MariaCarolinaAraullovsBenigno

AquinoIII

hen President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the
sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the
economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch
Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government
projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving
projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next years
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain
government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive
agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive.
Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive
and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP
program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in
fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as
noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the
General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby
appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos
claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President
as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief
Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken
from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does
not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some nonExecutive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA
(Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National
Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain
Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various

petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP.
Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which
provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly
the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI
of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49
of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures
and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law
(Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as
impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution.
DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an
appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As
such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1),
Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from
the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been
required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were
merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of
funds refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or
to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is
actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable
national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the
DAP was the transfer of funds.

III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is
true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of
funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made within
their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations
may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the
Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate
realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP,
even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are
non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were
appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were
not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being
declared by the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA,
savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the
funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or
finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds
withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition
of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for
the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the
fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from
certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as
savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money
source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if
there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the
revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no
such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects
of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy.
It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all
actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP
effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be
asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the
validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be
applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is

so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative)

that they have not acted in good faith.

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs.

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
G.R. No. 208566
November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L.
GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN
DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al,
Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of
which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers
who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of
pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus,
Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five
(5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct
Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers chiefs
-of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by
Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation
of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before
the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork
Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued
permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel
System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which
provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds,

such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional,
and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S.
Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to
Members of Congress

1.

1.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions
on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d)
accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
HELD:
Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas
of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of
powers. Congressrole must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny
and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that
will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly
allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of
powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

VILLAVERT
illavert is a Sales & Promotion Supervisor of PCSO Cebu Branch responsible for
the sale and disposal of PCSO sweepstakes tickets
he was allowed to consign Villavert incurred a total of P997,373.60 worth of
unpaid PCSO tick
e wrote the Chairman and Acting General Manager of PCSO, Manuel L. Morato,
proposing to settle his unpaid ticket accounts.
On 20 February 1995 Santos M. Alquizalas, COA Director IV, recommended to
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Arturo C. Mojica that the shortage in the
ticket accounts of petitioner should be properly treated under Art. 217 of the
Revised Penal Code
[8]

etitioner submitted an amended proposal of settlement for his accounts

10%dp,equalinstallment

titioner filed his counter-affidavit where he explained the circumstances which led
him to incur subject unpaid ticket accounts

Graft Investigation Officer II Edgemelo C. Rosales, after due consideration of the

evidence submitted by petitioner, rendered a resolution recommending the
dismissal of Adm. Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-95-0088
his petition for review was filed on 18 June 1998.
Whether the case at bar should be referred to the ca
on 16 September 1998 we promulgated Fabian v. Desierto where the basis for
the filing of this petition before this Court, i.e., Sec. 27, RA 6770, insofar as it
allows appeals to the Supreme Court in administrative disciplinary cases, was
declared invalid, thus depriving this Court of jurisdiction
[18]

[19]

As the instant petition was filed prior to 15 March 1999, its referral for
final disposition to the Court of Appeals is still in order.
ACCORDINGLY, let this case be REFERRED to the Court of Appeals
KHAN VS OMBUDSMAN

petitioners before the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) for

violation of RA 3019, using their positions in PAL to secure a
contract for Synergy Services CorporatioN, IN W/C THEY ARE
SH
etitioners filed motion to dismiss the complaint on the
GROUND THAT the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over
them since PAL was a private entity and they were not public
officers, DENIED
APPEAL, ombidsmana dismissed, pet for certiorari, claim that
public respondents acted without jurisdiction and/or grave
abuse of discretion
Ombudsmans jurisdiction only covers GOCCs with original
charters and these do not include PAL, a private entity created
under the general corporation law

ISSUE
Whether public respondents Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) and the Ombudsman
have jurisdiction over petitioners Ismael G. Khan, Jr. and Wenceslao L.
Malabanan, former officers of Philippine Airlines (PAL), for violation of Republic
Act No. (RA) 3019[1] (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
Ruling
jURISDICTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN OVER GOCCS IS CONFINED ONLY TO
THOSE WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS

t can only investigate and prosecute acts or omissions of the

officials/employees of government corporations. although the
government later on acquired the controlling interest in PAL,
the fact remains that the latter did not have an original
charter and its officers/employees could not be investigated
and/or prosecuted by the Ombudsman.
he phrase with original charter means chartered by special law
as distinguished from corporations organized under the
Corporation Code. PAL, being originally a private corporation
seeded by private capital and created under the general
corporation law, does not fall within the jurisdictional powers
of the Ombudsman under Article XI, Section 13(2) of the
Constitution. Consequently, the latter is devoid of authority to
investigate or prosecute petitioners.
ABUNDO VS COMELEC
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., v. COMELEC, ET. AL., G.R. No. 201716,
January 8, 2013
Facts of the case:
For four (4) successive regular elections, , Abundo vied for the position of
municipal mayor. In both runs, he emerged and accordingly served the terms as
mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of

canvassers initially proclaimed as winner Jose Torres (Torres), Abundo protested

and was eventually declared the winner, paving the way for his assumption of
office for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Then came 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other.
When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy, Torres lost no time in seekinghis
disqualification to run, the corresponding petition predicated on the threeconsecutive term limit rule. COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding
for Abundo, who in the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes and was
accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes.
Ruling of the RTC: RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor.
Ruling of the COMELEC: It affirmed the decision of the RTC. J
Issue: Whether or Not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive
terms.
Supreme Court Decision: No, Abundo has not served for three consecutive
terms. In the Court finds and declares that the two-year period during which his
opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, is found in Section 8, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution,
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the
provisions, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post;
and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
The facts of the case point to an involuntary interruption during the July 2004June 2007 term

FRANCISCO VS PERMSKUL
etitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the private respondent for a period of one year for
the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a month.
private respondent deposited with the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to answer for
unpaid rentals, VACATED THE PROP
petitioner rejected this request. He said the lessee still owed him for other charges

private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makat

efendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P7,750.0

cision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was affirmed n a
memorandum decision
hen the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition for review was denied

He is now before us to fault the respondent court, principally for sustaining the
memorandum decision of the regional trial court. His contention is that it violates
Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.

Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth
both as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation
will summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike
down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedienc

Wgetger the memo decision

ARNAULT VS BALAGTAS

FACTS:
This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault
against the Director of Prisons, Balagtas. Arnault was
incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate finding
Arnault in contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a
person with whom he transacted business in relation to a
government purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong
estates. The circumstances of Arnault's incarceration are

described in the companion case Arnaultvs.

Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the Legislature's power to
hold a person in contempt for defying or refusing to comply
with an order in a legislative inquiry.
Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted with one
Jess D. Santos in relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong
deal. Upon further inquiry, the Senate, obviously not
satisfied with Arnault's explanations, adopted Resolution No.
114
Whether or not the Senate may hold a person in contempt
or incarcerate him as a punitive rather than as a coercive
measure.
YES.
Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the
confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to coerce
the petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident
that the continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact
partly punitive. This may be inferred from the confining
made in the resolution that petitioner's acts were arrogant
and contumacious and constituted an affront to the Senate's
dignity and authority.
The legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses. This power is founded upon reason and policy.
Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the
exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said
power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge
and information on which to base intended legislation if it
cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge
and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its
power and authority? The legislative department should not
be constrained to look to the courts whenever for every act
of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy
with which it is faced.

The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the

defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme and is
not subject to judicial interference, except when there is a
manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere
exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of
constitutional limitations