People vs Marti

FACTS:
August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the booth
of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders carrying Four (4) wrapped packages. The
appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could examine and inspect the packages. She
refused and assures her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves.

Before the delivery of appellants box to the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Posts, Mr.
Job Reyes (Proprietor), following the standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for
final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted from the box and that the gloves contain dried
leaves. He prepared a letter and reported to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examinations. The dried marijuana leaves were found to have contained inside the
cellophane wrappers.

The accused appellant assigns the following errors: The lower court erred in admitting in
evidence the illegality of search and seized objects contained in the four (4) parcels.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?

vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,

typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.

Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the
respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other
records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained
to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those
seized as evidence against them.

On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the
same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.

Held:

Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or
being general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify
the things to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of
the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a
poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the
circumstances.

HELD:

Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken
from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality
different from that of the corporation.

Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. It was a private who open the parcels and
not law enforcers. If it was law enforcers there would/ should be a search warrant first

Soliven v MAkasiar
W/N consti rights of beltran were violated when he was issued a warrant of arrest w/o
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses if any to determine probable
cause

Stonehill v Diokno
Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners
personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to
search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences to search for personal properties books of accounts, financial records,

Judge following doctrine and procedure must 1. Personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and on the basis issue a warrant of arrest or 2. If on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses adding him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause

complainant and any witness he may produce the facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements together with their affidavits.

No grave abuse of discretion from the Judge

Facts: Petitioners are Chinese nationals (Chan Sau Wah from Fukein, with a minor child
from prior marriage, Fu Yan Fun) who were granted a temporary visitors visa as momimmigrant for 2 months upon posting P4k cash bond to visit a cousin in the Philippines.
She soon married to Esteban Morano, a Filipino Citizen, on January 24, 1962 and gave birth
to a child, Esteban Morano, Jr. After several extensions to prolong stay in Philippines, their
visas expired on Sept. 10, 1962 and were ordered by Commissioner of Immigration (COI)
on Aug. 31, 1962 thru a letter, to leave the country on or before Sept. 10, 1962 with
warning of issuance of warrant of arrest for failure to leave and confiscation of bond.

SILVA VS. PRESIDING JUDGE (marlon = tama. Nicomedes = comedes)

Facts: Sgt. Villamor, chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City filed an
"application for search warrant" and "Deposition of witness" against petitioner Nicomedes
Silva and Martin Silva. Judge Nickarter Ontal, then the presiding judge of RTC of
Dumaguete issued Search Warrant No.1 pursuant to the said applications for violation of
RA 6425 Dangerous Drugs ACT of 1972. Such warrant states that there is a probable cause
to believe that Mr. Tama Silva has the possession and control of marijuana dried leaves,
cigarette and joint. The warrant authorizes Sgt. Villamor to make an immediate search at
any time of the room of Mr. Tama Silva at the residence of his father Comedes Silva and to
open aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartons and containers to look for said illegal drugs. In
the course of the search, the officers seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the
amount of P1,231.40. Petitioner filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No.1 on the
ground that 1) it was issued on the sole basis of mimeographed 2) the judge failed to
personally examine the complainant and witness by searching questions and answers.
Issue: Whether or Not Search Warrant No.1 is invalid. WON the officers abused their
authority in seizing the money of Antonieta Silva.
Held: Search Warrant No. 1 is invalid due to the failure of the judge to examine the witness
in the form of searching questions and answers. The questions asked were leading as they
are answerable by mere yes or no. Such questions are not sufficiently searching to
establish probable cause. The questions were already mimeographed and all the witness
had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided. Judge Ontal is guilty of grave
abuse of discretion when he rejected the motion of Antonieta Silva seeking the return of
her money.

The officers who implemented the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they
seized the money of Antonieta Silva. The warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but
only for marijuana leaves, cigarettes..etc. Search Warrant No. 1 is declared null and void.

