G.R. No.

79538 October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner, vs.
THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF
THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS
DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.
COURTS, J.:
Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a
letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another
letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of
Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber
license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the
Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was
issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public
bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3)
the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs
found in the concession area [Annexes "6" and "7" of the Petition; Rollo,
pp. 54-63].
Petitioner made the following allegations:
(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement
designated as TLA No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was
issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except
prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an
area of 54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province
of Nueva Vizcaya* from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990;
(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development [hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"], Director Edmundo
Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in
Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging
concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant
to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of
Natural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex "5" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 49];
(c) that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the
Bureau, the contents of which were as follows:
PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU ARE
REQUESTED TO STOP ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS TO CONSERVE
REMAINING FORESTS PLEASE CONDUCT THE ORDERLY PULL-OUT OF
LOGGING MACHINERIES AND EQUIPMENT AND COORDINATE WITH THE
RESPECTIVE DISTRICT FORESTERS FOR THE INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT
PRIOR TO THIS ORDER THE SUBMISSION OF A COMPLIANCE REPORT
WITHIN THIRTY DAYS SHALL BE APPRECIATED [Annex "4" of the Petition;
Rollo, p. 48];

(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it

immediately sent a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos
which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support
thereof its contributions to alleging that it was not given the forest
conservation and opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its
logging 531, but no operations (Annex "6" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 50
favorable action was taken on this letter;
(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000
hectares of the area formerly covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to
Twin Peaks Development and Reality Corporation under TLA No. 356
which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed
to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal
award or license; and,
(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies
of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. Acting on petitioner's letter, the
MNR through then Minister Ernesto Maceda issued an order dated July
22, 1986 denying petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timber
license was not a contract within the due process clause of the

Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever

public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not
discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten
concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983. Moreover,
emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in the
provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposed on
April 2, 1986, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request for reinstatement
has been denied in view of the total ban of all logging operations in the
provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao which
was imposed for reasons of conservation and national security.
The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great
responsibility it bear [sic] in respect to forest t considers itself the
trustee thereof. This being the case, it has to ensure the availability of
forest resources not only for the present, but also for the future
generations of Filipinos.
On the other hand, the activities of the insurgents in these parts of the
country are well documented. Their financial demands on logging
concessionaires are well known. The government, therefore, is well
within its right to deprive its enemy of sources of funds in order to
preserve itself, its established institutions and the liberty and
democratic way of life of its people.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforestated order reiterating,
among others. its request that TLA No. 356 issued to private respondent
be declared null and void. The MNR however denied this motion in an
order dated September 15, 1986. stating in part:
xxx xxx xxx
Regarding [petitioner's] request that the award of a 26,000 hectare
portion of TLA No. 87 to Twin Peaks Realty Development Corporation
under TLA No. 356 be declared null and void, suffice it to say that the
Ministry is now in the process of reviewing all contracts, permits or
other form of privileges for the exploration, development, exploitation,
or utilization of natural resources entered into, granted, issued or
acquired before the issuance of Proclamation No. 3, otherwise known
as the Freedom Constitution for the purpose of amending, modifying or
revoking them when the national interest so requires.
xxx xxx xxx
The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development, has
jurisdiction and authority over all forest lands. On the basis of this
authority, the Ministry issued the order banning all logging
operations/activities in Quirino province, among others, where
movant's former concession area is located. Therefore, the issuance of
an order disallowing any person or entity from removing cut or uncut
logs from the portion of TLA No. 87, now under TLA No. 356, would
constitute an unnecessary or superfluous act on the part of the
Ministry.
On November 26, 1986, petitioner's supplemental motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Meanwhile, per MNR Administrative
Order No. 54, series of 1986, issued on November 26, 1986, the logging
ban in the province of Quirino was lifted.
Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the
Office of the President. In a resolution dated July 6, 1987, the Office of
the President, acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. The Office of the
President ruled that the appeal of petitioner was prematurely filed, the
matter not having been terminated in the MNR. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied on August 14, 1987.

Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari, with
prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction, on August 27, 1987. On October 13, 1987, it filed a
supplement to its petition for certiorari. Thereafter, public and private
respondents submitted their respective comments, and petitioner filed its
consolidated reply thereto. In a resolution dated May 22, 1989, the Court
resolved to give due course to the petition.
After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Court
finds several factors which militate against the issuance of a writ of
certiorari in favor of petitioner.
1. Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and
executory administrative orders does not constitute grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and
orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and
binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res
judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of
the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of
general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of
a matter once determined by competent authority acting within their
exclusive jurisdiction [See Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956);
Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; San Luis v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989].
In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the
MNR [now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) dated March 17, 1986 and April 2, 1986, respectively, sought the
reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest
Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as
well as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau
to private respondents in 1984.
But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies
under the law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, for
attacking the validity of these administrative actions until after 1986. By
the time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly
appointed Minister of the MNR requesting reconsideration of the above
Bureau actions, these were already settled matters as far as petitioner
was concerned [See Rueda v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 106 Phil. 300
(1959); Danan v. Aspillera G.R. No. L-17305, November 28, 1962, 6
SCRA 609; Ocampo v. Arboleda G.R. No. L-48190, August 31, 1987, 153
SCRA 374].
No particular significance can be attached to petitioner's letter dated
September 19, 1983 which petitioner claimed to have sent to then
President Marcos [Annex "6" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 50-53], seeking the
reconsideration of the 1983 order issued by Director Cortes of the
Bureau. It must be pointed out that the averments in this letter are entirely
different from the charges of fraud against officials under the previous
regime made by petitioner in its letters to public respondents herein. In
the letter to then President Marcos, petitioner simply contested its
inclusion in the list of concessionaires, whose licenses were cancelled, by
defending its record of selective logging and reforestation practices in the
subject concession area. Yet, no other administrative steps appear to
have been taken by petitioner until 1986, despite the fact that the alleged
fraudulent scheme became apparent in 1984 as evidenced by the
awarding of the subject timber concession area to other entities in that
year.
2. Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ
of certiorari in the present case because he failed to file his petition within
a reasonable period.
The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instant
petition is whether or not public respondents herein acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing
to overturn administrative orders issued by their predecessors in the past
regime. Yet, what the petition ultimately seeks is the nullification of the
Bureau orders cancelling TLA No. 87 and granting TLA No. 356 to private
respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively.

Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial
recourse to have the earlier administrative actions reviewed by the courts
through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause. For although no
specific time frame is fixed for the institution of a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must
nevertheless be done within a "reasonable time". The yardstick to
measure the timeliness of a petition for certiorari is the "reasonableness
of the length of time that had expired from the commission of the acts
complained of up to the institution of the proceeding to annul the same"
[Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No. 56761, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 566,
571]. And failure to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period
of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal
consequences of laches [Municipality of Carcar v. Court of First Instance
of Cebu, G.R. No. L-31628, December 27, 1982, 119 SCRA 392).
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto
has either abandoned it or declined to assert it [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,
G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29; Seno v. Mangubat, G.R.
No. L-44339, December 2, 1987, 156 SCRA 113]. The rule is that
unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an
alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of
the right itself. Verily, the laws aid those who are vigilant, not those who
sleep upon their rights (Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt)
[See Buenaventura v. David, 37 Phil. 435 (1918)].
In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the
assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner,
throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity
to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time,
its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount
to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these
orders will not lie.
3. Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a
writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public respondents
herein. It is precisely this for which prevents the Court from departing
from the general application of the rules enunciated above.
A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent
Minister Maceda of the MNR which were ed by the Office of the
President, will disclose public policy consideration which effectively
forestall judicial interference in the case at bar,
Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of
implementing the policy to develop and conserve the country's natural
resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber
license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under
the previous dispensation. In fact, both the executive and legislative
departments of the incumbent administration are presently taking stock of
its environmental policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands and
developing an agenda for future programs for their conservation and
rehabilitation.
The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to
the renewed and growing global concern over the despoliation of forest
lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced
ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be
disputed, most especially in this country. The Court takes judicial notice of
the profligate waste of the country's forest resources which has not only
resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and fauna peculiar to the region,
but has produced even more disastrous and lasting economic and social
effects. The delicate balance of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle
of floods and droughts has been triggered and the supply of food and
energy resources required by the people seriously depleted.
While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and
to meet the country's immediate financial requirements, the more
essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in
a viable environment demands effective and circumspect action from the
government to check further denudation of whatever remains of the forest

