case defense

ssa/tcbms

1nc ssa solvency

Doublebind either squo measures ensure US-sino coop, or Chinese
national interest blocks any attempt at coop
Mujamdar 16 defense editor at the National Interest (Dave, Defense
Secretary Ashton Carter Offers Olive Branch to China, June 21, 2016, The
National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/defense-secretaryashton-carter-offers-olive-branch-china-16663//dmeth)
While Washington is building a security network in the Asia-Pacific, the Obama
Administration is taking pains to transmit the message that it is not trying
to exclude Beijing . In fact, the United States wants China to join the Americanled liberal-institutional world order as Beijing emerges as a global power. This Asia-Pacific
security network is not aimed at any particular country. The network is not closed and excludes no one, Defense Secretary
Ashton Carter told an audience at the Center for a New American Securitys annual conference in Washington on June 20.
While we have disagreements with China, especially over its destabilizing behavior in the South China

we are committed to working with them and to persuade them to avoid

self-isolation. That is one reason the Pentagon continues to press for stronger
bilateral military-to-military relationships with the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army.
Carter said that as a part of that continuing effort, the U.S. Navy will once again host the Peoples
Liberation Army Navy in this years Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises in Hawaii this
summer. However, while the United States certainly gives the impression that is willing
peacefully to integrate China into the American-led world order, it is not clear if Beijing is
willing to accept the current system. Manylike noted realist scholar John
Mearsheimer believe that China will attempt to dominate Asia just like how the
United States maintains a regional hegemony over the Western hemisphere. Indeed, in many
Sea,

ways, Chinese actions in the South China Sea seem to echo the United States 1823 Monroe Doctrine. Mearsheimer argues

Washington will fight tooth and nail to prevent the emergence of another
regional hegemon . The United States has acted as a spoiler every other time another
potential regional hegemon has emergedsuch as Imperial Germany or the Soviet
Union. My argument in a nutshell is that if China continues to grow economically, it will attempt
to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere . The
United States, however, will go to enormous lengths to prevent China from
achieving regional hegemony, Mearsheimer wrote for The National Interest. Most of Beijings
neighbors, including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam, will join with the United
States to contain Chinese power. The result will be an intense security
competition with considerable potential for war. In short, Chinas rise is unlikely to
be tranquil . Essentially, Washington is holding out the olive branch in the hopes
that China will accept the current order without challenging American
dominance . But if it doesnt, Beijing will find itself facing off against Carters AsiaPacific security network. The bottom line is that the United States worked hard for over a century to gain
that

hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, and it did so for sound strategic reasons, Mearsheimer wrote. After achieving
regional dominance, it has worked equally hard to keep other great powers from controlling either Asia or Europe.

Status quo solvesUS and China have already implemented TCBMs to

reduce risk of conflict

Rose 15. (Frank, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. Using
Diplomacy to Advance the Long-term Sustainability and Security of the Outer Space Environment, State
Department. 4/16/2015. http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2015/240761.htm)//CB

The United States and China have already implemented some bilateral transparency and confidence
building measures (or TCBMs) to prevent the generation of additional debris in space . As part of the
2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, led by Secretary of State John Kerry, we reached agreement
on the establishment of e-mail contact between China and the United States for the
transmission of space object conjunction warnings. Not only does this communication
help prevent collision between objects in space, it will help to develop trust and
understanding between the United States and China. Over the past few years the United States
has also supported a number of multilateral initiatives that should reduce the chances of
mishaps, misperceptions and potential miscalculations. Multilateral TCBMs are means by which
governments can address challenges and share information with the aim of creating mutual understanding and reducing
tensions. Through TCBMs we can increase familiarity and trust and encourage openness among space actors. One of the
key efforts that we have been pursuing is working with the European Union to advance a non-legally binding International
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. The Code would establish guidelines to reduce the risks of debris-generating
events and to strengthen the long-term sustainability and security of the space environment. Among the draft Codes
most important provisions is a commitment for the subscribing States to refrain from any action -- unless such action is
justified by exceptions spelled out in the draft Code -- that brings about, directly or indirectly, damage or destruction of
space objects. We view the draft Code as a potential first step in establishing TCBMs for space. The State Department is
also leading U.S. efforts in the framework of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(UNCOPUOS) to move forward in the development of a draft set of guidelines for sustainable space operations to include
ways to prevent the generation of space debris.

Another important recent effort was the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts
(GGE) study of outer space transparency and confidence-building measures. That UN group, for which I
served as the U.S. expert, published a consensus report in July 2013 endorsing voluntary, non-legally binding TCBMs to
strengthen sustainability and security in space. The United States subsequently co-sponsored a resolution

with Russia and China referring the GGE reports recommendations for consideration by
the relevant entities and organizations of the United Nations system.

These diplomatic efforts contribute to reducing misperceptions and miscalculations and

help lower the chance of conflict extending into space.
SSA coop has zero chance of effectiveness ITAR restrictions block
Ressler 9 [Aaron R. Ressler, Major, United States Air Force, A Research Report
Submitted to the Faculty, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Advancing Sino-U.S. Space
Cooperation, April 2009]
Challenges. Space cooperation between the U.S. and China would not be an easy process to initiate and there would
certainly be challenges. While space cooperation is not new, the 2007 Chinese ASAT test has made the idea of working
with the PRC even more controversial.91One area of increased concern is technology transfer. This is especially true of
civil space technology being applied for military use (dual-use technology).92 For this specific reason, the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) limits space cooperation with China.93With the intention of preventing the transfer of
sensitive technologies to other governments, ITAR even makes normal science exchanges and

visits challenging.94 If there were to be increased space cooperative efforts between the U.S. and China, ITAR
restraints would need to be reexamined and changed.In a Congressional Research Service (CRS)
Report for Congress dated September 29, 2008, the author, Jeffrey Logan, mentions a possible challenge of
ineffectiveness.95 He further states that some argue that increased collaboration will not

produce
tangible benefits for the United States.96 It is mentioned in the 2006 U.S. NSP that international
cooperation is encouraged along the lines of mutual benefit.97 It is also mentioned in NASA Policy Directive (NPD)
1360.2A that each cooperative project must demonstrate a specific benefit to NASA or the

United States.98 With regard to the problem at hand (deterring Chinese ASAT operations), both NASA and
the U.S. would benefit if the threat of unannounced Chinese ASAT tests were reduced in
addition to the benefits mentioned above. It is a given that China is not technologically
where the U.S. is with regard to space, but as mentioned before, space cooperation with the
PRC would still be beneficial with regard to increased transparency, backup capabilities,
cost sharing and global stability.Another significant challenge is the different political
systems between the two countries, resulting in difficulty building trust with each
other.99 This issue has been tackled before between the U.S. and Russia, so while challenging, space cooperation is
feasible between China and the U.S. despite different political systems.

SSA only small part of what their authors recommend

Weeden and He 16. (Brian, former U.S. Air Force space and missile operations officer and
currently technical adviser for Secure World Foundation, a non-profit organization dedicated to the longterm sustainable use of outer space. Xiao, Assistant Research Fellow, Division of International Strategy, U.S.
Diplomacy and Politics @ Chinese Academy of Social Science, Institute of World Economic and Politics.
U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space, US-China Relations in Strategic Domains. The National Bureau of
Asian Research, Report #57, April 2016.
http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf)//CB

this domain will

have a significant impact on the future of bilateral relations . Although it is tempting to view the U.S.-China
ConclusionGiven that both the United States and China have considerable national security, civil, and commercial interests in space,

relationship in space through a similar lens as the U.S.-Soviet relationship, the differences between the two relationships and their contexts may ultimately matter

The key question is whether space will be a source of tension that creates instability
or an area of positive engagement that can strengthen the relationship .Both the
United States and China should look at where their interests in space overlap to find potential areas to strengthen their relationship. Both have
interests in working with the rest of the international community to strengthen the space
governance regime in a manner that enhances the long-term sustainability of space , including
by addressing both environmental threats and security challenges. Both countries should also find a way to engage in
bilateral and multilateral civil space projects, including science and exploration. Doing so
would create an element to their relationship that has a different dynamic from
military-to-military interactions . At the same time, both the United States and China should be cognizant of where their
interests in space differ and look to enact confidence-building measures to reduce tensions and the
risk of a crisis escalating into outright conflict . While the prospects for legally binding arms control measures are slim at this
stage, they could put in place unilateral and bilateral measures to reduce tensions created
by the testing and development of direct ascent kinetic-kill and RPO capabilities.
Finally, both countries would benefit significantly from improving their national SSA
capabilities and increasing data sharing with each other .
more than the similarities.
and risk

2nc status quo solves

Squo tech solves
Spera 16 editor, Aerospace Corporation (Gabe, GROUND-BASED
TELESCOPES FOR SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, February 23,
2016, Aerospace, http://www.aerospace.org/crosslinkmag/webexclusive/ground-based-telescopes-for-space-situationalawareness//dmeth)
Historically, sensitive radar systems have done the work of tracking and characterizing resident space objects. Although these radars are
effective, the data comes with inherent uncertainties. Researchers can supplement these systems with ground-based optical telescopes,
passively observing and tracking space objects via reflected sunlight. Depending on how the data are processed, physical attributes can be
ascertained beyond a simple orbit determination. For

the most part, though, space situational awareness

via optical telescopes has been a small niche field. The majority of large astronomical observatories lack the
capability to track objects in low and medium Earth orbits, and this has limited their participation. This situation is
rapidly changing , due in part to the proliferation of automated systems, sophisticated
extraction techniques, and purpose-built telescope drives. Even small-aperture telescopes
can now track objects from relatively low elevations . Newer large-aperture survey
telescopes, equipped with gigapixel CCD cameras, are capable of monitoring wide swatches of the night
sky to search for changes. For example, the Pan-STARRS observatory at the University of Hawaii features a 1.8-meter

telescope with a 1.4 billion pixel camera, and the future Large Synoptic Survey Telescope (LSST) will boast an 8.4-meter telescope with a 3.2
billion pixel camera. In nearly all cases though, such observations are limited to visible wavelengths. Aerotel captured this image of three
actively maintained geostationary satellites (center) with another satellite nearby (lower left). For this observation, the telescope was staring
at one spot, with no tracking movement. Thus, the stationary satellites appear as dots, while the background stars, which are moving at the
natural sidereal rate, appear as streaks. Aerotel captured this image of three actively maintained geostationary satellites (center) with
another satellite nearby (lower left). For this observation, the telescope was staring at one spot, with no tracking movement. Thus, the
stationary satellites appear as dots, while the background stars, which are moving at the natural sidereal rate, appear as streaks. To assess
the implications of these developments for government customers, Edward Laag of the Advanced Sensor Engineering Dept. has been

Aerotel
is a fast-slewing, highly sensitive 1-meter Cassegrain telescope that can track objects in
various orbits, Laag says. It can accommodate a variety of instruments, operating at both
visible and near-infrared wavelengths. The system has been in operation for about two years
and is actively enabling a variety of ongoing research projects. The main instrument for Aerotel is a
working with Aerotel, an observatory and telescope located on the roof of the Aerospace laboratories in El Segundo, California.

multiband imaging system called PF Cam. Located at the Aerotels prime focus, it provides a flat, aberration-free image plane for the
placement of various large-format square detector arrays and associated filters. The refractive correcting optics transmit wavelengths
ranging from near-ultraviolet and visible to shortwave infrared while preserving the high sensitivity of the primary mirror. There are few
reflective losses, and PF Cam is well suited for recording calibrated light curves. PF Cam currently accepts two high-frame-rate cameras
with complementary characteristicsthe commercial PCO Edge and the Aerospace-made Angie II. Each uses its own five-position filter
wheel. Both employ standard data-transfer links and supply images in a format ingestible by common data-processing routines. The two
cameras cannot be operated simultaneously, but they can be quickly swappedan unusual feature for a prime-focus instrument. This
means a low-orbiting object making two sunlit passes on the same night can be observed with both cameras. For visible light observations,
the PCO Edge is preferred for its simplicity. It employs a science-grade CMOS detector, with low noise and quantum efficiencies above 50
percent. At the nominal rate of 30 hertz, the unit can be read out in full-frame mode by a standard desktop computer. For shortwave
infrared and certain visible observations, the Angie II camera may be used. This system incorporates a 2048 x 2048 array of 18-micron
pixels., Angie II is a powerful infrared detector with a 1.1 degree field of view, but it is not restricted to infrared operation. It has high
quantum efficiency that extends well into traditional V-band (550 nanometers), so it can be used for visible observations and produces
high-quality wide-field images. Aerotel is a very modern Swiss-army-knife telescope, Laag
says. It can be configured to operate in a manner similar to survey telescopes, but is not purpose-built like Pan-STARRS or LSST. Going
beyond simple imaging, he says, there

are additional foci that allow more complex instruments to

be operated. One in particular is the Aerospace-built VNIRIS spectrometer, which provides continuous wavelength coverage from
400 nanometers to 2.5 microns. When properly calibrated, it can detect certain material properties. Laag and other
Aerospace researchers are using PF Cam to observe resident space objects with increasing
efficiency. The observatory has fielded requests from internal customers as well as
government agencies and even outside firms. For customer-requested observations, Aerotel accepts standard twoor three-line element sets or NORAD IDs. Aerospaces Satellite Orbit Analysis Program (SOAP) can be used to check for suitable target
passes beforehand. Over the course of a night, Aerotel can easily generate 100 gigabytes of raw data. Not long ago, this would have been
considered a problem, but today, it is no longer significant, Laag says. Aerotel data is generally stored on a server that has special access

in the future, data will be

pushed automatically to a temporary site so that customers can retrieve it wherever or
whenever they need. Having Aerotel on site has created countless benefits, but ultimately, it is not a replacement for traditional
privileges. Depending on the customer, it is internally processed and delivered. Laag expects that

mountaintop observing, Laag notes. Lessons learned from Aerotel will be applied directly to instruments fielded at more pristine sites

around the globe. The

plan is to continue to streamline operations until the system can operate

virtually autonomously. Looking forward, Aerotel observations will help improve space situational awareness and overall
mission safety, particularly when supported by Aerospace orbital analysis expertise. The utility of Aerotel can be extended further by
coordinating with other telescope facilities such as the newer survey telescopes, other Aerospace assets, space systems, or even sensors not
yet imagined, Laag says. In fact, the limiting factor is not the technology itself, but the processors and algorithms needed to parse through
the enormous volumes of data produced.

Status quo solvesframework for collaboration over debris already exists

between the US and China.

Rose 15. (Frank, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance.
Challenges to Arms Control in Space and Pragmatic Way Ahead, US Department of State. 11/20/2015.
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2015/250231.htm)//CB

A third promising area is international cooperation on space situational awareness, or SSA, which
can help contribute to a more comprehensive picture of what is transpiring in space and ensure the safety, sustainability,
stability, and security of the space environment. We see opportunities for cooperation on SSA with other governments and
nongovernmental space operators around the globe. Such cooperation on SSA is very important, as international
partnerships bring resources, capabilities, and geographical advantages. To date, the United States has signed 11 SSA
sharing agreements and arrangements with national governments and international intergovernmental organizations, and
50 with commercial entities. SSA is a critical capability to help us achieve our goal of preventing conflict from extending to
space in the first place; this goal is consistent with the ARFs objective to make significant contributions to efforts towards
confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.

One regional example of our cooperation in this area is our ongoing coordination with
our Chinese co-hosts on orbital collisions. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has
provided the United States with email contact information for the appropriate Chinese entity
responsible for spacecraft operations and conjunction assessment, allowing this
organization to receive Close Approach Notifications directly from the U.S. Department of
Defense. This lays the ground work for a much faster process for sharing
information , which reduces the probability of, and facilitates effective responses to, orbital
collisions, orbital break-ups and other events that might increase the probability of
accidental collisions in outer space.

Status quo solvesChina will inevitably adopt TCBMs and join global
space governance
Weeden and He 16. (Brian, former U.S. Air Force space and missile operations officer and
currently technical adviser for Secure World Foundation, a non-profit organization dedicated to the longterm sustainable use of outer space. Xiao, Assistant Research Fellow, Division of International Strategy, U.S.
Diplomacy and Politics @ Chinese Academy of Social Science, Institute of World Economic and Politics.
U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space, US-China Relations in Strategic Domains. The National Bureau of
Asian Research, Report #57, April 2016.
http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf)//CB

The United States has cautiously encouraged Chinas participation in enhancing the space
governance regime. China was one of the fifteen countries with direct participation in the UN
Group of Governmental Experts on transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBM) for outer space
activities.41 To date, China has played a mostly positive role in the discussions of best-practice
guidelines for the long-term sustainability of space activities in the UN Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space.42 And while Beijing voiced some concerns during the negotiations of the International Code of
Conduct for Space Activities that was proposed by the European Union, it was meaningfully engaged in the process. As

long as China continues to participate constructively in these and similar efforts and advance its
interests in a positive way, the United States is likely to welcome Chinese involvement in
future discussions of space governance.
Squo solves - $6 bil investment till 2020 in SSA
Gruss 15 grad of Miami University, covers military space issues for Space
News (Mike, U.S. Plans $6 Billion Investment in Space Situational
Awareness, October 19, 2015, Space News, http://spacenews.com/plannedu-s-investment-in-space-awareness-is-6-billion-gao-says//dmeth)

WASHINGTON The

U.S. government, primarily the Department of Defense, plans to spend some $6

billion on efforts to monitor the space environment in real time through
2020 , according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office. That figure, which the GAO acknowledged is not
comprehensive, nonetheless represents one of the most detailed accountings of space
situational awareness (SSA) programs and funding released to date . The
spending is dominated by the Pentagon, with other agencies, primarily NASA, accounting for just 10 percent of the total.
Included in the survey are at least some of the programs that U.S. defense officials say are funded

as part of a planned $5.5 billion investment over the next five years on space protection activities,
largely in response to growing threats from Russia and China. Also included is a classified missile tracking satellite now
being used for space surveillance. The GAO carried out the survey in response to Senate language in the 2015 National
Defense Authorization Act. The Oct. 8 report, Space Situational Efforts and Planned Budgets, makes no
recommendations to the Pentagon or to Congress. Tracking spending across multiple agencies on a common activity is a
difficult task, made much more so because for some organizations, such as the Missile Defense Agency, space surveillance
is a secondary mission and is not accounted for separately. The elusiveness of an overall dollar figure for SSA capabilities
has been a long-term frustration for Congress. Space surveillance has taken on increased importance

in recent years as near-Earth orbit becomes, as U.S. government officials are fond of
saying, more contested, congested and competitive. According to the GAO report, the Air Forces Joint
Space Operations Center (JSpOC) issued 671,000 notifications of possible orbital collisions in 2014 alone.
Compounding the congestion problem is what government officials say are increasingly threatening

activities by China and Russia. The full extent of these activities has not been disclosed, but China has
tested ground-based anti satellite weaponry while Russia has been conducting on-orbit satellite
maneuvers that have alarmed government and industry officials alike. Part of the Air Forces response is a major upgrade
to the JSpOC, which manages a catalog of known space objects and unofficially serves as the worlds space traffic cop. A
second phase of upgrades to the facility, now underway, includes an enhanced capability to catalog known space objects
and is expected to come on line in December 2016 at a cost of about $152 million in 2015 and 2016. The third planned
upgrade, which includes the ability to provide real-time alerts of hostile actions such as attempts to jam satellite
transmissions, will cost about $240 million through 2020, the report said. Previous Air Force budget documents had not
included such specific breakdowns. The report also provides detail on the governments SSA

infrastructure, consisting of some 375 sensors and systems owned by the military, civil
agencies and the intelligence community. These include eight dedicated sensors, two of
which are in space: the Space Based Space Surveillance Block 10 pathfinder satellite, and
the quasi-classified Advanced Technology Risk Reduction satellite launched by the
Missile Defense Agency but transferred to Air Force Space Command in 2011. The
government also operates 18 multimission sensors that in addition to space surveillance can be used for things like missile
tracking, the report said. The new programs cited in the report some of which are funded under the Defense
Departments $5.5 billion space protection investment program include: The space tracking radar known as the Space
Fence. The $500 million-plus Space Based Space Surveillance follow-on system. The Operationally Responsive Space-5
satellite. The JSpOC Mission System upgrade. An Energetic Charged Particle sensor that would fly aboard the Air Forces
next-generation weather satellite system, which is still being defined. The Energetic Charged Particle sensor will monitor
space radiation, data that will be used in part to distinguish between naturally occurring and man-made events. Earlier
this year, Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James mandated that all new satellite programs plan to include the Energetic
Charged Particle sensor, prototypes of which are expected to be delivered in fiscal year 2018, the report said. The report
also highlights a $60 million Air Force program that will use ground radars to detect changes in the ionosphere. The Air
Force Weather groups Next Generation Ionosonde consists of three ground-based radars whose installation is underway
and expected to be complete by 2022.

Private sector solves

Loomis 15 - Ilima Loomis is an award-winning journalist who has
contributed to Science, Popular Science, Nature, Muse, Hakai, Science News
for Students, Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, National
Geographic Traveler, Islands, Hawaii, Alaska Airlines Magazine, and many
other publications. (Ilima, Private firms spy a market in spotting space
junk, September 23, 2015, Nature, http://www.nature.com/news/privatefirms-spy-a-market-in-spotting-space-junk-1.18425//dmeth)
The US military has long taken the role of traffic cop in space: monitoring satellites, tracking debris and, in recent years,

A
wave of private firms is seeking to build a commercial market for space
situational awareness (SSA) high-precision tracking of artificial objects orbiting Earth. Defence

warning satellite operators and foreign governments of potential collisions and hazards. But now it has company.

contractor Analytical Graphics (AGI) of Exton, Pennsylvania, opened its Commercial Space
Operations Center (ComSpOC) in March last year to track active satellites and space
junk. Just a few months later, aerospace giant Lockheed Martin of Bethesda, Maryland,
announced its own effort to develop a space-debris tracking site in Western Australia. The
emerging commercial demand for such services was a hot topic last week at the Advanced Maui Optical and Space
Surveillance Technologies Conference in Wailea, Hawaii, which drew scientists and representatives of private firms,
government agencies and the military. Everybodys

getting into the SSA game , says Paul Welsh,

vice-president of business development at AGI. He attributes the growing interest to the expansion of
military space activity, the rapid growth of the commercial satellite industry and the
increasingly pressing problem of space debris. All three of those things are a
confluence of opportunity, Welsh says. Improvements in information technology have
also helped to fuel demand for commercial data on satellites and space junk , says Brian
Weeden, technical adviser for the Secure World Foundation, a non-profit group based in Broomfield, Colorado, that works
on issues of space sustainability. Private companies have proved adept at developing software for

managing big data, even as the US Air Force has struggled to update the decades-old
computer systems at its Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Whereas the military
tracks space debris with powerful, multimillion-dollar radars and telescopes, ComSpOC relies on observations

from a larger network of off the shelf sensors around the globe . These include eight optical
sites, three radiofrequency tracking sites and two radar installations. The centre purchases many
of its data from outside contractors that run the observation sites. A year and half after its launch, Welsh says that

ComSpOC is tracking 6,000 to 7,000 objects, including active and inactive satellites and
debris. That is many fewer than the approximately 23,000 objects being tracked by the US military, Welsh
acknowledges. But ComSpOC's quarry includes nearly all significant objects in geosynchronous
orbit, around 42,000 kilometres above Earth. AGI plans to bring two more radar
facilities online next year, which should allow the company to track more objects in low
Earth orbit, up to 2,000 kilometres above the planets surface; this is where the largest population of satellites and debris
is found, says Welsh. Orbital observation US military and civilian agencies such as NASA, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration are considered the biggest market for orbital data;

although the Air Force maintains its own sensor network, it is struggling to
keep up with an increasingly crowded and complex space environment. But
SSA firms also hope to attract customers among private satellite operators . If there
were no government buyers at all, it would still be a very viable, meaningful
business , says Clinton Clark, vice-president of sales at ExoAnalytic Solutions in Houston, Texas, a technology
company that sells satellite-observation data to ComSpOC, among other customers. Satellite operators are
accustomed to getting such data free from the US government, but Clark sees a growing
dissatisfaction with the volume and quality of that information. Theres too many false
alarms of potential collisions, he says. Still, the commercial market for SSA data is in its infancy. Its a new
thing, says Weeden. Its something thats fairly dynamic. Just in the last six months to a year, theres been a ton of
change, and its hard to tell what the future is going to look like.

Squo solves ADEPT

Jenkins et al. 15 - * Senior Engineering Specialist, System Analysis and Simulation
Subdivision, has worked for 24 years in the field of astrodynamics, B.S. in aeronautical
engineering and an M.S. in computer and systems engineering from Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute ** Marlon Sorge - Senior Project Engineer, Space Innovation
Directorate, has worked on space debris issues for more than 25 years, B.S. in physics
and an M.S. in aeronautical and astronautical engineering from Purdue ***Glenn
Peterson - Senior Engineering Specialist, System Analysis and Simulation Subdivision,
joined Aerospace in 1997. He works on a variety of topics including space debris,
collision analysis, meteor showers, and satellite disposal. He has a B.S. and an M.S. in
aerospace engineering from San Diego State University, and a Ph.D. from the University
of Texas at Austin. **** John McVey - B.S. in physics from the University of Florida and
an M.S. in aerospace engineering from the University of Colorado, Boulder. *****

Bernard Yoo - B.S. in mechanical engineering from Rice University and an M.S. in
aerospace engineering (astronautics) from the University of Southern California. (Alan,
Marlon, Glenn, John, Bernard, Understanding Space Debris: Causes, Mitigations, and
Issues, The Aerospace Corporation, Fall 2015, pgs 9-13,
http://aerospace.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/crosslink/Crosslink_Fall_2015.pdf//dmeth)
8 CROSSLINK FALL 2015 Predicting the Future Space Debris Environment The Aerospace Corporations ADEPT simulation
is being used to assess the effectiveness of mitigation practices on reducing the future
orbital debris population. Alan Jenkin, Marlon Sorge, Glenn Peterson, John McVey, and Bernard Yoo CROSSLINK FALL 2015 9 In a

landmark 1978 publication, NASA scientists Donald Kessler and Burton Cour-Palais concluded that collisions of satellites and spent rocket bodies would eventually
form the dominant source of orbital debris in low Earth orbit (LEO). They predicted that debris from such collisions would collide with other satellites and rocket
bodies and create even more debris. As a result of this chain reaction, the risk to satellites in certain regions of space would increase exponentially with time, even
without further launches into those regions. In a 1991 paper, Kessler used the term collisional cascading to describe this process. Since then, the term Kessler
syndrome has become widely used in the popular literature. In February 2009, the first of the predicted catastrophic collisions occurred between the Iridium 33
satellite and the Russian Cosmos 2251 satellite. This single event generated more than 2200 trackable fragments and significantly more that were too small to
track. An antisatellite test performed by China in 2007 had already produced more than 3400 trackable fragments. Between the two, the number of tracked objects

the U.S. Air Force initiated a study in 2009 to

assess the effects of an increasing debris population on the performance of future U.S.
military space systems. To support this effort, the Air Force asked Aerospace to generate discrete future LEO debris populations for input to its
simulations. This resulted in a new capability at Aerospace to model the future debris
environment in LEO. This initial capability was largely independent of models developed by other organizations, but still used a database of
object masses supplied by NASA. During the course of subsequent studies, Aerospace significantly enhanced its ability to
model the future LEO debris environment. Portions of the process were reconfigured The top graph shows future collisions for
had increased by about 65 percent. ADEPT Birth Following these events,

the Business as Usual scenario. Each point shows the altitude and date for each collision. Points from all 100 Monte Carlo ensembles are shown together. The
bottom graph shows mean curves over 100 Monte Carlo cases of number of collisional debris objects down to 1 centimeter on orbit vs. time for both scenarios. The
debris population grows more slowly in the "Compliance" scenario. This illustrates that existing international debris mitigation guidelines have a significant effect
in reducing the growth rate of orbital debris. These plots show the number of collisional debris objects down to 1 centimeter on orbit vs. time for the Business as
Usual (top) and Compliance (bottom) scenarios predicted by ADEPT as part of the 2012 MEO Debris Environment Projection Study. Each curve in the graph
corresponds to a Monte Carlo case. A total of 100 Monte Carlo cases are shown. x 106 Time (years) Number of objects (millions) 2 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
180 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 Time (years) Number of objects (millions) 2 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 x 106 Time (years) Number of objects
(milliions) 2 1 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 3 4 5 6 7 Business as usual Compliance 8 9 Collision data Collision altitude (km) 1/1/2012 12/31/2021
1/1/2032 12/31/2041 1/1/2052 12/31/2061 1/1/2072 1/1/2092 1/1/2102 1/2/2112 1/1/2122 1/2/2132 1/1/2142 1/2/2152 1/1/2162 1/2/2172 1/1/2182 1/2/2192
1/2/2202 12/31/2081 5000 0 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 10 CROSSLINK FALL 2015 to run on distributed high-performance
computing clusters, and the system was made fully independent of other debris models by establishing an Aerospace-developed database of object masses, sizes,

The capability became sufficiently mature to receive a name: the Aerospace

Debris Environment Projection Tool (ADEPT). In 2012, the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) requested a
and ballistic areas.

study to determine the effect of potential changes to National Space Policy on the future debris environment in medium Earth orbit (MEO), with the goal of

ADEPT was
extended to model not just LEO but all orbital regimes. This was necessary to account for possible cross-coupling
between the LEO, MEO, and geosynchronous (GEO) populations via collisions involving objects on highly eccentric orbits. A number of other
improvements have been made to ADEPT through internal research and development.
These include faster generation of future collisions, extension of Monte Carlo processing,
generation of future random solar cycles, greater fidelity of the original population,
better modeling of active debris removal, assessment of modeling accuracy via
comparison with actual data, and improved fragmentation modeling. These flowcharts illustrate the
assessing the risk to the Global Positioning System (GPS). This was known as the MEO Debris Environment Projection Study. For this effort,

ADEPT process for generating future debris population models. The first shows the high-level flow of the overall simulation, and the second shows specific steps
involved in generating debris from future collisions. These images are based on the 2012 MEO Debris Environment Projection Study and show the future orbital
debris population as predicted by ADEPT for the "Business as Usual" scenario in the years 2013, 2100, and 2200 (top to bottom). Collision generator Object
masses, collision radii, propagated mean elements Fragment generation (IMPACT) Down-sample to weighted population Feedback subsequent fragment
generations Orbit element history files for each object Object propagation (MEANPROP) Generation of future launched objects and associated debris Generation of
debris from future explosions (IMPACT) Generation of debris from future collisions Object propagation (MEANPROP) Orbit element history files for each object

discrete populations generated by

ADEPT can be used to derive a variety of products. For example, plots of the onorbit population vs. time can
measure the growth rate for the debris populationoverall, or in specific orbital regions. Plots of object spatial density vs.
altitude and time indicate which regions of space will see higher debris growth. This information can influence where a satellite
might be flown to minimize risk; it can also help show how different disposal practices
might affect different regions of space. Plots of probability vs. severity enable the user to rank orbital
objects by the amount of debris they might create from collisions in various scenarios.
This is useful in identifying objects for active removal that would achieve the greatest reduction in future debris growth. The ADEPT discrete
populations can also be used to predict the frequency of collision avoidance maneuvers
on orbit, which could affect the amount of propellant needed on board and help forecast mission outages that might be induced by the maneuvers. ADEPT is
Size/mass/area database Initial population CROSSLINK FALL 2015 11 ADEPT Products The

currently used at Aerospace to perform collision probability analyses for space debris assessment reports, which are required by Air Force Instruction 91-217
(Space Safety). ADEPT has also been used by Aerospace to support the NASA delegation at the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC).
ADEPT Results The 2012 MEO Debris Environment Projection Study used ADEPT to simulate two scenarios. In the first (compliance), all worldwide future

launches comply with internationally recommended disposal guidelines. In the second (business as usual), all worldwide future launches move to disposal orbits
near their mission orbits and do nothing else to comply with any guidelines. Results showed that the rate of growth of the future collisional debris population in the
business as usual scenario increases with time. The rate of growth also increases in the compliance scenario, but much more slowly. ADEPT scenarios have also
shown the effect of conservation of mass. In essence, as collisions occur, the amount of mass in orbit is redistributed from large objects (for example, satellites) to
smaller debris pieces. Smaller objects are less likely to collide, and when they do, they have less momentum and kinetic energy to impart to other objects. ADEPT
runs start with an initial population and create first-generation debris, caused by collisions between objects in the initial population, and second-generation
debris, caused by the collision of first-generation debris objects with both initial population objects and other first-generation objects. ADEPT simulations over 200
years have shown that second-generation debris grows much more slowly than first-generation debris. So, although the future collisional debris population
increases with time, it does not increase exponentially, at least for simulated time periods up to 200 years in the future. ADEPT Steps The process for generating
the debris population in ADEPT consists of the following steps. Step 1. Generate a population of current objects. This population includes the unclassified portion
of the U.S. Strategic Command catalog of resident space objects along with a statistical filler population to represent objects not available in the catalog. It also
includes a statistical population of debris from 10 centimeters down to 1 centimeter, which is intended to represent debris that is too small to track but still
considered lethal to operational satellites. Step 2. Generate a population of future launched objects. The modeling of future launch traffic has a strong influence on
the long-term generation of collisional debris. Studies to date have typically used the historical launch pattern 10 to 15 years prior to the start date. For specific
constellations, such as Iridium, Orbcomm, and Globalstar, a fixed rate of replenishment is assumed. This step also simulates the disposal of satellites and rocket
bodies at end of mission, which also has a strong influence on the resulting collisional debris population. A primary goal of ADEPT has been to quantify the effect
of disposal policy. Step 3. Propagate current and future objects over the simulation period. This is done using MEANPROP, an Aerospace tool that efficiently
propagates the slowly varying orbital elements averaged over complete orbital revolutions. This results in files containing orbital elements as a function of time for
each object. Step 4. Generate random explosions based on object type (e.g., satellite or rocket body) and apply the Aerospace breakup modeling code IMPACT to
generate fragments down to 1 centimeter. These fragments can then be propagated into the future using MEANPROP. Step 5. Generate Monte Carlo ensembles of
random future collisions. Each time the orbital traces of two objects intersect, the probability of collision is computed, and a random draw is taken to determine
whether a collision occurs. Typically, 100 Monte Carlo ensembles are generated. Step 6. Input the future collisions into IMPACT, which will generate collisional
debris objects down to 1 centimeter. Step 7. Down-sample the number of objects (typically on the order of several billion) to a manageable size. Each of the
resulting debris objects can be assigned a weighting factor that indicates the number of fragments that it represents. This down-sampled set of collisional debris
objects can then be propagated into the future using MEANPROP. Repeat steps 5 through 7 as needed to feed the new generation of collisional debris back into the
previous population. 12 CROSSLINK FALL 2015 ADEPT Future Studies Studies to date using ADEPT assume that historical launch patterns will continue into the
future. While this has been the standard practice in the debris modeling community, the future launch pattern will almost certainly be different. Russian launch
patterns and orbits have changed significantly, and China is emerging as a dominant spacefaring nation. The French Space Operations Act of 2010 imposes
morestringent debris mitigation requirements than previous laws, and could significantly change the future distribution of Ariane upper stages. The introduction of
CubeSats has also brought a significant change in launch patterns. Typically, a relatively large number of CubeSats will hitch a ride on a launch of a standard
satellite. Ultimately, CubeSats may form a large population occupying a wide range of orbitsbut that will not necessarily result in a larger future debris
population, because the effect of conservation of mass is present. Their small size reduces their probability of collision, while their small mass reduces their
potential for creating large amounts of debris when they do collide with other objects. So, as with second-generation debris, the effect of their small size and mass
on the creation of future debris may offset the effect of their greater numbers. Also, the ballistic coefficients of CubeSats are different from those of standard large
satellites. This means they will lose altitude (if their orbits are low enough to be affected by drag) at different rates than larger satellites. ADEPT can be used to help

Future development plans

for ADEPT include reconstructing the current debris population down to 1 centimeter and smaller from all previous space activity. This will
enable independent assessment of the debris risk posed to spacecraft by the existing
small, untracked debris population. It will then be possible to improve current estimates of the cost of shielding (typically feasible only
quantify how these opposing attributes of the CubeSat population will affect the future orbital debris population.

for debris up to 1 centimeter) or constellation replenishment to compensate for failures caused by debris impacts. Compliance 0.0E+00 5.0E-07 1.0E-06 1.5E-06
2.0E-06 2.5E-06 Altitude (km) Years Business as Usual Density (#/km3 ) 0.0E+00 2.0E-06 4.0E-06 6.0E-06 8.0E-06 1.0E-05 1.2E-05 0 40 80 120 160 200 205
405 605 805 1005 1205 1405 1605 1805 2005 Altitude (km) Years Density (#/km3 ) 0 40 80 120 160 200 205 405 605 805 1005 1205 140516051805 2005 These
plots from the 2012 MEO Debris Environment Projection Study show the object spatial density in LEO, including debris down to 1 centimeter, as a function of
altitude and time. The first figure shows the result for the Business as Usual scenario. The growth of the ridge between 800 and 1000 kilometers is limited by the
effect of atmospheric drag. The growing ridge just above 1400 kilometers occurs because the simulation includes a constellation of satellites that is continually
replenished. The disposed satellites accumulate because there is no atmospheric drag to remove them. The second figure shows the result for the Compliance
scenario. In this case, the ridge just above 1400 kilometers has been reduced significantly (note the different density axis scales) because the simulation moves the
disposed constellation satellites to an altitude of 2000 kilometers in compliance with debris mitigation guidelines; however, a new ridge appears at 2000
kilometers. These plots illustrate the population growth that could occur in LEO if nondecaying disposal orbits are used. ADEPT Features ADEPT differs from
other debris environment projection models in several important ways. For example, it uses an Aerospacedeveloped tool, IMPACT, to model breakups from
collisions and explosions. Other tools typically use variants of the NASA Standard Breakup Model. ADEPT uses a Monte Carlobased orbit trace crossing method
to generate future random collisions. Other models typically use spatial density methods with Poisson statistical models. One advantage of the orbit trace crossing
method is that it easily retains the correlation between the frequency of collision and the parameters that influence the fragmentation of the objects, including
relative impact velocity, direction, and object masses. ADEPT uses discrete weighted down-sampled populations to represent the full population. Other models
typically use spatial density to represent the full population, which is effectively a smoothed representation. The use of weighted down-sampled populations makes
it easy to retain any correlations between orbital elements of different objects. ADEPT uses an independently developed database of objects that includes size,
mass, ballistic area, and weighting factors. Having control of this database permits the execution of sensitivity studies. CROSSLINK FALL 2015 13 ADEPT

ADEPT simulation process enables projections of the future orbital

debris environment resulting from various scenarios . It can model the
impact of changes in launch traffic patterns and identify effective debris
mitigation approaches. The future debris environment representations
generated by ADEPT can be used to determine satellite collision avoidance
frequency and associated maneuver requirements and to support other
types of mission utility analysis . Used effectively, ADEPT studies can help identify debris
mitigation approaches that maximize the long-term sustainability of space
for future generations at reasonable cost to the current generation

Conclusion The

Squo solves DART

Hansen et al 15 - Engineering Specialist, System Analysis and Simulation,
B.S. and an M.S. in mechanical and aerospace engineering from Utah State
University. With Felix Hoots, B.S. in physics and an M.S. in mathematics
from Tennessee Tech University, and a Ph.D. in mathematics from Auburn
University. With Ryan E. McKennon-Kelly, B.S. in mechanical engineering
from The George Washington University, where he also received the Gamow

Fellowship for his work in nuclear physics research, and an M.S. in

aerospace engineering from the University of Michigan. (Brian,
Understanding Space Debris: Causes, Mitigations, and Issues, The
Aerospace Corporation, Fall 2015, pgs 41-45,
http://aerospace.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/crosslink/Crosslink_Fall_2015.pdf//dmeth)

The destruction of the Chinese Fengyun-1C weather satellite in 2007 brought to light a new class of problem. While a large amount of trackable debris was
generated, models showed that the explosion might also have produced tens of thousands of particles that were too small to track. Even small objects moving at

small bullet fragments were

untrackable but deadly, and traditional collision avoidance methods would be
unable to mitigate the risk to orbital assets. Efforts to visualize the problem were
hampered by the inherent limitation of popular techniques, which typically display every debris particle on a
speeds greater than 15,000 miles per hour can obliterate a much larger satellite. The danger was clear: these

computer screen at the same time. Due to the design and scale of computer displays, this technique would show a debris fragment as a single dot roughly the size of
Connecticut while in reality it was the size of a small bolt. In the case of tens of thousands of debris objects, the dots would block out the Earth and give the

To address these issues, the

newly formed Debris Analysis Response Team (DART) at The Aerospace Corporation
began work on a visualization technique that would represent debris as an
overall field rather than a collection of individual dots . By taking output from breakup models, such
as Aerospaces IMPACT tool, a 3-D surface could be calculated that would envelop the debris at a
given time. Density, risk, or other appropriate information could be communicated
intuitively by coloring individual regions of the surface or by rendering them as solid,
translucent, or completely invisible. The initial method assumed that debris had quickly spread around Earth into a ring and would
calculate the boundary such that it would envelop all the particles over the entire day. The resulting shape resembled a donut, especially
in the early phases of the breakup. The mathematical name for this shape is a torus, which over time became synonymous
with the visualization method: The Debris Torus, or simply, The Torus. Because the boundary was calculated as a
continuous 3-D surface, simple geometric tests could be performed to determine when a satellite
would enter and exit the debris field. The Torus Evolved: Alpha-Shapes In 2009, the first hypervelocity collision between two intact
impression that space was ruined even though there was still a large distance between them. The Genesis

satellites in LEO was confirmed. The defunct Russian satellite Cosmos-2251 collided with an operational communication satellite, Iridium-33. The Iridium
constellation suffered communication outages until the destroyed satellite was replaced, but more important, the resulting debris cloud posed a threat to other
satellites in orbit. Aerospace created a set of Torus models to examine the event. From these, it was clear that the areas near the poles where the orbital traces
intersected remained highly concentrated throughout the evolution of the cloud. It was also clear that the 3-D model was still overrepresenting the scale of the
debris cloud. Due to the nature of hypervelocity impacts, the shape of the debris cloud is not necessarily uniform or easy to describe mathematically. Thus, the ring
representation could not adequately model the shape of the cloud immediately following the breakupa period when debris is highly concentrated and therefore a
greater threat. To create a bounding surface, valid from just after breakup until an arbitrary future time, a far more complex method would be required. The Debris
Torus provides a more useful sense of the concentration of space debris. This image shows a model of the Chinese Fengyun-1C breakup, 14 days after collision.
Highly concentrated regions near the poles are shown as solid red sections, while less concentrated regions near the equator are shown as transparent and blue.

The standard method of representing debris as individual dots on a computer screen

gives a false impression of the extent of the debris hazard. 42 CROSSLINK FALL 2015 A Walker constellation that

lies at the same orbital altitude as a debris field may have multiple crossings. The precise timing of these penetration intervals can be quickly calculated using Torus
data and fed to operators, allowing them to make maneuver decisions. The Torus visualization makes it easier to grasp the nature of the problem.(Note that Earth

Areas of
higher risk are easy to identify. The evolution of the Torus to the alpha-shape
method improved upon earlier Torus models through better visualization and more
precise modeling. CROSSLINK FALL 2015 43 This new method would have to recognize when the debris field began to form rings around Earth and
adjust accordingly. If features such as holes were to appear, it would also have to account for them. Eventually , a method was found,
known as alpha-shapes (-shapes), that could wrap a boundary to an arbitrary set of
points and even calculate the area of the boundary (or volume in 3-D). This update to the
Torus became known as the -Torus, and it could model the debris field immediately
following the breakup, to three days after the breakup, to even a year later, following the debris field
evolution from a dense cloud to a ring to a sparse shell. A Quicker Response DART was involved in delivering a
has been scaled down to enable viewing of both sides of the orbit.) The debris Torus was used to model the Iridium-Cosmos collision of 2009.

standalone capability to the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC), and a requirement of that delivery was a visualization component. The Torus or -Torus
would be ideal; however, it lacked the requisite speed and simplicity. Even in compiled code, -Torus needed several hours or a 1000- core supercomputer to run.
Still, researchers believed that if the performance bottlenecks could be overcome, it could become a useful tool. They started developing an updated version that

QuickDART
was the culmination of many years of research into the characterization of space debris .
Based on acquired expertise, developers made a few simplifying assumptions (such as a stochastic
treatment of the breakup velocity) to achieve faster performance with only a minimal
drop in precision. Early in the development phase, it was discovered that a major component of the -Torus computation time could be reduced to a
would provide faster actionable data with minimal impact to accuracy. The result was QuickDART (Quick Debris Analysis Response Tool).

single calculation per run. This particular simplification dramatically reduced the overall run time. New methods of calculating density and applying colors were

also created along with a new method of determining penetration intervals. This invention has been prototyped extensively in C++ code and has also been
developed and improved inside Aerospaces Satellite Orbit Analysis Program (SOAP), an interactive 3-D orbit visualization and analysis tool. An analyQuickDART
provides a comprehensive snapshot to help users quickly grasp the most critical elements. The views clockwise from the upper left depict 1) the risk volume with an
orbit of interest passing through it, 2) a close-up view of the satellite of interest, 3) a color scale of relative debris density, 4) a dual-axis plot showing the density
profile over a 7.5 hour period with associated numerical integration and penetration intervals, and 5) instantaneous and integrated density values at the current
simulation time. The standard method of representing debris as individual dots on a computer screen gives a false impression of the extent of the debris hazard.
The debris Torus provides a more useful sense of the concentration of space debris. 44 CROSSLINK FALL 2015 sis that took two days with -Torus took only 510
minutes with the new prototype, creating a displayable model and providing entry and exit times for a watch list of satellites. The SOAP development team reduced
that computational time even more, down to 25 minutes in testing. Moreover, additional inventions regarding penetration detection were applied in SOAP to not

This timeline provides fast, intuitive

information as to when penetration occurs and the risk level of the penetrated section. The
only shade and color the Torus model, but to shade and color a penetration timeline.

user can select colors to match legacy models or to highlight risk levels specific to a single breakup. Summary Over the course of nearly a decade, Aerospace has

QuickDART tool conveys

critical information in a fast and intuitive manner. The visualization graphics shown here and on the

applied considerable resources to developing methods for visualizThis SOAP visualization within the

next page depict the aftermath of the Cosmos-Iridium collision of 2009. An example of an image generated by the Torus model that shows an analysts view of the
space environment on a given day at a given perspective. Visualization is an important tool for understanding and fly along views. CROSSLINK FALL 2015 45
ing, characterizing, and analyzing space debris clouds. Three separate methods, with varying fidelity, are now available to communicate the extent of a debris cloud

These models can help determine whether and when a particular

satellite crosses through a debris field through the volumetric
representation of a cloud of discrete points. Its ability to apply color and transparency to specific regions
makes it easier to communicate areas of danger to decisionmakers and the
general public . The collective effort of many individuals across the corporation has
extended the state of the art in performing analyses and providing mission assurance for
assets operating in an increasingly perilous environment.
and its associated risk.

Squo solves multilateral agreements in place

Siegel-Itzkovich 15 - the health and science editor at The Jerusalem Post,
has been in that position since 1986, moving over from coverage of the
Jewish world, immigration and absorption, the president of Israel, religious
affairs and other "beats" since she joined the paper in February 1973. She
has published over 29,000 news stories, features and columns as a Post
journalist and has A Master's degree graduate of Columbia University in
New York (Judy, US-Israel cooperation agreement signed to prevent
satellite collisions in space, The Jerusalem Post, August 17, 2015,
http://www.jpost.com/Business-and-Innovation/Health-and-Science/USIsrael-cooperation-agreement-signed-to-prevent-satellite-collisions-inspace-412370//dmeth)
The Space Administration in the Defense Ministrys MAFAT (Administration for the
Development of Weapons and Technological Infrastructure) has signed a cooperation
agreement with the US military on Monday to monitor and prevent collisions in space. The
agreement stated that man-made and other objects in space will be followed to ensure
ongoing activity in space and prevent unwanted collisions. It places Israel in a list of
countries that are active in space and regard themselves as responsible for ensuring
safety, the signatories said. Israel is known for its compact satellites. Other countries who have such
agreements are Britain, South Korea, France, Canada, Italy, Japan,
Australia and Germany, as well as the European Space Agenc y . The agreement, said
the Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv, will improve the know-how in each of the signatory countries on
movement in space and raise the security level of vital satellites that function daily in
communications, weather and navigation. In recent years, there has been an increase in the
number of satellites dispatched each year, and the number of government and private
owners has also increased, the ministry said. As a result, vast space has become relatively
crowded, so the objects must be monitored in an ongoing and efficient way to prevent accidents. Satellite
owners have to supply exact warnings in time. This information is vital when satellites are
launched, participate in exercises, suffer from electromagnetic interference and other events. MAFAT director Brig.Gen. (res.) Amnon Harari said that this agreement puts Israel at the forefront along with

other countries that see themselves as partners concerned about the stability of the world
and global security, and it will contribute to Israels national security. US Navy Adm. Cecil
Haney, who heads the United States Strategic Command, added that the US is determined to
improve the situation in space and cooperation and giving services to states ,
organizations and companies that use space satellite s. After all, we all have a
joint interest to act responsibility, boost transparency and create stable and lasting safety
in space over time, he said.

1nc ssa fails

Increased data fails low probability of collision means operators are
disincentivized from moving the satellites
Thompson 15 - Senior Engineering Specialist, Mission Analysis, B.S. in
engineering science and mechanics from North Carolina State University,
and an M.S. and a Ph.D. in engineering mechanics from Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University. (Roger, Understanding Space Debris:
Causes, Mitigations, and Issues, The Aerospace Corporation, Fall 2015, pg
6, http://aerospace.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/crosslink/Crosslink_Fall_2015.pdf//dmeth)
Mitigating the Hazards Although improved spacecraft design and shielding can be effective in minimizing damage from orbital debris, it is
far better to prevent an impact in the first place. Collision

avoidance (COLA, or CA) is a process where the

time of closest approach and probability of collision are computed from orbital data (this is
only possible for objects large enough to be tracked, which are 10 centimeters and larger ). If the probability of collision is
high and an avoidance maneuver is an option, satellite operators may choose to
maneuver their satellite to reduce the risk of collision. Of course, this is only possible when one of the objects at risk is an
active, maneuverable satellite; only a few hundred of the more than 1000 active satellites
have this capability. Collision avoidance is an issue that can be easy to understand in the abstractdetermine
the likelihood a piece of debris will strike a satellite and take measures to avoid it but difficult to apply, or even to
decide to apply. This arises because the risk of a satellite being struck by a piece
of debris is very low, on the order of one in tens of thousands , even one in a
million or more. At the same time, the consequences of both taking action and not taking
action are extremely high . If a satellite operator decides the risk is too high and takes
action to avoid a collision, valuable maneuvering fuel must be expended, shortening the
useful life of the satellite. If the operator decides not to take action and an impact occurs,
the satellite and its capability are lost; replacing it may take years and millions of dollars .
For commercial operators, business losses could run into the billions. There is also the attendant increased risk to other satellites from the
debris generated by this collision. Consequently, while there is risk in both taking COLA actions and not doing so, the implications of a
satellite loss are so great that COLA thresholdsin which a satellite is maneuvered out of harms waymay be very low, from one in 10,000
to one in a million.

cant solve space debris debris removal is key they only create additional
data
Muelhaupt 15 Associate Principal Director, Systems Analysis and
Simulation Subdivision, The Aerospace Corporation, more than 30 years of
experience in the analysis and operations of space systems. (Ted,
Understanding Space Debris: Causes, Mitigations, and Issues, The
Aerospace Corporation, Fall 2015, pg 2, http://aerospace.wpengine.netdnacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/crosslink/Crosslink_Fall_2015.pdf//dmeth)
Active debris removal will be necessary to reduce current debris levels . The
population of LEO will grow assuming a launch rate of new vehicles similar to that of last
couple of decades. It will at best only stabilize if postmission disposal guidelines are strictly adhered to, with growth being by far
the most likely outcome. The amount of growth will depend on the rate of compliance. What is unknown is what the correct population
density/level should be. There is not yet consensus on the acceptable level of debris risk. This is something of a quandary for the space
debris community. Disaster

is not imminent, but the need for mitigation action is now. Real
money must be spent on real programs now to benefit a somewhat vague future. The
immediate costs are very real, but the balancing benefits are extremely difficult to quantify. This is also a truly
international issueindeed an extraglobal onebut Aerospace and its partners can only directly affect U.S.

national programs. Politics and perception are also at play. An acceptable risk is largely based on human perception. For example, the
perception of the risk to astronauts flying the space shuttle changed drastically after the Challenger and Columbia disasters. At Aerospace,
the job has always been to focus on the technical accuracy of the answers supplied to the space community. The goal is to understand the
questions that the corporations customers have, to anticipate their problems, and to help them make the best decisions for success. These

analyses can help shine light on murky areas, give a solid foundation for broader programmatic decisions and policy recommendations, and
perhaps help prevent a manageable problem from becoming a serious one.

SSA fails many barriers that are unaddressed in astrodynamics literature

Jones and Bryant 15 University of Colorado, Department of Aerospace
Engineering Sciences (Brandon and Daniel, Challenges of Multi-Target
Tracking for Space Situational Awareness, International Conference on
Information Fusion, July 6-9, 2015,
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stamp/stamp.jsp?
tp=&arnumber=7266704//dmeth)
One of the findings of [6] is that significant improvement to SSA can be made via advanced data association techniques. Traditional
methods of multi-target tracking applied to SSA include multi-hypothesis trackers
(MHT) [1] and Joint Probabilisitic Data Association [2]. Alternatively, more recently developed methods
based on random finite sets (RFS) [12], [18] provide a framework that integrates data association with filtering, such as Probability
Hypothesis Density (PHD) [19] [21], Multi-Bernoulli [22], and Generalized Multi-Bernoulli filters [23], [24] are RFS filters that are
attractive candidates for SSA applications. However, there are issues that multitarget tracking algorithms must address. These include, but
are not limited to: Accurate modeling of target survival and detection probabilities, Handling spatiotemporal sparsity in measurements,
and Modeling birth, spawning, and clutter processes. Due

to the large number of observations and tracked

objects, Monte Carlo filter implementations of multi-target tracking algorithms are less
attractive when compared to Gaussian mixture (GM) filter implementations . However, GM
implementations are not without their own complications. To yield closed-form solutions to PDF
prediction and updates, GM implementations of the PHD (GM-PHD) filter assume that the survival probability (pS)
and detection probability (pD) are state independent. In the context of RSO tracking, the only
processes that are analogous to target death include reentry, a maneuver to leave the
Earth system, collision with another object, and a fragmentation event (e.g., explosion) of
sufficient energy. For a catastrophic collision or fragmentation, the death of one object would also result
in the birth of many smaller RSOs. Models exist to describe the distribution in number, size, and velocity change
for such events (e.g., [25]), but their probability at any point in time is nearly zero. Several factors
influence the probability of detection for RSOs. Often, especially for GM-based implementations of RFS multi-target
filters, pD is assumed constant over the field of view for the sake of tractability and numeric stability. However, the actual
detection probability is both a function of the sensor characteristics, the orbit environment, and the target itself. For radar sensors, the

visibility is
influenced by the solar phase angle and the Earths shadow, both of which affect pD [26]. Finally, the
instantaneous attitude and surface properties of an object influence the radar cross
section and brightness, which, when coupled with a sensors performance characteristics, yield a pD that varies
throughout a given scenario. For example, tumbling objects may appear to blink when viewed
over time via an optical sensor. The relatively large field of view for SSA sensors
creates key research challenges for multi-target tracking of RSOs . For example,
optical telescopes have a valid range from from just in front of the lens to infinity . Modeling
birth for a nearly infinite space is not tractable, which motivates the definition of a reasonable approximation. The d istribution of
space objects in Fig. 1 illustrates that objects are not uniformly distributed in altitude . Optical
telescope are typically used to observe objects at high altitudes (greater than 4,000 km), which includes GTOs. However, these objects
pose a challenge for modeling new-target birth given their large range of orbit altitudes
and a two-dimensional optical observation. Modeling birth in such a large region however, does pose significant
detection probability for an RSO increases as the range approaches a minimum. In terms of the orbit environment,

challenges, e.g., some models fill an entire FOV with diffuse Gaussian distributions which in this case requires a computationally intractable
number of GM components. This is also true for radar. Fig. 3 illustrates a radar FOV that is large enough to encapsulate a single arc of
observations of a LEO object. This region requires over 7500 GM birth components, each with a radius of 100 km, to cover the FOV.

Additionally, RSO tracks have states with a minimum of six dimensions which does not
work well with static birth region models. While 1280 6000 5000 4000 3000 X [km] 2000 1000 0 0 1000 2000

3000 Y [km] 4000 4500 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 Z [km] Fig. 3. Over 7500 GM birth components (centered at red
dots) with radii of 100 km required to fill a FOV just large enough to capture a single arc of observations. Distances on axes represent range
from sensor in the SouthEast-Up reference frame. increased

observation frequency allows for observing angle rates [27],

with the longer integration times that reduce clutter and increase the signalto-noise ratio. Modeling clutter for SSA sensors is a topic not commonly
addressed in the astrodynamics literature . As mentioned previously, this may be mostly eliminated for
this conflicts

optical sensors with larger integration times. Increased data rates allow for estimating angle rates, which produces observations with more

degrees of freedom. However, clutter distribution and density models are not prominently featured in the existing RSO tracking literature.

there lacks a sufficient amount of work which characterizes clutter with respect to observing
RSOs. The modeling of spawned targets is not trivial for space objects . The GM-PHD filter includes a
spawning model, however, its instantaneous estimate of the number of targets is unstable [ 12]. The GM
In summary,

Cardinalized PHD (GM-CPHD) filter [28] overcomes this cardinality instability by propagating the probability distribution of the number of
targets, however, classic forms of the CPHD fundamentally assume no spawning to improve tractability. Leveraging knowledge of persistent
RSOs to determine the states of spawned RSOs would likely be more computationally efficient than instantiating new objects via a birth
model.