*** Sec 4 Rule 126 Rules of Court

Examination of the complainant, record -the judge before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the

Morano vs. Vivo

Petitioners then filed with the CFI of Manila for Mandamus to compel COI to cancel their
ACR, to stop issuing arrest warrant, and preliminary injunction from confiscating their
bond. They argue that Chan Sau Wah became a Filipino Citizen upon marriage to Esteban
Morano by virtue of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Revised Naturalization Act).
Likewise, it argues that Section 37 of the Naturalization Law is unconstitutional for allowing
the COI to issue warrant of arrest and effecting deportation without judicial intervention
enshrined in the Constitution. CFI decided partly against petitioners, thus, COI and
petitioners both appealed to SC.
Issues:
Whether or not the marriage of Chan Sau Wah to Esteban Morano makes her a Filipino
citizen.
Whether or not Section 37 of the Naturalization Law empowering the COI to issue a
warrant of arrest, and deport upon a warrant on deportation cases is unconstitutional for
are covered by the Constitutional mandate on searches and seizures without judicial
intervention required under the Constitution on searches and seizures.
Ruling:
Citizenship. Marriage to a Filipino citizen does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen.
She must show that she possess all the qualifications, and none of the disqualifications
required by the Naturalization Law requiring as follows:
Valid marriage; and
Alien woman herself might be lawfully naturalized
In the additional stipulation of facts of July 3, 1963, petitioners admit that Chan Sau Wah is
not possessed of all the qualifications required by the Naturalization Law. Thus, she did not
become a Filipino citizen.
Searches and seizures. Power to deport aliens is an attribute of sovereignty planted on the
accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as
inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of
foreigners within its dominions. Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, does not
require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in
accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the

exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceeding

for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a
valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.
Petition for mandamus and prohibition with respect to petitioners Chan Sau Wah is hereby
denied; and judgment declaring her a citizen of the Philippines, directing COI to cancel her
Alien Certificate of Registration and other immigration papers, and declaring the
preliminary injunction with respect to her permanent, are all hereby set aside; and in all
other respects, the decision appealed is hereby affirmed.

Harvey
v
Santiago
Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American
nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den
Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Lagunarespondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor
Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to
apprehended petitioners at their residences. The Operation Report read that Andrew
Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two
naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the after Mission Report read that
two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being livein
for
sometime
now.
Seized during the petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of
suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in
sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17
February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of
the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another
charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face
deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted
against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code.
Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45
and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of
Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but
was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed
a petitionfor Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April
1988.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners
pending
determination
of
existence
of
probable
cause.
(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents.
(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.
Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates
the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and

social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause
determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified
the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an
incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126,
Section12
of
Rules
on
Criminal
Procedure).
The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an
absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the
arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the
foregoing,
the
search
done
was
incidental
to
the
arrest.
The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending
their arrest and estops them from questioning itsvalidity. Furthermore, the deportation
charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their
detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when
confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the
beginning.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance
with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised
Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported
upon warrant of theCommissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by
the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them.
Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a
punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a
specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must
also
be
conducted
with assistance of
a
counsel
if
desired.
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of
the sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued
presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the
people.
Alvarez v CFI
Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a
sworn affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists
used by him as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant
Almeda, chief of the task force, didnt say that the information was based on his personal
knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge
issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez house. On June 4, 1936, the agents
raided the subject place and seized different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks,
stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was
not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved
that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in
question be returned to him because the SW issued was illegal. On the other hand, the
Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for
further investigation. When the judge sustained the latters motion. Alvarez elevated the
matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the judge
authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.

Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit
of Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of
the facts which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but he had
knowledge thereof only through information secured from a person whom he considered
reliable.
Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General
Orders 58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search
warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath
of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes
any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform
an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by
the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of
his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of
a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury
could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The
affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and
fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the
search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are
illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the
applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the
search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda
and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The Constitution
does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the depositions of the
witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of
the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more
than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if
the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that
of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to
require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence
of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge,
it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the
applicants knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses
having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise
illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal
knowledge of the facts

Mata v Bayona

FACTS: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD
1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged
bets on the Jai Alai game by selling illegal tickets known as Masiao tickets without any
authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government
authorities concerned. Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case, he discovered
that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and
other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire
from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona,
presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied, it is with the court. The Judge then
handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a
motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized,
citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has made a
thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T.
Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in
fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating
to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is
of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be
attached to the records. Matas motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having
been denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari, praying,
among others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its alleged failure
to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the
articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any
proceedings on the matter.
ISSUE: WON the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions
in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him?
HELD:YES. Under the Constitution no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce. More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional
injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must before issuing the warrant
personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he
may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the
record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to
attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge
may be able to properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are
false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of
the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and
attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
Ppl v del Rosario

Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of
firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularlymethamphetamine or shabu.
After the issuance of the search warrant, which authorized the search and seizure of an
undetermined quantity ofmethamphetamine and its paraphernalias, an entrapment was
planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its
paraphernalias
and
of
a
.22 caliber pistol
with
3
live
ammunition.
Issue: Whether

or

Not

the seizure of

the

firearms

was

proper.