lands. Nothing less is expected of the government, in view of the clear

constitutional command to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology.
Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious
problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the
judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that
the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of
such agencies [See Espinosa v. Makalintal, 79 Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v.
Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905
(1960); Suarez v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19828, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA
461; Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G. R.
No. L-21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Villegas v. Auditor General,
G.R. No. L-21352, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877; Manuel v. Villena,
G.R. No. L-28218, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 745; Lacuesta v.
Herrera, G.R. No. L-33646, January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga Bay
Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA
80]. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private
logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the
pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court
recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government
in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and
manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the
privilege of utilizing these resources [Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R.
No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183; Lim, Sr. v. The Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-26990, August 31, 1970,
34 SCRA 751]. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege
granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require.
Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due
process of law clause [See Sections 3 (ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No.
705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548,
October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more
than suffice to justify the Court's refusal to interfere in the DENR
evaluation of timber licenses and permits issued under the previous
regime, or to pre-empt the adoption of appropriate corrective measures
by the department.
Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding
alleged irregularities in the issuance of timber license agreements to a
number of logging concessionaires.
The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources,
if done in contravention of the procedure outlined in the law, or as a result
of fraud and undue influence exerted on department officials, is indicative
of an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of the State's power to regulate the
use and exploitation of forest resources. The alleged practice of
bestowing "special favors" to preferred individuals, regardless of merit,
would be an abuse of this power. And this Court will not be a party to a
flagrant mockery of the avowed public policy of conservation enshrined in
the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, should the appropriate case be brought
showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of officials in the
DENR and related bureaus with respect to the implementation of this
public policy, the Court win not hesitate to step in and wield its authority,
when invoked, in the exercise of judicial powers under the Constitution
[Section 1, Article VIII].
However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents herein, the Court
finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the
affirmative reliefs sought.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

OPOSA vs. FACTORAN (1993)
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a
balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and
"inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether
the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed
before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,
now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined
by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the
Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and
non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in
concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural
resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new
Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered
upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as
a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of
the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who
are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The
minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be
rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
or approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under
the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000)
hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which
varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures
which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial;
scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis
of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent
(46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses;
the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as
(a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise
known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)
salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt
water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of
Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the
volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic
meters per annum approximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique,
rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of
cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a

critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of

drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing
velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers,
(i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the
absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and
shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation
and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and
catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global
warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and

healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as the parens patriae.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of

continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence
in the course of the trial.

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's
to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16)
million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's
land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more
than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of
the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin
old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of
the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature
and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have
granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to
cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging
purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is
hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per
annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources
after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and
irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the
plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident
and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced
and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their
successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this
rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment
of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of
plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the

defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant
a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as
Annex "B".

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's
is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors
who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and
devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the
Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy
of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which
man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with
each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the
State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and
wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)."
(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources
(sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
(Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind
the natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation
and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other
than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a

Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1)
the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised
by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990
Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint
shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory
and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against
him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in
the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of
the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set
aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents
of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also
joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a
cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right
to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
(Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating
the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of
man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation
embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's
correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the
people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged
grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs)
to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial
question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's nonimpairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in
this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even
if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled
that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so
requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to
allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the
complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
"protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such
allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They
then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly
addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They
therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to
court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would
ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that
the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once
issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for
twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be
revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice

and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry
laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative
of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural
matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The
original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with
this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is
indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and
general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the
court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned
interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the
said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to
the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors
assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can
only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right,
as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in
its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia,
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall
now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous
consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments
adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and
rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court
cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that
plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of
alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are
seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are
seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore,
the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions
and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail
to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being
impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy,
may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to
the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal
branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how
we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do

otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by

the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed
to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a
specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading
of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of
the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under

the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those to come generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining
life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this
right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner
Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the
section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all
forms of pollution air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment
necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same
and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be
irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of
the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization
of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino

promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which

expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands,
mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas,
and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of
all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure
equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the
following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure
the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including
the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable
access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of
the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value
system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the

Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which
reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino
people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent
with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the
different segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound

ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically
speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher
authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall
be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June
1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152
(Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a
continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and
other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c)
to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a
life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the
environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the
other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under
its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192
and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said
right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty
or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they
claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires
that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;
and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the

ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question
submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point
for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to
be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true,
may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in
the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the
rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the
absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct
appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted,
what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens,
there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the
statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly,
the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the
cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as
party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a
political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or
legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
22

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, Mr.

Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of
judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred
as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of
judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of
the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court,
noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even
less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even
the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is
the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The
court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how
we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by
the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not
shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his
motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would
have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue
and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders
because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect
the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of
changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was
aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber
license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No.
705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President
may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession,
permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded
by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property
right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.
In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or
public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license
does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property
rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs.
Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition
of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it
can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by
the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent
or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest
products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require.
Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due
process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No.

705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548,

October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which
reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

The first and third case, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were
originally assigned to the Second and Third Divisions of the Court,
respectively. They were subsequently consolidated with the second, a
case of the Court en banc.

27

cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are
contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because
by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed
in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs.
Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not
meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public
health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the
exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New
York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of
contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern.
The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference.
But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to
the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work
them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the
public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the nonimpairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract
would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with
respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July
1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The
petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants
the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 123784 June 18, 1996
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief,
Special Actions and Investigation Division, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), ATTY. NESTOR V.
GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H. CALLORINA,
JR., respondents.

Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352

Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a Lumberyard at Fortune
Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was
duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest
Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-0925900469. Its permit as such was to expire on 25 September 1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty.
Vincent A. Robles were, during all the time material to these cases, the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and the Chief of the Special Actions and Investigation Division
(SAID) of the DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra
flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the
petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of
foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said
lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out
from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322,
loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and
dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and
transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo
and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue,
Quezon City. 1 The team was not able to gain entry into the premises
because of the refusal of the owner. 2
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from
Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date
from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts,
trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and
approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa. 3
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's
lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the
remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total
volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce
upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary
invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the
invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and
origin. 4
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the
owner retains the physical possession of the seized articles. Only an
inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or his
representative. The owner is prohibited from disposing them until further
orders. 5
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles
requesting an extension of fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the
required documents covering the seized articles because some of them,
particularly the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province
of Quirino Robles denied the motion on the ground that the documents
being required from the petitioner must accompany the lumber or forest
products placed under seizure. 6
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report
recommending to Secretary Factoran the following:

1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's

Permit of Mustang Lumber, Inc. for operating an unregistered
lumberyard and resaw mill and possession of Almaciga Lumber (a
banned specie) without the required documents;

As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed

with the RTC of Manila a petition forcertiorari and prohibition. The case
(hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No.
90-54610 and assigned to Branch 24 of the said court.

2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard

including the truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and the lumber loaded
herein [sic] now at the DENR compound in the event its owner fails to
submit documents showing legitimacy of the source of said lumber
within ten days from date of seizure;

In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a

complaint against the petitioner's president and general manager, Ri
Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O.
No. 277. After appropriate preliminary investigation, the investigating
prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed down a resolution 11whose dispositive
portion reads:

3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang

Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if the circumstances warrant for illegal
possession of narra and almaciga lumber and shorts if and when
recommendation no. 2 pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV. 458 as
well as the lumber loaded therein for transport lumber using "recycled"
documents. 7
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending
immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-0925900469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days
why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles
informing the latter that the petitioner had already secured the required
documents and was ready to submit them. None, however, was
submitted. 8
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after
reciting the events which took place on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he
ordered "CONFISCATED in favor of the government to be disposed of in
accordance with law" the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan,
supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside the petitioner's
lumberyard. 9
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a restraining order or
preliminary injunction against Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and
Atty. Vincent A. Robles. The case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE)
was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 of
the said court. The petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1 April
1990, without any search and seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck
with Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted lumber consisting of
apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different sizes and dimensions with a total
value of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of Secretary Factoran of 23 April
1990 for lack of prior notice and hearing and of 3 May 1990 for violation
of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No.
705 (The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended, were
committed and acting upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order
No. 897, series of 1990, a team of DENR agents went to the business
premises of the petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo,
Manila. The team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber dealer
although its lumber-dealer's permit had already been suspended or 23
April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's lumberyard was open, the
team went inside and saw an owner-type jeep with a trailer loaded with
lumber. Upon investigation, the team was informed that the lumber
loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to the petitioner's customer. It
also came upon the sales invoice covering the transaction. The members
of the team then introduced themselves to the caretaker, one Ms. Chua,
who turned out to be the wife of the petitioner's president and general
manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was then out of town. The team's
photographer was able to take photographs of the stockpiles of lumber
including newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting machineries
and equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded with lumber. The team
thereupon effected a constructive seizure of approximately 20,000 board
feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in the premises by
issuing a receipt
therefor. 10

