UTNIF 2010 Afghanistan Starter Pack Aff - Neg

UTNIF 2010 AFGHANISTAN AFF/NEG
AFGHANISTAN COUNTER-TERRORISM AFF/NEG
AFFIRMATIVE
1AC .................................................................................................................................................................. 3
Afghanistan Advantage Extensions .............................................................................................................. 14
Pakistan Advantage Extensions.................................................................................................................... 16
Solvency Extensions ...................................................................................................................................... 19
Russian Relations DA 2AC Aff Answers ...................................................................................................... 20
Russian Relations DA Aff Answers Ext. Defense......................................................................................... 22
Russian Relations DA Aff Answers: Link Turns ......................................................................................... 24
2AC AFF Answers: Counterplan.................................................................................................................. 25
AFF Answers: Counterplan Extensions ....................................................................................................... 27
NEGATIVE
1NC Afghanistan Advantage ........................................................................................................................ 28

2NC Afghanistan Advantage: Extensions .................................................................................................... 31
2NC: AT Economy Add On .......................................................................................................................... 32
1NC Pakistan Advantage .............................................................................................................................. 33
2NC Pakistan Advantage Extensions............................................................................................................ 35
1NC Solvency................................................................................................................................................. 36
1NC Russian Relations DA ........................................................................................................................... 38
Russian Relations DA NEG: Uniqueness Extensions................................................................................... 40
Russian Relations DA Neg: Link Extensions................................................................................................ 41
Russian Relations DA NEG: Internal Link Extensions ............................................................................... 43
Russian Relations DA NEG: Impact Extensions Key to START ................................................................ 44
Russian Relations DA NEG IMPACT Extensions ....................................................................................... 45
Russian Relations DA NEG: Turns Case ..................................................................................................... 46
Advantage Counterplan 1NC........................................................................................................................ 47
Advantage CP Solvency extension ................................................................................................................ 48
Advantage CP AT: Perm .............................................................................................................................. 49
1
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INHERENCY:
THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER AFGHANISTAN HAS CONFLATED COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY
STRATEGIES. THE DUAL MISSIONS HAVE CREATED AN INTRACTABLE STALEMATE THAT ENSURES ENDLESS
INTERVENTIONIST WARFARE .
MICHAEL J. BOYLE 2010 (LECTURER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND A RESEARCH FELLOW AT THE CENTRE FOR THE
STUDY OF TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS, INTERNATIONAL A FFAIRS 86: 2 (2010)
333–353 DO COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY GO TOGETHER?)
the confusion over counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) that marks the
This episode indicates the extent of
contemporary debate over Afghan- istan. Both CT and COIN would envisage military action in Afghanistan,
but to very different ends. A CT mission would focus exclusively on Al-Qaeda while offering little or no
support to the Karzai government; a COIN mission envisages a comprehensive commitment to defeating the
Taleban and rebuilding the Afghan state while destroying Al-Qaeda operatives there. Yet it has now become
commonplace for politicians and military officials alike to mention CT and COIN in the same breath, or to treat
them as if they were functionally equivalent. The official US government definition now frames counterterrorism in classic ‘hearts and minds’ counterinsurgency language:
‘actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks’.12 Terrorist threats are now regularly described as insurgencies
and vice versa. The influential US Army and Marine Corps Counter- insurgency Field Manual states that ‘today’s operational environment also includes a new kind of insurgency, one which seeks to impose revolutionary
change worldwide. Al-Qaeda is a well known example of such an insurgency.’13 An official from US Central Command (CENTCOM), for instance, has gone so far to define counterterrorism as a ‘whole of government
COIN’ approach.14 Meanwhile, insurgent threats in places such as Chechnya, Indonesia and Thailand are now regularly redescribed as terrorist threats, as analysts speculate on whether local conflicts will become magnets
for Al-Qaeda or otherwise spill out into acts of horrific violence on the international stage.
these concepts
This confusion over the differences between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is not new, but it has become more serious over the last eight years.15 Since the events of September 11,
have regularly been conflated as policy-makers have struggled to come to grips with the threat posed by Al-
Qaeda. To some extent, this is natural: Al-Qaeda is a global terrorist organization which intervenes directly in local conflicts
(often insurgencies, defined here as organized violent attempts to overthrow an existing government) to bait the
US and its allies into exhausting wars of attrition. In other words, it is a terrorist organization which dabbles (sometimes successfully, sometimes less so) in insurgencies.
But the fact that the threats of terrorism and insurgency are so often intertwined in contemporary conflicts
does not make them fundamentally equivalent or susceptible to the same remedies. Nor does it warrant
extending counterinsurgency operations on a global level, as some prominent authors have suggested.16 The fusion of
the threats from terrorism and insurgency, so often described as symptomatic of the complexity of the modern security challenges, can be misread to imply that the responses to them should be similar or equivalent. In fact,
while intermixed in practice, these threats remain distinct, and require a policy response which disaggregates
and prioritizes threats and separates those actors who have a negotiable political programme from those who
remain incorrigible. Similarly, the fact that terrorists and insurgents operate in the same theatre, and in some cases function in tandem, is not an argument for a response that seamlessly interweaves
elements of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Indeed, there is no reason to assume that counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
strategies are fully compatible or mutually reinforcing. The record of the war in Afghanistan suggests rather
that both models of warfare involve tradeoffs or costs that may offset the gains made by the other. Unless these
tradeoffs are properly managed, the simultaneous deployment of counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency operations may operate at cross-purposes and make long-term strategic success
more elusive. The fact that US and UK leaders have been so willing to split the differ- ence between
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency—and to ignore the offsetting costs of each—may help to account for
the current painful stalemate in Afghanistan. This article will argue that counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are two
distinct models of war which can operate at cross-purposes when jointly applied to low-intensity conflicts such
as that in Afghanistan. The conflation of these two different models of warfare stems from an intellectual error, which assumes that a fused threat (for example, between a nationalist insurgent group
like the Taleban and a transnational terrorist group like Al-Qaeda) must necessarily be met by a joint or blended counterterrorism and counterinsurgency approach. In fact, these two models of
warfare involve divergent assumptions about the roles of force, the importance of winning support among the
local population, and the necessity of building a strong and representative government. Such approaches are not
necessarily mutually reinforcing or even compatible. At the tactical and strategic level, there are at least four possible offsetting costs—popular backlash,
countermobilization of enemy networks, a legitimacy gap and diminished leverage—that may be incurred when counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are deployed simulta- neously. At the political
level, the conflation of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency risks producing an overly interventionist
foreign policy which distracts and exhausts the US and UK as they treat an ever-increasing number of
localized insurgencies as the incubators of future terrorist threats.
2
1AC
PLAN: THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD REMOVE ALL FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN THAT ARE
UNNECESSARY FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS.
ADV 1: AFGHAN STABILITY

THE CURRENT COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY HAS MADE THE UNITED STATES BEHOLDEN TO THE CORRUPT
KARZAI GOVERNMENT, UNDERMINING DEMANDS FOR REFORM AND GOOD GOVERNANCE.
Finally, a counterinsurgency mission can have offsetting effects on counterterrorism goals if it sends a signal of
commitment that inadvertently reduces the leverage the foreign backer has over its partner government. Just as
the US learned to its peril with South Vietnam, each decision to send additional troops and resources reveals
how much the US needs to win, thereby reducing its leverage over its local partner.87 This is problematic
because counterterrorism cooperation depends on leverage, especially when the foreign backer asks the local
government to undertake or authorize costly operations to capture or kill suspected terrorists. There is certainly
evidence that this dynamic is in play in respect of Pakistan, which has received $15 billion in aid from the US,
much of it earmarked for counterterrorism support, only to find that the funds are diverted into weapons to be
used against India.88 Pakistan has refused to end its tacit support for the Afghan Taleban, who operate freely in Quetta, and there are unconfirmed reports that the Taleban still receive funds from its
intelligence service.89 Similarly, President Obama’s declaration of Afghanistan as a ‘necessary war’ and his
decision to send 30,000 additional US troops appear to have made the Karzai regime less willing to
accede to American demands over corruption reform and improved governance. Rory Stewart has pointed
out that ‘the more we give, the less influence we have over the Afghan government, which believes we need it more than it needs us. What
incentive do Afghan leaders have to reform if their country is allowed to produce 92 percent of the world’s heroin and still receive $20 billion of international aid?’90 It remains to be seen whether this lack of compliance
it is worth asking whether this renewed commitment to COIN strategies in the

will spill over into responses to counterterrorism demands, but
AfPak region will leave the US punching beneath its weight with both governments. The US is so heavily
invested in stopping the spread of violence in the region—to the point that it will tolerate both
Afghanistan and Pakistan exploiting their crises for profit—that it may find it lacks the leverage needed
to achieve its essential counterterrorism goals.
GOOD GOVERNANCE KEY TO AFGHAN STABILITY

SHANTHIE MARIET D'SOUZA 2009 (ASSOCIATE FELLOW AT INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES AND ANALYSES, TALKING
TO THE TALIBAN: WILL IT ENSURE 'PEACE' IN AFGHANISTAN? STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, VOLUME 33, ISSUE 2 MARCH 2009)
More than three decades of incessant fighting has led to a situation of 'reconciliation deficit' in Afghanistan,
which is reflected in the ongoing inter-ethnic distrust and ongoing power struggle between the Pashtun and
Northern Alliance groups. Serious challenges to governance have plagued the COIN effort and the credibility of the
Afghan Government. Lack of access to basic amenities such as roads, electricity, and drinking water are key concerns of the rural population. The 'governance deficit' is
further exacerbated by rampant corruption, a system of patronage, and the absence of public institutions capable
of mediating in local, national, and regional conflicts. The failure to establish rule of law has undermined
confidence in the Afghan Government. The international development effort in Afghanistan is, moreover, under-resourced and even the limited resources are being squandered.18
The new Afghan institutions that have emerged out of the 2001-2002 Bonn Process are still regarded by many
as unrepresentative, the subsequent elections notwithstanding. A number of individuals with direct ties to the
country's warlords, and those closely associated with the drug trade were elected to Afghanistan's new
parliament, promoting a 'culture of impunity'.19 Presently, some of the tribes and communities that do not feel
included in the current political process or do not benefit adequately from the reconstruction and development,
have reasons to support anti-government activities, even in a passive way. Thus, to achieve a stable security environment and a government that earns
trust and legitimacy, the COIN effort will have to include 'political outreach to disaffected groups'.20 In other words, the 'disaffected communities' within Afghanistan will have to be engaged through a serious negotiation and
reconciliation process to make maximum use of the rapidly shrinking political space.
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1AC
ENDING THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY WOULD SPUR A POLITICAL TRANSITION TO NEGOTIATIONS, ENDING
CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN
SHANTHIE MARIET D'SOUZA 2009 (ASSOCIATE FELLOW AT INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES AND
ANALYSES, TALKING TO THE TALIBAN: WILL IT ENSURE 'PEACE' IN AFGHANISTAN? STRATEGIC ANALYSIS,
VOLUME 33, ISSUE 2 MARCH 2009 , PAGES 254 – 272)
Defying the initial expectations of total and swift annihilation in the aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the Taliban continue to mount lethal attacks within
Afghanistan from their sanctuary in the Pakistani tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan. While South
and East Afghanistan have traditionally been happy hunting grounds for the Taliban, other areas, even in the
relatively stable North, have witnessed increased insecurity and instability. The net impact of these waves of violence and propaganda war launched
by the Taliban-led insurgency1 has been significant on the Afghan populace, most of whom are not supporters of the Taliban. This regime of intimidation and violence,
combined with the ineffectiveness of the international community's Counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign2 to
provide security and the sluggish progress in rebuilding the country, has had an adverse impact on the Afghan
Government's legitimacy among its populace. Its reach, as a result, has been curtailed and its authority has
waned. Optimism among the Afghans, which was generated in the aftermath of the toppling of the Taliban regime, is gradually giving way to despondency.
In light of the deteriorating security situation, there is a growing recognition among Afghan and NATO leaders
that peace in Afghanistan will not be won by the military effort alone. Mere reorienting of military manoeuvres
risks prolonging and intensifying the armed conflict, without initiating processes of negotiations and
reconciliation, to rebuild a broad political consensus in support of the Afghan Government. Reconciliation and negotiations are
viewed as mechanisms to weave-in disaffected elements inside the 'tent' which in turn could erode the support base for the Taliban. The politically disaffected groups - only some
of whom are with the Taliban, or others who now have common ground with the Taliban - need to be brought
over. It would be timely to explore such policy alternatives in effectively tackling the present insurgency.
The need for such reconciliation, talks, and negotiations used interchangeably in this article is characterized by the common parlance, of 'negotiating with the Taliban'. For obvious reasons, it continues to evoke strong
. The article looks primarily at

reactions from many quarters. It is important to note at the outset that this article does not promote acquiescence to Taliban demands nor extol Taliban's virtues
an alternative policy option that many international and Afghan analysts are increasingly proposing and that is
gaining currency - to move towards a national reconciliation which includes negotiating with the insurgents.
The Afghan Government has indicated its willingness to negotiate with the 'Afghan Taliban'. The focus of the article, therefore, will
be on prospects for negotiations and reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban and their affiliates, and not the 'moderate Taliban'.3 Of late, both the Afghan Government and the international community have been involved in
different levels of communications and dealings with the Taliban. Many concerns and doubts abound as far as the desirability and feasibility of such a process is concerned. This article is a stock-taking exercise of the nuances
and implications of such policy postures that could aid or impede peace-building processes in the conflict-ridden country.
The role of talks and reconciliation in addressing the Afghan insurgency
The issue of reconciliation and negotiations is an essential component of any COIN strategy, especially in a country whose social fabric has been severely damaged through decades of conflict. This has been enumerated in
'Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of
various recent studies. According to a recent study by RAND Corporation,
terrorist groups and nearly half of the terror groups analysed ended as a result of a transition into the
political process.'4 Another study that reviewed 80 conflicts in the period from 1990 to 2007, concludes that
only 7.5 per cent of them ended in a military victory and not always for government forces.5 Thus, in the long
run, a number of insurgencies have ended through a negotiated settlement.
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1AC
A FOCUS ON TERRORISM ONLY WILL GIVE THE UNITED STATES THE DISTANCE FROM THE KARZAI GOVERNMENT
NECESSARY TO SUPPORT GOOD GOVERNANCE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL .
, the
Accordingly, it is now essential for the US to think about ways to manage these tradeoffs effectively, so that the CT and COIN missions reinforce each other’s effects. Three important steps can be identified. First
US needs to restrict the number of potential targets of commando raids and drone strikes, and to tighten the
rules of engagement to prevent civilian casualties and reduce the risk of public backlash. Force should be used
sparingly, especially in Pakistan, and directed only at networks directly operating with Al-Qaeda and the
Afghan Taleban. These strikes should not be extended to other Islamist networks whose support for or links
with Al-Qaeda and the Taleban might be incidental. The US must be mindful that the long-term political costs
of employing these strikes against militant networks in Pakistan may outweigh the tactical benefits of doing
so.91 Second, as President Obama has recognized, the US needs to preserve its leverage over the governments
of Afghanistan and Pakistan by explicitly making aid, and the contribution of troops, dependent on reform, the
end of corruption and improvements in self-policing capacity. Third, the US needs to limit its focus in
Afghanistan to the problem of violence—that is, destroying Al-Qaeda and reversing the momentum of the
Taleban—and to put some distance between itself and the Karzai government. Rather than trying to enhance
the legitimacy of the Karzai government, it should focus its energies on supporting good governance at the
local and tribal level and on ensuring that the local delivery of security, justice and public services suffers less
from corruption.92 Such a bottom-up approach would see the Afghan state remaining a patchwork of territories
run by local warlords and strongmen with indirect links to the central government in Kabul. This end-state is
hardly inspiring, but it is far more realistic than assuming that it is possible to defeat an ever-expanding circle
of enemies while remaking Afghani- stan into a centralized modern state.
At the political level, however, the effects of the conflation of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are
perhaps more serious. One of the unfortunate by-products of the experience of the last eight years, which has
seen two major national insurgencies conducted concurrently with a global struggle against Al-Qaeda, is that
policy-makers have begun to conclude (as Miliband did) that counterterrorism is counterinsurgency. The
dangers of such a position are manifest. To treat every terrorist threat through the lens of counterinsurgency is
to commit the US to undertaking countless state-building missions abroad, often with limited prospects of
success. To treat every insurgency as the potential incubator of a future terrorist threat is a recipe for
overextension, distraction and exhaustion. The struggle with Al-Qaeda can be won only if the US keeps sight
of its priorities and avoids entangling itself in an ever-increasing number of distant conflicts. But it will
certainly be lost if the US exhausts itself—financially, militarily, even morally—by forever scanning the
horizon for new monsters to destroy.93
INSTABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN SPILLS OVER THROUGH CENTRAL ASIA.

LAL, 06 (ROLLIE, RAND CORPORATION, "CENTRAL ASIA AND ITS ASIAN NEIGHBORS. SECURITY AND
COMMERCE AT THE CROSSROADS," WWW.RAND.ORG/PUBS/MONOGRAPHS/2006/RAND_MG440.PDF)
The Asian states neighboring Central Asia have historic links and strong interests in the region. China, Iran,
Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan are critical players in the security and economic issues that will determine the
future of Central Asia and affect U.S. interests in the region. All of these states are of importance to the United
States, whether due to the war on terrorism, economic ties, arms control, nonproliferation, or other reasons. China,
Iran, and India have all aggressively sought to build trade ties to and through Central Asia, and China and India have also invigorated security cooperation. But regional states are concerned
about the situation in Afghanistan, which they fear might lead to a spillover of conflict onto their soil, and they also fear
the possibility of Pakistani activity and influence, which has led them to keep that state at arm’s length.
[LAI 06 CONTINUED NO TEXT DELETED]
5
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China has indicated that security is a primary interest in the re-gion through its initiative in establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Taji- kistan, and Russia (pp.
6–7). Concerns regarding China’s Muslim Uighur separatists, as well as concerns of U.S. encirclement, underpin China’s efforts to promote regional security cooperation (pp. 4–6, 9–10). China has also moved aggressively
to expand its economic interests in the region through commodity trade and agreements to im- port oil via pipeline from Kazakhstan (pp. 7–8).
Iran has a similar perspective toward its Central Asian neighbors. Stability in Afghanistan lies at the heart of
Iran’s concerns, as the Taliban has historically been anathema to Iran (p. 12). Iran main- tains that an
international, United Nations–led military presence should remain in Afghanistan to prevent a deterioration of
the security situation (pp. 11–12). However, U.S. presence there and in Central Asia creates concern in Iran that
U.S. intentions are to surround and isolate Iran rather than enhance regional security (p. 16). To increase its leverage in the region, Iran is
developing economic links with each country in Central Asia. Transport links are another important initiative, with routes being developed via Afghanistan, connecting Iranian ports and landlocked Uzbekistan (pp. 13–16).
India shares Iran’s concerns regarding the threat of militants based in Afghanistan. However, India welcomes U.S. presence in the region as a stabilizing influence (p. 34). Economic ties are growing, and India is developing
transport and energy links to the region via Iran and Afghanistan (pp. 33–34). The Central Asian states have close relations with India dating to the years of the Soviet Union and the Afghan war, a history that negatively
affects their relations with Pakistan.
Pakistan’s relations with Central Asia suffer from lingering memories in the region of Pakistan’s role in supporting the Taliban and Islamic militancy in general. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan all remain suspicious
of Pakistan’s regional intentions, and trade with Pakistan has been weak as a result (p. 25). The establishment of the Karzai government in Kabul has been a blow to Pakistan’s regional security strategy. Whereas the Taliban
regime would have been friendly to Pakistan’s interests, the current government is more open to ties with India (p. 23). Although Pakistan is moving to overcome its regional reputation, robust cooperation will take time and
Afghanistan remains critical to the future of Central Asia and its neighbors, as instability in Afghanistan
effort (p. 26).
has the potential to destabilize the region (pp. 19–20). A potent combination of drugs, weapons, and militants traverse
Afghanistan and cross into Central Asia and beyond. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan fear that Islamic
militants trained in Afghanistan may slip back across their borders (p. 20). Iran remains apprehensive that hostile,
anti-Shia elements may take control of Afghanistan, putting Iranian security at risk (p. 12). And Pakistan and India
both compete to ensure that the Afghan regime in power is friendly to their interests (pp. 26, 29). Although the countries across Asia do not
agree on how to secure Afghanistan against threats, unanimous agreement exists on the fact that a stable Afghanistan is critical to their
own security interests. The U.S. presence has led both the Central Asian states and their neighbors to ponder
how long the United States plans to keep troops in the region. U.S. intentions in the region have been inter-
preted in various ways. Both China and Iran are apprehensive that U.S. military presence and security interests
in the area have the dual purpose of containment (pp. 3, 9–10, 11–12, 16). Conversely, Af-ghanistan would like to see a continued strong role for the United States in
combating militancy and fostering stability (p. 22), and Pakistan and India see the potential for security cooperation with the United States in the region (pp. 27, 34). Despite the divergent
perspectives of their Asian neighbors, the Central Asian states continue to see a role for the United States in
promoting stability in the region.
INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL ASIA DRAWS IN RUSSIA, CAUSING NUCLEAR WAR.

BLANK 2K (STEPHEN, JUNE, WWW.STRATEGICSTUDIESINSTITUTE.ARMY.MIL/PDFFILES/PUB113.PDF)
In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a
Thus many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in
confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat.72
which third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus. For example, many Third World conflicts
generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel
obliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other side’s
stakes since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear
weapons to prevent a client’s defeat are not as well established or apparent. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the kind of rapid
and almost uncontrolled escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case.73 Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally,
Russian nuclear threats could trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature
of Russia’s declared nuclear strategies). The real threat of a Russian nuclear strike against Turkey to defend
Moscow’s interests and forces in the Transcaucasus makes the danger of major war there higher than almost
everywhere else. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious
instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other’s
perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional
forces; and, (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.74 Russian perceptions of the
Transcaspian’s criticality to its interests is tied to its continuing efforts to perpetuate and extend the vast
disproportion in power it possesses relative to other CIS states. This power and resource disproportion between Russia and the smaller states of the
Transcaspian region means that no natural equilibrium is possible there. Russia neither can be restrained nor will it accept restraint by any local institution or power in its pursuit of unilateral advantage and reintegration.75
6
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AND AFGHANISTAN STABILITY IS KEY TO MIDDLE EAST STABILITY BECAUSE IT IS THE LYNCHPIN IN THE WAR ON
TERROR.
ANATOL LIEVEN, 2007 (SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW WITH THE NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, MIDDLE EAST
POLICY, SPRING, HTTP://WWW.MEPC.ORG/FORUMS_CHCS/47.HTML)
So looking at the inevitable consequences of American withdrawal, the situation after America does withdraw, what should we be concerned with most critically? Well, the first is something which is too often not talked
De facto defeat in Iraq will be bad enough. De facto defeat in Afghanistan

about in the context of the Middle East, and that is of course Afghanistan.
would be a catastrophic humiliation for the United States, and would in effect mark defeat in the war on terror
as a whole. Now by defeat in Afghanistan I don't mean that the Taliban can actually chase us out like Vietnam in
'75. But that we also get into a situation where America, and Britain for that matter, and whoever remains there, which won't be very many allies, I think, are
suffering a continual stream of heavy casualties with no prospect of actually creating a successful, halfway
successful and stable Afghan state. Now this fits into the Middle East not just because American strategy as a
whole in the war on terror, but also because Iran is absolutely critical to the stabilization, the development of
Afghanistan. And not just that, but if in the future we ever face the situation in which we are going to withdraw
from Afghanistan as well, well then, we go back to the situation before 9/11 in which Iran and Russia were
critical to keeping the Northern Alliance going against the prospect of the Taliban conquering the whole
country.
ANOTHER WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST WILL GO NUCLEAR.

