TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC vs.

THE BOARD OF
TRANSPORTATION (1982)
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC vs. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION (1982)
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

A.
B.

1.
2.

On October 10, 1977, BOT issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 that aimed to phase out and replace old
dilapidated taxis to insure only safe comfortable units are used by the public, to respond to complaints by metro
manila residents regarding the old dilapidated taxis, to make the commuting public more comfortable, have more
convenience and safety. 6 years is enough for taxi operators to get back cost of unit plus profits. no car beyond 6
years can still be operated as taxi.
Taxis model 1971 were considered withdrawn on Dec 31, 1977 applied it to succeeding years just add one year to
both dates. they had to surrender the expired taxis plates to the BoT for turnover to Land Transpo Commission.
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued
Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other
personnel of BLT, all within the NCR, to implement the phasing out of the taxis.
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC
No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of
taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of
registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
The issues were in the form of questions that the petitioners presented to the SC through a query.
Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by
Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?
Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree
No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners'
constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
HELD:
The court here did not answer the queries directly they just dealt with the ff issues
WON the procedural and substantive due process rights of the taxi operators were violated NO.
WON their equal protection rights were violated NO.

On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:

Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power
4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be
furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles.
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its
powers:
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding section, the Board shall
proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require the cooperation and assistance
of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support
agencies within the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, or any other government office
or agency that may be able to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or
program in the implementation of this Decree.
The Board may also call conferences, require the submission of position papers or other documents, information, or
data by operators or other persons that may be affected by the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other
suitable means of inquiry.

PET claim that they were denied due process because they were not asked to submit position papers or to attend
conferences regarding the assailed circ.
o SC held that the PD provides a wide leeway as to how the board will choose to gather data in formulating its policy.
NOT ALL OPTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO BE DONE FOR POLICY TO BE VALID the board has the choice of which
avenue to pursue in collecting data.

PET also claim that 6 year limit was arbitrarily set oppressive they want each taxi cab to be inspected regarding
their condition WON it was still safe and roadworthy despite age.
o Court held that their proposed standard is not practicable and can open the door to multiple standards and corruption

o Court furthers aid that 6 years is a reasonable time based on experience and based on cost and fair returns on the
units
o Court held that a uniform standard is best and fair
On Equal Protection of the Law:
PET allege that the circular targets and singles out the taxi industry = violation of their equal protection rights
Court said NO. Circs of the same kind are also being implemented in other cities like Cebu and is also in the process of
conducting the same studies and policy formulations in other cities.
Manila was first because of the heavier traffic pressure and the more constant use of the taxis in MM.
SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION the traffic conditions in the various cities
CONCLUSIONS:
Manila has more traffic which means that taxis in Metro Manila are more heavily used and more likely to deteriorate.
The public has a right to convenience, comfort and safety in their public commute.
The danger posed by the dilapidated and old taxis is a valid nuisance that the Board can abate through the circular that
it passed.
Absent a clear showing of any repugnancy of the circular it is deemed valid.
Petition DISMISSED

Police Power
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of
taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within
the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No.
77-42 which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553,
seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation
in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which
were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
ISSUES:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner
required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners constitutional right to
procedural due process?
B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by
Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed
memorandum circulars violate the petitioners constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and

(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?

HELD
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding
consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all
things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the
language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando the necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

Equal Protection Phasing Out of Old Taxis in MM but not Elsewhere

On 10 Oct 1977, BOT issued Circ 77-42 which has for its purpose the phasing out of old and
dilapidated taxis which are 6 years older. The law is set to be immediately implemented in Metro
Manila first before it would be implemented elsewhere. Pursuant to this, the Director of the Bureau of
Land Transportation issued Circ 52 which is the IRR of the law in the NCR. TOMMI assailed the
constitutionality of the law. It avers, among other things, that the Circular in question violates their
right to equal protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is
directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation
outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection clause by the implementation of
the said circular.
HELD: The SC held that Circ 77-42 is valid. BOTs reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro
Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic
pressure and more constant use. Thus is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions
are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal
protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is
concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same
treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated.
It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or
based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform
operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be

accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged
Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.