2nc ssa fails

Tracking wont solve squo preventative measures fail to act upon SSA data
Pontin 14 science and technology writer (Mark, Beyond Gravity: the
complex quest to take out our orbital trash, Ars Technica, May 27, 2014,
http://web.archive.org/web/20140529222803/http://arstechnica.com/scien
ce/2014/05/beyond-gravity-the-complex-quest-to-take-out-our-orbitaltrash/3//dmeth)
Not only is there a lot of orbital debris to track, but theres no single answer about
what to do with it. The briefest consideration of the highly varied nature and distribution of
debris means that a one-size-fits-all technological solution is probably impossible. From a risk
management viewpoint, there are three categorically different challenges that removal technologies will need to
address. The highest priority is de-orbiting sizable items from orbits where the greatest
collision risks exist. Here the possible solutions include electromagnetic tethers, grapples, tugs, and inflatables and solar sails
(the latter delivered by nanosatellites). On reaching their targets, most of these technologies would
require months or years to complete their task . But that task is preventativeto deorbit large debris before it collides and fragmentsand the real risks of those collisions lie two to four
decades ahead. The second challenge is that we think those risks lie two to four decades ahead.
However, debris density has advanced far enough toward a Kessler-type
situation that the chances of black swan events (like the Iridium-Cosmos collision) are significant.
Worse, tracking may reveal two orbiting objects at imminent risk of collision
when we have no way to respond unless some kind of unmanned space tug can be rapidly deployed. Such a
rapid-response spacecraft would require a high degree of thrust and maneuverability, and it must be a high-mass object itself. That might
seem an unrealistically tall order, except that such a spacecraftor something very much like itis already being operated by the US Air
Force. Third, there

will be some need to develop collection media that can deal with clouds of
small debris fragments. Nobody wants the enormous expense and growing pains of developing and deploying such
technologies, but the situation will resemble the clean-up after a massive oil spill . That is, everybody
would prefer that matters never reach that point, but if enough orbital collisions start occurring, the technologies need to be available.
Enlarge / For scale purposes, look

how big some of the stuff we put into space is. NASA Weighing priorities
Why are high-mass objects the top priority? Simply put, so much of what we put in orbit is still in this form .
For instance, there's the football-field-sized ISS with its acre-wide solar panelsa habitat so big that, according to

Colonel Chris Hadfield, one could spend a whole day aboard without encountering another crew member. But there are also some 1,800
derelict rocket bodies and 3,200-odd satellites (about 1,000 operational), which comprise most of the mass hefted into orbit throughout the
decades. In this class of larger-scaled objects, two-dozen Russian SL-16 Zenit boosters, each massing 7,529 kilograms (equivalent to 8.3
tons), are clustered in a particularly crowded segment of LEO.

Applying a metric of collision probability

multiplied by mass, those Zenit boosters are high-priority candidates for removal
whenever we get serious about orbital debris remediation. As McKnight points out, Removing mass from

orbit as one large object of several thousand kilograms rather than as tens of thousands of fragments after a catastrophic collision will be at
least an order of magnitude less expensive and quicker to execute. One proposed solution is the so-called laser broom: a powerful groundbased laser pulsing at an orbital target. The

idea is to ablate the objects front surface so the resulting

plasma produces a retro-rocket-like thrust that slows it down. The drag of Earths upper
atmosphere does the rest, and it reenters and burns up. On its face, this concept has much in its favor. To
start, it's well researched. The Orion Project, a 1995-96 study by NASA and the US Air Force, concluded that a ground-based laser system
was both feasible and far more economically efficient than launching mechanical systems to grapple individually orbiting objects.
Furthermore, if someone wanted to do a near-zero-cost demo, the necessary technology exists right now in the form of the Starfire Optical
Range. That belongs to the Directed Energy Directorate at Kirtland US Air Force base, and it's currently used for tracking and imaging
satellites. But if it were a perfect solution, it'd be in progress already. "There are reasons that Orion final report has been on the shelf for
more than a decade," said Nicholas Johnson, Chief Scientist for NASA's Orbital Debris Program. Physics-wise,

the concepts
main downside is that pushing around objects with serious mass would only work
incrementally. A 2011 study by experts at Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, and various private firms evangelized for an improved laser
design as the only technology capable of taking down debris of all sizes and at all altitudes, including geosynchronous orbit (GEO), 35,786
kilometers above Earth. Yet even this improved laser, according to the study, would

require a minimum of 3.7 years

to de-orbit one large object with a mass of 1,000 kg. It would therefore need 27 years and
eight months to de-orbit one of those Zenit boosters. There are other problems . If a ground-

based lasers

pulses dont hit an orbiting object with total precision, the result might be a
diffused ablation jet that isn't effective, or worse, triggers its break up. This risk is enhanced if the
object happens to be tumbling or spinning. Ultimately, its the technologys dual-use potential that
currently blocks its deployment. NASAs official position is that any laser broom proposal is dead on arrival since any
laser able to blast a satellite sufficiently to de-orbit is a potential ASAT weaponas well as a technology that might help create an effective
ballistic missile defense. The technology is there," said Michael Krepon, director of the Space Security program at a global security think
tank called the Stimson Center. "The US isnt the only one who has it. Its

nave to assume, Krepon suggests, that

if the US started firing high-powered lasers at orbiting objects, the Russians or the
Chinese couldnt do the same. Since that would be far more destabilizing for the
international status quo than the US-China faceoff weve already had, nobody wants to
go there. Not yet, anyway. It would be nice to think that, alongside the international SSA data-sharing arrangement that the UKs

Crowther advocates, countries could reach an agreement to establish an internationally operated laser installation. One study prices such an
installation at $300 million; if it eliminated 300,000 pieces of orbital debris, thats $1,000 per object. This would make the laser broom
concept easily the most cost-effective means of dealing with debris, and thats on of top it being able to deal with both large and small debris
items. That size-agnosticism needs to be stressed, since high-mass objects like those Zenit boosters are just the biggest of 22,000-plus items
larger than 10 cm that the Pentagon currently tracks. Below that 10cm scale, a half-a-million-plus debris pieces, sized anywhere from 1 to
9cm, are circling in LEO at up to 18,000mph. A collision with a 5mm10cm-size object will still terminate a satellite or manned mission.
Even with sub-millimeter-sized debris, satellites have failed after being hit. Dozens of Space Shuttle windows had to be replaced because of
small-scaled debris impacts.

Alt causes geopolitics prevents cooperative solutions to space debris

Pontin 14 science and technology writer (Mark, Beyond Gravity: the
complex quest to take out our orbital trash, Ars Technica, May 27, 2014,
http://web.archive.org/web/20140529222803/http://arstechnica.com/scien
ce/2014/05/beyond-gravity-the-complex-quest-to-take-out-our-orbitaltrash/3//dmeth)
Its clear that weve got plenty of unclassified technologies ready to test alongside classified hardware that may be even more sophisticated.
So let's return to the question we started with: how

far do current international policies and governance

lag behind the LEO debris situation and our potential technological solutions ? Far
behind . Today, under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty that dictates existing space law, if one
of those dead Zenit boosters were in imminent danger of colliding with another nations
functioning spacecraft, itd be illegal for anybody but the Russians to touch the thing.
Currently, space law says that nations retain jurisdiction over their non-operational
spacecraft in perpetuity (unlike maritime law Earth-side, where salvage law applies). There are signs of change. The third draft
of an International Code of Conduct, or ICoC, for responsible spacefaring nations was released last year by the European Union. It moves
usefully toward managing space traffic and debris. Moreover, as the Stimson Centers Krepon noted, For the first time, Beijing and Moscow
have endorsed an official code of conduct in principle, so thats new ground. FURTHER READING RUSSIA SAYS IT MAY ABANDON
SPACE STATION BY 2020 OVER UKRAINE CONFLICT Country will also forbid US GPS stations within its borders in protest of sanctions.
Unfortunately, Chinese and Russian agreement in principle doesnt extend to the actual EU draft. Privately, the Chinese give two
objections in private, Krepon explained. Firstly, they object to language in the ICoC draft referencing the fundamental right nations have
in the UN charter to self-defense. According to Krepon, since the Bush II administration, the US has claimed an anticipatory right of selfdefense. So the Chinese might understandably resist seeing that applied in space. Secondly, though, they also object that the ICoC covers
military uses of space, while they prefer it cover only civil and commercial ones. Given their first concern, thats fairly self-contradictory.
Both Beijing and Moscow have been pushing since 2008 for a treaty banning systems specially produced or converted to be weapons in
space. However, Krepon said this treaty exempts ground-based systems. This exemption covers, effectively, most systems thatd actually be
deployed in any conflict in space today, including ASAT kinetic missilesprobably the first items a space weapons treaty should ban, since
they create the most debris. But figuring out what not to exempt is challenging. The

notion of banning weapons in

space rests on being able to define them," Krepon also noted. "I havent yet heard a definition
thats verifiable and meaningful when dealing with these multiple-purpose technologies .
If kinetic ASATs actually were banned, would it cover any medium-range missile, ICBM, SLBM, or missile defense interceptor that might
also be used for that purpose? Unless weapons inspectors could examine such a missiles programming, its purpose wouldnt necessarily be
evident. I

seriously doubt that this problem can be surmounted, Krepon says. The Russian and Chinese
are the prospects going forward? Krepon, for one, isnt
hopeful about the Chinese signing on to any grand international space agreements soon.
draft treaty is not a serious document. So what

In the near term, its possible that this ICoC, sensible though it might be, will remain a hostage to poor relations between the US and
China, and the US and Russia, he said. And

pessimistic as that may seem, Krepon is in the arms

control business, so he may be a little too optimistic. Official doctrine for both the
Chinese and US militaries is that the two nations are each others greatest future military
threat. Each has developed strategies targeting the others key space assets. Military
brinksmanship in LEO will likely recur . Sadly, this isnt an area where we can expect to see the private
sector leapfrog governments. Commercial space operators will resist spending any money on top of expenses that presently begin with

launch costs of approximately $5,000 for each kilogram placed in LEO. As Nassim Taleb stressed in his book, The

Black Swan, a
black swan event only has to be so rare or unpredictable that most people ignore its
possibilityand the precise timing of the next serious debris-creating collision is
inherently unpredictable. Here in 2014, the most likely prognosis is that research into orbital
debris removal technologies will get funded, but no serious deployment of those
technologies will take place before the next catastrophic event occurs. That, most
likely, is in the 2015-2018 time frame. At that point, people will sufficiently sober up and start realistically weighing the high costs of
deploying these technologies against the ever-greater costs of waiting. In the meantime, the clock is ticking.

2nc alt cause

Alt cause budget cuts
Schafer 16 Aerospace company, provide innovative engineering and
technology to the military, intelligence, DHS, NASA, new commercial space
companies and other industries, engaged in complex, high-level missions
and programs, guiding efforts such as development, modeling, simulation,
communication and technology management. (Commercial Space
Situational Awareness, May 25, 2016,
http://www.schafercorp.com/cssa//dmeth)
Recent projections show as much as a five-fold increase in space traffic based on more space
activity by traditional space faring countries and the arrival of many additional nations, businesses, and universities.
Along with that projection comes more satellites and more debris. Tracking and de-conflicting all of
this will stretch US Government SSA capacities to the breaking point ,
threatening continued safe and profitable use of space for all . Meanwhile, US
Government budget pressures will likely inhibit development of an SSA
architecture that can handle the demands of this emerging environment .

1nc ssa causes war

SSA makes conflict escalation between the US and China more likely rapid
escalation and overestimation of capabilities
stberg 15,
(Malin stberg has a Masters, Does military technology increase the likelihood of war? :
new precision and information technology and the future prospect of great-power war
between the People's Republic of China and the United States,
https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2391476/%C3%98stberg%2c
%20Malin%20Tr%C3%B8nningsdal.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, TMP)
In an attempt to secure the space domain, the US is advancing its monitoring capabilities. With
the advent of the US Air Forces Geosynchronous S pace S ituational A wareness P rogram (GSSAP), a
satellite program designed to deter potential rivals in space as the GSSAP satellites
can provide close up imagery of objects, it is no longer as easy to remain
anonymous when engaging in hostile activities in space . Two such satellites were
launched on July 28 2014, and should begin to deliver information in 2015. This project is highly classified,
and the only reason its existence is known is that, for purposes of deterrence , the
adversary needs to know that it exists. In attempts to control space, to deter and
potentially disrupt future attacks, the US has improved its terrestrial radars to gain access to
intelligence on Chinese launches (IISS 2015a:14). When anonymity is compromised, so is the element
of surprise. As little is known about the GSSAP satellites, speculations regarding their possible impact
are highly elusive. Although it is likely to help US estimation , it is also possible it
may foster a more rapid escalation of a potential conflict , should it be uncovered
that China had shot down a US asset or launched a potentially threatening object. Such a
scenario could lead to increase US fear , and potential preemptive attacks. It is not
easy to know the intentions of others, and it can be beneficial to either exaggerate or downplay own capabilities in some
cases to install the adversary with skewed expectations. Chase et al (2015:50) writes that (..) It is possible that the

PLA may be seeking to present itself as less capable in some dimensions , to shape potential
adversaries expectations and planning. This may also be the case for the US in that
so many of the reports hold that space is a great vulnerability for the US. It is
difficult to know whether this vulnerability indeed is as large as proscribed.

2nc turns china war

Space situational awareness causes space militarization the brink is now
McCall and Darrah 14
(Gene H. McCall is a PhD and Affiliate Research Professor at the Desert Research Institute in Reno Nevada,
(BEE, Georgia Institute of Technology; MEE, New York University; PhD, Princeton University) has served as
chief scientist, Air Force Space Command; laboratory fellow, Los Alamos National Laboratory; and
chairman, USAF Scientific Advisory Board. He helped found the Inertial Fusion Program at Los Alamos and
was a consultant to the Department of Energy for inertial fusion issues. In 1995 Dr. McCall directed the New
World Vistas study requested by the secretary and chief of staff of the Air Force, widely regarded by the
defense community as a guide for the development of twenty-first-century weapons for the Air Force. He has
received the Department of Energys E. O. Lawrence Award for contributions to national security, the Air
Force Associations Theodore von Karman Award for technical achievement, the Department of Defense
Distinguished Public Service Award, and the Secretary of the Air Force Exceptional Service Award with oak
leaf cluster. Space Situational Awareness: Difficult, Expensiveand Necessary,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/digital/pdf/articles/2014-Nov-Dec/SLP-Mccall_Darrah.pdf, TMP)
As part of the development and fielding processes, we

cultivated sophisticated methods for monitoring

the health, position , and operational status of space vehicles. However, the evolution and
installation of sensors to warn of and identify attacks on them were somewhat neglected. Even though some people
believed that such sensors were important, the programs, in general, proceeded as though their distance from the surface

we should not think , for even one

moment, that the increasing reliance of US military forces on space assets has
gone unnoticed by potential adversaries , both military and economic. Nations both
large and small have begun to develop space and antispace capabilities that fall
of the earth and their speed conveyed upon them a charmed existence. But

into two broad categories: (1) assets located in space that can enhance national military capabilities or contribute to the

technologies and devices that can defeat or

destroy American space assets . The first category includes surveillance instruments created by various

nations economic development, and (2)

nations, space-based navigation systems developed by Russia and China, and weather- and earth-sensing devices
produced by countries such as India and Japan. Such assets NovemberDecember 2014 Air & Space Power Journal | 8

we have
seen a significant amount of work on antisatellite devices by Russia and
China. Innovations in high-power laser and microwave technology, which
could be used against American space assets, continue in many countries .
These devices and technologies are US mission-defeat assets . As yet, we have
seen no direct-attack weapons based in space, such as warhead-carrying
missiles that could target an object on the earths surface, but we should not
completely discount the possibility of these weapons emerging in the future .
Senior Leader Perspective contribute to foreign mission enhancement (FME). In the second category,

As early as 1962, the Soviet Union began work on a device called the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS).
Although the Soviets did not design FOBS to place a nuclear weapon permanently in orbit, its launcher and guidance
system could do just that. The project appears to have been abandoned because of accuracy shortfalls, not deployment
difficulties. Development of improved reentry precision, occasioned by the need to provide services for the International
Space Station, may enable the deployment of such weapons in the future. In terms of a category, we identify these devices
as direct-attack space assets. A third categoryspace debrishas received much publicity but, as yet, has had only a minor
impact on space operations. We will expand this area a bit by defining a set of dangerous objects as passive threats.
Certainly, debris falls into this category, but it also includes items like out-of-control satellites and rockets.

Extinction
Mitchell, 01 Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the
University of Pittsburgh
(Dr. Gordon, ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic
Diplomacy at a Crossroads, No. 6 July,
http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html)

A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of

'peace through strength' deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the
tendency that ' the presence of space weaponswill result in the
increased likelihood of their use'.33 This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact
elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite

The interlocking nature of offense and

defense in military space technology stems from the inherent 'dual
capability' of spaceborne weapon components. As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of
warfare technologies go hand-in-hand'.34

Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to intercept something in space, you
could use the same capability to target something on land'. 35 To the extent that ballistic missile

interceptors can also

be used as orbiting 'Death Stars', capable of sending munitions hurtling
through the Earth's atmosphere. The dizzying speed of space warfare
would introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure into strategic
calculations, with the spectre of split-second attacks creating
incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair trigger'
devices. In theory, this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms.
However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands
and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners
could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict. Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has
interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such

analyzed 'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which have
many sophisticated components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. According to
Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems
could fail. As Perrow explains, '[t]he odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that, given the system

Deployment of
space weapons with pre-delegated authority to fire death rays or
unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given
the susceptibility of such systems to 'normal accidents'. It is chilling to
contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even
a tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high
velocity that it can do enormous damage even more than would be
done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!'. 37 In the same Star Wars technology
characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable'.36

touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing
offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people'.38 Given this

any nation subjected to space

weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, including use of
nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war
sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the
most destructive military conflict ever seen.
unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that

2nc china not key

US-China cooperation not key to the SSA- the US can do it by itself
Krepon, Hitchens, Katz-Hyman 09 Michael, Co-Founder of the Stimson Center. He
worked previously at the Carnegie Endowment, the State Department, and on Capitol Hill. His areas of
expertise are reducing nuclear dangers -- with a regional specialization in South Asia, Theresea, Senior
Research Scholar at CISSM, where she focuses on space security, Michael, research associate for the Space
Security Project of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Preserving Freedom of Action in Space:
Realizing the Potential and Limits of US Spacepower, (http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/researchpdfs/Preserving_Freedom_of_Action_in_Space.pdf) JB

Space situational awareness (SSA) the ability to monitor and understand the constantly changing
environment in space is one of the most important factors in ensuring the safety
and security of operational all satellites and spacecraft . SSA provides individual
actors with the ability to monitor the health of their own assets, as well as an awareness
of the actions of others in space. Transparency measures can be particularly helpful in
providing early warning of troubling developments and in dampening threat
perceptions. One measure of US spacepower and space prowess is Americas unparalleled space situational awareness
capabilities. Thus, the United States is in a position to become a leader in building space
transparency, which is the foundation stone of norm setting and rules of the road in
space.

space war advs

1nc no space war

no space war cost and inconvenience
Wordsworth 15 - I'm a UK journalist, and write for Gizmodo, Kotaku and
Vice. (Rich, Why We'll Never Fight a Real-Life Star Wars Space Conflict,
December 18, 2015, Gizmodo, http://www.gizmodo.co.uk/2015/12/whywell-never-fight-a-real-life-star-wars-space-conflict//dmeth)
Well, never say never. You might not make to the end of this paragraph before the sky lights up and the world goes dark.
But there are some good reasons to be optimistic that wont happen . One reassuring factor
is that the

more other countries develop their militaries, the more dependent on networks
they become as well. China is developing its own drone programme, and so is Russia,
which will both presumably be dependent on satellites to operate . And the more their (and
our) economies and business interests develop, the more everyone will rely on satellites
to further their economic ambitions. In the event that countries were to start knocking out each others
satellites on a large scale, the consequences across the board for everyone would be
disastrous. It would also be expensive in the short term. Getting things into orbit peaceful
or otherwise still isnt cheap, which is why only a handful of countries regularly do so. And
if you want to blow up a network of many satellites today (as you would have to in a first strike, to
ensure other satellites couldnt pick up the slack), launching small satellites or missiles into orbit is the
only practical way to do that arming satellites with their own weaponry just isnt
financially or technologically feasible on a grand scale . We are, happily, a long way from a Death Star.
I dont think [a large first strike] would be financially too costly [if youre] thinking about kinetic energy weapons and the
air-based or ground-based lasers, says Jasani. Its viable. But if you say, Im going to put an [ASAT]

weapon [permanently] in orbit, we are then getting into very expensive and very
complicated technology. So my guess is that in the foreseeable future, what we are going to focus on are the
kinetic energy weapons and possibly lasers that could blind satellites or affect, for example, the solar panels. That kind of
technology will be delivered in the foreseeable future, rather than having lasers in orbit [like] the Star Wars kind of thing.
But theres another, possibly even more persuasive reason that a kinetic war in space may not

happen: its just so much easier and less damaging to mess with satellites without
getting close to them. Jamming from the ground is not difficult, says Quintana. If you look at
the Middle East, pick a country where theres a crisis and the chances are that the military in that country has tried to jam
a commercial satellite to try and avoid satellite TV channels broadcasting anti-government messages. My guess is that by
the time we are ready for space warfare, I think you may not be banking on your hit-to-kill ASATs, but more on [nondestructive] high-energy laser-based systems, Jasani agrees. [Space debris] affects all sides, not just the attacked side.
The attacking side will have its own satellites in orbit, which might be affected by the debris [of its own attack]. And if

you really need to remove an enemys satellite coverage, you can always try to flatten or
hack the control stations on the ground, leaving the satellites talking with no-one to
listen. I dont think physically blowing things up from the ground is something that
people are looking at again, says Quintana. Countries and governments try to find means
other than physical conflict to achieve their strategic ends. So as space becomes more
commercial and more civilian and as more scientific satellites go up , then youll find that states
will not seek to directly attack each other, but will seek other means. It may just be that they
will try to cyber-attack the satellites and take them over, which has been done in the past. Its much

easier to physically or cyber-attack the ground control station than it is to attack the satellite itself - so why would you not
look to do that as a first port of call and achieve the same ends? Ultimately, then, what might keep us safe from

a war in space isn't the horror of explosives in orbit, but a question of cost and
convenience.

2nc alt causes

space war is inevitable
Billings 15 editor of Scientific American, featured in The New York Times,
The Washington Post, Scientific American, Popular Mechanics and many
other publications. From 2006 to 2011, he was an editor at Seed Magazine,
where he covered science and technology topics including astrophysics,
space exploration, paleontology and robotics. He graduated in 2003 from
the University of Minnesota with a degree in journalism. (Lee, War in
Space May Be Closer Than Ever, Scientific American, August 10, 2015,
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closerthan-ever//dmeth)
Meanwhile, shifts in U.S. policy are giving China and Russia more reasons for further
suspicion. Congress has been pressing the U.S. national security community to turn its
attentions to the role of offensive rather than defensive capabilities, even dictating that
most of the fiscal year 2015 funding for the Pentagons Space Security and Defense
Program go toward development of offensive space control and active defense strategies
and capabilities.
Offensive space control is a clear reference to weapons. Active defense is
much more nebulous, and refers to undefined offensive countermeasures that could be
taken against an attacker, further widening the routes by which space might soon
become weaponized. If an imminent threat is perceived, a satellite or its operators
might preemptively attack via dazzling lasers, jamming microwaves, kinetic
bombardment or any other number of possible methods.
I hope to never fight a war in space, Hyten says. Its bad for the world. Kinetic [antisatellite weaponry] is horrible for the world, because of the existential risks debris poses
for all satellites. But if war does extend into space, he says, we have to have
offensive and defensive capabilities to respond with , and Congress has asked us
to explore what those capabilities would be. And to me, the one limiting factor is no
debris. Whatever you do, dont create debris.
Technology to jam transmissions, for example, appears to underpin the Air Forces
Counter Communications System, the U.S.s sole acknowledged offensive capability
against satellites in space. It's basically a big antenna on a trailer, and how it actually
works, what it actually does, nobody knows, Weeden says, noting that, like most space
security work, the details of the system are top secret. All we basically know is that they
could use it to somehow jam or maybe even spoof or hack into an adversarys satellites.
For Krepon, the debate over the definitions of space weapons and the saber-rattling
between Russia, China and the U.S. is unhelpfully eclipsing the more pressing issue of
debris. Everyone is talking about purposeful, man-made objects dedicated to
warfighting in space, and its like we are back in the Cold War , Krepon says.
Meanwhile, there are about 20,000 weapons already up there in the form of
debris. Theyre not purposefultheyre unguided. Theyre not seeking out enemy
satellites. Theyre just whizzing around, doing what they do.
The space environment, he says, must be protected as a global commons, similar to the
Earths oceans and atmosphere. Space junk is very easy to make and very hard to clean
up, so international efforts should focus on preventing its creation. Beyond the threat of
deliberate destruction, the risk of accidental collisions and debris strikes will continue
to grow as more nations launch and operate more satellites without rigorous
international accountability and oversight. And as the chance of accidents increases, so

too does the possibility of their being misinterpreted as deliberate, hostile

actions in the high-tension cloak-and-dagger military struggle in space .
We are in the process of messing up space, and most people dont realize it because we
cant see it the way we can see fish kills, algal blooms, or acid rain, he says. To avoid
trashing Earth orbit, we need a sense of urgency that currently no one has. Maybe well
get it when we cant get our satellite television and our telecommunications, our global
weather reports and hurricane predictions. Maybe when we get knocked back to the
1950s, well get it. But by then it will be too late

1nc arms race

No space arms raceChina has no incentive to develop offensive capabilities

Weeden 15. (Brian, former U.S. Air Force space and missile operations officer and currently
technical adviser for Secure World Foundation, a non-profit organization dedicated to the long-term
sustainable use of outer space. Dancing in the dark redux: Recent Russian rendezvous and proximity
operations in space, Space Review. 10/5/2015. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2839/3)//CB

The fourth and final focus of Chinas space activities is to strengthen cooperation and
improve bilateral relationships with other major powers, of which the most prominent is
the United States. China has stated that the development of its space capabilities should
not be achieved at the cost of bilateral relations or mutual confidence with other
states.52 A space arms race may seriously deteriorate Chinas external environment and
divert precious and limited resources away from urgent domestic areas. In addition, it
could shift Chinas broader foreign policy and grand strategy from competitive
cooperation to total confrontation. The costs of a hostile space arms race and direct
conflict with the United States would thus far outweigh the benefits provided by new
space capabilities.

1nc miscalc
US-China hotline solves for miscalc
Lan 15- Chen, writer on the chinese space program, Go Taikounauts, (http://www.gotaikonauts.com/images/newsletters_PDF/GoTaikonauts18.pdf) JB
Though Sino-U.S. cooperation on human spaceflight is still uncertain, a positive move
between the two countries has been made, that is the establishment of a space hotline.
Western media reported in November that the hotline has been setup between Washington
and Beijing to allow easy sharing of technical information about their space
operations, hopefully avoiding any misunderstandings or accidents.
All of their impacts dont take into account the fact that since China is
becoming more invested in space- solves any possibility of miscalc because
nobody wants it
Pollpeter et al 15 Kevin, senior research analyst and Deputy Director, Study of
Innovation and Technology in China, Eric, research associate, Jordan, Policy Analyst,
Security and Foreign Affairs at U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Fan, an Yang is a research analyst, China Dream, Space Dream,
(http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20Dream%20Space
%20Dream_Report.pdf) JB
Moreover, what is unwritten in Chinese analyses is that as China becomes more
invested in space capabilities it takes on the same vulnerabilities as the
United States . Although China would not have the same asymmetries as the United States in a conflict in the
Western Pacific, the goal of having a global, 24- hour, all-weather remote sensing capability
and spending nearly $1 billion per year until 2020 to establish a global satellite
navigation system and associated technologies indicates that China is devoting
significant effort and resources to establish a system that is similar in architecture to that
of the U.S. militarys space program. With this trajectory, China will have as much to lose as it
has to gain from the management or mismanagement of the outer space global
commons. It is in this vein that some sort of strategic accommodation that ameliorates
the worst effects of competition could be achieved.
Nobody will fight a war in space- everybody loses and even if a war was
fought in space there is no guarantee that the US will retaliate
Lamrani 16- Omar, writer that focuses on air power, naval strategy, technology,
logistics and military doctrine for a number of regions, What the U.S. Military Fears
Most: A Massive Space War, (http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/what-the-usmilitary-fears-most-massive-space-war-16248?page=3) JB
Increased competition in space is reviving fears of a war there, one with devastating
consequences. Humanity depends on space systems for communication, exploration,
navigation and a host of other functions integral to modern life. Moreover, future
breakthroughs may await in space, including solar energy improvements, nuclear waste disposal and
extraterrestrial mining. A war in space would disable a number of key satellites, and the resulting debris would
place vital orbital regions at risk. The damage to the world economy could also be
disastrous. In severity, the consequences of space warfare could be comparable to those of nuclear war. What's more,
disabling key constellations that give early launch warnings could be seen as the opening salvo in a nuclear attack, driving

the United States and other nations are taking

measures to better prepare for a potential war in space , their emphasis will likely remain

the threat of a wider conflagration. While

on deterrence. This is an important notion to understand, not only for potential U.S. enemies but also for the United

States itself. For instance, it is conceivable that technological

advancements in the coming decades could

allow the United States to recover militarily from a space clash more quickly than the ever-more
space dependent China or Russia. In such a scenario, the costs that a space war would have for the
world as a whole might be enough to dissuade Washington from launching its own space
attack.

coop advs

1nc iss
China would never join the ISS
Lan 15- Chen, writer on the chinese space program, Go Taikounauts, (http://www.gotaikonauts.com/images/newsletters_PDF/GoTaikonauts18.pdf) JB
China must have concerns about its independence and the planned retirement of the ISS
in 2024 or as late as 2028, if lucky enough. It would be too risky to bind Chinas future
human space flight activities with the ISS. Russias plan to separate its segment
from ISS and the problems caused by the Ukraine crisis, also reminds the Chinese not to
repeat Russias path. There are potential conflicts of interest, global or regional, between
China and U.S. and China may face a similar or more serious situation than Russia is
facing today.

2nc china says no

China implemented its space program to increase prestige and become a
world power
Pollpeter et al 15 Kevin, senior research analyst and Deputy Director, Study of
Innovation and Technology in China, Eric, research associate, Jordan, Policy Analyst,
Security and Foreign Affairs at U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Fan, an Yang is a research analyst, China Dream, Space Dream,
(http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20Dream%20Space
%20Dream_Report.pdf) JB
Because Chinas explanation of its space policy is limited and because China has not
issued a space strategy, determining the direction of its space program can be difficult.
This does not mean, however, that Chinas space strategy is unknowable. In order to address
this challenge this study will position Chinas space strategy within the context of its grand strategy. Although it is
important to stress that China does not appear to have an official grand strategy, there is a consensus that

China

desires to increase its power and position in the world and that this desire is based on
several principles. First is the Chinese concept of fuqiang (), or wealth and power. The term fuqiang
is a shortened version of fuguo qiangbing ( ) meaning rich country and strong army. The goal of having a rich
country and strong army was first expressed by the Legalist philosopher Han Feizi during the Warring States Period of the
fifth century BC when he stated, If a wise ruler masters wealth and power, he can have whatever he desires. 7 The

pursuit of wealth and power has taken on new impetus with the rise to power of Chinese
President Xi Jinping in 2012 and his call for China and the Chinese people to chase the China Dream. Although the
concept of the China Dream remains ill-defined, Xi has described it as improvement of peoples livelihoods, prosperity,
construction of a better society, and military strengthening. 8 The concept of the China Dream and Chinas pursuit of
wealth and power also ties closely to the Chinese idea of national rejuvenation. Chinese history stresses

Chinas role as a world power that was lost to the hands of foreigners beginning in 1839 with the
first Opium War. From then until the founding of the Peoples Republic of China in 1949, described as the one hundred
years of humiliation, China was engulfed in domestic turmoil, civil war, and foreign invasion that rendered it weak, with
no real standing in the world order. Since 1839, Chinese politicians and intellectuals sought to restore

China to its previous periods of 4 economic and military power, 9 with little success until
the founding of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 when the Communist Party rid China of
foreign influence and later sought greater prosperity through economic reform started by Deng Xiaoping. This
legacy of Chinas downfall into foreign subjugation, economic stagnation,
and national humiliation is seen today in Chinas pursuit of wealth and
power. According to David Lampton, Hyman Professor and director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, One almost universally shared goal in the PRCindeed in China for
the last 150 years or more, since the Qing Dynasty went into declineis to make China rich and powerful and to regain the
nations former status as a great power that controls its own fate. 10 As Ye Zicheng of Peking University writes, China is
a unique country in the history of world civilization. Nearly all the more than 20 great civilizations in world history have
vanishedUnlike all these other civilizations, China is the only country that has continuously maintained its historical
civilization for some 5,000 yearsThis unique continuity expresses its creativity for self-renewal. 11 He continues, That
China was able to become a great power many times over the course of more than 2,000 years was due to its strong points
and the superiority that it enjoyed. This also confers on contemporary China some cultural and historical resources that
can be made use of today to expedite growth. 12 According to David Finkelstein, vice president and director of the China
Studies Division at the Center for Naval Analyses, Chinas grand strategy can be summarized as the attainment of a
strong, modern, and prosperous China. 13 Avery Goldstein further elaborates, writing that China aims to

engineer its rise to great power status within the constraints of a unipolar international
system that the United States dominates. It is designed to sustain the conditions
necessary for continuing Chinas program of economic and military modernization as
well as to minimize the risk that others, most importantly the peerless United States, will view the
ongoing increase in Chinas capabilities as an unacceptably dangerous threat that must be
parried or perhaps even forestalled. Chinas grand strategy, in short, aims to increase the countrys international clout
without triggering a counterbalancing reaction.14 The basis for Chinas rise to great power status is a strong economy.
Chinese scholars point to the Soviet Union as proof that merely having a strong army is not sufficient for maintaining a
countrys position in the world. Not only will a growing economy give China more influence in the world, it will also enable

it to afford the capabilities it needs to wield that power. The ultimate goal of becoming a rich country with a strong army is
to preserve Chinas sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and political system by integrating itself into the
existing international system, 15 while at the same time working to transform the system to better suit Chinas interests.16
But because the United States remains the worlds lone superpower, China must not derail its economic modernization
effort by coming into military or economic conflict with the United States. As a result, even though China is becoming
more assertive in defending what it sees are its legitimate interests, it will try to do so in a way that does not fundamentally
harm its economic interests and lead it into a military conflict with the United States. Although China does not seek
conflict with the United States, it must at the same time act in ways to bring about its goal of becoming a world power. 17
As Peking Universitys Ye writes, there is a close connection between the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and Chinas
becoming a world power. If China does not become a world power, the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will be
incomplete. Only when it becomes a world power can we say that the total rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has been
achieved. 18 Although President Xi Jinping has stated that China must strive to make our neighbors more friendly in
politics, economically more closely tied to us, and we must have deeper security cooperation and closer people-to-people
ties, 19 he has also stated that China would never sacrifice its legitimate rights or basic interests and that no foreign
country should expect us to make a deal on our core interests and hope we will swallow the bitter pill that will damage our
sovereignty, security, and development interests. 20 As Bonnie Glaser, senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, concludes: China appears to believe that growing Chinese economic and

military clout will over time persuade its neighbors that there is more to gain from
accommodating Chinese interests than from challenging them. In handling relations with its
neighbors, China is employing both carrots and sticks to deter countries from pursuing policies that inflict damage on
Chinese interests.21 This strategy will require a careful balancing act. China must learn to minimize confrontation with
potential foes while at the same time strengthening its economic ties with them. As Peking Universitys Wang Jisi writes,
All this means that it is virtually impossible to distinguish China's friends from its foes. The United States might pose
political and military threats, and Japan, a staunch U.S. ally, could be a geopolitical competitor of China's, but these two
countries also happen to be two of China's greatest economic partners. 22 The Pursuit of Comprehensive National Power
and Chinas Grand Strategy In order to carry out this grand strategy, China must build up what it calls comprehensive
national power (CNP). There is no set definition of comprehensive national power. According to a report written by the
Chinese Academy of Sciences, comprehensive national power refers to the complete power and international influence
that a sovereign country uses and developsIt includes societal, material, and spiritual factors. It also includes real power
and potential power and mechanisms to turn potential power 6 into real power. It is the organic integration and
interactive use of a countrys politics, economy, science, culture, education, national defense, diplomacy, national
resources, and national will. 23 It is also the representation of a countrys ability to protect and garner its national
interests. 24 Ye Zicheng defines CNP as the power of a sovereign country, including both hard power, such as economic
and military power, and soft power, such as spiritual, cultural, national historical tradition, and national cohesiveness.
National power also includes both present power and potential power. 25 In short, Ye writes that CNP is best understood
as comprising a countrys survival ability, development capacity, and international influence. 26 David Lampton uses a
more political science-oriented description of CNP as the sum total of coercive, economic, and ideational power of a
nation. 27 CNP is difficult to operationalize due to the difficulty in appropriately measuring resources and their relative
importance, and then combining them into one measurement while at the same time taking into account both real and
potential power.28 The purpose here, however, is not to debate the merits of using CNP, but rather to explore how it
guides Chinese analysts in their conception of Chinas grand strategy. As George Washington University professor David
Shambaugh writes, The Chinese have wisely learned one key lesson from studying the experiences of other previous
powers: genuine powers possess multidimensional strength. 29 This includes the economy, science, technology,
education, culture, values, military, governance, diplomacy, and other sectors as well as a strong component of soft
power.30 A critical part of Chinas quest to increase its CNP and become a world power is the ability to develop high
technology independently. Chinas leadership understands that its growth model based on being the worlds low cost
manufacturer is not sustainable over the long term and that it must move up the value chain by being able to manufacture
its own high technology products. The importance of technological innovation was highlighted in a June 2014 speech by
Xi Jinping in which he urged Chinas scientists and engineers to innovate, innovate, and innovate again. 31 According to
Xi, China is closer than at any other time in its history of reaching its mighty goal of the rejuvenation of the Chinese
people and that China must continue by resolutely implementing the strategy of using science and education to
rejuvenate the country and innovation to drive development and unswervingly continue on the road of making China into
a strong science and technology power. 32 Drawing on lessons from history, Xi statesthat science and technology are the
basis of a strong and prosperous country and that since the sixteenth century every science and technology revolution has
influenced the global power structure. Drawing on Chinas own history since the end of the Ming Dynasty, Xi states that
the strength of a country cannot simply be based on the size of its population or territory and that the reason China took a
beating between 1839 and 1949 was that it was backwards in science and technology. Xi concludes that China cannot lag
in the 23 Jiang Zhou, competitive arena of science and technology and must
catch up to and eventually surpass the current science and technology leaders by first focusing on core technologies.
Consequently, China can only maintain its economic and military security through original innovation and not on relying
on dressing up foreign technologies into Chinese products.33 Chinas Space Strategy Chinas grand

strategy is reflected in its pursuit of space power. Indeed, Chinas space program has
received high-level endorsement from Chinas leadership. Mimicking the China Dream slogan,
members of Chinas space program are encouraged to chase the Space Dream (). According to Xi Jinping, the
dream of space flight () is an important part of the strong country dream () 34 and the

space dream
is an important component of realizing the Chinese peoples mighty dream of national
rejuvenation. 35 The importance of the space program is rooted in the importance of the

role high technology plays in Chinas development. According to one researcher, building China
as a strong space power is the only way that China can rejuvenate to have wealth and
power. 36 According to this view, space technologies are both high risk yet a high value added
strategic industry that places great demands on a countrys research and development
apparatus across many different industries.37 As a result, the development of space
technologies is both a display of a countrys technological capability and by extension a
display of its military, economic, and scientific capabilities, but also a necessary move for
a country that wants to strengthen its national power.38

1nc coop solvency

coop fails empirics
Billings 15 editor of Scientific American, featured in The New York Times,
The Washington Post, Scientific American, Popular Mechanics and many
other publications. From 2006 to 2011, he was an editor at Seed Magazine,
where he covered science and technology topics including astrophysics,
space exploration, paleontology and robotics. He graduated in 2003 from
the University of Minnesota with a degree in journalism. (Lee, War in
Space May Be Closer Than Ever, Scientific American, August 10, 2015,
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closerthan-ever//dmeth)
In response to these possible threats, the Obama administration has budgeted at least $5
billion to be spent over the next five years to enhance both the defensive and offensive
capabilities of the U.S. military space program. The U.S. is also attempting to tackle the
problem through diplomacy, although with minimal success ; in late July at the
United Nations, long-awaited discussions stalled on a European Union-drafted code of
conduct for spacefaring nations due to opposition from Russia, China and
several other countries including Brazil, India, South Africa and Iran. The failure
has placed diplomatic solutions for the growing threat in limbo, likely
leading to years of further debate within the UNs General Assembly.
A UN treaty similar to the aff was recently rejected by china proves theres
no desire for space demilitarization
Billings 15 editor of Scientific American, featured in The New York Times,
The Washington Post, Scientific American, Popular Mechanics and many
other publications. From 2006 to 2011, he was an editor at Seed Magazine,
where he covered science and technology topics including astrophysics,
space exploration, paleontology and robotics. He graduated in 2003 from
the University of Minnesota with a degree in journalism. (Lee, War in
Space May Be Closer Than Ever, Scientific American, August 10, 2015,
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closerthan-ever//dmeth)
As an alternative, the U.S. supports a European-led initiative to establish norms for proper
behavior through the creation of a voluntary International Code of Conduct for Outer
Space. This would be a first step, to be followed by a binding agreement. A draft of the code which Russia and
China prevented from being adopted in last months UN discussions calls for
more transparency and confidence-building between spacefaring nations as a way of
promoting the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. This, it is hoped, can prevent the generation of
more debris and the further development of space weapons. However, like the Russian-Chinese treaty, the code does not exactly
define what constitutes a space weapon. That haziness poses problems for senior defense
officials such as General John Hyten, the head of the U.S. Air Force Space Command. Is our space-based surveillance system that looks out at the heavens and
tracks everything in geosynchronous a weapons system? he asks. I think everybody in the world would look at that and say no. But its maneuverable, its going

would [a treatys] language ban our ability to

do space-based surveillance? I would hope not!
17,000 miles per hour, and it has a sensor on board. Its not a weapon, okay? But

Coop fails lengthy delays

Martin 16 NASA Inspector General (Paul, NASAS INTERNATIONAL
PARTNERSHIPS: CAPABILITIES, BENEFITS, AND CHALLENGES, May 5,

2016, NASA Office of Inspector General, pgs 33-40,

https://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY16/IG-16-020.pdf//dmeth)
AGREEMENT PROCESS OFTEN LENGTHY The procedure NASA follows for
reviewing, negotiating, and approving international agreements known as the C-175 process
requires coordination with the interagency community , approval by State,
and is rarely completed within established timeframes . The result can be
project delays and uncertainty for both NASA and its partners . Ten of the 15
space agencies we surveyed cited agreement processing time as a factor that complicates
collaboration with NASA. It can take many months of negotiating between
NASA and its partners before an agreement is finalized . Moreover, we found that a
limited number of State Department staff, and in particular only one legal officer , is
assigned to review NASA agreements. In an effort to expedite the process, State and NASA have agreed upon standardized

implementing agreements under existing frameworks that allow for a 2 week processing period. NASA currently has frameworks with 12 foreign partners and is
working toward frameworks with 5 others. C-175 Process The C-175 process is intended to ensure proper exercise of the treaty making powers of the Federal
government. Pursuant to the process, State must approve agreements with foreign governments that meet the criteria set forth in the Case-Zablocki Act.54 In
determining whether an agreement is governed by the Act, State applies five criteria: (1) identity and intention of the parties, (2) significance of the arrangement,
(3) specificity of the parties responsibilities, (4) necessity for multiple parties, and (5) the format of the agreement.55 If the Act applies, the agreement must go
through the C-175 process. State approval is not required for international agreements that are not significant or are governed by U.S. law. OIIR is the NASA
office responsible for coordinating the C-175 process with State. Generally, OIIR receives a request from a NASA Mission Directorate or Center to work with a
foreign partner and prepares a proposed agreement for internal review by the applicable program office, the Chief Financial Officer, General Counsel, export
control officials, and other relevant offices. After obtaining all internal concurrences, OIIR prepares a C-175 package for submission to State. The package consists
of (1) an action memorandum addressed to the Assistant Secretary of States Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs requesting
authority to proceed, (2) a draft of the proposed agreement, (3) a draft information memorandum for the Under Secretary of State for Space and Science
Technology, and (4) e-mails addressed to any other Federal agencies that may need to review the request. A State action officer is assigned to handle all NASA
agreements, as well as agreements involving the Department of Energy, the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, the National Science Foundation, and the U.S. Geological Survey. Upon receipt of a package from NASA, the action officer verifies the
completeness of the package, determines if it needs an interagency review, and makes any necessary edits to the action memorandum. The action memorandum,
draft agreement, and associated documents are circulated through several State offices as well as the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the White House,
the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and any other U.S. Government departments and agencies that have interest in
the matter.56 When all clearances are received and any changes cleared with the originating agency, the action officer modifies the action memorandum as
necessary and submits the draft agreement to the Assistant Secretary for signature. According to federal guidance, the officer should complete this initial review
process in 20 days.57 Approved packages are then returned to OIIR, which now has the authority to negotiate and conclude the final agreement with the partner.
Once the partners have agreed to terms, OIIR resubmits the agreement to State for final approval. Thereafter, any substantive changes to the agreement, including
extensions, generally must go through a new C-175 process. Figure 11 outlines the C-175 process. 55 Identity and intention of the parties includes whether the
parties intend for the agreement to be governed by international law. 56 Within State, the C-175 packages are reviewed by the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty
Affairs, the Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, the Assistant Legal Adviser for the particular geographic
region, and the country and regional affairs desks of the appropriate regional bureau, among other offices. a This includes a review by, among others, the OIIR
Programmatic Lead, OIIR Division Director, Export Control Office, Program points of contact, other Mission Directorate officials, the Chief Financial Officer, and
the Office of General Counsel. b The package consists of an action memorandum addressed to the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs requesting authority to negotiate, conclude, or negotiate and conclude an agreement; a draft of the proposed agreement; an
information draft memorandum for the Under Secretary for Space and Advanced Technology; and an e-mail for other Federal agencies that need to review the
agreement. State reviews these documents for initial agreement approval. c According to Federal guidance, the initial review process should be completed in 20

Initial State Review Rarely Occurs in 20 Days Although guidance states the initial
review process should take no more than 20 days from NASAs submission of the C-175
package, State rarely meets this timetable.58 From January 2012 through December 2014, OIIR submitted 84
agreement packages to State for review through the C-175 process. Two of these agreements one of
which had been awaiting approval for 681 days as of September 3, 2015 had not
received initial approval at the time of our field work .59 Of the 82 approved packages, only
4 received initial approval within the 20-day timeframe. On average, the number of days
to obtain initial approval exceeded the 20-day timeframe by 67 days in 2012, 112 days 58 22 C.F.R.
days.

181.4(c). 59 The agreement waiting 681 days for approval is a proposed framework with Spain. We were informed that the delay was caused by other, higherpriority agreements. The second package awaiting review terminates agreements with Chile, France, and Spain relating to landing sites for the Space Shuttle, which
NASA stopped flying in 2011. Figure 12 shows the average number of days for initial approval from 2012 through 2014. Figure 12: Average Number of Days for
Initial State Approval, 20122014 Source: NASA Office of Inspector General presentation of OIIR information. One project that experienced a lengthy delay for
initial State approval was Hayabusa 2, a cooperative mission between NASA and Japan to explore an asteroid, retrieve fragments, and return them to Earth. NASA
sent the agreement package to State on April 10, 2014, but the package was not approved until 148 days later on September 5, 2014. After approximately 2 months
of negotiating the final agreement, OIIR returned the package to State for final approval on November 4, 2014, which State granted 2 days later. The agreement
was then signed on November 17, 2014, approximately 2 weeks before the mission launched. According to OIIR, the Hayabusa 2 agreement was complicated and
therefore required extra time for negotiations. To keep the project moving forward while they waited for initial approval, NASA and Japan entered into an interim
agreement governed by U.S. law that permitted planning work but did not address the actual launch and mission operations. Japanese officials told us the delay in
obtaining initial approval did not cause significant issues for the mission, although they believed approval should have been granted sooner and pointed out it took
much longer to work out the agreement with NASA than it does for agreements with commercial contractors. Figure 13 shows the timeline of States approval
process for Hayabusa 2. 60 The calculation includes only the average number of days for initial approval for calendar years 2012 through 2014 because those years
are complete. The average number of days for initial State approval from 2012 through 2014 was 87, 132, and 100, respectively. NASA Office of Inspector General
IG-16-020 37 Figure 13: Number of Days for State Approval of the Hayabusa 2 Agreement Package Source: NASA Office of Inspector General presentation of OIIR
information. See Appendix IV for additional information on the timeline for initial approval of NASA agreements submitted to State between 2012 and 2014.

Negotiation Process to Secure Final Agreement Can be Lengthy Once State approves
NASAs initial C-175 package, the Agency is free to negotiate and finalize the agreement
with its partners. The amount of time for negotiating and finalizing an agreement varies
greatly depending on the nature and complexity of the agreement. Some agreements can be negotiated in very little time, while others take
more than a year . For example, an interim agreement with ESA for the Jupiter Icy Moons Exploration mission that did not commit either

NASA or ESA to actual development, took 2 days to negotiate, but negotiations for a different agreement with ESA for the Smart Sensor Inter-Agencies Reference
Testbench continued for 440 days before final State approval.61 Typically, State reviews and approves final agreements relatively quickly, ranging on average from
6 to 9 days in the period we examined from 2012 through 2014. Of the 84 agreements NASA submitted to State during that period, 74 had received final approval
at the time of our review. Figure 14 shows the average number of days for negotiation and final State approval for 2012 through 2014. 61 The Jupiter Icy Moons
Exploration mission is planned for launch in 2022 and arrival at Jupiter in 2030. It will spend at least 3 years making detailed observations of Jupiter and three of
its largest moons: Ganymede, Callisto and Europa. NASA Office of Inspector General IG-16-020 38 Figure 14: Average Number of Days for Negotiation and Final
Department Approval, 20122014 Source: NASA Office of Inspector General presentation of OIIR information. Note: These figures are approximate because we
were provided complete data for only 27 of the 33 agreements that received final approval in 2012, 22 of 26 agreements in 2013, and 14 of 15 agreements in 2014.

complex projects often required more time to negotiate

Not surprisingly, more

. For example, NASA and the German
space agency negotiated for approximately 10 months before finalizing the implementing agreement for the InSight (Interior Exploration using Seismic
Investigations, Geodesy, and Heat Transport) mission, which intends to place a lander on Mars in 2018 to study the planets deep interior. Several international
partners are involved in the development of the specialized instruments the mission will use. In fact, technical challenges relating to an instrument the French
space agency is providing have caused NASA to delay the launch from 2016 to at least 2018. NASA submitted the initial agreement package for the mission to State
on May 1, 2013, and received approval on December 27, 2013. NASA returned the package to State for final approval on October 9, 2014, and State granted final
approval 5 days later. Figure 15 depicts the timeline for the InSight agreement process. NASA Office of Inspector General IG-16-020 39 Figure 15: Number of Days

Lengthy
periods to negotiate and receive State approval can delay projects for
months if not years. According to an ESA representative, reaching final agreement for the Jupiter Icy
Moons Exploration mission has taken so long that the planning phase of the mission
expired. Although this has not affected the planned launch date of 2022, extended planning due in part to agreement processing and procurement
for States Final Approval of InSight Agreement Package Source: NASA Office of Inspector General presentation of OIIR information.

arrangements have reduced the missions schedule margin. The Jupiter Icy Moons Exploration mission is a complex, Jupiter-bound mission that will include 10
instruments developed by scientific teams from 15 European countries, Japan, and NASA. NASAs contributions include an ultraviolet imaging spectrograph, a
radar for icy moon exploration, and a particle environment package. The Agency sent the agreement package for a Memorandum of Understanding between NASA
and ESA to State for initial approval on January 16, 2015, and the agreement package for an implementing agreement between NASA and Sweden on March 18,
2015. State granted initial approval for the packages 115 and 43 days later, respectively. As of November 9, 2015, NASA had been negotiating the final
Memorandum of Understanding with ESA for 182 days and the agreement with Sweden for 193 days. Although NASA committed to this mission in early 2013 and
had been working closely with ESA throughout the process, OIIR told us the length of the negotiation period was not unusual given the missions complexity and

several factors may contribute

to lengthy processing times of international agreements: (1) limited staff at State to process the agreements, (2) the
the number of partners involved. Factors that May Contribute to Lengthy Processing Times We found that

requirement that all substantive modifications and extensions of existing agreements go through a separate C-175 review, (3) a tendency by State to view all NASA
agreements as significant and therefore requiring review, and (4) NASAs manual process for internal review of agreement packages. NASA Office of Inspector

State Department Staff We found that a limited number of staff, and in particular only one
legal officer, is assigned to review NASA agreements . In addition to its NASA duties, States
Office of Space and Advanced Technology also reviews international agreements from
the Department of Energy, the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, the National Science Foundation, and the U.S.
Geological Survey. From 2012 through 2015, these agencies submitted 33 agreements to State for review. While State recognizes that the limited
size of its staff dedicated to processing NASA agreements is one factor that has slowed the C-175 process, officials told us competing priorities
prevent them from assigning additional staff to this task. Separate Review for
Modifications and Extensions Federal regulation requires all extensions and
substantive amendments to existing international agreements to undergo a separate C175 review.62 During 2014, NASA had 376 active agreements governed by international law, some of which may require modifications and/or extensions
and therefore C-175 reviews. OIIR representatives told us NASAs partners view this process as unnecessarily rigid
in that it fails to accommodate minor, routine modifications such as extensions that do
not result in significant changes to the underlying agreement. Characterization of All
NASA Agreements as Significant Federal regulation provides that minor or trivial undertakings, even if couched in legal
General IG-16-020 40

language, are not considered significant and therefore do not require a C-175 review. State has the authority to determine whether a particular agreement
qualifies as significant, and over the last 5 years, it has deemed all NASA agreements governed by international law significant. However, prior to this period, State
did determine some agreements to be insignificant and thus not in need of a C-175 review. We reviewed 20 agreements submitted to State in 2014, and found that
4 agreements State determined to be significant may in fact be considered insignificant. Although this number is small, the time consuming nature of the C-175
process has acted as a barrier to receiving more requests. To this point, one large foreign space agency stated they try to work on smaller projects with space

NASAs Internal Review NASAs

internal, paper-based review process for agreement packages may also contribute to
processing delays. Before an agreement package is submitted to State for approval, it is routed
through NASA Headquarters for concurrence. This process involves review by at least seven
NASA offices. Furthermore, the agreement package is hand-delivered to each office, adding
processing time and making it harder for staff to track progress . Center and partner
representatives indicated that a lack of communication with Headquarters and of a
centralized OIIR database to track packages makes it difficult for a Center to monitor the
status of agreements, leading to uncertainty regarding the timeframe for agreement
approval.
agencies other than NASA due to the amount of work and time required to gain approval.

Coop fails and wont spill over to broader relations export control
restrictions
Martin 16 NASA Inspector General (Paul, NASAS INTERNATIONAL
PARTNERSHIPS: CAPABILITIES, BENEFITS, AND CHALLENGES, May 5,
2016, NASA Office of Inspector General, pgs 43-49,
https://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY16/IG-16-020.pdf//dmeth)
EXPORT CONTROL RESTRICTIONS COMPLICATE THE EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION BETWEEN NASA AND FOREIGN PARTNERS A key aspect of international
cooperation is the exchange of project information and technology between partners. Any such exchange is required to comply
with U.S. export control regulations, which define an export as the transfer of anything to a foreign person or foreign destination.64
U.S. export controls are principally governed by two sets of regulations: the ITAR and the EAR . The
ITAR is 64 NASA Policy Requirement 2190.1B, NASA Export Control Program (December 27, 2011), p. 31. NASA Office of Inspector General IG-16-020 44
administered by State and governs defense articles, including launch vehicles and
certain spacecraft. The EAR governs dual-use items that have both military and
commercial application, such as Global Navigation Satellite Systems. To transfer items or technologies covered by the ITAR or the EAR,
organizations are generally required to obtain a license from either State or the
Department of Commerce. Thirteen international partners who responded to our survey identified U.S. export control regulations as a
challenge to international cooperation, with one agency labeling the ITAR as the largest inhibitor of technical exchange.65 Similarly, six of the seven
NASA project managers we interviewed told us export control regulations have a
detrimental impact on NASA projects involving foreign partners . According to the foreign partners and
project managers, export control regulations affect project schedules, communication between
NASA and its partners, and increase project costs. Impact of Export Control Regulations on Partner Exchange According
to NASA project managers and international partners, U.S. export control regulations affect collaborations with
foreign partners in three primary ways. First, ensuring compliance with export
control regulations is time-consuming. NASA and its contractors are required to
obtain licenses to export certain items and information, and some projects involve multiple pieces of
equipment or technical information that require separate licenses . For example, NASA
missions such as the GPM and the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) tend to have up
to five ITAR licenses each. It can take 6 months to obtain a license . In addition, NASAs
contractors use Technical Assistance Agreements to regulate communication of technical
information to foreign entities. Technical Assistance Agreements, which also must be approved by State,
can take up to 6 months to process . GPM, a smaller mission, has between 2030 agreements, while larger
projects such as the JWST can have 200 or more. Second, U.S. export control regulations can
impede communication among foreign partners . For example, the JWST, GPM, and
MMS project teams described instances in which foreign partners experienced hardware
complications NASA personnel knew how to solve. However, due to export control
regulations and licensing delays, the project teams could not share their
knowledge with the partners . Even if the regulations allow for the transfer of
information or technology, they are complex, and project teams may mistakenly believe a
particular transfer is not permitted. For example, there was an incident with the SOFIA Program in which a representative of the

German space agency gave a technical document to NASA personnel; NASA officials did not understand that U.S. export control regulations allowed them to return
this information to the Germans. As a result, NASA personnel unnecessarily undertook the lengthy process of obtaining a license to return the information.

Multiple NASA project managers also complained about having to go through the NASA
export control process when shipping a piece of technology back to the country from
which it was originally obtained. Finally, NASA project managers reported having to
ask international partners to leave meetings due to U.S. export control
restrictions . They indicated that excluding partners can be detrimental to relationships and
make meetings less efficient. Several project managers told us they structured meetings to provide for both NASA-only and joint partner
sessions to avoid having to ask partners to leave the room for ITAR-sensitive discussions. See Figure 17 for an outline of the process for sharing technical data with
foreign partners. 65 One agency did not address export control issues. NASA Office of Inspector General IG-16-020 45 Figure 17: Process for Sharing Technical
Data or Technology with a Foreign Person Source: NASA Advisory Implementing Instruction 2190.1, Export Control Operations Manual, April 2015.