JOHN STEINBACH 2002 (DC IRAQ COALITION,
HTTP://WWW.WAGINGPEACE. ORG/ARTICLES/2002/03/00_STEINBACH_ISRAELI-WMD.HTM)
Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire
missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would
now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining
momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is
widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images
of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching
its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland
seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession
of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual
use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its
weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening
Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)
7
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ADV 2: PAKISTAN
THE CURRENT COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MASSIVE INCREASE IN
DRONE ATTACKS IN PAKISTAN , WHICH IS STRENGTHENING RADICAL ELEMENTS IN THE PAKISTAN MILITARY.
A second, and related, problem is that the target set for the application of lethal force tends to expand over time
from counterterrorism targets to ones associated with the counterinsurgency effort. Such an expansion is often
justified on the grounds that militant networks in the insurgency operate in tandem with, or otherwise support,
a terrorist organization and vice versa. However, the expansion of the target set produces a range of direct and
indirect offsetting costs to the counterinsurgency mission by increasing the ranks of one’s enemies and by
realigning existing militant networks against the foreign power.
The effects of this ‘mission creep’ can be seen with commando raids and the use of Predator drones in
Pakistan. These were originally used sparingly and only against Al-Qaeda operatives; then the US gradually
broadened its target set to include senior Taleban officials in Afghanistan.63 By 2009, aware that high-ranking
Taleban were operating freely across the border in Pakistan, the US expanded commando raids into its tribal
regions.64 At least four raids were conducted, two of which were directed against so-called ‘high-value targets’
near the border. Similarly, in 2008 the US expanded the target list for Predator drone strikes to include Taleban
officials and related hostile Islamist networks (such as the Haqqani network) operating across the Pakistani border. In summer 2009, concerned over growing threats to the
stability of Pakistan, the US began to direct strikes against factions of the Tehrik-i-Taleban in Pakistan (TTP) and eventually killed its leader, Baitullah Mehsud.65 From 2007 to 2009, the change in the number of strikes and
in 2007 the US launched only five drone strikes, three

the target set has been dramatic. According to an analysis by Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedmann,
against Taleban targets and two against Al-Qaeda. By contrast, in the first ten months of 2009 it launched 43
strikes against a variety of targets, including 18 against the Taleban, 16 against Baitullah Mehsud, seven
against Al-Qaeda and four against the Haqqani network.66 Under the Obama administration, the number of Predator strikes and the diversification of the targets has
actually increased.67 There is considerable evidence that these raids and drone strikes have been successful in degrading
Al-Qaeda’s capabilities.68 Obama administration officials believe that they have eliminated more than half of
the top Al-Qaeda targets over the last year.69 There are numerous anecdotal reports that Al-Qaeda has been demoralized by the strikes, which they see as causing disarray in their
ranks.70 But the blowback effects have been significant. The immediate reaction to the drone strikes and
commando raids in Pakistan has been public outrage. A recent Pew study revealed that 58 per cent of Pakistanis did not believe that missile strikes were necessary,
and 93 per cent believed that they killed too many civilians.71 Even though the Pakistani government approves some drone strikes, approximately 58 per cent of Pakistanis now believe that the US conducts them without the
autho- rization of the government in Islamabad.72 What influence the US has is now seen as negative: 64 per cent of Pakistanis now
believe the US is their country’s enemy.73 The commando and Predator drone operations have reinforced a
perception that the government is weak and cannot say no to the US even when the latter conducts
unsanctioned air strikes and ground incursions on Pakistani territory.74 The growing sense that the Pakistani
government is paralysed in the face of US intervention has contributed to the countermobilization of
militant networks.75 This was precisely the fear of the Pakistani military, who warned after the first major US commando raid that ‘such action[s] are completely counterproductive and can result in
huge losses because it gives the civilians a cause to rise against the Pakistani military’.76 At present, there is only anecdotal evidence to suggest that
recruitment into militant networks has increased out of a desire for revenge for commando raids and drone
strikes.77 Since no reliable data on the supply of militant recruits to Pakistani Islamist networks exist, no one
knows whether the use of commando raids and drones creates more enemies than it kills.78 But it is clear that
the expansion of these strikes has accelerated the radicalization of existing militant groups and
encouraged them to make common cause with jihadi groups. The result has been a political realignment among existing militant groups in opposition to the US
and its alleged puppet government in Pakistan. The TTP, formed out of a coalition of disparate militant networks in December 2007, now comprises more than 40 militant groups, and has developed operational links with
long standing Kashmiri and Punjabi groups, which themselves are showing increasing susceptibility to jihadi ideologies. The use of commando raids and Predator drone strikes has pushed the TTP closer to Al-Qaeda, the
These strikes have also transformed

Haqqani network and its counterpart in the Afghan Taleban. Together, these groups now form an inchoate insurgency against the Zadari government.
the priorities of the Pakistani networks and turned some that were exclusively focused on challenging or
[BOYLE 2010 CONTINUED NO TEXT DELETED]
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overthrowing the incumbent regime in Islamabad towards actively countering the US and NATO in
Afghanistan. Worse still, Al-Qaeda appears to gain from this dynamic: Hakimullah Mehsud, the former leader of the TTP, stated unequivocally in October 2009 that ‘we have respect for Al-Qaeda and the
jihadist organizations—we are with them’.79 He also declared his allegiance to Afghan Taleban leader Mullah Omar as the ‘amir’ of his movement. The use of commando raids and drone strikes against militant networks in
Ironically, the
Pakistan has furthered the radicalization of existing groups and expanded the international horizons of militant groups whose focus was previously the Pakistani government or Kashmir.
result of the expansion of strikes into Pakistan may be to encourage the process of fusion that Kilcullen
described and to pull these groups even closer to Al-Qaeda.
The expansion of raids and strikes in Pakistan has added to the ranks of the enemies that the US is now
fighting. In doing so, it has turned the US into a party to the counterinsurgency effort in Pakistan, as the
bureaucratic designa- tion ‘AfPak’ recognizes. But such involvement has direct and indirect costs to the
counterterrorism effort. The direct cost becomes apparent when Al-Qaeda and Pakistani militant networks
target US counterterrorism assets, as occurred on 30 December 2009 when the Jordanian Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi blew himself up at a meeting with CIA agents in Afghanistan, killing
seven American and one Jordanian intelligence officials. This attack was facilitated by Hakimullah Mehsud, who declared that the attack was ‘revenge’ for the killing of Baitullah Mehsud in a Predator drone strike.80 This
attack was particularly costly for the CIA, which lost senior operatives with the highly specialist skills needed to pursue high-ranking Al-Qaeda members.81
The indirect costs are numerous. It is hard to measure what the US loses from the strikes, but it is obvious that
it gains no intelligence from dead (as opposed to captured) operatives. It also loses the moral high ground if the
strikes acciden- tally kill high numbers of civilians. But perhaps the greatest indirect cost is its contribution to
instability in Pakistan. The pressure placed on Al-Qaeda and its affiliates has accelerated the crisis facing the
Pakistani government and encouraged local militant networks (including ethnic separatist and tribal groups) to form tactical and
ideological alliances with Al-Qaeda, thus magnifying the threat they pose. As a result, the US is now stumbling
into a war across South Asia with a growing number of militant Islamist networks, many of whom have strong familial and tribal ties with
the local population and stronger regenerative capabilities than Al-Qaeda. The creeping expansion of the target set has transformed a set of
tactics originally reserved for counterterrorism operations into a tool for fighting an ever-widening circle
of insurgents in Pakistan. The dilemma is that, while the counterterrorism benefits of these operations are
clear, in adding to the ranks of its enemies the US now faces a more durable network of militants that will fuel
the Taleban’s insurgency against the United States, Pakistan and the Karzai government.
AND THE INCREASE OF TROOPS ON THE GROUND UNDERMINES PAKISTAN’S OWN CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE
PAKISTAN TALIBAN.
SYED MANZAR ABBAS ZAIDI 2010 (LECTURER, POLICING AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, UNIVERSITY OF
CENTRAL LANCASHIRE, ASIAN POLITICS & POLICY VOLUME 2, ISSUE 2, PAGES 257-277 NEGOTIATIONS AND
THE ANTI-TALIBAN COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PAKISTAN)
The situation in Pakistan is volatile enough without being "nudged" by a U.S. territorial intrusion in Pakistan;
this would only lead to an Afghanistan- and Iraq-style state implosion, allowing the Islamists even greater
predominance in Pakistani politics. The fallacy inherent on relying upon a purely military strategy has been an
unmitigated disaster in neighboring Afghanistan. Besides causing a huge number of civilian casualties, it has
also contributed to the political strengthening of the Taliban by making them appear like freedom fighters
taking on a colonial force. A purely military solution will again backfire; Islamist propaganda would then carry the power for an even greater tactic
stimulus of militants from all over the world, exacerbating an already grave situation. It has to be acknowledged that Pakistan is set to see a COIN
campaign that will extend over a few years at least to pay tangible dividends. Any efforts to "fast-track" this
campaign by putting foreign boots on the ground will only aggravate the militancy. For better or worse,
the Pakistani army is the only viable option to spearhead the COIN campaigns, and continuous efforts by
the international polity have to be directed to retrain, equip, and back up this entity for a protracted
antiguerilla campaign. Pakistan's Taliban imperative has been marked by a laissez-faire attitude toward them;
indecisiveness and inaction on the part of the state to tackle a festering insurgency allowed it to blossom into a
widespread movement. The widely prevalent belief in policy circles that the Taliban would continue concentrating on foreign troops in Afghanistan and encircling the Kabul regime inculcated a sense of
complacency, which now has to be shaken off. It must also be remembered that as army operations escalate in intensity, the Taliban–al-Qaeda nexus will be hard at work to chalk out a course of further terrorist tactics across
Pakistan; this has the potential of opening multiple fronts for the state forces, for which a COIN regime should have adequate "buffer" logistical backup.
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THE DESTABILIZATION OF PAKISTAN BY RADICALS RESULTS IN NUCLEAR WAR.
STEPHEN J. MORGAN, 07 (FORMER MEMBER OF THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,
“BETTER ANOTHER TALIBAN AFGHANISTAN”, HTTP://EZINEARTICLES.COM/?BETTER-ANOTHER-TALIBAN-
AFGHANISTAN,-THAN-A-TALIBAN-NUCLEAR-PAKISTAN?&ID=475808)
Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was "Osama"
(not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions
would be ripe for a coup d'état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised
masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take
place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations.
The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine,
through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast.
Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir.
Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly
nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out.
Atomic Al Qaeda
Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real
possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a "Pandora's box" for the region and the world. With the
possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear
arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear
and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda.
Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real
strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new
Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.
What is at stake in "the half-forgotten war" in Afghanistan is far greater than that in Iraq. But America's capacities for controlling the situation are extremely restricted. Might it be, in the end, they are also forced to accept
President Musharraf's unspoken slogan of "Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!"
AND A STRENGTHENED TALIBAN IN PAKISTAN WILL BE THE SOURCE OF THE NEXT MAJOR TERRORIST ATTACKS,
THIS TIME WITH ACCESS TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS .
SYED MANZAR ABBAS ZAIDI 2010 (LECTURER, POLICING AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, UNIVERSITY OF
CENTRAL LANCASHIRE, ASIAN POLITICS & POLICY VOLUME 2, ISSUE 2, PAGES 257-277 NEGOTIATIONS AND
THE ANTI-TALIBAN COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PAKISTAN)
The Taliban insurgency in Pakistan has caused escalating concerns among U.S. policy echelons, since
Pakistan's tribal areas are now being considered a likely source of the next 9/11; the fact that Pakistan has
nuclear weapons largely complicates the scenario. American concern for the militants' actions in these areas has
escalated exponentially, with repeated demands being made from the Pakistani establishment for firm and
conclusive action against them. "I'm not convinced we are winning in Afghanistan. I am convinced we can," Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Navy Admiral Mike Mullen said in a testimony
before the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee. Mullen said he was already "looking at a new, more comprehensive strategy for the region" that would cover both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan
"We can hunt down and kill extremists as they cross over the border from Pakistan, but until we work more
border.
closely with the Pakistani government to eliminate the safe havens from where they operate, the enemy will
only keep coming," he said (Daily Times, September 11, 2008).
Apparently, the United States has been thinking about and preparing for direct intervention in Pakistan's tribal areas for some time, notwithstanding that the unmanned drone attacks currently being conducted in FATAs are a
There has also been an ongoing tussle between the

link in this chain. Ostensibly, the Iraqi engagement has held these plans in abeyance ("Secret U.S.," 2008).
proponents of use of direct force and the school of thought that endorses unmanned attacks but decries landing
troops in a sovereign state, with the potential to turn a populace already disgruntled by U.S. policies in the
region further against it ("Secret U.S.," 2008). It is also a fact that the United States is not adequately prepared for a
Pakistani engagement, since the administrative level of expertise, particularly within the ranks of the CIA,
regarding this region is inadequate ("Secret U.S.," 2008). However, this has not stopped American territorial incursions utilizing unmanned Predator drones, which have been used regularly
to target al-Qaeda and Taliban in the Pakistani tribal theater.
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THIS RESULTS IN EXTINCTION.
YONAH ALEXANDER 2003 (PROF AND DIR. OF INTER-UNIVERSITY FOR TERRORISM STUDIES, WASHINGTON
TIMES, AUGUST 28)
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the
international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist
threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a
critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating
blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that
began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the
United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the
manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the
Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have

exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare.
introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The
internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of
Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications
concerning national, regional and global security concerns.
REDUCING FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN AND FOCUSING ON COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS STOPS INCREASING

RADICALISM IN PAKISTAN .
MALOU INNOCENT 2009 (FOREIGN POLICY ANALYST AT THE CATO INSTITUTE
HTTP://WWW.CATO.ORG/PUB_DISPLAY.PHP?PUB_ID=10479 THE US MUST REASSESS ITS DRONE P OLICY)
Drone strikes also contribute to the widening trust deficit between Pakistanis and the US. A recent poll
conducted by Gallup Pakistan for Al-Jazeera found that 59 percent believed the US was the greatest threat to
Pakistan. Most Pakistanis oppose extremism; they simply disagree with American tactics.
America's interests lie in ensuring the virus of anti-American radicalism does not infect the rest of the region.
Yet Washington's attempts to stabilize Afghanistan help destabilize Pakistan, because its actions serve as a
recruiting tool for Pakistani Taliban militants. Just as one would not kill a fly with a sledgehammer, using overwhelming firepower to
kill a single insurgent creates collateral damage that can recruit 50 more. Military force against insurgents must
be applied precisely and discriminately. On the ground, Pakistani security forces lack training, equipment, and
communication gear to carry out a low-intensity counterinsurgency. But drones provide a poor substitute if the
goal is to engage rather than alienate the other side.
A better strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan is for the United States to focus on limiting cross-border
movement by supporting local Pakistani security forces with a small number of US Special Forces personnel.
To improve fighting capabilities and enhance cooperation, Washington and Islamabad must increase the number
of military-to-military training programs to help hone Pakistan's counterterrorism capabilities and serve as a
confidence-building measure to lessen the Pakistan Army's tilt toward radicalism.
Ending drone strikes is no panacea for Pakistan's array of problems. But continuing those strikes will certainly
deepen the multiple challenges the country faces. Most Pakistanis do not passively accept American actions,
and officials in Islamabad cannot afford to be perceived as putting Washington's interests above those of their
own people. Long-term success in both Afghanistan and Pakistan depends on the people's repudiation of
extremism. Continued US actions add more fuel to violent religious radicalism; it is time to reassess both US
tactics and objectives in the region.
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SOLVENCY:
ABANDONING THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN WILL ALLOW WITHDRAW OF MAJOR
AMERICAN UNITS , SUCCESSFULLY ISOLATE THE KARZAI REGIME, AND ALLOW FOR BUILDING A MORE STABLE-
DECENTRALIZED AFGHANSTAN.
BING WEST APRIL 7, 2010 (AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, HAS
REPORTED ON THE AFGHAN WAR SINCE 2001. HOW TO SAVE AFGHANISTAN FROM KARZAI NEW YORK
TIMES. )
The United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, was guilty of understatement last fall when he told Washington that
''Karzai is not an adequate strategic partner.'' Still, getting rid of Mr. Karzai at this point wouldn't be easy, and any
major upheaval would clearly imperil President Obama's plan to start withdrawing American troops next
summer.
The Marja offensive, however, may have shown us an alternative approach to the war. For one thing, it
demonstrated that our Karzai problem is part of a broader failure to see that our plans for Afghanistan are
overambitious. The coalition is pursuing a political-military strategy based on three tasks. First, ''clear'' the guerrillas from populated areas. Second, ''hold'' the areas with Afghan forces. Third, ''build''
responsible governance and development to gain the loyalty of the population for the government in Kabul. To accomplish this, the coalition military has deployed reconstruction teams to 25 provinces. We may
call this a counterinsurgency program, but it's really nation-building.

The problem with building a new and better Afghanistan is that, above the local level, President Karzai has
long held the levers of political power by controlling provincial finances and leadership appointments, including
those of police chiefs. Regardless of the coalition's success at the district level, an obdurate and erratic Mr.
Karzai is an obstacle to progress. The success in Marja, however, changed the dynamics of the conflict. It now seems that the planned surge of 30,000 additional troops will likely achieve
progress in ''clearing and holding'' Kandahar and other Taliban-controlled areas by mid-2011. At that time, the force ratio will be one coalition soldier for every three Afghan soldiers and policemen, and the Afghan Army will
Ideally, we could then begin to withdraw major American units and leave behind small
still rely upon us for firepower and moral support.
task forces that combine advisory and combat duties, leading to a new ratio of about one American to 10
Afghans. Not only would this bring our troops home, but it would shift the responsibility for nation-building to
Afghan forces. At the same time, we would have to pivot our policy in two ways. First, Mr. Karzai should be
treated as a symbolic president and given the organizational ''mushroom treatment'' -- that is, we should shut off
the flows of information and resources directly to the national government.
President Ronald Reagan did something similar with another erratic ally, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines. In February 1986, Reagan warned Marcos that if government troops attacked opposition forces holed
up on the outskirts of Manila, it would cause ''untold damage'' to his relations with the United States -- meaning the aid spigot would be turned off. When his countrymen saw that he was stripped of prestige and support, they
forced Marcos into exile.
Second, the coalition must insist that the Afghan military play a primary role in the governance of the districts
and provinces, including in the allocation of aid and the supervision of the police. We should work directly with
those local and provincial leaders who will act responsibly, and cut off those who are puppets of Kabul.
This is happening, to some extent, in Helmand Province, site of the Marja battle, where the coalition has
independent control over $500 million in reconstruction aid and salaries. We have been fortunate that the
provincial governor, Gulab Mangal, while a Karzai appointee, has proved an innovative partner. But in any
case, we know that coalition aid need not flow through Kabul.
Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the head of Central Command, already seems to be considering this approach as the battle for Kandahar gains intensity. ''One of the things we'll be doing in the shaping is working with political
Although isolating Mr. Karzai will

leaders to try to get an outcome that makes sense'' including ''partnering inside the city with the Afghan National Police,'' he told reporters last month.
strike many as a giant step backward, the truth is that we don't have a duty to impose democracy on
Afghanistan. The advancement of liberty doesn't necessitate a ''one person, one vote'' system, as the 1.5 million
fraudulent votes cast for Mr. Karzai in last summer's sham election showed. We cannot provide democracy if
we desire it more than the Afghans.
The Philippines -- and South Korea as well -- evolved into thriving democracies at their own pace, well after American aid helped to beat back the military threats facing them. It was enough to prevent the Communist
takeovers and leave behind governments controlled in the background by a strong military. We didn't spend tens of billions of dollars on material projects to inculcate democratic principles.
Similarly, a diminished Hamid Karzai can be left to run a sloppy government, with a powerful, American-financed Afghan military insuring that the Taliban do not take over.
Admittedly, this risks the emergence of the Pakistan model in Afghanistan -- an army that has a country rather than a country that has an army. But we are not obliged to build a democratic nation under a feckless leader.
We need to defend our interests, and leave the nation-building to the Afghans themselves.
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A COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD ONLY REQUIRE 20,000 TROOPS, A REDUCTION OF
70,000 FROM CURRENT TROOPS LEVELS.
RORY STEWART 2009 (SERVED BRIEFLY AS AN OFFICER IN THE BRITISH ARMY (THE BLACK WATCH), IN
2003, HE BECAME THE COALITION DEPUTY GOVERNOR OF MAYSAN AND DHI QAR -- TWO PROVINCES IN THE
MARSH ARAB REGION OF SOUTHERN IRAQ. LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS VOL. 31 NO. 13 · 9 JULY 2009 THE
IRRESISTIBLE ILLUSION HTTP://WWW.LRB.CO.UK/V31/N13/RORY-STEWART/THE-IRRESISTIBLE-ILLUSION)
. It
After seven years of refinement, the policy seems so buoyed by illusions, caulked in ambiguous language and encrusted with moral claims, analogies and political theories that it can seem futile to present an alternative
is particularly difficult to argue not for a total withdrawal but for a more cautious approach. The best Afghan
policy would be to reduce the number of foreign troops from the current level of 90,000 to far fewer – perhaps
20,000. In that case, two distinct objectives would remain for the international community: development and
counter-terrorism. Neither would amount to the building of an Afghan state. If the West believed it essential
to exclude al-Qaida from Afghanistan, then they could do it with special forces. (They have done it successfully since 2001 and could
continue indefinitely, though the result has only been to move bin Laden across the border.) At the same time the West should provide generous development
assistance – not only to keep consent for the counter-terrorism operations, but as an end in itself.
A reduction in troop numbers and a turn away from state-building should not mean total withdrawal: good
projects could continue to be undertaken in electricity, water, irrigation, health, education, agriculture, rural
development and in other areas favoured by development agencies. We should not control and cannot predict the future of Afghanistan. It may in the future
become more violent, or find a decentralised equilibrium or a new national unity, but if its communities continue to want to work with us, we can, over 30
years, encourage the more positive trends in Afghan society and help to contain the more negative.
13
AFGHANISTAN ADVANTAGE EXTENSIONS
MIDDLE EAST WAR GOES NUCLEAR: ISRAEL STRIKE.

GAFFNEY 03 (MARK, A RESEARCHER, WRITER, POET, ENVIRONMENTALIST, ANTI-NUCLEAR ACTIVIST “WILL IRAN BE NEXT?”
ALTERNATIVES: TURKISH JOURNAL O FINTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, SUMMER VOL 2,
WWW.ALTERNATIVESJOURNAL.NET/VOLUME2/NUMBER2/GAFFNEY .PDF)
It is very possible--some would say probable--that the U.S., possibly in conjunction with Israel, will launch a “preventive” raid and destroy the Bushehr reactor before it goes on line.
Such a raid would be fateful for the region and the world. It would trigger another Mideast war, and possibly a confrontation with Russia, with effects that
are difficult to predict. A war with Iran might bring about the collapse of the NPT, lead to a new arms race, and plunge the world into
nuclear chaos. Such a crisis holds the potential to bring the world to the nuclear brink. This article will review the background, and provide an analysis. I
will discuss the reactor at Bushehr first, then the other suspect site
AFGHAN INSTABILITY SPILL OVER INTO IRAN

RHINEFIELD 6 [JEFFREY D., LIEUTENANT, UNITED STATES NAVY B.S., JACKSONVILLE UNIVERSITY; IMPLICATIONS OF
SOCIETAL FRAGMENTATION FOR STATE FORMATION: CAN DEMOCRACY SUCCEED IN AFGHANISTAN?;
MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL;
HTTP://STINET.DTIC.MIL/CGI-BIN/GETTRDOC?AD=A445561&LOCATION =U2&DOC =GETTRDOC .PDF]
In addition, Iran’s key interest in Afghanistan is to exert its own influence over the western part of that nation and to protect the Shia minority groups that live within the central region of Afghanistan.241 According to
“instability, chaos, and criminal activities in Afghanistan could spill over into Iran which, unsurprisingly has
Peimani, the possibility of
caused the Iranian government to watch their Afghan neighbors closely and has caused concern about the pace
of events within Afghanistan with the potential of inducing instability into Iran.”242
NUCLEAR WAR
EISENSTADT 4 [MICHAEL, SENIOR FELLOW @ WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY, IRAN WATCH # 899, “THE
IAEA AND IRAN: THE PERILS OF INACTION”, 9-16, HTTP://WWW.IRANWATCH.ORG /PRIVATEVIEWS/WINEP/PERSPEX-
WINEP-EISENSTADT-NUCLEARIRAN-091604.HTM]
Instability and unrest in a nuclear Iran could have dire consequences. Were antiregime
Implications of Instability in Iran?
violence to escalate to the point that it threatened the survival of the Islamic Republic (unlikely in the near term, but a possibility in the
future should popular demands for political change continue to be ignored by conservative hardliners), diehard supporters of the old order might lash out at
perceived external enemies of the doomed regime with all means at their disposal, including nuclear weapons.
The apocalyptic possibility of nuclear terrorism by an Islamic Republic in its death throes, though unlikely in the near term,
cannot be dismissed as a source of concern.
MIDDLE EAST INSTABILITY CREATES SANCTUARIES FOR TERRORIST AND DESTROY THE GLOBAL ECONOMY.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT M. MONARCH 2009 (DENYING SANCTUARY, DTIC.MIL/CGI-
BIN/GETTRDOC?LOCATION=U2&DOC =GETTRDOC.PDF&AD=ADA494801)
Sanctuaries are not only a threat to the newly formed governments of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also the governments hosting the
rebels (Pakistan, Syria and Iran) and stability in the region. Eliminating these sanctuaries is vital to successful
counter- insurgencies, thus providing the fledgling states security to develop their governmental systems. The host countries also need these areas eradicated to purge foreign-armed groups from within
their lands and restore sovereign control of their territory. Both of these factors contribute to stability within the countries and, ultimately, within their region. The United States seeks Middle
Eastern and Southwest Asian regions noted for their stability and prosperity. Free trade of vital natural
resources and goods from these regions is critical to a growing globalized economy. The solution to this goal is
insurgent-free states allowed to flourish in the international system wi thout fear of armed conflict or overthrow. As noted, at stake in both Iraq and Afghanistan is the fate of both nations’ governments.
Insurgencies are draining their national treasures and sapping the will of the populace to resist. For the United
States and our coalition partners, the stakes are equally high. A stable Middle East and unhindered trade are
necessary for vital economies within the United States, its allies, and the Middle Eastern countries. Also, the world cannot
afford for terrorists to once again establish bases in Southwest Asian nations with sympathetic regimes. Finally, defeating these insurgencies will slow the drain of our national treasures, both blood and resources, while
providing a growth of prestige amongst friends and foes alike around the world. To defeat the insurgencies, the sanctuaries must be eliminated.
14
AFGHANISTAN ADVANTAGE EXTENSIONS
EXTINCTION
PHIL KERPEN, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, OCTOBER 29, 2008, DON'T TURN PANIC INTO DEPRESSION,
HTTP://WWW.CBSNEWS.COM/STORIES/2008/10/29/OPINION/MAIN4555821.SHTML
It’s important that we avoid all these policy errors - not just for the sake of our prosperity, but for our survival. The Great Depression, after all, didn’t end until
the advent of World War II, the most destructive war in the history of the planet. In a world of nuclear and biological weapons and non-state terrorist
organizations that breed on poverty and despair, another global economic breakdown of such extended duration would risk armed conflicts
on an even greater scale.
EMPIRICALLY DENIED: RUSSIAN ECONOMIC COLLAPSE DECREASES THE RUSSIAN THREAT.