Held: No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must
particularly describe the things to be seized. In herein case, the only objects to be seized
that the warrant determined was themethamphetamine and the paraphernalias therein.
The seizure of
the
firearms
was
unconstitutional.

Roy Fulgencio was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP)
to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by
Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana.

Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to
be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to
the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant
went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of
persons. Pat. Fulgencio called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as
Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant.
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers
were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept
Macabante and appellant.

Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted.

Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be
a tea bag of marijuana.

Umil v Ramos
Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital,
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by
their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said
hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the
five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or
on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St.,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital
management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City
Homes, Bian, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded
man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the
Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for securityreasons. While confined thereat, he
was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM
mobile patrols.

When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from Sucro. The
police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant and recovered 19 sticks and 4
teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante

ISSUES:
Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently.
Whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.

HELD:
Issue: Whether

or

Not

Rolando

was

lawfully

arrested.

Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, anoutlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified
as it can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion,
subversion,conspiracy or
proposal
to
commit
such
crimes,
and
crimes
or offensescommitted
in
furtherance
therefore
in
connection
therewith
constitute directassaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

PEOPLE VS. SUCRO

G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991

FACTS:

The Court ruled in the affirmative. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule
states:
A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the
meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the
offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at
once to the scene thereof. Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct

his nefarious activity and the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was
caught throwing the marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought
the same from accused-appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the marijuana
stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the police
officers had personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitored Sucro's
nefarious activity. Police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the
crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused.

That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule.
Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec.
13, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. There is nothing unlawful about
the arrest considering its compliance with the requirements of a warrantless arrest. Ergo,
the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.

Ppl v rodrigueza
Facts: NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining information that there
was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents
were given money treated with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said location,
asked for a certain Don. Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him and a certain
object wrapped in a plastic later identified as marijuana was given in exchange for P200.
The agent went back to headquarters and made a report, based on which, a team was
subsequently organized and a raid was conducted in the house of the father of the
accused. During the raid, the NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana
leaves and a plastic syringe among others. There was no authorization by
any searchwarrant. The accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder. The lower court,
considering the evidences obtained and testimonies from the prosecution, found him guilty
of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether

or

Not

the

lower

court

was

correct

in

its

judgment.

Held: The NARCOM agents procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the
qualification that the suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of
selling marijuana to a person posing as a buyer, since the operation was conducted after
the
actual
exchange.
Said
raid
also
violated
accused
right
against
unreasonable search and seizure, as the situation did not fall in the circumstances wherein
a search may
be
validly
made
even
without
a search warrant,
i.e.
when
the search isincidental to a lawful arrest; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view.
The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and
necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that
the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their
intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first
secured asearch warrant during that time. The Court further notes the confusion and
ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and other
prohibited drug
paraphernalia presented
as
evidence
against appellant:
CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of
dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation

has been advanced therefor, what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and
thereafter utilized as evidence against the appellant were the following items:
One

(1)

red

and

white colored

plastic bag

containing

the

following:

Exh. "A"Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained inside a
transparent
plastic
bag.
Exh. "B" Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds contained inside
a
white colored
plastic labelled
"Robertson".
Exh. "C" Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops
having a total weight of seven grams then further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D" Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected dried
marijuana
fruiting
tops
having
a
total
weight
of
seventeen
grams.
Exh.
"E"
One
plastic
syringe.
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called
follow-up raid in the house of Rodriguezas father. The unanswered question then arises as
to the identity of the marijuana leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction. In
People vs. Rubio, this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried
marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the
existence thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would
be fatal to the cause of the prosecution. Conviction is reversed and set aside and accused
is acquitted.

Go v CA
Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-waystreet, almost had a
collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the
other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down
petitioners plate number and reported the same to the police, who subsequently ordered
a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the
police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently
a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the
case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation.
Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as
bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a
warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of
lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure
and
actions
undertaken
and
files
for
a
preliminary
investigation.
Issues:
(1)

Whether

or

Not

warrantless

arrest

of

petitioner

was

lawful.

(2) Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.
Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld
the warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of
the offenses,
which
however
constituted
continuing
crimes,
i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There was no lawful
warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were

not actually there during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their
information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule
112,
does
not
apply.
Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither
expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a
complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have been
scheduled to determine probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is
entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is
required appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary
investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from preliminary
investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail bond.