Complying with U.S. export control regulations also adds to project costs and
requires a significant commitment in resources and training . In 2014, the Export Control
Program at NASA Headquarters had a budget of approximately $868,000. In addition, each Center has assigned export control staff. NASAs contractors and
international partners must have programs to ensure compliance with U.S. export control regulations. For example, Japans space agency offers a basic ITAR

violations of U.S. export

control regulations come with both civil and criminal liability . For example, in 2008, Northrup
training course to its employees every few months and an advanced ITAR training regularly. Furthermore,

Grumman Corporation, the Boeing Company, and Lockheed Martin Corporation settled allegations of export control violations by agreeing to pay State a combined
total of $22 million.66 NASA personnel may also be subject to civil or criminal penalties for violating the regulations. 66 The alleged violations did not involve

complying with U.S.

export control regulations has led to the exclusion of NASA from some
international partnerships . In addition, according to media reports, Brazil is actively trying to avoid
using U.S. technology due to the perception that U.S. export control laws impose a
significant administrative burden.68 To this end, countries wishing to market aerospace technology to Brazil must ensure the
NASA technology. NASA Office of Inspector General IG-16-020 46 International partners expressed that the difficulty of

technology is generally free of U.S. parts. While Brazil interacts on major projects with several of NASAs international partners, including Canada, China, France,

U.S. space industry

has also reported lost business opportunities due to complex U.S. export
control regulations. The Department of Commerces Bureau of Industry and Security published an in-depth 67 NASA Office of Inspector
Germany, Russia, and Ukraine, its partnership with the Agency mostly consists of smaller educational and climate studies. The

General, NASA Can Improve its Mitigation of Risks Associated with International Agreements with Japan for Science Projects (IG-06-020, September 12, 2006).
68 Peter B. de Selding, Brazil Bypassing the U.S. as It Builds Out a Space Sector, SpaceNews, April 16, 2015, http://spacenews.com/brazil-bypassing-the-us-as-itbuilds-out-a-space-sector/ (last accessed March 6, 2016). CASE STUDY: ASTRO-E2 The Astro-E2 mission was a joint collaboration between NASA and the
Japanese space agency. The mission involved an X-ray astronomy satellite designed to observe celestial X-ray sources and launched on a Japanese M-V launch
vehicle from Uchinoura Space Center on July 10, 2005. Approximately 3 weeks after launch, an issue with the liquid helium cooling system caused the Astro-E2s
main instrument, the X-ray Spectrometer, to fail. In 2006, we performed an audit that examined several NASA-Japanese projects, including the AstroE2, and
found that project managers had identified information-sharing risks stemming from U.S. export control laws.67 However, they failed to work with NASA export
administrators during the planning phase of the project to develop an information sharing plan. As a result, there was insufficient time to obtain approval for
sharing technical data along with confusion among project personnel regarding what information could be shared. Our report, which was issued prior to the report
of investigation regarding the failure of the X-ray Spectrometer, found that due to a lack of insight and information sharing project personnel were challenged
when integrating instrument components with the spacecraft. We concluded that improper integration can lead to a malfunction of an instrument or spacecraft
level-system and can ultimately result in the loss of scientific data or mission failure. This observation was confirmed in NASAs mishap report, which described a
failure to implement a data transfer plan as a contributing factor to the mishap primarily due to a misunderstanding of what data sharing was allowed under the
ITAR. Artist's Rendering of Astro-E2 Source: JAXA. NASA Office of Inspector General IG-16-020 47 report on the impact of space-related export controls on

35 percent of providers of space-related

products and services reported lost sales opportunities estimated at between $988
million and $2 billion (see Figure 18). A quarter of respondents stated that they avoided export of
space-related products or services subject to ITAR-related controls and more than 20 percent stated
they incentivized non-U.S. organizations to design-out or avoid buying U.S. origin
space-related products or services. Several foreign partners noted the negative impact export control regulations have on the
industry in 2014. 69 The report surveyed the U.S. space industry and found that

competitiveness of the U.S. space industry, and U.S. space industry representatives described lost business opportunities as a result of U.S. export control
regulations.

Intl coop fails diverging national views and domestic agendas

Martin 16 NASA Inspector General (Paul, NASAS INTERNATIONAL
PARTNERSHIPS: CAPABILITIES, BENEFITS, AND CHALLENGES, May 5,
2016, NASA Office of Inspector General, pgs 51-52,
https://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY16/IG-16-020.pdf//dmeth)
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION GROUPS Several forums exist
that attempt to foster international collaboration in space; however, these groups have
limited ability to coordinate a common set of exploration missions among the worlds
space agencies. While NASA has made an effort to engage international partners in its projects, the Agency has
traditionally approached international cooperation on a project-by-project basis . Rather than
working to establish collective exploration missions, NASA and its international partners have generally
set their own domestic space agendas and entered into partnerships when those
individual agendas have aligned. Although major goals may align (as discussed in Chapter 1), a lack of
consensus exists across the worlds space agencies on which large scale exploratory
missions ought to be undertaken. Specifically, NASA and its traditional partners have
differing ideas regarding the future of space flight over the next few decades , with NASA working
towards a human mission to Mars and ESA advocating for a colony on the Moon. Furthermore, although the ISS is a positive example of
collaboration on a large scale exploratory mission, ESA has not yet committed to continue ISS operations until 2024 and is currently
engaging in a cost feasibility study. International

committees were created to increase cooperation

and enhance communication among developing space agencies. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of

Outer Space was created in 1961 during the Cold War in response to the Soviet Unions launch of Sputnik and continues to address
international principles pertaining to the use of outer space. Although the Committee has been instrumental in establishing the legal
framework in which the worlds space agencies operate, it

is not tasked with developing common space policy

objectives or directing agencies toward a specific vision. The International Space Exploration Coordination
Group seeks to address international space exploration goals, providing member states with a common vision for space exploration and
attempting to outline a general methodology to achieve that vision. However ,

the International Space Exploration

Coordination Group is by necessity voluntary and its actions nonbinding, giving space
agencies the ability to abandon its collective mission scenario at any time to pursue their
individual goals. To this point, the NRC recently remarked that [i]t is evident that near-term U.S. goals for
human space exploration are not aligned with those of our traditional international
partners and noted that although NASA is interested in missions to an asteroid and Mars, its international partners are primarily
interested in missions to explore the lunar surface.73 Such divergent goals may limit the
effectiveness of the International Space Exploration Coordination Group in
forming a consensus mission scenario . Although the International Space Exploration Coordination Group
coordinates human exploration initiatives, coordination of space science generally takes place through
topical working groups. Until NASA and ESA withdrew their support in the early 2000s due to a reduced interest in

participating, the Inter-Agency Consultative Group for Space Science served as an international coordinating mechanism for space science.
According to our interviews, NASAs international partners are interested in a more centralized international institution to facilitate
cooperation and reduce the need for redundant capabilities in the space science field.

US politics and international geopolitics hinder collaboration

Martin 16 NASA Inspector General (Paul, NASAS INTERNATIONAL
PARTNERSHIPS: CAPABILITIES, BENEFITS, AND CHALLENGES, May 5,
2016, NASA Office of Inspector General, pgs 53-57,
https://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY16/IG-16-020.pdf//dmeth)
U.S. POLITICAL PROCESS AND GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IMPACT
NASAS INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION Both the U.S. political process and
the geopolitical environment influence NASAs ability to work with foreign partners . First,
shifting priorities and uncertain annual budgets impact NASAs program s. For
example, NASAs participation in ExoMars an ESA led Mars exploration mission and SOFIA have been
canceled or threatened with cancellation due to lack of fundin g. NASAs partners
indicated that political and budgetary uncertainties make it challenging to plan complex,
long-term missions with the Agency. Moreover, geopolitical realities, which often relate to
national security issues, have prevented NASA from expanding its work with
major space powers such as Russia and China . NASA Office of Inspector General IG-16-020 54 Shifting U.S.
Space Policy Leads to Uncertainty in U.S.-Partnered Projects As the U.S. space program transitioned from a national priority during the
Apollo Program to a competing domestic priority under President Richard Nixon and subsequent administrations, Executive

Branch and congressional direction to NASA has also shifted, sometimes creating confusion
regarding the U.S. vision for space exploration. For example, in a 1989 speech President George
H.W. Bush outlined his Space Exploration Initiative, which, in contrast to President Nixons vision,

challenged the U.S. space program to once again venture beyond low Earth orbit, establish a permanent presence on the Moon, and launch
a human mission to Mars. President Bill

Clinton subsequently scaled back the program by removing human

exploration outside of low Earth orbit from the national agenda. When President George W. Bush took office in 2001, he
established the Constellation Program that called for a mission to the Moon no later than 2020. However, President
Barack Obama terminated the Constellation Program in April 2010 and directed NASA to undertake
a crewed mission to a near-Earth asteroid as a precursor to a human mission to Mars. The shifting priorities of the U.S. space
program can also affect NASAs relations with its foreign partner s. A 2009 report examining U.S. space
flight plans, initiated by the Office of Science and Technology Policy, noted that [m]uch of the international
community, probably justifiably, faults the United States [for] unilaterally
changing its aerospace plans to the detriment of its partner. 75 NASAs involvement with
the Laser Interferometer Space Antenna (LISA), ExoMars, and SOFIA illustrate these challenges. In 2011, NASA cut funds to
LISA a project between NASA and ESA to redirect funds to JWST, which has
experienced significant cost overruns. ESA subsequently revised the mission to

incorporate smaller roles for foreign partners. More recently, NASA bowed out of the ExoMars project, a mission
designed to search for life on Mars using an orbiter that detects trace gases and a demonstration lander. At the time of NASAs withdrawal,
the project was planned as a joint mission between NASA and ESA with NASA contributing more than $500 million and providing launch
services and ESA providing the orbiter. However, budget constraints led to ending funding for the program. According to the ESA ExoMars
Project Manager, NASAs

withdrawal from the program was devastating for ESA, which had to
find a new launch services provider, eventually agreeing to partner with Russia. The
SOFIA Program and its associated international partners have also been impacted by
budget instability. Developed by NASA and the German space agency, SOFIA is the worlds largest airborne telescope. SOFIA

reached full operational capability in February 2014 after a problematic 23-year development history and a cost of $1.1 billion more than
300 percent over original estimates. President Obamas fiscal year 2015 budget proposed to place SOFIA in storage for an undefined period
unless NASA identified partners to help subsidize operating costs. 75 Review of U.S. Human Space flight Plans Committee, Seeking a

the
project was one of the German space agencys largest science projects, the Germans were
given only 2 days notice of the Administrations plans . While the SOFIA Program was
ultimately fully funded by Congress and is scheduled to continue flying for the next 20
years, the SOFIA Project Manager told us the episode adversely impacted the
relationship between the NASA SOFIA team and their German counterparts. As other
foreign space agencies advance their technical capabilities, opportunities for
partnerships will become more and more competitive. The international partners we spoke
Human Space flight Program Worthy of a Great Nation (October 2009). NASA Office of Inspector General IG-16-020 55 Although

with that had experience with cancelled NASA projects expressed their willingness to continue partnering with NASA despite the Agencys
past withdrawal from several commitments. However, countries

like China and India are quickly

establishing themselves as viable partners, with India targeting an increase to 10 launches per year of science
missions and communications satellites by 2016. If NASA cannot provide partners with reliable
commitments, foreign space agencies may look elsewhere for opportunities . Indeed, some
foreign space agency representatives expressed a preference for partners other than
NASA that have more stable and dependable program and project budgets . Stable Budgets Help

ESA Managers Effectively Plan for the Future In contrast to NASA, ESA enjoys a more stable, albeit lesser, funding environment. ESA has
two types of programs: mandatory and optional. Mandatory programs include space science programs and ESAs General Budget. In 2015,
ESAs mandatory program budget was approximately 20 percent of its total budget, with the remainder used for optional programs in which
member states may choose to participate. Ministers of member states decide on the General Budget and then fund that budget in 5-year
increments.76 Member states contribute to mandatory programs in a percentage based upon their respective GDPs. In contrast, for optional
programs such as Earth observation, communications, and space flight transportation and navigation members decide their individual
levels of involvement. This relative funding stability allows ESA managers to plan more effectively especially in their procurement
activities and has played a role in ESAs ability to maintain its international commitments. While this practice may not extend to NASA,
some Federal programs, such as the Department of the Navys aircraft carriers, have been fully funded in a single year at the start of the
project in a manner similar to ESA. Fully funded projects provide both transparency to Congress regarding the expected cost of the project
and a defined amount of funds available to the Navy in future years, which can be increased in case of cost overruns. Aircraft carriers can
also be funded using a hybrid model of full and incremental funding also known as advance appropriations where the full cost of the
project is appropriated upfront but the budget authority for the funds is enacted annually. Although Congress has not given the Navy
advance appropriation authority for aircraft carriers, it has granted this authority to some Federal agencies, including the Departments of
Agriculture and Education. NASA unsuccessfully attempted on numerous occasions in the late 1990s and early 2000s to gain this authority
for the ISS. 76 Once the budget is established, the Science Program Committee decides its content. All member states sit on the Science
Program Committee and all have an equal vote in its determinations. Changes to the content of ESAs science program require a two-thirds
vote among members, which provides further stability. NASA Office of Inspector General IG-16-020 56 Geopolitical Environment Limits

NASAs international partnership efforts can be

disrupted by policy considerations unrelated to its programs . For example,
following fighting between Russia and Ukraine in April 2014, NASA circulated an
internal memorandum suspending the Agencys contact with Russian government
representatives with limited exceptions related to the ISS and several other ongoing programs. Similarly, since November 2011,
annual appropriations bills have limited NASAs participation in bilateral agreements
with China. According to its authors, this ban is in response to Chinas human rights record and perceived threat to the security of
Cooperation with International Partners

U.S. technology. Many other Western European countries have also enacted restrictions on working with Russia and China. Russia Despite
concerns about partnering with a country that had been viewed as an enemy of the United States during the Cold War decades, NASA has
been working closely with Russia since 1992 when NASA and the Russian space agency Roscosmos signed an implementing agreement
on human space flight cooperation. As discussed in Chapter 2, the NASA-Roscosmos collaboration includes construction and operation of
the ISS. The two agencies have also collaborated on a variety of science projects, including Russian instruments on NASAs Mars Odyssey,
Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, and Mars Science Laboratory missions. Moreover, Russia has committed to extending operation of the ISS
through 2024. Roscosmos has been one of the most reliable crew and cargo providers for the ISS, with 45 successful Soyuz missions (crew)
and 62 successful Progress launches (cargo), and NASA has been dependent on the space agency for transporting astronauts to the ISS since
retirement of the Space Shuttle Program in 2011. Although NASA is currently working with two commercial companies to provide a
domestic carrier for crewed missions to the ISS, the contractors have experienced significant delays, causing the Agency to purchase
astronaut transportation from Russia into 2019. In addition, the U.S. commercial space industry also has been heavily dependent on
Russian rocket engines. United Launch Alliances Atlas V rocket, utilized by NASA and the Department of Defense, uses a Russian RD-180
engine for its first stage. Orbital ATK under a $1.9 billion contract with NASA for eight cargo resupply flights to the ISS used Russian
AJ-26 engines for four launches of its Antares rocket and plans to use Russian RD-181 engines for its reconfigured Antares 230 rocket.

Although both NASA and the U.S. commercial space industry remain heavily dependent on Russias aerospace capabilities, NASA is
currently prohibited from engaging in cooperative activities with Russia with the exception of the ongoing operation of the ISS and a small
number of other science-related projects. For its part, Russia has begun to search for other partners for space-related projects, including
China. The two countries signed a space exploration agreement in May 2014 that established a control group for eight strategic projects.
NASA Office of Inspector General IG-16-020 57 China China has a well-funded space agency, with an estimated annual space development
budget of approximately $5 billion, and the country has made significant technical advances in recent years, including crewed missions to
low Earth orbit and a robotic lunar rover. However, since November 2011, NASAs appropriation legislation has restricted the Agency from
entering into bilateral partnerships with China. As of 2015, the two countries have exchanged data relating to space geodesy, lunar science,
Earth observation for glacier characterization in the Himalayan region, and air traffic management. The information NASA provided in
these exchanges was primarily publicly available data. OIIR officials and NASAs representative on the International Space Exploration
Coordination Group cautioned that striking

the right balance between risk and reward is a key issue

when considering whether to expand NASA-Chinese partnerships. NASA
counterintelligence personnel have identified China as one of the United States top
cyber-security threats, and China is suspected of stealing U.S. military technology . The
counterintelligence personnel cautioned that expanded partnership with China would
require increased controls to protect U.S. technology. Similar threats to the security of NASA technology

existed when the United States decided to partner with Russia in construction and operation of the ISS. To manage this threat, NASA
established a strategy of minimizing technical exchange between partners. For example, in building the ISS, different countries were
responsible for constructing different Station modules. ESAs largest physical contribution is the Columbus Laboratory, a scientific
laboratory attached to the ISS in 2008. Similarly, Roscosmos built and operates the Russian Orbital Segment of the ISS, which includes the
Pirs, Poisk, Rassvet, and Zvezda modules, and is one of the two main segments of the ISS. This division of responsibilities is apparent in
NASAs smaller projects as well. For the joint NASA-Indian satellite named the NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR), NASA is to
provide the Engineering Payload System and L-Band radar instrument, while the Indian Space Research Organization is to provide the
Spacecraft Bus System and S-Band radar instrument. By dividing the responsibility to develop different instruments, technical exchange is
limited to integration. In November 2011, NASA Administrator Bolden stated that some level of engagement with China in space-related
areas in the future can form the basis for dialogue and cooperation in a manner that is consistent with the national interests of both our
countries, when based on the principles of transparency, reciprocity and mutual benefit.77 Similarly, the NRC has noted that current
federal law that prevents NASA from participating in bilateral activities with the Chinese serves only to hinder United States ability to bring
China into its sphere of international partnerships and substantially reduces the potential international capability that might be pooled to
reach Mars.78

2nc coop solvency / coop fails

No chance of international cooperation in space
CSIS 06 CSIS, U.S. Leadership, International Cooperation, and Space Exploration,
(csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060426_us_space_leadership.pdf) JB
The environment for civil space is indeed more complex today than ever. Civil space activities have now
reached global status. In the world of nuclear proliferation, initially only 5 nations, China, France, the UK, the United States, and the
former USSR, had nuclear weapons and were able to discuss the topic behind closed doors. Now, there are more than 10 nations with the
technology base needed to make and deliver nuclear warheads over thousands of miles. This new situation is completely different, and
nuclear proliferation is difficult to control. The situation is wellknown and understood even if it is difficult to manage. The same situation

has occurred with space technology, though this situation is much less well-known and understood which is
strange, as rocket technology is missile technology. The UN Office of Outer Space Affairs in Vienna has only been able to generate progress
on the issue of space debris, and there

is still no international forum to discuss other space issues. The

lack of international cooperation on critical issues arises largely from the view shared by
many states that space is a strategic high ground. As such, countries are reluctant to
engage with each other, fearing that their respective asymmetric advantages in space
exploration might be eliminated or exploited. Whereas, in the 1950s and the 1960s, there were 2 main actors in
space, there are currently 6 nations with full space capabilities and many more, such as Israel, Ukraine, Brazil, Pakistan, and Korea, with
partial capabilities.

Alt causethe US wont shift to cooperation until it secures against

perceived Russian aggression

Weeden 15. (Brian, former U.S. Air Force space and missile operations officer and currently
technical adviser for Secure World Foundation, a non-profit organization dedicated to the long-term
sustainable use of outer space. Dancing in the dark redux: Recent Russian rendezvous and proximity
operations in space, Space Review. 10/5/2015. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2839/3)//CB

Finally, it is important to note other developments that may affect the U.S.-China
relationship and complicate the management of space-related issues. Notably, U.S.
concerns over a more uncertain and risky future are driven as much by recent
Russian activities in Eastern Europe as they are by any of Chinas activities. Russias
annexation of Crimea, involvement in Ukraine, and more bellicose attitude toward
Europe and NATO greatly concern U.S. military planners, as these developments may
signal a weakening of international rule of law and norms of behavior.43 Some reports
also suggest that Russia may be testing its own ASAT weapons again.44 The combination
of recent Russian aggression and Chinas growing military capabilities is what is causing
the shift in U.S. national security circles away from diplomatic and cooperative
approaches toward more militaristic solutions to dealing with the perceived threat.
China created the space program to challenge the US- it garners national
prestige, can kill US assets, and is a way to get tech to increase the power of
the PLA
Inkster 13- Nigel, former director of operations and intelligence for the British Secret
Intelligence Service and is currently the Director of Transnational Threats and Political
Risk at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Conflict Foretold: America and
China, (https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2013-94b0/survival-global-politics-and-strategy-october-november-2013-b1d0/55-5-02-inkster-8a63) JB
China has also focused on the asymmetric vulnerabilities of US military dependence on
space, conducting research into a range of technologies designed to kill or disable US space
assets, including particle beams, microwaves, space mines and lasers.11 In January 2007, China surprised the world by
conducting an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) test in which a defunct low-earth-orbit satellite was destroyed by a ballistic
missile, a capability which had previously been the preserve of the United States and Russia. The true purpose of that test,
which elicited much international criticism due to the resultant space debris, remains unclear. It might simply have been
the first evidence of an offensive capability; alternatively, it might have been designed as a deterrent or have been an

attempt to bring the United States to the negotiating table. In the event, the US response was to conduct its own ASAT test
just over a year later. This was followed by a further Chinese test in January 2010, during which a missile was destroyed in
mid-flight. Speculation that Beijing planned a further test for January 2013 proved unfounded.12 Chinas space
programme has a dynamic which is to some extent independent of the United States. The rapid growth of Chinese ICT has
driven an expansion of satellite capabilities, including efforts to establish the Beidou system as a competitor to the United
States GPS. China also sees space research as critical to promoting scientific and engineering breakthroughs that will have
an impact on economic development. The same economic-development rationale, which is imposing severe strains on
earth-based natural resources, is likely to drive Chinese ambitions to begin the exploitation of space-based minerals. And
the importance of national prestige as a driver for Chinas space programme cannot be

overlooked. Beijing has repeatedly emphasised the peaceful nature of this programme
and has long campaigned for an international treaty banning the development of
weapons in space.13 But the dynamics of the security dilemma make it hard for the
United States to take such protestations at face value, as evidenced by statements such as that
contained in the 2003 US Department of Defenses annual report to Congress: Publicly, China opposes the
militarization of space and seeks to prevent or slow the development of anti-satellite (ASAT)
systems and space-based ballistic missile defences. Privately, however, Chinas leaders probably
view ASATS and offensive counterspace systems in general as well as space-based
missile defences as inevitabilities.14 More recently, a report by Project 2049 for the USChina Economic and
Security Review Commission stated: Chinas space ambitions are in part peaceful in nature. Yet technologies can also be

space
technology increases the capacity of the PLA [Peoples Liberation Army] to project power
vertically into space and horizontally beyond its immediate periphery.15
used with ill-intent, and military applications of dual-use space technology are a principal concern:

China is pursuing a strong space program in order to become more

legitimate, compete with other major powers, and seek to push the US out of
Asia
Krepon and Thompson 13- Michael, Co-Founder of the Stimson Center. He
worked previously at the Carnegie Endowment, the State Department, and on Capitol
Hill. His areas of expertise are reducing nuclear dangers -- with a regional specialization
in South Asia, Julia, project associate focusing on defense and national security, Antisatellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations,
(http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/Anti-satellite_Weapons.pdf) JB
What is the strategy behind Chinas space activities? China has historically taken a long view of most
strategic issues, and these steps are likely part of a marathon approach rather than a sprint. Chinas declared space
expenditures $3 billion from 1992 to 2005, $3 billion from 2006 to 2013 may well be understated and are a fraction of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administrations (NASA) annual budget of approximately $17 billion. But one must be
very careful about Chinese pronouncements and about comparative budget estimates. It depends what can be purchased

China continues to invest in a multidimensional program to

deny others access to and use of space. 104 It is plausible that China has a mix of domestic
prestige, strategic, economic and political motivations. For domestic audiences, a sophisticated space program
culminating in a manned lunar landing by the end of the decade would be a huge political boost for the
regime and ratification that its focus on economic modernization without political
reform is the right course. Economically, China seeks to be a reliable and safe provider of
launch services for humans and satellites. It has already launched communication satellites for Pakistan
with what one spends.

and Nigeria and a remote sensing satellite for Venezuela. If commerce in space is a wave of the future, as it surely seems to
be, China seeks to be a major if not the dominant player. The increase in Chinese space launches might be explained
partly by the relatively short life spans of Chinese satellites. Experts note that they tend to last three to five years,
compared to 15 for the United States. Moreover, China, with all its current activity, still launches fewer satellites per year
than the United States. Chinas reconnaissance satellite resolution is thought to be about one meter. The commercially

China is
competing with India and Japan , two neighbors with active programs and growing ambitions in space.
Beijing has periodically experienced contentious relations with both states, and would
benefit politically, economically, militarily and psychologically by out-competing New
Delhi and Tokyo in space. Strategically and in the longer term, China is well aware that the United
States relies on satellites for perhaps 80 percent of its communications and more than 80 percent of its intelligence
available GeoEye satellite resolution is better, at slightly less than half a meter. Within Asia,

gathering.

By being able credibly to threaten US space assets, Beijing might seek to

dissuade US intervention in a Taiwan or other East Asian crises. Destroying the US capabilities in space if
deterrence fails could be determinative in conflict. US officials explain Beijings pursuit of a variety of air, sea,
undersea, space, counterspace and information warfare systems as contributing to an anti-access/area
denial [A2/AD] strategy. These pursuits are embedded in operational concepts, moving toward
an array of overlapping, multi-layered offensive capabilities extending from Chinas coast into the western Pacific. The
Pentagon seeks to counter Chinas A2/AD strategy by adopting measures that, if successful, would in fact, if not in name,
reflect its own A2/AD strategy.

Not only does the plan link to Chinese and US politics but China will also say
no because cooperation does more harm than good
Foley 14- Jordan, serving as Naval Liaison to the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Lincoln Laboratorys Space Systems Analysis Group, A New Look at
Cooperation on the Chinese Space Station, (http://spacenews.com/40852a-new-look-atcooperation-on-the-chinese-space-station/) JB
Military control of Chinas space program and related transparency issues make SinoU.S. cooperation difficult. Other factors play into the lack of bilateral exchanges, but China could take steps to
appear to improve its image internationally while not sacrificing much in terms of revealing sensitive information. In
fact, cooperating with the United States on CSS might do more harm than
good for China . There is no precedent for high-technology space cooperation between
the two countries and the mere act of cooperating would cause significant backlash
in both. In the near future, China would be better off pursuing agreements with the United
Nations. China should include the U.N. in selecting astronauts from non-spacefaring
states. Also, an agreement with the U.N. should coincide with Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ratification to
symbolize Chinas commitment to become more in line with the international system. The U.S. and China have yet to
ratify the treaty. China has stated that it is waiting for U.S. ratification before it considers; however, getting out in front of
the U.S. on this issue, carried out simultaneously with a space cooperation agreement, would gain the Chinese a higher
level of influence in the U.N. system. As a result, China would appear more transparent and benign

without compromising national security, thus facilitating its rise and expanding its
global influence.

2nc china cheats

China steals any and all space technology it can find- the closed political
system makes espionage a necessity
Walcott 12- John, Team Leader for National Security and Foreign Affairs at
Bloomberg News, China Is Rapidly Closing The Technology Gap With Its Sneaky
Espionage Tactics, (http://www.businessinsider.com/china-is-rapidly-closing-thetechnology-gap-with-its-sneaky-espionage-tactics-2012-4) JB
China is stealing U.S. military and civilian space technology in an effort to
disrupt U.S. access to intelligence, navigation and communications
satellites , according to a report from the State and Defense Departments. Chinas continuing efforts to
acquire U.S. military and dual-use technologies are enabling Chinas science and
technology base to diminish the U.S. technological edge in areas critical to the
development of weapons and communications systems, the report released yesterday found.
Additionally, the technologies China has acquired could be used to develop more advanced technologies by shortening
Chinese R&D cycles. Two U.S. intelligence officials said that while the Chinese military isnt preparing to fight a major
land war, its goal is to deny the U.S. military access to the other four arenas in which a war might be fought
-- the seas around China, the airspace surrounding the country, space, and cyberspace. The officials spoke on condition of
anonymity because intelligence matters are classified. Because Chinas closed political system

discourages the independent thinking that spawns innovation, the Chinese rely heavily
on stealing and reverse-engineering new technologies from Europe and America, both officials said.
The PLA steals all foreign technology it can get
Siegel 13- Jim, staff writer, The Win-Lose of US-China Space Cooperation (China
Wins; US Loses), (http://www.americaspace.com/?p=38668) JB
What does the U.S. have to gain this time by cooperating in space exploration with the
last remaining major communist nation? Do the benefits again outweigh the risks? This
time, I believe that the answer is no , for two fundamental sets of reasons: one related directly to space exploration itself,
and the second economic. Lets start with space-related rationale. Whats the one thing that NASA needs most to re-launch
deep space exploration? Obviously, its a heavy-lift rocket. Thats where the Chinese can help, right? On the contrary. Lets
look at the facts. First, lets compare orbital launchers either active or under development. Consider the characteristic
called LEO (Low-Earth Orbit) payload mass, expressed in kg. NASAs heavy lift rocket under development, the SLS, is
projected to deliver 130,000 kg. The Falcon Heavy, also under development, is projected at 53,000 kg. By comparison, the
currently operational Atlas V is rated at about 19,000 kg, the Delta IV at 23,000 kg, and the regular Falcon 9 at about
10,000 kg. Lets look at the Chinese rocket families. The current Long March 4 is rated at a mere 12,000 kg. The Long
March 5, under development, is only projected to deliver 25,000 kg. Incidentally, the gigantic American Saturn V, which
delivered the Apollo astronauts to the Moon and which last flew in 1973, delivered 118,000 kg. LEO payload mass. So
dont count on the Chinese to help with a heavy lift rocket. What about Chinese space exploration technology and
expertise? Recent media reports seem to suggest that the Chinese are hot on the heels of NASA. Really? It was only a year
ago that the Chinese achieved their first successful manual space docking exercise. Last month they had their longest
crewed time in space 15 days. And while U.S. rockets reach the ISS within eight hours of launch, it takes Chinese rockets
two days to reach their own orbiting station. Im sure that there are many very smart Chinese scientists and engineers, but
they have a very, very long way to go to reach NASAs space proficiency. Further, there is a troublesome aspect of

how the PRC have achieved what they have. According to a recent 92-page Annual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2013, China relies on foreign
technology, acquisition of key dual-use components, and focused
indigenous research and development (R&D) to advance military modernization. The
Chinese utilize a large, well-organized network to facilitate collection of sensitive
information and export-controlled technology from U.S. defense sources. This network
of government-affiliated companies and research institutes often enables the PLA to
access sensitive and dual-use technologies under the guise of civilian research and
development. In the case of key national security technologies, controlled equipment, and other materials not readily
obtainable through commercial means or academia, China has utilized its intelligence services and
employed other illicit approaches that involve violations of U.S. laws and export

controls. In other words, if they cant get advanced technology legally, the Chinese often
steal it.

at: asteroids
Zero impact to asteroids either too improbable or too small to matter
Bennett, 10 [James, Eminent Scholar and William P. Snavely Professor of Political
Economy and Public Policy at George Mason University, and Director of The John M.
Olin Institute for Employment Practice and Policy, The Chicken Littles of Big Science;
or, Here Come the Killer Asteroids! THE DOOMSDAY LOBBY 2010, 139-185, DOI:
10.1007/978-1-4419-6685-8_6]
The smallest falling bodies, those with diameters under a few meters, are of no
practical concern, says Chapman, and in fact they are to be desired, at least by those
who keep their eyes on the skies watching for brilliant fireballs whose burning up in the
atmosphere provides a show far more spectacular than the most lavish Fourth of July
fireworks. Even bodies with diameters of 1030 meters, of which Chapman
estimates six may fall to earth in a century, cause little more than broken
windows. They explode too high in the atmosphere to cause serious harm. The
next largest potential strikers of Earth are those in the Tunguska range of 30 meters
100 meters. The shock waves from the atmospheric explosion would topple trees,
wooden structures and ignit[e] fires within 10 kilometers, writes Chapman. Human
deaths could result if the explosion took place over a populated area. Though Chapman
estimates the likelihood of a Tunguska occurring in any given century at four in ten, it is
worth noting that there is no evidence that such an explosion has killed a
single human being in all of recorded history. Either were overdue or that 40
percent is high. Moreover, given that the location of such an explosion is utterly
unpredictable, it would be far more likely to happen over an ocean or a
desert than over, say, Tokyo or Manhattan. The after effects would be minimal,
and Chapman says that nothing practical can be done about this modest
hazard other than to clean up after the event. In fact, It makes no sense to plan
ahead for such a modest disaster other than educating the public about the
possibility. The cost of a telescopic survey capable of picking up bodies of
such diminutive size would be prohibitive. It would be the ultimate Astronomers
Full Employment Act. A body of 100 meters300 meters in diameter would
either explode at low altitude or upon impact with the ground; it would be
regionally devastating, but Chapman pegs the chances of such a catastrophe at
1 percent per century. A small nation could be destroyed by the impact of a
body of 300 meters1 km in diameter, or a flying mountain of sorts, which would
explode with energy yield ten times more than the largest thermonuclear bomb ever
tested. If striking land, it would carve out a crater deeper than the Grand Canyon. If it
hit a populated area, the death toll could be in the hundreds of thousands. The likelihood
of such a collision Chapman estimates at 0.2 percent per century. An asteroid or comet
of 13 kilometers in diameter would cause major regional destruction, possibly verging
on civilization-destruction level. Chapman puts the chances of this at 0.02 percent per
century. The impact of a body more than 3 kilometers in diameter might plunge the
Earth into a new Dark Age, killing most of its inhabitants, though the chances of this are
extremely remote less than one in 50,000 per century. Finally, mass extinction
would likely occur should a body greater than 10 kilometers pay us a visit,
though the chances of this are less than one in a million every century, or so
infinitesimal that even the most worry-wracked hypochondriac will not lose
sleep over the possibility. In fact, for any impact with a Chapman-calculated
likelihood of less than one in a thousand per century, he concedes that there
is little justification for mounting asteroid-specific mitigation measures.

The chance of a civilization-ender is so remote that he counsels no advance

preparations or almost none. For Chapman recommends further study of NEOs, as
well as investigation into methods of their diversion. 82 This is exactly what the NEO
lobby wants.

space colonization adv

at: space col

No spacecol
Coates 2009 former adjunct professor at George Washington University, President of
the Kanawha Institute for the Study of the Future and was President of the International
Association for Impact Assessment and was President of the Association for Science,
Technology and Innovation, M.S., Hon D., FWAAS, FAAAS, (Joseph F., Futures 41, 694705, "Risks and threats to civilization, humankind, and the earth, ScienceDirect, WEA)
Some prominent scientists as well as numerous science fiction writers have frequently
written about an escape of humankind from our planet to another planet [2]. This is
highly unlikely for two reasons. Under the assumption that there is no special or
unimaginable scientific discovery made between now and the time we would like to
depart, departing the Earth for survival is not in the cards. First is the question of how
many people are necessary to start a new colony or to keep a colony going. If we assume
two thousand or more, we get a sense of the needs in launching such an interstellar
venture. If we just look at interstellar travel in our own galaxy, we are confronted with
the multi-generational time that it would take. Stars tend to be close from one point of
view, twinkling in the sky, but from the point of view of travel, far distant. It may well
take 200250 years at eight-tenths the speed of light to reach a sun-like star with the
appropriate size and satellites similar to Earth, Venus or Mars. If the crew had to travel
for 250 years, it would imply a great stockpile of embryos ready to be grown into
humans. Technology is not quite ready yet with the artificial womb, but that, by no
means, is something to overlook. Another possibility would be to reproduce in the usual
way, during travel, keeping in mind that one would want to have the travelers as much
like each other at the end as at the beginning of the flight. Genetic tools would come into
play in selecting who mates with whom or what egg fits the then current gap. Having
gotten to a target, the question then confronting the interstellar travelers is what to do
and how to do it. No matter what the resources are, unless it is an already lush planet
like the Earthlush with life, lush with forms of lifethe travelers may have to start like
pioneers, from scratch. That raises the question of what raw materials, machinery,
devices, and training in use of those devices should be stored on board. It is getting to be
a mighty big space craft.
The notion of escaping to another world by a flight to another planet, under the best of
circumstances, borders on the extremely unlikely, shading off into the impossible, in
terms of the total global population and of what we know, assuming no extreme
discoveries or capabilities like teleportation.
Muscle and bone sensitivity make it impossible
Potember, Bryden, and Shapiro, Researchers for the Applied Physics Laboratory at
Johns Hopkins University, 2001 (Dr. Richard S., Dr. Wayne A., and Dr. Jay R.,
Analysis of bone metabolism biomarkers and countermeasures using time of flight mass
spectrometry,
Exposure to reduced gravity during space travel profoundly alters the loads placed on
bone and muscle. Astronauts lose muscle mass and strength while in space. Exercise
countermeasures are so important that other activities may not be given enough time.
The data from humans in space indicates a very rapid atrophy of skeletal muscle. After
5- day flights, mean cross-sectional areas of muscle fibers were 11 and 24% smaller in

type I and II fibers. These changes occurred even though countermeasures were
undertaken by astronauts. There is a need to measure pharmacological, hormonal and
growth factor biomarkers and to develop in-depth knowledge of molecular mechanisms
for complex interplay between muscle atrophy and bone demineralization. We are
evaluating the technical feasibility for evaluating the following biomarkers by TOF-MS:
growth hormone, insulin-like growth factors (IGF-I), glucocorticoids: cortisol (which
may play a central role in the early stages of muscle atrophy), and 3-methylhistidine
(breakdown product of muscle proteins). Exposure to microgravity rapidly leads to
osteopenia due to increased bone resorption and decreased bone formation. Studies
with Skylab and Russian crews demonstrated 1.0-1.6%/month mean losses of bone mass
from the spine, femur, neck, and pelvis, increasing the risk of fracture. Also of concern
is the lack of evidence that bone loss is fully reversible on return to earth. Progress in
developing effective countermeasures to demineralization depends on increased
understanding of how the complex biochemical systems that modulate bone turnover
response to pharmacological and stress-induced interventions.

space colonization

1nc Space Col Bad

Space colonization is an unethical tool for the elites, causes environmental
destruction, space war, and of course, plutonium falling from the sky
Dickens 10 (Peter Dickens teaches at the Universities of Brighton and Cambridge, UK. His most recent book, cowritten with James Ormrod, is Cosmic Society: Towards a Sociology of the Universe (2009). The interactive website linked
to this book and intended to stimulate debate over the humanization of the cosmos is The Sociology of the Universe. The
Humanization of the CosmosTo What End? November 2010 http://monthlyreview.org/2010/11/01/the-humanizationof-the-cosmos-to-what-end/#en75)///CW
Society is increasingly humanizing the cosmos. Satellites have for some time been central to the flow of information, to
surveillance, and to the conduct of warfare. As these examples suggest, however, the humanization of the

cosmos is primarily benefiting the powerful. These include major economic and military
institutions. Furthermore, the forthcoming commodification and colonization of the cosmos is again
likely to enhance the interests of the powerful, the major aerospace companies in particular. The time has
come to consider alternative forms of cosmic humanization. These would enhance the prospects of the socially
marginalized. They would also allow humanity to develop a better understanding of the cosmos and our relationship to it.1
Humanizing Outer Space The 1969 Apollo 11 moon landing is often seen as the high point of societys relationship with
outer space. Nothing quite so dramatic or exotic seems to have happened in outer space since. But nearby, parts of the
solar system (including the moon, some asteroids, and Mars) are now being routinely circled and explored and analyzed
by robots. Furthermore, President Obama has recently made important announcements regarding a new U.S. space
program that involves manned missions to Mars by the mid-2030s. But the NASA-based Constellation program to the
moon and Mars has been cancelled. Instead, NASA will undertake a long-term research and development program aimed
at supporting future forms of propulsion and exploration programs. Even more significant in the short-term is a proposed
$25 billion being allocated to NASA to kick-start commercial manned spaceflight over the next five years. New forms of
transport to the International Space Station will be funded, this time using innovative forms of space taxis designed by
private sector space companies.2 These plans entail new relations between the private and public sectors in the United
States. Meanwhile, a presence in outer space is being developed by other societies. This is partly because such a
presence is seen as an important symbol of modernization , progress, and social unity. The Indian
government has announced a manned mission to the moon in 2013, the European Space Agency envisages projects to the
moon and beyond, and the Chinese government is planning a similar project for 2020. This last development has caused
some consternation over Obamas plans. One suggestion is that the United States may after all be the next to send manned
missions to the moon, because Chinas space project is seen by some as a military threat that needs forestalling.3 Yet
among these plans and proposals, it is easy to forget that outer space is already being increasingly humanized. It has

now been made an integral part of the way global capitalist society is organized and
extended. Satellites, for example, are extremely important elements of contemporary communications systems. These
have enabled an increasing number of people to become part of the labor market. Teleworking is the best known example.
Satellite-based communications have also facilitated new forms of consumption such as teleshopping. Without satellite-

Satellites have also been

made central to modern warfare . Combined with pilotless Predator drones, they are now being
used to observe and attack Taliban and Al-Qaida operatives in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This
based communications, the global economy in its present form would grind to a halt.

action is done by remote control from Creech Air Force Base at Indian Springs, Nevada. The 1980s Strategic Defense
Initiative, or Star Wars program, aimed to intercept incoming missiles while facilitating
devastating attacks on supposed enemies. A version of the program is still being developed, with the citizens of the Czech
Republic and Poland now under pressure to accept parts of a U.S.-designed missile defense shield. This is part of a

wider strategy of Full Spectrum Dominance, which has for some time been official U.S.
Defense Policy.4 Using surveillance and military equipment located in outer space is now seen as the prime means of
protecting U.S. economic and military assets both on Earth and in outer space. Less dangerously, but still very
expensively, a full-scale space-tourism industry has for some time been under active development. Dennis Tito, a multimillionaire, made the first tourist trip into outer space in 2001. Richard Bransons Virgin Galactic has now sold over three
hundred seats at $200,000 apiece to its first tourists in outer space. The program is due to start in 2011, with spaceports
for this novel form of travel now being built in Alaska, California, Florida, New Mexico, Virginia, Wisconsin, the United
Arab Emirates, and Esrange in Sweden. Excursions circling the moon, likely to cost the galactic visitors around
$100,000,000, are now under development. Since the Renaissance period of the sixteenth century, the word
humanization has been used to connote something beneficial, especially to human beings. As we will now see,
humanizing the cosmos is regarded in just these terms by some influential proponents of space travel and space
colonization. The Space Renaissance Initiative One response to cosmic humanization is to welcome it as an early stage of a
wholly beneficial cosmic human society, one eventually encompassing the solar system and beyond. Such is the view of the
Space Renaissance Initiative, an international group of over seventy private organizations now promoting the expansion of
society into the cosmos. The aims and ideals of the Space Renaissance are made clear by the Initiatives manifesto
published in 2010. It reads: Help the Space Economy Revolution! The global economy is entering a deep crisis, the worst
since 1929. This is the second act of the Crisis of Closed-World Ideologies, which has been developing throughout the

20th century. In 1989 the fall of the Berlin wall was the Crisis of Collectivist Ideology. The recent massive failure of the
financial system is the Crisis of Neo-Liberal Ideology. Both these ideologies failed because they are based upon a closedworld, terro-centric philosophy. There are now almost 7 billion humans making massive demands on planet Earth: we
urgently need to open the frontier, and move to a wider vision of our world, so as to access geo-lunar system resources and
energy. In short we need a new Open World Philosophy. The alternative would be the implosion and collapse of our
civilization.5 In short, the Space Renaissance Initiative argues, society is undergoing massive social, environmental, and
population crises because it is thinking too small. The energy of the sun can, for example, be made into a source of clean
power from outer space, which would solve societys energy shortages at a stroke. The Initiative argues that opening up the
cosmos to humanitycolonizing the solar system, and opening up resources in the moon, Mars, and the asteroidscould
be central to social and environmental salvation. The progress made by the private sector in developing technologies and
efficiencies for space tourism means that commercial enterprise can now start planning to venture still further afield. The
philosophical roots of the Space Initiative are no less than the sixteenth-century Italian Renaissance and the
Enlightenment. With the enlightened patronage of such families as the Medicis, an unprecedented new age of
development took place: arts knew a wonderful age of innovation, culture took on some essential principles of classical
Greek philosophy, and modern science was born, with men like Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, and later Copernicus
and Galileo leading the way. This movement led to the Age of Enlightenment and its most famous offspring: the American
and French Revolutions. The manifesto also praises the writings of Descartes, Voltaire, and Jefferson. The belief of these
philosophers in the enterprising individual, in freedom, in liberty, and in reason all mean that political power should be
vested in the common person and not in states, kings, and nobility. The Space Renaissance Initiative believes in these
concepts, seeing them as the basis of a new, progressive, liberating, humanization of the cosmos. But there are surely
major problems here. For example, any claim that the Medici family (and similar families such as the Borgias) helped
overthrow feudalism is far-fetched. The Medicis were bankers and merchants who made their money at the center of an
emerging global mercantilist capitalism, one based in Northern Italy. They used this money to enhance their position
within their feudal societies. Members of the Medicis even made themselves into popes, thus further enhancing their
wealth and that of their many illegitimate offspring. Another of the Medicis was made the Queen of France. The language
used by intellectual elites of the day was Latin. This appealed to scholars across Europe but not to the great mass of
individuals living in Florence, Milan, or Venice.6 The Medicis and individuals such as Leonardo are often celebrated as
examples of The Renaissance Universal Man, one capable of spanning every kind of human practice such as art, music,
and politics. This Man is perhaps best symbolized by Leonardos famous image of a male human being, stretched over
the circle of the cosmos, his head in the heavens and his bowels located in earthly regions. But this Renaissance Manor
Womancan also be seen as prefiguring the self-centered, narcissistic individualism of our own day, one seeing the whole
of the cosmos at his or her command. This kind of modern human identity has since been enhanced by consumer-based
capitalism and, given the problems it creates both for ourselves and our environment, there seems rather little reason to
celebrate or restore it. The general point is that the vision of the Space Renaissance Initiative, with its

prime focus on the power of the supposedly autonomous and inventive individual,
systematically omits questions of social, economic, and military power . Similarly, the Initiatives
focus on the apparently universal benefits of space humanization ignores some obvious questions. What will
ploughing large amounts of capital into outer space colonization really do for stopping
the exploitation of people and resources back here on earth? The solution seems to
be simultaneously exacerbating social problems while jetting away from
them . Consumer-led industrial capitalism necessarily creates huge social divisions and increasing degradation of the
environment. Why should a galactic capitalism do otherwise? The Space Renaissance Initiative argues that spacehumanization is necessarily a good thing for the environment by introducing new space-based technologies such as
massive arrays of solar panels. But such solutions are again imaginary. Cheap electricity is most likely to

increase levels of production and consumption back on earth. Environmental

degradation will be exacerbated rather than diminished by this technological fix . A
simplistic and idealistic view of history, technology, and human agency therefore underpins the starting point of the Space
Renaissance Initiative. Humanization in this shapeone now finding favor in official government circlesraises all kinds
of highly problematic issues for society and the environment. What would an alternative, more critical, perspective on
humanizing the cosmos tell us? The Cosmos: Capitalisms New Outside Instead of indulging in over-optimistic and
fantastic visions, we should take a longer, harder, and more critical look at what is happening and what is likely to happen.
We can then begin taking a more measured view of space humanization, and start developing more progressive
alternatives. At this point, we must return to the deeper, underlying processes which are at the heart of the capitalist
economy and society, and which are generating this demand for expansion into outer space. Although the

humanization of the cosmos is clearly a new and exotic development, the social
relationships and mechanisms underlying space-humanization are very familiar. In the early
twentieth century, Rosa Luxemburg argued that an outside to capitalism is important for two main reasons. First, it is
needed as a means of creating massive numbers of new customers who would buy the goods made in the capitalist
countries.7 As outlined earlier, space technology has extended and deepened this process, allowing an increasing number
of people to become integral to the further expansion of global capitalism. Luxemburgs second reason for imperial
expansion is the search for cheap supplies of labor and raw materials. Clearly, space fiction fantasies about aliens aside,
expansion into the cosmos offers no benefits to capital in the form of fresh sources of labor power.8 But expansion into the
cosmos does offer prospects for exploiting new materials such as those in asteroids, the moon, and perhaps other cosmic
entities such as Mars. Neil Smiths characterization of capitals relations to nature is useful at this point. The reproduction
of material life is wholly dependent on the production and reproduction of surplus value. To this end, capital stalks the

Earth in search of material resources; nature becomes a universal means of production in the sense that it not only
provides the subjects, objects and instruments of production, but is also in its totality an appendage to the production
processno part of the Earths surface, the atmosphere, the oceans, the geological

substratum or the biological superstratum are immune from transformation by capital .9

Capital is now also stalking outer space in the search for new resources and raw materials. Nature on a cosmic scale now
seems likely to be incorporated into production processes, these being located mainly on earth. Since Luxemburg wrote,
an increasing number of political economists have argued that the importance of a capitalist outside is not so much that
of creating a new pool of customers or of finding new resources.10 Rather, an outside is needed as a zone into which
surplus capital can be invested. Economic and social crisis stems less from the problem of finding new consumers, and
more from that of finding, making, and exploiting zones of profitability for surplus capital. Developing outsides

in this way is also a product of recurring crises, particularly those of declining economic profitability.
These crises are followed by attempted fixes in distinct geographic regions. The word fix is used here both literally and
figuratively. On the one hand, capital is being physically invested in new regions. On the other hand, the attempt is to fix
capitalisms crises. Regarding the latter, however, there are, of course, no absolute guarantees that such fixes will really
correct an essentially unstable social and economic system. At best, they are short-term solutions. The kind of theory
mentioned above also has clear implications for the humanization of the cosmos. Projects for the colonization

of outer space should be seen as the attempt to make new types of spatial fix, again in
response to economic, social, and environmental crises on earth. Outer space will be
globalized, i.e., appended to Earth, with new parts of the cosmos being invested in by
competing nations and companies. Military power will inevitably be made an
integral part of this process, governments protecting the zones for which
they are responsible . Some influential commentators argue that the current problem for capitalism is that
there is now no outside.11 Capitalism is everywhere. Similarly, resistance to capitalism is either everywhere or nowhere.
But, as suggested above, the humanization of the cosmos seriously questions these assertions. New spatial fixes are due
to be opened up in the cosmos, capitalisms emergent outside. At first, these will include artificial fixes such as satellites,
space stations, and space hotels. But during the next twenty years or so, existing outsides, such as the moon and Mars, will
begin attracting investments. The stage would then be set for wars in outer space between nations and companies
attempting to make their own cosmic fixes. Crisis, Outer Space, and the Restructuring of Capital: Some Evidence What
evidence is there that economic, social, and environmental crises lie behind the growing humanization of the cosmos? One
indication is that, between 2004 and 2009, the global space economy (this including commercial satellites, military
hardware, space tourism infrastructure costs, and launch services) increased by 40 percent.12 So, while the global
economic crisis starting in 2008 has been grabbing the headlines, the sectors involved in the outer space economy have
experienced very rapid growth. In 2009 space industry and government budgets involved in outer space rose by 7 percent
to $261.61 billion. A 2010 survey of the global outer space economy puts this as follows: amidst a widespread
international economic crisis, the space industry proved resilient, demonstrating growth and expansion into 2010. While
several other leading industries suffered dramatically, and many governments struggled to remain fiscally viable, the
space industry defied the upheaval and broadened its fields of endeavour.13 All this suggests not just that the outer space
economy is doing well while other sectors are doing less well, but that growing investment in the solar

system is a response to global economic crisis. Again, this growth of the private space economy
underlines the significance of President Obamas shift toward private sector solutions to space humanization. The
private sector has long argued that, in terms of creating technological innovation and reducing costs, it is superior to
NASA and other government agencies. Nowand, it should be noted, with extensive earlier financial backing from NASA
it is advancing itself as capable of taking over large parts of the space program. But, at the same time, restructuring
within the space industry is following some very familiar lines. Close links and mergers are taking place between large
monopolistic companies and the smaller enterprises celebrated by the Space Renaissance Initiative. For example,
Northrop-Grumman, one of the leading U.S. defense manufacturers, has recently bought Scaled Composites, the latter
having pioneered lightweight materials used for space tourism vehicles. Northrop-Grumman has for many years designed
and constructed satellite-guided drones used in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. This merger raises the prospect of skills
and technologies originally designed to take wealthy people into outer space being developed to observe and eliminate
warlordsand othersback on earth. Space-X is another relatively small space tourism company. It was founded in 2002
by Elon Musk, a cofounder of PayPal. But this small enterprise is now rapidly growing as a result of a number of contracts
from the American Airforce. Launch services provided to the USAF by Space-X are resulting in contracts worth up to $1
billion. Other links, this time between big and small capital, are also developing. Bob Bigelow, for example, has long been
an important but small-scale contender in the outer space tourism business. His proposals have included hotels on the
moon and in other parts of outer space. He has already constructed 1:3-scale working models of these projects. Now, his
company is in close partnership with Boeing, the exceptionally large aerospace company. Together, they will supply the
space taxis outlined by President Obama. They will take astronauts and scientists to the International Space Station.
Bigelow declares himself very enthusiastic as part of the Boeing team: Were very excited about this program and the
Boeing partnership in general. Boeing brings with it unparalleled experience and expertise in human spaceflight systems,
which will be combined with Bigelows Aerospaces entrepreneurial spirit and cost conscious practices.14 But another,
more downbeat, assessment is that the individualistic, entrepreneurial spirit endorsed by the Space Renaissance Initiative
is, in practice, being co-opted into the military-industrial complex. Space Law: Making the Survival of Humankind
Profitable Given the increased emphasis on the commercialization of outer space, it comes as no surprise to find the
question of private property in outer space opened up for debate. If capital is to undertake a space program and
commodify nearby parts of the solar system, it needs reassurance that its investments will be protected by law. The issue is

now being highlighted by an argument over the geostationary orbit (GEO). This is the 30 km-wide strip 35,786 km above
the equator, one in which satellites can orbit at the same speed as the ground below them. With only three satellites in the
GEO, a media conglomerate, a communications company, or a government surveillance agency can cover the whole world.
No wonder it has been called spaces most valuable real estate.15 This raises the urgent question, one still not adequately
resolved, of who actually owns this area of outer space. Is it owned by the equatorial countries such as Colombia,
Indonesia, and Kenya under this strip? Or is it jointly owned and managed by all states? The debate over the GEO is a
microcosm of that concerning outer space as a whole. The present position is one in which the moon and other celestial
bodies cannot be legally owned. Under Article II of the 1967 United Nations Outer Space Treaty, the whole of outer space
is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.16
It seems clear that the intention here was to prevent ownership and commodification of outer space. But this is now being
challenged. Mirroring the perspective of the Space Renaissance Initiative, lawyers promoting the extension of the private
sector into outer space argue that the framers of the UN Outer Space Treaty were deliberately ambiguous about private
property as opposed to nationally owned property.17 Besides helping to ensure the survival of mankind, these lawyers
argue, the settling of spaceincluding the establishment of permanent settlements on the Moon and Marswill bring
incalculable economic and social benefits to all nations.18 Sufficient profits must be guaranteed, and this can only be
done by ensuring property rights in space. Future outer space treaties should, according to one group of space lawyers,
allow private ownership of a circle of land about 437 miles around an initial base. This means the reward for ensuring the
future of humankind would be about six hundred thousand square miles of cosmic real estate, approximately the size of
Alaska. Galactic Colonialism, Risk, and War But even if it were desirable, the success of a galactic

colonialism is by no means guaranteed. This is because the very venture of space colonization
brings new risks. The fifteenth-century Renaissance and the Enlightenment placed great faith in science as a means
of bringing progress. Now such progress is regularly challenged. Furthermore, much scientific intervention today stems
from the crises stemming from earlier intervention, or what some social scientists have called manufactured risk.19 This
kind of risk, for which no one agency or individual is usually culpable, is readily

recognizable in space-humanization progress. Note, for example, that there are now around
fourteen thousand tracked objects circling around the earth, known as space debris or
space junk. Improved tracking systems will increase the number of smaller, observable tracked objects to around thirty
thousand, many of these causing potential damage. Even whole satellites may collide. Such collisions are
estimated at millions or even billions to one. But on February 10, 2009, such a collision actually happened. A defunct
Russian satellite crashed into an American commercial satellite, generating thousands of pieces of orbiting debris.20
Space junk poses a serious threat to the whole enterprise of space colonization, and plans are now afoot to launch even
moresatellites, designed to drag older satellites out of orbit in order to avoid collisions.21 Space colonization

brings a number of other manufactured risks. The farther space vehicles penetrate the
solar system, the more likely it is that they will be powered by nuclear , rather than solar,
energy. It is not widely appreciated, for example, that the 1997 Cassini Mission to Saturns moons (via Jupiter and
Venus) was powered by plutonium. One estimate is that if something had gone wrong while Cassini was still circling the
earth, some thirty to forty million deaths could have occurred.22 No plans were in place for such an eventuality. Yet, as

early as 1964, a plutonium-powered generator fell to earth, having failed to achieve orbit .
Dr. John Gofman, professor of medical physics at the University of California, Berkeley, then argued that there was
probably a direct link between that crash and an increase of lung cancer on Earth . Both
President Obama and the Russian authorities are now arguing for generating electricity with
plutonium in space, and building nuclear-propelled rockets for missions to Mars .23 Some of
the wilder plans for space colonization also entail major risk. These include proposals for planetary engineering,
whereby the climates of other planets would be changed in such a way as to support life. Dyes, artificial dust clouds,
genetically engineered bacteria, and the redirecting of sunlight by satellite mirrors are all being advanced as means of
terraforming, or making parts of the cosmos more like earth. This and the Cassini example further demonstrate the
nature of manufactured risk. Science and technology, far from creating Renaissance or Enlightenment-style optimism

But even
manufactured risks may be minimal in scope, compared with another risk
stemming from cosmic colonization. This is outright war . Armed conflict has
long been a common feature of past colonialisms; between colonizing nations as well as between the
and certainty, are creating new problems that are unforeseen and extremely difficult to cope with.

colonizers and aboriginal peoples. Satellites are already a means by which territories and investments on Earth are
monitored and protected by governments operating on behalf of their economic interests. But the prospect of

galactic colonialisms raises the distinct possibility of hostilities in space. Galactic wars
may therefore be the product of galactic colonialism. Such a scenario was prefigured by the Star Trek
science fiction television series in which the main role of The Federation is the protection of capitalist mining
colonies.24 It is a discomforting fact that both China and the United States are now actively

developing their own versions of full spectrum dominance. China demonstrated its capabilities in
January 2007 by shooting down one of its own defunct satellites. In February 2008, the U.S. Navy demonstrated a similar

capability, destroying a faulty U.S. satellite with a sea-based missile. An

arms race in outer space has

already started.
Space exploration will cause superdiseases Earth bacteria rapidly mutate
ONeill 08 [Ian ONeill, 3-11-2008, Germs Living In Space, Universe Today,
http://www.universetoday.com/2008/03/11/germs-living-in-space-almost-three-timesas-likely-to-cause-disease/]///CW
In one experiment on board Space Shuttle Endeavor (STS-123) launched early this morning (at 2:28 am EST), the reaction
of terrestrial bacteria to zero-G will be tested. When compared with test bacteria bred here on Earth, previous studies

suggest that germs bred in space are far more potent and are more likely to cause illness
to people in space. The Endeavor mission will continue this experiment in the aim to find some way to prevent
these microscopic astronauts causing too many problems to the continuing missions on board the International Space
Station and future space tourism companies. Until a solution is found, don't go ordering fish off the in-flight menu on your
next spaceship ride Wherever humans go, a whole zoo of bacteria will follow. Most of the

bacteria hitching a ride on our skin and inside our bodies live in symbiosis with us, but
occasionally problem bugs like salmonella or Escherichia coli (E-coli) can get out of control, causing
problems such as common food poisoning to more serious, life-threatening ailments such as tetanus, diphtheria, syphilis,
cholera (the list is pretty long.) So, as humans venture into space, it is inevitable that bacteria

will come too - the whole symbiotic and parasitic jungle - exploring space with us.
Bacteria will mutate , often very quickly, adapting to the environment surrounding the little microbes.
Mutation is the difference between a bacteria being harmless to becoming deadly .
Mutations help bacteria to survive and as an example, they can become antibiotic resistant. This is a huge problem in
places where antibiotics are used very regularly (such as hospitals); genetic information is passed down the generations of
bacteria (often doubling in population in a matter of minutes). If just one microbe has the genetic ability

to survive a type of antibiotic, its number will multiply, creating a strain of "superbug"
that can avoid being killed by antibiotics - one of the most basic examples of "natural selection".
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is one particular nasty strain of the otherwise benign Staphylococcus
genus which has mutated to resist commonly used antibiotics.