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that

an information be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal
possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of
almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in
violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of
1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts,
trimmings and slabs covered by legal documents be released to the
rightful owner, Malupa. 12
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H.
Bello III, who served as Chairman of the Task Force on Illegal Logging."

13

On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991

by the DOJ with Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy
Po with the violation of Section 58 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL
CASE). The accusatory portion of the information reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent
thereto, within the premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in
Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully have in his possession truckloads of
almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and
shorts of various species including almaciga and supa, without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations. 14
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its
decision 15 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:
1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation in
favor of the Government the approximately 311,000 board feet of Lauan,
supa, end almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and seized
from the Lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune Village,
Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is
hereby set aside and vacated, and instead the respondents are required to
report and bring to the Hon. Adriano Osorio, Executive Judge, Regional
Trial Court, NCR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the said 311,000 board feet of
Lauan, supa and almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be dealt with as
directed by Law;
2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate
action before the proper court regarding the Lauan and almaciga lumber of
assorted sizes and dimensions Loaded in petitioner's truck bearing Plate
No. CCK-322 which were seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2, 1990
shall be rendered functus oficio upon compliance by the respondents with
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment;.

4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the Lauan, supa and almaciga
lumber, shorts and sticks mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this
judgment be returned to said petitioner is withheld in this case until after the
proper court has taken cognizance and determined how those Lumber,
shorts and sticks should be disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search
and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving
out from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded
with large volumes of lumber without covering document showing the
legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate
that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant. The
situation fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions where
warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving
vehicle. 16 As to the seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and
lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled that
the said seizure was a continuation of that made the previous day and
was still pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant issued by
Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even
question. 17 And, although the search warrant did not specifically mention
almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was valid
because it is settled that the executing officer is not required to ignore
contrabands observed during the conduct of the
search. 18
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May
1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the
Government for the reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to
the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio they should have
been returned to him in compliance with the directive in the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the
trial court ruled that the same had been rendered moot and academic by
the expiration of the petitioner's lumber dealer's permit on 25 September
1990, a fact the petitioner admitted in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL
CASE to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP
No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a
Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings based on the following
grounds: (a) the information does not charge an offense, for possession
oflumber, as opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, and even grantingarguendo that lumber falls within the
purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence
against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b)
Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST
CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves
the legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial question. 19
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and possession thereof without
the required legal documents is penalized therein. It referred to Section
3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the
definitions of timber and lumber, and then argued that exclusion of lumber
from Section 68 would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to
minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid
denudation of our forest resources. 20
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, 21 respondent
Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the motion to quash and
dismissed the case on the ground that "possession of lumber without the
legal documents required by forest laws and regulations is not a crime. 22
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18
October 1991, 23 the People filed a petition forcertiorari with this Court in
G.R. No. 106424, wherein it contends that the respondent Judge acted

with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash and in

dismissing the case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision 24 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 dismissing for lack of merit the
petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and
affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues raised. As to the claim that
the truck was not carrying contraband articles since there is no law
punishing the possession oflumber, and that lumber is not timber whose
possession without the required legal documents is unlawful under P.D.
No. 705, as amended, the Court of Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest
product involved has always been foisted by those who claim to be
engaged in the legitimate business of lumber dealership. But what is
important to consider is that when appellant was required to present
the valid documents showing its acquisition and lawful possession of
the lumber in question, it failed to present any despite the period of
extension granted to it. 25
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the
Court of Appeals in its resolution of 3 March 1992. 26 Hence, the petitioner
came to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No.
104988, which was filed on 2 May 1992. 27
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a
decision in the SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing the petition
for certiorari and prohibition because (a) the petitioner did not exhaust
administrative remedies; (b) when the seizure was made on 17
September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber, as its
license was still under suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under
Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and (d) the seizure was
justified as a warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No.
705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which
docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No.33778.
In its decision 28 of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of merit and
sustained the grounds relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the
SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on the definition of "lumber" by
Webster, viz., "timber or logs, especially after being prepared for the
market," and by the Random House Dictionary of the English
Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or adapted for various building
purposes," the respondent Court held that since wood is included in the
definition of forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under the
term forest product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee
can seize the forest product involved in a violation of Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705 pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775,
which provides in part as follows:
Sec. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. -- A forest officer or employee of the
Bureau or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall
arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his
presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate,
in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense, or
the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process of committing
the offense.

Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80

are the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest
products or possession of timber or other forest products without the
required legal documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of
Appeals in the resolution of 6 February 1996, the petitioner filed with this
Court on 27 February 1996 a petition for review
on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.

We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. No. 106424
with which the other two were consolidated.
G.R. No. 106424
The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No.
324-V-91 on the ground that it does not charge an offense. Respondent
Judge Dizon-Capulong granted the motion reasoning that the subject
matter of the information in the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is
neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, and hence, possession thereof without the required
legal documents is not prohibited and penalized under the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an
information may be quashed on the ground that the facts alleged therein
do not constitute an offense. It has been said that "the test for the
correctness of this ground is the sufficiency of the averments in the
information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted,
constitute the elements of the
offense, 29 and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the
sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
requires, inter alia, that the information state the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as
well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found.

Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection,
or removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein
mentioned without any authority; and (b) possession of timber forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But
conceding ex gratia that this omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber
from the section's coverage, do the facts averred in the information in the
CRIMINAL CASE validly charge a violation of the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible
conclusion that lumber is not solely its subject matter. It is evident
therefrom that what are alleged to be in the possession of the private
respondent, without the required legal documents, are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa.
The "almaciga and lauan" specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not
described as "lumber." They cannot refer to the "lumber" in no. (2)
because they are separated by the words "approximately 200,000 bd.
ft." with the conjunction "and," and not with the preposition "of." They
must then be raw forest products or, more specifically, timbers under
Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:
Sec. 3. Definitions. --

xxx xxx xxx

(q) Forest product means timber, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum,
wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest plant, the
associated water, fish game, scenic, historical, recreational and
geological resources in forest lands.

It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the
information. The public and the private respondents obviously
miscomprehended the averments in the information. Accordingly, even
if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted
above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the
information validly charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his
dissenting opinion that this Court go beyond the four corners of the
information for enlightenment as to whether the information exclusively
refers to lumber. With the aid of the pleadings and the annexes thereto,
he arrives at the conclusion that "only lumber has been envisioned in the
indictment."
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition
violates the rule that only the facts alleged in the information vis-a-vis the
law violated must be considered in determining whether an information
charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to
justify his conclusion. On the contrary, the Joint Affidavit of Melencio
Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, which is one of the annexes he referred
to, 30 cannot lead one to infer that what the team seized was all lumber.
Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four
(4) truckloads ofnarra shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible
amount of narra lumber, and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber
and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa which are
classified as prohibited wood species. (emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution 31 of
the investigating prosecutor, which served as the basis for the
filing of the information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be
filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber
consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in
violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (emphasis
supplied)

The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as

an affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is
excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
and thus possession thereof without the required legal documents is not a
crime. On the contrary, this Court rules that such possession is penalized
in the said section because lumber is included in the term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of
either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as
defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa)
of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or
combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other
forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallbond,
blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood
products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest
raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or
common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs
after being prepared for the market."32 Simply put, lumber is
a processed log or timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words

and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and
common usage meaning. 33 And insofar as possession of timber without
the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber.
Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of
the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting the motion to quash the information in the
CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing the said case.
G.R. No. 104988
We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably
failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in
its assailed decision of 29 November 1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with
Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard
loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions
which were not accompanied with the required invoices and transport
documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise
of the power vested upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held
by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the
search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be
lawfully conducted without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted
exceptions to the constitutional mandate 34 that no search or seizure shall
be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally
determining the existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are
(3) search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in
plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless
search. 35
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
that the search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April
1990 done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April
1990 by Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be
served at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose
cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the
following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a
warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same
warrant the following day, provided it is still within the ten-day period. 36
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because
possession of lumber without the required legal documents is not illegal
under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, since lumber is neither
specified therein nor included in the term forest product, the same hardly
merits further discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.
G.R. No. 123784
The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case
palpally fail to shaw prima facie that a reversible error has been
committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision of 31 July
1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We
must, forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit. There is no need to require
the respondents to comment on the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the
judgment of the trial court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner
never disputed the fact that its lumber-dealer's license or permit had been
suspended by Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension was
never lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of up to 25
September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or
otherwise dispose of lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his
authorized representative had the authority to seize the Lumber pursuant
to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which provides as follows:

Sec. 68-A Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other
forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned. . . .