POSADAS V CA
Facts: Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned
with the Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted
surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial
Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting
suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the
INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was unsuccessful. They then
checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith &
Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38
caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22
calibergun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the
course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to
possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was
then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him
were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.
Issue: Whether

or

Not

the

warantless search is

valid.

Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner,
argues that under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an
offense without a searchwarrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of
the
petitioner
was
lawful
under
the
circumstances.
in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering that it was
effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner
acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that
he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police
officers
to inspect the
same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of
the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a searchwarrant for the purpose. Such an
exercise
may
prove
to
be
useless, futileand much
too late.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore
discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures has not been violated.

PPL V MENGOTE
Facts: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there
were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard
in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the
place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his
abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen,
whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen
surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the accused-appellant
was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan
knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the police
headquarters for investigation. An information was filed before the RTC convicting the
accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was
among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the
revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that
he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him
at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as
evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a
poisonous tree.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.
Held: An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113
sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense,
(b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
the facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested
has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest
in question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his
abdomen, according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense
that has just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt
by Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a
broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion.
Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.

Malacat v CA 283 SCRA 159 (December 12, 1997)

Facts:
On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported
seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of
the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with
three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila,

near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslimlooking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of
the corner of
stop and frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to maintain the
status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information
; and that the seizure of the grenade from
Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the
crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as
minimum, and not more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18
February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the
Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals
(CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving
very fast. Yu and his
companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about
30 minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in
different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended
Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuch as allegedly the previous
Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others attempt
to detonate a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation grenade
tucked inside the latters front waist line. Yus companion, police officer Rogelio
Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from
whom a .
38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then brought to Police Station
3 where Yu placed an X mark at the
bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue any
receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat
was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment on 9
October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty.
Malacat denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila.
However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns.
Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade
only in court when it was presented. In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but
promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court ruled that the warrantless search and
seizure of Malacat was akin to a
Issue:

Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of stop and
frisk.

Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant,
subject to certain exceptions. As regards
valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A
warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
deno
minated as one in flagrante delicto, while that under Section 5(b) has been described as
a hot pursuit arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the
following: (1) customs searches; (2)
search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5)
a search incidental to a
lawful arrest; and (6) a stop and frisk.

The concepts of a stop

-andfrisk and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest
must not be confused. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the
requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable
scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto
or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the
part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating
that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be
committed. Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental
to a lawful arrest. On the
other hand, while probable cause is not required to conduct a stop and frisk, it neverthe
less holds that mere suspicion or
a hunch will not validate a stop and frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about
him. Finally, a stop

-andfrisk serves a two

-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which
underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in
an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly
and fatally be used against the police officer.
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the stop
-andfrisk was invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to Yus claim
that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days
earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by
any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Second, there was nothing in
Malaca
ts behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other
than that his eyes were moving very fast
an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere
near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his
companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or
trouble. Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat
was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he
admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the front waistline of Malacat,
and from all indications as to the
distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed
hiding a grenade, could not have
been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of Malacats rights
solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2
and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

People
v.
Aminudin
(Inadmissible
Evidence;
Invalid
Search)
- Aminudin was arrested shortly after disembarking from a ship. His bag was inspected
which
contained
marijuana.
- The prosecution had earlier an information that a marijuana would be transported in
Iloilo. Acting on the tip, they waited till evening when the ship embarked. They informant
pointed
on
Aminudin
followed
by
the
arrest
and
search.
- Aminudin disclaimed of the marijuana. He also invoked that he was arbitrary arrested and
was
searched
without
warrant.
He
was
convicted
by
the
trial
court.
- In this court he pleaded to reverse the ruling on the ground that the evidence against him
was
inadmissible.
SC: Tip they received from the informant was alleged to be 2 days prior the arrest. The

present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC
witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained
a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9.
His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And
from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort
was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority
that
a
"search
warrant
was
not
necessary.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing
a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he
was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. This is not inflagrante delicto. ACQUITTED.