No offense sustainable colonies are impossible unless we find another

civilization basic economics
Mann14(CharlesC.MannisanAmericanjournalistandauthor,specializinginscientifictopics.His1491:NewRevelationsof
theAmericasBeforeColumbuswontheNationalAcademiesCommunicationAwardforbestbookoftheyear.Heisathree
timeNationalMagazineAwardfinalistandarecipientofwritingawardsfromtheAmericanBarAssociation,theAmericanInstitute
ofPhysics,theAlfredP.SloanFoundation,andtheLannanFoundation.[2],TheTrickyEthicsofIntergalacticColonization
11/20/14http://www.wired.com/2014/11/futureofspaceexploration/)///CW
If we traveled to other worlds, could we avoid the Zheng He problem? Back in 1978, the Nobel-winning economist Paul
Krugman, a science fiction fan, playfully laid out the basic economics of interstellar trade. To justify the cost,
Krugman pointed out, would-be

starfarers must bring back something worth more than what

they would have made by putting the same money in an interest-bearing account and
staying on Earth. Going to distant planets, in other words, means fighting one of the greatest forces in human affairs:
compound interest. Today, the cheapest rockets available charge a little less than $1,000 to send 1 pound of material into
low-earth orbit. Sending that pound to other planets, let alone the stars, would cost vastly more. To be sure, time and
expense might be reduced by building space elevators and (should the laws of physics permit) taking advantage of handy

Exploration of distant lands will be a shortlived venture unless it yields something really, really valuable . If future space

wormholes. But the lesson of Zheng He remains:

voyagers decided to exploit a barren, lifeless planet, few would be upset. But such an endeavor is unlikely. As far as we
know, a world without life would be a world without oxygen, a stable climate, or the

possibility of growing food. Barring the discovery of some immensely valuable substance that doesnt exist on
Earth, there would be no reason to set up shop there , let alone despoil it. A world with
functioning ecosystems would be more attractive. But if local species were valuable, it would be
more sensible to carry back to Earth a snippet of their DNA than whole animals. The entire Alien
series can be considered as a proof by negative example of this assertion. The real jackpot, of course, would

be finding a nonhuman civilization: a planetful of new ideas, techniques, and expression. Here the
temptation to interactthat is, to intervenewould be enormous. China again provides an example. Travel costs today are
low compared to those in the 15th century. Africa, meanwhile, is still full of valuable resources, products, and land, so
Chinese ships are again going to Africa. In the past decade, the nation has shipped in a million or more migrants. Buying
and leasing swathes of land to grow food for export to the homeland, grabbing deals to extract minerals, locking up local
water suppliesthe newcomers have been throwing their weight around. Even though the Chinese have built many badly
needed roads, bridges, and power plants, their moves have created a furor. Landgrab! cry African newspapers. Chinese
workers have been attacked in Zambia, Cameroon, Niger, Sudan, and Angola.

2NC Space War

NASAs space colonization programs also fuel space militarization
Anderson 16 (Jake, NASAs Propaganda Campaign Wants You to Embrace the
Militarization of Space 4/11/16
http://theantimedia.org/nasa-propaganda-militarization-space/)///CW
(ANTIMEDIA) Weve seen quite a bit of NASA in the news recently. The latest photos of Pluto rattled up considerable
excitement and why not? The celestial body was dead not too long ago, heartlessly stripped of its 9th planet status. Now
its back with a vengeance. NASA made headlines again on Friday, when it announced a watershed mission to Europa, the
icy moon of Jupiter that many scientists believe could harbor life in the oceans under its glacial surface. Last year,
coinciding with the cinematically poignant, if not propagandistic film, The Martian, NASAs Jet Propulsion

Laboratory (JPL) unveiled its Visions of the Future project, a set of 14 posters meant to
instill a new generation of Americans with a renewed interest in traveling to other
planets and moons in the solar system and beyond. The posters, made by the design company Invisible Creature, are
fascinating. They depict a future in which advanced space travel has allowed humans to freely hop around the solar
system; it is intrasolar space tourism of the highest order. The project saw NASA officials, scientists, engineers, public
relations experts, and artists collaborating to imagine what the future of humanity could entail. One particularly

beautiful poster features humans in advanced hot air balloons touring Jupiter . The
description reads: The Jovian cloudscape boasts the most spectacular light show in the solar system, with northern and
southern lights to dazzle even the most jaded space traveler. Jupiters auroras are hundreds of times more powerful than
Earths, and they form a glowing ring around each pole thats bigger than our home planet. <="" ins="" dataadsbygoogle-status="done" style="margin: 0px 0px 0px -40px; padding: 0px; border: 0px; outline: 0px; font-size: 16px;
vertical-align: baseline; text-decoration: none; width: 320px; height: 100px; display: block; text-align: center;
background: transparent;"> Other posters include an illustrative future history of Mars exploration; a journey through the
clouds of Venus; a boat ride on Titans rivers and lakes of liquid ethane and methane; an undersea exhibit of the life forms
under the ice of Europa; exoplanets with red vegetation; a dark orphan planet flying through the galaxy without a sun
(where the nightlife never ends), and many more. The posters are undeniably inspired and sure to delight space buffs,
science fiction fans, and children alike. More than a few people have noticed the strangely

propagandistic feel of the posters. One writer even compared them aesthetically to the Atomic Age posters
from the 20th century. One of the artists responsible for creating the posters admitted the influence. We were inspired by
vintage travel posters, WPA-type posters from the 1930s and then all the way up to mid-century modern 1940s, 1950s,
1960s, he said. There is certainly no denying that while these posters have an altruistic goal of getting a new generation

they are also greasing the wheels for new NASA budget
proposals and the new age of the space-industrial complex . The agency, which
many mistakenly believe has been on essential furlough since the moon landings, has actually been prolific in
recent years, with unmanned missions to Jupiter, Pluto, and Mars. Currently, NASA is running very exciting,
interested in space travel,

groundbreaking projects, including JUNO, DAWN, and the New Horizons mission to Pluto, which garnered over 10
million visits to the NASA government homepage. That said, there have been considerable budget cuts in the last decades,
with more to come. Since 1966, NASAs budget has fallen from 4.41 percent of the federal budget to just 0.5 percent.
Despite the recent fantastic recent discoveries and NASAs robust social media presence, there has been the perception
that the agencys missions have become boring. Rocket launches barely even make the news these days, and, until this
decade, the only space endeavors that truly got people talking were images from Mars and speculation about life there.
Many believed space travel was dead. That is the perception NASA wants to overcome. Movies like The Martian which
NASA influenced heavily and the Visions of the Future space tourism posters can be seen as ambitious moves to get
the public excited about space exploration again. An excited public is a powerful leveraging tool for requesting more funds.
Some have noted that efforts by NASA to infiltrate popular culture are nothing new. The agency launched an entire series
of novels called NASA-Inspired Works of Fiction, for which they conscripted science fiction authors to produce novels
amenable to the new eclectic age of federally sponsored space travel. One of these novels, William Forstchens 2014
science fiction novel, Pillar to the Sky, for example, argues that bureaucratic slashes to the NASA budget are one of the
biggest threats to humanity. For the record, this is a textbook example of a psychological operation (psyop) or a planned
operation by the government meant to manipulate public opinion. Specifically, this would be classified as a white psyop,
which is an official statement or act associated with a government source. To put it bluntly, its the nicest form of
propaganda, as contrasted with grey and black psyops, which use varying gradations of subterfuge and covert operations.
There are thousands of psyops being conducted around the world, some acknowledged, some top secret with classified
government budgets. The release of both the Visions of the Future series and The Martiancoincided with NASAs request
of $19 billion to fund a manned mission to Mars. The request comes at a time when NASA is increasingly partnering with
private companies to bolster the United States space apparatus. Earlier this year, the agency issued massive contracts to
three companies SpaceX, Orbital ATK, and Sierra Nevada Corporation that will complete six cargo resupply missions
for International Space Station (ISS) by 2024. SpaceX, of course, is run by Tesla Motors CEO Elon Musk, who has openly
said he wants the company to help enable the colonization of Mars. Last year, the company released its own Mars
propaganda posters. Over the weekend, the company made headlines by successfully launching and delivering the first
inflatable room for astronauts. Orbital ATK is an American aerospace manufacturer and defense

industry company that produces tactical missiles, defense electronics, and medium and
large-caliber ammunition. Sierra Nevada Corporation is an electronic systems provider and systems integrator
specializing in microsatellites, telemedicine, and commercial orbital transportation services. In addition to the
NASA contract, the United States Army contracted them to manufacture Mobile Tower
Systems (MOTS) and help fund Gorgon Stare, a remotely controlled, aircraft-based Wide-Area Persistent Surveillance
(WAPS) system. Since 2006, the United States military has awarded the company 65 contracts, totaling nearly $3 trillion.
That NASAs functions are interwoven with the military-industrial complex should come as no

Since its inception, the Pentagon has controlled the agency through an
oversight committee, with the open goal of utilizing the space between
Earth and the moon for strategic military operations . Space is widely
considered to be the next frontier of warfare. The militarization of space in the coming
decades will see tactical satellites capable of launching nukes, disarming weapons, and
collecting vast amounts of surveillance data. Noam Chomsky calls it one of the biggest threats facing
surprise.

humanity. How does this connect back to the Visions of the Future posters? To be fair, theres absolutely nothing wrong
with getting excited about space. We live in an incomprehensibly large universe with billions of galaxies, each one
containing billions, and even trillions of stars. Our species has finally stepped off its front porch and is looking to venture
out into the cosmos. While some might question whether the human species is safe both to ourselves and others
leaving its home, we must colonize other planets in order to ensure the long-term survival of the species. Were set to
render our home planet uninhabitable, but that doesnt mean splinter groups of humans might not someday live
sustainably on a colony world (think big, folks!). Though we are likely centuries away from traveling to the nearest star,
Alpha Centauri, there is a very real chance we will explore other planets in the solar system in the coming decades. As we
rekindle our excitement about space, lets keep in mind that NASAs space technology will also allow us to

wage wars and engage in planetary surveillance. With great promise comes great peril. As with artificial
intelligence, biotechnology and countless other burgeoning fields with revolutionary potential, we must proceed with great
caution. With space, especially, we must carefully consider the people to whom weve entrusted our explorations or the
human race could end up like George Clooneys character in Gravity, metaphorically speaking.

Colonies get involved in any Earth war causes asteroid weapons and
extinction
Smith 15 (Michael Smith is an IT manager at a university and a frequent writer about science and technology.

The
problems with ensuring humanitys survival with space colonies 4/28/15
https://selfawarepatterns.com/2015/04/28/the-problems-with-ensuring-humanitys-survival-with-spacecolonies/)///CW
Stephen Hawking, as he has done before, expresses a common sentiment, that we need to colonize space in order to
survive. Humans should go and live in space within the next 1,000 years, or it will die out, Stephen Hawking has warned.
We must continue to go into space for the future of humanity, Mr Hawking said. I dont think we will survive another
1,000 years without escaping beyond our fragile planet. In February, he said that humans should colonise other planets
as life insurance for the species, and could be the only way of ensuring that humanity lives on. My first reaction to this is
that if were looking for space colonies to ensure the survival of the human race, we have a long way to go. It seems to me
that the first goal is simply to create a successful viable long term closed ecological system that can support humans. As I
understand it, every experiment attempting to do this so far has failed. I think we need to succeed pretty strongly at that
before attempting to do it in habitats millions of miles away, like on Mars. Until we do, any space colony is going

to be crucially dependent on a thin and fragile lifeline from Earths biosphere . Its also worth
noting that, once we can create a closed ecological system, we might be better off creating colonies here on Earth. A closed
hardened underground habitat would be a lot easier to build and maintain and would probably do just as much to ensure
humanitys survival. Anyone who thinks doing off world colonies is a substitute for fixing our environmental and social
problems doesnt understand the obstacles involved in any foreseeable colony. Mars, the best candidate right now, is cold
and desolate in a way that makes Antarctica look like The Garden of Eden. Add no oxygen, very low air pressure, and we
have an environment that humans cant exist in without spacesuits. Add radiation exposure from Mars lack of a magnetic
field, that would force humans to stay underground most of the time, and the idea of consigning humans to live there for
the rest of their lives starts to look a bit sadistic. (None of this is to say that I think we shouldnt have researchers and
scientists on Mars, just as we currently do in Antarctica. But no one is really tempted to colonize Antarctica.) Looking at
the longer term, people talk about things like terraforming. But I strongly suspect that, by the time we have the technology
and power to actually have a chance at terraforming an environment, were going to find that its a lot cheaper and easier
to modify ourselves for the environment rather than the environment for us. We will likely colonize other worlds, but
doing so will probably force us to give up the evolved forms that are fine tuned for Earths biosphere and location. At the
end of the lecture, Hawking encouraged his audience to look at up at the stars and not down at your feet. Ive written
before about the immense difficulties in any foreseeable interstellar travel. In short, FTL (faster than light) travel, a
common plot device in science fiction, would most likely require a new physics. But before you let that bother you,
consider that even getting to an appreciable percentage of the speed of light will require appalling amounts of energy.
(Think in terms of fuel equivalent to the mass of a planet possibly being necessary to accelerate a decent sized manned
ship to, say, 10% of the speed of light.) Our most likely path to the stars will be microscopic probes, with enough
intelligence to bootstrap an infrastructure at the destination solar system using local resources, and to transmit their

findings back to us. Its hard to see human interstellar travel being anything but the most extravagant of vanity projects,
unless mind uploading of some type or another becomes possible. Stephen Hawking has repeatedly warned of the danger
that humanity finds itself in, as a result of the rise of artificial intelligence and the dangers of human aggression and
barbarity. Ive written repeatedly about why I think the dangers of AI, although real to some degree,are vastly overblown. I
wont reopen that debate here. The only thing Ill point out is that if AIs are a danger on Earth, theyd also be a danger in a
space colony, or anywhere else wed go and be tempted to use them. On the dangers of human aggression

and barbarity, if we did solve the problems of closed ecosystems and had colonies around the solar system, and
humanity reached a point where it destroyed Earths biosphere in a war, its not clear to
me why such a war would stop there. Its extremely difficult to protect yourself from a
space based attack. The attacker can always go further out to accelerate an
asteroid or something similar at you, allowing kinetic energy to wrought
destruction . Space colonies might slightly increase the probability that humanity survives such a war, but not
nearly as much as people like to think. None of this is to say that I think humans shouldnt colonize space, in the long
term. But thinking that we are doing it to preserve the species is misguided , except in the very
broadest of terms and time scales. (Think human intelligence, in one form or another, surviving the evolution and
eventual death of the Sun.) In the mean time, our best chance of survival, it seems to me, is to address the

real issues we have here, because were a lot more likely to destroy ourselves than to have nature do it to us. The
threats of nuclear war or terrorism, global warming, biological warfare, or overall overpopulation, worry me a lot more
than a species ending asteroid strike or other mass extinction event, which only happens once every 50-100 million years.
(Not that we shouldnt do what we can to protect against asteroid strikes. Even one that doesnt endanger the whole world
can cause a lot of devastation.) I think the best way to protect against the threats of us destroying ourselves, indeed the
only way over the long term, is to give as much of humanity as possible a stake in the success of human civilization. This
involves fighting poverty worldwide, and promoting womens rights, which will help with the population problem, which
in turn helps with just about every other problem. If we really want to maximize humanitys long term survivability, thats
where we should start. The good news is that, when viewed through the broad sweep of history, things are moving in the
right direction. The only question is whether that movement will be fast enough.

Colonization causes resource wars and space weapons development

Gagnon 09
[Bruce K. Gagnon is the coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear
Power in Space and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus, Arms Race in Space,
March 19, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5971]///CW
NASA was created as a civilian agency with a mission to do peaceful space exploration. But the growing influence of the
military industrial complex has rubbed out the line between civilian and military programs. When George W. Bush
appointed former Secretary of the Navy Sean O'Keefe to head NASA in late 2001, the new space agency director

announced that all NASA missions in the future would be "dual use." This meant that every NASA
space launch would be both military and civilian at the same time. The military would ride the NASA
Trojan horse and accelerate space weapons development without the public's knowledge.
NASA would expand space nuclear power systems to help create new designs for
weapons propulsion. Permanent, nuclear-powered bases on the moon and Mars would
give the United States a leg up in the race for control of those planetary bodies . The
international competition for resource extraction in space (helium-3 on the moon) is now full
on. NASA's job is to do the research and development, and then be ready to turn everything over to private corporate
interests once the technology has been sorted out. The taxpayers will fund the technology investment program. The
military will create the space weapons systems to ensure free corporate access to the
space highways of the future. The aerospace industry is already making record profits from the ever-escalating
cost of space technology systems. Virtually every system now under development is well over budget. Just one illustration
is NASA's International Space Station. Originally slated to cost the taxpayers $10 billion, the project has now grown to
$100 billion and is not yet finished.

Space exploration causes asteroid warfare extinction

Singer 01 [Clifford E. Singer, professor of nuclear engineering and director of the
Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of
Illinois at UrbanaChampaign, Spring 2001, Swords and Ploughshares,
http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/homepage_docs/pubs_docs/S&P_docs/S&P_XIII/Singer.ht
m]///CW
However the technology to build isolated extraterrestrial settlements naturally brings along
with it another potentially powerful technologythe ability to move sizeable asteroids .
Back in 1979 it was shown that this is not as difficult as one might at first think. The requisite technique is to land a
spacecraft on one asteroid, dig up material and throw it the path of another asteroid that will approach nearby, and
perturb the orbit of that asteroid until it passes nearby another large object. Once an asteroid or comet makes

a controlled approach near any planet but Mercury or Pluto, then it can easily be directed near
or at the earth at enormous velocity. Fortunately for our hypothetical descendants here destroying all
human life on earth by asteroid impact would likely require moving objects with a
diameter in excess of ten kilometers. While there are many of these, the required orbit perturbation would
require a lot of lead-time and work and could be very difficult to motivate and conceal. Nevertheless with
contributions from this technology a dispute between the earth and a
handful of its fragile far-flung offspring in space that is carried to the
extreme could conceivably lead to human extinction . Only when settlements in space are
sufficiently numerous or far flung would such a possibility effectively be ruled out, primarily by physical considerations.

2NC Environment
Space colonization would lead to a massive increase in launches decimates
the ozone layer
Rastogi 9 (Nina Rastogi is a writer at Slate and the VP of Content at Filament. Dirty Rockets 11/17/9
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/the_green_lantern/2009/11/dirty_rockets.html)//C
W
There's a simple reason why we hear a lot more about cars, ships, and planes than we do about rocket ships: There are lot
more of them. Each flight into space does have a small impact on the planet it leaves behind, but

for the moment, at leastthese launchings are very rare. Only a couple of rockets blast off every week
around the world. As a result, space travel doesn't register on most environmentalists' radars .
One issue that might deserve some attention has to do with the depletion of stratospheric ozone, a
topic we discussed a few months back. Rocket engines emit reactive gases that cause ozone
molecules to break apart. They also discharge microscopic particles of soot and
aluminum oxide, which may increase the rate at which those gases wreak havoc . Each
variety of rocket propellantdelivers its own blend of ozone-depleting substances: Solid propellants, for example, are more
damaging than liquid ones, though exactly how much is unclear. Engine design matters, too. To make matters worse,

spacecraft dump some of these pollutants directly into the upper and middle
stratosphere, where they can start causing damage immediately. Despite all this, spacecraft contribute very little to

the global ozone problem. In arecent paper on the topic, researcher Martin Ross and three co-authors estimated that
rocket launches are responsible for roughly 1 percent of the total ozone depletion that can be
attributed to human causes. That

percentage may rise, however, as more traditional pollutants,

like CFCs, start to fade from the atmosphere (thanks to the 1987Montreal Protocol). At the same time, the
number of launchesfor purposes of exploration, tourism, and space-based solar power (PDF)is expected to increase.
One of the study's co-authors has been quoted as saying, " If

left unregulated, rocket launches by

the year 2050 could result in more ozone destruction than was ever realized

by CFCs." All that stratospheric damage may increase rates of skin cancer and cataracts, but what effect might rockets
have on global climate change? The exhaust from space-ship engines does add several kilotons of carbon dioxide to the
atmosphere every year. But that's just a smidgen compared with the several hundred kilotons produced by aircraft, as
Ross and his co-authors point out. Aircraft, in turn, are responsible for just 2 percent to 5 percent of the world's CO2
emissions. Even with major growth in the space industry, the authors say, it's unlikely that rockets will become a
significant issue vis--vis climate change. One wild card, though, are those microscopic particles we mentioned earlier
soot and aluminum oxide. They don't last very long in the stratosphereonly a few years, as opposed to centuries for
carbon dioxidebut on a per-unit-of-mass basis, they can be very effective at changing the radiation balance in the
atmosphere. The problem is, it's not always clear how they'll change that balance. Bits of aluminum oxide, for example,
reflect the visible light from the sun back into space, which cools the Earth. But those same particles can also absorb
infrared radiation emanating from the planet's surface, essentially trapping heat the way a greenhouse gas does. Soot, too,
can help warm or cool the planet, depending on the size, number, and location of the particles. Atmospheric scientists do
have the models to calculate what the overall climate effects of a given launch might be, even taking the fickleparticles into
consideration. What they don't have, Ross says, are good enough data on what's actually in those rocket plumes,
particularly when it comes to engines using liquid propellants or the new "hybrid" propellants (which use a combination of
a solid fuel and a liquid oxidizer). While this research proceeds, it's worth taking a moment to consider how rocket
launches pollute the environment just beyond our bordersnamely, the otherwise pristine wilds of outer space. Space
journeys leave behind all kinds of debris, including old batteries, jettisoned components, and human refuse. NASA
estimates that there are upward of 500,000 pieces of debris larger than one centimetercurrently orbiting the planetnot
to mention tens of millions of really tiny particles, which can damage sensitive equipment despite their diminutive size.
One astrophysicistrecently compared our celestial junkyard to a massive Superfund site. If we really want future

generations to have the option of enjoying the final frontier, it's worth thinking about
how to keep the place clean for them.
Space col destroys the ozone layer
Minard 9 (Anne Minard writes for National Geographic News.

Rocket Launches Damage Ozone Layer, Study Says

4/14/09 http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2009/04/090414-rockets-ozone.html)///CW
Plumes from rocket launches could be the world's next worrisome emissions , according to a
new study that says solid-fuel rockets damage the ozone layer, allowing more harmful solar rays to reach
Earth. Thanks to international laws, ozone-depleting chemicals such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and methyl bromide
have been slowly fading from the atmosphere. But when solid-fuel rockets launch, they release

chlorine gas directly into the stratosphere, where the chlorine reacts with oxygen to form ozone-destroying
chlorine oxides. Increased international space launches and the potential
commercial space travel boom could mean that rockets will soon emerge as
the worst offenders in terms of ozone depletion , according to the study, published in the
March issue of the journal Astropolitics. If the space tourism industry alone follows market projections, rocket
launches are "going to run up against Montreal Protocol," said study co-author Darin Toohey of the
University of Colorado at Boulder. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, an international
treaty, prescribes measures intended to hasten the recovery of Earth's depleted ozone layer. "This isn't urgent," Toohey
said. "But if we wait 30 years, it will be." Rocket Pollution Currently the U.S., European, and Indian governments power
their rockets with a mix of liquid and solid fuels, which generally take the form of powder or crystals. Russia and China use
liquid fuels almost exclusively. In general, the liquid rocket propellants havent yet undergone the level of scrutiny that
solid propellants have, noted study leader Martin Ross, an atmospheric scientist from the Aerospace Corporation in Los
Angeles. "There is a general assumption that the various liquid rocket engines use 'green propellants,' and this is likely
true to some extent," Ross said. "But how do liquids compare to solids as far as ozone loss is concerned? We do not know
for sure. "What we have shown in the Astropolitics paper is that the rockets of the future will use liquid propellants and
that they will fly ten or one hundred times more often than today's rockets," he continued. "We do not have enough
scientific information to predict how these high flight rates will affect the ozone layer in 10 or 20 years." Further
complicating matters, individual mission trajectories pollute to different degrees , he added. Some

launches release chemicals into the lower atmosphere, where most of them "rain out" fairly quickly. Others pollute
the stratosphere, where they can linger and react with other chemicals. Also, "we don't know
enough about the real atmospheric impacts of all the various types [of fuels] to say for sure which are best," study coauthor Toohey said. "We need to get some observations in a variety of rockets to start to reduce uncertainties." Global
Warming vs. Ozone Toohey is also sending out a pollution warning about so-called geoengineering proposals that have
surfaced to combat global warming. Some researchers, for example, want to seed the stratosphere with particles of sulfur
dioxide and aluminum oxide to spur global cooling. (Read "Extreme Global Warming Fix Proposed: Fill the Skies With
Sulfur.") But aluminum oxide is one of the chemicals in solid rocket fuel that depletes ozone, Toohey pointed out. "There
are people in the engineering world who think we could address global warming in a way that could destroy our ozone
layer," he said. "If people are going to put particles into the stratosphere, they'd better be

careful."
Ozone depletion is a risk-multiplier cumulatively leads to extinction
Gareau 13 - Assistant Professor of Sociology and International Studies at Boston
College
(Brian, Whatever Happened to Ozone Layer Politics?
http://www.e-ir.info/2013/01/29/whatever-happened-to-ozone-layer-politics/)
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Depletes the Ozone Layer (1997) is arguably the most successful global
environmental agreement ever created. The ozone layer is the Earths sunscreen, absorbing up to 99 per cent of the
suns ultraviolet (UV) radiation. Without it, life on earth would not exist. The Montreal Protocol was created to
eliminate human-made chemicals that destroy the ozone layer, what we call ozone-depleting substances (ODSs). ODSs destroy the ozone layer, thus allowing
more UV radiation to hit the surface and increasing skin cancer and skin disease rates, eye cataracts, damage to the immune system, and sunburn in humans and
other animals. The Protocol sought to put a halt to such harmful effects, chiefly to rid the world of chlorofluorocarbons, or CFCs. The most famous ozone holes
occur over the Antarctic. In 2006, an Antarctic ozone hole reached a record 11.4 million square miles wide, larger than all of North America. While it mostly covers
uninhabited land, the Antarctic ozone hole does reach some populated areas in South America as it is quite mobile. The Arctic hole, a newer phenomenon, has a
potentially larger impact on humans. The 2011 Arctic ozone hole moved from the North Pole into Scandinavia and Greenland. The World Meteorological
Organization cautioned habitants to protect themselves from the strong UV rays. Parts of Canada and Russia have also been affected lately. It is possible that
ozone depleted air will move south with the Arctic polar vortex, potentially reaching northern Italy, New York, and San Francisco. The US Environmental

increased UV exposure will lead to 150 million cases of skin cancer and three million
deaths during the course of the 21st century at an economic cost of $6 trillion.[1] Beyond skin cancer, reduced ozone
has also been shown to increase rates of malaria and other infectious diseases .[2]
Protection Agency estimates that

According to the American Cancer Society, in 2010 in the US alone more than 1 million new cases of skin cancer were expected, 68,000 of which would be
melanoma. The odds of contracting melanoma increased from 1:250 to 1:84 over the last quarter century. By the age of 70, 2/3 of Australians will be diagnosed
with skin cancer, accounting for 80% of all new cancers diagnosed each year in Australia.[3] More than 1,000 people in Australia are treated for skin cancer daily.

UV radiation also
contributes to genetic disorders especially in small aquatic species and amphibians. While plants
require solar energy to photosynthesize, too much UV radiation stunts plant growth and can lead to a decrease
in yields for important crops. Additionally, more UV radiation creates other economic costs by accelerating the degradation of materials
In southern Chile, where ozone layer thinning is extreme, skin cancer rates have escalated 66 per cent since 1994.

such as plastics, paints, and rubber. ODSs such as CFCs were used as early on as the late nineteenth century, when they became chief ingredients for fire
extinguishers. By the 1970s, 200,000 metric tons of CFCs were used in aerosols annually in the US alone. Soon after, it became increasingly evident that CFCs had

CFC and other ODSs are being eliminated through the

Montreal Protocol because these and other ODSs threaten life on earth. Today, every
single country on the planet has ratified the Montreal Protocol. Since the Montreal Protocol first entered into
a major side-effect: they depleted the ozone layer.

without the Montreal Protocol, by

2050 even the middle latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere would have lost half of their ozone layer,
and the Southern Hemisphere would have lost 70 percent. As Jonathan Shanklin of the British Antarctic Survey
put it, the Montreal Protocol is working. We can quite clearly see that the amount of ozonedestroying substances in the atmosphere is declining.[4] Because of the high level of compliance and cooperation
among countries, it is no exaggeration to state that the Montreal Protocol is the most successful global
environmental treaty ever created.
force in 1989, CFC levels in the atmosphere have declined. Scientific research predicts that,

2NC Diseases
Space exploration causes space diseases and extinction
Mullen 03 [Leslie, 8-25-2003, Alien Infection, Astrobiology Magazine,
http://www.astrobio.net/news/modules.php?
op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=570]///CW
Chris Chyba, who holds the Carl Sagan Chair for the Study of Life in the Universe at the SETI Institute, says there
are two types of potential alien pathogens: toxic and infectious. Toxic pathogens act as a
poison on other organisms. Infectious pathogens are viruses or bacteria that are passed
between organisms, causing sickness. Some viruses and microbes rely on specific biological systems in order to
replicate and infect their host, so not all pathogens affect all organisms the same way. Chicken farmers, for instance, can
remain untouched by a disease that decimates their flocks. It could be that a martian microbe would enter the human
body, but is rendered harmless because it is incompatible with human physiology. "After living in the dirt of Mars, a
pathogen could see our bodies as a comparable host; they could treat us 'like dirt,'" says John Rummel, NASA's Planetary
Protection Officer. "But, to quote Donald Rumsfeld, we're dealing with the unknown unknowns. It could be that even if the
microbes lived inside us, they wouldn't do anything, it would just be this lump living inside you." The conditions

on Mars are much different than those in the human body, so an inert pathogen seems
the most likely scenario -- especially since any life on Mars would have evolved without humans being present.
Co-evolution is why some pathogens only affect certain organisms. Infectious pathogens evolve based on
the reactions of their hosts. As the host develops defenses against a predatory pathogen, the pathogen has to
devise new means of sustaining itself within the host (or risk its own extinction). Some toxins also developed through coevolution. As predatory organisms seek food, their prey develop ever more sophisticated means to escape being eaten.
Many organisms developed specially targeted toxins as part of this evolutionary arms battle. Rummel says that humans
have evolved a complex defense system to prevent us from getting sick from a whole host of disease and pathogens. But
non-specific microbes - where human physiology did not influence their evolution - may evade our defense mechanisms.
The best way to understand the spread of potential alien pathogens is to examine the spread of such non-specific
pathogens on Earth. One example of a non-specific toxic pathogen is cyanobacteria that produce hepatotoxins (toxins
affecting the liver) and neurotoxins. According to Chyba, cyanobacteria living in lakes on the alpine pastures of
Switzerland have been implicated in a hundred cattle poisonings over the past 25 years. Chyba says the cyanobacteria
most likely did not develop their toxins in order to escape predation from cows (or to kill the cows in order to eat them!).
"Rather, the susceptibility of cattle to these toxins seems simply to be an unfortunate coincidence of a toxin working across
a large evolutionary distance," Chyba writes. An example of an infectious pathogen working across large evolutionary
distances is the bacterium Serratia marcescens. It is found in a variety of animal species, and also can be found free-living
in water and soil. Its transmission from human sewage has resulted in the decimation of Caribbean elkhorn coral. "The
distance between humans and corals emphasizes the possibility that certain organisms may prove pathogenic across a
wide evolutionary divide," Chyba writes. Of course, the evolutionary divide between humans and coral would not be as
wide a gulf as between any martian organisms and human beings. Yet one theory for the origin of life on

Earth is that it was transferred here from Mars by meteorites. This variant of the "Panspermia"
theory suggests that life on Earth and any life on Mars might be closely related. If Mars and Earth share the basis for life,
this life would presumably have evolved well beyond the original form. Such a large evolutionary divide could provide

if infection does occur, it might be related

closely enough to some Earth life to blaze through that population
unchecked . Human infection is not the only concern of planetary protection. Life on Earth forms an
interconnected, highly dependent web, so a pathogen affecting any life on Earth could have serious
repercussions for the health and environment of our planet.
protection from infection. But it could also mean that

2NC Defense
Sustainable space col is economically infeasible
Foust 16 (Jonah Foust is a National Security Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, where he publishes
analysis of various national security topics. He also spent two years as a fellow at the American Security Project doing
policy analysis on national security issues. And before that, he worked as a senior military intelligence analyst for the U.S.
government covering Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. Space Colonies Are Cool. And Economically Impossible.
6/2/16 http://joshuafoust.com/space-colonies-are-cool-and-economically-impossible/)///CW
At the Re:Code conference this week, Amazon CEO and rocketship manufacturer Jeff Bezos made some bold claims about
going into space. We will settle Mars, he told the audience. And we should, because its cool. Mars colonies are cool if
you dont think about them very much. But colonization never happens simply because it is cool. Europeans did not
colonize Africa, India, and the Americas because traveling in disease-choked ships, battling scurvy and mutiny, was cool.
They did it to make money. The prospect of new sources for gold and silver, brand new food crops (potatoes, corn,
tomatoes, beans, tobacco, chiles, cashews, pineapple, blueberry, sunflower, chocolate, squash, pumpkin), along with brand
new commodity crops (tobacco, quinine for medicine, etc.), made for a powerful incentive to move into the new lands even
if it required committing genocide to go there. Moreover, the people who did the colonizing were not the titans of industry.
Most of the earliest colonizers were the second sons of nobility, who were educated but had no chance of inheriting
either wealth or position. They were who lobbied the monarchs to form expeditions and set off to create massive economic
colonies. One last thing? The colonies were on the same planet as Europe. They did not need any novel equipment just to
breathe air or drink water. In relative terms, the Americas were a paradise to the Europeans. Space, in contrast, is

lethal: you must bring or manufacture your own air, and your water must be heavily
processed to be potable. The primary industrial output of any colony will be creating its
own habitability: generating power so you dont freeze or boil to death, refining water, and generating (and filtering)
the air. The Europeans just had to show up. There is a hint of this economic imperative in Bezos call for industrializing
space. He has a vision of moving all heavy industry into space, and rezoning the entire planet as residential and light
industrial use. How one would build, say, automobiles or a heavy crane in space and then hurl it to the ground in one piece
is not really clear; Bezos vision seems limited to generating electricity and building computer chips. There is a certain Sim
City aspect to this idea, and for good reason: the city building game not only shares these broad assumptions about
zones but it rests onfundamentally libertarian assumptions about how communities actually function: there are no
ghettoes, no races, no clubs or sports lobbies, and there are no politics apart from the tax base and generating a profit. In
other words: it is an ideal case for how a libertarian tech mogul would think about the world. That is not, however, the way
the world works. For starters, the economic case for colonizing space is far from settled: mining

raw materials on Earth is cheap, and launching equipment into space, to then wait years or decades for raw
materials in the form of asteroids to be brought close enough to Earth to be usable in a factory, remains horrifyingly
expensive. This may not be the case forever, but even with SpaceXs most optimistic projections (Bezos own firm cannot
reach orbit, so he has nothing yet to compete with Elon Musks company), the cost of launching heavy mining equipment
into space is going to be an appalling cost (the most optimistic projects are around $500 per pound for Low Earth Orbit).

There is zero competitive advantage to launching mining equipment with

such exorbitant capital costs . But what of Bezos plan for orbiting solar power installations? The idea has
some appeal, but USCD physics professor Tom Murphy looked at the issue and saw serious issues. The relatively
inexpensive-to-reach Low Earth Orbit is completely impractical for a solar power array, leaving only geosynchronous orbit
as a viable option. But launching things to GEO is heinously expensive SpaceX can get something there for around
$8,000 per pound. And these arrays need to be big: the transmitting dish would need to be a thousand feet across in
space, and the receiving dish more than half a kilometer wide on the ground. This is to say nothing of the extreme energy
losses in transmission, and other factors. As Dr. Murphy puts it: I find myself scratching my head as to why we should go
to so much trouble. The reality is one Bezos seems reluctant to admit. We want the population to keep growing on this
planet, he told his audience. We want to keep using more energy per capita. He described a harsh retrograde world,
whereby humans need to reduce their energy consumption and stem population growth, and claimed it sounded horrific.
But this is the world we live in today: rising incomes are tightly correlated (pdf) with reduced birthrates, and the last
decade of experience in the U.S. has shown thateconomic growth is not dependent on a steady increase in per-capita
energy consumption. So why would Bezos want an inefficient, crowded planet where people dont really work except in
space? Im not prepared to speculate about that, though I suspect the coolness of such a world is its primary appeal. But
being cool is expensive: a Mars colony will cost a tremendous amount of money to found and

operate; and it is unclear how such a colony could ever become economically viable or maintain an infinite case for its
corporate overlords to take a longterm financial loss (and dont forget itsgovernment). Similarly, big floating colonies in
space sound cool, but in reality are just asridiculously ineffecient and expensive as a Martian colony. Maybe, in time
Bezos threw out an estimate of hundreds

of years these ideas will become economically

viable. At some point, digging metal out of the ground will become more expensive than sending a bunch of
manufactories to an asteroid, but that point is a very long ways off. Maybe someone can concoct a viable economic case for
building vulnerable, marginal habitats on Mars, but that remains far into the future. But I worry about the excitement over
cool billionaires doing cool things that wont last. There is a strong scientific imperative to exploring, discovering, and
understanding the wonders of our solar system. And there is a solid case for sending exploration teams (along with

robots!) into the dark so that they can learn about our universe. But permanent

colonies are a really hard

sell. When Europeans set out for the New World, their lust for wealth wound up destroying the natural world around
them, the cultures that lived there, and millions of lives. It came at a horrendous cost, in other words. And that cost is
something the current titans of commercial space colonization seem completely unable to discuss.

1NC/2NC Nanotech Mod

Nanotech is key to space colonization space elevators
Globus 16 (Al Globus worked at the NASA Ames Research Center and runs the NSS Space Settlement Journal.
Space Settlement Basics http://settlement.arc.nasa.gov/Basics/wwwwh.html)///CW
How long did it take to build New York? California? France? Even given ample funds the

first settlement will

take decades to construct. No one is building a space settlement today, and there are no immediate prospects for
large amounts of money, so the first settlement will be awhile. If Burt Rutan's prediction of affordable orbital tourism in
25 years is correct, however, it's reasonable to expect the first orbital colony to be built within about 50 years. If the

first settlement is designed to build additional settlements, colonization could proceed

quite rapidly. The transportation systems will already be in place and a large, experienced workforce will
be in orbit. Unless... Space settlement is extraordinarily expensive because launch
vehicles are difficult to manufacture and operate. For example, the current (2004) cost to put an individual
into orbit for a short time is about $30 million. To enable large scale space tourism by the middle class, this cost must be
reduced to about $1,000-$10,000, a factor of 3 to 4 orders of magnitude. Space tourism has launch requirements similar
to space settlement suggesting that a radical improvement in manufacturing technology may be necessary to enable space
settlement. One candidate for a major improvement in manufacturing technology is

molecular nanotechnology. An important branch of nanotechnology is concerned with developing

diamonoid mechanosynthesis. This means building things out of diamond-like materials, placing each atom at a precise
location (ignoring thermal motion). Diamond is 69 times stronger than titanium for the same weight and is much stiffer. If
spacecraft were made of diamonoid materials rather than aluminum, they could be much lighter allowing more payload.
For an excellent analysis applying nanotechnology to space development, see McKendree 1995 Diamond mechanosythesis
may enable a radical transportation system that could allow millions of people to go to orbit each year --

an orbital tower. An orbital tower is a structure extending from the Earth's surface into orbit. To build an orbital
tower, start construction at geosynchronous orbit. Extend the tower down towards Earth and upwards at the same rate.
this keeps the center-of-mass at geosynchronous orbit so the tower stays over one point on the Earth's surface. Extend the
tower all the way to the surface and attach it. then an elevator on the tower can move people and materials to and
fromorbit at very low cost. There are many practical problems with orbital towers, but they may be feasible. An orbital
tower is in tension so it won't collapse, but it must be very strong or it will break. The point of greatest strain is at
geosynchronous orbit, so an orbital tower must be thickest at that point. The ratio of the diameter of the tower between
geosynchronous orbit and the ground is called the taper factor. For steel, the taper factor is greater than 10,000 making a
steel orbital tower completely impractical. However, for diamonoid materials the taper factor is 21.9 with a safety factor
the same as McKendree 1995 . Thus a diamonoid orbital tower 1 meter thick at the ground would be only 22 meters thick
at geosynchronous orbit. Fullerene nanotechnology, using carbon nanotubes, may be even

better than diamonoid allowing a smaller taper factor . Calculations suggest that the materials
necessary for construction of such an orbital tower would require one asteroid with a radius between one and two
kilometers. These calculations assume the tower is built from diamonoid material with a density of 4 g/cm^3 and the
asteroid has a density of 1.8 g/cm^3 and is 3% carbon. Thus,

molecular nanotechnology may

enable space settlement .

Colonization requires replicating nanobots for asteroid protection
Globus et. al. 98 (Al Globus, Creon Levit, Deepak Srivastava, and David Bailey worked at the NASA Ames
Research Center. Jie Han is a professor in geotechnical engineering at Department of Civil, Environmental, &
Architectural Engineering at the University of Kansas.Richard Jaffe works on theoretical chemistry at NASA. Ralph
Merkle also contributed. NASA applications of molecular nanotechnology The Journal of the British Interplanetary
Society, volume 51, pp. 145-152 http://www.zyvex.com/nanotech/NASAapplications.html)///CW
Laboratories throughout the world are rapidly gaining atomically precise control over matter. As this control extends to
an ever wider variety of materials, processes and devices, opportunities for applications relevant to NASA's missions will
be created. This document surveys a number of future molecular nanotechnology capabilities of aerospace interest.
Computer applications, launch vehicle improvements, and active materials appear to be of particular interest. We also list
a number of applications for each of NASA's enterprises. If advanced molecular nanotechnology can be developed, almost
all of NASA's endeavors will be radically improved. In particular, a sufficiently advanced molecular

nanotechnology can arguably bring large scale space colonization within our grasp.
Introduction This document describes potential aerospace applications of molecular nanotechnology, defined as the
thorough three-dimensional structural control of materials, processes and devices at the atomic scale. The inspiration for
molecular nanotechnology comes from Richard P. Feynman's 1959 visionary talk at Caltech in which he said, "The
problems of chemistry and biology can be greatly helped if our ability to see what we are doing, and to do things on an
atomic level, is ultimately developed---a development which I think cannot be avoided." Indeed, scanning probe
microscopes (SPMs) have already given us this ability in limited domains. See the IBM Almaden STM Gallery for some

beautiful examples. Synthetic chemistry, biotechnology, "laser tweezers" and other developments are also bringing atomic
precision to our endeavors. [Drexler 92a], an expanded version of Drexler's MIT Ph.D. thesis, examines one vision of
molecular nanotechnology in considerable technical detail. [Drexler 92a] proposes the development of programmable
molecular assembler/replicators. These are atomically precise machines that can make and break chemical bonds using
mechanosynthesis to produce a wide variety of products under software control, including copies of themselves.
Interestingly, living cells exhibit many properties of assembler/replicators. Cells make a wide variety of products,
including copies of themselves, and can be programmed with DNA. Replication is one approach to building large systems,
such as human rated launch vehicles, from molecular machines manipulating matter one or a few atoms at a time. Note
that biological replication is responsible for systems as large as redwood trees and whales. Another approach to
nanotechnology is supramolecular self-assembly, where molecular systems are designed to attract each other in a
particular orientation to form larger systems. Hollow spheres large enough to be visible in a standard light microscope
have been created this way using self-assembling lipids. There are many other examples and this field is rapidly
advancing. Biological systems can do most of what molecular nanotechnology strives to accomplish -- atomically precise
products, active materials, reproduction, etc. However, biological systems are extremely complex and molecular
nanotechnology seeks simpler systems to understand, control and manufacture. Also, biological systems usually

work at fairly mild temperature and pressure conditions in solution -- conditions that are
not found in most aerospace environments. Today, extremely precise atomic and molecular manipulation
is common in many laboratories around the world and our abilities are rapidly approaching Feynman's dream. The
implications for aerospace development are profound and ubiquitous. A number of applications are mentioned here and a
few are described in some detail with references. From this sample of applications it should be clear that although
molecular nanotechnology is a long term, high risk project, the payoff is potentially enormous -- vastly superior
computers, aerospace transportation, sensors and other technologies; technologies

that may enable large

scale space exploration and colonization. This document is organized into two sections. In the first, we
examine three technologies -- computers, aerospace transportation, and active materials -- useful to nearly all NASA
missions. In the second, we investigate some potential molecular nanotechnology payoffs for each area identified in
NASA's strategic plan. Some of these applications are under investigation by nanotechnology researchers at NASA Ames.
Some of the applications described below have relatively near-term potential and working prototypes may be realized
within three to five years. This is certainly not true in other cases. Indeed, many of the possible applications of
nanotechnology that we describe here are, at the present time, rather speculative and futuristic. However, each of these
ideas have been examined at least cursorily by competent scientists, and as far as we know all of them are within the
bounds of known physical laws. We are not suggesting that their achievement will be easy, cheap or near-term. Some may
take decades to realize; some other ideas may be scrapped in the coming years as insuperable barriers are identified. But
we feel that they are worth mentioning here as illustrations of the potential future impact of nanotechnology. Technology
Computer Technology The applicability of manufacturing at an ever smaller scale is nowhere more self-evident than in
computer technology. Indeed, Moore's law [Moore 75] (an observation not a physical law) says that computer chip feature
size decreases exponentially with time, a trend that predicts atomically precise computers by about 2010-2015. This
capability is being approached from many directions. Here we will concentrate on those under development by NASA
Ames and her partners. For a review of many other approaches see [Goldhaber-Gordon 97]. Carbon Nanotube SPM Tips
Carbon nanotubes [Iijima 91] can be viewed as rolled up sheets of graphite from 0.7 to many nanometers in diameter. The
smaller tubes are single molecules. [Dai 96] placed carbon nanotubes on an SPM tip thus extending our ability to
manipulate a single molecule with sub-angstrom accuracy. Not only are the tips atomically precise, but they should have
approximately the same chemistry as C60, and thus be functionalizable with a wide variety of molecular fragments [Taylor
93]. Functionalizing carbon nanotube tips will allow mechanical manipulation of many molecular systems on various
surfaces with sub-angstrom accuracy. One particularly intriguing possibility along this line is to utilize a carbon nanotube
SPM tip to engrave patterns on a silicon surface. It should be possible to create features a few nanometers across. These
would be perhaps 100 times finer than the current state of the art in commercial semiconductor photolithography.
Further, in contrast to approaches such as electron microscope lithography for which the speed of operation now appears
to be an insuperable obstacle for industrial production, nanotube SPM-based lithography can be accelerated by utilizing
an array with thousands of SPM tips simultaneously engraving different parts of a silicon surface. Also, nanotube SPM
lithography could provide a practical means to explore various futuristic electronic device technology ideas, such as
quantum cellular automata, which require exceedingly small feature sizes. Needless to say, if these ideas pan out, they
could literally revolutionize computer device technology, paving the way for systems that are many times more powerful
and more compact than any available today. For the near term, it should be noted that the semiconductor industry is a
major market for SPM products. These are used to examine production equipment. High performance carbon nanotube
tips should be of substantial value. NASA Ames is collaborating with Dr. Dai, now at Stanford, to develop these tips. Data
Storage on Molecular Tape It is possible to store data on long chain molecules (for example, DNA) and it may be possible
to read these data with carbon nanotube tipped SPMs. Existing DNA synthesis techniques can be used to write data. If the
different DNA base pairs can be distinguished with a carbon nanotube tipped SPM, then the data can be read nondestructively (current techniques allow a destructive read). However, the difference between base pairs is not great. If the
base pairs cannot be distinguished, techniques for attaching modified enzymes to specific base pair sequences [Smith 97]
could be used. Certain enzymes (DNA (cytosine-5) methyltransferases) attach themselves onto a specific sequence of base
pairs with a covalent bond. The enzyme then performs its operation and breaks the bond. [Smith 97] modified the enzyme
such that the initial covalent bond was formed but the subsequent operation was disrupted. The result is that DNA
synthesized with the target base pair sequences at the desired location can force precise placement of the enzymes. The
presence of an enzyme could represent 1 and its absence 0. Enzymes are sufficiently large that distinguishing their
presence should be straightforward. If the DNA/enzyme approach proves impossible, a wide variety of other polymer
systems could be examined. Data Storage on Diamond [Bauschlicher 97a] computationally studied storing data in a
pattern of fluorine and hydrogen atoms on the (111) diamond surface (see figure). If write-once data could be stored this

way, 1015 bytes/cm2 is theoretically possible. By comparison, the new DVD write-once disks now coming on the market
hold about 108 bytes/cm2. [Bauschlicher 97a] compared the interaction of different probe molecules with a one
dimensional model of the diamond surface. This study found some molecules whose interaction energies with H and F are
sufficiently different that the force differential should be detectable by an SPM. These studies were extended to include a
two dimensional model of the diamond surface and two other systems besides F/H [Bauschlicher 97b]. Other surfaces,
such as Si, and other probes, such as those including transition metal atoms, have also been investigated [Bauschlicher
97c]. Among the better probes was C5H5N (pyridine). Quantum calculations suggest that pyridine is stable when attached
to C60 in the orientation necessary for sensing the difference between hydrogen and fluorine. Half of C60 can form the
end cap of a (9,0) or (5,5) carbon nanotube, and carbon nanotubes have been attached to an SPM tip [Dai 96]. Thus, it
might be possible using today's technology to build a system to read the diamond memory surface. [Avouris 96] has shown
that individual hydrogen atoms can be removed from a silicon surface. If this could be accomplished in a gas that donates
fluorine to vacancies on a diamond surface, the data storage system could be built. [Thummel 97] computationally
investigated methods for adding a fluorine at the radical sites where a hydrogen atom had been removed from a diamond
surface. Carbon Nanotube Electronic Components As mentioned before, carbon nanotubes can be described as rolled up
sheets of graphite. Different tubes can have different helical windings depending on how the graphite sheet is connected to
itself. Theory [Dresselhaus 95, pp. 802-814] suggests that single-walled carbon nanotubes can have metallic or
semiconductor properties depending on the helical winding of the tube. [Chico 96], [Han 97b], [Menon 97a], [Menon
97b], and others have computationally examined the properties of some of hypothetical devices that might be made by
connecting tubes with different electrical properties. Such devices are only few nanometers across -- 100 times smaller
than current computer chip features. For a number of references in fullerene nanotechnology see [Globus 97]. Molecular
Electronic Components Several authors, including [Tour 96], have described methods to produce conjugated
macromolecules of precise length and composition. This technique was used to produce molecular electronic devices in
mole quantities [Wu 96]. The resultant single molecular wires were tested experimentally and found to be conducting
[Bumm 96]. The three and four terminal devices have been examined computationally and look promising [Tour 97]. The
features of these components are approximately 3 angstroms wide, about 750 times smaller than current silicon
technology can produce. Helical Logic From [Merkle 96]: Helical logic is a theoretical proposal for a future computing
technology using the presence or absence of individual electrons (or holes) to encode 1s and 0s. The electrons are
constrained to move along helical paths, driven by a rotating electric field in which the entire circuit is immersed. The
electric field remains roughly orthogonal to the major axis of the helix and confines each charge carrier to a fraction of a
turn of a single helical loop, moving it like water in an Archimedean screw. Each loop could in principle hold an
independent carrier, permitting high information density. One computationally universal logic operation involves two
helices, one of which splits into two "descendant" helices. At the point of divergence, differences in the electrostatic
potential resulting from the presence or absence of a carrier in the adjacent helix controls the direction taken by a carrier
in the splitting helix. The reverse of this sequence can be used to merge two initially distinct helical paths into a single
outgoing helical path without forcing a dissipative transition. Because these operations are both logically and
thermodynamically reversible, energy dissipation can be reduced to extremely low levels. ... It is important to note that
this proposal permits a single electron to switch another single electron, and does not require that many electrons be used
to switch one electron. The energy dissipated per logic operation can likely be reduced to less than 10-27 joules at a
temperature of 1 Kelvin and a speed of 10 gigahertz, though further analysis is required to confirm this. Irreversible
operations, when required, can be easily implemented and should have a dissipation approaching the fundamental limit of
ln 2 x kT. Rod Logic One study not conducted by Ames or partners is particularly worth mentioning since it places a loose
lower bound on the computational capabilities of molecular nanotechnology. [Drexler 92a] designed a number of
computer components using small diamondoid rods with knobs that allow or prevent movement to accomplish
computation. While this tiny mechanical Babbage Machine is probably not an optimal computational engine, its calculated
performance for a desktop computer is 1018 MIPS -- about a million times more powerful than the largest supercomputer
that exists today (Fall 1997). Note that with very fast computation energy use and heat dissipation become a severe
problem. One approach to addressing this issue is reversible logic. Aerospace Transportation Launch Vehicles [Drexler
92a] proposed a nanotechnology based on diamond and investigated its potential properties. In particular, he examined
applications for materials with a strength similar to that of diamond (69 times strength/mass of titanium). This would
require a very mature nanotechnology constructing systems by placing atoms on diamond surfaces one or a few at a time
in parallel. Assuming diamondoid materials, [McKendree 95] predicted the performance of several existing single-stageto-orbit (SSTO) vehicle designs. The predicted payload to dry mass ratio for these vehicles using titanium as a structural
material varied from < 0 (the vehicle won't work) to 36%, i.e., the vehicle weighs substantially more than the payload.
With hypothetical diamondoid materials the ratios varied from 243% to 653%, i.e., the payload weighs far more than the
vehicle. Using a very simple cost model ($1000 per vehicle kilogram) sometimes used in the aerospace industry, he
estimated the cost per kilogram launched to low-Earth-orbit for diamondoid structured vehicles should be $153-412. This
would meet NASA's 2020 launch to orbit cost goals. Estimated costs for titanium structured vehicles varied from $16,00059,000/kg. Although this cost model is probably adequate for comparison, the absolute costs are suspect. [Drexler 92b]
used a more speculative methodology to estimate that a four passenger SSTO weighing three tons including fuel could be
built using a mature nanotechnology. Using McKendree's cost model, such a vehicle would cost about $60,000 to
purchase -- the cost of today's high-end luxury automobiles. These studies assumed a fairly advanced nanotechnology
capable of building diamondoid materials. In the nearer term, it may be possible to develop excellent structural materials
using carbon nanotubes. Carbon nanotubes have a Young's modulus of approximately one terapascal -- comparable to
diamond. Studies of carbon nanotube strength include [Treacy 96], [Yacobson 96], and [Srivastava 97a]. Space Elevator
[Issacs 66] and [Pearson 75] proposed a space elevator -- a cable extending from the Earth's surface into space with a
center of mass at geosynchronous altitude. If such a system could be built, it should be mechanically stable and vehicles
could ascend and descend along the cable at almost any reasonable speed using electric power (actually generating power
on the way down). The first incredibly difficult problem with building a space elevator is strength of materials. Maximum
stress is at geosynchronous altitude so the cable must be thickest there and taper exponentially as it approaches Earth.
Any potential material may be characterized by the taper factor -- the ratio between the cable's radius at geosynchronous
altitude and at the Earth's surface. For steel the taper factor is tens of thousands -- clearly impossible. For diamond, the

