Prescription

DOMINICA CUTANDA v. HEIRS OF ROBERTO CUTANDA

FACTS:
Roberto Cutanda owned 2 parcels of land in Bohol, and upon his death, his children
became owners of said land by inheritance. They left Bohol and established residence in
Leyte. In 1988, they returned to Bohol hoping to work on the land that was left to them.
However, they discovered that these lands were already in the possession of their
relativesheirs of their uncles and aunts.
Petitioners averred that the land in question is actually owned by their late uncle,
Anastacio Cutanda, who died without children, and left the lands to his siblings, one of
which was Roberto Cutanda.
Furthermore, they claim rightful ownership of the land as they have been in open,
contiguous, adverse, and uninterrupted possession of these for about 55 years.
The trials court found for the Petitioners. However, the CA reversed the RTCs decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the rights of the heirs of Roberto Cutanda have already prescribed, thus,
giving rightful ownership to the Petitioners?

HELD:
The action brought by the respondents to the court was one of accion publiciana to
recover the right to possession and to be declared rightful owners of the land. Since the
complaint actually put in issue the ownership of the land, it should thus be treated
properly as an accion reinvindicatoria.
Nevertheless, both have already prescribed as these rights are extinguished if not
brought within 10 years from dispossession. Therefore, the petitioners have indeed
acquired possession and ownership of the land in question by prescription, as the
respondents failed to bring this action only 55 years later.

SERASPI vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. 135602 April 28, 2000
FACTS:
The lots in question were originally owned by Marcelino Recasa and are both situated in
Barangay Lapnag, Banga, Aklan. When Marcelino died in 1943, and in 1948 his intestate
estate was partitioned into three parts to his corresponding heirs in his Three (3)
marriages during his lifetime.
In the same year, Patronicio Recasa (the representing the heirs first marriage) sold their
share to Dominador Recasa (representing heirs in the second marriage). In 1950,
Dominador sold their share to Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi.
In 1958, the Seraspis acquired a loan from Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) the subject
land being the security, however, they failed to pay the loan and the property was
foreclosed and sold to the highest bidder KRBI, and subsequently sold the same to
Manuel Rata (brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi) who allowed Quirico to administer the
same.
In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa (Marcelinos heir by his third marriage) took
advantage of the fact that Quirico was paralyzed due to a stroke, forcibly entered the
lands in question and took possession thereof.
In 1983 the Seraspis were able to purchase the lands from Manuel Rata and thereafter
filed a case against Simeon Recasa for recovery of possession of the lands.
RTC ruled in favor of Seraspi, but CA reversed on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the there was acquisitive prescription in favor of Simeon Recasa?

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

HELD:
No, there was no acquisitive prescription
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary. In the case at bar, respondent claim ordinary prescription through adverse
possession of the property for more than Ten (10) years under Art. 1134 of the Civil
Code.
However, for purposes of prescription, respondent was not able to prove his just title or
good faith required by acquisitive prescription, as he did not acquire possession of the
property through the modes recognized by the Civil Code for acquisition of ownership or
other real rights, namely:
Occupation
Intellectual creation
Law
Donation
Succession
Tradition in consequence of certain contracts
Prescription
Also, under Article 714, the ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by
occupation, nor can respondent claim that he acquired his right through succession
because he was an heir to the original owner, remember that the property was validly
partitioned and the subject lots are not part of those which he inherited, and lastly, he
cannot be considered in good faith as he entered the property without the knowledge
and permission of the original owner, thus making him a mere usurper.
When the property belonging to another is unlawfully taken by another, the former has
the right of action against the latter fir the recovery of the property and such right may
be transferred by the sale or assignment of the property and the transferee can maintain
such action against the wrongdoer.
*1974-1983 in only 9 years.