STEPHEN SESTANOVICH 2008 (SENIOR FELLOW FOR RUSSIAN AND EURASIAN STUDIES RUSSIA AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMIC CRISIS CFR BRIEF WWW.CFR.ORG/PUBLICATION/17844/RUSSIA_AND_THE_GLOBAL_ECONOMIC_CRISIS.HTML)
Any international economic crisis afflicts different countries in different ways, but an unfortunate few experience every painful dimension of it. In the current crisis, Russia is
confronting virtually all the negatives at once--sharply declining export earnings from energy and metals, over-
leveraged corporate balance sheets and a chorus of bailout appeals, a credit crunch and banking failures, a
bursting real-estate bubble and mortgage defaults, accelerating capital flight, and unavoidable pressures for
devaluation. The Russian stock market is down 70 percent from late spring. The government has burned through
more than 20 percent of its foreign-exchange reserves since August. The outflow of capital in October alone
was $50 billion. Next year's budget is based on a projected average price for oil of $95 per barrel; now budget
planners have to work with forecasts of $50 or lower. Since Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin has said that Russian government spending goes into deficit at $70 per barrel,
pressures for spending cuts are starting to mount. Severe reductions have already been announced in housing and education programs. Russians, it seems, at last have an answer to
the question they have been asking since the economic collapse of 1998: Can anything approaching that crisis
happen again? The vast hard-currency reserves they accumulated during years of high oil and gas prices (and thanks to conservative fiscal policies) make it hard to imagine that Moscow might default on its debts
anytime soon. Yet the very fact that this crisis has engulfed the country at a moment of high confidence in the future
has made it in some respects even more shocking. Debate about how it is being handled, how far it will go, and what changes it will bring with it is becoming intense and
much more open. Russians remember, after all, that 1998 was not only an economic calamity but a political crisis--perhaps the low moment of the entire presidency of Boris Yeltsin. It toppled the government, ended the
political careers of key liberal policymakers, and actually brought Communists back into the cabinet. It offered a hearing to protectionist demands for Russia to insulate itself against the fluctuations of the international
economy. It revived talk of the need to hew to Russia's collectivist traditions, rather than to alien Western ideas about markets and the primacy of the individual. The very fact that this crisis has engulfed the country at a
moment of high confidence in the future has made it in some respects even more shocking. In Russia's response to the crisis of 2008 there have been a few echoes of 1998, including a generous share of anti-Western rhetoric.
President Dmitry Medvedev and others have repeatedly criticized the United States and called for a reduction in its global influence. There have also been hints of a further tightening of authoritarian rule. Many Russian
commentators have interpreted Medvedev's proposal to lengthen the president's term of office as a sign that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin plans an early return to the Kremlin--perhaps to rule with heightened powers.
Yet, for all this, the most distinctive feature of the Russian leadership's overall response to the crisis has been its
emphasis on the importance of further reform and on cooperation with other countries. There has been no
repudiation of liberal policymakers, and few suggestions that Russia should pursue a "Third Way," much less
wall itself off from the world economy. If there is one theme that unites Medvedev's many policy statements, it
is that the restoration of state control of the economy must be avoided at all cost. "The government," says Arkady
Dvorkovich, the president's chief economic adviser, "cannot replace the private sector, the market, and business, nor is it going to do so." For Medvedev, the state bureaucracy is already far too powerful and is guided by
The only way to stabilize the economy and sustain growth, he has repeatedly and
Soviet-era mistrust of "free people and free enterprise."
publicly argued, is through transparency, competition, accountability, and protection of property rights. When
Medvedev and others call for changes in international financial regulation, their message is that Russia should try to increase its influence in global processes, not withdraw from them, and abide by international norms, not
talk idly of creating alternatives.Many Russian commentators have said that if the goal is to keep a hard-hit Russian economy
in the international mainstream, adjustments in Russian foreign policy are likely to follow as well. They do not
predict a complete change of direction, but a less confrontational, less ideological, more prudent, more
resource-constrained approach to relations with the West. The need for such adjustments is particularly obvious where resources are concerned. With housing,
education, and infrastructure budgets under acute pressure, it is hard to imagine that military spending could be completely unaffected. Military officials who were told by Putin in
September that they would get a 50 percent funding increase over the next three years may well resist
suggestions by President Medvedev that their budget is now on hold. Yet arguments about the urgent need for
military modernization can hardly have the same force that they did earlier in the fall. Already the armed forces have had to accept a plan
to cut the size of the office corps by almost 60 percent in the next three years. The Russian government's desire to delay large increases in military spending surely also contributes to its apparent interest in a new round of
arms-control agreements with the incoming U.S. administration.
15
PAKISTAN ADVANTAGE EXTENSIONS
COUNTERINSURGENCY FAILING NOW: MARJAH.
JONATHAN WALLACE MAY 25 2010, (ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AT THE NEW A MERICA FOUNDATION, AND AN
INCOMING MASTERS STUDENT IN SECURITY STUDIES AT G EORGETOWN UNIVERSITY FOREIGN POLICY SHOWTIME IN KANDAHAR
HTTP://AFPAK.FOREIGNPOLICY .COM/POSTS/2010/05/25/SHOWTIME_IN_KANDAHAR)
Kandahar will be the most important test thus far of Gen. Stanley McChrystal's strategy of increased resources
and a thorough counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Though it will be a "process" rather than one pitched battle, success or failure in the
southern Afghan province -- a historical Taliban stronghold -- will determine operational momentum well into
2011, when the first of the U.S. troops are scheduled to begin withdrawing. The Taliban are treating it like a major battle, attacking the boardwalk in
Kandahar air base during a sophisticated operation over the weekend.
If Kandahar is show time, then Marjah has been the dress rehearsal. It is not going well. The Marjah operation
has not been successful in rooting out Taliban elements, which continue to terrorize the population and
undermine the Afghan government that was supposed to take root in the ineptly named "government in a box"
experiment. It is clear that coalition forces, while seemingly able to clear out fighters during the initial battle, cannot fully eradicate the deep roots of the insurgency. As Carlotta Gall, one of the best Western
reporters in Afghanistan, noted last week, the Taliban "are village men who never left the area although they quit fighting soon after the military operation. Gradually they found a stealthier
way of operating, moving around in small groups, often by motorbike or on foot." Rather than merely waiting
until the time is ripe to resurge, then, local fighters must be convinced to throw in their lots with the Afghan
government. However, lack of security, poor performance of the Afghan armed forces, and the slow pace of
government projects have undermined the credibility of the McChrystal strategy (and its partners in the Afghan
government) and acted as force multipliers for the Taliban's intimidation tactics. Though still in progress, the
Marjah offensive -- a "bleeding ulcer" -- leaves much to be desired.
NO UNIQUENESS TO THE TURNS: COUNTER-INSURGENCY IS DOOMED TO FAILURE AND IS ULTIMATELY
UNNECESSARY FOR SUCCESSFUL COUNTER-TERRORISM.
STEVEN SIMON; JONATHAN STEVENSON 2009 (ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW AT THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, IS A PROFESSOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES AT THE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE AFGHANISTAN:
HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?', SURVIVAL, 51: 5, 47 — 67)
Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan also would probably fail. Counterinsurgency generally works only when
the domestic government resisting the insurgents enjoys the respect and support of most of the domestic
population. Rising perceptions of Hamid Karzai's government as ineffectual and corrupt, and especially
suspicions that it rigged the 20 August national election, indicate that it does not have that kind of credibility
among Afghans. On the operational level, provisional and qualified counter-insurgency success in Iraq is not a
persuasive precedent for a comparable result in Afghanistan. One indirect indication is the difficulty the Obama administration is having in figuring out how to measure such success! While Iraq's prime
insurgency challenges were essentially compartmentalised in the confined space and among the relatively small populations of Anbar, Diyala and Ninewah provinces and in Baghdad, Afghanistan's hazards permeate its Texas
applying the surge formula to Afghanistan, however it is adjusted, is likely to empower warlords,
sized national territory. Thus,
increase factionalism and ultimately make Afghanistan harder to sustain as a functioning unitary state. This
would make Afghanistan more susceptible to being used as a strategic pawn by a number of regional actors,
including Iran as well as India and Pakistan. Comprehensively successful counter-insurgency in
Afghanistan, however, is not necessarily required to fulfil the US counter-terrorism mission. It remains
unclear whether a US-led counter-insurgency effort would aim to induce the Taliban factions to reject al-Qaeda,
or some other constellation of tribes to join forces against the Taliban. But none of the factions share the kind of overarching nationalist self-interest that
unified Iraqi Sunnis across tribal lines. They are more like Somali clans, and no visible daylight has emerged between the 'good'
Taliban and 'bad' militants. Those advocating an extended counter-insurgency campaign note that 'the Taliban is
not a unified or monolithic movement', that many Taliban militants 'fight for reasons having nothing to do with
Islamic zealotry', and that each Taliban grouping has 'specific needs' and 'particular characteristics'.' By the same token,
however, these home truths indicate such a high degree of motivational fragmentation within the Taliban that no single faction is likely to gain complete dominance. Thus, power is likely to remain devolved, and Afghan
factions, like Somali ones, will tend to worry about, and focus on, immediate rivals rather than external adversaries.9 To the extent that there is unity among Afghan factions, as with Somalis, it will be against foreigners."
16
COUNTER-INSURGENCY FAILING NOW: KARZAI
DEXTER FILKINS JUNE 11, 2010 (STAFF WRITER, THE NEW YORK TIMES KARZAI IS SAID TO DOUBT
WEST CAN DEFEAT TALIBAN)
But their motivations appear to differ starkly. The Americans and their NATO partners are pouring tens
of thousands of additional troops into the country to weaken hard-core Taliban and force the group to
the bargaining table. Mr. Karzai appears to believe that the American-led offensive cannot work. At a news
conference at the Presidential Palace this week, Mr. Karzai was asked about the Taliban’s role in the June 4 attack on the loya jirga and his faith in NATO. He declined to address either one. “Who did it?” Mr. Karzai said of
the attack. “It’s a question that our security organization can bring and prepare the answer.” Asked if he had confidence in NATO, Mr. Karzai said he was grateful for the help and said the partnership was “working very, very
well.” But he did not answer the question. “We are continuing to work on improvements all around,” Mr. Karzai said, speaking in English and appearing next to David Cameron, the British prime minister. A senior NATO
official said the resignations of Mr. Atmar and Mr. Saleh, who had strong support from the NATO allies, were “extremely disruptive.” The official said of Mr. Karzai, “My concern is, is he capable of being a wartime
leader?” The NATO official said that American commanders had given Mr. Karzai a dossier showing overwhelming evidence that the attack on the peace conference had been carried out by fighters loyal to Jalalhuddin
The resignations of Mr. Saleh and Mr. Atmar revealed a

Haqqani, one of the main leaders fighting under the Taliban’s umbrella. “There was no doubt,” the official said.
deep fissure among Afghan leaders as to the best way to deal with the Taliban and with their patrons in
Pakistan.
NO LINK: CAN SIGNAL DEDICATION TO PAKISTAN WITHOUT TROOPS.

DANIEL MARKEY 2007 (A FALSE CHOICE IN PAKISTAN. BY: MARKEY, DANIEL, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
00157120, JUL/AUG2007, VOL. 86, ISSUE 4)
Third, if and when greater coercion is deemed necessary, it should be applied through demands for more
engagement. Rather than threatening to cut off assistance, the White House should insist on greater access--to
Pakistani intelligence operatives, to army and other security forces, to information. Washington should put an
end to any lingering doubts about its plans to stay actively involved in Pakistan and the region. Islamabad is deeply
averse to having U.S. armed forces operate autonomously within Pakistan, so these demands should not be raised publicly, and an effort should be made to find less conspicuous ways to integrate Americans into Pakistani
Today's communications, reconnaissance, and long-range strike technologies can bring U.S. forces into a
operations.
fight without ever placing boots on the ground. Beyond possible tactical benefits, greater U.S. involvement
would send the signal that Washington plans to invest in long-standing, working-level ties and that its ultimate
goal is deeper, closer cooperation.
17
INCREASED TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN INCREASES PAKISTAN INSTABILITY.
STEVEN SIMON; JONATHAN STEVENSON 2009 (ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
PROFESSOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES , US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE A FGHANISTAN: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?', SURVIVAL, 51: 5)
counter-terrorism is thus still Washington's most pressing task.
Al-Qaeda remains the biggest threat to the United States in Central and South Asia, and
There is little dispute on this point. The question is whether counter-insurgency and state-building in
Afghanistan are the best means of executing it. The mere fact that the core threat to US interests now resides in
Pakistan rather than Afghanistan casts considerable doubt on the proposition. Unlike the Taliban, the secular
Pakistani government is not a viable target for the US military. Its relationship to al-Qaeda is far more subtle and complicated than was the Taliban's. Whereas
the Taliban embraced alQaeda as an economic benefactor in the absence of international legitimacy, and thus amounted to a full strategic ally of an enemy, Islamabad perceives al-Qaeda as a kind of virus: it is ultimately
the wrong kind of coercion could cause it to mutate into something more dangerous - to
inimical to the Pakistani leadership, but
wit, a catalysing movement that fuels Islamic radicalisation in Pakistan and imperils the secular regime. This is
one reason that Pakistan's counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency cooperation has been so erratic. Another reason is that
helping to keep the Taliban a viable political player in Afghanistan serves Pakistan's regional strategic interests in providing Pakistan with strategic depth vis-à-vis India and in denying India a fully stable and cooperative
regime there. President Obama has cast Afghanistan as a neglected war of necessity in contrast to the putative war of choice with Iraq. Yet for the United States, any analytic distinction between a war of choice and
one of necessity at this point is arguably untenable: if necessity is a function of an existential threat - that is, one that imperils the American state - the United States faces none from any quarter, so no war it undertakes is truly
necessary in that sense. The Soviet Union, with abundant nuclear weapons and a vast, well equipped military, was an existential threat. Al-Qaeda, though extremely dangerous and disruptive, is not.' War, of course, may be on
balance a desirable or advisable way of advancing American interests. In the case of Afghanistan, the implicit assumption of US policymakers is that pacifying the country through coercive and expansive counter-insurgency
operations and a concerted effort to bring order to its politics will make it easier, or at least will not make it harder, to contain regional militancy and ensure stability in Pakistan. The United States plans to bring the American
troop presence in Afghanistan to 78,000 by mid 2010, which would represent an increase of nearly a third over the mid 2009 number. Fiscal-year 2010 funding for Operation Enduring Freedom will increase by almost 40%,
including a $7.5 billion bump for the Afghan security forces and an additional $700 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, a flexible spending programme that allows for swifter and more tailored
training and equipment for Pakistani counter-insurgency forces. Indeed, in August 2009 US commanders began pressing for more troops to be deployed at a faster pace.4 Whatever US officials might concede
the White House, State Department and Pentagon have thus far not acknowledged publicly the possibility that greater
privately,
American intrusiveness in Afghanistan might mean less Pakistani cooperation. That, however, appears to be the
case. To be sure, Pakistan has pragmatically responded to US pressure to thwart the Taliban in its tribal areas. But it is more significant in the broader strategic
context that Pakistan has objected to expanded US military operations in Afghanistan on two grounds.
Firstly, they would cause a cross-border spillover of militants into Pakistan and increase the counter-
insurgency burden on the Pakistani military. Secondly, they would foment political instability in Pakistan by
intensifying popular perceptions of American military occupation of the region and the Pakistani government's complicity with the Americans in suppressing a group that
was not even considered an enemy of Pakistan. Indeed, in a July strategic priority 2009 briefing, Pakistani officials made it clear that, however concerned the United States was about the Taliban, they still regard India
as their top strategic priority and the Taliban militants as little more than a containable nuisance and, in the long term, potential allies.5 the realistic American objective
In this light,
should not be to ensure Afghanistan's political integrity by neutralising the Taliban and containing Pakistani radicalism, which is probably unachievable. Rather, its aim should be merely to ensure
that al-Qaeda is denied both Afghanistan and Pakistan as operating bases for transnational attacks on the United
States and its allies and partners.
COUNTER-INSURGENCY WILL INCREASE ANTI-AMERICANISM AND THE RISK OF TERRORISM.

STEVEN SIMON; JONATHAN STEVENSON 2009 (ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
PROFESSOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES , US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE A FGHANISTAN: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?', SURVIVAL, 51: 5)
The Obama administration's instincts favouring robust counter-insurgency and state-building in Afghanistan
reflect the 199os-era US and European predilection for peacekeeping, reconstruction and stabilisation, and the
multilateral use of force for humanitarian intervention, deployed to positive effect in the Balkans and withheld tragically in Rwanda. To the extent that this mindset was
premised on an expansion of the rule of law to hitherto poorly and unjustly governed areas, such as Somalia and Bosnia, it reflects the broader conception of counter-terrorism adopted after ii September.
Insofar as it favours collective action by major powers with the unambiguous endorsement of the UN Security Council, it is also consistent with the Obama administration's rejection of Bush-era unilateralism. And an
In this
aggressive internationalist approach to spreading democracy and the rule of law, notwithstanding the shortsightedness and inefficacy of the Bush doctrine, is admirable and in some instances appropriate.'
case, however, it is more likely to hurt than help. While a larger US military footprint might help stabilise
Afghanistan in the short term, the effects of collateral damage and the aura of US domination it would
generate would also intensify anti-Americanism in Pakistan. This outcome, in turn, would frustrate both
core American objectives by rendering it politically far more difficult for the Pakistani government to cooperate
with Washington (and easier for the quasi-independent Inter-Services Intelligence to collude with the Taliban and al-Qaeda), thus making it harder for the United States to defeat alQaeda. It would
also increase radicalisation in Pakistan, imperil the regime and raise proliferation risks, increasing rather than
decreasing pressure on India to act in the breach of American ineffectuality.
18
SOLVENCY EXTENSIONS
COUNTER-INSURGENCY WILL COLLAPSE HEGEMONY: INEVITABLE WITHDRAW OF FAILED WAR.
The upshot is that only if the United States establishes a well-calibrated limited policy now will it have the
political flexibility to sustain it over the longer-term and thereby to effectively contain the jihadist threat
in Central Asia. If, on the other hand, the Obama administration promises more than it can deliver in
Afghanistan, a reprise of Vietnam may occur: once failure becomes clear, domestic support will evaporate, the
administration will be compelled to withdraw precipitously, and the United States will lose considerable
traction in the region.
NO RISK OF NATO COLLAPSE: 3 REASONS.
JAMES SPERLING AND MARK WEBBER 2009 (PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, U OF AKRON,
PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY, NATO: FROM KOSOVO TO
KABUL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 85: 3 (2009) 491–511)
This view of a NATO apparently perched permanently at the edge of collapse is problematic on at least three
counts. First, the narrative of crisis is clouded by imprecision—at what point a crisis becomes terminal and
precisely what NATO’s dissolution would look like are rarely, if ever, specified. Second, it falls foul of what might be
termed the ‘Peter cried “Wolf!”’ syndrome. NATO has faced imminent collapse so often that it is difficult to take
seriously the latest judgement that its days are numbered. Third, and as the list above suggests, NATO seems to
possess an inexhaustible capacity for recovery, a characteristic NATO pessimists largely ignore. Of course, mere survival is not enough; what matters equally is how far and
how well survival reflects a more thoroughgoing adaptation to new circumstances. NATO’s efforts to do just that, however imperfect or ill-judged, is the real story of the last two decades. The epithets of
decline, dissolution and even death are, in this connection, misleading; while they allude to the very real
problems NATO has encountered, they usually refer to a single operational experience or historical moment.
Longer-term processes of change are, consequently, ignored. In fact, from 1989 to 2009 the alliance has
engaged in a ceaseless process of transformation—of structure and organization, of operations, partnerships
and membership. Located squarely in the middle of all this activity is OAF. That operation marked a decisive climax to a debate which had simmered throughout the 1990s over NATO’s relevance and
purpose. The debate was not resolved in 1999, but OAF and the simultaneous adoption of the NATO Strategic Concept at the 50th anniversary summit in Washington DC marked the most significant shift in NATO’s
history towards non-Article 5 missions. It also made manifest deep-seated problems of cohesion, leadership and capabilities. Thus OAF was both the occasion for presentiments of catastrophe yet also a driver of change. Its
operational and political implications run all the way to the mission in Afghanistan.
NON-UNIQUE AND NO IMPACT: FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN WON’T DOOM NATO.

JAMES SPERLING AND MARK WEBBER 2009 (PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, U OF AKRON,
PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY, NATO: FROM KOSOVO TO
KABUL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 85: 3 (2009) 491–511)
The purported cost of failure in Afghanistan is for NATO no less dire than the consequences that had been
predicted earlier in Kosovo. Defeat here, some claim, could ‘ultimately threaten the [very] raison d’etre of the
alliance’.50 The Obama administration, meanwhile, has staked its foreign policy reputation on addressing the Afghan imbroglio. Here, NATO is seen as central. Should it fail, retired General James Jones noted
prior to taking up the job of Obama’s National Security Advisor, ‘NATO’s cohesion, effectiveness and credibility will be shaken and the rationale for NATO’s expeditionary, out of area, role would be undermined.’51
Internally, the alliance has been beset by fundamental disagreements over Afghanistan: over the security
interests at stake there and over key aspects of the operation itself. In many ways, NATO’s involvement has
crystallized persistent and deeply held disagreements about key aspects of NATO operations in general, past,
present or future. Yet in this sense the Afghan experience, while clearly of a particular character, can be read as
yet another instance of crisis as normality. This is neither to belittle the problems NATO faces in Afghanistan nor to spin the chances of success; it is rather to suggest that
these problems should be seen contextually, as part of the seemingly endless, but often exaggerated, narrative
of NATO failure and decline. The actual experience of NATO in Afghanistan, once more, provides a mixed
record, and the assumption that this is NATO’s swansong does not necessarily follow.
19
RUSSIAN RELATIONS DA 2AC AFF ANSWERS
1) NO TERMINAL UNIQUENESS: US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS SWING INEVITABLY.
VIKTOR MAKAROV MAY 31, 2010 (DIRECTOR, POLICY CENTRE EUROCIVITAS, “LATVIAN EXPERT DISCUSSES
SIGNIFICANCE OF US-RUSSIA "RESET"” EXCERPT FROM REPORT BY LATVIAN NEWSPAPER TELEGRAF WEBSITE ON 28 MAY BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING [INTERVIEW WITH POLITICAL SCIENTIST VIKTOR MAKAROV BY ALEKSANDRA GLUHIH, PLACE AND
DATE NOT GIVEN: "POLITICAL SCIENTIST: HISTORIC ISSUES MAY BE REVISED"])
Experts compare US-Russian relations to a pendulum swinging from tension and hostility to attempts of
[Makarov]
demonstrative friendship. First of all it may be explained by history. Russia feels itself as a successor of the
USSR keeping the idea that the United States is its main rival, a country that it needs to constantly compare
itself with, when in fact this has not been the case for a long time. The United States does not see Russia as a
rival. This place has been firmly taken by China. Of course, there are a number of fields where Moscow and Washington have different interests. First of all, it concerns
Russia's closest neighbours: Moscow wants to retain its influence while the United States, to put it mildly, does not support this idea. Another potential subject for conflict is Iran. Now the Kremlin is pursuing a new aim -
returning to foreign affairs as a world superpower. There were doubts between two concepts: either Russia becomes a fully independent superpower itself or it is one of Eastern superpowers open to partnership with the West
in a wide spectrum including Europe, the United States, and Japan. On the one hand, this country is a partner and a neighbour, on the other hand - a potential rival, with whom rapprochement is quite risky. [Gluhih]
2) NON UNIQUE/TURN: COUNTER TERRORISM COOPERATION ALREADY EXISTS AND PROMOTE RELATIONS
AND ARMS REDUCTION EFFORTS.
ALEXANDER ET AL, 2009 (YONAH, DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TERRORISM STUDIES AT THE POTOMAC
INSTITUTE, "A MERICAN-RUSSIAN COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIP" MIDDLE EAST TIMES, 7/22)
Observers of the Moscow summit between Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev focused on the modest progress the two leaders achieved in
Russian-American nuclear arms reduction talks. Largely overlooked in the summit coverage has been the wide-ranging
counterterrorism cooperation between the two powers. At the summit, the two leaders pledged to cooperate further in countering
regional terrorism in South Asia, including by strengthening joint efforts between Afghanistan and Pakistan in order that both countries more effectively
coordinate their strategies in combating al-Qaida and the Taliban. When he visited Moscow a week before the July 6-8 summit, Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, cited the
potential for Russian-American collaboration against terrorism in explaining why the two countries needed to deepen
military ties. In late June, NATO also restored military relations with Russia and invited the Russian Navy to participate in an upcoming exercise in the Mediterranean to practice counter-terrorism techniques at sea.
The new U.S.-Russian Bilateral Presidential Commission established at the Moscow summit is specifically charged with
enhancing counterterrorist cooperation between the American and Russian governments.
3) NO UNIQUE INTERNAL LINK: START WON’T BE RATIFIED NOW.

KIM HOLMES MAY 27, 2010 (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, IS A VICE PRESIDENT AT THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION, WHAT'S THE BIG IDEA: NEW START NEGOTIATIONS: SHOW US THE RECORDS! WASHINGTON TIMES)
The Obama administration's drive to win Senate approval of the New START arms treaty with Russia has hit a
speed bump. Several senators are asking to see the secret negotiating record from the administration's official
talks with Russia. Why? Because U.S. and Russian officials publicly disagree about what the treaty says. Senators
have a right to know - before they consent to ratification of a treaty that affects national security - how those terms now at issue were handled during the negotiations. The differences regarding
missile defense are stark. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov asserts that the treaty links arms reduction to
restraint on missile defense and that this linkage is legally binding. Russia, he says, can withdraw from the
treaty if "the U.S.' buildup of its missile defense strategic potential in numbers and quality begins to considerably affect the efficiency of Russian
strategic nuclear forces." Conversely, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton insists that the treaty "has no restrictions on our ability to develop and deploy our planned missile defense systems or long-range conventional
strike weapons now or in the future."
4) ALTERNATIVE CAUSALITY: US BLOCKING RUSSIAN ENTRY INTO THE WTO.

BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING FEBRUARY 5, 2010 (RUSSIAN PUNDIT SAYS EXPECTATIONS MAY BE
"INFLATED" BY RESET IN US RELATIONS)
Finally, thirdly, the brakes have been put on Russian membership of the WTO. Having returned to its active position,
which implies its independent membership of the organization (instead of the Customs Union joining, as announced in June last year by Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin and then cautiously repudiated by Medvedev), Russia was counting on the block on its WTO membership by Washington being
lifted, against the background of the "reset" in the relationship with America. However, it appears that these
[BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING CONTINUED, NO TEXT DELETED]
20
RUSSIAN RELATIONS DA 2AC AFF ANSWERS
expectations also look inflated for the moment. On 27 January, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov held a meeting with Putin on the outcome of the meeting on
the formation of the Customs Union. Shuvalov stated that a small number of differences remained in the question of joining the
WTO - mainly on the part of the United States. According to first deputy prime minister, resolving these
differences would enable the negotiations process to move forward significantly. Thus, the government is once
again naming America as the main brake on the process of Russia joining the WTO. "Unfortunately, until now there have been no steps by
our American partners to enable us to seek such outcomes. So far, it has not been suggested to us how we should conduct the negotiations," Shuvalov told Putin. He also noted that the United States was presenting experts of
an insufficient level for the negotiations: "The negotiations on a specific area, that is the search for compromises, need to be raised to the level of the political leadership." Thus, this subject could be moved to the level of
presidents, and Medvedev will have to agree all the fundamental positions with Putin.
5) CASE OUTWEIGHS:
A) MAGNITUDE: 1AC HAS MULTIPLE SCENARIOS FOR EXTINCTION THROUGH ESCALATING NUCLEAR
CONFLICT; DA IMPACT TERMINATES IN PROLIFERATION.
B) PROBABILITY: TERRORISTS HAVE INCREASED MOTIVATION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHILE
INTERVENING ACTORS CAN DISSUADE STATES AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF ACCIDENTS ARE LOW GIVEN CHANGES
IN THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW.
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 2010
(HTTP://WWW.UCSUSA.ORG/NUCLEAR_WEAPONS_AND_GLOBAL_SECURITY/NUCLEAR_WEAPONS/POLICY_ISSUES/O
BAMA-ADMINISTRATIONS- NPR.HTML)
What the NPR says: * At present, the United States should maintain the current operational status of its
nuclear weapons: the strategic bombers off full-time alert, nearly all ICBMs on alert, and significant numbers of nuclear-armed submarines at sea. * To reduce the risk of
accidents and unauthorized actions, the United States should take steps to maximize the time available to the
president to make a launch decision. During his presidential campaign, then-Senator Obama called attention to the dangers posed by maintaining U.S. nuclear weapons on high alert status,
which allows them to be launched in a matter of minutes. The United States and Russia each still maintain approximately 1,000 nuclear weapons on high alert status. This situation carries with it the unacceptable risk of
nuclear use due to a miscalculation, accident, or unauthorized action, putting millions of lives at risk. A reliable and credible U.S. nuclear deterrent does not require the ability to retaliate immediately but only the assurance
The review took a significant step forward by recommending that the

that U.S. nuclear forces and command and control systems would survive an attack.
administration take measures to maximize the time the president would have to make a decision to use U.S.
nuclear weapons.
C) TIMEFRAME: PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE BEEN ON HIGH ALERT FOR OVER 60 YEARS
WITH NO ESCALATING ACCIDENTS, WHILE TERRORISTS HAVE BEEN CAUSING ESCALATING DEATHS AND
MILITARY COUPS HAVE ALREADY CAUSED VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN; INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE IS ON THE
BRINK.
D) CASE SOLVES THE TERMINAL IMPACT: PROLIFERATION IS MOST DANGEROUS IN AN UNSTABLE MIDDLE
EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA.
6) NO LINK: COUNTER-NARCOTICS ARE PART OF COUNTER-TERRORISM

MATTHEW LACOUTURE 2008 (MA CANDIDATE IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
DENVER, NARCO-TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN: COUNTERNARCOTICS AND COUNTERINSURGENCY,
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW, HTTP://WWW. IAR-GWU.ORG/NODE/390)
Since the 2001 invasion and the lifting of the Taliban opium ban, opium production in Afghanistan has increased from 70 percent of the overall global illicit opium production to 92 percent today. This increase has occurred
The loose relationship between terrorist organizations,

in tandem with the declining security situation precipitated by the 2001 coalition invasion of the country.
violence, decentralized governance, and poverty that existed prior to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in
Afghanistan, has coalesced into a truly narco-terrorism-driven system. The implications of this are severe to
both Afghanistan’s and America’s long-term goals. Corruption, lawlessness, instability, violence, and human suffering all contribute to, and result from, the precipitous
increase in opium cultivation and narcotics production and trafficking. Thus, in attempting to subdue the Taliban- and al-Qaeda-led insurgencies,
and to forge a stable and effective government in Afghanistan, there must also be effective and socially
conscious measures undertaken to eliminate the pervasive narco-economy. As President Karzai has stated, “The question of drugs . . . is one that will
determine Afghanistan’s future. . . . [I]f we fail, we will fail as a state eventually, and we will fall back in the hands of terrorism.”
21
RUSSIAN RELATIONS DA AFF ANSWERS EXT. DEFENSE
NON-UNIQUE: RUSSIA ALREADY REACTING TO DRUG TRAFFICKING FROM AFGHANISTAN.
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR MAY 19, 2010 (MOSCOW FURIOUS, FRED WEIR)
Russia's new drug czar, Viktor Ivanov, is spitting mad at NATO. A gruff and graying veteran of the Soviet Union's disastrous military intervention in
Afghanistan, he recently made his first return visit to that country. When he came back to Moscow, he had harsh words for the Western alliance, charging that it
is enabling a drug-fueled hurricane of destabilization that is now sweeping across former Soviet Central Asia
and Russia. He wants the war in Afghanistan to be a proper drug war.
NO UNIQUE LINK: RELATIONS ARE ALREADY MOVING IN CONTRADICTORY DIRECTIONS.

BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING FEBRUARY 5, 2010 (RUSSIAN PUNDIT SAYS EXPECTATIONS MAY BE
"INFLATED" BY RESET IN US RELATIONS)
The "restart" between Russia and the United States is being constantly tested, against the background of the
slow-down in the process of preparing the main START-2 document. In the absence of a fully drafted positive agenda, cooperation on
topics of great importance for both sides is progressing in a contradictory fashion. Last week, for the first time since the war in
Georgia in 2008, military cooperation between Russia and NATO resumed. However, despite the positive movement and the achievement of real results,
risks of inflated expectations on Russia's part are emerging at the same time due to the large number of strategic
differences between Russia and the West. The "reset" in relations between Russia and the United States and the departure of the new American administration, headed by Barack
Obama, from George Bush's tough foreign policies towards Russia were sufficient for the Kremlin to renounce its "hostile rhetoric" and at the same time start to consider the reality created from the point of view of new
, in such a situation there are risks, which should not only not be underestimated, but should
opportunities for interaction. However
not be overstated either. An exaggeration of the risks may be associated with a "deja vu" effect, with the
realities of 2001-2005, when Russia was a partner of the US anti-terrorist coalition - which, however, led to
significant disappointment - being transposed onto the current situation. The United States is not now oriented towards active expansion, its neo-
conservative supporters are no longer in office, and this objectively reduces the tension in bilateral relations (thus, in contrast to 2004, the Ukrainian election campaign has not led to a polarization in the positions of Russia
and the United States). In addition, the trend has changed in Russia itself, where conservative "anti-orange" trends have given way to aspirations for modernization, which cannot be achieved in conditions of confrontation
with the West - the repository of modern technology.
22
RUSSIAN RELATIONS DA AFF ANSWERS: DEFENSE
NO INTERNAL LINK: RELATIONS NOT KEY TO CHANGING RUSSIAN BEHAVIOR.
ROBERT KAGAN MAY 25, 2010 (THE WASHINGTON POST THE RUSSIA 'RESET' FRAUD SENIOR ASSOCIATE AT
THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE)
What is bizarre is the administration's claim that Russian behavior is somehow the result of Obama's "reset"
diplomacy. Russia has responded to the Obama administration in the same ways it did to the Bush
administration before the "reset." Moscow has been playing this game for years. It has sold the same rug many times. The only thing that has
changed is the price the United States has been willing to pay. As anyone who ever shopped for a rug knows, the more you pay for it, the more valuable it seems. The Obama administration has
paid a lot. In exchange for Russian cooperation, President Obama has killed the Bush administration's planned
missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Obama has officially declared that Russia's
continued illegal military occupation of Georgia is no "obstacle" to U.S.-Russian civilian nuclear cooperation.
The recent deal between Russia and Ukraine granting Russia control of a Crimean naval base through 2042 was shrugged off by Obama officials, as have been Putin's suggestions for merging Russian and Ukrainian industries
So at least one effect of the administration's "reset" has been to produce a wave of
in a blatant bid to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty.
insecurity throughout Eastern and Central Europe and the Baltics, where people are starting to fear they can no
longer count on the United States to protect them from an expansive Russia. And for this the administration has gotten what? Yet another hollow
U.N. Security Council resolution. Some observers suggest that Iran's leaders are quaking in their boots, confronted by this great unity of the international "community." More likely, they are laughing up their sleeves -- along
with the men in Moscow.
NO IMPACT: TREATIES WITH RUSSIA ARE UNENFORCEABLE.

KIM HOLMES MAY 27, 2010 (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, IS A VICE PRESIDENT AT THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION, WHAT'S THE BIG IDEA: NEW START NEGOTIATIONS: SHOW US THE RECORDS! WASHINGTON TIMES)
History shows how important it is to know exactly what the Russians claim when it comes to missile defense.
The Soviet Union supported a narrower interpretation of the ABM Treaty, even as it was secretly violating that
treaty. Today, Moscow has made it clear that it sees the New START agreement as practically limiting what we can do to defend ourselves against ballistic missiles. We can dismiss those claims all we want. But if
the Senate were to vote for ratification of the treaty without knowing what assurances - if any - were made by
U.S. negotiators, it would open the door for Russia to insist that we are perpetually in violation of it. Should we attempt to
deal with, say, a future Iranian missile threat by expanding missile defense capabilities in Europe, Russia could invoke these assurances and accuse us of violating the treaty. Who cares what the
Russians say? The Obama administration does. It's the leitmotif of its "reset" strategy toward Russia. Even without an arms
treaty, the administration bent to Moscow's will and sacrificed missile defense sites in the Czech Republic and Poland. If it would do that voluntarily, what would it do if Russia were to level charges of treaty violations?
Russia will doubtless continue

Every missile defense opponent would claim the effort to defend ourselves and allies endangers "the arms control process" and undermines U.S.-Russian relations.
to press for additional arms negotiations to formalize and expand limitations on our missile defense. At some
point it will likely ask either for separate negotiations on missile defense or for a START follow-on treaty
focused on U.S. missile defense systems. We should not sacrifice our ability to defend Americans. No treaty should hinder the future
development, testing and deployment of U.S. missile defenses. There can be no ambiguity or uncertainty about
this. The current debate over missile defenses reflects deeper and even more troubling aspects of this treaty. For the
sake of just getting a treaty, the president signed an instrument that establishes Russia as a dominant nuclear power; limits America's ability to respond to future threats; and will likely start rather than deter a future arms race.
23
RUSSIAN RELATIONS DA AFF ANSWERS: LINK TURNS
TURN: RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE STAGNATING—AFGHANISTAN IS CRITICAL TO REINVIGORATE THEM
IHT 1/5/09 [“OBAMA'S AFGHAN CHALLENGE: BUILD A NEW ALLIANCE,” WWW.IHT.COM/ARTICLES/2009/01/05/OPINION/EDAFGHAN.PHP]
There is little chance for peace in Afghanistan until a crucial majority of its neighbors act on a common interest in Afghan stability.
One intriguing sign that such cooperation is possible comes from Russia. Despite the tension in U.S.-Russian relations since the war in Georgia last
August, Russian officials are saying openly that they share with NATO a strategic interest in helping protect Afghanistan from the
Taliban. Toward that end, Russian and NATO representatives have been discussing the transport of NATO supplies to Afghanistan through Russia's airspace.
Obama's Afghan challenge will be more diplomatic than military. To save Afghanistan, he will need to mold a strategic partnership that
includes parties as disparate as Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia and the Central Asian states. This will not be an easy task. But the alternative is endless war
in Afghanistan.
NO LINK/ TURN: RUSSIA SUPPORTS THE PLAN. THEY BELIEVE CT IS PART OF COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS
NICHOL ET AL, SPECIALIST IN RUSSIAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS FOR CRS, 2010 (JIM, "RUSSIAN POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY ISSUES AND US INTERESTS" C ONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, JAN 29, P 37)
In a meeting with Afghan President Hamid Karzai in August 2008, Russian President Medvedev called for “opening a new page in relations” between the two countries, “because, unfortunately, our countries are coming up
Russia hosted a Shanghai
against similar threats and problems.” Russia provides some foreign assistance and investment to Afghanistan, although it has rejected sending military forces.
Cooperation Organization conference on Afghanistan, counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics in late March 2009,
which was attended by U.S. and NATO observers. The conference communique praised the efforts of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan but offered no substantive assistance. At the July 2009 U.S.-Russia summit, a joint statement on
assistance to Afghanistan called for enhancing cooperation within the U.S.-Russia Counter-Terrorism Working Group
(established in 2000); further implementing the Russia-NATO Council’s counter-narcotics project; supporting Afghanistan-related activities of the OSCE; increasing training for the Afghan National Army, police, and
counter-narcotics personnel; and greatly increasing cooperation to halt illicit financial flows related to heroin trafficking in Afghanistan. The two sides also called for enhancing
counter-terrorism cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
TURN: US COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN INCREASE RELATIONS

RIA NOVOSTI 5/18/10 (HTTP://EN.RIAN.RU/WORLD/20100518/159056625.HTML)
The United States are satisfied the way Russia provided its air cargo route for American counter-terrorism efforts in
Afghanistan, the Russian deputy prime minister said. Moscow and Washington signed the Air Transit Agreement on July 6 after U.S. President Barack Obama's visited Russia in May of 2009. "The air and ground
[U.S.] transit is outstanding. The U.S. Department of State as well as the White House say that the transit is good," Sergei Ivanov said. A spokesman for the U.S. Department of State,
Philip Crowley, confirmed his statement saying that Secretary of State Hilary Clinton expressed the same opinion upon
meeting Ivanov, who in turn met with U.S. Undersecretary Bill Burns. "They noted the smooth operation of the agreement reached at the Moscow
summit last July on overflights to Afghanistan. The Secretary remarked during her brief period with them the success in
resetting the relationship between the United States and Russia and the positive view the direction of our relations," Crowley told
a daily press briefing in Washington.
24
2AC AFF ANSWERS: COUNTERPLAN
1) COUNTERPLAN CAN’T SOLVE THE AFF
A) NEGOTIATIONS: TALIBAN WON’T NEGOTIATE UNTIL US TROOPS LEAVE AFGHANISTAN: THAT’S D’SOUZA
B) KARZAI CREDIBILITY: KARZAI IS A DOOMED PARTNER: ONLY ABANDONING THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY
STRATEGY WILL ALLOW THE US TO EFFECTIVELY BROKER WITH LOCAL LEADERS: THAT’S BOYLE.
C) PAKISTAN STABILITY: COUNTER-INSURGENCY DRIVES TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA INTO PAKISTAN, OVER-
POWERING PAKISTAN ANTI-TERROR CAPACITY:
Finally, within the operational environment of Afghanistan and Pakistan themselves, the alternative to a minimalist
approach is likely to be not the controlled and purposeful escalation envisaged by the current policy but rather
a pernicious spiral with an indeterminate outcome. If the United States continues to respond to the threat of
al-Qaeda by deepening intervention in Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Qaeda and the Taliban will rejoin with
heightened terrorist and insurgent operations that bring further instability. Indeed, that appears to be happening.
In August 2009, as US ground commanders requested more troops, Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, on CNN described the situation in Afghanistan as 'serious and deteriorating' and the
Taliban as having 'gotten better, more sophisticated, in their tactics'.28
The United States' next logical move would be to intensify pressure, raising civilian casualties, increasing
political pressure on the Kabul and Islamabad regimes, and ultimately weakening them, which would only help
al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In fact, some evidence of this dynamic has already materialised, as the Pakistani
government has faced difficulties in dealing with hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis displaced by the military
campaign, undertaken at Washington's behest, in the Swat Valley. Certainly worries about Islamabad's ability to handle the Taliban on its own are justi-
fled. Some Taliban members are no doubt keen on regime change in favour of jthadists, as noted by Bruce Riedel, who headed up the Obama administration's 6o-day policy review.29 But Pakistan's military capabilities
should not be given short shrift. The Pakistani army, however preoccupied by India, is seasoned and capable, and able to respond decisively to the Taliban should its activities reach a critical level of destabilisation. Inter-
Services Intelligence, devious though it may be, would be loath to allow the transfer of nuclear weapons to the Taliban.
D) NO SOLVENCY: STOPPING ALL DRONES HURTS COUNTER-TERRORISM.
STEVEN SIMON; JONATHAN STEVENSON 2009 (ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW AT THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, IS
A PROFESSOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES AT THE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE A FGHANISTAN: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?', SURVIVAL)
Given the tenuous relationship between instability in Afghanistan and the graver threat posed by instability in Pakistan, the typically long duration of insurgencies and infrequency of indecisive outcomes, and the
daunting list of prerequisites to US counter-insurgency success in Afghanistan, Washington should quietly
develop a fallback strategy. Such a strategy should play to demonstrated US strengths. From the standpoint of the US domestic constituency to which American policymakers are ultimately
answerable, the core concerns are still al-Qaeda and allied militants and the threats they pose to Americans. Accordingly, Washington might continue its current policy of
eliminating al-Qaeda's leadership through targeted killing. Although it is a controversial policy, the Obama administration's position in the freighted domestic policy
debate on the nature of counter-terrorism is entirely consistent with it. Despite its declared post-11 September national security policy, which acknowledged roles for both law enforcement and military force in combating
terrorism, in practice the Bush administration gave short shrift to law enforcement and strongly favoured military measures. Obama, both during the presidential campaign and after assuming office, decried what he and others
viewed as the excessive militarisation of counter-terrorism in practice, and endorsed a more fluid, open-minded and pragmatic approach. While he would prefer to fight transnational terrorists with law-enforcement tools, he
understood that that could not always be done effectively. In particular, he realised that the United States could not, practically speaking, dispatch FBI special agents to Pakistan's anarchical tribal areas and other ungoverned
spaces in an unmarked Ford Crown Victoria to arrest al-Qaeda suspects and bring them back to federal district court in Washington for trial, so measures like targeted killing from drones were needed. Thus, Obama continued
and in fact ramped up the targeted killing policy when he became president. The new president confirmed his instrumental view of counter-terrorism in an impassioned but grounded May 2009 speech, in which he stated for
the record that the counter-terrorism tool chosen should fit the particular circumstances. Though he nodded clearly to the preferred status of the law- enforcement approach in focusing on closing the Guantanamo Bay
detention facility and ending the use of so-called enhanced interrogation techniques, he also argued more generally for 'strategically applying our power' as well as our principles, and doing so 'pragmatically'. The president
further noted that 'absolutists' on the 'national security' and the 'law enforcement' side of the counter-terrorism debate were both wrong, and endorsed a middle course of 'common sense' .12 One key implication of the speech
was that re-orientating American counter-terrorism policy away from the use of military force would render Islamist militancy more containable by dem- onstrating US restraint and emphasising American respect for the
rule of law. The other, though, was that military force remained indispensable in certain circumstances. It does appear that targeted killing, while only an operational tool and not a strategic solution in itself, the targeted- can
help manage a terrorist threat." Open-source information indicates that the recent US campaign in killing policy Pakistan, in particular, has been effective. Over the past 18 months or so, the United States has used two related
types of unmanned aerial vehicles, the Predator and the faster, higheraltitude Reaper, which is capable of carrying two Hellfire anti-tank missiles and precision-guided bombs, to attack individuals and safe houses, eliminating
about a dozen key al-Qaeda operatives and dozens more other militants. There were 36 such attacks in 2008 and about 20 in the first eight months of 2009. As of the end of August 2009, they had eliminated Abu jihad al-
Masri, al-Qaeda's intelligence chief; Khalid Habib, head of its Pakistan operations and fourth in the chain of command overall; Abu Khabab al-Masri, the group's ranking explosives expert; and Abu Laith al-Libi, al-Qaeda's
The success of the air-strikes has

commander in Afghanistan. One of the missiles killed Pakistan Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud in August." Afghanistan: How Much is Enough? I 55
resulted from improved technical and human intelligence on al-Qaeda operations in the border area. The logic of the
strategy is to make it increasingly difficult for al-Qaeda to repopulate its command structure, and US officials believe the
programme has produced the broadest and deepest impact on al-Qaeda senior leadership in several years.
Continued success could yield the practical neutralisation of al-Qaeda in Pakistan. Bureaucratically, the Obama administration has already set
the table for adopting this strategy: for FY 2010, it has requested $79.7m for Hellfire missiles and $489.4m for 24 Reapers, nearly doubling the 2009 number.
25
2AC AFF ANSWERS: COUNTERPLAN
2) PERM: DO BOTH
A) PERM NOT SEVERANCE: DRONE ATTACKS RUN COUNTER TO OBAMA’S OVERALL COUNTERTERRORISM
STRATEGY.
STUART GOTTLIEB 2009 (FORMER SENATE FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER, DIRECTS THE POLICY STUDIES
PROGRAM AT YALE UNIVERSITY'S MACMILLAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES,
OBAMA’S DRONE-STRIKE COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY, FOREIGN POLICY,
HTTP://EXPERTS.FOREIGNPOLICY.COM/POSTS/2009/04/07/OBAMA_S_DRONE_STRIKE_COUNTERTERRORISM_P
OLICY)
If you were under the impression that U.S. President Barack Obama's promise to craft new counterterrorism
policies "in a manner that is consistent with our values and our ideals" could be accomplished without exposing
dangerous contradictions, consider this:
Since Obama's swearing-in, the United States has executed dozens of suspected al Qaeda leaders and operatives without court hearings, the presentation of evidence, or the involvement of defense lawyers. These executions,
typically carried out by missile strikes from unmanned CIA drone aircraft, have taken place in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Scores of civilians, including many women and children, have reportedly been
killed or maimed in the strikes.
Calls for granting habeas corpus rights to Guantánamo detainees and outrage over the Bush administration's harsh treatment of enemy combatants have dominated the headlines. Yet this side of the U.S. war against al Qaeda
and its affiliates is little discussed and even less deliberated.
But with tensions rising in Pakistan and around the Muslim world over the brutality and high civilian death toll
from these targeted assassination attacks, the United States' day of reckoning regarding this policy may soon
arrive as well. As we learned from the Bush administration, there are tremendous costs to aggressive counterterrorism policies,
especially when their purposes are not clearly understood. Unless Obama candidly explains how targeted
killings fit within his overall counterterrorism approach, he faces similar difficulties and the possible exhaustion
of goodwill toward his new administration.
Indeed, although targeted killings can be justified on national security grounds -- to weaken the capability of
Taliban and al Qaeda forces to carry out attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere -- they run counter to
Obama's espoused counterterrorism ethos. Assuring the world in one breath that "America does not torture" suspected terrorists, while in another ordering Hellfire missile strikes that
can burn victims alive, is unsustainable from both policy and diplomatic perspectives. How does the U.S. president explain why one suspected terrorist leader held in Guantánamo gets a team of lawyers fighting for his day in
court, while another is killed in his car along with his family?
B) PERM SOLVES: TALIBAN WON’T NEGOTIATE UNTIL TROOPS ARE REMOVED.