taper factor is 21.9 [McKendree 95] including a safety factor. Diamond is, however, brittle. Carbon nanotubes have a
strength in tension similar to diamond, but bundles of these nanometer-scale radius tubes shouldn't propagate cracks
nearly as well as the diamond tetrahedral lattice. Thus, if the considerable problems of developing a molecular
nanotechnology capable of making nearly perfect carbon nanotube systems approximately 70,000 kilometers long can be
overcome, the first serious problem of a transportation system capable of truly large scale transfers of mass to orbit can be
solved. The next immense problem with space elevators is safety -- how to avoid dropping thousands of kilometers of cable
on Earth if the cable breaks. Active materials may help by monitoring and repairing small flaws in the cable and/or
detecting a major failure and disassembling the cable into small elements. Interplanetary transportation [Drexler 92b]
calculates that lightsails made of 20 nm aluminum in tension should achieve an outward acceleration of ~14 km/s per day
at Earth orbit with no payload and minimal structural overhead. For comparison, the delta V from low Earth to
geosynchronous orbit is 3.8 km/s. Lightsails generate thrust by reflecting sunlight. Tension is achieved by rotating the sail.
The direction of thrust is normal to the sail and away from the Sun. By directing thrust along or against the velocity vector,
orbits can be lowered or raised. This form of transportation requires no reaction mass and generates thrust continuously,
although the instantaneous acceleration is small so sails cannot operate in an atmosphere and must be large for even
moderate payloads. Active Materials Today, the smallest feature size in production systems is about 250 nanometers -- the
smallest feature size in computer chips. Since atoms are an angstrom or so across and carbon nanotubes have a diameter
as small as 0.7 nanometers, atomically precise molecular machines can be smaller than current MEMS devices by two to
three orders of magnitude in each dimension, or six to nine orders of magnitude smaller in volume (and mass). For
example, the size of the kinesin motor, which transports material in cells, is 12 nm. [Han 97a] computationally
demonstrated that molecular gears fashioned from single-walled carbon nanotubes with benzyne teeth should operate
well at 50-100 gigahertz. These gears are about two nanometers across. [Han 97c] computationally demonstrated cooling
the gears with an inert atmosphere. [Srivastava 97c] simulated powering the gears using alternating electric fields
generated by a single simulated laser. In this case, charges were added to opposite sides of the tube to form a dipole. For
an examination of the state-of-the-art in small machines see the 1997 Conference on Biomolecular Motors and
Nanomachines. To make active materials, a material might be filled with nano-scale sensors, computers, and actuators so
the material can probe its environment, compute a response, and act. Although this document is concerned with relatively
simple artificial systems, living tissue may be thought of as an active material. Living tissue is filled with protein machines
which gives living tissue properties (adaptability, growth, self-repair, etc.) unimaginable in conventional materials.
Swarms Active materials can theoretically be made entirely of machines. These are sometimes called swarms since they
consist of large numbers of identical simple machines that grasp and release each other and exchange power and
information to achieve complex goals. Swarms change shape and exert force on their environment under software control.
Although some physical prototypes have been built, at least one patent issued, and many simulations run, swarm potential
capabilities are not well analyzed or understood. We briefly discuss some concepts here. For a summary of swarm
concepts see [Toth-Fejel 96]. [Michael 94] proposes brick-shaped machines of various sizes that slide past each other to
assume a variety of shapes. He has generated a large number of videos showing computer simulations of simple motions.
Although his web site contains rather extravagant claims, this work has received a U. K. patent. [Yim 95] built a small
swarm with macroscopic (size in inches) components called polypod, built a simulator of polypod, and programmed it to
move in various ways to study locomotion. There are two brick shaped components in polypod, one of which has two
prismatic joints linked by a revolute joint. The second component is a cubic connector with no mechanical motion.
Polypod is programmed by tables for each member of the swarm. Each member is programmed to move at various speeds
in each degree of freedom for certain amounts of time. The swarm components are implicitly synchronized so there is no
clock signal. [Hall 96] proposes a swarm with 10 micron dodecahedral components each with 12 arms that can move in
and out, rotate a little, and grab and release each other. This concept is called the "utility fog." [Hall 96] estimates that the
utility fog would have a density of 0.2, tensile strength of 1000 psi in action and 100,000 psi in a passive mode, and have a
maximum shear rate of 100 km/second/meter. [Bishop 95] proposes a swarm consisting of 100 nanometer brick-shaped
components that slide past each other to change shape. [Globus 97] proposes a swarm with two kinds of components -edges and nodes. The terms "node" and "edge" are chosen to correspond to those in graph theory. The roughly spherical
nodes are capable of attaching to five edges (for a tetrahedral geometry with one free edge per node) and rotating each
edge in pitch and yaw. The rod-like edges are capable of changing length, rotating around their long axis, and
attaching/detaching to/from nodes. See figure. Component design, power distribution and control software are significant
challenges for swarm development. Consider that with 10 micron components a cubic meter of swarm would contain
about 1015 devices, each with an internal computer communicating with its neighbors to accomplish a global task. NASA
Missions NASA's mission is divided into five enterprises: Mission to Planet Earth, Aeronautics, Human Exploration and
Development of Space, Space Science, and Space Technology. We will examine some potential nanotechnology
applications in each area. Mission to Planet Earth EOS Data System The Earth Observing System (EOS) will use satellites
and other systems to gather data on the Earth's environment. The EOS data system will need to process and archive
>terabyte per day for the indefinite future. Simply storing this quantity of data is a significant challenge -- each day's data
would fill about 1,000 DVD disks. With projected write-once nanomemory densities of 1015 bytes/cm2 [Bauschlicher 97a]
a year's worth of EOS data can be stored on a small piece of diamond. With projected nanocomputer processing speeds of
1018 MIPS [Drexler 92a], a million calculations on each byte of one day's data would take one second on the desktop.
Smart Dust Given a mature nanotechnology, it should be possible to build sensors in balloon-borne systems
approximately the size of bacteria. With replication based manufacturing, these should be quite inexpensive. If the serious
communication and control problems can be solved, one can imagine spreading billions of tiny lighter-than-air vehicles
into the atmosphere to measure wind currents and atmospheric composition. A similar approach might be taken in the
oceans -- note that the oceans are full of floating microscopic living organisms that can sense and react to their
environment. Smart dust might sense the environment, note the location via a GPS-like system, and store that
information until close enough to a data-collection point to transfer the data to the outside world. Aeronautics and Space
Transportation Technology The strength of materials and computational capabilities previously discussed for space
transportation should also allow much more advanced aircraft. Stronger, lighter materials can obviously make aircraft
with greater lift and range. More powerful computers are invaluable in the design stage and of great utility in advanced
avionics. Active surfaces for aeronautic control MEMS technology has been used to replace traditional large control

structures on aircraft with large numbers of small MEMS controlled surfaces. This control system was used to operate a
model airplane in a windtunnel. Nanotechnology should allow even finer control -- finer control than exhibited by birds,
some of which can hover in a light breeze with very little wing motion. Nanotechnology should also enable extremely small
aircraft. Complex Shapes A reasonably advanced nanotechnology should be able to make simple atomically precise
materials under software control. If the control is at the atomic level, then the full range of shapes possible with a given
material should be achievable. Aircraft construction requires complex shapes to accommodate aerodynamic requirements.
With molecular nanotechnology, strong complex-shaped components might be manufactured by general purpose
machines under software control. Payload Handling The aeronautics mission is responsible for launch vehicle
development. Payload handling is an important function. Very efficient payload handling might be accomplished by a very
advanced swarm. The sequence begins by placing each payload on a single large swarm located next to the shuttle orbiter.
The swarm forms itself around the payloads and then moves them into the payload bay, arranging the payloads to
optimize the center of gravity and other considerations. The swarm holds the payload in place during launch and may even
damp out some launch vibrations. On orbit, satellites can be launched from the payload bay by having the swarm give
them a gentle push. The swarm can then be left in orbit, perhaps at a space station, and used for orbital operations. This
scenario requires a very advanced swarm that can operate in an atmosphere and on orbit in a vacuum. Besides the many
and obvious difficulties of developing a swarm for a single environment, this provides additional challenges. Note that a
simpler swarm might be used for aircraft payload handling. Vehicle Checkout Aerospace vehicles often require complex
checkout procedures to insure safety and reliability. This is particularly true of reusable launch vehicles. A very advanced
swarm with some special purpose appendages might be placed on a vehicle. It might then spread out over the vehicle and
into all crevices to examine the state of the vehicle in great detail. Human Exploration and Development of Space
Nanotechnology-enabled Earth-to-orbit transportation has the greatest potential to revolutionize human access to space
by dropping the current $10,000 per pound cost of launch, but this was discussed above. Other less dramatic technologies
include: High Strength and Reliability Materials Space structures with a long design life (such as space station modules)
need high-reliability materials that do not degrade. Active materials might help. The machines monitor structural integrity
at the sub-micrometer scale. When a portion of the material becomes defective, it could be disassembled and then
correctly reassembled. It should be noted that bone works somewhat along these lines. It is constantly being removed and
added by specialized cells. On Demand Spares and Tools To effect timely repairs, space stations require a large store of
spare parts and tools that are rarely used. A mature nanotechnology might create a "matter compiler," a machine that
converts raw materials into a wide variety of products under software control. Contemporary examples of very limited
matter compilers are numerically controlled machines and polypeptide sequencers. With a substantially more capable
nanotechnology-based matter compiler, a space station crew could simply make spare parts and tools as needed. The
programs could be stored on-board or on the ground. New tools invented on Earth could be transferred as software to the
station for manufacture. Once used, unneeded tools and broken parts could be ionized in a solar furnace, transferred using
controlled magnetic fields, and the constituent atoms stored for later manufacture into new products. Waste Recycling An
advanced nanotechnology might be able to build filters that dynamically modify themselves to attract the contaminant
molecules detected by the air and water quality sensors. Once attached to the filter, the filter could in principle move the
offending molecules to a molecular laboratory for modifications to useful or at least inert products. A swarm might
implement such an active filter if it was able to dynamically manufacture proteins that could bind contaminant molecules.
The protein and bound contaminant might then be manipulated by the swarm for transportation. With a sufficiently
advanced nanotechnology it might even be possible to directly generate food by non-biological means. Then agriculture
waste in a self-sufficient space colony could be converted directly to useful nutrition. Making this food attractive will be a
major challenge. Sleeping through RCS firings Sleeping crew members in the shuttle experience considerable pain and
sleep disruption when the reaction control system fires and they collide with the cabin walls. If crew members were
connected to the walls by a swarm, the swarm could absorb most or all of the force before the crew member struck the
wall. The swarm could then gradually return the crew member to center (without the oscillations associated with bungee
cords) in preparation for the next firing. Spacecraft Docking For resupply, spacecraft docking is a frequent necessity in
space station operations. When two spacecraft are within a few meters of each other, a swarm could extend from each,
meet in the middle, and form a stable connection before gradually drawing the spacecraft together. Zero and Partial G
Astronaut Training A swarm could support space-suited astronauts in simulated partial-g environments by holding them
up appropriately. The swarm moves in response to the astronaut's motion providing the appropriate simulation of partial
or 0 gravities. Tools and other objects are also manipulated by the swarm to simulate non-standard gravity. Smart Space
Suits Active nanotechnology materials (see active materials) might enable construction of a skin-tight space suit covering
the entire body except the head (which is in a more conventional helmet). The material senses the astronaut's motions and
changes shape to accommodate it. This should eliminate or substantially reduce the limitations current systems place on
astronaut range of motion. Small Asteroid Retrieval In situ resource utilization is undoubtedly

necessary for large scale colonization of the solar system. Asteroids are particularly promising for orbital use
since many are in near Earth orbits. Moving asteroids into low Earth orbit for utilization poses a safety problem should the
asteroid get out of control and enter the atmosphere. Very small asteroids can cause significant

destruction. The 1908 Tunguska explosion, which [Chyba 93) calculated to be a 60 meter diameter stony asteroid,
leveled 2,200 km2 of forest. [Hills 93] calculated that 4 meter diameter iron asteroids are near the threshold for ground
damage. Both these calculations assumed high collision speeds. At a density of 7.7 g/cm3 [Babadzhanov 93], a 3 meter
diameter asteroid should have a mass of about 110 tons. [Rabinowitz 97] estimates that there are about one billion ten
meter diameter near Earth asteroids and there should be far more smaller objects. For colonization

applications one would ideally provide the same radiation protection available on Earth .
Each square meter on Earth is protected by about 10 tons of atmosphere. Therefore, structures orbiting below the van
Allen belts would like 10 tons/meter2 surface area shielding mass. This would dominate the mass requirements of any
system and require one small asteroid for each 11 meter2 of colony exterior surface area. A 10,000 person cylindrical space
colony such as Lewis One [Globus 91] with a diameter of almost 500 meters and a length of nearly 2000 meters would

require a minimum of about 90,000 retrieval missions to provide the shielding mass. The

large number of
missions required suggests that a fully automated, replicating nanotechnology may be
essential to build large low Earth orbit colonies from small asteroids . A nanotechnology
swarm along with an atomically precise lightsail is a promising small asteroid retrieval
system. Lightsail propulsion insures that no mass will be lost as reaction mass. The swarm can control the lightsail by
shifting mass. When a target asteroid is found, the swarm spreads out over the surface to
form a bag. The interface to the sail must be active to account for the rotation of the asteroid -- which is unlikely to
have an axis-of-rotation in the proper direction to apply thrust for the return to Earth orbit. The active interface is simply
swarm elements that transfer between each other to allow the sail to stay in the proper orientation. Of course, there are

many other possibilities for nanotechnology based retrieval vehicles .

Nanotech is a prerequisite to space col
Clark 12 (Stuart Clark is an astronomy journalist and author of several books about space
Nanotechnology can launch a new age of space exploration 4/17/12 http://www.theguardian.com/nanotechnologyworld/nanotechnology-can-launch-a-new-age-of-space-exploration)///CW
Launching equipment into space is an expensive business : it costs $10,000 (6,300) to lift every
0.45kg (1lb) of stuff into orbit. Making

things smaller and lighter is, therefore, a natural route to

reducing the cost of launching a spacecraft . It is no surprise then that the principles of
nanotechnology and the potential to reduce the mass and size of spacecraft and payloads are focusing the
minds of space engineers. "When nanotechnology is really developed, even countries that don't presently think
about space will be able to afford space exploration," says Meyya Mayyappan, chief scientist for exploration technology at
Nasa's Centre for Nanotechnology, California. He envisages swapping the multi-tonne spacecraft of today for shoeboxsized craft weighing just 2kg-5kg, yet matching all the capabilities of today's behemoths. Taking its first step towards
nano-sized instruments, Nasa has developed a sensor, which utilises nanotechnology, for the International Space Station
(ISS) that is the size of a postage stamp and can detect toxins in the air. It was taken into space briefly in 2009 for tests
and, according to Mayyappan, is now ready for deployment. It is likely to be incorporated into Nasa's space shuttle
replacement vehicle and could be used on a future Mars rover to sample the alien atmosphere. The sensor could also be
modified to sample liquids. At present, astronauts' blood and urine samples have to be returned to ground control in
Houston and checked in large-scale laboratories there for diseases, infections and general health. Nano-based sensors on

If manned Mars missions were

ever to become a reality, such capabilities would be vital . The European Space Agency

board the ISS could provide instantaneous analyses and diagnoses.

(Esa) has also been studying the potential of nanotechnology. "There seems to be no limit to the potential application of
nanotechnologies for space applications. Almost all technical domains covered by space research

and development could benefit from these emerging technologies," says Laurent Marchand, head
of components technology at Esa's European Space Research and Technology Centre, Noordwijk, the Netherlands.

Nanoengineering could produce surfaces that regulate spacecraft temperatures more

efficiently than the materials used today. It could also generate more efficient solar cells, rendering
large panels redundant. This summer, Esa will be hosting their eighth biannual meeting to assess the technological
readiness of various micro and nano technologies. Topics of discussion will include the possible uses of nanotech, how to
test its reliability in space, and the current strategy for the development of such systems for space. While making smaller
components is an obvious way to drive down the mass and power consumption of an otherwise conventional spacecraft,
nanotechnology offers much more potential than that. "Nanotech can completely change the way we do

space exploration," says Constantinos Mavroidis, distinguished professor of engineering, Northeastern University,
Boston, Massachusetts. In 2006, he assembled a team to investigate concepts that could be possible within 50 years. "We
wanted to think of what was simply not possible without nanotech," he says. They hit upon two ideas. The first was a
lightweight spacesuit that was more flexible than current garments. It would consist of three layers and be suitable for
spending long periods of time exploring the moon or Mars. Being thinner, however, the potential for damage would be
higher, so Mavroidis investigated how to make it repair itself using self-assembling nanounits held inside the suit's layers.
The nanounits would be based upon proteins and free to move along the suit layers. In the event of a breach, they would
spill out, attaching to one another and building bridges across the damage. They could even carry emergency drugsto
immediately treat any wound the astronaut may have suffered. The team's second idea was a "spider's web" of hairline
tubes that could be deployed across large tracts of a planet's surface. Inside the tubes would be an army of nanosensors
that could measure the surface temperature and composition. Each web would span a dozen kilometres and be capable of
sensing a planetary environment in great detail. In space itself, nanotechnology-based missions hold great promise.
Instead of general purpose spacecraft, hundreds or even thousands of identical microchip-sized spacecraft could be
deployed to perform highly specific tasks. Using funding from the European Research Commission, Colin McInnes,
professor of engineering, University of Strathclyde, Scotland, is currently studying such missions. At present, Esa uses
four nearly identical spacecraft called Cluster to measure the Earth's magnetic field and gauge its response to solar storms.
Large numbers of smaller, nanotechnology-based spacecraft, known as "nanosats", could do a more detailed job by
"carpeting" a much wider volume of space to provide continual monitoring of magnetic behaviour with high sensitivity.
Such nanosats would be so small that any gravitational attraction to the Earth would easily be overwhelmed by other

forces, such as the pressure of sunlight and the minuscule drag of the Earth's highest atmosphere. This means that a
nanosat would find it much easier to escape Earth's gravitational pull altogether, opening up new possibilities for
propulsion. Part of McInnes's study is to find the natural pathways in space that such nanosats could settle into. Once
identified they could be exploited for future missions, allowing the tiny spacecraft to drift like dandelion fluff through the
solar system. " Nanotech

is a new way of thinking about space missions. Once the

idea is out there, people will think of all sorts of applications ," says McInnes.

NASA is developing nanotech for space exploration with national security

applications
Meyyappan 13 (Meyya Meyyappan is chief scientist for Exploration Technology at NASAs Ames Research Center
in Californias Silicon Valley. Until June 2006, he served as the director of the Center for Nanotechnology at Ames. He also
is a founding member of the Interagency Working Group on Nanotechnology (IWGN) established by the Office of Science
and Technology Policy in Washington, D.C. The IWGN is responsible for developing the National Nanotechnology
Initiative. Nanotechnology for Space Exploration 8/11/13 http://theinstitute.ieee.org/ieee-roundup/opinions/ieeeroundup/nanotechnology-for-space-exploration)///CW
When I started at NASA nearly 18 years ago, my first priority was to understand its various mission needs so that I could
better assess the technology gaps and figure out how to fill them. After talking to many veteran NASA scientists and
engineers and reading numerous reports, I came to a surprising conclusion: NASA runs a very expensive

weight watchers program! It costs about US $10 000 per pound to lift anything (including astronauts) to Earths
orbit and $100 000 per pound when traveling to distant planets. Asking astronauts to shed a few pounds is probably not
the best way to solve this problem, and is not going to help much given the overwhelming size, volume, and weight of the
rest of the payload, which includes computers, instruments, sensors, and other support systems. However,
miniaturization of what goes onboard is key to cost savings , which involves making these items
smaller without sacrificing the quality of their performance. Increased functionality per unit weight is the goal in every
mission and the driver behind the miniaturization efforts. Moreover, wherever NASA travels, there is no utility company
waiting on the other end to service us. We have to generate our own power, often from the sun, and use it wisely. This
means everything in the payload must be power efficient. If decisions have to be made inside an autonomous-thinking
spacecraft - instead of in the mission control facilities at Houston or Pasadena, Calif., - we then need powerful computers
that run our missions, but at the same time they cannot exceed the size of a laptop. The computers and all electronic
components brought onboard also have to be radiation-tolerant since space is a hostile environment in terms of not only
the devastating effects of radiation, but also the extreme swings in temperature. Luckily, in all these scenarios we can

use nanotechnology to develop architectures, devices, materials, and systems at the

nanoscale level to produce lightweight and often times tiny products. The ultimate object does not have
to be nanosized, however. Novel nanomaterials such as carbon nanotubes and graphene, as well as elements and
compounds that can be shaped in the form of one-dimensional nanowires or nanoparticles, give us the ability
to design applications with these nanomaterials that benefit a spectrum of
industries , including computing, electronics, energy, environment, health and medicine, national
security, space exploration, and transportation. These emerging developments can help NASAs missions in
many ways. The need for sensing a gas or vapor arises often in space exploration to do the
following: to detect potential fuel leaks in space vehicles, monitor air-quality in spacecraft or crew cabins in the
International Space Station, map planetary atmospheres, and detect water vapor on Mars. Conventional approaches use
instruments that are bulky and expensive. Chemical sensors, made from nanomaterials, are an ideal

alternative since they can be small - the size of a postage stamp - and consume less power. The form of these sensor
systems can be anything we want, whether a sticky sensor on the wall of a spacecraft or a drill bit in contact with soil or
rocks. It could even be hundreds of sensors interconnected across a planet. Biosensors are also key in space missions,
which can be used for monitoring water quality, providing routine health checkups of astronauts, and detecting life on
other planets. The current practice mostly relies on taking soil and water samples, or blood or urine, and keeping them
frozen until the next flight home, delaying laboratory analysis to a much later time. Instead, a lab-on-a-chip is a more ideal
solution. Here again, nanotechnology is providing extraordinary compactness, low-power

operation, and sensitivity, as well as instant results.

There are many other examples of the benefits of

nanotech for NASA, particularly in the areas of energy generation and storage. Thermoelectric devices can generate power
by exploiting the temperature difference between the two ends of the device. Piezoelectric devices can produce power from
vibrations and other surface movements. Both provide greater efficiency for energy conversion. Future supercapacitors
that use materials such as carbon nanotubes could help improve the efficiency of robots, rovers, and other vehicles and
systems that require quick start and stop functions. And electron sources that use cold field emission from nanomaterials
can help miniaturize various analytical instruments to about the size of a shoebox. Indeed, all these exciting developments
point to the possibility of downsizing the Mini Cooper-sized Curiosity Mars rover to the size of a shopping cart with
tremendously increased functionality.

--Grey Goo Impact

Nanotech would consume the universe- creating grey goo
Webb 2 StephenPhD in theoretical physics and professor at Open University- (Where
is Everybody: page 249 )
One of the elements of any future nanotechnology is likely to be the nanorobot or nanobot,
for short. Although their development is a long way off, theoretical studies suggest we could construct nanobots from one
of several materialswith carbon-rich diamondoid materials perhaps forming the basis for many types of nanobot.
Studies also suggest that one of the most useful types of nanobot will be a self-replicating

machine. Alarm bells start to ring whenever self-replication is mentioned. The danger inherent in
producing a self-replicating nanobot in the laboratory is clear upon answering the following
question: What happens when a nanobot escapes into the outside world? In order to
replicate, a nanobot made of carbon-rich diamondoid material would need a source of
carbon. And the best source of carbon would be the Earths surface biosphere: plants,
animals, humansliving things in general. The swarms of nanobots (for soon there would be
many copies of the original) would dismantle molecules in living material and use the carbon to
produce more copies of themselves. The surface biosphere would be converted from the rich,
varied environment we see today into a sea of ravenous nanobots plus waste sludge. This is the
grey goo problem. As mentioned above in the discussion on overpopulation, exponential growth is a powerful thing.
Freitas has shown that, under ideal conditions, a population of nanobots growing exponentially could
convert the surface biosphere in less than three hours! We can add this, then, to the depressing list of
ways in which the lifetime of a communicating phase of an ETC might be shorted: a laboratory accident, involving the
escape of a nanobot, turns their biosphere into sludge.

--Arms Race Impact

Nanotech will not stay isolated causes an arms race and extinction
Nasu & Faunce 10 (Hitoshi Nasu: Lecturer, The Australian National University College of Law, Australia.
Thomas Faunce: Associate Professor, The Australian National University College of Law and Medical School, Australia.
Australian Research Council Future Fellow, Nanotechnology and the International Law of Weaponry: Towards
International Regulation of Nano- Weapons, Journal of Law, Information and Science)
Military applications of nanotechnology will not be confined to defensive capabilities ,
however. Nanotechnology

allows the building of conventional missiles with reduced mass

and enhanced speed, small metal-less weapons made of nanofibre composites, small
missiles as well as artillery shells with enhanced accuracy guided by inertial navigation
systems, and armour-piercing projectiles with increased penetration capability . Although it
is still highly speculative, further research could lead to the development of micro-combat
robots, micro-fusion nuclear weapons, new chemical agents carried by
nanoparticles, and new biological agents with self-replication capability. 38
Some of the potential offensive military applications of nanotechnology could span several
traditional technological compartments and blur the distinction between
conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction . The ability of
nanotechnology to design and manipulate molecules with specific properties could lead
to biochemicals capable of altering metabolic pathways and causing defined
hostile results ranging from temporary incapacitation to death .39
Nanotechnology could also make it possible to contain and carry a minute amount of
pure-fusion fuel safely until released, detonating a micro-nuclear bomb at a microspot .40
As will be shown below, it is likely that those new weapons would be subjected to prohibition
and inspection under existing treaties, as long as currently available chemicals and
biological agents are used in nano-size.41 However, the dual-use potential of
nanotechnology and the low visibility of nanoparticles in weapons make it hard to
detect their development and use as weapons Concern has been raised about the
potentially unique harmful effects of nanoweapons. At an individual level, explosives such as those
using nano-energetic particles, nano-aluminum or non-metal nano-fibre composites, and nanomedicines that improve
soldiers ability to overcome sleep deprivation,42 could cause unnecessary suffering to both combatants and noncombatants. At a larger, strategic level, the development and deployment of smaller, longer range

missiles with greater precision, or new bio-chemical agents could dramatically change
the balance of military power and the way in which a war is fought. Because of these concerns,
there have been calls for moratoriums or bans on nanotechnology.43 Others have proposed the creation of a preventative
arms control regime based on prospective scientific, technical, and military operational analysis of nanotechnology.44

no international agreement alone would be effective or even feasible

in halting or controlling the development of nanotechnology without proper
regulatory mechanisms that will address the right balance between military
necessity, humanitarian considerations and peaceful applications of nanotechnology.
However,

espionage da

1nc
Chinas space threat and capabilities are risingdiplomacy is losing
effectiveness
Billings 2015 (Lee, editor at Scientific American covering space and physics, author of
Five Billion Years of Solitude, War in Space May Be Closer Than Ever: China, Russia
and the U.S. are developing and testing controversial new capabilities to wage war in
space despite their denial of such work, August 10, 2015, Scientific American,
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever/,
silbs)
The worlds most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula,

Iran, Israel, Kashmir or Ukraine. In fact, it cannot be located on any map of Earth, even though it is very easy to find. To see it, just look up into a clear sky, to the

Earth orbit, where a conflict is unfolding that is an arms race in all but name.
The emptiness of outer space might be the last place youd expect militaries to vie over
contested territory, except that outer space isnt so empty anymore. About 1,300 active
satellites wreathe the globe in a crowded nest of orbits, providing worldwide communications, GPS navigation,
weather forecasting and planetary surveillance. For militaries that rely on some of those satellites for modern
warfare, space has become the ultimate high ground, with the U.S. as the undisputed
king of the hill. Now, as China and Russia aggressively seek to challenge U.S. superiority in space with
ambitious military space programs of their own, the power struggle risks sparking a
conflict that could cripple the entire planets space-based infrastructure . And though it might begin in
space, such a conflict could easily ignite full-blown war on Earth. The long-simmering
tensions are now approaching a boiling point due to several events, including recent and
ongoing tests of possible anti-satellite weapons by China and Russia, as well as last months failure of tensionno-mans-land of

easing talks at the United Nations. Testifying before Congress earlier this year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper echoed the concerns held by many

growing threat to U.S. satellites, saying that China and Russia are both
developing capabilities to deny access in a conflict, such as those that might erupt over
Chinas military activities in the South China Sea or Russias in Ukraine. China in particular, Clapper said, has
demonstrated the need to interfere with, damage and destroy U.S. satellites , referring to a series
senior government officials about the

of Chinese anti-satellite missile tests that began in 2007. There are many ways to disable or destroy satellites beyond provocatively blowing them up with missiles.
A spacecraft could simply approach a satellite and spray paint over its optics, or manually snap off its communications antennas, or destabilize its orbit. Lasers can
be used to temporarily disable or permanently damage a satellites components, particularly its delicate sensors, and radio or microwaves can jam or hijack

In response to these possible threats, the Obama administration

has budgeted at least $5 billion to be spent over the next five years to enhance both the defensive
and offensive capabilities of the U.S. military space program. The U.S. is also attempting
to tackle the problem through diplomacy, although with minimal success; in late July
at the United Nations, long-awaited discussions stalled on a European Union-drafted code of conduct for
spacefaring nations due to opposition from Russia, China and several other countries
including Brazil, India, South Africa and Iran. The failure has placed diplomatic solutions for the growing
threat in limbo, likely leading to years of further debate within the UNs General
Assembly. The bottom line is the United States does not want conflict in outer space , says
transmissions to or from ground controllers.

Frank Rose, assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, who has led American diplomatic efforts to prevent a space arms race. The

But let me make it very clear: we will defend our space

assets if attacked. Offensive space weapons tested The prospect of war in space is not new. Fearing Soviet nuclear weapons launched from orbit,
U.S., he says, is willing to work with Russia and China to keep space secure.

the U.S. began testing anti-satellite weaponry in the late 1950s. It even tested nuclear bombs in space before orbital weapons of mass destruction were banned
through the United Nations Outer Space Treaty of 1967. After the ban, space-based surveillance became a crucial component of the Cold War, with satellites
serving as one part of elaborate early-warning systems on alert for the deployment or launch of ground-based nuclear weapons. Throughout most of the Cold War,
the U.S.S.R. developed and tested space mines, self-detonating spacecraft that could seek and destroy U.S. spy satellites by peppering them with shrapnel. In the
1980s, the militarization of space peaked with the Reagan administrations multibillion-dollar Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed Star Wars, to develop orbital
countermeasures against Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. And in 1985, the U.S. Air Force staged a clear demonstration of its formidable capabilities, when
an F-15 fighter jet launched a missile that took out a failing U.S. satellite in low-Earth orbit. Through it all, no full-blown arms race or direct conflicts erupted.
According to Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the Stimson Center think tank in Washington, D.C., that was because both the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. realized how vulnerable their satellites wereparticularly the ones in geosynchronous orbits of about 35,000 kilometers or more. Such satellites
effectively hover over one spot on the planet, making them sitting ducks. But because any hostile action against those satellites could easily escalate to a full nuclear
exchange on Earth, both superpowers backed down. Neither one of us signed a treaty about this, Krepon says. We just independently came to the conclusion
that our security would be worse off if we went after those satellites, because if one of us did it, then the other guy would, too. Today, the situation is much more

Low- and high-Earth orbits have become hotbeds of scientific and commercial
activity, filled with hundreds upon hundreds of satellites from about 60 different nations. Despite their largely
complicated.

peaceful purposes, each and every satellite is at risk, in part because not all members of the growing club of military space powers are willing to play by the same

Space junk is the greatest threat. Satellites race

through space at very high velocities, so the quickest, dirtiest way to kill one is to simply
launch something into space to get in its way. Even the impact of an object as small and low-tech as a marble can disable or
rulesand they dont have to, because the rules remain as yet unwritten.

entirely destroy a billion-dollar satellite. And if a nation uses such a kinetic method to destroy an adversarys satellite, it can easily create even more dangerous
debris, potentially cascading into a chain reaction that transforms Earth orbit into a demolition derby. In 2007 the risks from debris skyrocketed when China
launched a missile that destroyed one of its own weather satellites in low-Earth orbit. That test generated a swarm of long-lived shrapnel that constitutes nearly
one-sixth of all the radar-trackable debris in orbit. The U.S. responded in kind in 2008, repurposing a ship-launched anti-ballistic missile to shoot down a
malfunctioning U.S. military satellite shortly before it tumbled into the atmosphere. That test produced dangerous junk too, though in smaller amounts, and the

More recently, China has launched what many

experts say are additional tests of ground-based anti-satellite kinetic weapons . None of these
debris was shorter-lived because it was generated at a much lower altitude.

subsequent launches have destroyed satellites, but Krepon and other experts say this is because the Chinese are now merely testing to miss, rather than to hit, with

Chinese officials insist the tests only

purpose is peaceful missile defense and scientific experimentation. But one test in May
2013 sent a missile soaring as high as 30,000 kilometers above Earth, approaching the
safe haven of strategic geosynchronous satellites. That was a wake-up call, says Brian Weeden, a
the same hostile capability as an end result. The latest test occurred on July 23 of last year.

security analyst and former Air Force officer who studied and helped publicize the Chinese test. The U.S. came to grips decades ago with the fact that its lower
orbit satellites could easily be shot down, Weeden says. Going nearly to geosynchronous made people realize that, holy cow, somebody might actually try to go

shortly after the May 2013 test, the US declassified details

of its secret Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP), a planned set of four
after the stuff we have up there. It was no coincidence that

satellites capable of monitoring the Earths high orbits and even rendezvousing with other satellites to inspect them up-close. The first two GSSAP spacecraft

to basically
send a message saying, Hey, if youre doing something funky in and around the
geosynchronous belt, were going to see. An interloper into geosynchronous orbit need not be an explosives-tipped missile to be
launched into orbit in July 2014. This used to be a black programsomething that didnt even officially exist, Weeden says. It was declassified

a security riskeven sidling up to an adversarys strategic satellites is considered a threat. Which is one reason that potential U.S. adversaries might be alarmed by
the rendezvous capabilities of GSSAP and of the U.S. Air Forces highly maneuverable X-37B robotic space planes. Russia is also developing its own ability to
approach, inspect and potentially sabotage or destroy satellites in orbit. Over the past two years, it has included three mysterious payloads in otherwise routine
commercial satellite launches, with the latest occurring in March of this year. Radar observations by the U.S. Air Force and by amateur hobbyists revealed that
after each commercial satellite was deployed, an additional small object flew far away from the jettisoned rocket booster, only to later turn around and fly back. The
objects, dubbed Kosmos-2491, -2499 and -2504, might just be part of an innocuous program developing techniques to service and refuel old satellites, Weeden
says, though they could also be meant for more sinister intentions.

China can and will steal US space tech via cooperation and use it to create a
dominant advantage in space kills US leadership, causes multiple
scenarios for US-China war, and gives China PGS capabilities
Fisher 15 (Testimony of Richard D. Fisher Jr. before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Hearing on China Space and Counter-Space Issues. He is a Senior Fellow on Asian Military Affairs at the International
Assessment and Strategy Center. Fisher is a recognized authority on the PRC military and the Asian military balance and
their implications for Asia and the United States. Fisher has worked on Asian security matters for over 20 years in a range
of critical positions -- as Asian Studies Director at the Heritage Foundation, Senior Analyst for Chairman Chris Coxs
Policy Committee in support of the report of the Select Committee for US National Security and Military/Commercial
Concerns with the Peoples Republic of China, and a consultant on PLA issues for the Congressionally chartered US China
Security & Economic Review Commission. Fisher has been Editor of the Jamestown Foundations China Brief, and a
regular contributor to publications such as the Wall Street Journal, Far Eastern Economic Review, Janes Intelligence
Review, National Interest, Air Forces Monthly, and World Airpower Journal. Fisher studied at Georgetown University and
at Eisenhower College where he received his BA with honors. He is currently President of Pacific Strategies, Inc. Chinas
Military Ambitions in Space and Americas Response 2/18/15
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf)///CW
Introduction Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the United States-China Economic Security Review Commission, it
is a privilege to present testimony concerning Chinas strategic and military ambitions in outer space. While China

pursues a growing commercial, deep space and space science agenda, the foundation of its
space program remains the pursuit of military advantage for the Peoples Liberation
Army (PLA). Chinas space endeavors are subordinate to the PLA . While the PLA does not offer
public briefings or budget information about its space combat programs, there is a considerable body of
secondary literature presumably based on strategy or doctrine, which has long appeared to justify
the development of a PLA capability to wage war in space. Occasionally , however,
statements by top officials appear . According to Chinese press reports on 5 December 2012, newly
elevated Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Secretary General Xi Jinping gave a speech to a Second Artillery (SA) audience.
Almost nothing of the content of that speech was reported, until the late 2014 surfacing of a journal article by SA veteran
General Sun Mingfu. In that speech, General Sun said that President Xi made clear the need to enhance

the build-up of ground-based anti-satellite combat force to ensure the timely formation of combat
capability, and to accelerate the development of strategic anti-missile capability. This article quickly disappeared off of
its hosting web page and a famous Chinese military-technical blog KKTT that gave it prominence soon disappeared as

well. On 14 April 2014, Xi was reported to have given a speech before a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) audience in which he
called for an integrated air and space capability. This phrase was also used by former PLAAF commander General Xu
Qiliang during the 2009 PLAAF 60th anniversary, and by military academic commentators which listed space weapons
the PLA should acquire. Perhaps Xi Jinping also gave the PLAAF specific space warfare preparation guidance. While there
has been some discussion in the PLA of a new service or a Space Force, today it appears that current services of the PLA
are being encouraged to develop individual space combat capabilities. Based on an accumulation of data, it is possible to
conclude that the PLAs apparent goal is to exercise denial and then dominance in Low Earth

Orbit (LEO) and then to extend control into the Earth-Moon system. Since the early 1990s China has developed four,
possibly five, attackcapable space-combat systems. China may be the only country developing such variety of space
weapons to include: ground-based and air-launched counter-space weapons; unmanned space combat and Earth-attack

the PLAs projection into

space is an integral part of Chinas development of military capabilities to
dominate the Asia-Pacific region , and then to project power globally into the 2020s
and 2030s. The PLA requires increasing space control in order to 1 assure that space-based Information Surveillance
platforms; and dual-use manned platforms. It is also important to consider that

Reconnaissance (ISR) systems can provide targeting and other and support for missile, air, naval and ground forces,
future intercontinental Prompt Global Strike (PSG) forces, and for the forces of client/partner states. Sustaining
superiority in LEO, in turn, will require control of the High Ground, or the Moon and Deep Space. The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) leaderships intertwined pursuit

of global military power and dominant

space power has three main motivations: 1) to help sustain the power position of the CCP; 2)
to aid the CCPs pursuit of economic-political dominance in key regions to best assure
resource/commercial access; and, 3) to eventually displace the United States from its position of
global leadership. Space power will also be used to support new Chinese-led or promoted
anti-U.S./anti-democratic coalitions as it will be used to crush democratic threats to its rule, beginning with
the democracy on Taiwan. As with the former Soviet Union, Chinas pursuit of regional and then
global military power is not rooted in an existential threat, but in the CCPs fears for its
power position. This requires a CCP-led rejuvenation of China, entailing mobilization for greater power, ever more
control over its own people, and then increasing control over others. Another result is Chinas choice to be
hostile to Western rules or concepts that may constrain Chinas power. This justifies an essential
Chinese rejection of American or Western conceptions of transparency and restraint, or
verifiable weapons control in space which might constrain its power. This mirrors the CCP/PLAs
repeated refusal of U.S. requests to consider real nuclear weapons transparency and control,
transparency over its nuclear and missile exports, and --from many of its neighbors and Washington -- fair settlement of
territorial disputes which threaten war. The latter, especially in the South China Sea, is instructive. As it has gained
military power in the South China Sea, China has sought to change the strategic environment and dictate new rules to
increase its security at the expense of others. Once it gains commanding strength and position in space, will China do the

cooperation with China in space may yield some benefits, but it likely will
have little impact on the direction and severity of terrestrial conflicts which
will dominate relations with China . One can see the value of meeting with Chinese space officials,

same? For the United States,

especially higher CCP and PLA leaders, to advance concerns over their actions in space and to promote transparency. But
at this juncture, before China has achieved levels of space dominance, it is crucial to link any real cooperation with China
to its behavior in space and elsewhere which threatens U.S. security. Furthermore, allowing China increasing

access to U.S. space technology, space corporations, or government institutions at this

time presents two risks. First it could encourage China to advance an illusion of
cooperation with the U.S. and the West while differences on Earth become sharper. This
could become useful for Beijing to deflect criticism on other issues, or even to obtain
leverage over U.S. options and actions. Second, as has been proven repeatedly, China will exploit any
new access for espionage gains to strengthen its own space and military
sectors . 2 Chinas increasing space power, however, like its growing economic and political power, cannot be
contained. Russia appears ready to greatly expand space and military cooperation with China as part of a larger strategic
alignment, while the European Space Agency is edging toward greater cooperation with China. These attractions may only
increase if China has the only LEO manned space station in the mid-2020s. Already a top commercial space service and
technology provider, China will use its gathering space diplomacy tools to aid its pursuit of economic, political and
military influence in critical regions like Africa and Latin America. The challenge for the United States is to

maintain the means to compete with China in space both in military and non-military
endeavors. Chinas potential for developing new space combat systems means the U.S. must be able to

rapidly develop appropriate deterrent capabilities. There should also be a more developed U.S.
capability to rapidly repopulate satellite systems taken down by PLA attacks, and there should be more terrestrial or
airborne systems to compensate for lost navigation, communication and surveillance satellites. In addition, as the PLA
moves substantially out to deep space, the Moon, or to the Lagrangian Points, it will be necessary for the U.S. to consider a
compensating presence that is affordable, attractive to a coalition of democracies, and helps to deter China from seeking
strategic advantage. Strategic priorities would suggest that a presence on or near the Moon is of greater importance than
going to Mars. A multinational government-private presence on the Moon is one option, as is the likely less expensive
option of a far cis-lunar presence to further develop manned deep space capabilities. As was the case with the former
Soviet Union, relative peace on Earth or in space will not truly be possible until China evolves beyond its Leninist
dictatorship. In its final years, the Soviet Union was on the cusp of deploying multiple space combat systems despite years
of U.S.-Soviet space diplomacy. Real space cooperation between Russia the West became possible only after the fall of the
Soviet Union, and may again become threatened by Russias slide into authoritarian aggression. Substantive

cooperation with China in space offers no assurance that China will change its
threatening behaviors on Earth or in space, but does create opportunities for China to
exploit U.S. and Western space technology to gain potential military advantages . The
following will address questions posed by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. But first, it is
necessary to reflect on the relationship between Chinas pursuit of space power and its military buildup for regional
dominance and global projection. Space Power and Chinas Military Expansion During the 1950s and 1960s, Mao Zedong
sought to quickly exploit generous assistance from the Soviet Union, and the insights of U.S.-trained engineers like Qian
Xuesen, to complete the early nuclear missiles to deter feared U.S. and Soviet nuclear strikes. His 651 Program succeeded
in launching the Dong Fang Hong-1 satellite in 1970, while also aiding the development of larger missiles. But Maos
efforts to build broader space power, such as the 640 Program to build strategic missile defenses, and his early 741
Program manned space ship, faltered largely due to his destructive politics. Mao, nevertheless, realized that China
required the technology and 3 prestige of space in order to increase its ability to compete with Moscow and Washington on
the global stage. Fears for political survival and ambitions for global leadership remain the

basis for Chinas current surge for global military power and space power . The greatest impetus
for the most recent phase of PLA modernization and buildup was the shock of the 1989 Tiananmen rebellion -- the only
time the Partys power position was actually threatened by popular, though unorganized, reformist and democratic
demands. In addition to ruthlessly crushing any potential for democratic dissent, the transitioning CCP leadership of Deng
Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin decided to begin the broad military and space modernization and buildup we see today. At first
focused on coercing Taiwan and then securing control over disputed territories, the early 1990s saw the start of many
PLA programs increasing its Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) capability targeted on the First

Island Chain. These include the Chengdu Aircraft Corporations 4th generation J-10 fighter and its J-20 5th
generation fighter, and the large Xian Aircraft Corporation Y-20 heavy jet transport. Chinas aircraft carrier ambitions
predate Tiananmen but second generation nuclear attack and ballistic submarine programs received greater emphasis.
This period also saw the beginnings of the PLAs first reconnaissance strike complex of terminally guided medium-range
missiles, and the ability to target them with high resolution surveillance, navigation and communication satellites. In
addition, the PLA started developing its second anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system along

with a new anti-satellite (ASAT) system, tested successfully on 11 January 2007. The early 1990s also saw
the beginning of Chinas second manned space program, code named the 921 Program. With substantial inputs from
Russian space companies the 921-1 or Shenzhou spaceship made its first unmanned flight in 1999. While the PLAs
General Armaments Department (GAD) took control of the manned space program in 1998, we did not learn of this until
former CCP Chairman Jiang Zemin congratulated former GAD Director and then Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan as
chief director of the manned space program after the April 2002 landing of Shenzhou-3. The dual-use nature of

Chinas manned space program was starkly demonstrated by the first manned
Shenzhou-5 mission in 2005, when Astronaut Yang Liwei shared his ship with two optical surveillance cameras. A
little over a year later in December 2004, the current phase of PLA modernization and space development was signaled by
the New Historic Missions enunciated by Chairman Hu Jintao, in which the PLA started preparing to

defend the CCPs global interest, in addition to its regional ambitions . Over the following decade,
better combat systems for regional dominance emerged, with new aircraft carriers, amphibious projection ships, and new
large airborne projection transports designed to enable the PLA to defend more distant CCP interests. Since the late
1990s, space systems have played an increasing role in the PLAs Informationalization

strategy, providing commanders with higher resolution optical and radar satellite
surveillance, new space electronic intelligence tools, space-based data relay and new infrared-multispectral early
warning satellites. Space information systems give PLA platforms global navigation and
communication capabilities, as they help to target increasing numbers of precisionguided missiles and bombs . These capabilities are essential to the fulfillment of
4 Chinese objectives which include the recovery of Taiwan, consolidating
military control over disputed regions in the East and South China Seas,
and undermining and eclipsing American-led alliance relationships in Asia .

Chinas space ISR power will also be used to help military allies and clients. Having helped North Korea, Iran and Pakistan
to become current or imminent nuclear missile powers, it makes sense that China would directly or indirectly assist their
future space ISR requirements. In a scene that could be repeated elsewhere, today China is pushing to help rearm
Argentina, which has already agreed to lease a critical space tracking and control facility to China. A Chinesearmed

Argentina with access to Chinese space ISR may be able to better threaten war to take
the Falkland Islands. Even if Britain settles for a negotiated transfer, China will gain regional prestige
for having defeated a Western power, further reducing U.S. influence in Latin America .
By the 2020s and the 2030s, the PLAs development of space projection and combat capabilities
could become the leading element of the next phase of PLA modernization .
Networks of larger more capable/survivable surveillance satellites, combined with networks of smaller more survivable
satellites, will provide more secure navigation, communication, and targeting for larger numbers of power projection
platforms such as nuclear powered aircraft carriers, large amphibious projection ships, very large military transport
aircraft, and a next generation of export weapon systems. These could include a new generation of

Prompt Global Strike systems, enabled by high data rate optical data-relay satellites .
These could be joined by more ground-based or air-launched ASAT systems, new LEO-based laser or kinetic armed space
combat platforms, and Space-to-Earth combat platforms. Chinas political-diplomatic and military space power will be
increased by the completion of a dual-use manned space station in the early 2020s and perhaps new small and large
reusable dualuse unmanned and manned space planes. If the ISS winds down in the early 2020s it is increasingly
apparent that Russia may seek significant space cooperation with China, replacing its space relationship with Washington.
By the early 2030s, the new date for the completion of its 100-ton-plus payload heavy SLV, China may be taking its first
steps on the Moon and building toward permanent bases by the 2050s or 2060s. Chinas push for the Moon is prompted
by a quest for prestige and to control areas that may yield potential economic/resource benefits. The PLA can also be
expected to seek military benefits from its Moon presence. Should Chinas emerging space and terrestrial power
increasingly constrain U.S. power, then Europe and India may be tempted to increasingly bandwagon with China,
especially in space. Question 1: Provide a net assessment of U.S. and Chinese space capabilities in a 2015 conflict scenario.
How does this assessment change, if at all, for a 2030 scenario? While it is possible to better assess near term Chinese
military-space capabilities due to an accumulation of Western and Chinese disclosures, assessing potential capabilities in
the next fifteen years requires making estimates that could over- or under-estimate Chinese capabilities. As the PLA does
not reveal its military-space intentions in public documents it is necessary to consider a body of grey data that offers
indications of potential capability intent. This estimate 5 projects from current indicators but does not review potential
major technology breakthroughs that might accelerate development projections. 2015 Conflict Scenario: The main
difference in assessments of U.S. and Chinese military space capabilities in the near-term is that China has a gathering
active space combat potential and is beginning to build passive mil-space capabilities, whereas it is not possible to
determine whether the U.S.is developing the former, though it is interested in the latter. The U.S. is credited with over 500
military and civil satellites. While China has about 120 satellites, about 75 are used exclusively or largely by the PLA, and
the PLA has access to more of Chinas civil communication satellites. In 2015 China may be capable of strikes against
scores of U.S. satellites in LEO, Geostationary Earth Orbits (GEO, 35,000km), or Medium Earth Orbits (MEO, 2,00035,000km). In 2015 the U.S. may only be capable of limited retaliation against Chinese satellites in LEO, and would be
stressed to repopulate critical U.S. satellite networks. Space ISR: By 2015 the PLAs surveillance satellite network could
comprise about 40 optical surveillance satellites, 10 radar satellites, 8 possible early warning satellites, and about 21
electronic intelligence (ELINT) counter-naval satellites. In addition there may be 4 weather satellites that assist global
missile targeting. All of these use LEO polar orbits so they are more vulnerable to ground or air-launched ASATs.
However, there are indications that the PLA may be developing much larger surveillance satellites, with the potential they
may be placed in much higher orbits. By 2015 the PLA may have four to five dedicated communication satellites in GEO,
and 16 to 20 navigation satellites in GEO or MEO. The Beidou/Compass navigation satellite system has a secondary global
communication capability at a text-message level. In addition the PLA will control three TianLan data-relay satellites in
GEO, intended primarily to support tracking and command of manned platforms, but could also support global military
operations. Earth-based global tracking and control networks crucial to maintaining Chinas space architecture include
four large Yuan Wang tracking and control ships. In China there are eight tracking and control facilities and it has or will
gain access to facilities in Argentina, Chile, French Guiana, Kenya, Namibia and Pakistan. In September 2013 and
November 2014 China launched its Kuaizhou, a China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) solid-fueled
mobile SLV based on the DF-21 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) or a larger intermediate range ballistic missile
(IRBM). The model of a potential export version of this missile was displayed at the November 2014 Zhuhai Airshow. Also
revealed were six new microsatellites for surveillance and communication missions for this SLV. This could be the
beginning of Chinas Operationally Responsive Space initiative to be able to repopulate satellite networks. The China
Aerospace Science and Technology Corporations (CASC) liquid fueled small Long March-6 SLV may also be slated for this
mission. Since the mid-1990s China has also invested heavily in micro and nanosatellites, detailing development work
mainly to Chinese aerospace universities including the Harbin Institute of Technology, Tsinghua University, Nanjing
University of Aeronautics and Aerospace, and the National University of Defense Technology. China has the capability
today to rapidly develop 6 constellations of micro and nanosats that can be used to replace attacked satellites, or to
succeed them with more secure but distributed satellite networks. A recent Chinese report notes that the Province of Jilin
plans to loft Chinas first civil network of four imaging microsatellites. In contrast, the more varied U.S. surveillance
satellite network makes extensive use of larger systems placed in higher orbit systems in order to reduce their
vulnerability. But this is now changing as the PLA develops ASATs able to attack higher orbits. Attempts to build a larger
number of smaller surveillance satellites like the SBIRS series faltered due to complexity and expense. As a consequence,
the U.S. has shown greater interest in even less expensive and smaller satellites like the U.S. Air Forces TacSat or
Operationally Responsive Space-1 (ORS-1). Ground Based Lasers: On 28 September 2006, the U.S. publication Defense
News first reported that China had fired a high power laser at a U.S. spy satellite as a test of the Chinese ability to blind

the spacecraft. While U.S. officials tried to downplay the test, Chinas intent to military blind enemy satellites was
confirmed in the December 2013 issue of Chinese Optics in an article Development of Space Based Laser Weapons
written by three engineers from the Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics. They stated, In 2005, we
have successfully conducted a satellite blinding experiment using a 50-100 KW capacity mounted laser gun in Xinjiang
province. The target was a low orbit satellite with a tilt distance of 600 km. Over the following eight years it is likely that
China has improved its ground-based ASAT lasers. In 1997 the U.S. Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRCL)
demonstrated its ability to dazzle a LEO satellite but the U.S. is not known to have developed ground-based lasers
capable of conducting ASAT missions. As far as is known publicly, the U.S. Air Force YAL-1 chemical airborne laser was
not tested against LEO targets during its 2007 to 2011 testing program. Ground-Launched ASAT: The PLAs combined
ASAT and ABM program that gained momentum in the early 1990s has resulted in at least two known ground-launched
ASAT systems. Derived from the CASIC KT-1 mobile solid/liquid fuel SLV, the SC-19 ASAT began a test program in 2005
that resulted in its first successful destruction of a FY-1C weather satellite at 864km in January 2007. Subsequent SC-19
tests on 11 January 2010 and 23 July 2014 were judged as ASAT tests even though they destroyed lower altitude missiles.
It is possible that the PLA may now have an inventory of scores of SC-19 ASAT/ABM missiles. On 13 May 2013, China
tested its larger DN-2 ASAT. Chinese sources claim it reached an altitude of 10,000km, while U.S. sources noted it nearly
reached GEO. It is possible that both the SC-19 and DN-2 have been put into production although this cannot be
confirmed. The DN-2 could be based on a version of the CASC DF-31 ICBM or the CASIC Kuaizhou mobile SLV. Mobility
for the SC-19 and DN-2 means it can be moved to multiple locations to facilitate surprise ASAT strikes. On 20 February
2008, a U.S. Navy modified SM-3 surface-to-air missile destroyed a decaying U.S. reconnaissance satellite at an altitude of
247km. Believed to have been a counterdemonstration for China, the U.S. is not known to have put into production a
ground launched 7 ASAT. The SM-3 or U.S. Army THAAD could form the basis for a LEO ASAT but no such program has
been reported. Air Launched ASAT: The April 2009 issue of the journal of the Shenyang Aircraft Design and Research
Institute, or 601 Institute, contained an article titled, The Technologies of the Fighter Platform Launching Trajectory
Missile Attack Satellite. This article concludes that it is feasible and reasonable that an aircraft be used to attack a
satellite in the present stage. This suggests that SAC has already adapted, or may be in the process of adapting its J-11
fighter, a clone of the Russian Sukhoi Su-27, to perform ASAT missions to attack LEO satellites. An ASAT-capable J-11
fighter would offer greater tactical flexibility and could be concealed at numerous PLA Air Force airbases. While there are
no open reports of a Chinese airborne ASAT test, it is conceivable that China has developed such a system over the last six
years. The Reagan Administration in 1988 cancelled the ASM-135, the second U.S. air-launched ASAT program, due to
cost, technical and Congressional opposition challenges. It was tested successfully once against a satellite target in
September 1985. In 2015 the Defense Advanced Research Program Agency (DARPA) reportedly will start testing its
Airborne Launch Assist Space Access (ALASA) F-15 fighter-launched small SLV, which could form the basis for an
airlaunched ASAT. Co-Orbital Interceptors: China apparently has developed satellites capable of co-orbital interceptions
of other satellites for benign or hostile missions. On 19 July 2013, China launched three satellites, two of which, the
Shiyan-7 (SY-7, Experiment-7) and Chuangxin-3 (CX-3), interacted with the Shijian-7 (SJ-7, Practice-7) launched in 2005.
The SY-7 is believed to have manipulator arm that could perform maintenance or intelligence missions, or attack missions
which disable without creating a debris cloud. While classified as an experimental system, this satellite could also be
developed into a more capable co-orbital close-up surveillance or interceptor platform. In late 2010 or early 2011, China is
believed to have conducted a sub orbital test of its Shenlong small space plane, a technology test bed which could also be
developed into a multi-mission dual use platform similar to the U.S. Boeing X-37B small space plane. A Russian source
confirmed to this analyst that the Shenlong was tested, but there is no open reporting that an operational version has been
produced. Larger manned and unmanned Chinese space planes are very likely under development. U.S. experience with
co-orbital inspection capabilities may extend to the Prowler satellite launched in 1990, and more recently to two XXS and
two MITx satellites launched in the last decade. However, it is not known publicly whether these have been developed into
operational system; most likely not. The U.S. Air Force has also built three 5-ton Boeing X-37A/B small reusable space
planes which are capable of deploying micro or nanosatellites, or carrying passive or active military payloads. They have
conducted three lengthy but classified missions. While small, the X-37B would be vulnerable to ground-based PLA
interception systems. Dual Use Manned Platforms: While the U.S. never launched a manned military space platform, the
Soviets lofted military Salyut small space stations in the 1970s, and in the late 8 1980s tried to launch an unmanned space
combat platform and were considering turning their Mir space station into a base for space bombers. Perhaps influenced
by this Soviet example, China could be planning for a range of military uses for its manned space platforms. The
September 2008 Shenzhou 7 mission, remembered most for Chinas first manned spacewalk, also saw its launching of a
micro-satellite shortly before passing about 45km from the International Space Station. As far as can be determined,
China provided no warning of its intention. Also, despite the potential for an accident which may have threatened the lives
of two Russian and one U.S. astronaut onboard, there has been no public response to this incident from U.S. or Russian
officials. Was this an early Chinese attempt to simulate space docking, or was it a simulated co-orbital attack against the
ISS? Does this incident, and the previous use of the Shenzhou to carry military payloads, mean that Chinas manned space
platforms will be equipped to perform active military missions? If the PLA could equip the Shenzhou orbital module to
launch the BX-1 micosatellite, could it also modify the orbital module to carry intercept sensors and kinetic kill vehicles
(KKVs)? The larger Tiangong has payload bays which have used Earth observation cameras. Might China consider
modifying Tiangong to be perform ASAT or orbital Earth bombing missions? U.S. programs to develop manned militarymission space platforms like the Dyna Soar space plane and the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) were cancelled by the
end of the 1960s in favor of unmanned satellites for military-space missions. While both the Soviet Union and China
feared that the U.S. Space Shuttle would be modified for combat missions, there is no open reporting this was done.
However, the Shuttle was used on numerous occasions to deploy military payloads but was retired in July 2011. The U.S.
National Air and Space Administrations (NASA) Boeing Orion manned capsule made its first unmanned test on 5
December 2014 but may not make a manned test until 2021. The private SpaceX Corporation Dragon manned capsule
may not fly until 2017 or 2018. There is no reported consideration that either may be modified for active military missions
2030 Conflict Scenarios: Chinas Potential Capabilities Provided the CCP survives to expand its power, by 2030 China will
require increasing space power in order to support its expanding global projection forces on Earth, and because military
competition in space will have become more intense, largely due to Chinas continued development of space combat

capabilities. It is likely that an expansion in the number of space combat programs by individual services will have
prompted the PLA to create a unique Space Force. While Chinas first manned forays to the Moon may not occur until
soon after 2030, plans will have advanced significantly toward the creation of a permanent Moon Base by 2050 or sooner.
A proliferation of its space combat systems around the Earth will push China to seek increasing advantage, setting the
stage for its strategic-military development of the Moon. As mentioned earlier, absent a fundamental change in the
character of the CCP or its evolution in a pluralistic direction, China is unlikely to accept negotiated limits on its expanding
space power. Furthermore, Russia, provided its authoritarian anti-Western character increases, may have to seek a far
more deeper military relationship with China, assuming Beijings hunger for Russian resources can be satisfied short of
taking its territory. 9 Space technology may become Russia strong suit in its military relationship with China, provided it
can sustain Chinese funds to insure its space sector remains competitive. Since early in the last decade Russia has been
considering its post-ISS future in space, considering alternate space station designs, Moon and initial Mars missions,
manned architectures and next generation spaceships, perhaps to include nuclear propulsion. While Chinas preference
may be to develop its national space capabilities, as it has done repeatedly regarding weapons technology it could begin
broad space technology cooperation with Russia to accelerate next generation capabilities. Chinas Future Close-to-Earth
Mil-Space Capabilities If current trends discernable today continue, it is likely that China will have multiple options to
distribute its critical satellite service requirements to larger and deeper space platforms as well as to clouds of micro and
nanosats. As it does so, it should be expected that China will develop means to both attack and defend its evolving satellite
networks. Large satellites may include 5-ton and 10-ton systems able to reside in deeper space which may active and
passive defenses. Chinese academic engineering literature shows some familiarity with large membrane space mirrors, for
example as used by the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agencys (DARPA) Membrane Optical Imager for
Realtime Exploitation (MOIRE). Membrane mirrors can be expected to enable large deep space surveillance satellites, as
envisioned by MOIRE, or to make micro and nano-surveillance satellites even more powerful. Future Chinese micro and
nanosats might be able to cleave or double or quadruple in the event of an attack. A previously mentioned Chinese
report notes that the Province of Jilin plans to have a constellation of 137 small satellites by 2030, noting this may enable
a revisit time of 10 minutes. The PLA or civil authorities in China could be hosting scores of satellite cloud
constellations by 2030. The potential for China to develop counters to small satellites should also be considered. Already,
China is testing and considering other novel concepts for capturing/disabling small UAVs with airborne nets. Conceivably,
large nets could be used to coorbitally intercept small satellite clouds. A potential Chinese leap-frog technology advance
was briefed at the 2014 International Astronautical Congress (IAC) in Toronto attended by this analyst. A Chinese
engineer briefed a paper proposing that Chinas next generation data relay satellites use optical or laser data links, which
could phenomenally increase data transfer rates. The major technological obstacle was to develop an optical/laser data
transfer to Earth receivers that could overcome atmospheric distortion. If successful, such data transfer rates could go far
to enable an intimate level streaming tactical imagery of targets for very distant hypersonic Prompt Global Strike systems,
space bombing platforms, perhaps in multiple simultaneous combat theaters. The kicker: the engineer noted this satellite
could begin development to construction in 2016 or 2021. China may be the only country investing in this capability.
Occasional statements from Chinese military academics and academic engineering articles point to Chinas interest in
developing a range of future space combat capabilities. Asian military sources told this analyst in 2008 that an initial PLA
ABM system could emerge in the early 10 2020s. This might happen even sooner. Chinese-developed ABM/ASAT capable
missiles may become smaller and deployable on aircraft, ship and submarine platforms. In a December 2013 journal
article, engineers from the Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics, a leading Chinese laser weapon
research body, proposed it would be possible by the mid-2020s for China to loft a 5-ton laser-armed space combat
platform. A key enabling technology would be large membrane mirrors. It should be considered that by the mid-2030s
might China be able to halve the size of possible laser space combat platforms so as to launch more in a single SLV. At the
2006 IAC in Valencia, engineers from the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) briefed a paper on two
reusable space plane concepts under consideration: a 130-ton or so manned space plane for LEO operations, and a 100ton unmanned suborbital space plane for launching payloads on an expendable second stage. Both concepts, which could
appear in the early 2020s, apparently are dependent on using the first stage of the Long March-5 heavylift SLV slated to
begin testing in 2015 or 2016. The manned space plane concept carries most of its weight in fuel as a second stage to
reach orbit. However, more reserve fuel may enable greater capability for maneuver than U.S. or Soviet space shuttle
concepts, which could increase its military utility. Chinese military academics and academic engineering articles have
addressed the idea of using platforms in LEO to bomb targets on Earth. This could be done with a relatively simple
platform derived from the Tiangong, a manned or unmanned space plane, or a hypersonic cross air vehicle (CAV), for
which there may be some interest as seen in Chinese academic engineering literature. It also has to be considered that
Chinas interest in manned space combat platforms may extend to its future space stations. The first 120-plus ton space
station that may be completed by 2023 is based on the replaceable module concept developed in the 1970s by the Russian
Energia Company. There is some reason to conclude that under the guise of goodwill, Russia was unwise enough to allow a
significant Chinese espionage exercise within its space companies in the late 1990s and that Energias space station
technology may have fallen victim. The first Chinese space station may have two experimental modules, one of which will
have large imaging systems pointed out to space and at the Earthwhich could be dual-use. If needed, such modules
could be replaced with others equipped for combat, more capable military surveillance or command-control needed to
compensate for the loss of Earth control facilities. At the 2014 IAC in Toronto, a Chinese academic told an audience that
China was likely planning a larger second generation space station. Given that the first may have a life span of 10 years,
the second may be ready by the early 2030s. Before the 2020s it can be expected that the PLA will also make real progress
in creating Near Space capabilities that can compensate for the loss of LEO assets. Large UAVs or stratospheric airships
capable of performing radar, optical, communication and navigation satellite functions could emerge soon. A next more
capable generation of these systems may emerge in the mid-tolate 2020s. 11 Potential Deep Space Ambitions As it controls
the rest of Chinas space program, the PLA also controls Chinas Moon program. As it has done throughout its space
program, the PLA can be expected to seek dual use benefits from Chinas presence on the Moon. Over a decade ago,
Chinese Moon program leader Dr. Ouyang Ziyuan, highlighted the Moons military value and the need for China to be able
to secure vital resources, perhaps Helium-3 to power future fusion energy reactors. Writing on 31 January 2015 on the
website of the CCP Central Committees journal Quishi (Seeking Truth), the Chairman and CCP Party Secretary of the