CIMAFRANCA VS. IAC 147 SCRA 611 (1987)

G.R. No. L-68687 January 3l, 1987
SPOUSES FRANCISCO CIMAFRANCA and VIBESA GURDIEL, CARIDAD EGUIA,
and FIDELA EGUIA, petitioners, vs. THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, THE HEIRS OF PERFECTO JALOSJOS, namely: DOMINADOR JALOSJOS,
TEODULO JALOSJOS, REMEDIOS JALOSJOS, ELITIO JALOSJOS, FELISA
JALOSJOS, JOSEFA JALOSJOS, AQUILINO JALOSJOS, RODRIGO JALOSJOS,
ARCELITA JALOSJOS, BONIFACIA LORETE VDA. DE JALOSJOS, and THE HEIRS
OF MARIA CLEOFE JALOSJOS, namely: LINO PALACIO, VERGEL PALACIO,
LOLITO PALACIO, NIEVES PALACIO, and ADE PALACIO, respondents.
FACTS:
Lot No. 86 (1589 sq. m.) of Cad. Survey of Lubungan, Zamboanga del Norte is the
subject land of this case. It was originally registered on August 8, 1919 in the names of
'Simplicia Bagsican, a, widow; Pedro Gurdiel, married to Simplicia Adrias; Delfina
Gurdiel, the wife of Jose Dalman and Cristeto Gurdiel, single, in the proportion of 1/2
share to the first named and the remaining 1/2 in undivided equal shares to the last
three ...,' pursuant to a decree dated March 2, 1917.
In 1917, Pedro Gurdiel sold a portion of the lot to Perfecto Jalosjos, respondents
father. The latter took possession of the portion of the lot and constructed a house on it.
In 1919, he declared the portion of the lot for taxation purposes.
On March 13, 1958, Pedro Gurdiel and the heirs of Dalman executed a "Deed of
Extrajudicial partition and confirmation of Previous Sale". In the deed, Lot 86 was
adjudicated to Pedro Gurdiel and Lot 9 to the Dalmans. Also, in the deed, Pedro further
ratified the sale he made of interest in Lot 86 to Perfecto. Subsequently, OTC No. RO1708 (6515) was cancelled and TCT No. T-4569 was issued. It appears that some of the
heirs of Pedro conveyed their 1/9 share in Lot No. 86 pertaining to the share of the late
father.
On December 21, 1970, the heirs of the deceased Pedro executed an "Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person with Simultaneous Deed of Sale and
Confirmation of Previous Sales" whereby 3/4 share over Lot No. 86 of the deceased
Pedro was first adjudicated to his 8 children in 1/9 share each, except Dominador who
had acquired the 1/9 share of his mother and was given 2/9 share; and thereafter,
taking cognizance of the various conveyances made by some of the heirs in favor of
Vibesa Gurdiel married to Francisco Cimafranca declared the latter the owner of 7/9
share of 3/4 of the lot. It appears that the other 2/9 shares were acquired by the sisters
Eguia, 1/9 share each, who are co-plaintiffs in this case and owners of an adjoining Lot
No. 87.
When surveyed on June 12, 1971, the portion occupied by the petitioners had an
area of 487 square meters while the portion occupied by private respondents had an
area of 1,109 square meters as shown in the Sketch Plan.
On December 10, 1971, petitioners filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages
seeking the partition of the property in question and the reconveyance by private
respondents of the excess portion they had been allegedly illegally occupying, the
demolition and transfer of their residential building and fence, and damages. Said
complaint was amended to include private respondent Bonifacia Lorete Vda. de Jalosjos.
In the answer of private respondents, they pray for the cancellation of TCT No. T-4569,
and for an award of damages by way of counterclaim.

Petitioners argue that TCT No. T-4569 which respondents sought to nullify is and
has always been valid and binding against the whole world, and its validity cannot now
be properly raised in the instant suit.
The trial court decided in favor of the respondents.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed trial courts decision in toto. Hence, the appeal to
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not after the lapse of 14 years respondent can still question the
validity of the deed of extrajudicial partition and subsequently TCT No. T-4569.
HELD: NO.
An action for reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud must be filed
within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken
place from the issuance of the certificates of title. Respondents had only 4 years from
October, 1958 or until 1962 to bring this action which respondents failed to do. They
have not taken any step to have the deed of extrajudicial partition corrected, if it is true
as they claim it is, that what had been sold to their father is 3/4 share of Lot 86 instead
of 1/4 share. It is now both too late and bereft of basis to ask for the cancellation of TCT
No. T-4569.
In fact, petitioners' claim that it is private respondents themselves who are in
estoppel or are barred by prescription and laches from questioning the validity and
binding effect of TCT No. 4569 is well taken under the circumstances considering
particularly the time that has elapsed since the issuance of the pertinent Torrens Title.
Besides, a Torrens title cannot be attached collaterally. The issue on its validity can be
raised only in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. The efficacy and integrity
of the Torrens System must be protected.