The response on the part of the Taliban to such offers for talks and reconciliation has been varied to say the
least. While the leadership has clearly stated goals, the middle and lower rung commanders are not averse to negotiations. For instance, the highly publicized drama during the release of 21 out of the 23 abducted South
Korean missionary aid workers in 2007 that came after a landmark deal between Seoul and the Taliban was seen by some as readiness on the part of the Taliban to do business.47
Taliban leadership has consistently called for a withdrawal of all international soldiers currently
At the same time, the
operating in Afghanistan before any talks could even begin. Karzai's single condition for talks is that his
interlocutor(s) agree to end armed operations and embrace the basic tenets of the Afghan Constitution. Both
these conditions remain major roadblocks and are perceived to be non-starters. Moreover, different voices of
various actors involved in negotiations and reconciliation have resulted in dissipated efforts and blurred vision.
There are fears that unilateral attempts by countries to talk to the insurgents might prove counter-productive,
leading to further weakening of the Afghan Government; these concerns are not entirely unfounded.
Afghan opposition and public opinion
26
AFF ANSWERS: COUNTERPLAN EXTENSIONS
NEGOTIATIONS FAIL: 4 REASONS.
SHANTHIE MARIET D'SOUZA 2009 (ASSOCIATE FELLOW AT INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES AND ANALYSES, TALKING
TO THE TALIBAN: WILL IT ENSURE 'PEACE' IN AFGHANISTAN? STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, VOLUME 33, ISSUE 2 MARCH 2009)
these efforts at reconciliations and negotiations, are not adequate to address the
Despite calls and attempts at various levels by different actors,
challenges of instability and insecurity posed by the Taliban-led insurgency. To engage with the Taliban and their affiliates in an effective reconciliation process, some of the
following challenges and constraints need to be addressed. Sanctuary in Pakistan Al Qaida and the Taliban, with the command and support
structure in Pakistani tribal areas, are able to carry out systematic campaigns of terror and violence in Afghanistan. There is little likelihood that Al Qaida, foreign
fighters with extreme jihadi ideology, will give up on their agendas. They would increasingly target and eliminate the moderate tribal leaders, viewed as
government collaborators and infidels, as is witnessed in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Southern Afghanistan. The existence of a terrorist infrastructure,
capitulation through 'peace deals', and the support provided by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to the
insurgents calls for greater international scrutiny of Pakistan's role in the war on terror. At the same time, to advance towards a
meaningful reconciliation process, the cooperation of Pakistan is essential. Given the cross-border ethnic and tribal ties, a coordinated regional approach to address the challenge posed by the rising insurgency is essential.
Need for a network-centric approach The present reconciliation policy, so far, has focused on 'reconciled'
individuals, not whole networks which provide the support base. For example, Abdul Wahid Baghrani, one high-profile Taliban leader in Helmand who
reconciled in April 2005 without a formal deal, did not deliver any of the political or military capital, valuable intelligence, and access to other insurgents. This serves little purpose as far as weakening the insurgency is
concerned. If a commander has sufficient clout and is convinced, he could bring his fighters and supporters in. This would help erode the support base for the insurgents. Beyond using wedge
tactics to foster divisions, there is a need to have strategic talks with the Taliban leadership. This could be done in a phased manner of
first reconciling with local commanders and then 'bringing in' the leadership. Public perception management The international community and the Afghan Government need to explain to the
public the rationale behind negotiations. It is important to counter the local perception that negotiations with the Taliban do not
mean acquiescence to the demands of the Taliban, nor does it imply waning or withdrawal of the international commitment. An effort should also be made to ensure that the
Northern Alliance members do not feel that national reconciliation with the Taliban will result in a shift of power or compromise their position. Neither should it be perceived as a sign of weakness for the Afghan Government
Lack of incentives and

or the international community. Rather, it needs to be viewed as an attempt at building a politically inclusive order with active Afghan participation and leadership.
guarantees One of the important reasons that most of the Taliban are apprehensive to reconcile is the lack of
assurance that they will be treated fairly on return. Many of those who attempted to join the reconciliation
process have either been kept in Pakistani prisons or were handed over to the United States before they could
reach the Afghan Government mediators. For any effective reconciliation process, it is essential that they be given security guarantees, incentives, and assurance of their safety and fair
treatment. Presently, such international guarantees are non-existent. Apart from guarantees at the local, shura and tribal levels, there is a need for international guarantees that they would not be sent to detention centres and
that they would have incentives such as re-education programmes, employment opportunities, and financial support for reintegration (R of the DDR). The minimal role for the International Committee of the Red Cross or the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in this programme needs to be enhanced. Some of the reconciled Taliban, including the former Taliban ministers, have complained of harassment even after their
safety is guaranteed. This is not an encouraging example for others to follow.
27
1NC AFGHANISTAN ADVANTAGE
MIDDLE EAST WAR WON’T GO NUCLEAR
ROWLEY AND WEBB 2007 [CHARLES, THE LOCKE INSTITUTE, AND MICHAEL, REGULATORY ECONOMICS
GROUP, PUBLIC CHOICE, “ISRAEL AND PALESTINE: THE SLOW ROAD TO PEACE OR THE FAST TRACK TO
MUTUAL ANNIHILATION?” VOL. 132, ISS. 1-2, P. 25]
Israel would never deploy nuclear devices over the Holy Land, not least because such deployment would
threaten religious sites and contaminate the Jew as well as the Arab. As we have noted, it is fully prepared to deploy such devices elsewhere, as a last resort
means of avoiding total military defeat. The threat of such action has proved sufficient to maintain the peace, if peace is defined as the absence of major war. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, likewise, are
unlikely to deploy nuclear weapons over the Holy Land for reasons identical to those of Israel. Arabs would be
loath to sacrifice the Old City of Jerusalem, and their own ethnic brothers, simply to eliminate the State of
Israel. In this sense, a nuclear stalemate would be the expected outcome. Iran, on the other hand, poses a more serious threat, as a non-Arab Shia Muslim, nation,
historically at odds with its Sunni Arab neighbors, and currently ruled by Islamic fundamentalists. Central to all three religious branches of the Abrahamic tree, is the notion of the ‘end of days’ (Judaism), the ‘day of
judgment and the Mahdi’ (Islam) and ‘Armageddon’ (Christianity). Each religion describes this event in apocalyptic terms, as a period of great conflict between God and Satan, resulting in the Resurrection of believers and
great suffering for non-believers. The current Islamic fundamentalist government of Iran openly glorifies in the prospect of the coming of the Mahdi, the restorer of religion and justice who will rule before the end of the
world. If such leaders envision nuclear holocaust as a route to sitting in Paradise at the right hand of the Prophet, the certainty of a nuclear second-strike by Israel may not deter an Iranian first-strike against the Infidel.
Knowing this provides both Israel and Palestine with an increased incentive to formulate a true peace, to open their borders to each other in competitive trade, to reduce corruption and to reduce tensions in the Middle East
survival is much more attractive than a nuclear holocaust. Thus, ironically, the threat of nuclear
(Dershowitz 2005). For both nations, prosperous
proliferation may be the necessary incubus to renewed pursuit of a peace settlement between Israel and
Palestine, which will require the suppression of religious extremism in both nations and a radical reorganization and reduction in the size of the public sector. In our judgment, therefore, Armageddon,
though not out of the question, remains extremely unlikely. Even in a Middle East consumed with mutual malevolence among
nations, the genetic and kinship instinct not to wipe out one’s own, will surely dominate the passion for personal immortality. At least, that is the position on which we choose to rest, in drawing this analytic historical
narrative to a close.
MIDDLE EAST WAR GOOD

A) RUSSIA – WAR SPARKS RAPID GROWTH AND STABILITY – OIL REVENUES SKYROCKET
CETRON AND DAVIES 2007 PHD, FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT OF FORECASTING INTERNATIONAL; READER IN
SOCIAL HISTORY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF HERTFORDSHIRE [MARVIN J AND OWEN, “WORST CASE
SCENARIO: THE MIDDLE EAST,” THE FUTURIST, SEP/OCT, VOL. 41, ISS. 5]
Russia clearly benefits from a Middle Eastern war. In any such scenario, Europe must become even more dependent on
Russian oil than it is today, and Russia grows rich. This does not represent a significant change, of course; the trends are going in that direction already. In addition, by
drawing Muslim extremists to the Middle East, a war between the Sunni and Shi'ite lands is likely to bring
relative stability to Chechnya and the "stans" for so long as it draws terrorist attention away from local goals.
Russia can only welcome this development.
28
RUSSIAN DECLINE ENSURES GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR
OLIKER 2002 [OLGA, WITH TANYA CHARLICK-PALEY, RAND CORPORATION PROJECT AIR FORCE,
“ASSESSING RUSSIA’S DECLINE,” WWW.RAND.ORG/PUBS/MONOGRAPH_REPORTS/MR1442/]
The preceding chapters have illustrated the ways in which Russia’s decline affects that country and may evolve into challenges and dangers that extend well beyond its borders. The political factors of decline
may make Russia a less stable international actor and other factors may increase the risk of internal unrest. Together and separately, they increase the risk of conflict and the potential scope of other imaginable disasters. The
trends of regionalization, particularly the disparate rates of economic growth among regions, combined with the politicization of regional economic and military interests, will be important to watch. The potential for locale,
or possibly ethnicity, to serve as a rallying point for internal conflict is low at present, but these factors have the potential to feed into precisely the cycle of instability that political scientists have identified as making states in
transition to democracy more likely to become involved in war. These factors also increase the potential for domestic turmoil, which further increases the risk of international
conflict, for instance if Moscow seeks to united a divided nation and/or demonstrate globally that its waning power remains something to be reckoned with. Given Russia’s conventional
weakness, an increased risk of conflict carries with it an increased risk of nuclear weapons use, and Russia’s
demographic situation increases the potential for a major epidemic with possible implications for Europe and perhaps beyond. The dangers posed by Russia’s
civilian and military nuclear weapons complex, aside from the threat of nuclear weapons use, create a real risk of proliferation of weapons or
weapons materials to terrorist groups, as well as perpetuating an increasing risk of accident at one of Russia’s
nuclear power plants or other facilities. These elements touch upon key security interests, thus raising serious concerns for the United States. A declining Russia increases the likelihood of conflict—
internal or otherwise—and the general deterioration that Russia has in common with “failing” states raises serious questions about its capacity to respond to an emerging crisis. A crisis in large, populous, and nuclear-armed
Russia can easily affect the interests of the United States and its allies. In response to such a scenario, the United States, whether alone or as part of a larger coalition, could be asked to send military forces to the area in and
around Russia. This chapter will explore a handful of scenarios that could call for U.S. involvement. A wide range of crisis scenarios can be reasonably
extrapolated from the trends implicit in Russia’s decline. A notional list includes: Authorized or unauthorized belligerent actions by Russia troops in trouble-prone
Russian regions or in neighboring states could lead to armed conflict. Border clashes with China in the Russian Far East or between Russia and
Ukraine, the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, or another neighbor could escalate into interstate combat. Nuclear-
armed terrorists based in Russia or using weapons or materials diverted from Russian facilities could threaten Russia, Europe, Asia, or the
United States. Civil war in Russia could involve fighting near storage sties for nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and agents, risking large-scale contamination and humanitarian disaster. A nuclear accident at a
power plant or facility could endanger life and health in Russia and neighboring states. A chemical accident at a plant or nuclear or nuclear-related facility could endanger life and health in Russia and neighboring states.
Ethnic pogrom in south Russia could force refugees into Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and/or Ukraine. Economic and ethnic conflicts in Caucasus could erupt into armed clashes, which would endanger oil and gas pipelines
. An increasingly criminalized
in the region. A massive ecological disaster such as an earthquake, famine, or epidemic could spawn refugees and spread illness and death across borders
Russian economy could create a safe haven for crime or even terrorist-linked groups. From this base, criminals, drug traders, and terrorists
could threaten the people and economies of Europe, Asia, and the United States. Accelerated Russian weapons and technology sales or unauthorized diversion could foster the proliferation of weapons and weapon materials to
rogue states and nonstate terrorist actors, increasing the risk of nuclear war.
B) TERRORISM – MIDDLE EAST WAR PREVENTS AN ATTACK ON THE U.S. – GUARANTEES COMPARATIVELY
BETTER LOCAL TARGETS
CETRON AND DAVIES 2007 PHD, FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT OF FORECASTING INTERNATIONAL; READER IN SOCIAL HISTORY
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF HERTFORDSHIRE [MARVIN J AND OWEN, “WORST CASE SCENARIO: THE MIDDLE EAST,” THE FUTURIST,
SEP/OCT, VOL. 41, ISS. 5]
Al-Qaeda and its allies object to any U.S. presence in
Terrorism, quelling the threat. Terrorism is fundamentally a separate issue from the U.S. relationship with Israel.
the Middle East, particularly in Saudi Arabia, the location of Mecca. For al-Qaeda, supporting the Palestinian cause is little more than an opportunity to curry favor among moderate Muslims. As things stand,
a sustained and convincing display of even-handedness toward the Palestinians by the United States could weaken moderates' support for al-Qaeda, and this can only be beneficial for the West. However, a Middle
Eastern war changes that equation. In any credible future, we can expect to see much the same level of terrorism we already are accustomed to. Hotels owned or patronized by Americans
will be bombed all too often. The United States and its allies will lose the occasional embassy. There may even be another attack on the scale of the World Trade Center every decade. But will a regional
war bring more terrorism against the West or less? We see two possibilities. An all-out war between the Sunni and Shi'ite
lands could reduce the amount of anti-Western terrorism. In this scenario, extremists throughout the Muslim world
would rush toward the Middle East to fight for whichever side of the conflict holds their allegiance. Most are
likely to be Sunnis, as they form a large majority in most of the Muslim world. These extremists will be too busy
killing their fellow Muslims to bother much with the United States and its allies. Eventually, they could turn the training and experience won in
the Middle East against the West. But it is at least possible that a long internal conflict might finally slake the extremists' appetite for
slaughter. And two or three decades is long enough for the West to demonstrate good will toward Islam and reduce the appeal of jihad.
CROSS-APPLY 1AC ALEXANDER EVIDENCE: IMPACT IS EXTINCTION.
29
NO IMPACT TO AFGHAN INSTABILITY—IT’S INEVITABLE BUT EMPIRICALLY DOESN’T ESCALATE
FINEL 9 [DR. BERNARD I. FINEL, AN ATLANTIC COUNCIL CONTRIBUTING EDITOR, IS A SENIOR FELLOW AT
THE AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT, “AFGHANISTAN IS IRRELEVANT,” APR 27
HTTP://WWW.ACUS. ORG/NEW_ATLANTICIST/AFGHANISTAN-IRRELEVANT]
It is now a deeply entrenched conventional wisdom that the decision to “abandon” Afghanistan after the Cold
War was a tragic mistake. In the oft-told story, our “abandonment” led to civil war, state collapse, the rise of the Taliban, and inevitably terrorist
attacks on American soil. This narrative is now reinforced by dire warnings about the risks to Pakistan from instability in
Afghanistan. Taken all together, critics of the Afghan commitment now find themselves facing a nearly unshakable consensus in continuing and deepen our involvement in Afghanistan. The problem
with the consensus is that virtually every part of it is wrong. Abandonment did not cause the collapse of the
state. Failed states are not always a threat to U.S. national security. And Pakistan’s problems have little to do with the situation across the border. First, the
collapse of the Afghan state after the Soviet withdrawal had little to do with Western abandonment. Afghanistan
has always been beset by powerful centrifugal forces. The country is poor, the terrain rough, the population
divided into several ethnic groups. Because of this, the country has rarely been unified even nominally and has never
really had a strong central government. The dominant historical political system in Afghan is warlordism. This is not a consequence of Western involvement or lack thereof. It is a
function of geography, economics, and demography. Second, there is no straight-line between state failure and threats to the United States. Indeed, the problem with
Afghanistan was not that it failed but rather that it “unfailed” and becameruled by the Taliban. Congo/Zaire is a
failed state. Somalia is a failed state. There are many parts of the globe that are essentially ungoverned. Clearly criminality,
human rights abuses, and other global ills flourish in these spaces. But the notion that any and all ungoverned space represents a core national
security threat to the United States is simply unsustainable. Third, the problem was the Taliban regime was not that it existed. It was that it was allowed to fester without any significant
response or intervention. We largely sought to ignore the regime — refusing to recognize it despite its control of 90% of Afghan territory. Aside from occasional tut-tutting about human rights violations and destruction of
cultural sites, the only real interaction the United States sought with the regime was in trying to control drugs. Counter-drug initiatives are not a sound foundation for a productive relationship for reasons too numerous to
Their failure to turn

enumerate here. Had we recognized the Taliban and sought to engage the regime, it is possible that we could have managed to communicate red lines to them over a period of years.
over bin Laden immediately after 9/11 does not necessarily imply an absolute inability to drive a wedge
between the Taliban and al Qaeda over time. Fourth, we are now told that defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan
is imperative in order to help stabilize Pakistan. But, most observers seem to think that Pakistan is in worse
shape now — with the Taliban out of power and American forces in Afghanistan — than it was when the
Taliban was dominant in Afghanistan. For five years from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban ruled Afghanistan and the
Islamist threat to Pakistan then was unquestionably lower. This is not surprising actually. Insurgencies are at their most dangerous — in terms of threat of contagion —
when they are fighting for power. The number of insurgencies that actually manage to sponsor insurgencies elsewhere after
taking power is surprising low. The domino theory is as dubious in the case of Islamist movements as it was in
the case of Communist expansion. There is a notion that “everything changed on 9/11.” We are backing away as a nation from that concept in the case of torture. Perhaps we should also
come to realize that our pre-9/11 assessment of the strategic value and importance of Afghanistan was closer to the mark that our current obsession with it. We clearly made some mistakes in
dealing with the Taliban regime. But addressing those mistakes through better intelligence, use of special forces
raids, and, yes, diplomacy is likely a better solution than trying to build and sustain a reliable, pro-Western
government in Kabul with control over the entire country.
30
2NC AFGHANISTAN ADVANTAGE: EXTENSIONS
AND IT WON’T ESCALATE
ELGORAISH 1986 PHD CANDIDATE AT UNIVERSITY OF KENT [GAMAL, GRADUATE DISSERTATION,
NUCLEARIZATION AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, PP. 409-410]
In conclusion, it seems that the risks of nuclear war in a nuclear Middle East are essentially at three levels. The first level is concerned with the risks related in particular to the Middle East and other similar regions of the
world. The second level of risks focuses on the possible responses of the major nuclear powers to nuclearization of the Middle East states. The third level is related to the risks of Superpower involvement in a Middle East
nuclear conflict escalating to nuclear confrontation. Some of the risks at the first level are less worrisome than others such as a low level of rationality, weak conceptualization of use of weapons, accidental and catalytic war
and nuclear terrorism. However, the risks of the vulnerability of command and control centres and weapons, difficulty of controlling escalation, miscalculation and pre-emptive and preventive strikes would remain major
sources of concern. The possible responses of the major nuclear powers to the nuclearization of the Middle Eastern states are more likely to emerge in the form of strong protests, pressures and threats than in direct military
The risks of a Middle East nuclear conflict escalating to a Superpower nuclear confrontation is a very
intervention.
real and serious risk but it would not necessarily lead to nuclear war between the two Superpowers. A nuclear
exchange in the Middle East is more likely to be a regional tragedy and a very unpleasant contingency rather
than a global holocaust. However, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East would be a serious danger to regional and global security of unprecedented magnitude. We just do not know
the rules of the nuclear game between local powers and between parts of a regional system, or between other regional systems and the global system.
7 ALTERNATIVE CAUSES TO AFGHAN STABILITY

KJÆRNET & TORJESEN 7 [*HEIDI IS A RESEARCH FELLOW IN THE ENERGY PROGRAMME AND THE DEPARTMENT OF RUSSIA
AND EURASIA AT THE NORWEGIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND ** STINA IS A SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW AT
THE NORWEGIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL A FFAIRS, “AFGHANISTAN AND REGIONAL INSTABILITY: A RISK ASSESSMENT”
GOOGLE]
The regional context of Afghanistan poses a range of challenges for the country’s stabilisation process: Pakistan Pakistan’s
central government has lacked control of developments in the areas bordering Afghanistan (Baluchistan, the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas and the North-West Frontier Province), making President Musharraf unable to implement the US-encouraged crackdown on
Pakistani Taleban supporters. The Pakistani border areas have become a key source of weapons, equipment and
new recruits for anti-government militant groups in Afghanistan, while Pakistan–Afghanistan bilateral relations remain, as so often before, strained. The
Pakistani election results from February 18 2008 give grounds for cautious optimism. Nevertheless, the serious challenges stemming from Pakistan will continue
in the short to medium term for Afghanistan. Iran–US tensions The standoff between Iran and the USA over Iran’s nuclear
programme has introduced difficulties in Iran–Afghan relations. Iran remains an important supporter of the Westernbacked Hamid Karzai government.
Nevertheless, in the face of US pressure, Iran is beginning to demonstrate, according to some reports, its ability to destabilise
Afghanistan and derail Washington’s Afghan campaign, as a means of enhancing its overall leverage regarding the USA.1 Geopolitical
rivalries Geopolitical rivalries in the region preclude any optimal co-ordination of support to Afghanistan by
neighbours and great powers. These tensions include the long-standing conflict between India and Pakistan as
well as the serious Russian and Chinese unease over the US and NATO military presence in the region.
Regional trade difficulties Security concerns and post-Soviet bureaucratic inertia prevent Afghanistan’s northern neighbours
from fully endorsing the vision, promoted by the USA and other nations, of Afghanistan’s economic recovery being facilitated by denser integration into
regional trade and communication links. Uzbekistan The government of Uzbekistan is highly authoritarian and deeply unpopular. Large-
scale political and social upheaval remains one likely future scenario for the country. Upheaval in Uzbekistan
would pose a serious challenge to the stability of Afghanistan’s northern and western territories, including Mazar-e-sharif and possibly Meymaneh, where
Norwegian troops are stationed. The German-run ISAF base located in Termez in Uzbekistan near the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan border, and Mazar-e-sharif would be particularly vulnerable in case of upheaval in
Uzbekistan. Drugs Drugs production and trafficking constitute one of Afghanistan’s central domestic challenges, but drugs trafficking
can also be seen as a regional problem. The large-scale criminal activities and incomes associated with regional drug flows are
undermining the states of the region: in this way Afghanistan’s neighbours – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in particular – are becoming weaker, more criminalised, more unstable and less
able to act as constructive partners for Afghanistan. Water Afghanistan’s northern neighbours have a lengthy history of water disputes. If
Afghanistan in the medium or long term decides to claim its legitimate share of the region’s water resources – as it may well do in order to further its economic development – then watersharing in the
region will become even more difficult. Bilateral and multilateral relations between and among the Central
Asian states have been severely strained at times, although fully fledged ‘water wars’ have remained a remote prospect.
31
2NC: AT ECONOMY ADD ON
NO ECONOMIC COLLAPSE—GLOBAL ECONOMY IS RESILIENT
BLOOMBERG 6 .COM, INFORMATION-SERVICES, NEWS AND MEDIA COMPANY THAT PROVIDES BUSINESS AND
FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS WITH THE TOOLS AND DATA THEY NEED ON A SINGLE, ALL-INCLUSIVE PLATFORM,
SEPTEMBER 14, 2006 [HTTP://QUOTE.BLOOMBERG.COM/APPS/NEWS?PID=20601087&SID=AR44A7JLPYFM]
Sept. 15 (Bloomberg) -- The global economy is resilient and growth prospects are strong , said Rodrigo de Rato, the head of the International Monetary Fund,
adding that inflation is a risk for growth. ``The global economy has been resilient and growth prospects remain strong,'' de Rato said at a press conference today in Singapore, where the IMF is holding its annual
IMF raised its forecast for global

meeting. ``Inflation risks are a concern as output gaps narrow; high oil prices could adversely affect both inflation and growth.'' The
economic growth yesterday to 5.1 percent this year and 4.9 percent in 2007. Both forecasts are 0.2 percentage point higher than the April
predictions. The fund also warned a U.S. housing slowdown threatens growth. Emerging economies are on a much firmer footing, while the world
economy has responded positively to risks, de Rato said.

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WILL DRIVE GLOBAL GROWTH AND WITHSTAND US DEMAND SHOCKS
LEE 8 [BRIAN, THE STRAIGHT TIMES (SINGAPORE), "DEVELOPING NATIONS TO LIFT WORLD ECONOMY AMID
US SLOWDOWN", JANUARY 10TH, LEXIS]
DEVELOPING nations will be key in helping the global economy mitigate the drag from a slowing United
States. With their domestic economies coming into their own, poor countries will be the world's biggest growth
driver this year, the World Bank said in a report yesterday. And Singapore is especially well-poised to take advantage of this as it is located amid the hottest of the world's emerging economies. 'I do believe
that there is an impact from whatever happens in the US economy on the developing regions,' World Bank lead
economist Hans Timmer said at a press conference to present the bank's outlook for the world economy. 'But the result is not that the world economy
will be on its knees.' The bank is predicting global economic growth will moderate to 3.3 per cent this year, due mainly to a slowdown in the US, the world's biggest economy. The US, mired in a severe
housing market downturn that has caused much financial turmoil worldwide, is widely expected to decelerate further this year. While the World Bank has estimated that the US should manage a modest 1.9 per cent expansion
this year, fears of a recession appear to be rising, prompted by recent economic data. 'We can certainly smell a US recession although we can't taste one yet,' said United Overseas Bank economist Thomas Lam.
Against this ominous backdrop, developing economies are emerging as a bright spot for the year. They are
expected to grow 7.1 per cent this year, with East Asia's growth stars clocking in at an average of 9.7 per cent.
'Singapore benefits from its location in Asia, which has shown the strongest dynamism in the world,' said Mr Timmers, who cited the region's red-hot economies of China and Vietnam. He pointed out that
developing nations have become much more resilient to external demand shocks in the past few years. The US housing
slowdown, for instance, began two years ago and has been hurting US imports of goods made in poorer countries. But that has not
derailed the developing world from its growth path as its robust domestic economies - bolstered by better
economic policies, open borders and stronger supply-side structures - have been picking up the slack. Many
emerging economies have also been largely unscathed by financial problems caused by the US sub- prime crisis
as their direct exposure to the crisis has been limited. 'With that resilience, with their strong performance, developing
countries are now mitigating the slowdown that is occurring in the US,' said Mr Timmers. He noted that the developing
economies together equal the US economy in size. 'But they are growing more than three times as fast. That
means their contribution to global demand is more than three times as important as the contribution of the United States.'
32
1NC PAKISTAN ADVANTAGE
CURRENT AFGHANISTAN STRATEGY IS WORKING.
GENERAL SIR RICHARD DANNATT JUNE 13, 2010 (FORMER CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE BRITISH
ARMY HTTP://WWW.TELEGRAPH.CO.UK/COMMENT/PERSONAL-VIEW/7823555/AFGHANISTAN-CAN-THE-WAR-
BE-WON. HTML AFGHANISTAN: CAN THE WAR BE WON?)
On the face of it, this would seem to have been a bad week for Nato and the Pakistanis in the Afghan-Pakistan
region: more than a dozen Nato troops killed; British military fatalities now not far off the three hundred mark; a bomb at a wedding in Kandahar that killed more than 40 family members and friends; a boy of seven
apparently executed for being a government spy; and more than 50 Nato vehicles burned while pausing on one of their epic resupply journeys from Karachi to Kandahar. All of this has happened in
the early months of the US military surge, which is designed to transform the lives of the Afghan population – coincidentally, just in time for the US mid-term elections.
However, on the other side of the coin, we see: an international community that is more in harmony with the
Afghan government than for a long time; the third most senior al-Qaeda leader killed just over the border in
Pakistan; further significant areas of Helmand province now under government control; a major Nato operation
in Kandahar province about to be launched, drawing on the lessons of the ongoing successful British-led
Operation Moshtarak in Helmand; and a British Prime Minister prepared to spend the night with the Army in its
forward base at Camp Bastion, and even having enough energy to go for a morning run around the camp in the
Afghan heat before getting stuck into his duties. I find all that very encouraging, because this campaign is about
leaders and people. The Taliban leadership – under the influence of the fundamentally malign and negative al-Qaeda-backed Islamist agenda – is not concerned with Afghanistan as such, but with the
enforced reimposition of the Islamic Caliphate for their own political ends. What do they have to offer their people, other than a diet of repression and fear? How can rational people want to support a movement that destroys
schools simply because they include girls among their pupils, and that is prepared not only to execute people in public in a football stadium, but also to kill a seven-year-old because he is deemed a government spy? Such
behaviour is unacceptable. If it was only to the detriment of the Afghan population, we might be able to turn a blind eye. But it was among that mayhem, imposed by the Taliban, that al-Qaeda was able to establish itself in the
First, the
late 1990s, wreak havoc and death in New York and Washington and, given the chance, would do so again. This campaign is very much focused on people, and there are three specific dimensions to it.
campaign is being conducted among the people – the Afghans are the environment within which our troops
fight; in the way that river lines, hill tops, villages and towns were in the conventional wars of the past. Second, it is a fight about the people. In this sense it is a
classic counter-insurgency campaign in which the pro-government forces need to win the hearts and minds of
the population under threat. General Stan McChrystal’s military concept of operations is one of “Clear, Hold and Build” – to clear areas of Taliban, to then hold them securely with sufficient
numbers of Allied and Afghan troops so that the inhabitants feel safe, and then offer them the opportunity for a better life built on a legal economy and a traditional society, free from fear. But third, this campaign is not just
being fought for the people of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the South Asia region under the immediate threat of Islamist terror. It is also being waged for the people of the West – North America, Europe and for this country,
where it is especially important that we have a mutually beneficial relationship with our large British-Muslim population. (But not tolerate those who oppose and would seek to change our society through violence for their
own political ends.) So much for the people; but what about the leaders? David Cameron, as our new Prime Minister, has made a very impressive start, holding the inaugural meeting of his National Security Council on his
first full day in office, receiving President Hamid Karzai as his first overseas visitor, and pledging unequivocal support to our Armed Forces. Mr Cameron’s address on Friday morning to our troops was not just words, but a
statement of intent – he wants to put the military back centre-stage in our national life. From our soldiers’ point of view, the doubling of the Operational Allowance to close to £5,000 for a six-month operational tour in
Afghanistan, or elsewhere, is excellent news, and the allocation of a further £67 million to tackle IEDs is absolutely right. The former is a worthy recognition of the difficult and dangerous work on behalf of the nation carried
out by the Armed Forces, while the latter is a carefully focused enhancement, necessary for the conduct of the campaign. But those aspects of leadership, while welcome, could be thought to be more symbolic than
substantive. The acid test for Barack Obama and David Cameron will come from the single-mindedness and clear
focus that they exhibit in pursuing the real issues in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in the wider security
interests of the United States, the United Kingdom and elsewhere. So if Afghanistan is all about leadership and people, what is to be done? Essentially, the
future of the country must be in Afghan hands. We can advise and enable, but we should progressively reduce the international military presence as the Afghans take increasing responsibility for themselves. Our exit
strategy from the country itself is synonymous with the blueprint for the establishment of a sufficiently
functional Afghan state. The Afghans must run their own security, which is why huge emphasis is being placed
by Nato on building up the national army and police; the Afghan economy must be converted as quickly as possible from one based on the illegal opium trade, to one
profiting from traditional cash crops, such as wheat, saffron and pomegranates. From these two key developments will flow an increase in the rule of law, a reduction in corruption and the chance for a society largely based
Away from big media