The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not

penalized must also fail view of our disquisition and ruling on the same
issue in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the issue is totally irrelevant in the
SECOND CIVIL CASE which involves administrative seizure as a
consequence of the violation of the suspension of the petitioner's license
as lumber dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more
than rituals to cover up blatant violations of the Revised Forestry Code of
the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as amended. They are presumably trifling
attempts to block the serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the decree,
efforts which deserve the commendation of the public in light of the
urgent need to take firm and decisive action against despoilers of our
forests whose continuous destruction only ensures to the generations to
come, if not the present, an inheritance of parched earth incapable of
sustaining life. The Government must not tire in its vigilance to protect the
environment by prosecuting without fear or favor any person who dares to
violate our laws for the utilization and protection of our forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE and ANNULLING,
for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the challenged orders of 16
August 1991 and 18 October 1991 of respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch
172, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91,
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po"; (c) REINSTATING the information in
the said criminal case; and (d) DIRECTING the respondent Judge or her successor to hear
and decide the case with purposeful dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for utter failure of
the petitioner to show that the respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error
in the challenged decisions of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST
CIVIL CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 on the SECOND CIVIL CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997

LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC),
Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN,
JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE
GUZMAN, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
may an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is
the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section
68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to
confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest
products in favor of the government?
These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our
resolution.
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the
truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to

Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity)
personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce
the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the
truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989
an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen
(15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not
be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required
explanation. On June 22, 1989, 1 Regional Executive Director Rogelio
Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation
and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of
Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.
Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989
of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was,
however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989. 2Subsequently,
the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR
pursuant to private respondents' statement in their letter dated June 28,
1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then
"this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary." 3 Pending
resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil
Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner
Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan 4 with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2 of Cagayan, 5 which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck
to private respondents. 6Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director
Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter
alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989. 7 Their motion for
reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was
filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which
sustained the trial court's order ruling that the question involved is purely
a legal question. 8 Hence, this present petition, 9 with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners
on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27,
1993, 10 the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order of
petitioners was granted by this Court.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners
aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin
because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant
to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private
respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this
principle asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of the
doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated because
they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and
forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR
and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that
the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of
the crime.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant
jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the opinion that the plea of
petitioners for reversal is in order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party
is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded
him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then
such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can
be sought, The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to
one's cause of action. 11 Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or
estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of
action. 12 This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not
without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the
courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the
case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of

exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is

not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is
called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there
is a violation of due process, 13 (2) when the issue involved is purely a
legal question, 14 (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, 15 (4) when there is estoppel
on the part of the administrative agency concerned, 16 (5) when there is
irreparable injury, 17 (6) when the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter, 18(7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, 19 (8) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim, 20 (9) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings, 21 (10) when the rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 22
In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending
before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the
denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private
respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, 23 private respondents clearly
recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to
avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. The letter, reads,
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action,
then this letter should be considered as an appeal to the
Secretary. 24
It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the
Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to
him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy
still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus,
they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, seek court's intervention by filing an action for
replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an
administrative proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws,
rules and regulations and the protection, development and management
of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of
its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by
judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its
jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin
suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment
into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine
of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. 25 In Felipe
Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, 26 which was
reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS
vs. Vasquez, 27 this Court held:
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and
multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation of these
resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish
the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted
with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies.
To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the
instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases
heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in
this case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private respondents
to be without merit. First, they argued that there was violation of due
process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of
confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on.
Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply

an opportunity or right to be heard. 28 One may be heard, not solely by

verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably
and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. 29 In administrative
proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense. 30 Indeed, deprivation of due process
cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration, 31 as in the instant case, when
private respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present
their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989
which was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive
Director Baggayan, In Navarro III vs. Damasco, 32 we ruled that :
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of
notice or hearing.
Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and
forfeiture of the truck because the administrative officers of the DENR
allegedly have no power to perform these acts under the law. They
insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products as can be
gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as
amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:
Sec. 68. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government
of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed,
or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments,implements and
tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or forest products
are found. (Emphasis ours)
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private
respondents' thinking not only because the aforequoted provision
apparently does not mention nor include "conveyances" that can be the
subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact
that private respondents' interpretation of the subject provision unduly
restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other
provision of Section 68-A, which is quoted herein below:
Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly
Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of
violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations,
theDepartment Head or his duly authorized representative, may order
the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed,
or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land,
water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the
same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on
the matter. (Emphasis ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his
duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and
forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws,
rules and regulations. The phrase "to dispose of the same" is broad
enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the
government. The only limitation is that it should be made "in accordance
with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter." In the
construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to
the purpose projected in the statute. 33 Statutes should be construed in
the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be
suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance
the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. 34 In
this wise, the observation of the Solicitor General is significant, thus:

But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws "more

responsive to present situations and realities" and in view of the
"urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country," that the
government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory provision is
an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal
proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to supplant the
inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws through
criminal actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section
68-A to PD 705-is most revealing:
"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest
resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and
protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our
forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from
technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal
provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize
certain acts more responsive to present situations and realities;"
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision
authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only "conveyances," but
forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest
products by the "court" in a criminal action has long been provided
for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on
confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court
under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no Purpose at all.
Simply put, Section 68-A would not have provided any solution to the
problem perceived in EO 277, supra. 35
Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal
because the petitioners themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12,
1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that the truck of private
respondents was not used in the commission of the crime. This order, a
copy of which was given to and received by the counsel of private
respondents, reads in part, viz.:
. . . while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in
the commission of the crime, we uphold your claim that the truck owner
is not liable for the crime and in no case could a criminal case be filed
against her as provided under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code. . . 36
We observed that private respondents misread the content of the
aforestated order and obviously misinterpreted the intention of petitioners.
What is contemplated by the petitioners when they stated that the truck
"was not used in the commission of the crime" is that it was not used in
the commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal
action be filed against the owner thereof for violation of Article 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate the
possibility that the truck was being used in the commission of another
crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O.
277. In the same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners pointed out:
. . . However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended and further
amended by Executive Order No. 277 specifically provides for the
confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport of forest products
not covered by the required legal documents. She may not have been
involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in question but the
fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is therefor
liable. . . 37
Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined
and punishable under Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when
petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that private respondents
could not be charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could
not have committed an act constituting a crime under Section 68. We

disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its
amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No. 277
amending the aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license.
Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from
private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit,
shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 68, P.D. 705 before its
amendment by E.O. 277)
Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without
license. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations,
shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 1, E.O. No. 277 amending Section
68, P.D. 705 as amended)

With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of

P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing
forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense
independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for
under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from
the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase
"shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code" and inserted the words "shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code". When the statute is clear and explicit, there is
hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the
law. 38
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not
be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and
retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to
Section 68-A of the P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit
for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents' failure to
exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of
action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case
and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.
Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition
precedent prior to one's recourse to the courts and more importantly,
being an element of private respondents' right of action, is too significant
to be waylaid by the lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely
on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought
to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are
unlawfully detained. 39 "To detain" is defined as to mean "to hold or keep
in custody," 40 and it has been held that there is tortious taking whenever

there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of

dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this, without
manual seizing of the property is sufficient. 41 Under the Rules of Court, it
is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his
own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the
property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of
detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or
seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt
from such seizure, and the actual value of the property. 42 Private
respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful
detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be
noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was
transporting forest products without the required permit of the DENR in
manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O
277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the
confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his
duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the
provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or
detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture
proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful detention exists in
the case at bar.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to
question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in
pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8
of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau
of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of
the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that
courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a
special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads:
Sec. 8. REVIEW All actions and decisions of the
Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon
appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the
Department Head whose decision shall be final and
executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the
receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless
appealed to the President in accordance with
Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The
Decision of the Department Head may not be
reviewed by the courts except through a special civil
action for certiorari or prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July
14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order
promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the
Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with utmost
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.