employees. But meanwhile, Punsalan sold his shares in
petitioner-corporation and resigned as its president in 1987.
Facts:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation, organized in 1986 to
operate a customs bonded warehouse at the old Manila International Airport in Pasay City (Before NAIA). To get a license for petitioner from the Bureau of Customs (BoC), Antonio Punsalan Jr., the corporation president, asked a proposal from respondent Sao for the preparation of a feasibility study on Oct. 17, 1986. Sao gave a letter-proposal to Punsalan which was for 350k which will be paid in partially by the petitioner. But Cheng Yong, the majority stockholder of petitioner, objected to Saos offer because another company priced a similar proposal at only 15k. Nevertheless, Punsalan preferred Saos services because of the latters membership in the task force, which had strong ties with BoC. Hence, Punsalan pushed through with Saos proposal. (This is now regarded as the First Contract). After completing the First Contract, on Dec. 4, 1986, Punsalan subsequently made another letter-proposal which was now priced at 400k (Now regarded as the Second Contract). On January 10, 1987, Andy Villaceren, Vice President of petitioner, received an operations manual prepared by Sao as a result from the Second Contract. Petitioner submitted this to the BoC so it could start operating the bonded warehouse. After getting a license to operate, petitioner became 1 of the 3 public customs bonded warehouses at the airport. Sao also conducted, in the 3rd week of January 1987 in the warehouse of petitioner, a 3-day training seminar for the latters
On February 9, 1988, Sao filed for collection against
petitioner alleging that he had prepared an operations manual for petitioner, conducted a seminar-workshop for its employees and delivered to it a computer program; but that, despite demand, petitioner refused to pay him for his services on the Second Contract.
Petitioner objected by alleging that the letter-proposal was
signed by Punsalan without authority, in collusion with Sao in order to unlawfully get some money from petitioner corporation, and despite his knowledge that a group of employees of the company had been commissioned by the board of directors to prepare an operations manual. RTC declared the Second Contract unenforceable but made petitioner liable for 60k as it got an operations manual from respondent based on the contract. Hence, it applied solution indebiti if petitioner wasnt made to pay. But Sao appealed. CA reverses making the Second Contract valid. Punsalan entered into the First Contract, which was similar to the Second Contract. Thus, petitioner clothed Punsalan with apparent authority to enter into the latter contract. It became the practice of the petitioner-corporation to allow its president to negotiate and execute contracts without prior board approval, thus, te board itself, by its acts and through acquiescence, practically laid aside the normal requirement of prior express approval. Thus, making petitioner liable for 400k. CA also noted that petitioner corporation didnt make an appeal from the RTC ruling, thus, implying on the premise
that it was only made liable for 60k, as compared to the 400k as stated in the contract.
Petitioner argues that a single isolated agreement prior to the
Second contract does not constitute corporate practice, which Webster defines as frequent or customary action. It cited Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, in which the practice of NACOCO allowing its general manager to negotiate and execute contract in its copra trading activities for and on its behalf, without prior board approval, was inferred from 60 contracts not 1, which is unlikely in their case.
SC counters saying that apparent authority may be
ascertained through:
Issue: WON Punsalan had authority to bind petitioner-corporation
even without prior board approval. YES Held:
General rule is in the absence of authority from the board of
directors, no person, not even its officers, can validly bind a corporation. A corporation has a separate and distinct personality, thus, having powers authorized by law or incident to its existence. It may act through its board of directors pursuant to Sec. 23.
CA correctly ruled that the authority to bind a corporation
may be presumed from acts of recognition like wherein the power was in fact exercised without any objection from its board or shareholders.
Here, petitioner previously allowed Punsalan to enter into
the First Contract with Sao without a board resolution expressly authorizing him nor did it object or make acts of repudiation. Thus, it clothed Punsalan with apparent authority to execute the Second contract. This was also bolstered by the testimony of Yong, senior vice president, treasurer and major stockholder of petitioner. He stated that he objected to Saos over and preferred the lower priced offer of another company but Punsalan said to Yong that he was the president and he gets his way.
a. The general manner in which the corporation holds out
an officer or agent as having the power to act or, in other words, the apparent authority to act in general, with which it clothes him; or b. The acquiescence in his acts of a particular nature, with actual or constructive knowledge thereof, whether within or beyond the scope of his ordinary power. It requires presentation of evidence of similar act(s) executed either in its favor or in favor of other parties. It is not the quantity of similar acts which establishes apparent authority, but the vesting of a corporate officer with the power to bind the corporation.
With regard to the validity of the contract, by accepting the
benefits of the contract and not repudiating Punsalans acts, and especially when it submitted the operations manual to BoC, petitioner ratified the Second Contract.
JESUS V. LANUZA, MAGADYA REYES, BAYANI REYES and ARIEL REYES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DOLORES ONRUBIA, ELENITA NOLASCO, JUAN O. NOLASCO III, ESTATE OF FAUSTINA M. ONRUBIA, PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC.
G.R. NO. 131394 March 28, 2005
AWARD_19141 Salah Laku It is further ordered that the Company shall pay the total amount of
RM132,000.00 to the Claimant through the Claimants' solicitor's, Messrs Shanker
& Arjunan, within 30 days from the date of this Award subject to statutory
deductions, if any.