bis by~tD:;n

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S8condly, it :orc~\r~~d.e2 -f0T Emal..l re8erves to naintaJ.n combat

strength and efi:ic).e:wy fc>r 'r,G'1Q:CaJ days 8rter in:i.tLtion of the

attack .. ' vrren '-it is mest n8COG ~id!'Y t:;' r... ninta.:i.n d.r~';',9 a.nd momen-GUID.

TtT'Cl~";~l.OU::; til] A:<:7.iCI ~~E:.ch["~e3.Q' ~:re,i}-:~..tfrf'ough a,no c oDtil!tir.~tion,

of the, "advance -to, PI:"~~~_~ ~,dQiGloY:ial T'81>,_[j.C9~_:lel:'+,3 ':;reTe 2~tQi"1'Jd :1n
groupe of 150 to ~-?:.j) ~ af\J E"_:b-- '::,lJ".o':!2-\;'sd '~~o regJ :~0i]'',j~, ma1.B.G0:'n :.ng
in each anove:c-stl'ength of ?50, It is trUo th<lt i.n a'l extremely
l'apide:dvp,.nce it is more c:if"l "'.LIt 'to maj n'tain l'epla"8ID'mt <.:o',lpanies
2.$ such and one 01" t\:i'O mj.l1l)T broak-:J.OYinS O'JcuT.'x'ed in trH? ?r'o~cd\l.::'e.
Tt:rou.gh ex,erience r;;.ined i.ll figLtJ~ng r~!1rl the r;l8.i.l~li~lg of opera
tIon ofreplacm:,ent cc;np'.ni"s, it is con."i:ior})uthat a u~it of a
tot:o.l strength of 750 enlIsted n;en, infan~"'J, attached 100 the l>i.v
is ion, is t.he better p~.an ~)rov:..c.itlr the llecess:p"t:l overht!od J:o!'.30nnel;
administ~~'>ati()-n f'!K1 ~.ai:r..ten~lnca eq1J.:'pment can ~G mc.de av-Hil!;;.ble t.o
the Divis~_on Comm,.lnder... PreE.'~nt. -'r/:2 -alJ.owD,nc3S do not. perr-d.t the
cpGr13.t:.or... aocl !taj.ll'SGhr:;.r;C{~ Q~ 'sn 1.,)Tg(3 a group a.s a sepx::'2.te unit.
Officer persoll,")"J. J'Vf trdnine ad;ninist:'ation can be obtained from
su:rplus a.ssi8)t'l9~l oif J_C8TS ~ i.f '~:~l]'J prr.:.n::ice of a. sur?lus i\~ t.~ ~e
maintcd.p),1~
F"~s~7..r ~~l1iB B,+ L~.cL.e,5 t'nit tr.e:i.."'e should be 3 replacement
cotlp,~ni.8s - on;) d.l.lo~o.teo: to 'JnC~l :r3gL"hent..
This provides the reg i
me~tal.' co~~:~:.d'er 7'?5.tll .a~ OP~'?:T..U~~t;r to t?t&te m~n in a. s~c.te of
~3:ar ,8J:n.at'!.St:;.o:'l. ~ ~'c:=-l Cl,1g Tl,',:;' ',. :,i,.-.ll fr0sn man ,1',11.ih G:. m:::..illDr~l"D. nmount
of .0,Q,tninj.strative det.~:,ils
I~ p!";:; ~ ,~,. ;.:,.r' op:)Or~unity to t:;.J.in re
plac(Jtl(mt groUps, 1.n thORO chbjec,t3 Y;L~ch are couaidoredlws t necos-..

S8.ry for th:J.t :'egimont: "j, t. the t.i::'i.c; hO~;8or.1'3r, tbe unit r8Ir!13.71'...i!lg

under' t,he -Divisioli COT::r.:.ant.L~rl S oentro:!.. I-c A.lso provides an op

portunity for the men to becolYe ar'quainted with the regiment in

.:hieh. th<;lY will ultimatClly ser-:r8."