People
v.
Malmstedt
[GR
En Banc, Padilla (J): 8 concur, 1 on leave

91107,

19

June

1991]

Facts: Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the 3rd time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985. In
the evening of 7 May 1989, Malmstedt left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the
morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for 2 days.
On 11 May 1989, Capt. Alen Vasco of NARCOM, stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his
men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province,
for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to
establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles
coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover,
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that
a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. At about 1:30
pm, the bus where Malmstedt was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded
the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would
conduct an inspection. During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on Malmstedts
waist. Suspecting the bulge on Malmstedts waist to be a gun, the officer asked for
Malmstedts passport and other identification papers. When Malmstedt failed to comply,
the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist, which
was a pouch bag. When Malmstedt opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed 4
suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, which turned out to contain
hashish, a derivative of marijuana, when opened. Malmstedt stopped to get 2 travelling
bags from the luggage carrier, each containing a teddy bear, when he was invited outside
the bus for questioning. It was observed that there were also bulges inside the teddy bears
which did not feel like foam stuffing. Malmstedt was then brought to the headquarters of
the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa for further investigation. At the investigation room, the
officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish.
Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of
Malmstedt and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis,
which established the objects examined as hashish. Malmstedt claimed that the hashish
was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the 2 travelling bags were

not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he
met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same
bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to
take the next ride and asked Malmstedt to take charge of the bags, and that they would
meet each other at the Dangwa Station. An information was filed against Malmstedt for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. During the arraignment, Malmstedt entered a plea of
not guilty. After trial and on 12 October 1989, the trial court found Malmstedt guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 and sentenced him
to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000. Malmstedt sought reversal of the
decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether the personal effects of Malmstedt may be searched without an issued
warrant.
Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where
the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant.
A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person
under the following circumstances. Section 5 provides that a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)
When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under
paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. Herein, Malmstedt was caught in flagrante delicto,
when he was transporting prohibited drugs. Thus, the search made upon his personal
effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
Espano
vs.
Court
of
Appeals
Third Division, Romero (J): 3 concur

[GR

120431,

April

1998]

Facts: On 14 July 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., Pat. Romeo Pagilagan and other police
officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the
Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets,
Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw Rodolfo Espano selling
something to another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached Espano,
identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic
cellophane tea bags of marijuana . When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that
there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten
more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Espano was brought to the police headquarters
where he was charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On 24 July 1991, Espano
posted bail and the trial court issued his order of release on 29 July 1991. On 14 August

1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting Espano of the crime charged. Espano
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, on 15 January
1995 affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Espano filed a petition for review with
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the search of Espanos home after his arrest does not violate against his
right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Held: Espanos arrest falls squarely under Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He
was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on
the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of
Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw Espano handing over
something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two
cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of
marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime. As for the 10
cellophane bags of marijuana found at Espanos residence, however, the same
inadmissible in evidence. The articles seized from Espano during his arrest were valid
under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search
made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became
unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time.
Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of Espano. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. An exception to the said rule is a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the person of the one
arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Herein, the
ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioners house after his arrest at Pandacan
and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.
Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling
marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt.
Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani
to Musas house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaperwrapped
dried
marijuana
for
P10.00.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully
buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned
themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was
going on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted
more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and
came back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened
and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the
latter moved in and arrested Musa insidethe house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living
room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt.
Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a cellophane colored white and

stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They asked Musa about its contents but failed
to get a response. So they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was
then
placed
under
arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is
unreasonable,
hence,
inadmissible
as
evidence.
Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as
evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspects lawful arrest,
may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the plain view of an officer who has
the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the plain view of the object.
In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the police.
They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for
other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the
plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain view of said object.
Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot
be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.

Valmonte vs. De VillaFacts:

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) wasactivated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters,AFP, with
the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility andperipheral
areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintainingpeace
and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic andpolitical
development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peaceand
order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents

of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the
arbitrary,capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints,
consideringthat their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and checkups, especiallyat night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court
order. Their allegedfear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin
Parpon, a supplyofficer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down
allegedly in cold bloodby the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along
McArthur Highway at Malinta,Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to
the checkpoint and forcontinuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.
Issue:
WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people againstunreasonable
searches and seizures
Held:

Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by themilitary
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se
, illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of
theirroutine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners''
rightsagainst unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional right
againstunreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those
whose rightshave been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and
seizures areprohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. The setting up of
the questionedcheckpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC
to pursue itsmission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and
order for thebenefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to
thwart plots todestabilize the govt, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent
right of thestate to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual s
right against awarrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the former
should prevail. True,the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by
the military in thesame manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But,
at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpointsduring these abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part
of the pricewe pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.