on traditional families and tribes to be sufficiently stable so that al-Qaeda will never be able to plan, train and prepare to bring violence to the shores of our country again.
headlines, less dramatic developments in Afghanistan and elsewhere that rarely get reported bear witness to the
progress being made. Sadly, opening a school, drilling a well, or even reducing the poppy harvest in Helmand
by 25 per cent in 2009 go largely unrecorded. As the campaign continues, the Army will hold its nerve as it
does the right thing on behalf of our nation. Perhaps the real question is whether the nation will hold its own nerve in order to do the right thing for itself? This is a leadership
challenge of huge proportions for our new Government, but one that it must get right. From what we have seen for far, I believe it will.
33
1NC PAKISTAN ADVANTAGE
TROOP SURGE SOLVES TERRORISM AND PAKISTANI COLLAPSE
SENOR AND WEHNER 9/4 (DAN AND PETER, “AFGHANISTAN IS NOT OBAMA’S WAR”
HTTP://ONLINE.WSJ.COM/ARTICLE/SB10001424052970204731804574390631037605374.HTML )
The president deserves credit for his commitment earlier this year to order an additional 17,000 troops for
Afghanistan, as well as his decision to act on the recommendation of Gen. David Petraeus and Defense Secretary Robert Gates to replace the U.S. commander in Afghanistan with Gen. Stanley McChrystal. These
were tough and courageous decisions. The president's actions have clearly unsettled some members of his own party, who hoped he would begin to unwind America's commitment in Afghanistan. Mr. Obama not only ignored
The war in Afghanistan is a crucial

their counsel; he doubled down his commitment. There should therefore be no stronger advocates for Mr. Obama's Afghanistan strategy than the GOP.
part of America's broader struggle against militant Islam. If we were to fail in Afghanistan, it would have
calamitous consequences for both Pakistan and American credibility. It would consign the people of
Afghanistan to misery and hopelessness. And Afghanistan would once again become home to a lethal mix of
terrorists and insurgents and a launching point for attacks against Western and U.S. interests. Neighboring
governments—especially Pakistan's with its nuclear weapons—could quickly be destabilized and collapse.
TURN: FEAR OF US ABANDONMENT STRENGTHENS TIES BETWEEN THE PAKISTAN ARMY AND RADICALS.
DANIEL MARKEY 2007 (A FALSE CHOICE IN PAKISTAN. BY: MARKEY, DANIEL, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
00157120, JUL/AUG2007, VOL. 86, ISSUE 4)
. Neither coercive threats nor unfettered democracy is likely
As convincing as these prescriptions might sound, following them would in fact be counterproductive
to yield near-term or sustainable success in the war on terrorism. At the heart of the critics' assessment of
Pakistan lies an incorrect assumption about the nature of the army's connection to Islamists. The critics believe
that that connection will be impossible, or at least exceedingly difficult, to sever. In fact, a break could come
more easily than they think (although, given the long history, it may not happen as quickly or as smoothly as
Washington would like). Pakistan's security services maintain these connections less out of ideological
sympathy and more out of strategic calculation: as a hedge against abandonment by other allies--especially the
United States.
TURN: COUNTER-INSURGENCY BORDER SECURITY AND ANTI-CORRUPTION KEY TO SOLVE TERRORISM.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT M. MONARCH 2009 (DENYING SANCTUARY: REJECTING SAFE HAVENS IN
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS DTIC.MIL/CGI-BIN/GETTRDOC?LOCATION=U2&DOC=GETTRDOC.PDF&AD=ADA494801)
In Pakistan today, the Waziristan Accords are in shambles and the Sons of Iraq are making significant progress
in Iraq. These sanctuaries, both external and internal, are in peril. The correct coordination of these three actions
is required to capitalize on these events. Meanwhile, border security must continue during the lull , in
anticipation of future events and in the interest of host-nation national security. Indeed, border security in
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq must be strengthened and the almost insurmountable flagrant corruption must
be overcome. None of the described methods can stand-alone. The U.S. Department of Defense must
develop a strategy to implement a combination of these plans to eliminate safe havens for terrorists and
other insurgencies. The United States cannot allow these ungoverned areas to exist or it will be under constant
threat of terrorist attacks. From this strategy will flow doctrine, organizational tables, equipment requirements
and the manpower required to be successful. This problem must be met head-on right now since, as has been
noted, this systemic and enduring problem will not go away in the near future.
34
2NC PAKISTAN ADVANTAGE EXTENSIONS
TURN: FEAR OF ABANDONMENT OF WASHINGTON SPURS PAKISTAN ARMY AND INTELLIGENCE
RADICALIZATION.
DANIEL MARKEY 2007 (A FALSE CHOICE IN PAKISTAN. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 00157120, JUL/AUG2007, VOL. 86, ISSUE 4)
It is true that Pakistan's government needs greater popular legitimacy-- won through the ballot box--in order to advance both long- and short-term counterterrorism goals. But the critics' prescriptions for how to advance these
If members of the Pakistani army and the Inter-

goals risk throwing the United States, Pakistan, and the war on terrorism off course without offering a better alternative.
Services Intelligence (ISI) retain ties to militant groups, including Taliban sympathizers, they do so as a hedge
against abandonment by Washington. The past six decades of on-again, off-again bilateral cooperation have
undermined Pakistani confidence in long-term U.S. partnership. Washington, accordingly, should resist the appeal of the cathartic but counterproductive
approach of confronting Islamabad with more sticks and fewer carrots. Any attempt to crack down on Pakistan will exacerbate distrust, resulting in increased Pakistani support for jihadists; coercive threats will undermine
confidence without producing better results. Nor is democracy a magic bullet. Pakistan's security services will not easily be cowed, sidelined, or circumvented, and the challenges facing democracy in Pakistan go far beyond
. Still,
rigged elections or exiled politicians. Weak civilian institutions and a history of dysfunctional civil-military relations mean that bringing democracy to Pakistan is less a matter of resuscitation than of reinvention
success in Pakistan's long-term struggle against extremism will eventually demand a thoroughgoing democratic
transition in Islamabad, even if that transition is not realistic at the moment. The Bush administration has failed to broaden its partnership with
Pakistan much beyond army headquarters; it views the civilian dimension of Pakistani politics as a distraction rather than an integral part of the counterterrorism effort. Most Pakistanis believe that Washington is all too happy
Islamabad needs greater popular legitimacy in order to muster grass-roots support for the
to work with a pliant army puppet.
counterterrorism agenda. The United States should work to empower Pakistan's moderate civilians even as it
builds trust with Pakistan's security forces. These goals are not contradictory: Washington can win the confidence of Pakistan's military establishment without accepting its exclusive
political authority, and it can help empower civilian leadership without jeopardizing the army's core interests.
TURN: A ROBUST FORCE IN AFGHANISTAN IS KEY TO SOLVE PAKISTANI LASH-OUT- SOLVES FEARS OF
ENCIRCLEMENT.
DANIEL MARKEY 2007 (A FALSE CHOICE IN PAKISTAN. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 00157120, JUL/AUG2007, VOL. 86, ISSUE 4)
In addition to providing money and materiel, the United States should demonstrate its ability to address
Pakistan's regional interests. Washington's influence in Kabul and New Delhi can help to ease Pakistani fears of
strategic encirclement by a hostile India and its allies--a core Pakistani security concern. A long-term, robust
U.S. commitment to promoting stability in Afghanistan is essential; it offers Pakistan the only way to
extricate itself from Afghanistan without ceding the ground to regional adversaries, real or perceived. Washington also can
and should continue to exert a moderating influence on stormy Afghan-Pakistani relations. Sustained three-way diplomacy at senior levels--such as the Bush-Musharraf-Karzai dinner of September 2006--should be
complemented by enhanced working-level political dialogues.
SURGE IS WORKING
JAMES BLITZ JUNE 13, 2010 (FINANCIAL TIMES, HTTP://WWW.FT.COM/CMS/S/0/E9511E06-7707-11DF-BA79-
00144FEABDC0.HTML MCCHRYSTAL SQUARES UP TO BIG CHALLENGES)
In a Financial Times interview last week, Gen McChrystal made clear that he has reason to be satisfied on several fronts. First, he now
has sufficient troops on the ground to move forward. When he arrived in Kabul the alliance effort in
Afghanistan was under-resourced and the insurgency growing. Now nearly all the 30,000 additional troops
sought by Barack Obama, US president, last autumn have arrived. As a result, he says, the Nato operation is
“much more effective” and “we have built the foundation to move forward”. Second, there has been significant
growth in the Afghan National Security Forces, essential if Nato is eventually to hand over security control and
leave. The army and police have grown in size by some 50 per cent over the past year and may well reach
growth targets for October ahead of schedule. There are still problems with the quality of personnel, especially in the police, but the general believes that this and the scale of
training are improving. Third, there is a more constructive relationship between the US and Hamid Karzai, Afghan
president, than was the case a year ago. Last autumn Washington was openly hostile to Mr Karzai, indicating he
was not a credible partner. It now realises that forging a good relationship is the only sensible way forward. Mr
Karzai is still a difficult partner, as was shown earlier this month when he sacked two senior Afghan security ministers with whom Nato has worked closely. But Gen
McChrystal is relaxed about this: “It shows it’s a government that actually works, that can find people and
replace people, almost like a body breathing.”
35
1NC SOLVENCY
THE AFFIRMATIVE DOESN'T SOLVE - CT VERSUS COIN DEBATES ARE OUTDATED APPROACHES TO CONFLICT.
ONLY THE CREATION OF A NEW PARADIGM WILL SOLVE
GORKA, FACULTY OF IRREGULAR WARFARE DEPARTMENT AT THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 2010
(SEBASTIAN, "AL-QAEDA AND AFGHANISTAN IN STRATEGIC CONTEXT" REAL INSTITUTO ELCANO, MAY 17)
the realities on the ground must be recognised for what they are: centuries-old political, social
Additionally,
and economic truths. Afghanistan has never functioned as a modern nation-state based on one coherent
national identity. Moreover, the Soviets and the British before them, despite huge resources and a complete lack of stultifying political correctness, proved entirely incapable of securing the Durand Line.
Therefore, as we de-legitimise al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other terror groups through an active and sophisticated propaganda campaign, Washington and Kabul must recognise the legitimacy of the only political structures that
have ever successfully exercised sovereignty in the area: the tribes.[31] In exchange for their de facto authority being recognised trilaterally by the US, the Afghan government and Islamabad, the tribes must guarantee that
their territory will never again be used by extremist forces to launch attacks on the US, Kabul or Pakistan. This is one feasible strategy that can stabilise the region and deny it to our enemies. Additionally,
Washington must step beyond the ‘COIN versus counterterrorism’ debate. With foes as variegated
and multifaceted as AQAM and the Taleban one cannot take an ‘either/or’ approach. At the highest
strategic level, the decision-makers who deploy our troops and operatives must recognise how
fundamentally the shape of war has changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union and especially after 11 September 2001. It is no exaggeration to state that irregular
warfare is now the regular way of applying violence for both us and our enemies. We need not prepare in the short or even medium terms for conventional warfare between nation-states, using tanks and aircraft carriers. For
The sooner this reality is reflected in the

the foreseeable future our enemies will be non-state actors –with or without state sponsorship– using irregular means against us.[32]
way we educate, train and utilise our forces, the sooner our new enemies will be defeated.
TURN: NATO WILL MODEL THE US—FAILURE TO DEPLOY CRUSHES RELATIONS

REUTERS 12/21/08 [“ALLIES MUST FOLLOW U.S. IN BOOSTING AFGHAN FORCES: NATO”
HTTP://UK.REUTERS.COM/ARTICLE/BURNINGI SSUES/IDUKTRE4BK1912
0081221?PAGENUMBER=2&VIRTUALBRANDCHANNEL=0]
NATO members must follow the United States in committing additional forces to Afghanistan to ensure the burden of the battle against militants
Other
Mullen said on Saturday Washington aimed to send 20,000-30,000

is properly shared, the alliance said on Sunday. The chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike
extra troops to Afghanistan by the beginning of next summer to combat a growing Taliban insurgency in the east and south. A NATO spokesman said the additional U.S. troops
would go a long way to meeting the needs assessment of U.S. Army General David McKiernan, commander of international forces in Afghanistan. But other
allies still had to do more. "We want to ensure that as the U.S. increases we have a proper balance between what the Americans are doing and what the other allies are doing -- both for military and political reasons," James
Appathurai said. "(NATO) Secretary General (Jaap de Hoop Scheffer) would like to see an increase, not only from the Americans, but also from other allies, in
particular the Europeans, to ensure we have a political, as well as a military, sharing of burdens within this mission," he said. A NATO diplomat said the alliance wanted to avoid a
situation in which two or three of the 26 allies did almost all the dangerous work. " Politically that can go badly very, very
quickly ," he said. " It would be seen in the U nited S tates as the Europeans not pulling their weight ." The United States already has some 31,000 troops in Afghanistan,
out of a total foreign force there of more than 65,000 from over 40 nations. Britain has the second biggest force at 8,700, more than twice as many troops as next-in-line Germany, France, Canada and Italy. U.S. President-
Obama, who takes office in January, has pledged a renewed focus on Afghanistan, where U.S.-led forces toppled the Taliban government in late 2001 after the
elect Barack
September 11 attacks. McKiernan has said he wants the extra forces to reach a "tipping point" against the Taliban and no longer
wants to launch operations to clear an area unless he has forces to hold onto it and bring in aid and development.
THAT PREVENTS RUSSIAN NUCLEAR LASHOUT AND EUROPEAN ESCALATORY WARS

DUFFIELD 95 [JOHN, ASST PROF. OF GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS , U OF VIRGINIA, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY]
In view of these uncertainties, the countries of Western Europe have found it desirable to maintain a counterweight to the residual
military power of the former Soviet Union, especially Russia’s nuclear capabilities. Alone, however, they lack the
means to do so. Only the United States is seen as fully able to neutralize the potential nuclear threat , however remote it may be, and more
generally to preserve the European strategic balance. And it is primarily through NATO that American military power is
linked to the continent. A second post-cold war NATO function that has assumed greater prominence is the protection of alliance members against an array of newly emerging threats. Increasing
attention ahs been paid to possible dangers emanating from North Africa and the Middle East , in part because of the spread of the technology for producing missiles and weapons of mass destruction to those areas. Highest
Such
on the list of new external concerns, however, are ethnic, territorial, and national conflicts within and among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as exemplified by the fighting in the former Yugoslavia.
conflicts have the potential to generate large numbers of refugees of even to spill over onto the territory of
neighboring countries, which include NATO members. In a worst case scenario, outside states might feel compelled to intervene, risking an
expansion of hostilities, as occurred at the beginning of World War I..
36
1NC SOLVENCY
TURN: WAR IN AFGHANISTAN IS KEY TO HEGEMONY
CUTLER 1 [ROBERT M., FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, “US INTERVETNION IN AFGH.: IMPLICATIONS FOR
CENTRAL ASIA”]
The geopolitical significance of the U.S. war in Afghanistan for Central Asia is the on-the-ground foothold that
it gives the American military in the region. Certainly China views the U.S. presence as a hindrance to its strategic objectives of dominating the region, and probably Beijing does
not believe that the U.S. has staying power there. But the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan increases the prospect of a continuing
U.S. military presence on the ground in Uzbekistan--above and beyond the presence of "merely" economic
instruments of diplomacy such as the presence of the international energy companies. It has monkey-wrenched
an incipient consolidation of Sino-Russian hegemony over Central Asia and motivated the beginning of a rapprochement between Moscow and
Washington, the eventual success of which, however, remains in doubt.
NUCLEAR WAR
THAYER 6 [Thayer, Bradley A., PROFESSOR OF DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES @ MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY “In
Defense of Primacy.,” National Interest; Nov/Dec2006 Issue 86, p32-37]
THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a
dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the
anarchic world of international politics.
Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights,
growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current
amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages
followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the
liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you
lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system
causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership
reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy
helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South
Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where
Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great
power wars.
37
1NC RUSSIAN RELATIONS DA
UNIQUE INTERNAL LINK: US/RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE THE HIGHEST IN 15 YEARS, BUT REMAIN EXTREMELY
FRAGILE. DISRUPTION OF RELATIONS WILL DESTROY START RATIFICATION.
SERGEY ROGOV, MAY 26, 2010 (DIRECTOR OF RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES US AND CANADA INSTITUTE
BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING EXPERT SEES "WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY" IN US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS)
A year-and-a-half ago, Russia and the US were on the brink of a new cold war. Today, we may say that
relations between the two countries have reached their highest point in the last 15 years. After the end of the Cold War, the US
and Russia have repeatedly proclaimed a strategic partnership. But each time, these declarations were not justified. It would be a mistake to place responsibility for the unrealized promises on the Americans alone. But the
. Since the mid-1990's, the US has constantly placed Russia before

main reason was Washington's unwillingness to consider the lawful interests of Moscow
accomplished facts. The expansion of NATO, the attempts to weaken Russian influence in the post-Soviet area,
the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the unilateral application of military force contrary to principles of
international law - all this testified to US unwillingness to build equal relations with Russia.
Therefore, many of us perceived the reset proclaimed by the Obama Administration
with skepticism, suspecting that the declarations will once again not be secured by specific actions. But today,
we may speak of real headway in American policy, when the US is beginning to really (and not just in worlds)
consider the interests of Russia in its approach to an entire series of key questions.
1. Washington is rejecting its paternalistic tone in regard to Moscow. Not only the tonality of relations has changed, but the Obama Administrationhas demonstrated a readiness for constructive dialogue and a search for
compromises and mutually acceptable solutions to the problems that have accumulated.
2. A new START Treaty has been signed, which, unlike the Moscow treaty of 2002, does not impose unilateral concessions upon Russia, but allows us to maintain a balance of strategic nuclear forces on a parity basis and
retains the improved mechanism of inspection and verification. Thus, the arms control regimen is getting a second wind.
3. Last year, the Obama Administration repealed or froze all strategic missile defense programs. The emphasis was shifted to regional missile defense, which cannot threaten Russian ICBMs. The US will in fact remain within
the framework of the ABM Treaty until the end of this decade. Consequently, the model of mutual nuclear deterrence is also retained.
4. The question of acceptance of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, to which the Bush Administration gave the priority, has been put off to the distant future. Judging by all, the new NATO strategy does not reject the idea of
further expansion of the bloc, but places greater emphasis on development of military cooperation with Russia.
5. Although the US is refusing to recognize the CIS as a zone of "privileged interests" of Russia, here too a departure from harsh opposition has been noted. Washington calmly perceived the political changes in Kiev and the
Russian-Ukrainian rapprochement. After the next revolution (or coup) in Kyrgyzstan, Russia and the US did not support different clients, but helped the new government.
6. New signs of positive economic shifts have appeared. For the first time in many years, the US House of Representatives held hearings on the possible repeal of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. The administration re-
submitted the agreement on cooperation with Russia in the sphere of nuclear technologies ("1-2-3 Agreement") to Congress. American sanctions against Rosoboroneksport and MAI have been repealed. Serious negotiations
have been renewed on acceptance of Moscow into the WTO, although as yet it is not quite clear whether Russia intends to join this organization independently or together with other members of the Customs Union.
There are definite shifts also in the position of Russia. We have concluded an agreement on transit of military
cargo and personnel through our territory to Afghanistan. Russia also supported the moderate economic
sanctions against Iran, which the US had been striving for.
Thus, a "window of opportunities" has opened up for normal, mutually advantageous cooperation of Moscow
and Washington in the future. Of course, Russian-American relations still remain quite fragile. We cannot
rule out the possibility that ratification of the START Treaty may be disrupted. Obama's opponents accuse
the White House of making unjustified concessions to Moscow on questions of verification, tactical nuclear
arms, and missile defense. At the hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, some Republican
senators categorically spoke out against agreement with Russia in principle.
In order to force ratification prior to the November elections to Congress, Obama was able to mobilize an impressive team of retired state Republican leaders in support of the START Treaty. Among them are former
Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, and James Baker, and former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. The decisive support on the part of the incumbent Secretary of Defense - Republican Robert Gates,
who has 40 years of experience in participating in negotiations on arms control - is no less important. Aside from that, the administration has tossed the Republicans a "bone," by increasing expenditures for modernization of
nuclear weapons and missile defense.
The discussion of economic questions in Congress will be no less difficult. An "unnatural" coalition of
conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats may speak out against rejection of economic barriers.
The state visit of President Medvedev to the US will take place in a month. This will be a good opportunity to
consolidate what has been achieved and to outline further steps on development of Russian-American
cooperation for the coming years, despite the differences on certain questions.
Evidently, it is expedient to place particular emphasis on development of trade and investments. After all,
without an economic basis, relations between Washington and Moscow will remain unstable.
One other priority task is the development of cooperation in the sphere of missile defense. Here, it is time to go
from discussion of threats to specific agreements on the methods of parrying them - exchange of information in
a real time regimen, zones of responsibility, holding training exercises, etc.
Finally, we must get practical results from the work groups that are part of the presidential commission created by Medvedev and Obama almost a year ago. We cannot allow the commission to turn into a tourist agency for
high-level bureaucrats. The upcoming Russian-American summit in Washington must give a signal for practical implementation of the action plans adopted by the work groups.
38
1NC RUSSIAN RELATIONS DA
LINK: AN INCREASE OF US DEDICATION TO ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN ARE CRUCIAL TO
MAINTAINING RELATIONS.
VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV FEBRUARY 5, 2010 (ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER, THE HERALD RUSSIA, US
TO STEP UP DRUG FIGHT)
Russia on Thursday hailed a new agreement with the United States intended to boost joint anti-drug efforts, but urged
the U.S. and NATO to do more to stem a flow of drugs from Afghanistan that has sickened millions of Russians. The deal signed by Gil
Kerlikowske, director of the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, and Russia's drug control chief Viktor Ivanov, envisages setting up groups of experts to plan joint action in combatting drugs and also steps to curb
Kerlikowske told reporters after the meeting that he promised Ivanov to monitor
demand for drugs and toughen law enforcement and coordinate legislation.
and assess the U.S. and Afghan governments' efforts to "interdict drug supplies, particularly those drug supplies
headed to Russia," combat drug laboratories and drug storage facilities. He added the U.S. and Russia will also "work cooperatively on drug
traffickers and financiers." Ivanov hailed the agreement as a key component of U.S.-Russian efforts to "reset" relations
that became badly strained under the previous U.S. administration. But he also urged the U.S. and NATO forces
to do more to combat Afghan drugs which have become a major threat to Russia's security. "The efficiency of
international drug-fighting efforts in Afghanistan needs to be strengthened," Ivanov said. "We agreed that the
result of our work should be a significant reduction in drug production in Afghanistan." He criticized an international conference on
stabilizing Afghanistan held in London last week for failing to offer specific steps to fight drug production in Afghanistan. Afghanistan provides more than 90 percent of the heroin consumed in the world, and the bulk of it
The problem of drug abuse is of vital concern for Russia - where cheap, abundant
flows through ex-Soviet Central Asia and Russia.
Afghan heroin has helped fuel a surge in addiction rates, and injection drug use has been a key factor in the
spread of the virus that causes AIDS. Ivanov said in an interview published Thursday that there are about 2 million opium and heroin addicts in Russia and another 3 million people who
use other drugs. Authorities said that about 30,000 die each year of drug overdoses. Ivanov has strongly urged Washington to continue the Bush administration's policy of large-scale eradication of opium crops in
Afghanistan. But some U.S. officials have called earlier crop eradication tactics ineffective and claimed that they boosted support for the Taliban. Instead, the Obama administration has focused on targeting drug labs and
Kerlikowske said Thursday the U.S. is making "the very best efforts" to combat drugs
encouraging farmers to raise alternative crops.
by offering emphasis on offering rewards to Afghan provincial governors for reducing opium fields and
providing alternative crops to farmers so that poor farmers don't fall into the hands of the Taliban. He stressed that other
priorities include tracking down the traffickers and their financiers, cracking down on drug labs and opium and heroin caches and tracking down shipments of chemicals used in heroin production. Kerlikowske said Russia
and the U.S. will "exchange information on a very trustworthy and credible basis and a very timely basis in order to cut the head off the snake, in order to go after the finances, in order to go after those individuals that are
trafficking."
IMPACT: START IS KEY TO PREVENT EXTINCTION – SOLVES ACCIDENTS AND NONPROLIFERATION .