"It is dif:;:'ic:ll t f'or"n cf.Nee!" '.cUhout cOD;but mrporience to ta1{o

0VG't comrflflnd of a pl;J.t.oon i~l ':: bD:!:.tlo w:!.se combat experi9nccd outfit.
Ee ~_s subj Gct to his own dO'.-bt,' arid mis:;i7tngs- as 1',011 CLS to the
doubts and miB~:"vir'fS of t,]:'1:"; !fl';';:l1 '.u1dGr .him.
He may be fa.ced V"lj th tbe ~lJl'jblGln' of' taking' eomrn:"',nd of 0. rifle
:IQ:t";"l~!f ill 0. '~i.i:13 CrJI:l:::'1.Dj .. rit,!1t in: tho' rn~.ddJG of tin ntt[l.'~k"
His
l~:i.'('di~f,.mol:t ~ny bo fa:!,:,tbnr .co;:~plioo.t~~d by tbo .fact t1:o.t c2.:. ~'.:"8 pnf't
O.i:tJ~;.ri::.JJ.Y...' o ~1~~8 'Jee!'. l:''T:~tl)'l tb st[1.ff J.1("Jsitf.:::;ns or.' a Eo,l,dt:t~,~ucY.'s unit
. ,.1.1.'.'.(-...0 L')t'rral t0nQr:,;1C./ .ti3 to" ,t:tsmpt to str~ss his !lbil~.ty by
takinG J..:1rr{!o3.ia:~o 1::-.1'11.2,,;-1:5,,"0 in tl~f; attack;r an attitude of "iI'.j,
sho.T-:::V.0U a'.~.l ~"~8 gryi:; '.','hr:"lt :::'1: trk.;9~. TtG rcsll.lt is gt':l1.3rally
ono off"_clJ:' Ctl...:l";..-.a ':I~y - J.n.t~ fr '~ . ~1.~ :Jnt ly fd:i:..' ll.
" ,";.B;amcjJ:IO~ ~~l,' 1 ~ ~'j':-') 1.;='~J.i\>~... -i .:....!(.:.::J Dom~!:~,t pL, '.toen c:x:pccir, tl "r..;'.'.l
ri3cru~,:5I' -' t".d.:'.:.~ til~~l/ s ";1;']:( J:-~j ~3 -'-;'0 'bis" It.On - t.o p:::rson~:.ll:Y' bo the

fhct Ir,np '';0 jomjlouT, - snd he,d the:issaul:t of tI:o r0gil,).JI;t on Hill
~ Ump cy .,:'JmrJ i."
. '~ "
~-:..,~
.:'~0 ::':i~?Cr:t.Llg ~-.i!1i 1/';, to '0,::3 Er:1.Jt1 :;.s ho is nnd qs SCJ.rod ns
hq '. i~h L'(7. ~'1il!. . bo h;:>/t;ing "tJ:,:; g~outl.d overy tiFO he hears r:. srel1
:g') over:,un~il.somCi b-"ck ",:c':'.v:te ~ c;isu:tlly ffi~ntior.s "It's OK Lieu
,tCinant'-.thoso o.~'e cn:.'6 '~s':.'r". "';J:" to 'gl'Get Jorry", Fell' bottor

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lot. hi;:;J. .... 'trl,ko' '1 df)Op br..::;:..;th - ST"'11!_O',i ha.rd for fi,re mtlutos
forgot all the sal'~ting - 8.nci Gating outs and ohm,ings - ho usod to
bo so good CIt hick in th,; Skt.os - Gnd tknk tho Ind. Lot him find
out nho ~mcnf{ tis n0:1-C()[1S [:'-""': thn most combat exporienco - '1:;ld
loetrn U.oir sscr ,t.s. l~iYJ t!'om fn:}. ~'. - donI t bo :.fraid to
t:J.::o and ask th',,:'.r ,~dv:'.c:,.Donl t try to' be ::1 ;:orld buettor - tho
first for'! dnys" - tl.ke it o,:.~.sy - .~Sk 3 lot of quest.ions ~1nd leo.rn ns
f.:'.i'.n::r <111Sr,''Jrs n,s po::wiblc. V,fit;1 luc1'" on his sido ho m~J,y -l".st th(j r.:ook
out. If ho le.st" tho r:cck - he; 7:Hl h::w suuneno.ugh- lo.wned
onough - md d 0l'.O onough - :en U [l O,1n nn.tur'll ':lay - to c;,rry him
tLrnugh - from then on ind'Jf',.ni:':ol;'."