BUREAU OF FORESTRY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO GALLO

G.R. No. L-37995

FACTS:
In 1961, Mercedes Diago applied for the registration of 4 parcels of land situated in
Buenavista, Iloilo containing an approximate area of 30.5 hectares. She alleged she
occupied said parcels of land having bought them from the estate of the late Jose Ma.
Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought the lands in turn from Canuto Gustilo in 1934.
The Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that neither the applicant
nor her predecessors-in-interest have sufficient title over the lands applied for, which
could be registered under the Torrens systems, and that they have never been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at least 30 years.
The Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that certain portions of the lands,
with an area of approximately 19.4 hectares are mangrove swamps and are within a
Timberland Block.
In 1965, Filomeno Gallo purchased the subject parcels of land from Mercedes Diago, and
moved to be substituted in place of the latter, attaching to his motion an Amended
Application for Registration of Title.
Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved to substitute petitioner Bureau of Forestry
as oppositor, since supervision and control of said portion have been transferred from
the Bureau of Forestry to the PFC.
In April 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration of the 4
parcels of land in the name of Filomeno Gallo. It ruled that although the controverted
portion of 19.4 hectares are mangrove and nipa swamps within a Timberland Block,
petitioners failed to submit convincing proof that these lands are more valuable for
forestry than for agricultural purposes, and the presumption is that these are agricultural
lands.

ISSUE:
WON the classification of lands of public domain by the Executive Branch of the
Government into agricultural, forest or mineral can be changed or varied by the court.
NO

HELD:
Admittedly, the controversial area is within a timberland block classified and certified
as such by the Director of Forestry in 1956. The lands are needed for forest
purposes and hence they are portions of the public domain which cannot be the subject
of registration proceedings.

Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the Director of Forestry
to submit convincing proofs that the land is more valuable for forest purposes than for
agriculture.
As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the classification or
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now
a prerogative of the Executive Department and not of the courts. With these rules,
there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the
classification of lands of the public domain but the Executive Branch, through the Office
of the President.
Furthermore, respondents cannot claim to have obtained their title by prescription since
the application filed by them necessarily implied an admission that the portions applied
for are part of the public domain and cannot be acquired by prescription, unless the law
expressly permits it. It is a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 71110 November 22, 1988
PAZ VILLAGONZALO, ESTELA VILLAGONZALO, AIDA VILLAGONZALO, HERMINIA
VILLAGONZALO, GWENDOLYN VILLAGONZALO, JENSINE VILLAGONZALO and
LEONILA
VILLAGONZALO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and CECILIA A. VILLAGONZALO, respondents.
Julio L. Falcone and Makilito B. Mahinay for petitioners.
Adelino B. Sitoy for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
From a decision rendered in favor of herein petitioners, as plaintiffs, against herein
private respondent, as defendant, in an action for reconveyance in the then Court of
First Instance of Leyte, 1 which reads:
Wherefore, decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
defendant declaring Lot No. 7429 of the Ormoc Cadastre, situated at Bo.
Dolores, Ormoc City, with an area of 97,213 square meters, more or less, as
the conjugal property of the deceased spouses, Juan Villagonzalo and
Felicisima Abella Villagonzalo hereby ordering the cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 4259 in the name of Cecilia A. Villagonzalo and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Ormoc City to issue another Transfer
Certificate of Title in the name of spouses Juan C. Villagonzalo and Felicisima
A. Villagonzalo, Filipinos, of legal age, residents of Cebu City now deceased
and survived by the present plaintiffs and defendants, each of whom upon
payment of the inheritance taxes with the BIR, shall be entitled to 1/9 share
of the land, subject to claims by other heirs and creditors within a period of
two (2) years as provided for by the Rules of Court, and further ordering the
partition of the said land within a period of ninety (90) days from the finality
of this decision and if the parties cannot agree on the partition this Court
may appoint a commissioner to partition the same without pronouncement
as to costs. 2

therein defendant appealed to the former Intermediate Appellate Court which, in a