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), Lei Fanpei, stressed that "We will adhere to the path of
developing military-civil integration in our coming demonstration of deep space exploration, manned moon landing,
heavy launch vehicle and other major programs, and are of major significance both to the nation's longterm development
and to the task of building the nation into a strong space power." This is a strong indicator that the PLA will use its Moon
and Deep Space program for military gain. While some Western analysts may scoff at the idea of the Moon having military
value, perhaps PLA planners have decided otherwise. While from the perspective of current technology it may be better to
invest in ISR and military capabilities closer to Earth that can dominate LEO and GEO, perhaps as ISR assets move well
beyond MEO it may then become useful to have Moon capabilities to find or interfere with such assets. Early in the
Change unmanned Moon probe program there was mention that the stationary Moon lander might include an
experimental payload using a laser to measure distance to the Earth. While recent reporting on the December 2013
Change-3 Moon landing mission has not included mention of a laser package, at the 2014 IAC a Chinese space company
official did mention that it could be included in a future landing mission. A low-power laser on the Moon could become
militarily useful were it able to vibrate and thus interfere with the very thin membrane mirror of a potential MOIRE like
surveillance satellite. What if, in about 100 years, breakthroughs in space propulsion make it possible to reach Mars in
weeks, versus months or years? Should the Earths economy come to be dominated increasingly by access to resources on
Mars, then the Moon and the Langrangian Points become the nearest parking garages to support that commerce. So
from a very long term perspective it may be attractive to the PLA to secure a dominant position on the Moon in order to
have the option to secure access to other potentially strategic positions in the Earth-Moon system. Question 2: Given
Chinas emerging counter-space capabilities, which defensive or offensive capabilities should the United States prioritize
to maintain its strategic advantage in space? Assess the implications, if any, for U.S. defense budget requirements in these
areas. The degree to which China, with possible Russian help, obtains space control will most likely be determined by
the degree to which the United States rises to defend access to space by the democracies and deters attacks by China and
Russia. From the perspective of the 2015 policy balance in Washington, this will require a fundamental political shift to
emphasize a commitment to sustaining a broad rebuilding of U.S. power to include space power. It will also require a
constant investment in the futures technologies. There must be a deep search for what will 12 succeed the systems viewed
as the next wave of space power: micro and nanosat constellations; mega membrane-based deep-space surveillance
satellites; hypersonic cross-air and glide vehicles; liquid-fueled 100-plus ton payload SLVs; solid state lasers; $1 -$20
million space launch services; and, strategic position on the Moon. Suggested Military-Space Priorities Retaliation: After
nearly 25 years of continuous development of its current ASAT systems, China shows little inclination to consider
constraints on its space combat system development. So far China has demonstrated four, possibly five, ASAT systems;
ground based lasers, two ground launched ASATs; and both an unmanned and a possible manned co-orbital interceptor.
It is reasonable for the United States to conclude that it needs to develop appropriate capabilities to deter the CCP/PLA
from starting a shooting war in space. This should include capabilities that produce rapid symmetrical effects following
Chinese attacks against U.S. space assets. It may not be necessary for the U.S. to match every Chinese space combat
development, but the U.S. may require its own variety of space combat capabilities. To reduce costs it is suggested that
initial ASAT systems exploit existing long-range surface-toair missiles, to include the U.S. Navys SM-3 or the U.S. Armys
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), which in some instances
may only need appropriate software. This should be succeeded by a common ASAT which is able to use ground, ship, and
submarine launch platforms and to reach targets in MEO. It will also be necessary to develop an air-launched ASAT for
use from strike fighters or bombers, which would offer fastest response to a PLA space attack. DARPAs ALASA fighterlaunched small SLV may offer an early path to an air-launched ASAT but the U.S. should also develop a heavier multistage air-launched ASAT that can reach GEO. Responding to the possible PLA use of unmanned orbital Earth attack
platforms may require consideration of multiple responses. Should the PLA launch continuously orbited space combat or
Earth attack platforms, perhaps something similar to the Soviet unmanned Polyus system, then the U.S. should consider
an appropriate in-orbit system to immediately respond to its use. Should the PLA instead launch space combat/Earthattack platforms in concert with larger military campaigns, then it may be necessary to develop near-space hypersonic
platforms able to intercept the PLA space attack platform. Responding to potential PLA use of manned platforms for
military operations, or its placement of military assets on the Moon, also requires serious consideration. One possible
conclusion from the 2008 Shenzhou 7 mission is that China has signaled that it will show no hesitation to attack manned
space craft from the United States or other countries that it deems threatening. It is perhaps appropriate now for the U.S.
to consider, as a matter of policy, whether it reserves the right of defensive response to Chinas use of manned space craft
for military missions and then to make public that decision. A key enabling technology for future U.S. space combat
platforms or, for providing naval or ground forces a defense against space-launched weapons, will be energy weapons. It is
crucial to proceed more rapidly with programs that can increase the strength and reduce the size and 13 energy
requirements for solid state lasers. In addition, there should be greatly accelerated development of large and smaller
railguns, which have the potential to launch steel pellet clouds to shred PLA anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs),
hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), and perhaps, space-launched ground attack munitions. Resilience: The other side of the
coin to deterring PLA attacks in space is to demonstrate that any space assets that are attacked can rapidly be either
replaced or have its function effectively reconstituted. DARPA is now pursuing a number of programs which are intended
to strengthen U.S. space resilience; these are deserving of increased support. In addition to the ALASA airlaunched SLV,
there is the Galileo program, intended to take parts off of older satellites in GEO and reconstitute them in space. DARPAs
associated Phoenix program would develop a robotic builder satellite, in addition to its Spacecraft Morphology project
that would use common Lego-like Satlets to build satellites for different missions. In addition to such government-led
programs, the U.S. should encourage many private corporate or university based initiatives to loft small sat clouds with
the goal of succeeding the functions of larger more costly single satellites. In Japan, the Next Generation Space Systems
Technology Research Association (NESTRA) is working on a 30-40 constellation of small sats with a 1 meter resolution.
U.S. companies like Skybox, Planet Labs, and Black Sky are also developing constellations of small sats to provide
commercial imagery with cheaper-smaller platforms. If a satellite constellation cannot be replaced, such as the MEO
Global Positioning Satellites (GPS), then there should be a greater investment in terrestrial alternatives. For example,
growing jamming threats and Chinas DN-2 ASAT should provide ample justification for the U.S. to invest in E-LORAN to
compliment and provide backup for GPS. E-LORAN will at least help provide vital navigation signals for aircraft and

ships, aid ground vehicle navigation, and provide time synchronization services. In addition, the U.S. should invest in
airborne platforms such as very long-endurance UAVs and near-space airships which can also replicate the functions of
many satellite types. Position: As it seeks to deter via retaliation and resilience, the U.S. must also be investing in
strategic-positional deterrence, or simply put, make sure it can contest the high ground-- which for the near term means
the Moon. For the U.S. to bypass the Moon and simply invest in a Mars program that many take many decades to
materialize, and leave China to build dominance over the Moon, would constitute strategic myopia for the United States.
Under national policies of civil-military integration China likely seek military benefits from its presence on the Moon,
perhaps to include developing options to block U.S. access to Mars. Essential to exercising the option to build a Moon or
Cis-Lunar presence would be the development of the heavy lift Space Launch System (SLS), and encouraging private
companies to develop more efficient medium-heavy lift SLVs. While the U.S. government may not necessarily require a
program to physically return to the Moon, it should retain the means to get there if required, and it should actively
encourage multinational government-private initiatives to build an unmanned or manned Moon presence. 14 This could
offer a new broad international program to succeed the ISS. It has the advantage of allowing space-faring nations with
interests in deep space, like India and Japan, to own this project from the beginning and to leverage their participation
to develop respective national capabilities such as heavy SLVs. A large multinational Moon program could create positive
pressures for Russia and China play nice and, depending upon relations on Earth, advance an opportunity for peaceful
cooperation that may offer a better chance to challenge Chinas spacenationalist policies. If this does not work, then the
West will have secured a presence on the Moon that can at least offer options to respond to possible Chinese or Russian
military exploitation. Question 3: Discuss China's approach to space diplomacy and cooperation, particularly with the
United States. Assess the risks and benefits of U.S.-China space cooperation. Chinas space diplomacy

approach toward the United States, as with Russia, has been to try to use all doors the
front and the back and sides. Despite occasional opportunities for discussions between space officials, largely
due to post-Tiananmen sanctions, China and the U.S. did not engage in space-technical cooperation as China and Russia
did starting in the early 1990s. The U.S. was not selling, but Russia was, so China was able to import significant Russian
space technology to accelerate its 921 Program manned effort. China has repeatedly expressed its willingness to consider
space cooperation with the United States, as it stands ready to cooperate with many others. But instead of responding to
over two decades of variously sourced U.S. concerns about its behavior on Earth, or in space, Chinas basic spacediplomacy strategy is to wait out the Americans. They are relying on Chinas accumulation of space power to convince
enough U.S. power centers to carry the rest that cooperation with China must proceed despite real risks. It is a strategy
that has worked well for Beijing in both economic and military realms. A 29 September 2014 editorial in the prestigious
Aviation Week and Space Technology noted, It is absurd that the U.S. Navy can conduct joint exercises with the Chinese
navy but Congress bars NASA from working directly with Chinese engineers and scientists. Well, to the shock of the U.S.
Navy and its allies, when China accepted its first invitation to participate in the 2014 multilateral RIMPAC

exercises, it brought along its own ELINT ship to record everybodys electronic emissions a
threatening response demonstrating essential hostility to the intent of inviting Chinas participation. This simply
does not bode well for cooperation in space either . To boot, the U.S., Russia and Europe all
have had their sad experiences with Chinese espionage targeting their respective space sectors. According to the testimony
of a Chinese solid fuel rocket motor engineer interviewed by this analyst, what they learned from the Martin

Marietta solid satellite kick motor used on a Chinese SLV in the early 1990s has enabled all of their
solid rocket motors for their new ballistic missiles now targeting the United States and
its allies with nuclear weapons. Europes Galileo navigation satellite program wanted China to be a partner, but
when China obtained the technology it needed, it left and built its Compass system. At the 2007 Moscow Airshow, Russian
space officials explained their attempt circa 1998 to promote business and cooperation by selling internships or access,
to some 200 Chinese engineers, to 15 Russian space companies. The Russians did not sell space station tech to China, but
they now know why the Chinese space station looks like theirs. A simple reality for U.S. policy makers to keep in mind is
that cooperation in space with China cannot be separated from Chinas ambitions on

Earth or out into space. Likewise, for the United States to wall off space cooperation with China and to treat it as
a special realm only plays into Chinas game. As long as it is ruled by the CCP, China is not likely to alter its ambitions to
end the democracy on Taiwan, militarily consolidate the South China Sea, ensure that Iran and North Korea, like Pakistan,
become nuclear missile states, or facilitate wars which challenge U.S. and Western security interests, merely to advance
cooperation in space. It is imperative for U.S. leaders to accept that each of these challenges --

and countering Chinas expanding military ambitions in space --, are more important to
U.S. security than is space cooperation with China.
The threat of space war is on the tipping pointChina wants to attack our
satellites to keep us in the dark about their activities
Gertz 3/16 (Bill, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon, China, Russia Planning
Space Attacks on U.S. Satellites Critical space infrastructure faces crippling missile
strikes, small satellites, lasers, March 16, 2016, http://freebeacon.com/national-

security/china-russia-planning-space-attacks-on-u-s-satellites/, The Washington Free

Beacon, silbs)
China and Russia are preparing to attack and disrupt critical U.S. military and intelligence
satellites in a future conflict with crippling space missile, maneuvering satellite, and laser
attacks, senior Pentagon and intelligence officials told Congress on Tuesday. Air Force
Gen. John Hyten, commander of the Air Force Space Command , said the threat to U.S.
space systems has reached a new tipping point, and after years of post-Cold War stagnation foreign states are
focused on curbing U.S. space systems. Adversaries are developing kinetic, directed-energy, and cyber tools to deny, degrade, and destroy
our space capabilities, Hyten said in a prepared statement for a hearing of the House Armed Service strategic forces subcommittee.
They

understand our reliance on space, and they understand the competitive advantage
we derive from space. The need for vigilance has never been greater , the four-star general said.
Hyten said U.S. Global Positioning System satellites remain vulnerable to attack or jamming .
The satellites extremely accurate time-keeping feature is even more critical to U.S. guided weapons than their ability to provide navigation
guidance, he said. Disrupting

the satellites time capabilities would degrade the militarys ability

to conduct precision strike operations used in most weapons systems today. Hyten said a new
joint military-intelligence command center is helping to monitor space threats, such as anti-satellite missile launches, covert killer robot
satellites, and ground-fired lasers that can blind or disrupt satellites. The unit is called the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations
Center, located at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado. The Space Command also is creating 39 cyber mission teams that will be used for
defensive and offensive cyber operations involving space systems. Lt. Gen. David Buck, commander of Joint Functional Component for
Space, a U.S. Strategic Command unit, testified along with Hyten that China and Russia pose the most serious threats to space systems.
Simply stated, there isnt a single aspect of our space architecture, to include the ground architecture, that isnt at risk, Buck said. Russia
views U.S. dependency on space as an exploitable vulnerability and they are taking deliberate actions to strengthen their counter-space
capabilities, he said. China in December created

its first dedicated space warfare and cyber warfare

unit, called the Strategic Support Forces, for concentrating their space, electronic, and
network warfare capabilities, Buck said. China is developing, and has demonstrated, a
wide range of counter-space technologies to include direct-ascent, kinetic-kill vehicles, co-orbital
technologies that can disable or destroy a satellite, terrestrially-based communications
jammers, and lasers that can blind or disable satellites, Buck said. Moreover, they continue to modernize

their space programs to support near-real-time tracking of objects, command and control of deployed forces, and long-range precision
strikes capabilities, the three-star general said. Douglas Loverro, deputy assistant defense secretary for space policy, also warned about
growing threats to satellites and outlined U.S. plans to deter future attacks. Loverro said the United States does not want a war in space.
But let me be clear about our intentwe will be ready, he said. None of the five Pentagon and intelligence officials who took part in the
budget hearing for military space efforts mentioned any U.S. plans or programs to develop anti-satellite missiles and other space weapons
for use against Chinese or Russian space systems. The subcommittee, however, held a closed-door session after the public hearing. A
modified U.S. missile defense interceptor, the SM-3, was used in 2008 to shoot down a falling U.S. satellites in a demonstration of the
countrys undeclared anti-satellite warfare capability. Loverro suggested U.S.

defense and deterrence of space

attacks could involve counter attacks, possibly on the ground or in cyber space. But he
provided no specifics. Today our adversaries perceive that space is a weak-link in our deterrence calculus, Loverro said. Our
strategy is to strengthen that link, to assure it never breaks, and to disabuse our adversaries of the idea that our space capabilities make
tempting targets. Many of the most important navigation, communications, and intelligence satellites were designed during the Cold War
for use in nuclear war and thus incorporate hardening against electronic attacks, Loverro said. For conventional military conflict, however,
adversaries today view attacks on U.S. satellites as a way to blunt a conventional military response what Loverro called the chink in the
conventional armor of the United States. In this topsy-turvy state, attacks on space forces may even become the opening gambit of an
anti-access/area-denial strategy in a regional conflict wherein an adversary seeks to forestall or preclude a U.S. military response, he said.
Chinese

military strategists began writing about the targeting of space assets as a

tempting and most irresistible choice in the late 1990s, and the Peoples Liberation Army has been pursuing the

necessary capabilities ever since, he said. Rather than threatening foreign states satellites, Loverro said deterrence against foreign nations
space attacks is based on defending against missile strikes or other attacks and making sure satellite operations will not be disrupted in war.
That would be carried out through partnering with the growing commercial space sector that is expected to deploy hundreds of new
satellites in the coming years that could be used as back up systems for the Pentagon in a conflict. Deterrence also will be based on
increasing foreign partnerships with allied nations in gathering intelligence on space threats and other cooperation. A space defense offset
strategy will seek to reduce the advantage of using relatively low cost of missiles, small satellites, or cyber forces to attack U.S. satellites,
Loverro said. An

advanced U.S. satellite might cost upwards of $1 billion; missiles that could
destroy such a satellite cost a few percent of that sum; co-orbital microsatellites cost even
less; and lasers that might blind or damage satellites have an unlimited magazine with
almost zero cost per shot, Loverro said.
Without ISR capabilities, space war goes nuclear
Kulacki 2016 (Gregory, China Project Manager in the UCS Global Security Program,
The Risk of Nuclear War with China: A Troubling Lack of Urgency, May 2016, Union of
Concerned Scientists,

http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-withChina.pdf, silbs)
Given that the United States plans to use nuclear weapons in a war with China under certain
contingencies, U.S. decision makers worry that a conventional conflict could escalate to the
level where they must face those contingencies. PRC planners assume that no government would
ever invite nuclear retaliation by using nuclear weapons first, and they worry that their U.S. counterparts
might believe they can avoid or prevent retaliation. As a result, the strategic problem for U.S. decision
makers is how to control the escalation of a conventional conflict, while the strategic
problem for PRC decision makers is how to convince the United States that China can
and will retaliate if the United States initiates a nuclear attack. The steps the PRC is taking to solve its
strategic problem make it more difficult for U.S. military planners to solve theirs. The United States wants to be able to
threaten to escalate to the nuclear level in order to prohibit the outbreak of a
conventional war or, if that fails, to determine the outcome . The PRC wants to take nuclear weapons off
the table, and it believes it can do so as long as it maintains a credible ability to retaliate to a U.S. nuclear attack. Its greatest apprehension is
that the United States can use new conventional capabilities to degrade PRC nuclear retaliatory forces to the point where U.S. military
planners feel they can risk threatening a nuclear attack to stop a conventional war. Liberation from this kind of nuclear blackmail is why the
CCP decided to develop nuclear weapons in the first place (Sun 2013). Put differently, PRC leaders want to be able to prosecute a
conventional war without worrying it will escalate to the nuclear level. PRC military authors refer to this as the ability to fight and win a
conventional war under conditions of nuclear deterrence (CAMS 2013). The United States wants Chinas leaders to believe that nuclear
escalation is a possibility in order to restrain the PRC, while at the same time minimizing the possibility that U.S. leaders will be forced to
confront the prospect of actually using nuclear weapons. The result is a psychological contest that is driving an unusual arms race between
U.S. conventional capabilities that threaten PRC nuclear forces and a mix of new PRC nuclear and conventional capabilities designed to
mitigate those threats. The

PRC is most concerned about U.S. missile defenses, U.S. conventional

precision-strike weapons, and U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities (CAMS 2013). Improved ISR could enable the United States to find, track, target, and
confirm the destruction of PRC nuclear forces. Conventional precision-strike weapons
could enable the United States to destroy those forces without resorting to a nuclear first
strike. Missile defenses could be insurance that enables the United States to intercept those PRC nuclear weapons it fails to discover or
destroy. China can counter ISR by disabling or destroying the satellites the United States
uses to help find, track, target, and confirm the destruction of military targets. As noted, the
PRC used a direct-assent, hitto-kill interceptor to destroy one of its own weather satellites in 2007 (Kulacki and Lewis 2009). Antisatellite
weapons might also be useful in degrading the accuracy of conventional strike weapons. U.S. government reports indicate that a PRC ASAT
test in May 2013 demonstrated an ability to attack U.S. GPS satellites (Weeden 2014). The PRC is countering U.S. missile defenses by
increasing the number of warheads it can deliver to the United States, as well as by improving the quality and diversifying the basing modes
of the missiles hat deliver them (OSD 2016). It is also developing countermeasures, including maneuverable reentry vehicles and decoys, to
prevent those warheads from being intercepted (OSD 2016). In addition, the PRC intends to develop and build a strategic early warning
system that will give it more time to protect its nuclear forces or, if protection is not possible, to launch missiles on warning of an incoming
attack (CAMS 2013). The technical requirements for these PRC solutions to its strategic problempreserving the ability to retaliate from a
nuclear attackare far less imposing than the requirements facing U.S. military planners who seek to prevent a conflict from starting or
escalating. That may be why the United States is considering developing new nuclear weapons designed to credibly threaten a first use. U.S.
proponents think they might be able to intimidate their PRC counterparts into believing that a tailored U.S. use of a supposedly small
nuclear weapon is not worth the cost of PRC nuclear retaliation against U.S. cities (Roberts 2015). It

is not difficult to
imagine situations that could trigger an inadvertent or accidental nuclear war. For
example, PRC leaders could underestimate U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons to
stop a conventional war. U.S. leaders could underestimate PRC willingness to retaliate
after a tailored U.S. nuclear attack. The PRC could launch a retaliatory nuclear attack if
the United States were to launch conventional missile strikes that China mistakenly
believed were nuclear. The United States could make the same mistake. Equipment in the command
and control network of either nation could be destroyed or malfunction, especially given the interest of both countries in anti-satellite
weapons. Decision makers may not have timely access to accurate information in the fog of a conflict. A PRC decision to move to launch on
warning would be especially dangerous. The U.S. and Soviet/Russian experience with warning systems shows that false alarms and
unexpected situations occur due to human and technical errors, and they are especially likely early in the deployment and operation of such
a system. Errors of this sort increased the risk of a nuclear exchange on multiple occasions for the United States and Russia both during and
after the Cold War.

uniqueness/link

xt uniqueness
US is winning the space arms race now but China is coming up behind them
lack of alliances and cooperation are the main impediment
Axe 2015 (David, American military correspondent who writes on military life and
aspects of current conflicts. He runs War Is Boring, a collective of national security
reporters, When it comes to war in space, U.S. has the edge,
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/08/09/the-u-s-military-is-preparing-forthe-real-star-wars/, Reuteres, August 10, 2015, silbs)
Quietly and without most people noticing, the worlds leading space powers the United States, China and Russia have been deploying new and more

Earths orbit is looking more and more like the planets surface
heavily armed and primed for war. A growing number of inspection satellites lurk in orbit, possibly awaiting commands to sneak up
sophisticated weaponry in space.

on and disable or destroy other satellites. Down on the surface, more and more warships and ground installations pack powerful rockets that, with accurate

A war in orbit could wreck the delicate satellite

constellations that the world relies on for navigation, communication, scientific research
and military surveillance. Widespread orbital destruction could send humanity through a
technological time warp. You go back to World War Two, Air Force General John Hyten, in charge of U.S. Space
Command, told 60 Minutes. You go back to the Industrial Age. Its hard to say exactly how many weapons are in orbit. Thats
guidance, could reach into orbit to destroy enemy spacecraft.

because many spacecraft are dual use. They have peaceful functions and potential military applications. With the proverbial flip of a switch, an inspection
satellite, ostensibly configured for orbital repair work, could become a robotic assassin capable of taking out other satellites with lasers, explosives or mechanical

The
United States possesses more space weaponry than any other country, yet denies that
any of its satellites warrant the term. When 60 Minutes asked the Air Force secretary whether the United States has weapons in
claws. Until the moment it attacks, however, the assassin spacecraft might appear to be harmless. And its dual use gives its operators political cover.

space, Secretary Deborah Lee James answered simply: No, we do not. Still, its possible to count at least some of the systems that could disable or destroy other

Some of the surface-based weaponry is far less ambiguous and so easier to tally.
Even taking into account the difficulty of accurately counting space weaponry, one thing
is clear: The United States is, by far, the worlds most heavily armed space power . But not
for a lack of trying on the part of other countries. New Cold War in space Earths orbit wasnt always
such a dangerous place. The Soviet Union destroyed a satellite for the last time in an
experiment in 1982. The United States tested its last Cold War anti-satellite missile,
launched by a vertically flying F-15 fighter, in 1985. axe-anti-sat-better An anti-satellite missile launched from a highly
satellites.

modified F-15A over Edwards Air Force Base, California, September 18,1985. U.S. Air Force photo illustration For the next three decades, both countries refrained
from deploying weapons in space. The unofficial moratorium, as Laura Grego, a space expert with the Union of Concerned Scientists, described it, put the brakes

Then in 2002, President George W. Bush withdrew the United States

from a treaty with Russia prohibiting the development of antiballistic-missile weapons .
The move cleared the way for Bush to deploy interceptor missiles that administration
officials claimed would protect the United States from nuclear attack by rogue states such
as North Korea. But withdrawing from the treaty also undermined the consensus on the strictly peaceful use
of space. Five years later, in January 2007, China struck one of its own old satellites with
a ground-launched rocket as part of a test of a rudimentary anti-satellite system . This scattered
thousands of potentially dangerous pieces of debris across low orbit. Beijings anti-satellite test accelerated the militarization of space. The United
States, in particular, seized the opportunity to greatly expand its orbital arsenal. U.S. companies
and government agencies have at least 500 satellites roughly as many as the rest of the
world combined. At least 100 of them are primarily military in nature. Most are for communication or
on the militarization of space.

surveillance. In other words, theyre oriented downward, toward Earth. But a few patrol space itself. The U.S. militarys Advanced Technology Risk Reduction
spacecraft, launched into an 800-mile-high orbit in 2009, is basically a sensitive infrared camera that can detect the heat plumes from rocket launches and,
presumably, maneuvering spacecraft. It then can beam detailed tracking data to human operators on the ground. The risk-reduction satellite works in conjunction
with other spacecraft and Earth-based sensors to keep track of Earths approximately 1,000 active satellites. The telescope-like Space-Based Space Surveillance
satellite, launched in 2010, has a clear and unobstructed view, according to an Air Force fact sheet, of resident space objects orbiting Earth from its 390-milealtitude orbit. Resident space object is military speak for satellites. A network of around 30 ground radars and telescopes complements the orbital sensors.

Observing and tracking

other countries satellites is a passive and essentially peaceful affair. But the U.S. military
also possesses at least six spacecraft that can maneuver close to enemy satellites and
inspect or even damage them. X-37B Personnel run initial checks on the X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle at Vandenberg Air Force Base,
Together, these systems make 380,000 to 420,000 observations each day, Space Command explains on its Website.

California, December 3, 2010, U.S. Air Force/Michael Stonecypher In 2010, the Air Force launched its first X-37B space plane. A quarter-size, robotic version of
the old Space Shuttle, the X-37B boosts into low orbit around 250 miles high atop a rocket but lands back on Earth like an airplane. The two X-37Bs take turns
spending a year or more in orbit. Officially, the Air Force describes the maneuverable mini-shuttles as being part of an experimental test program to demonstrate
technologies for a reliable, reusable, unmanned space test platform. But they could also attack other spacecraft. The X-37Bs could be used to rendezvous and

inspect satellites, either friendly or adversarial, and potentially grab and de-orbit satellites, the Secure World Foundation, a space advocacy group, pointed out.
The group stressed that the feasibility of the X-37Bs as weapons is low because the mini-shuttles are limited to low orbits and because the United States operates at
least four other maneuverable satellites that are probably far better at stalking and tearing up enemy spacecraft. These include two Microsatellite Technology
Experiment satellites that the military boosted into low orbit in 2006. The MiTEx satellites are small, weighing just 500 pounds each. This makes them harder for
enemy sensors to detect giving them the advantage of surprise in wartime. The two Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program satellites are much
bigger and higher up. From their stationary positions 22,000 miles above Earth, these spacecraft in orbit since July 2014 monitor other satellites and can,
according to the Air Force, maneuver near a resident space object of interest, enabling characterization for anomaly resolution and enhanced surveillance.

Maneuverable space planes and satellites are one way of attacking enemy spacecraft. But
theres an older, less subtle method blasting them out of space with a rocket . In late
2006, an U.S. spy satellite malfunctioned shortly after reaching low orbit. In early
February 2008, the Pentagon announced it would shoot down the dead spacecraft .
Officially, Washington insisted that the anti-satellite operation was a safety measure , to
prevent the defunct crafts toxic fuel from harming someone when the satellites orbit decayed and it tumbled to Earth. But it appeared to more
than one observer that Chinas 2007 anti-satellite test motivated Washingtons own
satellite shoot-down. A new Cold War was underway, this time in space. axe-erie SM-3 just after

launch to destroy the NRO-L 21 satellite, February 20, 2008. U.S. Navy photo On Feb. 20, 2008, the Navy cruiser Lake Erie, equipped with a high-tech Aegis radar,
launched a specially modified SM-3 antiballistic-missile interceptor. The rocket struck the malfunctioning satellite at an estimated speed of 22,000 miles an hour,
destroying it. Today, the United States has dozens of Aegis-equipped warships carrying hundreds of SM-3 missiles, more than enough to quickly wipe out the
approximately 50 satellites apiece that Russia and China keep in low orbit. Aegis ships could be positioned optimally, Grego of the Union of Concerned Scientists

As an anti-satellite backup, the U.S. Army

and the Missile Defense Agency also operate two types of ground-launched missile
interceptors that have the power to reach low orbit and the accuracy to strike
spacecraft. Against this huge arsenal, Russia and China possess few counterweights. Chinas
2007 anti-satellite test, and a similar trial in early 2013, proved that Beijing can hit a low
satellite with a rocket. In 2010, the Chinese space agency launched a cluster of small
space vehicles, including two named SJ-6F and SJ-12, that slammed into each other in
orbit, seemingly on purpose. In July 2013, China deployed a small inspection spacecraft,
designated SY-7, in low orbit. Like the U.S. fleet of maneuverable inspection spacecraft, the tiny SY-7 with its remote-controlled claw
wrote in a 2011 paper, to stage a sweep attack on a set of satellites nearly at once,

could be orbital repair or inspection vehicle or it could be a weapon. One could dream up, Brian Weeden, a technical and space adviser at the Secure World

But
China lacks the space- and ground-based sensors to accurately steer these weapons
toward their targets. Compared to the U.S. space-awareness system, with its scores of
radars and telescopes, China possesses a relatively paltry system one consequence of
Beijings diplomatic isolation. Where the United States can count on allies to host parts of a global sensor network, China has
few formal allies and can only deploy space-awareness systems inside its own borders,
on ships at sea or in space. The Chinese military can watch the skies over East Asia, but is mostly blind elsewhere. By contrast, Russia
Foundation, told the War Is Boring Website in 2013, a whole bunch of dastardly things that could be done with a robotic arm in close proximity.

inherited an impressive space-awareness network from the Soviet Union. Russias allies in Europe in particular, the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc states
extend the networks field of view. As a result, Moscow possesses a relatively complete catalog of space objects, the Secure World Foundation concluded. But

Russia is still far behind the United States and China as far as space weaponry is
concerned. There was a 31-year gap between the Soviet Unions last anti-satellite test and Russias first post-Soviet orbital-weapon experiment. On

Christmas Day in 2013, Russia quietly launched a small, maneuverable inspection spacecraft into low orbit, hiding the tiny spacecraft among a cluster of
communications satellites. Two more space inspectors followed, one in May 2014 and another in March 2015. Moscow hasnt said much about them, but amateur
satellite spotters have tracked the vehicles performing the kinds of maneuvers consistent with orbital attack craft. You can probably equip them with lasers,

They join a
growing number of space weapons guided by expanding networks of Earth-based and
orbital sensors on a new, distant battlefront of a so far bloodless neo-Cold War.
Anatoly Zak, the author of Russia in Space: Past Explained, Future Explored, said of the Russian craft. Maybe put some explosives on them.

Chinas space program is behind now but is rapidly advancingits only a

matter of time before theyll be able to challenge US space dominance
Pollpeter 15 (Kevin, Deputy Director of the University of California Institute on Global
Conflict and Cooperation Project on the Study of Innovation and Technology in China.
He is widely published on China national security issues, focused on China's space
program and information warfare, HEARING BEFORE THE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC
AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION, February 18, 2015,
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/February%2018%2C
%202015_Transcript.pdf, silbs)
China is a nation on a quest for wealth and power. It seeks increased influence and independence from foreign
powers with the ultimate goal of preserving Chinas sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and political system. Over the long

term, China seeks to transform the international system to better suit its interests , but seeks to
integrate itself into the existing international system over the short term with the goal of reshaping the Asia-Pacific political environment
into one in which it is dominant. Chinas

pursuit of space power is intended to carry out this strategy.

China views the development of space power as a necessary move for a country that
wants to strengthen its national power. Indeed, Chinas goal is to become a space power on par with the United States
and to foster a space industry that is the equal of those in the United States, Europe, and Russia. China takes a comprehensive, long-term
approach to its space program that emphasizes the accrual of the military, economic, and political benefits space can provide. By placing
much of its space program in a 15-year development program and providing ample funding, the Chinese government provides a stable
environment in which its space program can prosper. Although

China is probably truthful when it says that

it is not in a space race, such statements mask the true intent of its space program: to
become militarily, diplomatically, commercially, and economically as competitive as the
United States is in space. Chinas efforts to use its space program to transform itself into a military, economic, and
technological power may come at the expense of U.S. leadership. Even if U.S. space power continues to improve
in absolute terms, Chinas rapid advance in space technologies will result in relative
gains that challenge the U.S. position in space. At its current trajectory, Chinas space
program, even if not the equal of the U.S. space program, will at some point be good
enough to adequately support modern military operations, compete commercially, and
deliver political gains that will serve its broader strategic interest of again being a major
power more in control of its own destiny.

chinas military space abilities are rapidly increasingtheyre using hacking

to supplement asymmetric warfare capabilities
Pollpeter 15 (Kevin, Deputy Director of the University of California Institute on Global
Conflict and Cooperation Project on the Study of Innovation and Technology in China.
He is widely published on China national security issues, focused on China's space
program and information warfare, HEARING BEFORE THE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC
AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION, February 18, 2015,
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/February%2018%2C
%202015_Transcript.pdf, silbs)
Indeed, I would argue that China's space program plays a central role in China's
antiaccess/area denial plans. China views space as critical to its development of what
they call an "informationized force." And, in fact, almost every Chinese source that you do read
states that whoever controls space controls the earth. As a result, Chinese military
writers conclude that China must achieve space supremacy , which is to control space, to
be able to freely use space, and to be able to deny the ability to use space to adversaries. And so what we see here is almost a
full spectrum development of its space capabilities, both on the C4ISR realm and on the
counterspace realm. We have the Beidou satellite navigation system, which by 2020 will have a
constellation of 35 satellites. It will be similar to our GPS system, and with the aid of a differential supplementary system,
it will be able to achieve accuracies of up to one meter. They have introduced a wide range of remote-sensing
satellites since 2000. These include electro-optical, both color, multispectral, black and white, synthetic aperture radar, electronic
intelligence satellites, and by 2020, China wants to form a global 24-hour all-weather remote-sensing system. And connecting all
these is a system of communication satellites called the Tianlian satellites, which will be
able to connect and provide near real-time information gathering and processing for
China's ISR capabilities. And what this is supposed to do is to enable China to be able to detect
and locate and target U.S. Navy ships' bases that are beyond visual range and to be able
to keep those ships out beyond an effective range. We also see China is invested heavily
in counterspace capabilities during this time. We've mentioned the 2007 ASAT test. There have been
missile defense tests in 2010, 2013, and 2014, and these missile defense tests have obvious counterspace
implications, and these are mainly to threaten satellites in low earth orbit. In 2013, we have seen what China has
called a high altitude scientific mission. This also has obvious counterspace implications

in that it could threaten U.S. satellites in medium earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit. China has also
been engaged in a far-ranging directed-energy weapon campaign, developing lasers,
high-powered microwave weapons and particle beam weapons. In 2006, China used a laser against a
U.S. satellite though it's unclear what the purpose of that was, whether it was actually to interfere with the satellite or whether it was to
actually just range the satellite. We've also seen a host of co-orbital satellite technologies being developed by China. These are primarily
dual-use. All of them have a legitimate peaceful use. With the Shenzhou-7 in 2009, China used the Banxing-1, or the BX-1, to orbit the
Shenzhou-7 to take images of the Shenzhou-7. In 2010, China bumped two satellites together in what was ostensibly a practice for their
future docking missions. And in 2013, China has tested a robotic arm, space robotic arm system, where one satellite met close with another

Cyber is also a continuing sort of pernicious threat to our space

capabilities . There have been reported hacks against our Landsat systems, against our
jet propulsion laboratory, most recently against our National Weather Service . It's uncertain
who did these so we can't say that China did these, but it does point to a vulnerability within our satellite computer systems, and it also
points that China views cyber as a new method of warfare that will change, what they say
will change the future of warfare as we know it and places a lot of emphasis on this in their writings. There's also such things
as electronic warfare, specifically against GPS. GPS has a very weak signal and it's easy to
jam. Lastly, what I want to point out is what is unique about China's space program is its emphasis on manned platforms. We well know
that they have a vibrant manned space program, but they also see military uses for their manned space
program that includes reconnaissance as well as counterspace implications, whether such fanciful notions of putting weapons on space
stations or having astronauts fly around in spacecraft attacking other satellites. But buttressing this is a new series of
launch vehicles that China plans to introduce. The first one will probably be launched this year, the Long March 7,
and grappled with it.

and a much heavier version with the Long March 5, which will be able to put up larger reconnaissance satellites as well as aid China's efforts
to the moon. What

I want to point to here is development of solid rocket launch vehicles , one, the
carry relatively small
satellites but will enable China to have an operational responsive space capability where
if they lose satellites or if they lose their launch centers, they'll be able to rapidly replace
satellites with these launchers. So, by 2013, we will see that China will have a new variety of launch vehicles. They will
Kuaizhou, and the other is the Long March-11. These can be launched on mobile rocket launchers. They

have a comprehensive robust space-based C4ISR network. They will have a satellite navigation system that will have accuracies as good as
GPS, and they will be able to launch on a much more responsive basis than either the U.S. or they can do right now. You've asked us to take
a look at the implications. What

should be some of the responses by the U.S. for this? First of all, I
would say that we need to continue to invest in spaceYou know, there are a lot of reasons
why we are good at doing space, but money is a buttressing factor, is the fundamental
factor, and we need to keep investing in space both on the military and civilian side. And we
also need to invest in our people. If you look at the workforce demographics for China's space industry, their big bubble in demographics is
people aged from 25 to 35. If you look at our workforce, it's aging. The largest percentage is 55 to 65, and we need to be able to keep those
people going into our pipeline. And, finally, we

need to invest in things like space surveillance network

and invest in smaller, more nimble satellites so we can develop our own operational
response capability. And with that, I will end and thank you, Commissioners.

chinas space abilities are rapidly increasing and they intend to use them for
the military
Pollpeter 15 (Kevin, Deputy Director of the University of California Institute on Global
Conflict and Cooperation Project on the Study of Innovation and Technology in China.
He is widely published on China national security issues, focused on China's space
program and information warfare, HEARING BEFORE THE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC
AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION, February 18, 2015,
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/February%2018%2C
%202015_Transcript.pdf, silbs)
Indeed, I would argue that China's space program plays a central role in China's
antiaccess/area denial plans. China views space as critical to its development of what
they call an "informationized force." And, in fact, almost every Chinese source that you do read
states that whoever controls space controls the earth. As a result, Chinese military writers
conclude that China must achieve space supremacy, which is to control space, to be able to freely use space,
and to be able to deny the ability to use space to adversaries. And so what we see here is almost a full spectrum

development of its space capabilities, both on the C4ISR realm and on the counterspace realm.
We have the Beidou satellite navigation system, which by 2020 will have a constellation of 35 satellites. It will
be similar to our GPS system, and with the aid of a differential supplementary system, it will be able to achieve accuracies
of up to one meter. They have introduced a wide range of remote-sensing satellites since 2000. These
include electro-optical, both color, multispectral, black and white, synthetic aperture radar, electronic intelligence satellites, and by 2020,
China wants to form a global 24-hour all-weather remote-sensing system. And connecting

all these is a system of

communication satellites called the Tianlian satellites, which will be able to connect and
provide near real-time information gathering and processing for China's ISR capabilities .
And what this is supposed to do is to enable China to be able to detect and locate and target
U.S. Navy ships' bases that are beyond visual range and to be able to keep those ships out
beyond an effective range. We also see China is invested heavily in counterspace
capabilities during this time. We've mentioned the 2007 ASAT test. There have been missile defense
tests in 2010, 2013, and 2014, and these missile defense tests have obvious counterspace implications, and these are
mainly to threaten satellites in low earth orbit. In 2013, we have seen what China has called a high altitude
scientific mission. This also has obvious counterspace implications in that it could
threaten U.S. satellites in medium earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit. China has also been engaged in a
far-ranging directed-energy weapon campaign, developing lasers, high-powered
microwave weapons and particle beam weapons. In 2006, China used a laser against a U.S. satellite though it's
unclear what the purpose of that was, whether it was actually to interfere with the satellite or whether it was to actually just range the
satellite. We've also seen a host of co-orbital satellite technologies being developed by China. These are primarily dual-use. All of them have
a legitimate peaceful use. With the Shenzhou-7 in 2009, China used the Banxing-1, or the BX-1, to orbit the Shenzhou-7 to take images of
the Shenzhou-7. In 2010, China bumped two satellites together in what was ostensibly a practice for their future docking missions. And in

Cyber
is also a continuing sort of pernicious threat to our space capabilities. There have been
reported hacks against our Landsat systems, against our jet propulsion laboratory, most
recently against our National Weather Service. It's uncertain who did these so we can't say that China did these,
but it does point to a vulnerability within our satellite computer systems, and it also points that China views cyber as a
new method of warfare that will change, what they say will change the future of warfare as we know it and places a lot of
emphasis on this in their writings. There's also such things as electronic warfare, specifically against
GPS. GPS has a very weak signal and it's easy to jam. Lastly, what I want to point out is what is unique about
China's space program is its emphasis on manned platforms. We well know that they have a vibrant manned space program, but they also
see military uses for their manned space program that includes reconnaissance as well as counterspace
2013, China has tested a robotic arm, space robotic arm system, where one satellite met close with another and grappled with it.

implications, whether such fanciful notions of putting weapons on space stations or having astronauts fly around in spacecraft attacking
other satellites. But buttressing

this is a new series of launch vehicles that China plans to

introduce. The first one will probably be launched this year, the Long March 7, and a much heavier version with the Long March 5,
which will be able to put up larger reconnaissance satellites as well as aid China's efforts to the moon. What I want to point to
here is development of solid rocket launch vehicles, one, the Kuaizhou, and the other is the Long March-11.
These can be launched on mobile rocket launchers. They carry relatively small satellites but will enable
China to have an operational responsive space capability where if they lose satellites or if
they lose their launch centers, they'll be able to rapidly replace satellites with these
launchers. So, by 2013, we will see that China will have a new variety of launch vehicles. They will have a comprehensive robust spacebased C4ISR network. They will have a satellite navigation system that will have accuracies as good as GPS, and they will be able to launch

What
should be some of the responses by the U.S. for this? First of all, I would say that we need to
continue to invest in spaceYou know, there are a lot of reasons why we are good at doing
space, but money is a buttressing factor, is the fundamental factor, and we need to keep
investing in space both on the military and civilian side. And we also need to invest in our people. If you
on a much more responsive basis than either the U.S. or they can do right now. You've asked us to take a look at the implications.

look at the workforce demographics for China's space industry, their big bubble in demographics is people aged from 25 to 35. If you look at
our workforce, it's aging. The largest percentage is 55 to 65, and we need to be able to keep those people going into our pipeline. And,
finally, we

need to invest in things like space surveillance network and invest in smaller,
more nimble satellites so we can develop our own operational response capability. And with
that, I will end and thank you, Commissioners.

link iss
Space cooperation with China goes straight to their militarytheres no
divide
Spiegel 13 (Jim Spiegel is a frequent author at AmericaSpace and Space Flight Insider. The Win-Lose of US-China
Space Cooperation (China Wins; US Loses) 7/15/13 http://www.americaspace.com/?p=38668)///CW
Lets keep in mind that there is an inherent, fundamental struggle between an open, democratic

society and a closed, communist society. History is littered with the remains of closed, tyrannical societies that
could not exist over the long term surrounded by open, free societies. Some lost military conflicts that they initiated to
extend geopolitical domination; others lost to popular uprisings, in spite of vigorous and often ruthless suppression. The
experience of the Soviet Union proved that a planned economy and a suppressed population couldnt compete with a freemarket economy and a citizenry motivated by economic liberty. While peaceful coexistence may be possible in the short
term, open and free societies must remain vigilant against the inevitable threat of oppressive regimes. There is, of course,
precedent for joint space initiatives with a communist government. With the U.S. and USSR locked in a cold war struggle
and the nuclear Sword of Damocles looming overhead, the 1972 agreement for an Apollo Soyuz Test Project was seen as a
low-risk means to reduce cold war tensions. It culminated in a successful July 17, 1975, docking of a U.S. Apollo and USSR
Soyuz space capsules. The American and Soviet teams conducted joint experiments and exchanged gifts before
separating 44 hours later. That initiative led to other joint cooperation and activities that eventually led to wider

cooperation on the International Space Station (ISS). Why was it low-risk ? Because with its national
security implications, the U.S. had already won the space race , thanks to a motivated American
scientific community and the successful Apollo landings on the Moon. Apollo-Soyuz was a small baby-step toward
geopolitical and military dtente, a move that was clearly in the best interest of the United States. It relaxed the nuclear
trigger fingers just a bit. In addition, the ability to dock with Soviet spacecraft gave NASA an important backup in case
something went wrong with its own missions. The benefits outweighed the risks. Fast forward to 2013. What does the U.S.
have to gain this time by cooperating in space exploration with the last remaining major communist nation? Do the
benefits again outweigh the risks? This time, I believe that the answer is no, for two fundamental sets of reasons: one
related directly to space exploration itself, and the second economic. Lets start with space-related rationale. Whats the
one thing that NASA needs most to re-launch deep space exploration? Obviously, its a heavy-lift rocket. Thats where the
Chinese can help, right? On the contrary. Lets look at the facts. First, lets compare orbital launchers either active or
under development. Consider the characteristic called LEO (Low-Earth Orbit) payload mass, expressed in kg. NASAs

heavy lift rocket under development, the SLS, is projected to deliver 130,000 kg. The Falcon
Heavy, also under development, is projected at 53,000 kg. By comparison, the currently operational Atlas V is rated at
about 19,000 kg, the Delta IV at 23,000 kg, and the regular Falcon 9 at about 10,000 kg. Lets look at the Chinese

rocket families. The current Long March 4 is rated at a mere 12,000 kg . The Long March 5, under
development, is only projected to deliver 25,000 kg. Incidentally, the gigantic American Saturn V, which delivered the
Apollo astronauts to the Moon and which last flew in 1973, delivered 118,000 kg. LEO payload mass. So dont count

on the Chinese to help with a heavy lift rocket. What about Chinese space exploration technology and
expertise? Recent media reports seem to suggest that the Chinese are hot on the heels of NASA. Really? It was only a year
ago that the Chinese achieved their first successful manual space docking exercise. Last month they had their longest
crewed time in space 15 days. And while U.S. rockets reach the ISS within eight hours of launch, it

takes Chinese rockets two days to reach their own orbiting station. Im sure that there are many very smart
Chinese scientists and engineers, but they have a very, very long way to go to reach NASAs space proficiency. Further,
there is a troublesome aspect of how the PRC have achieved what they have. According to a recent 92-page Annual Report
to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2013, China relies on

foreign technology, acquisition of key dual-use components, and focused indigenous research and
development (R&D) to advance military modernization . The Chinese utilize a large, wellorganized network to facilitate collection of sensitive information and export-controlled
technology from U.S. defense sources. This network of government-affiliated companies and research
institutes often enables the PLA to access sensitive and dual-use technologies under the guise of civilian research and
development. In the case of key national security technologies, controlled equipment, and other materials not readily
obtainable through commercial means or academia, China has utilized its intelligence services and

employed other illicit approaches that involve violations of U.S. laws and export
controls. In other words, if they cant get advanced technology legally, the Chinese often steal it. The report even cited
at least four such high-profile thefts during 2012 alone. So whats in joint U.S.-Chinese space exploration for America?
Certainly not space exploration knowledge. On the other hand, despite the relative infancy of Chinas space program, some
Western observers are worried about the potential strategic military direction of the PRCs space program: According to
same Defense Department report mentioned above, China is developing a multi-dimensional program to improve its
capabilities to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by adversaries during times of crisis or conflict. Chinas
irresponsible 2007 anti-satellite weapon test exponentially increased the amount of space debris in orbit, which is

dangerous to operating satellites. Space debris is now recognized by all countries (and militaries) as a threat to space
assets. According to Dean Cheng of the Asian Studies Center, The Chinese have not separated their

civilian and military space programs. Instead, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is intimately
involved in Chinese space efforts. Unlike the Kennedy Space Center in Florida or the Johnson Space Center in
Houston, Chinas space facilities are all manned and operated by elements of
the PLA . Similarly, Chinese reporting about their human spaceflight program (the Shenzhou and Tiangong
programs) and lunar exploration missions (the Change program) all include senior PLA officers as commanders of the
effort. Space cooperation with China will almost inevitably mean cooperation with Chinas

military. Further, according to Cheng, In this light, any technology that is transferred to China,
openly or as a result of espionage, is likely to benefit the PLA . This is exacerbated by the lack of
transparency into Chinas space program. Similarly, why China decided to shoot down a weather satellite in 2007, and
who was involved in that decision, remains a mystery. The PRC is apparently getting more financially serious about their
space initiative. Although spending in prior years is unknown, a spokeswoman for Chinas manned space missions said
last year the program would cost a total of almost 40 billion yuan (U.S. $6.27 billion). Thats about 14 percent more than
NASAs 2014 budget for space exploration activities (minus the ISS support) of $5.5 billion.

we dont have a deep enough understanding of Chinese espionage to allow

them a free pass into our space technology programsno telling what theyll
do
Van Cleave 2013 (Michelle, National Counterintelligence Executive under President
George W. Bush, lawyer, and Senior Fellow at George Washington University,
ESPIONAGE THREATS AT FEDERAL LABORATORIES: BALANCING SCIENTIFIC
COOPERATION WHILE PROTECTING CRITICAL INFORMATION, HEARING
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE,
AND TECHNOLOGY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ONE HUNDRED
THIRTEENTH CONGRESS: FIRST SESSION, Serial No. 11328, May 16, 2013, silbs)
Our national laboratories are the guardians of some of our nation's most closely held and vital
secrets. As such, they are targets of extreme interest by foreign powers seeking to acquire
those secrets. The first time our nuclear weapons secrets were stolen, it led to a 50-year Cold War with the Soviet Union. In the
late 1905, the Cox Commission revealed that China acquired through espionage design
information on all nuclear weapons currently in the U.S. inventory ... and we still don't
know how they did it. Other sensitive areas of federally funded R&D are clearly of great interest to our adversaries as well - as
are the propriety secrets and intellectual property of American business and industry. The latest NCIX report on economic espionage
assesses that the

greatest foreign interest is in information technologies, military

technologies, and civilian/dual use technologies in sectors likely to experience fast growth such as clean energy,
health care, and pharmaceuticals. In 2012, DSS found that the top four most targeted technology categories were unchanged
from the year before: information systems, lasers, optics and sensors; aeronautics systems; and electronics. Annaments and energetic
materials came in fifth, with a

growing interest in technologies for processing and manufacturing, directed energy, and
space systems. I would invite the Committee's attention to the prominent position of
aeronautics and space systems on the list of foreign interest . The launch of Sputnik some
56 years ago, which led to the creation of this Committee, was a technology challenge and a national
security shock that profoundly changed the way the U.S. government approached science
and technology. From that point forward, it did not require much of a visionary to understand that space would
be critical to national defense - or that its enabling technologies would be coveted by adversaries and
competitors. The Chinese, in particular, are keenly interested in space technology, in which America
is still the world's unquestioned leader. Just ask 3D-year spy Dongfan Chung (Orange County, Calif.) or Shu
Quan-Sheng (Newport News, Va.) or Lian Yang (Seattle), now serving time for passing inter alia
space-shuttle communication technologies, spacelaunch cryogenic fuels data and
satellite semiconductor devices, respectively. And that's just the tip of the iceberg. Collection
activities There are significant intelligence gaps in understanding how foreign nations collect against U.S. technology. However, we do know
that a number of the major foreign

intelligence agencies have: Dedicated programs whose primary

task is technology acquisition. These programs often involve the use of front companies, which operate surreptitiously.