h. BQl:l:tc~J;1ont Trdl!1..::lli.. P'J,'crts 1.)Cdic"\tG thC\trop1'1comonts, ,~1~hough

improving, still nro mt .:. C"'083 s'lction 'of the rr:::m brougH, j.ntci the'servico.
They frequently are in n lO'.;or AG c1~ssL'i.c:.ltiGn tost scoring bracket und do not
mer.sure up to thG'lbov~ :\vcr"'\c'9 phyric'll sknd'lrd "'.'hieh should be Cl requirerrdint
for nIl infantry units. All t.oo frc.q'c.r.'~" ",};L pJ.'lCC)S 'C.D ,\dlliticmnl burden on
platoon lC~1.dD;r.s and nO.'1-co!!l:ni.ss'ic,ned offi.ce:!';.:; aD L~,jl1 o'f thij co.libGr do .llQ..~
nlnays ho.vC! nn 3gg?~sive iT'1.ti~:.""..:.jVl; -y .rl J"'L~'::;_lt:j jon e'XcDsSivG c'lsu.'.ltit..:.s. In the
maj 6rity 'of c~,~sop t}:lG unJ.Y trDJ.ning l::,c),:~.r~g is l}~,:~tlG ox"qorionco.. Ho', \;::vor nn
excessive 'lcunCirity profoss' ignor:'lnce in U", nso of 'cGrtrcin \'Ie:lpcns. I t is the
concensus of'o: ~nion of but-tl,} tr'5n,,(~' I..'Ji;1 II ,.itl-vconsider:1bleexpurio!1Co
th'1t 'men 'lssignod to 'ln in',.mtry cor.;?,,,,::; ,,",u,s' bo [lolo t,) US} everT VI3'lPOn Clssigned
to the compnl'\Y :lfJ they YJill be, :;orc~d j.nt.c " ~osition in "hich ttoy :nust use them
sooner or b.tor.

"I have foqnd tl:."lt recant rBP1ccc8::>onta lack s'.lfficient kwmledgll

of :1\.1:r,cr;-;-: t ic ,:-:o':l.pO~G. T~.! 'i -::' .,:~E. ~ S ::. V..Jr:! irrlportant t;":;npon ':nd shaulj
be Gtr'JssG~ 5.n bt~sic tra:1.n~ ::f~. :-7()ct replacements doni t h6.vG tho.
sliChtost id3a of hOff "- !"ifl" cn,ck sowlds ;.;hon firod in his dir
ection. Gormnn '.7crt~On~ oh-..'!.':. k~0. -:~sDd for this typo of trtlining
so t}-~,.'l.t tho' indlvid'J.'-l.I 8()2->:'~':"~.'r (:0.n 6J<:'1+~~"'--'5sh thorn by sound, In
oth-~r wcrds tr').i!:.icg s}wl.l.ld ~.nfJlc;dc ::::jre of battlo drills ~lith over
hoced firiJJg.
Lc.st bqt not '.GtRt, Ul0Y tuv.J D.'. ie!laonc,r t.o bunch up on thG
mcrch or othu!' ;;'or:r:n.ticn,J. \1

PrivdG First Chss DA!iIEI, R. BI.J;CK, 1?3:rd Inf~ntry.

PrivntG First Cli.ss OLENN Ii. LtJ''E, 133rd b:::1ntry.
lIi;.1":'.ny ot- thJ'-rri,jn that Cf):-.!C: t.,,, thi.s' COID:pc..~J t::'.:..J'o novor firtad the
RHle'Grollade, Thuy sh'nld bo 1I'.e.deto firo t.his Vie~'0ori ~efor() ..
boil1g ;3c~t. to co.mb .It! "units'.
C?lC th1ng tl-! ... t is V~;T/ 5.rr:pr:-rtant in copb-:1t, is m::.p '1nd compass
:Gc,di:?[C. Tho' inf'1l1trjronhccnllunt 'do6s not ge1J 'enough 'of this

':,r,dm.ng.
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Fil-st Lieutenn.nt DONAW C. JCJ!NSONj 1:;5th Infantry.