decision 3 of the Second Civil Cases Division in AC-G.R. No. 65128, reversed the
appealed judgment and dismissed the complaint for reconveyance.
As found by the respondent Court
The facts in this regard show that on February 22, 1961, Juan C.
Villagonzalo, the predecessor-in-interest of the parties, purchased Lot No.
7429 of the Ormoc Cadastre, situated at Barrio Dolores, Municipality of
Ormoc, containing an area of 97,213 sq. meters covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 24611 of the Register of Deeds of Ormoc City, from
the Heirs of Roman Matuguina for Pl,500.00 (Exhibits A and 6, Folder of
Exhibits, pp. 1, 15). It was made to appear however that the sale was in the
name of his daughter, defendant Cecilia Villagonzalo, who was single, since
he borrowed from her the sum of P500.00 to complete the full payment of
the price of the lot. Consequently, TCT No. 4259 was issued in the name of
defendant Cecilia A. Villagonzalo as the registered owner (Exhibit 5, Ibid., p.
15) on July 18, 1962. The complaint was filed on April 2, 1975 thirteen (13)
years after the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4259 on the
subject land in the name of the defendant Cecilia Villagonzalo. 4
On such factual moorings, the respondent court, now the Court of Appeals, held that the
right of action of therein plaintiffs-appellees, petitioners herein, had prescribed for the
reasons that follow. 5
It ratiocinated that when private respondent obtained Transfer Certificate of Title No.
4259 in her name she thereby excluded herein petitioners from the estate of their
deceased predecessor-in-interest and, consequently, she set up a title to the land
adverse to them. The registration of the deed of sale with the Register of Deeds, so it
opined, was constructive notice to the whole world of defendant's adverse claim to the
property, thereby repudiating any fiduciary or trust relationship involved. It anchored its
conclusion on doctrinal holdings that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years counted from the date when adverse title is
asserted by the possessor of the property.
Prescinding therefrom into the field of laches, respondent court further noted that
because of the neglect and inaction of the present petitioners, the private respondent
was thereby made to feel secure in her belief that she had rightly acquired the
controverted land and that no legal action would be filed against her. She was thus
induced to spend time, money and effort for the cultivation of the land and the payment
of the taxes thereon. It then further rested its conclusion on the established principle
that inaction and neglect of a party to assert a right can convert what could otherwise be
a valid claim into a stale demand.
Petitioners have come before Us contending that their action was seasonably filed
because private respondent's registration of the land in her name was not a repudiation
of the implied trust created between her and their father; and, confusing extinctive for
aquisitive prescription, that good faith and just title are essential requisites in this case.
The respondent court is correct and certiorari must be denied.
It is now well settled that an action for reconveyance of real property to enforce an
implied trust shall prescribe after ten years, 6 since it is an action based upon an
obligation created by law, 7 and there can be no doubt as to its prescriptibility. 8
It is likewise established that said period of ten years is counted from the date adverse
title to the property is asserted by the possessor thereof. In the case at bar, that
assertion of adverse title, which consequently was a repudiation of the implied trust for
the purpose of the statute of limitations, took place when Transfer Certificate of Title No.

4259 was issued in the name of private respondent on July 18, 1962. As succinctly but
pithily resolved inVda. de Pama vs. Pama, et al.: 9
... Considering the settled doctrine that an action for reconveyance of real
property based upon constructive or implied trust prescribes in ten (10)
years counted from the date adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the
property (Diaz vs. Gorricho, 103 Phil. 261; Candelaria vs. Romero, 109 Phil.
100; J. M. Tuazon vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42); that when respondent
Guillermo Pama caused the registration on June 18, 1956 of the affidavit of
adjudication declaring himself to be the sole heir of the late Mateo Pama and
obtained Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4006 in his own name, he thereby
excluded petitioners from the estate of the deceased Mateo Pama and,
consequently, set up a title adverse to them; that such registration
constitutes constructive notice to petitioners of the respondent's adverse
claim to the property (Carantes vs. Court of Appeals, 76 SCRA 514, 523;
Gerona vs. de Guzman, 11 SCRA 153, 157); and it appearing that
petitioners filed their complaint for reconveyance only on April 28, 1969, or
twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and ten (10) days after their cause of
action had accrued on June 18, 1956; this Court resolved to dismiss this
petition and to affirm the questioned order dismissing petitioner's
complaint ... 10
There is also evidence of record that as far back as 1961, private respondent refused to
give any share in the produce of the land to petitioners; that in 1963 she mortgaged the
property in her own name; and that in 1969, she leased the same to one Ramon Valera,
without the petitioners taking preventive or retaliatory legal action. 11
The rule in this jurisdiction is that an action to enforce an implied trust may be barred
not only by prescription but also by laches, in which case repudiation is not even
required. 12 Whether the trust is resulting or constructive, its enforcement may be
barred by laches. 13 Petitioners were, therefore, correctly faulted for their unjustified
inaction.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the respondent Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