FACTS: The Board of Transportation issued a

memorandum circular prohibiting the operation as taxis of
cars which were more than six years old. Petitioner
claimed it violated equal protection, since it did not apply
to other transportation services.
HELD: The fact that the memorandum circular does not
apply to other transportation services does not violate
equal protection. Equal protection does not require that
the
same
treatment
be
accorded
to
all.
(Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs. Board of
Transportation, 117 SCRA 597)
GR # L-59234, September 30, 1982 (Constitutional Law Police Power, Equal Protection)
FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old
on grounds that it is violative of the constitutional rights of equal protection because it is only enforced in Manila and directed
solely towards the taxi industry.
Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety and comfort of the riding public from the
dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.
ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old is a valid exercise of police
power.
HELD: No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the safety and general welfare
of the people. In addition, there is no infringement of the equal protection clause because it is common knowledge that
taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, creating a substantial distinction from
taxicabs of other places.
(Administrative Law, reasonableness, quasi-judicial power)
Facts: Board of Transportation issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 providing for the phasing out and replacement of old
and dilapidated taxis beyond 6 years old.

Pursuant to the BOT circular, the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Implementing Circular No. 52 instructing the
implementation of said circular and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for
registration as public conveyances.
Petitioners seek to declare the nullity of the circulars on the ground that fixing the ceiling at 6 years is arbitrarily and
oppressive because the road worthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are
subjected and therefore their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of the registration.
Issue: WON a circular phasing out taxicabs more than 6 years old is unreasonable and arbitrary.
Held: No. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles uniformly, fairly and justly. The span of 6 yearsw
supplies that reaonable standard. By the time taxis have fully depreciated, theircost recovered, and a fair return on
investment obtained. Thyey are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public.
Taxicabs in Manila, compared to those in other places are subject to heavier traffic pressure and constant use.

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOC. vs. MICHAEL DEFENSOR ET AL Gr. No. 163980,
August 3, 2006 Facts: The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from
enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207,
otherwise known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land
Utilization Act of 2003." Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc.
(Association) is a homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC. Named
respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government Center
Administration Committee (Committee). At the filing of the instant petition, the
Committee was composed of Secretary Michael Defensor, Chairman of the Housing
and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), Atty. Edgardo Pamintuan,
General Manager of the National Housing Authority (NHA), Mr. Percival Chavez,
Chairman of the Presidential Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP), Mayor Feliciano
Belmonte of Quezon City, Secretary Elisea Gozun of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), and Secretary Florante Soriquez of the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed
into law R.A. No. 9207. In accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the
Committee formulated the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
9207 on June 29, 2004. Petitioners subsequently filed the instant petition
questioning its validity. The OSG claims that the instant petition for prohibition is an
improper remedy because the writ of prohibition does not lie against the exercise of
a quasi-legislative function. Since in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the
Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function, which is
the scope of a petition for prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the instant prohibition should be dismissed outright, the OSG

contends. For their part, respondent Mayor of Quezon City and respondent NHA
contend that petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing the
instant petition with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals, which has
concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition.
Issue: Whether or not a petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail an
IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function.
Held: Yes.The court ruled that a petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy
to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is
an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering
said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are
without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied
with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial
or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions.
Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the
limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly
channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of
jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the
bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available
in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the
principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, CASE DIGEST: CHAPTER III
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ELECTION LAW meikimouse
petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which
properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case,
petitioners allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform
functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by
the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rulemaking powers and quasijudicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making
power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated
legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of
nondelegability and separability of powers. In questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party
need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle,
however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act
pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued
pursuant to the quasilegislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by
R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued
by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and

purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity
or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to
pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasilegislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not
give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. True, this Court
has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly with
it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so
warrant. A direct invocation of the Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,
the Court said that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify
the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction. A perusal, however, of the petition for prohibition
shows no compelling, special or important reasons to warrant the Courts taking
cognizance of the petition in the first instance. Petitioner also failed to state any
reason that precludes the lower courts from passing upon the validity of the
questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution,
the Courts power to evaluate the validity of an implementing rule or regulation is
generally appellate in nature. Thus, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the
instant petition should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court.

Facts :
A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, authorized
the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government
Center (NGC).On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City,
covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the
NGC. On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No.
137, excluding 150 of the440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of
Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded
portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. In view of the rapid

increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from
the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued
Proclamation No. 248 on September7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of
the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively
become beneficiaries of the governments socialized housing program. On May 14,
2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Petitioner
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association
from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president, Nestorio F.
Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity and on behalf of
the association. The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing
the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise
known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act
of 2003."
Issue :Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee
was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function and should be
declared null and void for being arbitrary, capricious and whimsical.
Held:Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rulemaking power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated
legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of
non-delegability and separability of powers. In questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party
need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle,
however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act
pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued
pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by
R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued
by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and
purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity
or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to
pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasilegislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not
give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.