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Facts: On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and
Ester Francisco hired and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by
respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round trip from Oroquieta
City to Zamboanga City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national
highway at kilometre, the car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N.
71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. And driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result
of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical
treatment and hospitalization.
Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving
their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross
violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car,
petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed with respondent Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages against the private respondents, owners and drivers,
respectively, of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary
attachment.
Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their answer in the aforementioned Civil Case admitting the
contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged, by way of defense, that the accident was due to the
negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus driver.
Respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. And Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that that
the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present
action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in a Criminal Case of the Municipal Court of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police for double serious and less
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal
case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally
adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant
civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until
after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence; that Art. 33
of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art. 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or
homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.
The lower court dismissed the complaint for damages.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal is proper.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the dismissal is improper and ordered the lower court to proceed with
the trial.
The same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime under article 100
of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under articles
21762194 of the New Civil Code. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct
and independent negligence. Having always had its own foundation and individuality.
The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules does not detract from
the nature and character of the action as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is
merely descriptive of the failure of the said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure
resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear
indication of negligence.
also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
When the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff's own act, which contributed
to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury.
9. Bulao vs. CA
Facts: On April 25, 1983, respondent Santiago Belleza filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Tayum, Pearrubia, Abra, a complaint against petitioner Honorio Bulao. It was docketed as "Civil Case No.
70-Damages." The petitioner moved to dismiss the same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He argued
that the said case was cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, the real issue being one of ownership,
possession of the land where the ditches are located, and real rights involving the use of ditches. The court
denied the motion and required him to answer the complaint.
The petitioner failed to do so and was declared in default. He then moved for reconsideration and the
lifting of the order of default. This time he claimed that it was the National Water Resources Council that
had jurisdiction over the case because it involved rights on the utilization of water. The motion was also
denied, and the court proceeded to receive the evidence of the private respondent.
On October 4, 1984, the Court handed down a judgment by default ordering the petitioner to pay the
following amounts in favor of the private respondent, plus the costs:
1. 1. P6,000.00 representing the unrealized harvest of the private respondent on the land he was
working on;
2. 2. P2,625.00 representing his unrealized share from the harvest of his tenant; and
3. 3. P2,000.00 representing attorney's fees.
The petitioner did not appeal the decision and the corresponding writ of execution was issued in due time.
He moved to quash the writ but to no avail.
On March 25, 1985, the petitioner lodged before the Regional Trial Court of Abra Branch I, a petition for
relief from judgment/order in Civil Case 70. This was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner neither
filed his answer to the complaint nor later availed himself of his right to appeal from the judgment. His
motion for reconsideration was denied.
The petitioner next came to this Court to seek certiorari with preliminary injunction. His petition was
referred to the Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits. On July 5, 1991, the
respondent court promulgated a decision denying the petition. His motion for reconsideration having been
likewise denied, the case is now before us for review.
Issue: What is the nature of the action filed?
Held: In any case, the injury has been done and that is what the private respondent was suing about in his
action for damages. The relief he prayed for did not change Civil Case No. 70 into a water dispute coming
under the jurisdiction of the National Water Research Council.
It follows that since the court a quo had jurisdiction over the action instituted by the private respondent, its
decision, which has already become final and executory, can no longer be disturbed.
The Court notes that the title of the complaint is "Civil Case No. 70Damages." Although not necessarily
determinative of the nature of the action, it would nevertheless indicate that what the private respondent
contemplated was an action for damages. It is pointed out, however, that paragraph (a) of the prayer for
relief seems to convey the impression that the private respondent is asking for the right to use the
irrigation water and for the recognition by the petitioner of an easement on his land. Would this change the
character of Civil Case 70? We have consistently held that the allegations of fact set forth in the complaint
and not the prayer for relief will determine the nature of an action.