BERGADO vs. CA and REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 84051
May 19, 1989
FACTS: Disputed is a lot situated in Pangasinan and covered by an OCT in the name of
Alejandro Trinidad and Aniceta Soriano. It was inherited by Marciana Trinidad, their sole
heir. She transferred it by virtue of an Escritura de Compraventa dated May 3, 1928, to
Pedro Bergado and Justina Galinato, the petitioners parents. She then conveyed it
again, this time through a Deed of Sale to the Parent-Teacher Association of the
Urdaneta Community High School.
The property subject of this case is claimed by both the petitioners and the Republic
under two separate deeds of sale executed by the same vendor The petitioners claim the
property by right of inheritance from their parents. The Republic says the land was
donated to it by the said PTA.
The Republic was sustained by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The petitioners
are now before us, contending that the courts below have erred and so should be
reversed.
The petitioners argue that neither prescription nor laches can operate, against them
because their title to the property is registered under the Torrens system and therefore
imprescriptible. Additionally, they contend that in cases of double sale, assuming the
sale to the private respondent was also valid, the buyer who registers the property first
shall be preferred.
ISSUE:
1.
WON the petitioners were now barred by prescription and laches from asserting it.
2.
WON their alleged right was superior to the title asserted by the Republic to the
property in question
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
1. The petitioners argue that neither prescription nor laches can operate, against them
because their title to the property is registered under the Torrens system and therefore
imprescriptible. Additionally, they contend that in cases of double sale, assuming the
sale to the private respondent was also valid, the buyer who registers the property first
shall be preferred.
The principles cited, while admittedly correct, are nonetheless not applicable to the case
at bar. The reason is that what the petitioners registered was not their ownership
of the property but the Escritura de Compraventa, and only thirty-six years after it
was executed by Marciana Trinidad. The most she conveyed to the petitioners parents
was inchoate ownership as she herself was not the registered owner. The property
remained in the names of Trinidads parents; no transfer certificate of title had been
issued in her favor. Consequently, no certificate could also be issued in the petitioners
names. Moreover, the petitioners did not take possession of the land as they could have

on the strength of the Escritura de Compraventa. Worse, they permitted the PTA and
later the Republic to do so and made no protest at all until 1981.
An action for recovery of title to or possession of real property or an interest therein can
be brought only within ten years from the date the cause of action accrues. In the
present case, the cause of action accrued as early as 1947 when the property was sold
to the PTA or at the very latest in 1965-1966 when the adobe wall enclosing the
property was erected. Counted from either year, the ten-year prescriptive period has
indisputably elapsed. The petitioners complaint was clearly barred already when it was
filed almost three and a half decades after the PTA had taken possession of the land.
2. The record shows that the disputed property had been in the possession of the PTA
since it acquired the same by virtue of the deed of sale, and of the Republic of the
Philippines since the date of the deed of donation executed in its favor. The PTA and later
the Republic had been constructing improvements on the land which certainly could not
have escaped the attention of the petitioners. During all that time, the land was also
enclosed with a barbed wire fence and later with an adobe wall erected by the school
administration. The fence and later the wall symbolized the PTAs exclusive claim of
ownership to the disputed property
Clearly applicable is Article 1544 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it
should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it
who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents
the oldest title, provided there is good faith. (Emphasis supplied.)
The inscription of the Escritura de Compraventa in 1964 produced no legal effect
because it was made in bad faith. Ownership should therefore vest in the respondent
Republic of the Philippines because it was first in possession of the property in good
faith. If any recourse is still available to the petitioners, it definitely is not against the
Republic of the Philippines. Their claim for satisfaction on which we do not rule at this
time may be addressed only to Marciana Trinidad who, for reasons still to be discovered,
sold the same land once, and then once again, to separate purchasers.