BLANCHFIELD 09 (MIKE, 7-4, REPORTER FOR THE VANCOUVER SUN, “OBAMA'S NUCLEAR-WEAPONS
ADVISER DELIVERS DOOMSDAY SCENARIO”, HTTP://WWW.COMMONDREAMS.ORG/HEADLINE/2009/07/04-1)
Still, Blair and many others say the need for the U.S. and Russia to show leadership is even more pressing, to remove not
only the ever-present Cold War possibility of a world-ending nuclear accident, but the 21st-century threat of
nukes falling into terrorist hands. Much has been made of the need to press the ``reset'' button on the strained relations of late between the White House and the Kremlin. Medvedev
struck a conciliatory note this past week when he called for a new era in relations with Washington, based on a ``purely pragmatic'' agenda. Thomas Graham, a retired U.S. diplomat and Clinton-era arms-control
ambassador, said Russian and American co-operation on arms control, including a new START treaty, would pay dividends in a
much broader sense. ``For too long in this post-Cold War world, the two former Cold War adversaries have
remained in a semi-hostile relationship,'' Graham said this past week. ``There could be a serious threat of broader nuclear-
weapon proliferation. Many people are concerned about the Iranian nuclear program. . . . This administration, I
believe, correctly understands that we cannot effectively deal with either of those issues, and many others, as well, without close
cooperation with the Russian Federation.'' Officials from both countries are already hammering out the details of an agreement that would replace the START 1 treaty which
expires Dec. 5. Though the Moscow-Washington relationship is tangled in a web of tension over the U.S. missile-defence-shield plans for Europe, and NATO's eastward expansion, positive signals emerged from the
The main
Kremlin on Friday on one front: Medvedev's spokesman said he and Obama would sign a side deal that would allow the U.S. military transit of goods through Russian territory to Afghanistan.
goal would be a new START framework that would essentially see both sides slashing their nuclear-warhead
stockpiles by one-quarter, down to about 1, 500 warheads each. Despite the spread of nuclear-weapons arsenals to countries such as China, Pakistan, India and elsewhere, nine out of every 10
nuclear bombs on the planet are under the control of the White House and the Kremlin. Lilia Shevtsova, of the Moscow office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggests that a renewed version of
START will not necessarily make the world a safer place. ``When you start counting nukes, you start talking disarmament and verification procedure. It's a sign, not of mutual trust; it's rather a sign of lack, an absence
of mutual trust,'' says Shevtsova. Charles Ferguson, a senior fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, says if Russia and the U.S. were to go so far as to cut their arsenals down to 1,000 each, other nuclear countries
could begin to compete with them. ``We're uncertain as to where China is headed, in terms of its gradual nuclear development. There's still uncertainties even about India, where it may be headed, or Pakistan,'' says
Ferguson. For Blair , it's well past the time to abandon long-held suspicions and animosities . After walking his Ottawa luncheon crowd through his
Paris doomsday vision, Blair piles on more scenarios. If there were an accidental launch of weapons that triggered all-out nuclear war between Russia and the U.S., 119 million people in each country would die in the
initial exchange. That would include 15 million around the Kremlin in Moscow. A city like Chicago or Ottawa would be gone within the hour. ``We've pushed our luck as far as we can; now we need a policy. So, to put
it bluntly, there are two paths that stretch before us: We either bury our weapons or we're buried by them,'' says Blair.
39
RUSSIAN RELATIONS DA NEG: UNIQUENESS EXTENSIONS
RELATIONS ARE HIGH NOW, BUT SHORT TERM SUCCESSES ARE KEY TO MAINTAIN THEM.
BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING FEBRUARY 5, 2010 (RUSSIAN PUNDIT SAYS EXPECTATIONS MAY BE "INFLATED")
Relations between Russia and the United States have made significant progress since the "reset": fundamentally
important accords have been reached on Afghanistan; the treaty on strategic offensive weapons will most
probably be signed soon; a dialogue on matters of developing civil society has begun. However, the question arises as to whether a
comprehensive agenda for bilateral relations over the long term, which will enable relations to be firmly
established at a positive level, will be successfully drawn up. A shortage of quick successes could in the
future cause an increase in anti-American sentiments among part of the ruling elite in Russia. Although a very
important obstacle in the path of this trend in Russia is the new domestic political reality (the tandemocracy, the weakening of the "siloviki", the replacement of the "imperial" modernization agenda, the ambiguity of the
financial and economic situation), within the framework of which the Kremlin is today prepared to act more pragmatically and flexibly
RELATIONS STRONG NOW, BUT CONTINUED COOPERATION IS KEY.

VIKTOR YENIKEYEV MAY 18, 2010 (VOICE OF RUSSIA, WINDS OF CHANGE IN US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS)
"New winds are blowing in the US-Russian relations" - this is how Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey
Ivanov characterized the current relations between the two nations at a press conference in Washington. It is important that the Russian Deputy
Prime Minister made the statement not on the basis of paper work but summing up the results of his intensive
working visit to the US. Ivanov visited NASA's space centers in Florida and Texas, met officials of the State Department, Pentagon, National Security Council of the US Congress. By the way, US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also said that the reset of the US-Russian relations is going smoothly. Indeed there are
many facts to prove it. On April 8, in Prague Dmitri Medvedev and Barack Obama signed the new strategic arms reduction treaty.
In early May, the US administration kept its promise and submitted the new START Treaty to the Senate for ratification.
Right after that the White House submitted the US-Russia Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (123 Agreement) to the lawmakers. The meetings of the Russian Deputy Prime Minister with US officials proved that
At the
at present the US has "neither claims nor questions" to Russia regarding its relations with Iran. Ivanov said he would not be surprised if in the near future the UN adopts a new resolution on sanction against Iran.
same time nobody would object that Russia and the US should not rest on the laurels of the current
achievements and move further strengthen the base of the cooperation. This implies first of all cooperation between Moscow and Washington
on establishing a joint anti-missile defense system. According to Ivanov, even in this vulnerable sphere the discussions have become calmer and less dramatic. Ivanov said that in late 2010, Russia will get a clearer picture of
the US plans on the new anti missile system. There are also real prospects of the US Russian cooperation on space programs including the projects of exploration of the Moon and Mars. Ivanov said that an agreement to that
effect may be signed in the summer when President Dmitry Medvedev visits to US.
UNITED STATES IS STALLING ON AFGHAN DRUGS, CAUSING ANXIETY AND RUSSIAN ASSERTIVENESS.
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR MAY 19, 2010 (MOSCOW FURIOUS, FRED WEIR CORRESPONDENT)
US destroys coca, not poppies?"We have sent requests to the US, asking them to intensify the struggle against drug production,
but they respond that they are still analyzing their options and worry about driving the peasants into the arms of the Taliban," says Viktor
Ilyukhin, deputy chair of the State Duma's security commission. "Their excuses are very slim indeed." Ivanov told journalists that he can't understand why the
US advocates destruction of coca plantations in Colombia, but seems reluctant to take the same measures in Afghanistan. "OK, we differ over whether to destroy poppy plantations," Ivanov says, "but why doesn't NATO
target the laboratories? There are more than 200 giant laboratories in the Afghan mountains, which produce more and more concentrated drugs, and they are not touched. Our conclusion is that there is no struggle against drug
The issue could portend trouble for the fledgling "reset" in US-Russia relations, say some analysts. "There is
production going on at all."
a suspicion in Moscow that the lack of interest in fighting drugs in Afghanistan is connected with the US
strategy of creating safe conditions for withdrawal from the country before the next US presidential elections in 2012, and not in permanently
resolving the problems," says Dmitry Suslov, who is with the Council on Foreign and Defense Policies, an independent Moscow think tank. "This naturally
creates anxiety over what kind of Afghanistan NATO will leave behind, and how big a problem it is going to be for Russia." But a few Russian experts say the Kremlin
is hyping the drug issue as a pretext for becoming more assertive in Central Asia. "The Russian state drug service tends to overestimate drug
consumption in Russia; there is no independent confirmation," says Andrei Soldatov, editor of Agentura.ru, an online journal about security issues. "All of a sudden we hear a lot of
declarations about how the threat is dire, and growing, and something has to be done. But it looks to me like
convenient political theater, and I find it very difficult to trust all these claims.
UNIQUE LINK: US SURGE AIMS TO ERADICATE POPPY.

BLOOMBERG JUNE 6, 2010 (OPIUM THREATENS U.S.-LED AFGHAN FIGHT, RUSSIA SAYS DANIEL TEN KATE)
U.S., British and Afghan troops in January launched the biggest operation against the Taliban since the 2001
U.S.-led invasion, aiming to wipe out an opium production center that has helped fund the guerrilla movement.
The number of American troops in Afghanistan surpassed those in Iraq in May by about 94,000 to 92,000, according to the U.S. Defense Department.
40
RUSSIAN RELATIONS DA NEG: LINK EXTENSIONS
COUNTER-NARCOTICS ARE NOT NECESSARY FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM OFTEN
UNDERMINES COUNTER-NARCOTICS.
ELIZABETH A BENNETT, 2010 (PHD CANDIDATE, POLITICAL SCIENCE, BROWN UNIVERSITY, OVERSTATING
POPPY: THE U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS, COUNTERTERRORISM, AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY NEXUS IN
AFGHANISTAN THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY SOLUTIONS WINTER 2010, VOLUME 12)
Oftentimes, the media conflate terrorism and narcotics, creating one aggregated “evil” that flourishes or is quelled as a single entity.23 This infers that
counterterrorism and counternarcotics success are mutually necessary conditions in which one is absolutely
required for the other to succeed. However, this is in no way true. Counterterrorism can successfully disband
transnational terrorist organizations, eliminate state-sponsored safe havens, and provide alternatives to
extremism, even if organizations and their supporters have access to drug money. Two pieces of evidence
strongly support this point. First, there are many countries, such as Mexico and Colombia, in which drug
money provides luxurious lifestyles for drug lords, allows the poor to make ends meet, or even fuels local
organized crime and lawlessness, but does not finance a terrorist threat to American homeland security.24
Second, counterterrorism successes have already been realized in a context under the heavy influence of drug
trade.25 Al Qaeda has been deprived of its Afghan safe haven, the current government does not sympathize
with it, and many of its key members have been killed. 26 Thus, counterterrorism can succeed where
counternarcotics is failing, and counternarcotics can succeed in an environment where terrorism exists. By increasing
the level of risk associated with the drug trade, terrorists may opt to rely on alternative sources of financing, allowing terrorism to continue while narcotics involvement wanes.27 Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics:
Sufficient Conditionality Although neither counterterrorism nor counternarcotics is a necessary condition for the other to succeed, if one succeeds, can we expect the other to do so as well? The answer—in both
directions—is no, though there is a caveat.Terrorist funding is dynamic and multifaceted, and cannot be undermined by limiting one
source of funds.28 Therefore, eliminating opium revenue in Afghanistan will not severely hamper al Qaeda.29 In
the other direction, not all opium farmers are Taliban, and even if they are Taliban, not all Taliban support al Qaeda. By disbanding al Qaeda or repressing the Taliban,
counterterrorism missions are not necessarily impacting the farmers or traffickers of opium. Many opium farmers claim to have
no other economically viable crop choice, and some traffickers serve organized crime rings unrelated to transnational terrorism. 30 Therefore, successful counterterrorism will not necessarily impact all people involved
in narcotics and will not necessarily inhibit involvement in drug trade. Countering terrorism is not a sufficient condition for successful counternarcotics. It should be noted, however, that to a limited extent,
counternarcotics does decrease the financial, logistical, and structural power base of the Taliban who are sympathetic to and willing to assist al Qaeda. In this way, counternarcotics may support countering terrorism.
Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics: Crossfire Between Operations Understanding that the two missions have one similar goal but two disparate missions, and that either’s success is not a necessary or sufficient
condition for the other, the remaining question There are two externalities of
is: How do one mission’s strategies impact the other mission’s capacity to succeed?
counterterrorism. First, the War on Terror subordinates the War on Drugs. U.S. counterterrorism operations
offer impunity to drug lords in exchange for information, helping the same groups and individuals targeted by
U.S. counternarcotics missions.31 When the two conflict, the security objectives are prioritized. 32 Second,
counterterrorism undermines counter-narcotics. Foreign military forces turn a blind eye to drug trafficking in
exchange for intelligence and military support in operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda.33
LINK: ACTIVE SUPPORT OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT IS KEY TO POPPY ERADICATION.

RIA NOVOSTI JUNE 6, 2010 (RUSSIAN DEPUTY PM CITES SOVIET EXPERIENCE AS A PATTERN TO SOLVE
AFGHANISTAN'S DRUGS PROBLEM)
The Soviet Union has managed to halt drug traffic from Afghanistan during its 10-year invasion in the country,
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said on Sunday urging the current international force in the
Central Asian country to solve the problem. "Whatever ambiguously the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan might be viewed, nobody disputes the fact that the drug issue in
that country practically did not exist in that very period," Ivanov told regional security conference in Singapore "The explanation is simple: in spite of the military
confrontation, the government of Afghanistan with an active support of the Soviet Union paid major attention to
social and economic needs of the Afghan population," he added in a speech delivered in English. Moscow has more than once
rang alarm bells over a 40-fold growth in heroin traffic from Afghanistan to Europe through Russia. The
growing drug traffic contributes to a fast growth of the number of drug addicts in Russia itself, a situation described by the
country's leaders as a major threat national security. Russian officials have said that the international forces, deployed in Afghanistan since its Taliban rulers were toppled in a U.S.-led invasion in 2001, do little to restrain the
growth of drug production in Afghanistan.
41
RUSSIAN RELATIONS DA NEG: LINK EXTENSIONS
LINK: RUSSIA IS CURRENTLY PRESSING RENEWED UNITED STATES DEDICATION TO ERADICATE POPPIES .
RADIO FREE EUROPE JUNE 6, 2010 (KREMLIN 'UNHAPPY' WITH ANTIDRUG EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN
WWW.RFERL. ORG/CONTENT/KREMLIN_UNHAPPY_WITH_ANTIDRUG_EFFORTS_IN_AFGHANISTAN/2063411.
HTML?PAGE=1& X=1#RELATEDINFOCONTAINER)
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov told delegates that narcotics from
At an Asia security conference in Singapore,
Afghanistan are a threat to Europe, Asia, and the United States and urged NATO forces in Afghanistan to step
up the campaign to eradicate opium poppy cultivation there. "We are not happy with what the world community
is doing in the antidrug war" in Afghanistan, Ivanov told delegates on June 6 at the summit, known as the
Shangri-La Dialogue. Ivanov said the blame for the continued production of opium in Afghanistan and the
export of the heroin made from Afghan opium rests on "those who took responsibility for ensuring peace
and stability in Afghanistan." Ivanov said it's time for foreign military forces in Afghanistan -- the UN-
mandated and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) -- to step up efforts to eradicate
opium-poppy cultivation and heroin production. "Next year, I think that ISAF will break the Soviet record of the duration of stay in Afghanistan," Ivanov said, claiming that
during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979-1989, "the problem of narcotics practically did not exist." 'A Lot Should Be Done' The UN estimates that some 90 percent of the world's current heroin supply
originates in Afghanistan. Ivanov said despite the conflict in the 1980s, the Soviet-supported government during that period kept attention fixed "on the social and economic needs of the Afghan people." Ivanov made a
similar recommendation to governments trying to help Afghanistan today. "A lot should be done in just starting very primitive social-economic life in Afghanistan," he said. "If we don’t do that, any military presence would
be in vain." Ivanov said that for every poppy plantation that is burned, investments must be made in conventional agriculture. In the meantime, he said, Russia is prepared to work with international partners to impose several
Ivanov said Russia has been aiding international efforts to bring

"drug rings" around the country to intercept narcotics being exported. 'Never Again'
stability to Afghanistan. But Ivanov said there is a limit to how much help the international community can
expect from Russia,
LINK: RUSSIA ALREADY SUSPECTS US LACKS COMMITMENT TO ERADICATE POPPY.

MATTHEW C. DUPEE AND SARA KAUFFMAN APRIL 20, 2010 (IN AFGHANISTAN, POPPY ERADICATION PITS
RUSSIA VS. NATO, WORLD POLITICS REVIEW)
Russian officials have recently accused U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan of “conniving with drug
producers” and urged the coalition to pursue aggressive aerial eradication operations against Afghanistan’s
opium poppy crops. Despite having spent over $1 billion on counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan since
2002, including eradication efforts, the U.S. and the U.K. have failed to curb the illicit drug industry there.
Moscow’s tough stance on narcotics stems from its own internal consumption levels, which have steadily
reached epidemic proportions. According to 2008 records, up to 21 percent of the world’s production of illicit
opiates ended up in Russia, resulting in 30,000 deaths blamed on heroin-induced overdoses annually. “We are obviously
very dissatisfied with the lack of attention from NATO and the United States to our complaints about this problem,” Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s envoy to NATO, told reporters on March 12. Russia is not
convinced the U.S. and NATO are doing enough to stifle the cultivation of opium poppy and the processing of
opium into heroin. The complaints focus on the recent decline in the amount of poppy eradicated annually in Afghanistan. Between 2008 and 2009, only 10,000 hectares of opium poppy, or less than 4
percent of the land devoted to its cultivation, were eradicated, compared to 19,000 hectares eradicated in 2007 and 15,300 hectares in 2006. The massive decrease in eradication reflects NATO’s new emphasis on attacking
entrepreneurs who benefit from the drug trade higher up the value chain, while sparing the lower-level participants, such as farmers. Russian officials have slammed this approach and instead are demanding that NATO
The
pursue an aerial eradication program designed to eliminate 25 percent of Afghanistan’s poppy fields, a notion previously endorsed by the U.S. State Department but rejected by the Afghan government in 2007.
growing divide between Russian and NATO officials over Afghanistan’s war on drugs once again brings a
highly controversial counternarcotics issue to the table: to spray or not to spray?
42
RUSSIAN RELATIONS DA NEG: INTERNAL LINK EXTENSIONS
POPPY ERADICATION IS A DIVISIVE ISSUE IN RELATIONS AND DRIVES AFGHAN INSTABILITY.
FINANCIAL TIMES MAY 24, 2010 (RUSSIA REBUKES US OVER AFGHAN HEROIN GLUT, ISABEL GORST)
Moscow has criticised US-led forces in Afghanistan for failing to eradicate heroin production and warned at the weekend that drug
smuggling was endangering Russia’s national security. As drug smuggling across central Asia’s porous borders has soared, Russia has
emerged as the world’s biggest per capita user of heroin, consuming about 35 tonnes of the drug a year. Viktor Ivanov, the head of Russia’s anti-narcotics agency, told
reporters on Sunday: “It is a threat to national peace and security.” Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian president, and Barack Obama, his US counterpart,
agreed to co-operate more closely to combat international drug traffic during a meeting last year. With its regional knowledge, Russia is well placed to help the
US track down Afghan drug barons and unravel heroin trafficking networks in central Asia. But the US and Russia disagree on how to deal with poppy
plantations that have proliferated in Afghanistan since the Taliban lost control of the country. The US has rejected Russia’s call to destroy poppy crops, saying that alienated farmers might join the insurgency.
Mr Ivanov rejected the US argument on Sunday, linking the criminalised drug business with insecurity in
Afghanistan. “As long as we do not liquidate [drug] production there will be a conflict in Afghanistan,” he said.
Mr Ivanov said he had passed a list of Afghan and central Asian drug barons to Gil Kerlikowske, the director of the US office of national drug control policy, during talks at a Moscow airport this weekend, his fourth meeting
with the US drug tsar in the past year. Russia earlier handed the US information about 25 people involved in the illegal drug trade and 175 secret drug laboratories manufacturing heroin in Afghanistan. While Afghan drug
Mr Ivanov
barons formerly traded mainly raw opium, they have now obtained access to industrial chemicals to produce heroin, helping boost the returns on the drug trade to an estimated $65bn a year.
warned that central Asian nations did not have the capacity to stem the flow of heroin across their borders from
Afghanistan and said that poverty drove many people in the region to engage in drug trafficking.
POPPY ERADICATION IS AN ACTIVE ISSUE IN BILATERAL RUSSIAN RELATIONS .
VOICE OF RUSSIA MAY 24, 2010 (RUSSIA WANTS TOUGHER STANCE ON AFGHAN DRUGS VICTOR YENIKEEV)
Russia defends a more decisive fight against the drug threat coming from Afghanistan and insists that the
United Nations should play a more active role in it. This topic will feature prominently today during a meeting in Moscow between Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
and the UN Special Envoy to Afghanistan Stephan De Mistura. These consultations are being held ahead of the new international meeting on Afghanistan, which is due to take place in July. Moscow has
taken a very active stand on the counteraction to the drug threat from Afghanistan. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defence
Minister Anatoly Serdyukov discussed this issue with their Italian counterparts in Rome last week. By the way, the idea of such meetings belongs to Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev and to Italy’s Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi.The Russian government insists that the United Nations, NATO and the EU member-states should become more actively
involved in the fight against the poppy crops in and drug trafficking from Afghanistan. Besides, Moscow
believes that all these international structures must work in close cooperation with the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO) and with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The CSTO unites Russia, Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and the SCO includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and China. These countries have acquired great experience in counteracting the Afghan drug
It would be good to mention here that Russia is actively working in this field on a bilateral basis as well.
threat.
Among other things, within the framework of the Russian-American commission, which was established by the
decision of the two presidents – Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama. Last Sunday information about 9 big drug merchants living in Afghanistan was given to the Americans. And earlier
Washington received information about 175 drug labs, which were discovered in the country.
AFGHANISTAN IS KEY TO RELATIONS .

BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING FEBRUARY 5, 2010 (RUSSIAN PUNDIT SAYS EXPECTATIONS MAY BE "INFLATED")
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who is not traditionally considered a "dove", has noted serious psychological changes in bilateral relations. Speaking about the treaty on
strategic offensive weapons, preparation of which is now on the home straight, he said: "The new treaty is being concluded in an era when trust between
our two countries has become much stronger, when we can do business with one another solely on the basis of equal rights and consideration of one another's interests, on the
basis of a strict parity in everything." However, there is also another problem - an underestimation of the risks connected with the
effect of inflated expectations. Therefore, a serious analysis of the risks still remains relevant. Firstly, this concerns
the lack of correlation between the opportunities for Russia to participate in NATO's current agenda,
starting with the topic of Afghanistan and ending with drawing up the alliance's strategy. A very important event last week
was the first session of the Russia-NATO Council at the level of chiefs of General Staff since the end of military action in the South Caucasus. The main issue at it was cooperation
in Afghanistan. Dmitriy Rogozin, the Russian Federation's permanent representative at NATO, told Kommersant that the main focus was on Afghanistan as the only area of cooperation that had not been
curtailed in 2008. A significant positive signal from Russia was its consent to an amnesty for moderate Taleban, who are being brought into the country's legal political life. Previously, Russia had taken a tough stance on this
issue, which was extremely disadvantageous to the Americans, since it hampered the legalization of figures with whom they had already been cooperating closely and for a long time, and who they are seriously counting on in
Cooperation on Afghanistan really is becoming a dominant factor in the political

the matter of the Taleban split.
rapprochement between Russia and NATO.
43
RUSSIAN RELATIONS DA NEG: IMPACT EXTENSIONS KEY TO START
START WILL PASS NOW
VOICE OF AMERICA JUNE 3, 2010 (US SENATE RATIFICATION HEARINGS ON NEW START TREATY
UNDERWAY ANDRE DE NESNERA)
The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee has begun ratification hearings on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty - or
START. The New START Treaty was signed by U.S. President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart Dmitri Medvedev on April 8 in Prague, capital of the Czech Republic. It replaces the 1991 START I treaty
that expired last December. Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, a private research group, says the new pact reduces by 25 to 30 percent the number of deployed strategic - or long-range -
nuclear warheads on each side. "The New START Treaty has two main limits: one on strategic nuclear warheads of 1,550. It has a limit of no more than 700 operationally deployed strategic delivery systems and another
limit of no more than 800 strategic delivery systems of all kinds," he said. Many experts, including David Holloway from Stanford University, say the new limits on long-range warheads are modest. "I was somewhat
surprised that the total wasn't lower - I mean the ceiling on the number of strategic nuclear warheads each side could have. Initially I thought they might go to 1,000 and I know they discussed the possibility of 1,000 but
ultimately they settled on 1,550 nuclear warheads apiece," he said. The treaty also provides verification provisions that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates describes as unique. "This treaty for the first time gives us actual
access to Russian weapons and Russian facilities. We've had access to facilities, but not the weapons themselves before," he said. Secretary Gates, along with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, recently appeared before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee as that body began ratification hearings for the New START Treaty. Secretary Clinton urged quick Senate ratification. "Some
may argue that we don't need the New START Treaty," she said. "But the choice before us is between this
treaty and no treaty governing our nuclear security relationship with Russia; between this treaty and no agreed verification mechanisms on Russia's
strategic nuclear forces; between this treaty and no legal obligation for Russia to maintain its strategic nuclear forces below an agreed level." 67 out of 100 Senators must approve the
treaty in order for it to be ratified. Many analysts, including Daryl Kimball, say the treaty has broad support
among senators. "The questions and criticisms of the treaty don't have to do with the treaty itself, but side issues: missile defense, or the fact that tactical nuclear weapons are not covered in this strategic arms
reduction treaty," he said. "So I do not foresee Republican senators voting against this treaty in a large group." One man urging the Senate to
reject the treaty is former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and arms control expert John Bolton. "I don't think this is a very good deal. I think the Russians out-bargained the Obama administration and I think that the
limits that have been created are too low," he said. "I don't think this is the alpha [beginning] and the omega [end] - the Senate can, and often has, sent negotiators back to do a better job. So even if the Senate were to take a
vote on this treaty and reject it, it just means Obama needs to go back to the negotiating table." But experts such as David Holloway believe if the Senate rejected the treaty, the consequences would be far more devastating. "I
think that would torpedo President Obama's vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and it would be a serious setback to the U.S.-Russian relationship as well," he said. "Because Russia would feel that this seemed to be
not a very far-reaching treaty but one that in some sense codified the strategic relationship - and if you can't even do that with the U.S., what does it mean the U.S. really wants? Is it aiming for some kind of ultimate
superiority over Russia?"
RELATIONS KEY TO START PASSAGE.