First LieutelJant CLIPTON 1I. FARNUN, 1.35th Infantry.
"Thera is not enough training given for scouting. It takes a
brave quick thinkltJg l!nrl'to be a ~oodscout." 'l'he type of men Vlhiob
we are l'eceiving as' repl,'lcemontsnt present are very poor. It, seelIlll
that fI'Xll"YlDan th.. . t is incompetQl)t in other type units is put in
the ini'abtry. lM,1I r~lllts in the high percentage in ctUlUalties
nmong platoon leaders and good non-e6mmissioned officers. The
Plntoon Leader has ~o be first scout and also lead these rcplaoo~
ments up to n fighting posit:J.on persoon'J.y or they seem to d:J.eappear
nbout the t1ine you need them most. Half' of II\?' platoon at present
has hnd different trainL~ 'than that of an infantry rifle company."
First Lieutennnt ROBERT LOOER, 1.33rd Infantry.

"All men in the squad ~ould be ,given an opportunity in train

ing to lend the sqund. 'I'he replacement private of today is the
hUO of tomorrow 'in cOr.lbat."

k M9];;:W? It is believed that the \'Iord 'IDOrale' is the, most miil~used

in the olTicta;L language of the U.S. Io.'rmy. 'today. Actually it is far more than '
the
snows. and do~hnuts,the 1<ord scums. to bring to mind. It is confi
dence in seI:r, ~it esprit, apd a 17iH ,tocarrJ out orders all bound together
by 1lll.pEll'io:r leadership. The former should 'b" properly called cntertaill!llent
and haB its proPGr place as a modiua to role,x the individut:\l thus simplifying
tho installc.tion of a high st'lte of morale. It is w(,ll to note that in vietory,
h017ever su,.ll. the engagement, morale is highest, uhile in defeat it !S at its
lowest ebb.
'
'

u.s.o..

SOllond Lieutclll\nt l'WY L. HUMPll!UYS' JR, 135th Infantry.,

"There has been a lot written about morale since tho-startef
this uar.
I've seen the effoot ot U.S.O. shows, mail, food, etc,. ThGse
aro all big items but the larg<lst factor in combat is leadership;
eepecialJ.y that diBpl~yed by platoon leaders and IDO's.
.
an the front'there arc innumerabie diffioulties auch as bad
, \'leather,' poor food, ~nd long m:lTches to mention a fGlw~ '. Y/l1en rl unit
has baen on the line ~or a long time these' thip~s grow in importance,
teadoo:-s, muat be ongunrd :and 1IIUSt nOt allorl thoir men to believe
that they are getting a rrlTI deal 11
..
,
Ii' the loaders can instill in their men an aggresBive spirit
and maintain strict diBoitlline' thro\U!hout the cam'Paign they ..ill
find the morale of their inen lot higher when the campaign nears
a oonclus:!.on."

g.

Appointment. Promoti,lO, Al7nrds and

Recl,o.s"ifi~ation.

Lieutenant Colonel HARom L. ST!PP, Hendqual'ters 34th Infantry

Division.
" '
,

ot

"Enlillted men appoint.eq office:rs on the field ot battle because

oute tanding performnnce of combat duties, have proved far more
"

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competent than replacemont oficer~ recoived. This iSl;lot due to