Laundry lists of targeted technologies and specific strategies for acquisition . Where an entire
system cannot be acquired, foreign intelligence services may attempt to steal component parts. Arrangements to share
technology that has been both legally and illegally acquired with other countries' intelligence and security services, even
when the sharing of that technology is itself illegal. Programs that provide funding for students and businessmen who assist in collecting
intelligence information. In other words, foreign targeting of the U.S. science and technology base is driven by purposeful collection, tasking

the techniques
used to acquire sensitive US technologies go beyond those traditionally associated with
espionage. The rich network of human interaction, business and commerce that is innocent and open and above-board provides
and exploitation by foreign nations who employ the full reach of their intelligence capabilities to that end. Moreover,

excellent cover for the sliver of activity that is none of that. Let me review some of these techniques.

link manned cooperation

Manned space cooperation is badChina would advance their foreign policy
initiatives with access to US tech
Pace 11 (Scott Pace is Professor of the Practice of International Affairs and the Director of the Space Policy Institute at
GWU. From 2005-2008, Dr. Pace served as the Associate Administrator for Program Analysis and Evaluation at NASA.
Prior to NASA, he was the Assistant Director for Space and Aeronautics in the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP). From 1993-2000, Dr. Pace worked for the RAND Corporation's Science and Technology Policy
Institute (STPI). From 1990 to 1993, he was Deputy Director and Acting Director of the Office of Space Commerce, in the
Office of the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Commerce. Dr. Pace received a Bachelor of Science degree in Physics
from Harvey Mudd College in 1980; Masters degrees in Aeronautics & Astronautics and Technology & Policy from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1982; and a Doctorate in Policy Analysis from the RAND Graduate School in
1989. Dr. Pace received the NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal in 2008, the US Department of States Group Superior
Honor Award, GPS Interagency Team, in 2005, and the NASA Group Achievement Award, Columbia Accident Rapid
Reaction Team, in 2004. How far - if at all - should the USA cooperate with China in space? Elsevier Space Policy
27)///CW

China does not have a fully separate civil space program

The first point that should be made is that

in the model of NASA and US
civil space activities. Chinas development of space capabilities began in the mid1950s at the direction of the Central Military Commission, less than a decade after the founding of the Peoples

Chinas
human spaceflight efforts are managed by elements of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and require industrial
Republic. The development of space launch vehicles was part of the same development of diverse aerospace capabilities such as rockets, guided missiles and aviation.

capabilities that are the same as those used for military programs. Thus it might be more accurate to say that China has civil space activities, such as science and exploration, but does not have a
civil space program. An important second point is that China sees its space activities as part of its comprehensive national power. That is, the development of space capabilities contributes to

Space launch capabilities represent a dual-use

capacity that can be used for long-range ballistic missiles. Requirements for human
spaceflight are used to improve the quality control of Chinese industries. Offers of space technology to
Chinas overall economic, military, foreign policy, and even social and cultural objectives.

developing countries are used to secure access to needed raw materials for the Chinese economy. Chinese astronauts are helpful to promoting the China brand in promotional videos and
international conferences. Interestingly, China has also recognized the achievements of persons of Chinese descent, such as Taylor Wang e an American scientist who flew on the Space Shuttle in
1985. While an American citizen, Dr Wangs achievement as the first person born in China to fly in space has been included in lists of Chinese achievements in space. The history of Chinese

China has engaged in a steady, longstanding effort to build and

strengthen its space capabilities. Current programs are not the results of crash efforts but have spanned almost the entire period of the modern Chinese state.
manned space activities leads to a third important point.

Table 1 shows the dates of major space milestones for China, Russia, and the United States. China has achieved progressively more ambitious space capabilities over a longer period of time and

While recognizing the

experience gap with the partners on the International Space Station (ISS), there is a risk
of underestimating how soon China will have comparable space capabilities to those of
those same partners. It is not a question of whether China will have a full range of
human spaceflight capabilities, but a question of when and what they intend to do with
those capabilities. One possible use for Chinese human spaceflight would be to advance
Chinese foreign policy objectives. The USSR and the USA both used flights of foreign astronauts as symbolic means of aiding allies and creating good will.
with fewer missions than those of the USA or the USSR. It has proceeded cautiously but steadily without any sense of racing an adversary.

China could do the same, as well as using such flights to support economic growth by securing supplies of raw materials and access to markets. Chinese space cooperation agreements in Africa (e.g.

As its space
capabilities increase, China is becoming more active in international organizations such as the
Nigeria) and Latin America (e.g. Brazil, Venezuela) have reportedly included offers of technology, training, loan guarantees, and other inducements to trade.

International Astronautical Federation and is hosting more space conferences. China leads an intergovernmental space cooperation organization, the AsiaPacific Space Cooperation Organization
(APSCO) that is similar in some respects to the European Space Agency. APSCO is based in Beijing with member space agencies from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru,
Thailand, and Turkey. China is also a member of a less formal association of space agencies, the AsiaPacific Regional Space Agency Forum, led by Japan. The forum includes space agencies,
governmental bodies and international organizations, as well as nongovernmental organizations such as companies, universities and research institutes. Japan is among the many Asian countries

At recent international conferences, China has given clear

indications of what its next steps are in human spaceflight . It plans to place an unmanned module in space, demonstrate
with their own space ambitions that are paying attention to China.

docking using another unmanned module and then send a crew to visit a modest space laboratory, Tiangong. In some respects, this would be similar to what the USSR did in the Salyut space
station program. Following the Tiangong would be a more ambitious space station akin to the Soviet/Russian Mir space station. It would consist of multiple modules with an overall mass of about
60metric tons to which a single Shenzhou ship could dock along with an unmanned cargo resupply vehicle. Interestingly, on current schedules, this station would be deployed at about the same

, the Chinese
are making progress toward acquiring the capabilities necessary to conduct such
missions. For example, the Chinese EVA suit derived from the Russian Orlan design has boots with heels and other features for walking on a surface as well as floating outside a
time as the International Space Station may be preparing to close down. China does not publicly have a formal program for sending humans to the Moon. However

spacecraft. While I was at NASA, we did a notional analysis of how the Chinese might be able to send a manned mission to the Moon. We concluded that they could use four Long March 5 vehicles,
capable of lifting 25 metric tons each, to place a little under 15 metric tons on the lunar surface. This is about the same mass as the US lunar modules that were launched by a single Saturn V. Fig. 1

As noted earlier, it is not a question of whether China will have a

full range of manned spaceflight capabilities, but what the nation intends to do with
those capabilities. 3. Cooperative developments Growing Chinese space capabilities have naturally created
speculation about future international space cooperation. A recent issue of Aviation Week and Space Technology (22 April 2011) covered the
shows the notional concept developed in 2008.

wide and diverse range of international aerospace cooperation with China, notably in commercial aircraft. Such cooperation includes a full range of US and European suppliers as well as
traditional rivals, Boeing and Airbus. The amount and depth of cooperation is even more striking when compared to the minimal level of cooperation in space, even including space and Earth
science. The two most recent US-China summit meetings included brief joint statements on space: The United States and China look forward to expanding discussions on space science cooperation
and starting a dialog on human spaceflight and space exploration, based on the principles of transparency, reciprocity and mutual benefit. Both sides welcome reciprocal visits of the NASA
Administrator and the appropriate Chinese counterpart in 2010. (Beijing, 17 November 2009) The United States and China agreed to take specific actions to deepen dialog and exchanges in the
field of space. The United States invited a Chinese delegation to visit NASA headquarters and other appropriate NASA facilities in 2011 to reciprocate for the productive visit of the U.S. NASA
Administrator to China in (October) 2010. The two sides agreed to continue discussions on opportunities for practical future cooperation in the space arena, based on principles of transparency,
reciprocity, and mutual benefit. (Washington, DC, 19 January 2011) The 2009 statement was vague regarding who the Chinese counterpart to the NASA administrator would be, as that seems to be

unclear even to the Chinese. The China National Space Administration (CNSA) had previously been used as the civil, interlocutor for space cooperation and it was initially assumed that this

However, the technical capabilities and management of human

space missions reside with the PLA and it has not been clear that the CNSA would add
value to discussions. For the USA, however, it would also seem odd to have a former Marine Corps General (Administrator Bolden) meeting with senior PLA officers if the
might hold true for discussions of human spaceflight.

future for U.S.China military-to-military dialog continues to be as uncertain as it has been.1 Nonetheless, the NASA administrator did visit China in October 2010 and the 2011 summit statement
said that discussions of practical cooperation would continue on the basis of transparency, reciprocity and mutual benefit. The latter two principles are unremarkable and have been a consideration

The principle of transparency is a different consideration and

goes to one of the central concerns with all Chinese space activities e a lack of
understanding of how decisions are made and what strategic intentions drive them. In large
part, such opacity is intentional on the part of Chinese officials . In various discussions, they have expressed their discomfort even
with the term transparency, preferring other formulations such as clarity of outcomes e thus shielding their internal decision-making processes. Gaining a better
understanding of Chinas decision-making process and strategic intentions remains a
central objective and problem for the USA. This applies to civil space cooperation as well as other areas of the relationship. To oversimplify, in the
in all US space cooperation since the beginning of NASA.

case of the USSR, we knew their intentions as well as their capabilities. China is not the USSR, thankfully, but we may know more about their capabilities than their intentions. It is also possible
they may not know themselves; but it is hard to tell even that. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the demise of the USSR and the emergence of Russia, there was a compelling case for human
spaceflight cooperation with Russia. The Russians had extensive experience with long-duration manned space station just as the USA was building its space station with multiple foreign partners.
There was a desire to symbolize a new post-Soviet relationship with the USA. Finally, there was a desire to engage the Russian space community internationally in a constructive project as

there are no compelling political or

technical reasons to engage in human spaceflight cooperation with China. The Chinese
have space capabilities but nothing unique that the USA needs.2 As the Chinese themselves said to the NASA
opposed to seeing it engaging in missile proliferation and other destabilizing activities. Unfortunately,

Administrator Bolden during his 2010 visit (to paraphrase): we dont need you and you dont need us but we could do good things together. The question of cooperation with NASA may be moot
for the moment as a result of Congressional language barring bilateral cooperation with China in the House 2011 continuing resolutions appropriations bill: SEC. 1340. (a) None of the funds made
available by this division may be used for the National Aeronautics sand Space Administration or the Office of Science and, Technology Policy to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or
execute a, bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chineseowned company, unless such activities

I would not recommend

engaging with China on human spaceflight cooperation. The technical and political
challenges are just too great e as are the political risks of not meeting raised
expectations. However, I do believe that scientific space cooperation with China could be mutually benefi- cial and reciprocal, while improving our understanding of Chinese
are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of, enactment of this division. Even if this language was not in place,

decision making and intentions. Space cooperation with China could start small with scientific projects that have minimal to no technology transfer concerns or potential for dual-use exploitation.
As an example, European and Chinese cooperation in space plasma physics has been successful. Two Chinese Double Star spacecraft carrying European and Chinese experiments joined four ESA
spacecraft in high orbits around the Earth. The combination of six spacecraft produced new insights into the magnetosphere and the solar wind. A similar US project might extend work in plasma
physics and heliophysics on a traditional basis of no exchange of funds and open sharing of the scientific data produced. For example, a primary source of solar storm warnings is an aging NASA
satellite, the Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE), which is almost 15 years old. Solar storms and coronal mass ejections can cause damage to electrical power grids and telecommunication

Cooperation need not involve

creating new spacecraft but could involve ensuring compatibility and interoperability with existing spacecraft. China and the USA already participate in international
networks. While plans are in work to replace ACE, it would be beneficial to have more robust sources of warnings.

voluntary standards bodies such as the Consultative Committee on Space Data Standards (CCSDS), which develops open standards that enable cross-support for telecommunications and space
navigation. The USA has been engaged in discussions with China for some years on its COMPASS satellite navigation system to ensure compatibility and interoperability. While GPS and
COMPASS are both dual-use systems, commercial competition and open markets are expected to foster sales for satellite navigation receivers that can use the civil or open signals from both

Joint ventures are another way to engage commercially with China and strengthen
international use and acceptance of GPS while avoiding transfer of sensitive space
technologies.3 Given the reliance of the USA on space systems, it is unsurprising that it seeks to reduce and mitigate the creation of orbital debris. The 2007 Chinese ASAT test of
systems.

course added greatly to the orbital debris population. This was a regrettable action for many reasons, among which was that fact that China had earlier participated constructively in technical
discussions within the Science and Technology Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which developed a consensus set of orbital debris
mitigation guidelines. Nonetheless, the USA continues to seek Chinese cooperation on reducing the creation of orbital debris and routinely provides conjunction warnings to countries e including
China e at risk from being struck by debris. If China is successful in maintaining astronauts in orbit for extended periods of time, they might have increased incentives to cooperation with ISS
partners in reducing potential hazards to those astronauts. If asked about protecting the space environment today, the likely response from China, would include the RussianeChinese draft Treaty
on the Prevention of the Placement of, Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, (PPWT). The PPWT is outside the scope of this article save to note that the
USA rightly remains opposed to its adoption. In contrast, the USA is considering a European Union draft proposal for an international, voluntary, nonbinding Code of Conduct for Outer Space
Activities that would promote a variety of transparency and confidence-building measures of value to all spacefaring states. Such a code would have little value as just an agreement between the
USA, Europe and Japan but would be more effective if space powers such as China and India, as well as emerging spacefaring states such as Brazil, Korea, Nigeria, and South Africa, were to adopt
it. Thus, the USA should pursue a diplomatic strategy that encourages countries with which China cooperates in space to adopt the Code of Conduct as well as engaging with China directly. Chinese
space capabilities could be of potential value in reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. While the six-party talks (North Korea, South Korea, China, the USA, Japan and Russia) are currently
suspended, future discussions will continue to deal with missile proliferation as well as de-nuclearization. If North Korea is to give up its long-range missile capabilities and suspend space launch
activities, it is likely that the countrys leadership will require inducements or compensation of some sort. One such offset could be Chinese launch services for North Korean satellites as part of a
broader agreement that eliminated North Korean strategic missiles. While highly speculative, it is possible to imagine constructive outcomes if China chose to pursue them.

link space cooperation

Cooperation is a sham deterrence is the only hope to avoid an all-out space
war
Mujamdar 16 defense editor for the National Interest citing Haney,
commander of U.S. Strategic Command (Dave, Get Ready, America: Russia
and China Have Space Weapons, January 26, 2016, The National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/get-ready-america-russia-chinahave-space-weapons-15027?page=2//dmeth)
Russia and China are increasingly pursuing the ability to attack Americas space-based
assets, but is there anything the Pentagon can do to thwart Beijing and Moscows
ambitions? While it is sometimes treated as an afterthought here on earth, space-based capabilities like
GPS, communications and reconnaissance satellites are the sinews that hold the U.S. military
together , allowing American forces to operate across the globe. Thats a fact, however, that has not gone unnoticed in
Beijing or Moscow. Adversaries and potential adversaries are developing, and in some cases
demonstrating, disruptive and destructive counterspace capabilities. Furthermore, they are
exploiting what they perceive as space vulnerabilities threatening the vital,
national, civil, scientific and economic benefits to the U.S. and the global community ,
Adm. Cecil D. Haney, commander of U.S. Strategic Command told an audience at the Center for a New American Security
on January 22. The biggest challenges come from rival great powers which have the technical

and financial wherewithal to challenge American power in space. Russias 2010 military doctrine
emphasized space as a crucial component of its defense strategy, and Russia has publicly stated they are researching and
developing counterspace capabilities to degrade, disrupt and deny other users of space, Haney said, adding that Russias
leaders also openly assert that Russian armed forces have anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, conduct ASAT research and
employ satellite jammers. Last year," Haney said, "the Washington Times reported Russian President Putin as saying
that Russia, following the Chinese military, is building state-of-the-art weapons that would guarantee [for] Russia the
fulfillment of space defense tasks for the period until 2020. While Russiaand the Soviet Union before itmight have
been Americas closest rivals in space, these days the most dangerous challenge comes from Beijing. China, like Russia,

has advanced directed energy capabilities that could be used to track or blind
satellites, and like Russia, has demonstrated the ability to perform complex maneuvers in
space, Haney said. He added: In November, China conducted its sixth test of a
hypersonic strike vehicle , and several news sources reported an ASAT the previous
month. Of course, many of us are still dealing with Chinas 2007 ASAT test, which created more than 3,000 pieces of
debris, adding significantly to the congested space environment. Well over 80 percent of this debris, which litters one of
the most utilized areas of space, will affect space flight for many decades to come. But what can Washington do

to counter these developments? The answer to that question is less clear. Haney laid out four main points:
First, we must have a deeper, broader understanding of our adversaries, and potential adversaries.
No matter the foe, we must understand their capability and intent , so that we can
deny enemy action , hold critical nodes at risk, and prevent perceptions, misperceptions
and actions from escalating . Second, we must view and fund space as a critical
mission capability vs. an enabler. Our sensors, command and control systems, and Space Situational
Awareness capabilities underpin our ability to maintain awareness. These resources are vital to the
decision-making process and supporting forces around the globe. Third, we must look at our military
capabilities in a holistic manner, and fully integrate them into our other
elements of national power . We must have a whole of government approach, and include our allies,
partners and commercial entities, where appropriate. Finally, we must increase readiness across
the arena of strategic capabilities: nuclear, space, and cyberspace. The United States is pursuing
other technical solutions as well. Haney explained: We are working on several new capabilities, both in
low earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit. To enhance our capability of tracking objects in low earth orbit, our Space
Fence program will work in conjunction with the rest of our space surveillance network to provide the Joint Space
Operations Center or JSpOC, an integrated picture of the joint operating environment, providing significantly improved

un-cued space surveillance capabilities. To

further refine space situational awareness, we are

relocating a C-Band radar to Australiain order to provide low earth orbit coverage in
the Southern altitudes. A major advance in geosynchronous space surveillance was the declaration of IOC of the
Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program that is providing improved situational awareness out to 22,000
miles. . . Future initiatives must build in resiliency and survivability whether thats
through disaggregation, smaller, less complex satellites or real-time command and control. The United States has a long
way to go in securing its space-based assets, but Washington is making progress. While we still have a
significant way to go, I am delighted with how far this innovative solution has come. I cant tell you much of what we are
doing due to classification of its operations, but we are experimenting high velocity learning as we experiment in an

Ultimately, the
United States must rely on deterrence in space , if possible. The key is to make
sure that potential adversaries understand that attacking U.S. space assets
will come at a significant cost. At the end of the day, we must ensure that
we deter conflict from extending to outer space . As threats evolve, we must continue
to look for additional investments in the space portfolio. We simply cannot risk
denied access to a domain that is so vital to U.S. national security , Haney said.
environment with seamless participation of the DoD and intelligence community, Haney said.

But if the worst should happen, I am proud to tell you that U.S. Strategic Command is a ready force, capable of delivering
comprehensive warfighting solutions for our commander in chief, should deterrence fail. Should we need to respond, we
will respond proportionally, using all elements of our national power, and that response will occur at a time, domain, and
place of our choosing.

no tangible benefits to US-China space cooperationonly a risk theyll steal

our tech and make us pay for the project
Listner and Johnson-Freese 2014 (Michael J. Listner is an attorney and the founder
and principal of Space Law and Policy Solutions, a think tank and consultation firm that
concentrates on legal and policy matters relating to space security and development.
Joan Johnson-Freese is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College
in Newport, Rhode Island. Commentary | Two Perspectives on U.S.-China Space
Cooperation ://spacenews.com/41256two-perspectives-on-us-china-spacecooperation/#sthash.RnGyBKrU.dpuf, July 14, 2014, silbs)
The Case Against Engagement One definition of cooperation in terms of ecology is the beneficial but inessential interaction between two
species in a community. Considering the nature of geopolitics, this is an apt definition for cooperation between states and forms a good
basis for analysis in particular when discussing outer space cooperation between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China.
Utilizing this definition, two questions arise: First, would

outer space cooperation between the United

States and China be beneficial to the national security interests of the United States ?
Second, is outer space cooperation with China essential to the national security interests of
the United States? Not surprisingly, national security is a focal point of the analysis given the inherent nature of states to consider
their own interests before those of another, especially given that the United States and China are geopolitical competitors. When states,
including geopolitical competitors, cooperate, there is always an unspoken premise that aside from the stated political goal each participant
will have the unstated goals of reaping short- and long-term benefits of resources belonging to the other. In

terms of
cooperation between China and the United States, any stated goal of cooperation would
implicate technology, intellectual property, scientific methodologies and funding. Given
this presupposition, does China possess an advantage in any of these areas that would
benefit the national security interests of the United States in a partnership? The answer
is to both questions is cumulatively no. China has made significant strides in its space program, and its
accomplishments follow in the footsteps of the outer space activities performed by the United States. China does have the perception of

Cooperation
with China would reap no tangible benefits in terms of technology for the United States
and in fact would risk exposing outer space technology and methodologies that China
could appropriate under the guise of cooperation and incorporate into its own space and
military programs. There is precedent for this concern from Chinas participation in the
Galileo satellite navigation system. Chinas technical partnership with the European
Union on the Galileo project led to its application on Chinas indigenous Beidou Phase 2
satellite navigation system. The accuracy of the Beidou signal came as a surprise to its European partners as such accuracy
was unlikely to be obtained without taking shortcuts. Thus, what began as a cooperative effort between the European
momentum in its space program and uses current technology to facilitate its achievements, but it still lags behind.

Union and China led

to China reaping the technological benefit with the resultant national

security implications. Such would be the case with a cooperative effort with the United
States. Any effort would expose U.S. technology, and it stands to reason that no matter what
safeguards were put in place China would acquire and benefit from that technology. Not
only would the United States not benefit from a cooperative effort it would also sacrifice
its technological advantage and compromise its national security. The same rationale applies to
funding. Past cooperative efforts with geopolitical competitors has left the United States
footing a substantial amount of the bill. Cooperative efforts with the Soviet Union and then
the Russian Federation have been and continue to be funded substantially by the United States with the other
party to the cooperative agreement reaping most of the benefit. Projects such as the Apollo/Soyuz rendezvous mission during the Cold War
and the current engagement with the international space station are examples where the United States has provided a disproportionate
amount of funding. The

current arrangement with the ISS in particular has seen the Russian
Federation receiving substantial economic benefit from funding of modules, revenue generated from
commercial activities, including space tourism, and revenue received from ferrying of NASA astronauts. It is conceivable that China
would reap a similar economic benefit to the detriment of the United States in cooperative outer space activities.
The likelihood is great that China would insist that any arrangement entered into be funded
disproportionately by the United States. This in turn would take away from other programs,
inflate the national deficit and even require more borrowing from China, which would have a cumulative effect on the
national and economic security of the United States with little or no benefit. The only benefit to the United States in entering into
cooperative outer space activities with China is the political veneer of U.S.-Chinese cooperation. Aside from the political aspect, cooperative
ventures with China would be inessential from a national security and geopolitical perspective. China

brings no tangible
benefits to the table, and with the paradigm shift toward commercial space activities by the
United States, any cooperative arrangements with China would be met with resistance by
private operators who would have concerns of their own regarding technology and the ability to
operate in the outer space environment.

China would totes steal the tech it did with the EU

Listner 14 (Michael Listner is an attorney and the founder and principal of Space Law & Policy Solutions, a legal and
policy think tank that identifies issues and offers practical solutions on matters related to outer space security, national
security and outer space development. Commentary | Two Perspectives on U.S.-China Space Cooperation 7/14/14
http://spacenews.com/41256two-perspectives-on-us-china-space-cooperation/)///CW
When states, including geopolitical competitors, cooperate, there is always an unspoken premise that aside from the
stated political goal each participant will have the unstated goals of reaping short- and long-term benefits of resources
belonging to the other. In terms of cooperation between China and the United States, any stated goal of cooperation would
implicate technology, intellectual property, scientific methodologies and funding. Given this presupposition, does China
possess an advantage in any of these areas that would benefit the national security interests of the United States in a
partnership? The answer is to both questions is cumulatively no. China has made significant strides in its

space program, and its accomplishments follow in the footsteps of the outer space activities performed by the United
States. China does have the perception of momentum in its space program and uses current technology to facilitate its
achievements, but it still lags behind. Cooperation with China would reap no tangible benefits in terms of
technology for the United States and in fact would risk

exposing outer space technology and

methodologies that China could appropriate under the guise of cooperation and incorporate into
its own space and military programs . There is precedent for this concern from Chinas participation
in the Galileo satellite navigation system. Chinas technical partnership with the European Union on
the Galileo project led to its application on Chinas indigenous Beidou Phase 2 satellite
navigation system. The accuracy of the Beidou signal came as a surprise to its European partners as such accuracy
was unlikely to be obtained without taking shortcuts. Thus, what began as a cooperative effort between
the European Union and China led to China reaping the technological benefit with the
resultant national security implications. Such would be the case with a cooperative effort with the United
States. Any effort would expose U.S. technology , and it stands to reason that no matter
what safeguards were put in place China would acquire and benefit from that technology. Not only
would the United States not benefit from a cooperative effort it would also sacrifice its technological advantage and
compromise its national security. The same rationale applies to funding. Past cooperative efforts with geopolitical

competitors has left the United States footing a substantial amount of the bill. Cooperative efforts with the Soviet Union
and then the Russian Federation have been and continue to be funded substantially by the United States with the other
party to the cooperative agreement reaping most of the benefit. Projects such as the Apollo/Soyuz rendezvous mission
during the Cold War and the current engagement with the international space station are examples where the United
States has provided a disproportionate amount of funding. The current arrangement with the ISS in particular has seen
the Russian Federation receiving substantial economic benefit from funding of modules, revenue generated from
commercial activities, including space tourism, and revenue received from ferrying of NASA astronauts. It is conceivable
that China would reap a similar economic benefit to the detriment of the United States in cooperative outer space
activities. The likelihood is great that China would insist that any arrangement entered into be

funded disproportionately by the United States. This in turn would take away from other
programs, inflate the national deficit and even require more borrowing from China , which
would have a cumulative effect on the national and economic security of the United States with little or no benefit. The
only benefit to the United States in entering into cooperative outer space activities with China is the political veneer of
U.S.-Chinese cooperation. Aside from the political aspect, cooperative ventures with China would be inessential from a
national security and geopolitical perspective. China brings no tangible benefits to the table, and with the paradigm shift
toward commercial space activities by the United States, any cooperative arrangements with China would

be met with resistance by private operators who would have concerns of their own
regarding technology and the ability to operate in the outer space environment.
China IP theft of space technology is empirically proven and a huge risk
Danis et al 2015 (Michael R., senior intelligence officer with the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and established and led a unique team of China technology specialists producing
assessments on Chinas military-industrial complex, and the impact of U.S. exportcontrolled and other foreign technology on Chinese weapons development programs,
U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION : CAROLYN
BARTHOLOMEW, PETER BROOKES, ROBIN CLEVELAND, JEFFREY L. FIEDLER,
Hon. CARTE P. GOODWIN, DANIEL M. SLANE, Hon. JAMES M. TALENT, Hon.
KATHERINE C. TOBIN, MICHAEL R. WESSEL, LARRY M. WORTZEL, 2015 Report to
Congress of the U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION,
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2015%20Annual
%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF, silbs)
Moreover, Chinas large-scale, state-sponsored theft of intellectual property and proprietary
information through cyber espionage has enabled future space and counterspace
operations by filling knowledge gaps in Chinas space R&D, providing insight into U.S.
space plans and capabilities, and helping to identify vulnerabilities in U.S. space systems.
In May 2015, Pennsylvania State University disclosed that two separate groups of cyber
actors had been sifting through the computers of its engineering school for more than
two years. The University is also home to a separate lab that specializes in aerospace issues and works primarily for the U.S. military.
Although the labs networks are reportedly separate from those of the engineering school, the length of the breach raises
the possibility that the hackers may have entered the labs networks as well, according to a source
familiar with the U.S. government investigation of the intrusions, as cited in a U.S. media article. This source also alleged
that China sponsored at least one of the groups, while the other is believed to be statesponsored as well.111 Earlier in June 2014, Crowdstrike, a private U.S. cybersecurity firm,
published a report providing detailed technical information regarding the activities of a
Chinese cyber threat group, which Crowdstrike refers to as Putter Panda. According to the report, the group
supports Chinas space surveillance mission and is subordinate to the Third Department
of the PLA General Staff Department, widely believed to be Chinas premier organization responsible for signals intelligence collection
and analysis. Crowdstrike assesses that Putter Panda since 2007 has targeted government, defense, research,
and technology sectors in the United States, with specific targeting of space, aerospace,
and communications. 112 Moreover, Mandiant, a U.S. cybersecurity firm, has responded to
multiple incidents in which at least six distinct China-based threat actors have
compromised aerospace and defense companies both in the United States and other countries. These
threat groups, which Mandiant assesses most likely are associated with the Chinese government, have targeted the sector since at least
2006, and frequently steal sensitive data from their victims. Stolen files include human resources records, internal business
communications, marketing and sales documents, and test results and other product information pertaining to the development and
operation of missile systems and military and civilian satellite technology for both communications and location tracking.

China has stolen US space technologytheyre still after information from satellite,
aerospace, defense, and telecommunications industries
Nurkin 2015 (Tate, Managing Director of Research and Thought Leadership, Janes
IHS Aerospace, Defense and Security, member of the World Economic Forums Global
Agenda Council on Nuclear Security, HEARING BEFORE THE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC
AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION, February 18, 2015,
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/February%2018%2C
%202015_Transcript.pdf, silbs)
It is difficult to develop a comprehensive picture of how much aerospace and defense
technology China acquires through espionage, but open source reporting on the subject strongly
suggests that espionage, both traditional forms and cyber-espionage, constitute an important avenue for
the acquisition of aerospace and defense technology, including space-focused
technologies. A March 2014 Department of Justice report detailing major US export
enforcement, economic espionage, trade secret and embargo-related criminal cases from
January 2008 through March 2014 included over two dozen cases of prosecuted
espionage regarding / theft of controlled items relevant to Chinas space a nd broader aerospace
programs, such as: multiple cases focused on thermal imaging cameras and aerospace grade
carbon fiber as well as cases involving electronics used in military radar and electronic
warfare; radiation hardened materials and gyroscopes; military accelerators; military
optics; unmanned systems; rocket / space launch technical data; restricted electronics
equipment; source code; and the theft of space shuttle and rocket secrets for China.
China is also pursuing the illicit acquisition of advanced aerospace technologies from the United
States via cyber-espionage, though direct attribution of cyber-attacks is exceptionally difficult. Chinas cyberespionage capabilities and activities have received particularly acute attention since the
release of a series of high-profile reports in early 2013, including reports from the US Defense Science Board,
the private Internet security firm Mandiant, and a classified National Intelligence Estimate, elements of which were leaked to the press.

Collectively, these reports and several subsequent U.S. government and private sector
reports describe a significant and sustained cyberespionage campaign against US
companies in a variety of industries emanating from China and initiated by the Chinese
government. Satellites, defense, aerospace and telecommunications were all
listed among targeted industries.

link ssa
SSA significantly contributes to Chinese military space and counterspace
abilities
Saunders 2015 (Phillip, Director, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs
Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University, Testimony before
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on Chinas Space
and Counterspace Programs, February 18, 2015,
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/February%2018%2C
%202015_Transcript.pdf, silbs)
China views space diplomacy and international cooperation as means of learning from
countries with more advanced space capabilities (including from the United States), demonstrating Chinas
technological prowess to both domestic and international audiences, using technology sharing and space cooperation to strengthen its ties
with other countries (especially developing countries), and earning revenue from its investments in military and civil space technology.

Given the dual-use nature of much space technology and the fact that even Chinas civil
and manned space programs have heavy military involvement, there is reason to be
cautious about space cooperation with China. That said, a complete prohibition on official
and commercial space cooperation with China would have heavy costs in terms of its
negative economic impact on the U.S. space industry (especially on secondary and tertiary suppliers), on U.S.
allies (if the U.S. pressures them not to engage in space cooperation with China), and on the U.S. global image (if U.S. unwillingness to
cooperate with China on even innocuous space issues is viewed as a sign of unwarranted hostility and a loss of U.S. self-confidence).

Accordingly, the U.S. government should identify areas where space cooperation with
China could contribute significantly to Chinese military space and counterspace
capabilities and limit cooperation in these areas. Some of this analysis has already been done in the recent
process of revising U.S. export controls governing space technology. In some cases, such as space situational
awareness , the United States should limit cooperation that might enhance
Chinas ability to locate and target U.S. satellites, even if it is willing to cooperate
with other allies and partners.29

link treaties/multilat
China uses lawfare to destroy US military capacities --- the plan cedes the
space domain to china
Major John W. Bellflower 10, space law instructor at the Advanced Space Operations
School and National Security Space Institute, Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air
Force Base, ARTICLE: THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON COMMAND OF SPACE, 65 A.F.
L. Rev. 107, lexis
Potential adversaries, such as China, may also employ strategic lawfare to limit U.S. command of
space. Recognizing its current technological inferiority in space as compared to the United States, China has focused its
military efforts on "developing capabilities that target potential vulnerabilities of the United States." n150 This is
particularly the case with American dependence on space assets, something China views as

America's "soft ribs and strategic weakness." n151 Aware that military options are not a viable choice at
this time given the financial, military, and technological gap between it and America, China is beginning to use
i nternational law as a means of countering American space power, in part to buy itself time to
develop capabilities to take advantage of America's space vulnerabilities. n152 To justify its future
military actions in space , China is continually developing doctrine and legal
justifications to garner support within the international community. n153 It has, in essence,
taken Machiavelli's advice n154 and not only sought to achieve its military objectives through resort to law, but also to
legitimize its military actions in case resort to military means become necessary. A. Chinese Lawfare The Chinese

view space as an essential arena for future warfare. n155 Rather than attempt to achieve parity and
directly compete with U.S. space capabilities, China appears focused on an asymmetric strategy "to
deny its opponent use of [space] as much as possible." n156 Thus, China is pursuing means to inhibit
American freedom of action in [*134] space through the development of capabilities to destroy, damage, and interfere with
American satellite systems in an effort to blind and deafen the U.S. military in the event of conflict. n157 Complementing
its increase in military capabilities, China has embraced asymmetric warfare at a level previously unimagined. n158
Chinese doctrine views warfare as not only "a military struggle, but also a comprehensive contest on fronts of politics,
economy, diplomacy, and law." n159 Thus, China appears to eschew the tactical use of lawfare in

favor of its strategic use as an "active defense" to be employed in advance of actual

conflict and across the spectrum of human activity. n160 The Chinese formulation of full-spectrum warfare is
contained in the concept of "Three Warfares" that combines and incorporates psychological, media, and legal components
into a coordinated strategy. n161 The legal component describes "the use of international and

domestic laws to gain international support and manage possible political repercussions
of China's military actions" n162 and advocates seizing "the earliest opportunity to set up regulations." n163
Further, Chinese military doctrine closely intertwines public opinion warfare--media and psychological
warfare--and lawfare. Media warfare seeks to manipulate the news media to achieve a propaganda victory and break an
enemy's will to fight. n164 Psychological warfare employs the use of "selected information and indicators to foreign
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,
organizations, groups and individuals . . . to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to [China]." n165
Thus, China blends lawfare and public opinion warfare in order to achieve international

legitimacy for its actions. n166 This strategy [*135] finds current expression in China's
actions regarding the sea --a use of lawfare that has enormous implications
for its projected activities in the space domain . B. China's Maritime Predicate China is a
signatory to the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), n167 which provides that territorial waters
end at the twelve nautical mile mark as measured from a nation's low-water line along its coast. n168 Within this
territorial sea, ships of all nations enjoy the right of innocent passage. n169 Passage is deemed innocent if it is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order, and security of the coastal state. n170 A ship is considered to be operating prejudicial
to the peace, good order, or security of a coastal state if it engages, inter alia, in any act aimed at collecting information to
the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal state. n171 Although China ratified UNCLOS the United
States is not a party, but the

U nited S tates asserts that the navigation provisions of UNCLOS are

reflected in and supported by c ustomary i nternational l aw. n172 In addition to the exclusive nature of
territorial waters, UNCLOS permits a nation to enjoy exclusive economic rights within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),
which extends outward two hundred nautical miles from the same baseline used to determine territorial [*136] waters.
n173 Within the EEZ, a nation enjoys "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and

managing the natural resources," n174 but cannot restrict another state's freedom of navigation or overflight. n175
However,

China has consistently sought to extend its sovereignty beyond the limits of
internationally recognized territorial waters through its adoption of a domestic
law regulating passage and overflight through its EEZ. n176 It has used this interpretation of

UNCLOS and its domestic law "to substantiate the interception, harassment, and engagement of U.S. aircraft flying above
its [EEZ]" n177 and U.S. ships operating within its EEZ. n178 In April 2001, a People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) F8II fighter struck an unarmed U.S. Navy EP-3E (Aries II) reconnaissance aircraft flying on a routine mission in
international airspace approximately 70 miles off the coast of China. n179 The U.S. aircraft survived the near-fatal
encounter and landed [*137] safely at a Chinese naval base where the crew and craft were promptly detained by the
Chinese government. n180 In March 2009, five Chinese Navy ships intercepted and impeded the free navigation of the
USNS Impeccable, an American naval vessel under supervision of the U.S. Navy but carrying a civilian crew, while it was
conducting a survey of the ocean floor about 75 nautical miles from China's Hainan Island. n181 The Chinese forced the
American ship to come to an emergency stop before she eventually withdrew from the area. n182 Despite the fact that
both of these incidents took place outside Chinese territorial waters, China asserts that the United States violated its
sovereignty by conducting military operations--alleged military reconnaissance in these two cases--within the Chinese
EEZ. n183 Both China and the United States agree that the EP-3E aircraft and the Impeccable were operating outside
China's territorial sea but within China's EEZ. n184 Despite the unambiguous language of the UNCLOS
treaty,

China continues to pursue a strategy of gradually extending its strategic depth

or sovereignty in order to support offshore defensive operations . n185 China's
adherence to this flawed legal interpretation, reinforced by aggressive military action,
demonstrates that "through an orchestrated program of scholarly articles and symposia, China is working to
shape international opinion in favor of [its preferred] interpretation of the
Law of the Sea by shifting scholarly views and national perspectives away from long-accepted
norms of freedom of navigation and toward interpretations of increased coastal state sovereign authority."
n186 By doing so, China is not only distorting [*138] the settled law of the sea, but perhaps
also preparing to deploy a similar strategy in the space domain . C. Chinese
Assertions of Vertical Sovereignty in Space Absolute national sovereignty over the airspace above a state's territory has
"been claimed and exercised as far back into history as proof may exist of the creation and protection by state law of
exclusive private property rights in such place." n187 Land and airspace, therefore, were viewed as inseparable; a rule that
can be traced to Roman times. n188 This right of absolute vertical sovereignty continued to prevail

until the Chicago Convention of 1944 when, despite the convention's failure to define airspace, it defined an
aircraft as "any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of
air against the earth's surface." n189 By indicating that the convention would apply "only to those parts of the atmosphere
where gaseous air is sufficiently dense to support balloons and airplanes," the convention set a de facto limit

on airspace. n190 This proposition was reinforced when no nations objected to the
overflight of satellites above their territorial airspace at the dawn of the space age. n191 However, the lack
of a definitive resolution of this issue in i nternational law has permitted some in China to
advocate vertical sovereignty in space. n192 Consistent with China's seamless view of warfare, a number
of Chinese authors n193 are exploring the nexus between traditional notions [*139] of state
sovereignty and space, with particular emphasis on attempting to establish a legal
foundation for potential military operations in space . Although such apparent
assertions of Chinese vertical sovereignty may only be in their formative stages, the
U nited S tates must respond and counter them now or risk permitting China to gain
credibility, regarding potential military operations, which would restrict freedom of movement in
the space domain. 1. The Chinese Position and Its Implications China's most prominent advocate
for vertical sovereignty is Major General Cai Fengzhen, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army
Air Force. n194 General Cai contends that the space above ground, including airspace and space,
is inseparable and integrated. n195 Thus, General Cai reaches back to the Roman-based doctrine of cujus est
solum, ejus est usque ad coelum, n196 which essentially means "he who owns the soil, owns up to the sky." n197 Absent
a clear demarcation between airspace and space, i nternational law does not directly
contradict or prohibit this view . n198 Indeed, Bin Cheng warned in 1997 that "States which object to
certain types of satellites, such as those that engage in remote sensing, [may] claim sovereignty over national space above
the usual heights at which such satellites orbit so as to subject them to the consent and control of the States overflown but
not necessarily to exclude them." n199 This is precisely the position taken by Bao Shixiu, a Senior Fellow at the Academy
of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation [*140] Army of China. n200 In his critique of the U.S. 2006 National Space
Policy (NSP), Bao advances the notion of vertical sovereignty with the following curious statement: "[t]he NSP declares

that U.S. space systems should be guaranteed safe passage over all countries without exception (such as 'interference' by
other countries, even when done for the purpose of safeguarding their sovereignty and their space integrity)." n201
However, the statement in the NSP to which Bao refers is not limited solely to U.S. space systems. It reads: "The United
States considers space systems to have the rights of passage through and operations in space without interference." n202
Thus, the rights recognized in the U.S. space policy are applicable to all space systems, which is compatible with the Outer
Space Treaty. However, the principal concern vis-a-vis potential Chinese claims of vertical

sovereignty over portions of space above their territory lies not with a claim of complete
sovereignty, but rather with the assertion that satellite navigation above Chinese
territory is subject to Chinese "consent and control" as articulated by Professor Cheng. n203 This
space sovereignty position is directly analogous to China's assertion of
sovereignty over the airspace above its seaborne EEZ. n204 Recall that China alleges that
military reconnaissance missions constitute an abuse of overflight rights. n205 China may easily adapt and
extend this same position to the space domain , applying it to overflight by
American military satellites passing over Chinese territory. n206 Legal scholar Ren Xiaofeng
summarizes Beijing's sensitivity to reconnaissance and military activities in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and its
adjacent airspace this way: "Freedom of navigation and overflight does not include the freedom to conduct military and
reconnaissance activities. These things [military reconnaissance activities] amount to forms of military deterrence and
intelligence gathering as [*141] battlefield preparation." These activities in the EEZ, according to Ren, connote preparation
to use force against the coastal state. When Ren refers to the "adjacent airspace," he includes outer space and space
reconnaissance. n207 China's ostensible military objective for such action is denial, "the

temporary elimination of some or all of a space system's capability to produce effects, usually
without physical damage." n208 This legal argument, if ultimately successful, would have the
strategic effect of rendering American military satellites useless and could establish a
lawful predicate for Chinese military action against those satellites . n209 Given its
increased military expenditures for research and development of counterspace n210 technology, China could contemplate
action that would effectively blind the United States with regard to Chinese military actions. International

acquiescence or acceptance of Chinese assertions of vertical sovereignty would

effectively vitiate national means of verification of compliance regarding any
existing or new arms reduction treaties, and would render meaningless any
proposal to ban or limit weapons in space.

at: diplomacy solves

Diplomacy cant prevent threats in space
Johnson and Dodge 2015 (Justin, specializes in defense budgets and policies for The
Heritage Foundations Allison Center for National Security and Foreign Policy, Michaela,
specializes in missile defense, nuclear weapons modernization and arms control as policy
analyst for defense and strategic policy in The Heritage Foundations Allison Center for
Foreign Policy Studies. Read her research, A Space War With China or Russia Is a Real
Threat, http://dailysignal.com/2015/06/30/a-space-war-with-china-or-russia-is-areal-threat/, June 30, 2015, silbs)
A war in space sounds like a great plot for a summer blockbuster. Unfortunately, a conflict in space isnt just a
Hollywood movie script anymore, but a threat in the real world. Both Russia and China have developed, or are
developing, the ability to shoot satellites out of space. In addition to this, a number of other countries are developing ways to harm satellites
from the ground using jammers and lasers. Lieutenant General John Raymond, who is in charge of U.S. military space operations, told
Congress earlier this year that the

Chinese have tested anti-satellite weapons twice in the past two

years and that the Russians have a previously undeclared microsatellite in space, which some believe to be a space weapon.
Americas potential adversaries are developing these capabilities because theyve realized
how incredibly vital space is, as a tool, for the U.S. armed forces and intelligence
agencies. Satellite communications allow our troops to be able to operate anywhere in the world, and can range from simple text
messages, to nuclear command and control. GPS is able to provide precise location and timing for cruise missile launches, as well as enable
close air support to troops on the front line. Intelligence and surveillance satellites provide imagery and technical intelligence including
missile warnings. This week, The New York Times editorial page discussed preventing a war in space. Regrettably, their proposal is
predictable and not particularly helpful (calling for more diplomacy). In Preventing a Space War, the argument is made for developing
some sort of international treaty. This op-ed rightly notes, that China and Russia have proposed a legally binding ban on space weapons.
These proposals come, however, as both are developing weapons that could be used in a space conflict. Despite China and Russias space

Diplomacy
always plays a role in preventing conflicts, but with the actions of the Chinese and
the Russians, the U.S. must now focus on deterrence and defense in addition to
continued diplomatic pressure. The United States must be able to protect its vital space
systems, which many Americans depend on for everyday life. Diplomacy alone is
unlikely to prevent an attack on U.S. space assets and will only make the
United States more vulnerable. If deterrence fails, the U.S. must be able to restore
its space capabilitiesand preserve a strong military option to stop the threat. The U.S. must
weapon development, some in the State Department seem to be interested in pursuing a space arms control treaty.

make it clear that an attack on American satellites will be treated the same as an attack on other American equipment such as ships, planes,
or bases. There must be no doubt in the minds of our potential adversaries on our commitment to respond to an attack in space to U.S.
property. The

United States can strengthen deterrence in space by taking steps to complicate

potential adversarial attacks. The president and military must have a full awareness of what is happening in space, along
with an ability to rapidly reposition our satellites, if needed, to avoid threats. The U.S. should also consider providing defensive capabilities
to its critical satellites. Diplomacy

alone is not a sufficient response to the rising threats in space.

If China or Russia believe that they can win a war in space, treaties will do little to
prevent their continued investment in space weapons.

impacts

ext.
Cyber and space threats escalate to nuclear war
Goldstein 2013 (Avery, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International
Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate
Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University
of Pennsylvania, First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.China Relations, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 4989,
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/ISEC_a_00114, silbs)
During a Sino-American crisis, the shadow of nuclear escalation would likely inhibit the United States from using force, perhaps even
from undertaking a limited conventional strike against militarily valuable targets on the mainland, such as missile bases and radar installations vital to the

ASW and ASAT

operations mentioned above, and especially nonkinetic cyber- and information warfare, might be
tempting because they seem less risky. They probably would be less risky, but they would not be risk free, and crisis stability would
not be fully assured. On the contrary, as analysts who have begun to examine the implications of growing
cyber- and space-warfare capabilities have indicated, the advantages that the attacker
enjoys in these realms and the integration of such assets with both nuclear and
conventional forces generate distinctive but still unknown cross-domain escalation
risks. During peacetime, mutual vulnerability of important satellite and computer
systems encourages restraint. If that restraint is breached, however, the lack of selfevident rebreaks in cyber- and spacewarfare operations, and the lack of historical
experience with military operations in these domains during a crisis, will require both
sides to improvise, raising novel challenges for crisis management .87 In a crisis, the U.S.
and Chinese interests at stake will be high, and either side could decide that the risk of
escalation introduced by conventional, space, or cyberattacks was worth running . Even though
no stake in a crisis would be high enough for either the United States or China to choose an unrestrained nuclear exchange, some stakes might be
high enough for either one to choose to initiate military actions that elevate the risk of
escalation to such a disastrous outcome.88 As discussed above, both China and the United States have important interests over
which they could nd themselves locked in a warthreatening crisis in the Western Pacic. The recent pattern of pointed Chinese
and U.S. statements about the handling of persistent disputes in the South China Sea, for
example, suggests that both sides attach a high and perhaps increasing value to their
stakes in this region. Whether that value is high enough to contribute to crisis instability is an empirical question that cannot be answered in
effectiveness of Chinas operations in the Western Pacic.86 Other American uses of conventional force, however, including the

advance. The most worrisome source of instability, however, is clearthe temptation to use nonnuclear strikes as a way to gain bargaining leverage, even if doing

SinoAmerican crises that could erupt in the near future, while China remains militarily
outclassed by the United States, present distinctive dangers. The preceding analysis offers some reassurance that
the interaction of conventional and nuclear capabilities would limit the degree of instability. Because it is so difficult to fully
eliminate the adversarys ability to use military force to generate a shared risk of catastrophe, the incentives that can
make striking first so tempting in a conventional world are diminished. But because instability in a nuclear world could
result in disaster, even a small chance that the parties would initiate the use of force is
troubling. During a crisis, the desire to achieve a favorable outcome will provide incentives to manipulate risk and may encourage the use of force if only to
signal resolve as each side seeks the upper hand. This suggests that the most worrisome possibility is a crisis in
which the United States and China fail to grasp each others view about the importance
of its interests at stake. If one side believes that its stronger interests ensure that it will be more resolute, it could be tempted to signal resolve
so generates an unknowable risk of nuclear catastrophe that both China and the United States will have incentives to manipulate. Conclusion

through the limited use of conventional force to manipulate risk. Because the risk being manipulated is ultimately the genuine risk of escalation to a nuclear
exchange, this should be sufcient reason for scholars to provide policymakers with a better understanding of the current prospects for such dangerous instability
in U.S.-China crises. Concerns raised by the possibility that China could one day grow strong enough to become a true peer competitor facing the United States

greater attention
needs to be paid to the immediate danger of instability in the kinds of crises that could
ensnare the United States and China while China is still relatively weak. Ironically, perhaps, whatever new security challenges a
have received much attention. Although clearly important, that is a discussion about the distant future. In the meantime,

much stronger China could one day pose, the end of Chinas currently profound military weakness would at least mitigate the key near-term problem identied
herethe potential for crisis instability exacerbated by asymmetry in Sino-American power. But before any such major shift in power occurs, there is a real, if
limited, possibility that a mismanaged Sino-American crisis will render all speculation about the long term tragically moot.

2nc PGS impact scenario

PGS poses a global threatescalates to nuclear war
Saalman 2014 (Lora, Associate Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
and is focusing in her research on Chinas nuclear and conventional weapons and
cybersecurity policies, PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE: CHINA AND THE SPEAR, April
2014, silbs)
For most of the administration of former U.S. president George W. Bush, PGS discussions focused on the possibility
of placing non-nuclear warheads on Trident D5 sea-launched ballistic missiles and, to a lesser extent,
intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, because of concerns that potential adversaries would not be
able to differentiate nuclear- and conventional-tipped ballistic missiles, which would risk
inadvertent escalation to nuclear war, research on boostglide weapons subsequently
moved to the fore. Most U.S. funding for the current program interest is focused on a glider known as the Advanced Hypersonic
Weapon (AHW). However, the development of a new sea-launched intermediate range ballistic
missile has also been discussed. By contrast, Chinese descriptions and research into U.S. PGS include
a much broader set of systems. These studies find continuity in describing U.S. PGS
evolution from the Space Operations Vehicles of the 1990sa reusable space launch vehicle20through more recent programs, such
as the Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2a global-range boost-glide system and X-37Ban unmanned, reusable space orbiter.21 They
also remain trained on a variety of U.S. platforms,22 such as hypersonic cruise missiles, Minutemen and Peacekeeper ICBMs, boost-glide
conventional strike missiles, supersonic air-launched cruise missiles, as well as SLIRBMs.23 Beyond

continuity, the ability

of Washington to surprise with speed and precision globally via space planes appears
throughout Chinese technical journals, strategic journals, and the popular press when discussing prompt
global strike.24 For example, the China Academy of Aerospace Dynamics, which is known for aerodynamic tunnel testing of missile
systems,25 writes that the U.S. space orbiter X-37B is: the first reusable hypersonic aerospace vehicle in the world, with hypersonic
velocity, highly mobile orbital change and rapid response capabilities. The X-37B has broken through the thermal protection technology
handicap of space vehicles, successfully demonstrating a new type of lightweight non-ablative thermal protection technology. This analysis
of X-37B prompt global strike against targets contains special features of thermal protection system requirements and proposed new
technology for X-37B space vehicle thermal protection systemsthat are lightweight, non-ablative, and will finally explore approaches for
implementation of the new X- 37B thermal protection technology.26 And

even in the face of reports that

Washingtons PGS range might not end up being global, Chinese discussions of U.S.
capabilities are. While some Chinese experts factor in a shorter striking distance for the United States systems, they emphasize
that Washington will make the most of its forward deployment with ground-based programs for high-precision surgical strikes like
Forward-Based Global Strike (FBGS), as well as such companies as ATK that are viewed as capable of using their worldwide locations to
quickly reach distant targets.27 According

to this view, even in the face of U.S. PGS not being

deployed as a global system in terms of range, it will still pose a global threat.

PGS enables preemptive action and lowers the barrier for nuclear escalation
Saalman 2014 (Lora, Associate Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
and is focusing in her research on Chinas nuclear and conventional weapons and
cybersecurity policies, PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE: CHINA AND THE SPEAR, April
2014, silbs)
Beyond the Chinese focus on U.S. intent in developing prompt global strike, the volume
of Chinese research into PGS-related systems reflects a belief that strategic conventional
weapons (zhanlue changgui wuqi) are the future of warfare. While a few articles suggest that U.S. PGS systems could be used to
deliver nuclear weapons, most are more preoccupied with the threat that a lowered threshold on use with
PGS will enable preemptive action on the part of Washington, leading to conventional and even
nuclear escalation. The view of PGS, in tandem with BMD, as replacement weapons for nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence took hold in China
in the wake of the 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.40 In a world in which nuclear weapons are greatly reduced
or completely absent, Chinese experts argue that systems like PGS augment the level of U.S. global
military dominance, since the nuclear force equalizer would be diminished or lost for countries with weaker conventional weapons capabilities.
Chinese analysts are well aware of the higher potential for strategic conventional
weapons use, as opposed to nuclear weapons, in other words conventional weapons

employed for strategic or nuclear aims. With the shift towards greater reliance on highly accurate and prompt conventional

weaponry, a number of Chinese experts envision an erosion of the threshold on use that is thought by many in China to have been instrumental in staying the hand

Researchers from the Beijing Institute of Structural and Environmental

Engineering, which has been linked to research into materials research for aerospace systems,41 describe PGS weapons as both
more useable than nuclear weapons and part of larger aims at maintaining dominance :
of nuclear weapons powers.

In reality nuclear weapons cannot be used for force, and simply have become decorative. However, the United States is developing these new conventional
weapons, with high combat accuracy, controlled damage range, flexible time use, and hypersonic flight (within one hour it can strike any target on the planet), [in
other words] strategic conventional weapons that are easy to use and able to be used. No wonder that the United States had such a reinvigorated stance when it
signed a new nuclear arms reduction treaty on April 8, 2010, since it had already in other countries military space begun establishing new conventional strategic
strike capabilities, such that it could dominate the world with military technology and military force in space. Currently, the United States is facing a transition

Beyond the nuclear

domain, prompt global strike capabilities are part of Washingtons drive towards space
weaponization in the view of many Chinese analysts .43 In particular, they fit PGS into a
narrative of U.S. pursuit of space hegemony (taikong zhengba)44 or space weaponization and space deterrence (taikong
wuqihua yu taikong weishe).45 With the establishment of the Schriever space wargame series conducted by the United States starting in 2001, there is
little question within China as to whether or not space weaponization has begun .46 In their
from a nuclear to a conventional strategic strike force and will not give up just because a few test flights fell into the Pacific.42

view, it is already well underway. As one expert at Chinas National University of Defense Science and Technology, under supervision of the Ministry of National

hypersonic space weapons, tactical

nuclear weapons, and ballistic missile defense programs, three unified swords (san jian he yi),48 preemption (xian
fazhi ren) are what the U.S. military envisions as the future of warfare . () U.S. ballistic missile defense has been
Defense and a leading institute in China's supercomputer and space programs,47 writes:

established; hypersonic space weapons that can perform prompt global strike missions are already deployed. () mutually assured destruction, as originally
provided by strategic nuclear weapons, has become completely ineffective. The United States has a preemptive advantage of launching the first nuclear strike, and
even though other countries have nuclear weapons, this no longer equates with pulling a card to avoid death (miansi pai) () The U.S. Department of Defense
spared no expense on its missile defense program, has been assiduous in pursuing hypersonic space weapons, while at the same time advocating a world without

The purpose and targeting of the

envisioned weapons are highly ambiguous, meaning that Chinese articles cite any
number of facilities that might be at risk, including: long-range missile launch sites,
military command centers, command and control capabilities, national leaders, nuclear
facilities, nuclear weapons production facilities, nuclear material storage warehouses,
high-value individuals, mobile missile launchers, terrorist training camps,
manufacturing plants, financial supporters of international terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction development programs, as well as anti-American countries or rogue states. 50
nuclear weapons. Clearly, the United States military has long been eyeing space.49

Beyond targeting ambiguity, U.S. conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities are increasingly merged in Chinese studies that lump PGS-type platforms in
with long-range systems, tactical warfare, surveillance and reconnaissance, as a nuclear/conventional offensive strike system (he/changgui jinggongxing daji

Strategic effects, including on the nuclear balance, are anticipated even if the
weapons delivered are not nuclear. For example, if Chinese command and control for conventional and nuclear arsenals are costationed,52 this means that a U.S. strike against such facilities could have repercussions in both the
conventional and the nuclear sphere. The nature of extant U.S. capabilities in space planes, cruise missiles, boost-glide, and
submarine launched ballistic missiles suggests that no matter what form PGS takes, Chinese experts are trained
upon the high-speed, high-precision, and perceived stealth (yinxing) of such systems. The
inability to detect and respond to an attack until it is too late drives these concerns that
feed Chinese efforts to bolster early warning . These studies show that a core concern within China is the fact that such rapid
xitong).51

and precision strike systems can be used in a variety of venues against any number of targets. This marks a less than predictable revolution in military affairs,
whether predicated upon a nuclear weapon-free world or not.