MAX BERGMANN, SAMUEL CHARAP, APRIL 6, 2010 (MAX BERGMANN IS A NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY
ANALYST AND SAMUEL CHARAP IS ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR RUSSIA AND EURASIA AT THE CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS. A
STRONG CASE FOR A NEW START, HTTP://WWW.AMERICANPROGRESS.ORG /ISSUES/2010/04/NEW_START.HTML)
New START is definitive proof that engagement with Russia has paid off. The reset restored a degree of
trust and created an atmosphere that allowed the two countries to produce what is a landmark document.
Engagement has raised the prospects for future cooperation between Washington and Moscow, both on arms
control and the vast array of other issues on the bilateral agenda, ranging from stabilizing Afghanistan to
confronting Iran to deepening trade. As President Obama put it, “When the United States and Russia can cooperate effectively, it advances the mutual interests of our two nations, and the
security and prosperity of the wider world.” His policy of engagement put this key relationship on a productive footing and made
New START possible.

RELATIONS KEY FOR INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT ON ARMS REDUCTION.
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER APRIL 26, 2010 (A SSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF VERIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND IMPLEMENTATION,
REMARKS AT A RMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION’S ANNUAL MEETING, GENEVA.USMISSION.GOV/2010/04/27/AC-ANNUAL-MEETING/)
the New START Treaty and its Protocol were completed and the Presidents signed both at Prague on April 8. It was a thrill to witness the signing
Twelve months later,
ceremony, an eventwhich signified not only the completion of the negotiation but the launch of the critical phase of work that lies ahead. Within the
coming weeks, the Treaty, Protocol, Annexes and associated documents will be submitted formally to the United States Senate. I believe there is every reason for the Senate to
provide its advice and consent to ratification of the New START Treaty. The Treaty will ensure and maintain the strategic balance between the United
States and Russia at lower, verifiable weapons levels, appropriate to the current security environment. It will promote strategic stability by ensuring transparency and predictability regarding U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear
An important aspect of this phase of work is introducing the new

forces over the life of the Treaty. It will definitively strengthen U.S. national security.
Treaty not only to the Senate, but also to international organizations, non-governmental and advocacy
organizations, and, most critically, the public. While I am here in Washington speaking to all of you, I know my
Russian counterpart – Ambassador Anatoliy Antonov – is similarly engaged in Russia. Had it not been for the volcanic ash cloud hovering
over Europe last week, the two of us would have jointly briefed the Conference on Disarmament, the OSCE, the EU and the IAEA on the new Treaty. We plan to do so at the NPT Review Conference next month in New
Embarking on a cooperative venture of this kind is a first in the history of

York, and we intend to reschedule our European briefings soon thereafter.
arms control—an experiment, but an important one that we believe will work.
44
RUSSIAN RELATIONS DA NEG IMPACT EXTENSIONS
1) RELATIONS KEY TO SOLVE ALL MAJOR SOURCES OF GLOBAL INSTABILITY
GARY HART 2009 (“THE ROAD TO MOSCOW,” THE NATIONAL INTEREST, 4/27)
If Russia were not a major power, possessing nuclear weapons, a veto in the United Nations Security
Council, huge energy resources and a major presence in the post-Soviet space, one could make a case that
having distant relations with Moscow is not so terrible. But in practical terms, we constantly discover that
Russian cooperation is essential to advancing vital U.S. interests. Moreover, it is clear that rivalry with
Russia would damage U.S. effectiveness in the areas that matter most, including nuclear nonproliferation,
counterterrorism, energy security and, last but not least, dealing with the global financial crisis.
2) A) I MPROVED RELATIONS SOLVE MISCALCULATION IN THE SHORT TERM.
PAVEL PODVIG 06 (4-3, ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR RESEARCH (2008-2009) CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND
COOPERATION, “REDUCING THE RISK OF AN ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH,” SCIENCE AND GLOBAL SECURITY, VOL. 14,
HTTP://RUSSIANFORCES.ORG /PODVIG/2009/04/REACTION_TO_ THE_OBAMA-MEDVEDEV.SHTML)
Part of the problem is that the launch on warning posture is an integral part of nuclear deterrence strategy, which the United States and
Russia still recognize as one of the primary missions of their strategic forces. Even though the value of deterrence in the current U.S.–Russian
relationships can be questioned, neither country is willing to forgo it completely. To some extent this problem can be
dealt with by continuing the efforts to improve theU.S.–Russian relations by expanding the current arms
reduction process and by creating the institutional and legal framework for cooperation and transparency in
military relations. In the long run, this would be the most reliable and most effective way of reducing the risk
of an accidental launch, as well as most of the risks associated with nuclear weapons.
B) ACCIDENTS OUTWEIGHS RISK OF CASE.
JOHN HALLAM 09 (EDITOR OF NUCLEAR FLASHPOINTS, JOHN BURROUGHS AND MARCY FOWLER, LAWYERS
COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR POLICY, 2, NPT PREPARATORY COMMITTEE, STEPS TOWARD A SAFER WORLD)
Why did an article in the September 2008 edition of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, entitled 'avoiding human extinction' give a list of measures
needed to avoid that, with lowering the operating status of nuclear weapon systems (along with their elimination) topping
the rather consequential 'to - do' list, even before climate - change measures and incoming large asteroids?
Why over the years has this issue been thought so important at such a high level? The US and Russia undeniably keep a large number (estimated by Blair at 2,654 by Kristensen more recently 2,300) of nuclear
The core of the issue is

warheads (both land - based ICBMs and SLBMs) in a status in which they can be launched at roughly 2 minutes or less notice. This fact is never seriously disputed.
that standard operating procedures envisage extremely short decision making timeframes, and these are
imposed by the simple fact of having some missiles on quick - launch status. Careful and measured
decision-making in such a situation is simply not possible. Yet the consequences of such decisions are truly
apocalyptic. Recent research by US scientists (Toon and Robock 2008/9) on the effects of the use of US and Russian arsenals indicates that even at levels down to 1000 warheads, the use by malice,
madness, miscalculation or malfunction of the 'on alert' portions of US and Russian strategic nuclear forces would be essentially terminal for civilization. Maintaining arsenals in an unstable configuration was insanely
risky during the Cold War, when there were even larger numbers of warheads on alert and when there were just too many occasions on which it would be fair to say that the world came just too close to ending. There
is even less reason, now that the cold - war confrontation has supposedly ended, to maintain nuclear forces in these dangerous configurations. Yet in spite of denials and obfuscations from those who wish to maintain
Obama, in his election manifesto, promised to negotiate with Russia to lower

existing postures they are indeed so maintained. President
the operational status of nuclear weapon systems. It is vital that this promise is not forgotten. The talks between the US and
Russia on the successor to the START Treaty are an ideal opportunity to take action to implement Obama's
promises
45
RUSSIAN RELATIONS DA NEG: TURNS CASE
TURNS CASE: NO STABILITY WITHOUT WINNING THE DRUG WAR.
BLOOMBERG JUNE 6, 2010 (OPIUM THREATENS U.S.-LED AFGHAN FIGHT, RUSSIA SAYS , DANIEL TEN KATE)
June 6 (Bloomberg) -- U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan will be “in vain” if forces fail to fight opium production and
provide people with alternative economic opportunities, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said
today. NATO forces must figure out how to start “very primitive social economic life in Afghanistan,” Ivanov said today at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, which brought together defense officials from 28
countries. “If we don’t do that, any military presence will be in vein.” The International Security Assistance Force should do more to curb the
opium production that provides Taliban and other groups like al-Qaeda with “billions and billions of dollars” a
year, Ivanov said. Russia is “not happy” with global efforts to stem the narcotics trade that threatens
international peace and security, he said.
Russia, located on the transit route between Central Asia and Europe, has become the world’s third-largest
market for illegal drugs in the past decade. The country, which fought its own war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, supports the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s mission by
allowing military supplies to cross its territory.
TURNS CASE: FAILURE TO ERADICATE DRUGS INCREASES TERRORISM.

VOICE OF RUSSIA MAY 24, 2010 (RUSSIA WANTS TOUGHER STANCE ON AFGHAN DRUGS VICTOR
YENIKEEV)
One of the most serious problems of the fight with the drug threat from Afghanistan is that the USA and the
other states, making part of the coalition forces, refuse to take decisive measures to destroy either the poppy
crops or the drug labs working in the country. They believe that this will lead to the impoverishment of the local population, will set it against the coalition forces and will increase
the number of Taliban supporters. However, such practice has proved fatal, has led to the growth of terrorism and has triggered
an increase in the drug trafficking from Afghanistan. It is significant that over the years that the NATO
servicemen have been deployed in Afghanistan, the poppy crops, according to the United Nations, have
increased there by 40 times. Which means that Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had plenty to discuss with the UN Special Envoy to Afghanistan Stephan De Mistura.
TURNS CASE: DRUG TRADE DESTABILIZING CENTRAL ASIA
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR MAY 19, 2010 (MOSCOW FURIOUS, SAYS US NOT PUSHING DRUG WAR IN
AFGHANISTAN BYLINE: FRED WEIR CORRESPONDENT)
Why? Mr. Ivanov says the flow of narcotics from the fields of Afghanistan into Russia has increased by 16
percent in the past three years alone, spiking urban drug addiction. He alleged in a March press conference that
drug barons are uniting with Islamist militants to seize power in vulnerable Central Asian states - and that the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) failure to deal with Afghanistan's burgeoning drug production
threatens to create a security nightmare for Russia and its regional allies. "We do not believe the principal aims of the NATO security operation in
Afghanistan have been achieved," Ivanov said at a press conference. "Of course the struggle against terrorism should take precedence, but what
about liquidating drug production? How does it happen that almost 10 years after NATO occupied this country,
Afghanistan is not only the world's largest producer of opium, but also of hashish, surpassing the traditional global leader, Morocco?" In recent
years, Russia and NATO have run a school for Afghan antidrug police in the Moscow-region town of Domodedovo, turning out hundreds of graduates. But despite that cooperation, experts say Moscow
is increasingly dubious about NATO's ability to impose order in Afghanistan, and may be seeking ways to
expand its influence in Central Asia against the day the United States decides to leave. Some analysts suggest that the Kremlin's recent
backing of a coup in Kyrgyzstan could be a sign of more assertive behavior to come. "The former Soviet states of central Asia are our own backyard," says Tatiana Parkhalina, director of the independent Center for European
Moscow doesn't want to stand by while the Taliban and terrorist networks convert the financial
Security in Moscow. "
resources from drug trafficking into arms and political influence... There is a practical alliance taking shape
between drug traffickers and terrorists, and it is a very big threat."
46
ADVANTAGE COUNTERPLAN 1NC
TEXT: THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD SUSPEND ALL DRONE ATTACKS IN PAKISTAN
AND ENGAGE IN RECONCILIATION TALKS WITH INSURGENTS IN AFGHANISTAN.
COUNTERPLAN SOLVES RENEWED COMMITMENT TO RECONCILIATION IS KEY TO AFGHAN STABILITY.

SETH JONES 2006 (POLITICAL SCIENTIST AT THE RAND CORPORATION AND ADJUNCT PROFESSOR IN THE SECURITY STUDIES
PROGRAM AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY SURVIVAL, AVERTING FAILURE IN A FGHANISTAN V 48 NO 1)
The second pillar is a strategy for dealing with the insurgents and warlords. Both pose a long-term threat to the stability of Afghanistan. The
absence of a peace treaty makes this task more difficult. In dealing with insurgents, the most effective strategy
will be to co-opt as many as possible by convincing them to give up arms in exchange for amnesty. For the
rest, the United States and NATO will need to conduct a sustained unconventional warfare campaign that
combines strike operations and civil–military activities. This means working by, with and through Afghan
security forces to undermine popular support for insurgents, and killing or capturing those who won’t be co-
opted. Some Taliban have agreed to disarm through the Afghan government’s reconciliation programme, which
is open to all Taliban members except senior leaders linked to terrorism or major war crimes.43 But many have
not. Part of the problem has been the half-hearted nature of the reconciliation programme, which should
become a major plank in the counterinsurgency campaign. Pakistan also needs to play a major role in cooperating with a revamped
reconciliation process. Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami militants should be strongly encouraged to give up the
insurgency in exchange for amnesty and a chance to participate in the political process. Negotiations could also
begin with senior Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami leaders about a formal peace settlement. Termination of civil wars usually requires settling
with insurgent organisations, for example the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front in El Salvador and Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana in Mozambique.
AND SUSPENDING DRONE ATTACKS IS KEY TO PAKISTAN STABILITY

MALOU INNOCENT 2009 (A FOREIGN POLICY ANALYST AT THE CATO INSTITUTE, THE US MUST REASSESS ITS DRONE
POLICY, LEBANON DAILY STAR ON AUGUST 25, 2009. HTTP://WWW.CATO .ORG/PUB_DISPLAY.PHP?PUB_ID=10479)
An American missile killed Pakistan's most wanted militant, Baitullah Mehsud, on August 5. The death of the radical Taliban commander was a success for Pakistan and the United States. However, the method
used may well produce dangerous unintended consequences in how it might undermine one of the United
States' primary interests. Chaos in Afghanistan could spill over and destabilize neighboring Pakistan. That's
why the efficacy of missile strikes must be reassessed. The targeting of tribal safe havens by CIA-operated
drone strikes strengthens the very jihadist forces that America seeks to defeat, by alienating hearts and
minds in a fragile, nuclear-armed, Muslim-majority Pakistani state. During a recent visit to the frontier region, I spoke with several
South Waziri tribesmen about the impact of US missile strikes. They recounted how militants exploit the popular
resentment felt from the accidental killing of innocents from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and defined
themselves as a force against the injustice of a hostile foreign occupation. The ability to keep militant groups off
balance must be weighed against the cost of facilitating the rise of more insurgents. Missile strikes alienate thousands of clans, sub-clans and
extended families within a tribal society that places high social value on honor and revenge. To the Pashtun tribes straddling the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, personal and collective vendettas have been known to last for
generations, and are invoked irrespective of time and cost involved. Successive waves of Persian, Greek, Arab, Turk, Mughal, British and Soviet invaders have never successfully subdued this thin slice of rugged terrain. On
August 12, the US special envoy for the region, Richard Holbrooke, told an audience at the Center for American Progress that the porous border and its surrounding areas served as a fertile recruiting ground for Al-Qaeda.
One US military official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, called drone operations "a recruiting windfall for the Pakistani Taliban." Military strikes appear to be the only viable recourse against the tribal region's
shadowy insurgents, with US officials pointing to the successful killing of high-value Al-Qaeda militants like Abu Laith al-Libi in January 2008 and chemical weapons expert Abu Khabab al-Masri in July 2008. However,
even if tomorrow Osama bin Laden were killed by a UAV, the jihadist insurgency would not melt away. The ability to keep militant groups off balance must be weighed against the cost of facilitating the rise of more
insurgents. Citizens living outside the ungoverned tribal areas also detest drones. "Anti-US sentiment has already been increasing in Pakistan … especially in regard to cross-border and reported drone strikes, which Pakistanis
perceive to cause unacceptable civilian casualties," conceded US Central Command chief General David Petraeus in a declassified statement written on May 27, 2009. Drone strikes also
contribute to the widening trust deficit between Pakistanis and the US. A recent poll conducted by Gallup Pakistan for Al-Jazeera found that 59 percent
believed the US was the greatest threat to Pakistan. Most Pakistanis oppose extremism; they simply disagree with American tactics. America's interests lie in ensuring the virus of
anti-American radicalism does not infect the rest of the region. Yet Washington's attempts to stabilize
Afghanistan help destabilize Pakistan, because its actions serve as a recruiting tool for Pakistani Taliban
militants. Just as one would not kill a fly with a sledgehammer, using overwhelming firepower to kill a single
insurgent creates collateral damage that can recruit 50 more. Military force against insurgents must be applied precisely and discriminately. On the ground,
Pakistani security forces lack training, equipment, and communication gear to carry out a low-intensity counterinsurgency. But drones provide a poor substitute if the goal is to engage rather than alienate the other side.
47
ADVANTAGE CP SOLVENCY EXTENSION
MILITARY EFFORT MUST BE REORIENTED TO A NEW INCLUSIVE POLITICAL ORDER THROUGH
RECONCILIATION TALKS.
It is crucial not to view peace and reconciliation efforts as tactics to assist a faltering military effort, but to
reorient the military effort to support a durable political peace process. This would mean engaging the
Afghan Government, the international community, and the key regional actors, to encourage the broadening of
such efforts into a comprehensive reconciliation process. Establishing trust between ethnic and tribal
communities and building confidence in public institutions are imperative.
There must be room for some 'out-of-the-box' thinking in engaging excluded and alienated communities
towards developing a more inclusive political order, rather than merely confining reconciliation efforts to
bringing dissidents into the mainstream. Reconciliation efforts will have to reach out to the larger civil society
groups through initiatives such as people-to-people reconciliation at the local (shura, jirgahs), national (institution-
building), and regional level (jirgahs, border commissions), and re-education programmes to promote a
'constituency and culture of peace'. For such an endeavour to succeed, a greater coordinated effort by the
international community needs to be directed at facilitating an Afghan-led process of engaging excluded
constituencies in building durable 'peace' in the conflict-ridden country.
US KEY: VETO POWER
in March 2007, many Taliban fighters through the Takhim-e-Solh (Strengthening Peace) Programme (PTS
Similarly,
in its Afghan initials) as part of the amnesty have been included thereafter in the political process.42 However,
these processes have been conditioned to approval by the US and the Northern Alliance. For example, in 2003,
President Karzai's offer to the Taliban to join the political process was blocked by the Northern Alliance and the
United States. Moreover, the apparent division between the 'unpardonable' and 'pardonable' Taliban has created some confusion. The list of the unpardonable former Taliban members has never been made
public by President Karzai. Moreover, comments made in May 2005 by the head of the Afghan Senate, Sebghatullah Mojaddedi, changed the issue of unpardonable into a contentious political problem.43
48
ADVANTAGE CP AT: PERM
PERM FAILS OR IS SEVERANCE: THE SURGE IS CRUCIAL TO A CREDIBLE BARGAINING POSITION WITH
INSURGENTS.
CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES 2009 (LAST THROW OF THE DICE? US STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN
SE1.ISN.CH/SERVICEENGINE/FILES/ISN/98276/IPUBLICATIONDOCUMENT_SINGLEDOCUMENT/A2331C68-
4805-46BE-8D15-F258BCBE99A7/EN/CSS_ANALYSEN_NR51-0409_E.PDF)
That said, the US will need to be careful to ensure that the taliban does not infer even a vague hint of “capitulation”
sitting between the lines of its new strategy; if they do, Kabul could be soon to fall. But at the same time, US
assertiveness also needs to be to be subtly wedded to acknowledgement towards regional players that
Washington now regards itself as part of the problem as much as the solution in Afghanistan in order to pave
the way for longer term departure. the current “surge, settle, strategize” mantra already takes a step in this
direction. the deployment of 17,000 new troops by the US is not intended to “defeat” the Taliban, but to
establish more favorable conditions for political deals with local tribes and warlords. this policy tilt has been broadly welcomed across the
alliance, but any new political strategy inevitably brings new political risks; unless tactical and political engagement with the Taliban is properly
aligned, the likelihood of failure

is acute.
Negotiations: Risks and opportunities the most pressing tactical challenge in the short term is what to do with the new troops.
opinion remains sharply divided as to whether they should be deployed in the political negotiations rather than
civil war. This can only be achieved by a stronger show of coalition resolve, both now and in the future. It remains crucial from a political perspective to wait for military gains to take effect before entering into
negotiations. Failure to do so would merely hasten the Taliban’s return to power given their strategic ascendancy. and even if the Taliban is militarily dented, it still remains highly uncertain as to how many groups would
be amenable to serious negotiations rather than drawing on ethnic Pashtun support from Pakistan. But what must not be in doubt is the broad basis on which any agreement would be struck: Negotiations must be based on
For this to remain a

recognition of the sovereign authority of the afghan government and its security forces throughout its territory as a means of building stable and accountable institutions.
credible prospect, the government in Kabul must be seen by the Taliban to be a long-term factor in Afghan
politics. They must also believe that Nato resolve will not crack when called upon to send more troops as a
means of keeping the Taliban and other groups at the negotiating table. Once the chairs have been taken, substantial political incentives will still
need to be offered to in order to tip the balance towards constructive engagement on a national and local level. While this will offend western liberal sensibilities, it would be with a long term view of seeing political reforms
at both ends of Afghanistan’s political spectrum. This would start with the Karzai government in Kabul and extend down to tribal factions to ensure that the interests of the Pashtun, Hazara, Uzbek, and Tajik populations
can be balanced. at the very least, this might help to leave behind an afghan government and political entity that could survive a western withdrawal at some point beyond 2012 without internal meltdown and regional
conflagration.
DRONE ATTACKS ARE PART OF COUNTER-TERRORISM. THE PERM IS SEVERENCE.

KENNETH ANDERSON 2009 (PROFESSOR OF LAW, RESEARCH FELLOW, THE HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR,
REVOLUTION AND PEACE, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, TARGETED KILLING IN U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM
STRATEGY AND LAW, HTTP://SSRN.COM/ABSTRACT=1415070)
Targeted killing, particularly through the use of missiles fired from Predator drone aircraft, has become an
important, and internationally controversial, part of the US war against al Qaeda in Pakistan and other places.
The Obama administration, both during the campaign and in its first months in office, has publicly embraced
the strategy as a form of counterterrorism. This paper argues, however, that unless the Obama administration takes careful and assertive legal steps to protect it, targeted killing using
remote platforms such as drone aircraft will take on greater strategic salience precisely as the Obama administration allows the legal space for it in international law to shrink.
49

UTNIF 2010 Afghanistan Starter Pack Aff - Neg

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UTNIF 2010 AFGHANISTAN AFF/NEG

AFGHANISTAN COUNTER-TERRORISM AFF/NEG

1NC Afghanistan Advantage ........................................................................................................................ 28

ADV 1: AFGHAN STABILITY

it is worth asking whether this renewed commitment to COIN strategies in the

GOOD GOVERNANCE KEY TO AFGHAN STABILITY

. The article looks primarily at

INSTABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN SPILLS OVER THROUGH CENTRAL ASIA.

[LAI 06 CONTINUED NO TEXT DELETED]

INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL ASIA DRAWS IN RUSSIA, CAUSING NUCLEAR WAR.

De facto defeat in Iraq will be bad enough. De facto defeat in Afghanistan

ANOTHER WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST WILL GO NUCLEAR.

in 2007 the US launched only five drone strikes, three

These strikes have also transformed

[BOYLE 2010 CONTINUED NO TEXT DELETED]

There has also been an ongoing tussle between the

Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have

REDUCING FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN AND FOCUSING ON COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS STOPS INCREASING

call this a counterinsurgency program, but it's really nation-building.

Although isolating Mr. Karzai will

MIDDLE EAST WAR GOES NUCLEAR: ISRAEL STRIKE.

AFGHAN INSTABILITY SPILL OVER INTO IRAN

EMPIRICALLY DENIED: RUSSIAN ECONOMIC COLLAPSE DECREASES THE RUSSIAN THREAT.

The resignations of Mr. Saleh and Mr. Atmar revealed a

NO LINK: CAN SIGNAL DEDICATION TO PAKISTAN WITHOUT TROOPS.

COUNTER-INSURGENCY WILL INCREASE ANTI-AMERICANISM AND THE RISK OF TERRORISM.

NON-UNIQUE AND NO IMPACT: FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN WON’T DOOM NATO.

enhancing counterterrorist cooperation between the American and Russian governments.

3) NO UNIQUE INTERNAL LINK: START WON’T BE RATIFIED NOW.

4) ALTERNATIVE CAUSALITY: US BLOCKING RUSSIAN ENTRY INTO THE WTO.

The review took a significant step forward by recommending that the

6) NO LINK: COUNTER-NARCOTICS ARE PART OF COUNTER-TERRORISM

The loose relationship between terrorist organizations,

NO UNIQUE LINK: RELATIONS ARE ALREADY MOVING IN CONTRADICTORY DIRECTIONS.

NO IMPACT: TREATIES WITH RUSSIA ARE UNENFORCEABLE.

Russia will doubtless continue

TURN: US COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN INCREASE RELATIONS

The success of the air-strikes has

B) PERM SOLVES: TALIBAN WON’T NEGOTIATE UNTIL TROOPS ARE REMOVED.

Lack of incentives and

MIDDLE EAST WAR GOOD

Their failure to turn

7 ALTERNATIVE CAUSES TO AFGHAN STABILITY

IMF raised its forecast for global

economy has responded positively to risks, de Rato said.

Away from big media

The war in Afghanistan is a crucial

TURN: COUNTER-INSURGENCY BORDER SECURITY AND ANTI-CORRUPTION KEY TO SOLVE TERRORISM.

If members of the Pakistani army and the Inter-

The sooner this reality is reflected in the

TURN: NATO WILL MODEL THE US—FAILURE TO DEPLOY CRUSHES RELATIONS

Mullen said on Saturday Washington aimed to send 20,000-30,000

THAT PREVENTS RUSSIAN NUCLEAR LASHOUT AND EUROPEAN ESCALATORY WARS

. Since the mid-1990's, the US has constantly placed Russia before

IMPACT: START IS KEY TO PREVENT EXTINCTION – SOLVES ACCIDENTS AND NONPROLIFERATION .

RELATIONS STRONG NOW, BUT CONTINUED COOPERATION IS KEY.

UNIQUE LINK: US SURGE AIMS TO ERADICATE POPPY.

LINK: ACTIVE SUPPORT OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT IS KEY TO POPPY ERADICATION.

Ivanov said Russia has been aiding international efforts to bring

LINK: RUSSIA ALREADY SUSPECTS US LACKS COMMITMENT TO ERADICATE POPPY.

AFGHANISTAN IS KEY TO RELATIONS .

Cooperation on Afghanistan really is becoming a dominant factor in the political

rapprochement between Russia and NATO.