lack of ability in malW Meoa of replacement officers, but due to
lack of experience ,'which can 'onlY' be gained On the battlefield.
Reportl3 indicate that men are far more w:l.lling to folloTi battle tried
enlisted men who are commissiotled, than a new replacement officer.
Reported confidOOOe in lenders gained. frcm this source proves th",,'\'.
fighting efficienoy of the small front line elements is ~catly "
improved. E:l1:parience w,ithin this CO!lll1lll.nd has proven that no bc.tt,lc
field appointeeh~s ever been re-classified for inefficiency or 'in
experience. rlhile this is not trUG of officer replaoemonts received
through normal, replacGment ohannels.
There are a number or instances in which privates, prc's, and
t.ho lower grade non-commissioned Officers are holdinl:l' down positions
'Ihich c!l11 for o.\1igher grade Il,!ld that they havii' dOn.a so to7,' con
sidorable periods of time. due, mainly to personnel of'the proPer
grndE> beil)S rotllj,ned on the rolls of tho organiz:ltion lihile not
nctUilUy present. This is belioved to b8 dUe to long term hosp~
italizo.tior1, faiLtt'e to fill rob.tj.on '''::'Qanoi06, a)ld personnel on
temporary duty to the Unit3d 6t'ites under the fUrlough policy. '
This situ.':1'\;io)1 creates a sonse of unjustness when it occurs for a
protracted period, also Q. l!Jenseof f:ltilitY' in th"t they perfol'ln
their job under extremely h"z!l:,dr,IlS conditions yot oannot obtain
the TC1'InTd fOT it. ));ru:isted personnel in front line elements are
extremely con8cio'~s of this, and. it is believed th~,t general effici...
onoy could be promoted by ost(\bl~Ung 'lsystem in uhich theso vacanw
eies OOllld be fillod in Cl rOc)'s')r,e,bly .s1101"t time.
601\10 roports received ;"nC!.io~,te (\ feeling th'lt an insufficient
number of awards and deeoT,,:ti~!ls ',ro boing presol+ted to dosorving
porsonn01. 4feel:i.ng hels ocr.mrred that meritorious awards are re
jected because of teohnicc.l;l.tJ.es ar-d thl. t t,,,>o r".,Ilny reoommendations of
n~ iU'i[ll'd 'are being rodUloo to 1GS Bel' ''lw~ds by tpe he C1aquarters
~"uthorized to'pc.Sl! an these matters. ' This. tendellcy ill often common
to tho individual ';:hen not' eOl'lllideted in the lig;rt of the uhole
co.mmand. It h'ls pOSSibly been true dthin this OO!lll1lll.nd to some
extont. ~J!:treme a:(,:(,orts hwe peen exerted to oV'erO'Ollle' this' feel.
ing, More and more awards I)ro boir,g oonsidered. and In9re and mo.re
granted as time ~sscs. It has beon fo.ur~ necGssa~ to. inaugurate
intensive selling, c,'lrtlpaigns to in~urc th'lt j)ersonnel ,of the command
observe acts of hel'oism and make o.ppropl'ia"',e reconur'3nd'ltiollS. This
campaign has rss\llted in llnUY f.\.\la:rds th::lt 'i/ould othorwil!e net have
come t.o light~
,
In ordorto. ,1e1d an effic~a."lt f~"ght~ ,1ln:!.t, thos", who arain~
effectivo, IlIedioo:re, nOIll-agrsrJssiva, .,o.~~w;i:t,Jio~t' prqfessional !mo\1
l(Jdge, must beel1Jll1nat'ild . ,Repo:t"CI1, $'oc9h~ed, !:rom bot.h offioer~, and
men bnvo ISt:r;el:tsoo th1s 'p<'1int, and. believ~,t{lnt . a", mol'o liberal. sY'stem,
of eliminating the t:'Pe Of o::t:icor ''ll:!9v~,:i:'Qf:ei':i:'ecFtol be ina.ugm'atad.
It. is furth~ tb!;l concensus' of opi::d,cl'l~ c,,;>t' rQolas5!ific~t:\.on shoUld
not qo.; USeda8 apUn:b!bmant, ':ihien ;it is g~kara!;Ly believed to bo~
but' as Il method of. elilllitiation.f::;omthepO<\l1:tion' iO'i7hiob they can\,
nail fill r,nd pla,cel!leot in one t.ha:t, they are a):ih .to handle. Howover,
it iSa ~thel' opinioli\ th"t. they IIho~, ~ot1;le, given ISOW jobs Iln

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rear echelons and oermittcd the advantages of rapid promotion.

As in the cas; of' ofi'icars '" syetom should be esto.l:ll1a8Gd
by ~hich misfits, incompetents, those ~ho haye let do~n beca~O of
cxtreltlGly long periods in nct,ivo ,combat, can be rec.ssigncd to non..
combatant units, eliminatod from the service, or other disposition
mc.de of them, upon a recommendation of !l1dt 'commanderS concorned~
This u111 insure a ~ximum efficiency in the front lines, creating
greater drive and follow-through, resulting in the taking of ob
jectives with less casualties. Thls has long been a fault in combat
el()ments in which no adeqUate answer has yet been found and shout
which tl1ere :l,s constant compla!nt and oriticism."

- - - ....

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