China PGS capabilities risk Taiwan conflict

Davis and Dodd 2006 (Ian, independent human security and arms control
consultant, writer and activist. He was executive director of BASIC (20012007) and has
over 30 years in government, academia and the NGO sector, Robin, US Prompt Global
Strike Capability: A New Destabilising Sub-State Deterrent in the Making? JUNE 2006,
Number 51, BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL, silbs)
The PGS capability also raises serious non-proliferation issues. First, it is likely to lead to
a new arms race in ballistic missiles and countermeasures as other countries seek to
match the US system and/or seek to protect their sovereignty by building weapon systems to counter
US capabilities. It seems likely, for example, that other nuclear powers, such as China and
Russia, would embark on similar SLBM and ICBM conversion projects. This could in turn ratchet up
the potential for major armed conflict in areas, such as the Taiwan Straits,

where tensions already run high . Second, PGS clearly undermines ballistic missile
non-proliferation efforts, such as the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, which calls for
greater restraint in developing, testing, using, and spreading ballistic missiles.22 At the signing of the Code, John Bolton, then US Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, affirmed US support for it, but also highlighted a number of qualifying
factors and reservations. One such reservation concerning prelaunch notifications was that the United States reserves the right in
circumstances of war to launch ballistic missile and space-launch vehicles without prior notification.23 If the US administration is also
asserting its right to pre-emptive launch of a PGS capability the Code is as good as dead and buried. Third, it will lower the threshold of use
for such weapons. And as Steve Andreason, a former US Nation Security Council staffer has pointed out: Long-range

ballistic
missiles have never been used in combat in 50 years. But once the United States starts
indicating that it views these missiles as no different than any other weapon, other
nations will adopt the same logic, he said.24

2nc pgs Taiwan impact scenario

China PGS capabilities risk Taiwan conflict
Davis and Dodd 2006 (Ian, independent human security and arms control
consultant, writer and activist. He was executive director of BASIC (20012007) and has
over 30 years in government, academia and the NGO sector, Robin, US Prompt Global
Strike Capability: A New Destabilising Sub-State Deterrent in the Making? JUNE 2006,
Number 51, BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL, silbs)
The PGS capability also raises serious non-proliferation issues. First, it is likely to lead to
a new arms race in ballistic missiles and countermeasures as other countries seek to
match the US system and/or seek to protect their sovereignty by building weapon systems to counter
US capabilities. It seems likely, for example, that other nuclear powers, such as China and
Russia, would embark on similar SLBM and ICBM conversion projects. This could in turn ratchet up
the potential for major armed conflict in areas, such as the Taiwan Straits,
where tensions already run high . Second, PGS clearly undermines ballistic missile
non-proliferation efforts, such as the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, which calls for
greater restraint in developing, testing, using, and spreading ballistic missiles.22 At the signing of the Code, John Bolton, then US Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, affirmed US support for it, but also highlighted a number of qualifying
factors and reservations. One such reservation concerning prelaunch notifications was that the United States reserves the right in
circumstances of war to launch ballistic missile and space-launch vehicles without prior notification.23 If the US administration is also
asserting its right to pre-emptive launch of a PGS capability the Code is as good as dead and buried. Third, it will lower the threshold of use
for such weapons. And as Steve Andreason, a former US Nation Security Council staffer has pointed out: Long-range

ballistic
missiles have never been used in combat in 50 years. But once the United States starts
indicating that it views these missiles as no different than any other weapon, other
nations will adopt the same logic, he said.24

US-China war over Taiwan is the largest flashpoint for conflict

Easton 2016 (Ian, research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, where he conducts
research on defense and security issues in Asia. During the summer of 2013 he was a
visiting fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) in Tokyo. Previously,
Ian worked as a China analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), March 2016,
Strategic Standoff The U.S.-China Rivalry and Taiwan,
http://www.project2049.net/documents/Strategic
%20Standoff_US_China_Rivalry_Taiwan.pdf, silbs)

To better see the shape of things to come we must first look to the past. Prior to America's entrance into World War Two, the nation had much reason to fear Nazi
Germany and Imperial Japan, but isolationism meant there were few actual flashpoints. Only the prospect of an enemy attack on U.S. soil, realized at Pearl Harbor,
could drag the country into war. In contrast, the Cold War featured a rapid expansion of American security commitments and interests abroad. Far-flung standoffs
and proxy wars ranged from the Korean Peninsula to Berlin, from Cuba to Vietnam, and from Afghanistan to Grenada. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991
the world became a much safer place for the United States and other democracies. Great power conflict and the attendant specter of nuclear war no longer seemed
threatening simply because no other country had the military wherewithal to compete. However, after a two-decade buildup, China now confronts the U.S. with a

Of all the powder kegs out there, the potential

for a war over Taiwan is the largest and most explosive .14 Beijing has made clear that its
main external objective is attaining the ability to apply overwhelming force against
Taiwan during a conflict, and in a manner that would keep American-led coalition forces from intervening.15 Chinese military
strategists focus on Taiwan because the communist party is insecure. The CCP views
Taiwan, which exists as a free and independent state that is officially called the Republic
of China (ROC), as a grave threat to its grip on power. Taiwan is anathema to the PRC because it serves as a beacon of
freedom for Chinese speaking people everywhere. 16 Consequently, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which is the armed wing of the CCP, considers
the invasion of Taiwan to be its most critical mission . It is this envisioned future war that drives the PLA's
modernization program.17 Correcting Misplaced Assumptions Understanding a Taiwan scenario requires some myth-busting. It has become
conventional wisdom that Taiwan will eventually be pulled into China's orbit by cross-strait trade
entanglements.18 This view, however, is disconnected from the reality on the ground and in the streets of Taiwan. The
Taiwanese are fiercely protective of their hard won freedoms and rightfully proud of their
democracy. They are no more willing to compromise their territorial sovereignty for the sake of economic benefits than the Japanese or Australians. In
new rivalryand new flashpoints around which to organize strategic efforts.

Taipei's close ties with

Washington means that it does not have to bow to coercion from the authorities in
Beijing, economic or otherwise.19 Nor is the U.S. likely to sell Taiwan out , another remarkably popular myth.20 The
American commitment to Taiwan is enshrined in U.S. Public Law 96-8, the Taiwan Relations Act.21
This legal instrument is founded on bedrock judgments of national interest. Every professional American strategist since
Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur has recognized that Taiwan is a center of gravity
in the Asia-Pacific.22 The island sits astride the world's busiest maritime and air superhighways, right in the middle of the first island chain, a
defensive barrier for keeping Chinese naval power in check. 23 America does not need Taiwan as a base for its soldiers, marines, sailors, or airmen, but it
does require that the island remain in the hands of a friendly government. If Taiwan were
lost, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines would become extremely vulnerable to the
threat of Chinese naval blockades and air assaults. For this reason (and many others), any PRC attempt to
gain control of Taiwan would almost certainly be regarded as an attack on the vital
interests of the United States, and therefore repelled by any means necessary, including military force. While
China's expansionism in the South China Sea has dominated the discourse on the PRC's rise and brought its naval threat into sharp relief, it is the
Chinese threat to Taiwan that is likely to keep the Pentagon awake at night in the years
ahead.24 The RAND Corporation, the venerable defense think tank that helped guide America's strategic competition with the Soviet
Union, has repeatedly warned of the challenge PLA modernization poses to America, especially in
a Taiwan conflagration.25 Taiwan's own military still maintains many potent capabilities, yet its overall combat power
risks being eclipsed by the PLA's rapid buildup, increasing the likelihood of Chinese
aggression.26 Barring a dramatic reduction in Taiwan's self-defense capabilities or a general reversal of U.S. military power in Asia, the direct defense of
spite of the power disparity that existsTaiwan has a population of 23 million to China's 1.3 billion

Taiwan will remain a credible strategy for the foreseeable futurebut only if the U.S. and Taiwan can work more closely together. According to RAND, Beijing's
investments into space and cyberspace weaponry, conventionally armed ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, and stealthy submarines and fighters all make it more

Maintaining a favorable
balance of power in the Taiwan Strait will therefore be essential for the prevention of
catastrophe. 28 The destructive potential of China's growing military strength means that even though the U.S. and coalition partners are likely to emerge
conceivable that America could lose the next waror at the very least fail to deter it, a strategic defeat in its own right.

from any future war over Taiwan victorious, they would still wish more had been done to keep the conflict from occurring in the first place. As Benjamin Franklin
famously noted: "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." The question of how the U.S. can best deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan will be hotly
debated in the years ahead. Rightfully so. Peace and prosperity in Asia and beyond are riding on America's ability to get this problem right. Some scholars have
entertained notions of abandoning Taiwan, trading it away for other ends as if it were a stack of poker chips.29 Their views, however, will be ignored by
policymakers in Washington who recognize that the dispute between China and Taiwan cannot be separated from the larger geopolitics of the region, and that

Taiwan is critical not only for its location, but also for its shared liberal values and its position as a
PRC diplomats often assert that China is big and Taiwan is little, therefore
constructive relations with China matter more, and it is in the American interest to
compromise on Taiwan. This is a false argument. When it comes to freedom, human rights,
and quality of government, Taiwan towers over China. Experience has shown senior U.S. policymakers time and time
there is an underlying confluence of interests.30
key trading partner. 31

again that nations that share democratic values are the best partners and worth defending. Common values generate common interests, which are the basis for
making a common cause in addressing global challenges. Taiwan is currently America's ninth largest trading partner, ahead of Saudi Arabia, India, and Brazil.32
The Taiwanese excel when it comes to researching, designing, and manufacturing the advanced technology that drives much of America's economy. Integrated
circuits (or microchips) are the brains of our handheld devices and computers. The global chip making business as we know it was invented by Taiwan in the 1980s,

However, the PRC is rapidly catching

up, something that poses a serious threat to the security of the world's hardware.33
America needs Taiwan as a "Silicon Shield," keeping the technology of tomorrow from
being controlled and corrupted by an adversary.34
and the high-tech island nation still occupies a strong position on the global supply chain.

AT:

AT: china wont steal

China space espionage is a major concernmany cases
Kohler 2015 (Hannah, Research Assistant, Edward Bennett Williams Law Library at
Georgetown University Law Center, Federal Aviation Administration - FAA, Georgetown
University Law Center, 11th Annual Space Generation Congress, The Eagle and the
Hare: U.S.Chinese Relations, the Wolf Amendment, and the Future of International
Cooperation in Space, Vol. 103:1135,
http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/04/Kohler-TheEagleandtheHare.pdf, silbs)
A major concernand one that sets China apart from other nations that might otherwise be considered threatening
is the high suspicion of technological espionage, especially with regard to ballistics,
communications, and observation technology developed by the United States (and by NASA in particular).
In addition to the Hughes and Loral gaffe, Chinese nationals have several times been accused ofor caught
smuggling confidential or sensitive information from NASA out of the country. In one
especially vivid recent case, Dr. Bo Jiang, a Chinese citizen and contractor with the National Institute
of Aerospace (NIA) working at NASAs Langley Research Center, was apprehended while
trying to leave the country suddenly on a one-way plane ticket to China .75 On his person,
agents recovered a NASA-issued laptop and other computer equipment. 76 Jiang had been
working on a new, high-tech observation and mapping system that NASA had been
developing, and he was already under suspicion for violating the Arms Export Control
Act for bringing a NASA laptop to China on a previous trip .77 His status as a foreign national subjected Dr. Jiang
to special NASA regulations meant to preserve information security, but his supervisors allegedly waived these to allow him to work more easily.78 Jiang was

This embarrassingbut
not uniqueevent highlights the strangeness of the modern U.S.China spacepolicy
relationship, and grants a glimpse into the suspicion and uncertainty with which each
nation views the other.
eventually released when it was discovered that he had sexually explicit materialbut no sensitive NASA technologyon his laptop.79
sadly

AT: china fails

China has a wide range of space technology now and have military plans to
adopt new programs
Pollpeter 15 (Kevin, Deputy Director of the University of California Institute on Global
Conflict and Cooperation Project on the Study of Innovation and Technology in China.
He is widely published on China national security issues, focused on China's space
program and information warfare, HEARING BEFORE THE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC
AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION, February 18, 2015,
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/February%2018%2C
%202015_Transcript.pdf, silbs)
Military Benefits Chinas space program assists the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in its
efforts to achieve information superiority, defined as the ability to freely use information
and the ability to deny the use of information to an adversary. Based on their analysis of
U.S. military operations, Chinese military researchers view space as a critical component
in making the PLA into a force capable of winning informatized wars and recognize the role space
plays in the collection and transmittal of information and the need to deny those capabilities to an adversary. Indeed, nearly every Chinese
source describes space as the ultimate high ground, leading many Chinese

analysts to assess that space warfare

is inevitable. Because of the preeminence of the space battlefield, analysts writing on space argue that it will become the center of
gravity in future wars and one that must be seized and controlled. In fact, these analysts argue that the first condition
for seizing the initiative is to achieve space supremacy. Space Technologies China has made
impressive progress in space technologies since 2000. China now has nearly a full range
of satellites to accomplish a variety of missions. These include remote sensing satellites with various resolutions
and covering various spectrums, a satellite navigation system, communication satellites, and robust human spaceflight and lunar
exploration programs. Space-based C4ISR Technologies A

robust, space-based C4ISR system is often

described as a critical component of a future networked PLA. The necessity to develop space-based
C4ISR systems is based on the requirement to develop power-projection and precision-strike capabilities. The development of long-range
cruise missiles and ballistic missiles requires the ability to locate and target enemy ships and bases hundreds of kilometers away from
Chinas shores, as well as the ability to coordinate these operations with units from multiple services. In doing so, remote sensing satellites
can provide intelligence on the disposition of enemy forces and provide strategic intelligence before a conflict begins .

Communication satellites can provide global connectivity and can facilitate

communications between far-flung forces. Navigation and positioning satellites can provide critical information on
location and can improve the accuracy of strikes. Satellite Navigation Chinas Beidou satellite navigation system is
planned to provide a global service by 2020. Designed to be similar to the U.S . Global
Positioning System (GPS), Beidou will consist of 35 satellites in medium Earth and geosynchronous
orbits that will provide positioning accuracies of less than 10 meters. With the use of a nation-wide system of

differential Beidou, accuracy will be improved to one meter. Unlike GPS, Beidou has a short messaging service in which messages as long as
120 characters can be sent to other Beidou receivers. Beidou

is increasingly used by the Chinese military at

the regiment level and above and is reportedly being integrated into weapon guidance
systems. Remote Sensing The stated purpose of Chinas satellite remote sensing project is to
build an all-weather, 24-hour, global Earth remote sensing system by 2020 capable of
monitoring the ground, atmosphere, and oceans. China has a variety of remote sensing satellites, including four

new series introduced since 2000: the Gaofen, Yaogan, Huanjing, and Tianhui satellites. This is in addition to legacy satellite series such as
the Ziyuan Earth remote sensing satellite and the Fengyun meteorological satellite. With these satellites, China can serve a variety of remote
sensing needs. Chinese imagers have stated resolutions of one to thirty meters and can image in the visible, infrared, and multispectral
ranges. The Yaogan and Huanjing satellites also use synthetic aperture radar (SAR) to be able to image through cloud cover or at night.
Certain Yaogan satellites are also rumored to have electronic intelligence capabilities. Accessing information from these satellites is
facilitated by a network of three satellites, designated Tianlian, that relay communications and data between satellites and ground stations
anywhere on the Earth regardless of the position of the satellite in orbit or the location of the unit on the ground. Counterspace
Technologies The

PLA also recognizes that it must deny the use of information to its
opponents. Chinese analysts assess that the employment of space-based C4ISR
capabilities by potential adversaries, especially the United States, requires the PLA to
develop capabilities to attack space systems. According to the U.S. Defense Department, China has a
broad-based development program for counterspace technology that consists of

jammers, direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicles, directedenergy weapons, and co-orbital

spacecraft.1 Chinas development of counterspace weapons appears to be aimed at developing an all-around capability to threaten
satellites with a variety of weapons at all orbits. Direct Ascent Counterspace Technologies The most prominent
demonstration of Chinas counterspace technologies was the 2007 destruction of a
defunct FY-1C meteorological satellite with a direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicle. In 2010, 2013, and 2014, China
conducted mid-course tests of a missile defense system that are believed to be de facto ASAT tests. In addition to missile
defense tests, China conducted a high altitude science mission in 2013 using a sounding
rocket. According to the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the rocket reached an altitude of more than 10,000 kilometers and released a
barium cloud to study the dynamic characteristics of the Earths magnetosphere.2 This claim appeared to be contradicted by a U.S.
government assessment that the rocket appeared to be on a ballistic trajectory nearly to geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO), which could
refer to a distance of 30,000 kilometers.3 If so, the test would represent an expansion of Chinas ASAT capabilities and could help enable
China to threaten satellites such as GPS and communication satellites in medium and high Earth orbits. Directed Energy Counterspace
Technologies China

is also developing directed-energy weapons such as lasers, high-powered

microwave, and particle beam weapons for ASAT missions .4 The Defense Department concluded in 2006
that China had at least oneground-based laser designed to damage or blind imaging satellites.5 Lasers at higher power levels can
permanently damage satellites and at lower power levels can temporarily blind the imagers of a remote sensing satellite. In 2006 it was
reported that China had fired a laser at a U.S. satellite. According

to U.S. officials, the intent of the lasing is

unknown and did not damage the satellite, suggesting that China could have been
determining the range of the satellite rather than trying to interfere with its function .6
China is also researching radio frequency (RF) weapons that could be used against
satellites. Radio frequency weapons using high power microwaves can be ground-based, space-based, or employed on missiles to
temporarily or permanently disable electronic components through overheating or short-circuiting. RF weapons are thus useful in achieving
a wide spectrum of effects against satellites in all orbits.7 Because RF weapons affect the electronics of satellites, evaluating the success of
an attack may be difficult since no debris would be produced.8 Co-orbital Counterspace Technologies Chinese researchers also discuss the
use of co-orbital counterspace technologies. As one researcher states, the ample use of the superiority and characteristics of modern small
satellites, ingeniously applied to space attack and defense, will cause small satellites to become a space weapon assassins mace.9 Coorbital satellites are those satellites that come within a close distance to another satellite to interfere with, disable, or destroy the target
satellite. Co-orbital satellites do not have to be dedicated to the counterspace role and can also serve legitimate peacetime functions.10
According to the U.S. Defense Department, China has conducted increasingly complex close proximity operations between satellites.11
During the Shenzhou-7 mission the Banxing-1 flew around Shenzhou-7 at a distance of several tens of meters to several hundred meters.
After the astronauts departed for Earth, BX-1 orbited Shenzhou-7 at a distance of one to two hundred kilometers. BX-1 was equipped with
two cameras that took images of Shenzhou-7. The stated reason for the BX-1 was to test the orbiting of a spacecraft with the Shenzhou 7 to
prepare for an eventual docking mission with a space station.12 The BX-1 mission was involved in some controversy when it passed within
45 kilometers of the International Space Station, leading some to conclude that the mission was also a test of a coorbital ASAT capability13
or that it was testing satellite inspection capabilities.14 The proximity of the BX-1 did not present a hazard to the International Space
Station.15 In August 2010 it was reported that after conducting a series of maneuvers the Shijian-12 (SJ-12) satellite had most likely
bumped into the Shijian 6F (SJ-6F), causing it to drift slightly from its original orbit. The maneuvering could have been practice for docking
the Shenzhou space capsule with the Tiangong-1 space station, but Chinese silence on the intention of the test fueled concern that it was a
cover for testing ASAT capabilities.16 In August 2013 China conducted a test of robotic arm technologies involving the Chuangxin-3,
Shiyan-7, and Shijian-15 satellites where one of the satellites acted as a target satellite and another satellite, most likely equipped with a
robotic arm, grappled the target satellite. As with the August 2010 test involving the SJ-12 and SJ-6F, the test could have been for a
legitimate peaceful purpose: the testing of robotic arm technologies to be used on future Chinese space stations. As with the August 2010
tests, however, the dual-use nature and silence by the Chinese on the matter have only fueled speculation that China was also testing
counterspace technologies.17

AT: US Too Strong

Space weapons are the only way to overcome US military superiority
Horta 13 (Loro Horta is a consultant with the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central
Asia (UNRCCA). He was a Senior Adviser for Defense and Security to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
(MNEC) of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Before assuming his functions at the Foreign Ministry, he was the
United Nations National Project Manager for Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste. He is a graduate of the US Naval
Post Graduate School of the United States National Defense University, the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army National
Defense University senior officers, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce Central School, Sydney University (Australia),
Nanyang Technological University (Singapore). His articles have been published by Military Review, Australian Defense
Journal, The Journal of Defense and Security Analysis, Australian Army Journal, Comparative Strategies, Strategic
Analysis, Strategic Review, Asia-Pacific Perspectives, Yale Global Magazine, the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), Washington D. C., East Asia Forum, China Brief, The Diplomat, The Diplomatic Courier and Le
Diplomatic Macao Magazine. He has also written for some of Asias main newspapers such as the Japan Times, The
Australian, Australian Financial Review, China Post, The Straits Times, The Jakarta Post, South China Morning Post, Asia
Times, The Nation, Brunei Times and The Bangkok Post. Mr Horta has won several awards for his research on Asian
security issues. He is regularly interviewed by several international media outlets. The Dragons Spear: Chinas
Asymmetric Strategy 10/17/13 http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/dragon%E2%80%99s-spear-china%E2%80%99sasymmetric-strategy)///CW
BEIJING: Over a decade ago the Federation of American Scientists described the Chinese missile program as a pocket of
excellence in an otherwise problematic indigenous military industry. In 2010 the Chinese military was reported to have
started tests on its most ambitious missile project, the DF-21A, an anti-ship ballistic missile. In early 2013 several reports
claimed that the missile had begun to be deployed in small numbers in Southern China. The DF-21A is reportedly
designed to be an aircraft carrier killer aimed at deterring US aircraft-carrier battle groups from interfering in case of
conflict over Taiwan and other flashpoints like the South China Sea. Chinas decision to use ballistic missiles for anti-ship
warfare is unusual considering that targeting moving ships with a missile on a ballistic trajectory is much harder and
requires more sophisticated navigation than cruise missiles. The Peoples Liberation Army decision to opt for an anti-ship
ballistic missile, or ASBM, reflects the growing confidence and sophistication of its military industries. Analysts are
divided over the implications of the new system for the US military. Some, not surprisingly, claimed that it is a gamechanger and a threat to US forces in the region. Other analysts observed that the US military has several ways of defeating
the ASBM such as using decoys and by targeting Chinese support and communication systems. While both sides of the
debate have raised valid points, one should not see the Chinese ASBM in isolation, but as part of larger process of military
modernization and a changing doctrine in the PLA. Chinese military strategists have for millenniums

been fascinated by asymmetric methods of warfare. China has no illusions about its
military inferiority vis--vis the United States and knows that the status is likely to endure for at least two
decades. As such the PLA has been developing a full range of asymmetric strategies to deter
the US until its military reaches maturity. Aware of the US dependence on space and satellite
communications to conduct even the most basic military operations, the PLA has for the past decade
invested significant amounts to develop anti-satellite weapons. In January 2007 China fired its
first anti-satellite missile destroying one of its own aging satellites in outer space. In May 2013 China fired a rocket
carrying no payload over 10,000 kilometers into outer space, the highest launch since the mid-1970s. The absence of a
payload such as a satellite could suggest the rocket is designed as an anti-satellite weapon. In addition to ballistic missiles
and rockets, China has also experimented with green and blue laser weapons with the US

military accusing China of firing several laser beans at its satellites. Laser pulses can
disrupt satellite communication and depending on the strength could destroy it. Chinas missile
program has also progressed steadily in the area of cruise missiles with accuracy and range improving
rapidly. Progress in missiles, which one would expect as a result of greater advances in
Chinas space program , is demonstrated by the growing number of satellite launches and the programs
growing sophistication. Chinas lunar program is a further reflection of the priority it attaches
to space. The PLAs asymmetric warfare strategy is not limited to the domain of outer space, but extends to the other
domains of battle land, sea, air and cyberspace. For instance at sea, the Chinese PLA Navy is not focusing on matching
the US carrier for carrier or ship for ship as some might expect. China has been deploying a growing number of attack
submarines, both conventionally powered and nuclear powered, with submarines accounting for 45 percent of its naval
combatants, the highest percentage among the worlds major navies. In addition to submarines, the Chinese navy is
deploying thousands of land-based missiles, both ballistic and cruise types. The navy is also developing dozens of stealth
fast-attack missile craft and corvettes such as the Hubei class catamaran. In narrow seas and close coastal environments,
these vessels can be quite effective against larger craft, particularly if deployed in swarm tactics. Another area fast
emerging as a pocket of excellence in the PLA is cyberwarfare. Since 2000 Chinese military scholars have discussed the
concept of total war or unrestricted warfare in which the PLA would use asymmetric tactics in all domains of the battle
space. The most popularized work on Chinese asymmetric warfare is a book written by two PLA colonels in 1999 entitled
Unrestricted Warfare, or , which literally means war without boundaries. Recent cyberattacks and intrusions into
sensitive targets of US and other advanced nations demonstrate the growing strength of Chinas cyberwarfare. In recent

years, Chinese military educational institutions such as the Academy of Military Sciences, the National Defense University
and the Naval Institute have devoted considerable time studying campaigns of Western militaries confronting stronger
opponents. Israeli-Arab conflicts, including the second Lebanon war, provide the Chinese with countless examples in
which sea-based missiles caused severe damage to an advanced navy. While Chinas fascination with

asymmetric warfare is not new, it is fast moving from the theoretical realm to the practical,
and this is emerging as its dominant approach. This is not to suggest that the PLA will rely solely on asymmetric strategies.
Indeed as China closes the technological gap, many of its strategies will come to resemble those of more established
powers. Considering Chinas millennial fascination the asymmetric element will likely remain a dominant strategy. In
contrast, the US military has regarded asymmetric and other forms of unconventional

warfare with marginal interest. The so-called US style of warfare focuses on offensive firepower and tends to
neglect the defensive elements. The question is not whether the United States is capable of countering a particular system
or not, but whether its capable of appreciating the nature of an asymmetric strategy across all domains of the battle space.
As noted at the US Naval Postgraduate School by US Navy Captain Scot Jaspar, with more than 30 years of experience and
specializing on antisubmarine warfare: The combination of ballistic and cruise missile in conjunction with submarines
and stealth fast missile graft could prove deadly for an aircraft carrier. Large numbers of missile with modern counter
measures against jamming could saturate our most advance systems such as the Aegis. Indeed, during the 2006 war
against Israel, Hezbollah fired a Chinese-made missile, the C802 supplied by Iran, at an Israeli Eilat class corvette, killing
four sailors. The Eilat-class corvette is considered to be the most advanced ship of its kind in the world. While the

United States will maintain military superiority for the foreseeable future, Chinas asymmetric
capabilities have the potential to mitigate this advantage . This could have a positive effect in the
sense that both great powers deter each other. China and the United States have grown increasingly economic
interdependent, sharing many common interests. This lucrative relationship may reduce the chance for tension. However,
one should remember, in both world wars of the previous century, Germany was Britains largest trade partner.

india da

mechanics

1nc india space mil da

The status quo combines just enough engagement with China and India to
balance the relationship tilting it toward China alienates India
Madan, Brookings Foreign Policy Project on International Order and
Strategy Fellow, 15 [Tanvi, PhD in public affairs from UT and Masters in IR from
Yale, Jan 20, Brookings, The U.S.-India Relationship and China,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-us-india-relationship-andchina-madan, accessed 6/24/16, GE]
The Peoples Republic of China has shaped the U.S.-India relationship since it came into
existence in 1949. Fifty five years ago, for example, a senator from Massachusetts argued
that there was a struggle between India and China for the economic and political
leadership of the East, for the respect of all Asia, for the opportunity to demonstrate
whose way of life is the better. He asserted that it was crucial that the U.S. help India
win that contest with China. A few months later, that senator would be elected president.
The man he defeated, Richard Nixon, had earlier also highlighted the importance of the
U.S. helping India to succeed in the competition between the two great peoples in Asia.
This objective was made explicit in Eisenhower and Kennedy administration documents,
which stated that it was in American national interest to strengthen Indiaeven if that
country wasnt always on the same page as the U.S. Today, both India and the U.S. have
relationships with China that have elements of cooperation, competition and, potentially,
conflictthough in different degrees. Each country has a blended approach of engaging
China, while preparing for a turn for the worse in Chinese behavior. Each sees a role for
the other in its China strategy. Each thinks a good relationship with the other sends a
signal to China, but neither wants to provoke Beijing or be forced to choose between
the other and China. Each also recognizes that China especially uncertainty
about its behavior is partly what is driving the India-U.S. partnership. Arguably,
there have been three imperatives in the U.S. for a more robust relationship with India
and for supporting its rise: strategic interest, especially in the context of the rise of
China; economic interest; and shared democratic values. Indian policymakers recognize
that American concerns about the nature of Chinas rise are responsible for some of the
interest in India. New Delhis own China strategy involves strengthening India both
security-wise and economically (internal balancing) and building a range of partnerships
(external balancing)and it envisions a key role for the U.S. in both. Some Indian
policymakers highlight another benefit of the U.S. relationship: Beijing takes Delhi more
seriously because Washington does. But India and the U.S. also have concerns about the
other when it comes to China. Both sides remain uncertain about the others willingness
and capacity to play a role in the Asia-Pacific. Additionally, Indian policymakers worry
both about a China-U.S. condominium (or G-2) and a China-U.S. crisis or conflict. There
is concern about the reliability of the U.S., with the sense that the U.S. will end up
choosing China because of the more interdependent Sino-American economic
relationship and/or leave India in the lurch. Some in the U.S. also have reliability
concerns about India. They question whether the quest for strategic autonomy will
allow India to develop a truly strategic partnership with the U.S. There are also worries
about the gap between Indian potential and performance. Part of the rationale for
supporting Indias rise is to help demonstrate that democracy and development arent
mutually exclusive. Without delivery, however, this rationaleand Indias importance
fades away. As things stand , neither India nor the U.S. is interested in the others
relationship with China being too hot or too cold the Goldilocks view . For New

Delhi, a too-cosy Sino-U.S. relationship is seen as freezing India out and impinging
on its interests. It would also eliminate one of Washingtons rationales for a
stronger relationship with India. A China-U.S. crisis or conflict, on the other hand,
is seen as potentially destabilizing the region and forcing India to choose between the
two countries. From the U.S. perspective, any deterioration in Sino-Indian relations
might create instability in the region and perhaps force it to choose sides. Too much
Sino-Indian bonhomie, on the other hand, would potentially create complications for the
U.S. in the bilateral, regional and multilateral spheres.
Specifically true of space cooperation its a zero sum game
Covault, two time Neal Award winner, 12 [Craig, The Neal award is the equivalent
of a pulitzer for specialized writing, December 13, Space Quarterly, India Races China in
Space For Asian Prestige, Military Security, http://spaceref.com/asia/india-races-chinain-space-for-asian-prestige-military-security.html, accessed 6/22/16, ge]
A surging space race between India and China is underway amidst nearly a dozen other
Asian nations, like India, trying to avoid a loss of prestige or military security to
China's aggressive space program. "There is definitely a space race between India
and China for top regional prestige and influence," says James Clay Moltz, a professor in
the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School's Dept. of National Security Affairs, Monterey, Calif.
"Evidence shows the two countries' are watching each other's activities in space very
carefully and keeping score as to who is gaining and losing influence ," Moltz told
Space Quarterly. China with seemingly no limits on its space budget or engineering talent
is sailing a steady course. It is advancing across all space disciplines with no outward
regard to India's space program, except for one important factor--"that India may
develop retaliatory capabilities in response to China's 2007 ASAT test ," said
Bharath Gopalaswamy, associate director of Arms Control, Disarmament and
International Security at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana. He is a noted
PhD analyst on India's nuclear and military space directions. Even before China's ASAT
test, the highly successful use of U. S. military space assets during the first Persian Gulf
War "aroused some curiosity" within India's military services toward Indian
development of its own military satellites, Gopalaswamy told Space Quarterly. "With
India what we have seen is a very significant change from a program that until recently
was almost exclusively focused on space applications," said Moltz. "India has moved
from mainly serving its population with remote sensing, telemedicine and transponders
on fishing vessels, to one that has now adopted high prestige lunar and planetary science
missions in addition to a fairly active military space program," he said. There are also
broader global power implications with the situation as India is more open to space
cooperation with the U. S. and Russia to counter China. Another perspective is that
space rivalries are also growing across traditional Asian political lines, especially
between Japan and China, South Korea and Japan and North Korea vs. South Korea.
Unlike the U.S. - Soviet race to the Moon, Asia's space rivalries are "more a longduration cross-country race with many runners and different objectives," says Moltz in
his recent book Asia's Space Race. "China's rise in space also has had the influence of
pushing very unlikely partners and former adversaries like Japan and Vietnam together
into new strategic alliances,' Moltz said in an interview. "One of the most fascinating
examples is that Japan is providing Vietnam with more than $US 1 billion in space
development assistance for the Vietnamese to build a National Space Center to develop
and operate two radar imaging satellites," says Moltz. "These Vietnamese spacecraft will
not only overfly Vietnam, but also China, gathering information that Vietnam will likely
share with Japan." While India and fellow west leaning nations seek to counter China's

space power, China is using space to bring as many developing countries as it can under
its sphere of influence. To do that it formed the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation
Organization (APSCO). So far Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Mongolia, Peru
and Thailand are part of the group. There is currently, however, virtually no chance
for space cooperation between India and China. China's growing military
space prowess and India's perceived loss of prestige to China explains why
India has suddenly decided to "very significantly expand its space budget
and the range of its space activities ," says Moltz. The key tipping points that
sparked major changes in India's space program are China's aggressive military space
development and growing ties with Pakistan, development of a human space flight
program, its successful 2007 test of an ASAT weapon, China's successful 2007-2010
Chang'e-1 and 2 lunar orbit missions and development of a 2013 lunar rover. All of these
factors have resulted in India making pivotal changes to its space program including:
Major budget increase: In the last year India has increased it annual space budget by
38% for both civilian and military programs "in an all out effort to catch up with China,"
said Moltz. "This is a very large increase and indicates that India realizes that it has to
step up its game if it is to remain at all competitive with China," he said. Human space
flight: In response to China manned space initiative, India is developing an Indian
manned flight program with the launch of Indian astronauts planned by 2016-2018
using manned spacecraft and launch vehicles developed in India. Russian Cooperation:
After the U.S. declined an Indian request for manned space technology because of
technology transfer issues, India sought similar technology help from Russia, which has
agreed to provide some manned spacecraft technology. India is also seeking and likely to
get some help from Russia with imaging reconnaissance satellite ground system
technology, said Gopalaswamy. Dueling lunar rovers: An Indian lunar rover mission is
under development with Russian help for launch to the Moon in 2014. India's about 200
lb. lunar rover will use a Russian built lander similar to, but smaller than, the twin ramp
landers that carried the 1 ton Soviet Lunokhod 1 and 2 rovers to the Moon in the 1970s. If
successful, the Indian launched mission will help counter Asian space leadership issues
that will arise with China's lunar rover mission set for launch in 2013, if successful. In
2008 India launched its Chandrayaan-1 lunar orbiter mission with U.S. and European
instruments to counter the prestige gained by China with its Chang'e 1 and 2 lunar
orbiters. But India's prestige related ham-handed secrecy may have fouled the water with
NASA and ESA for future missions. India kept secret a serious thermal problem then
nearly doubled the spacecraft's lunar altitude without telling its partners, confusing data
reduction. Mars exploration: India is developing a Mars orbiter for launch by 2018-2020
to focus on methane detection and to counter an expected Chinese Mars mission
challenge. Military Space: India's Ministry of Defense has formed a small Integrated
Space Cell staffed with a few Army, Navy and Air Force officers to help plan near term
space priorities with ISRO and also plan "what the Indian military services hope will
become a much larger Indian Military Space Command in coming years," Gopalaswamy
told Space Quarterly. ISRO's military role: The Indian government has assigned the
civilian Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) to use its launch vehicles, personnel
and facilities to provide capabilities for use by the Indian military, including an initial
military spacecraft capability for each of the services. ISRO sought to remain in control
of new Indian military spacecraft, but the government ruled they will instead fall under
control of the military's Integrated Space Cell. Israeli Collaboration: In order to obtain a 1
meter day/night all weather imaging capability to watch over China and Pakistan, the
Indians collaborated with Israel for an Israeli TecSar imaging radar satellite that India
designated Risat-2 and launched in 2009. Israel provided the satellite in exchange for
Indian launch of an identical Israeli Air Force TecSar that Israel could not launch into a

suitable orbit with its own smaller launch vehicle. The arrangement is likely to continue.
Indian Navigation System: In early 2013 India will begin the launch of its own seven
navigation spacecraft under the Indian Regional Navigational Satellite System (IRNSS).
The program will obviate the need for Indian forces to use the American GPS system.
Anti-Satellite Weapons: The Indian government asserts that it is prepared to fire an
ASAT test of its own, using existing Indian antiballistic missile systems to convince
China that India will defend its own space assets in the face of China's 2007 test of its
own medium altitude ASAT capability. Details emerging from China include evidence
that top People's Liberation Army officers are writing in military circles about Chinese
space security and other concerns should India decide to test its own ASAT . Also in a
mid October, noted defense writer Bill Gertz reported in Washington Free Beacon.com ,
that intelligence reports say China is ready to test a new "Dong Ning (DN-2)" ASAT
missile designed to attack U.S. GPS spacecraft in 12,000 mi. (19,312 km) orbits and a
wide array of International military spacecraft in geosynchronous orbit more than
22,000 (35,405 km) mi. high. "The Indian response [to the 2007 test] has so far been
measured and exploratory as far space security is concerned," said Gopalaswamy. But
this report [of a higher altitude ASAT] and eventual test "will once again, reinforce and
highlight Indian concerns and threat perceptions in space," he said. "India already feels
the necessity to develop retaliatory capabilities, but not necessarily test them. So this
[high altitude ASAT ] might not necessarily hasten or slow any Indian response, but
rather serve as a validating point in India's course of fashioning technological and policy
responses to China," Gopalaswamy told Space Quarterly. There remains an active debate
in India about whether India should hurry with an ASAT test to counter China's and also
demonstrate capability before any ASAT test ban. India wants to win its space race with
China and has made it clear that it is not going to take a secondary role to China in
military space capability. But India is also just beginning to feel the high budget costs
and the policy, engineering and organizational challenges it must overcome to achieve
that goal.
Alienating India means theyll break away from the US and start militarizing
Adityanjee, Council for Strategic Affairs President, 15 [CSA is an independent,
autonomous, non-partisan, non-governmental & privately funded India-centric think
tank, November 23, CSA, ASAT Weapons Program with Chinese Characteristics,
http://councilforstrategicaffairs.blogspot.com/2015/11/asat-weapons-program-withchinese_23.html, accessed 6/24/16, GE]
Chinese space capabilities pose serious strategic challenge to India owing to history of
Chinese roguish behavior and adverse land-grabbing by China. Indeed, independent
observers have noted that the US will not be the probable target of Chinese missile
defense system but Chinas neighbors including India and Japan. A new study by the
Federation of American Scientists asserts that the the prime impact of Chinese missile
defense would be on Indias confidence on its ability to deter China with its nuclear
weapons as well as sending a message to Japan. China can now use its advanced ASAT
capabilities to hit Low, Medium and High Earth Orbit Indian satellites. China can also
utilize jamming technology and laser technology to jam India's satellites. Indias space
infra-structure is around $12 billion and expanding rapidly. The Chinese ASAT weapons
pose a direct challenge to India's C5ISR architecture. Indias efforts to establish her own
GAGAN (GPS) network with MEO and LEO satellites can be compromised by China.
Chinas DN-3 direct ascent missile system can ram into and destroy GSAT-15, India's
latest communications satellite that was launched on November 11, 2005. In 2008, we
were the first to suggest that India must match China with its own direct ascent ASAT
tests. This analyst had exhorted then government and future Governments of India to
seek technological parity with China and not box India again into a situation analogous

to the NPT conundrum. We had speculated in 2008 about the possibility of Japan, Iran,
Pakistan and North Korea also developing ASAT capabilities. We are fast reaching an
alarming situation of gross asymmetry between Chinas offensive ASAT capabilities and
Indias ability to defend her space assets. India also needs to learn from her experiences
during the negotiation of the NPT and its subsequent extension in perpetuity. If India
had tested its nuclear device in 1968 instead of 1974, she would have been grandfathered
into the NPT as a nuclear weapon state. India would have successfully negotiated any
strategic challenges and would not have been boxed into the current situation she is in.
Since China has already developed an ASAT weapons program and it pursues the
doctrine of strategic parity with the US, it will continue to advance its cyber and space
war capabilities. It is understood that the benefits from an ASAT attack are limited and
would not confer decisive military advantage in every plausible conflict, however, each
weapons system has its strategic value in case of a protracted war. China is using the
cloak of BMD research to give a political cover for testing its anti-satellite weapons under
the guise of missile defense. Chinese ASAT weapons research and development has
triggered a secondary ASAT proliferation race. Both the US and Russia have retooled
their ASAT programs after the Chinese ASAT test of 2007. US went to the extent of
destroying its apparently own out-of-control spy satellite (USA-193) in 2008 using a
missile launched from Aegis cruiser. US analysts like Dr. Ashley Tellis agreed privately
that this was nothing but a disguised ASAT test. Iran and Pakistan are projected to be
next in line to develop ASAT capabilities. Indian response, so far, has been tardy, halfhearted, feeble and inadequate. Seeking to guide Indias responses to the Chinese
threats, Space Security Coordination Group (SSCG) was set up in 2010 under the
chairmanship of the former National Security Advisor SS Menon. SSCG had
representation from the DRDO, IAF and NTRO. In 2012, the then DRDO Chief VK
Saraswat emphasized a defensive strategy for India in the space domain. Following the
trial of Agni V IRBM, Dr. Saraswat declared that the DRDO will field a full-fledged ASAT
weapon by the end of 2014 based on Agni and ad-2 ballistic missile interceptor without
resorting to actual testing. He projected the view that space security entailed the creation
of gamut of capabilities without weaponizing. These capabilities included the
protection of satellites, communications and navigation systems and denying the enemy
access to their own space systems. India has mastered technical expertise over all the
components of ASAT capabilities without actually testing an ASAT weapon.
Unfortunately, having the technological capability without actually having tested has no
deterrence value. India must cure herself of the 6th nation syndrome in every advanced
technological field. For a period of 14 years from 1974 to 1998, successive Indian
governments kept the facade of not testing nuclear weapons while the international
regulatory regimes hardened. Not only the NPT was extended into perpetuity by the P5
but also the CTBT was negotiated by the backdoor and its entry into force was made
contingent upon Indias accession and ratification. It is imperative at this stage that
India formally declares her-self to be a space weapon power and formally tests her ASAT
capabilities prior to successful negotiations of multi-lateral space weapon control
regimes. India must declare presence of her independent civilian and military space
programs for strategic deterrence value. Owing to the nature of the power games being
played, it is unlikely that we will have successful multilateral treaties signed soon.
Meanwhile, the big three actors, USA, Russia & China will continue to enhance their
space weapon programs. It is incumbent upon the current Government of India to take
this issue seriously, for once, in a proactive manner instead of reacting to international
demands. There is still time for India to test, demonstrate the technology, acquire the
capability and thereby safeguard our long-term strategic interests. The window of
opportunity for India will not last very long in case the US decides to force the issue of an

internationally verifiable space weapons regime. Some analysts like Arvind John have
suggested that India should conduct an ASAT test after seeking prior permission from
the US. That is an absurd notion because the US is not going to give its blessings
to an Indian ASAT test and program as is amply evident from the US response to
Indias nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998. The US is a status quo superpower that
will preserve its technological superiority and would not allow any other
nation to share the exclusive expertise. If India needs to develop her strategic
space capabilities, India will need to develop the spine and deal with the consequences
for ASAT testing later on. India must test a direct ascent ASAT weapon now while
simultaneously minimizing the space debris by lowering the orbit of the target satellite.
Russia and China have pushed for years for a PAROS treaty (Treaty on the Prevention of
Arms Race in Outer Space). A draft treaty on the prevention of placement of weapons in
outer space (PPWT) was also submitted. Russia insists that it constitutes another
multilateral measure in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and thus
would be a real contribution to strengthening the NPT regime. These proposals do not
include the ground based ASAT weapon systems. The US initially refused the need for
arms control agreements in outer space as it considered they are not a verifiable tool for
enhancing the long-term space security interests of the US. The draft treaty on
preventing arms race in outer space provides for a ban on placing any arms in space, a
ban on the use of force or a threat of force against space objects as well as is called upon
to remove the present lapses in the international space law as well as to ensure
preservation of space property and strengthening of universal security and control over
armaments. The PAROS treaty aims to fill gaps in existing law, create conditions for
further exploration and use of space, and strengthen general security and arms control,
The US responded to the proposal saying it opposed any treaty that sought to prohibit
or limit access to or use of space. The US insisted that such a treaty would also be
impossible to enforce and verify because any object orbiting or transiting through space
can be a weapon if that object is intentionally placed onto a collision course with another
space object. The EU has suggested a voluntary, non-binding international code of
conduct in space. India needs to look at the military uses of space technologies and be
prepared with its own ASAT weapon program. After ASAT testing, India should propose
her own draft of a treaty and should become an active party to the outer space
disarmament agenda. One of the reasons for a proactive stance is that India can ill-afford
an expensive outer space arms race with China. Furthermore, we need to able to
influence the treaty negotiations as an insider rather than as an outsider. India must
factor in the worst case strategic scenario of an emerging hegemon China
metamorphosing as a rogue outer-space superpower. The twin possibilities that China
either will proliferate to Pakistan or will threaten to shoot down Indian satellites should
be factored into the decision making process. The US has started to talk of multilateral,
verifiable treaty that includes both ground based and space based ASAT weapons. Before
that is negotiated, India needs to preserve her strategic parity and balance of power by
developing her own anti-satellite kinetic-kill capability. Other countries are likely to
develop these space weapon capabilities and India should not remain far behind. Time
has come for India to assertively proclaim its military space program after formally
testing ASAT capability so as to avoid being marginalized again due to newly emerging
international control regimes.
Indian space mil causes global nuclear war
Schendzielos 8 [Kurt, USAF Major, Protection in Space: A Self-Defense Acquisition
Priority for US Satellites, Monograph submitted to School of Advanced Military Studies]

India As of 2008, there

is no public evidence of a fielded operational ASAT system in India. There

have been, however, clear steps taken by India toward that goal . India has the desire
and has significant potential to field a credible destructive ASAT soon . The Indian Defence
Ministry has publicly stated that it has a full appreciation of the importance of space exploitation and it also fully realizes
that it must have a means to counter adversarial space exploitation in order to protect its drive toward greater regional
hegemony. 55 The Indian military is also in the process of setting up a separate space command,
labeled Aerospace Command, which

would have the mission of OCS and DCS and is planned to be

managed under the Indian Air Force. 56 This organizational change to the command and control
structure of India reflects the evolving space technologies in India . India views China as its
most pressing challenger and threat. 57 The 2007 Chinese coorbital kinetic ASAT test made many defense
and policy officials in India nervous. Fears were already high concerning China and other potential rivals to Indian space
capability, namely Pakistan. 58 India also recognizes that there is a potential for adopting an adversarial role concerning
the U.S. 59 As a result, over the past five years, India has been dedicating resources toward

building and protecting both its civil and military space capabilities . It has a partnership with
Israel to acquire and produce space-based remote sensing satellites, both for civilian application and military intelligence
gathering. 60 Reports indicate that India is funding research into domestically produced disruptive and

destructive ASAT systems.

The Center for Defense Information released a report detailing the extent of Indias
ASAT research in 2004. The report highlighted that while none of the systems were beyond conceptual research stages at
the time, New Delhi was exploring technological developments involving ground-based laser ASATs, space-based lasers
and a kinetic attack loitering interceptor. 61 Based upon current indications, these domestically produced ASAT
programs are expected to take at least a decade before coming to fruition, assuming there is no outside assistance. If

India should desire to accelerate OCS capabilities, specifically because of rising tensions surrounding
Pakistan or China, it may well obtain outside assistance that could drastically shorten the timeline for a
credible Indian disruptive or destructive ASAT to be fielded. There is speculation that India, like any nuclear power with
significant ballistic missile technology, could resort to an indiscriminate HAND ASAT using a variant of its Satellite
Launch Vehicle-3 (SLV-3) or a variant of the Agni ballistic missile. Indias on-going ballistic missile development
combined with the nuclear arms race against rivals China and Pakistan is of significant concern to the U.S. and indicates
that India might already be capable of employing a crude HAND ASAT, if pressed. 62 India has already

indicated a desire and potential willingness to utilize a discriminate destructive ASAT

to protect its nuclear research programs. 63 It is precisely that rhetoric that could make
what is already a tense arms race spin out of control . Indian space experts have
publicly supported and proposed developing or acquiring destructive ASATs. That call increases
the tensions of its neighbors and provides the impetus for them to acquire OCS and DCS capabilities. The
ultimate fear, reminiscent of the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is that A global
competition that produced armadas of space weapons . . . could raise the risk of
accidental nuclear war if, for instance, a whirling piece of space junk knocked out a spy satellite. 64 The
precipitated nuclear war could severely impact U.S. LEO and MEO satellites even if the U.S. is not participating in the
conflict.

uq space coop now

US-India space coop now prevents space weaponization
Sidhu, Center for International Cooperation Senior Fellow, 15 [Waheguru Pal
Singh Sidhu earned his Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge. He holds a Masters in
International Relations from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi and a Bachelor's degree in History from St. Stephen's College,
Delhi University, India, August, 31, Live Mint, Space: securing Indias final frontier,
http://cic.nyu.edu/news_commentary/space-securing-india%E2%80%99s-finalfrontier, accessed 6/24/16, GE]
Even as the country was agog with a salacious society murder and an indefensible
regional protest over reservations, which hogged the electronic bandwidth and the print
media, an event of strategic import crucial to secure Indias space frontier was relegated
to a footnote. The launch of the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) D6
powered by an indigenous cryogenic engine is a game changer in itself. Coupled with a
military payload a satellite, which will enhance secure communications among Indias
strategic forces and other key users the event is critical for several reasons. First, this
launch validates the new Indian GSLV design and Indian made cryogenic engine, which
was successfully tested in January 2014 and, according to Indian Space Research
Organisation (ISRO) officials, proves that this second successful launch was no fluke.
Indeed, the growing confidence in the capabilities of this GSLV Mark II version will
prove crucial for ISROs development of the GSLV Mark III version capable of putting
satellites up to 5000 kilograms in Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO). Second, at an
estimated cost of around $ 36 million per launch, this GSLV is much cheaper than other
options that India has used. For instance the Ariane 5, which was used to launch
GSAT-7 Indias first advanced multi-band communication satellite dedicated for
military use costs approximately $ 60 million per launch. While India will continue to
use foreign launch services given ISROs limited capacity, the GSLV option is, clearly,
more economical. Third, as a corollary, India is also on the path of becoming a
competitive global space actor. It has already become a significant market player in
launching satellites between 1425 kilograms and 1750 kilograms to Geosynchronous and
Geostationary orbits and Sun-Synchronous Polar orbits respectively through its Polar
Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV). Until now the PSLV has launched over 40 satellites for
19 countries. The GSLV will enhance Indias competitive edge, evident from the fact that
the GSLV Mark II has been commissioned to launch the NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture
Radar satellite in 2021. The GSLV-D6 marks a crucial turning point in Indias credentials
as a significant space power and the desire of its military to use space to enhance Indias
security. Over the past five years India launched an average of 4 to 5 satellites per year
(including on foreign launchers). Over the next few years this number is expected to go
up to an average of 7 to 8 per year. In recognition of this increasing demand ISRO plans
to build a third launch pad and a second vehicle assembly building to enhance launch
turnaround. Indias impressive space credentials notwithstanding, they pale in
comparison to China, which is likely to be Indias commercial and military competitor in
space. According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Annual Report to Congress
on Military and Security Developments involving the Peoples Republic of China 2015,
China is already placing an average of 17-25 satellites on orbit each year three to five
times Indias average. Moreover, these spacecraft have expanded Chinas strategic
satellite communication and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.
Additionally, China has also completed construction of its fourth space launch centre
its biggest on Hainan Island. Unlike India, all four of Chinas launch centres are
located in different parts of the country and provide it with greater launch flexibility and

redundancies. Simultaneously, while building up its own space-based assets, China is

also developing the capabilities to disrupt the space-based assets of adversaries through
directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers. This, according to the DoD report is in
line with the assertion by Chinas military to blind and deafen the enemy by
destroying, damaging and interfering with the enemys satellites. India, which is only
just starting to use space-based assets for military purposes, needs to address these
challenge through a mix of diplomacy (to promote norms that prevent outer space
becoming a battlefield) and offensive and defensive space capabilities, which will allow it
to protect its own assets from attack while also developing the capability to take action
against other assets, if necessary. In the diplomatic arena India has thrown in its lot with
the G-21 group of countries (with a disparate membership ranging from Algeria to
Zimbabwe and including problematic countries (for New Delhi) like North Korea, Iran,
and Pakistan. While the groups position is supportive of the objective of the prevention
of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), their approach is not; it echoes the position of
Russia and China and annoys the United States, with whom India is increasing its
space cooperation . It might be time for New Delhi to review its diplomatic approach
and, perhaps, go it alone rather than part of this group. In terms of building its military
capabilities, India has shied away from overtly developing offensive capabilities, even
though it has the technological wherewithal to do so. In contrast, China, which is one of
the leading proponents of PAROS has simultaneously moved ahead to develop and
demonstrate its offensive anti-satellite attack capability.
India is way behind China forces them to cooperation with the US and
Russia
Mistry, University of Cincinnati Associate Professor,12 [Dinshaw, The
Diplomat, Where China Leads, India Follows?,
http://thediplomat.com/2012/06/where-china-leads-india-follows/, accessed 6/22/16,
gE]
In purely technological terms, India could acquire capabilities similar to Chinas, but it
will take 15 to 20 years.
First, India will have to build a launcher to lift a spacecraft to LEO. Its reliable Polar
Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), which has had more than a dozen successful flights,
cannot lift a large payload . But the more powerful though unreliable Geostationary
Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV), which has failed in four of its seven flights, can lift a 5ton spacecraft to LEO. The GSLVs successor, the GSLV-Mk 3, which is expected to first
fly in early 2013, can carry an 8-ton Shenzhou-like payload to LEO. By 2020-2025, if
they prove their reliability after many consecutive successful flights, these rockets would
be available for launching spacecraft. Second, India will have to build the required
spacecraft to ferry astronauts. In 2007, its 0.6 ton space recovery experiment tested the
heat-shields needed for spacecraft re-entry to earth. Indias space agency has also
conceptualized a 3 ton spacecraft that supports two astronauts for two-day space
missions. Within a few years, India can build such a spacecraft, followed by a more
capable 5 to 8 ton spacecraft. After three to four unmanned flights to test the technology,
these spacecrafts can be available for manned missions. China reportedly spent $2.5
billion for the first five Shenzhou flights. It will be just as, or even more, expensive for
India. In 2007, Indias space agency projected that the first steps to manned space flight
involving launchers, spacecraft, and an astronaut-training facility will cost $2 billion
over eight years; more substantial capabilities would cost $5 billion over several years.
Indias $1.5 billion space budget, even if it grows at 10 percent to 15 percent each

year, cant support such expenditures. Consequently, India can only follow
Chinas manned space trajectory if it considerably increases its space budget an outlay
that can come only at the expense of other developmental priorities. Another option is for
India to reduce expenditures on its existing space activities and divert some of its space
budget toward a manned program. However, this would reduce the scope of important
current projectsIndias satellites have many economic developmental applications and
also have military-strategic applications. Manned space programs have no real economic
or military applications. They mainly have scientific applications, because some useful
scientific research is conducted in space (most significantly, on the International Space
Station). The technologies used in a manned space program may also have industrial
spinoffs. Still, the magnitude of these benefits is modest. In the end, it would only
be prudent for India to follow in Chinas space footsteps if it can develop the required
technologies, keep costs low and promise significant benefits. Since costs will be high
and the benefits remain unclear, an alternative option for India is to
partner with the United States , Russia and other states, and draw upon their
proven heavy launchers, spacecrafts, and space labs. Thus, Indian astronauts could fly on
U.S. and Russian spacecraft, and Indian spacecraft could be lifted by international
launchers, while India simultaneously develops its own manned space program. For its
space partners, India can bring cost-sharing and future co-production possibilities to the
table. In short, piggy-backing to space may be better for India than taking the slow,
indigenous route to a manned space program.

link china engagement

US-India relations are at cross roads deepening of relations with China
pushes the opportunity for a strong partnership away
Joshi et al, 13 [Sunjoy, Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswar Pillai Rajagopalan PhD,
James Jay Carafano PhD, Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis, Derek Scissors Ph.D, April 26,
Heritage Foundation, Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-us-indiarelations, accessed 6/24/16, GE]
Few relationships among major powers have been transformed so comprehensively in
recent years as that between India and the United States. Yet, there is a growing sense in
both New Delhi and Washington that the much-heralded partnership has not
lived up to its promise . In short, the relationship has plateaued. This Special Report
by the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi and The Heritage Foundation in
Washington, D.C., is about understanding this paradox and finding ways to rekindle the
strategic enthusiasm between the two countries. The sections in this report offer specific
proposals for advancing bilateral cooperation in various sectors, such as the economy,
defense, regional security in East and Southwest Asia, nonproliferation, and
counterterrorism. Introduction In real terms, there is no denying the extraordinary
progress in the engagement between India and the United States over the past two
decades. Throughout, and even after, the Cold War, the world's two largest democracies
remained estranged. In the first decade after the end of the Cold War, the two countries
quarreled over nuclear nonproliferation; the U.S. role in the IndiaPakistan disputes,
especially the question of Jammu and Kashmir; terrorism; trade and finance; regional
security in the Middle East and Asia; and multilateral issues. India's defiance of the
international community by conducting five nuclear tests in May 1998 put the two
nations on a confrontational footing. The U.S. led the international sanctions against
India and demanded a rollback of India's nuclear and missile programs. New Delhi
refused but embarked on a substantive and consequential dialogue on security issues
with Washington. President Bill Clinton visited India in 2000, the first American
presidential visit to the country in more than two decades, despite the unresolved
differences over India's nuclear program. As a non-signatory to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, India's pursuit of nuclear weapons and testing of nuclear
devices in 1974 and 1998 put it at odds with U.S. nonproliferation policies, and made
New Delhi a target of the international nonproliferation regime. Clinton's recognition of
the need to deal with India on an exceptional basis was translated into reality by George
W. Bush. President Bush removed the Kashmir dispute as an irritant in the relationship,
de-hyphenated U.S. dealings with India and Pakistan, and invested much political capital
at home and abroad to end India's prolonged nuclear isolation. President Barack Obama,
despite his reservations on the civil nuclear deal initiated by the Bush Administration in
2005, extended its logic by supporting India's membership in the various international
export-control groupings. He also backed New Delhi's permanent membership of the
United Nations Security Council. Beyond these high-profile initiatives, the sustained
engagement between three different U.S. Presidents and two Indian prime ministers has
laid the foundation for a strong partnership. Considering that the two countries did not
cooperate for decades and were near strangers in the middle of the 20th century, the
scale and scope of their current bilateral engagement is truly impressive. While
Washington has a bigger, stronger economic relationship with China, its economic
relationship with India involves fewer political problems. While the U.S. military
engagement with Pakistan is deeper than that with India, New Delhiunlike Islamabad

has not, in any way, undermined the American effort in Afghanistan. More than 30
forums of bilateral U.S.India consultations are currently underway. The trade and
investment relationship has gathered momentum. India, which previously never bought
major defense equipment from the U.S., has imported nearly $10 billion worth in the
past few years. India's armed forces exercise more with the U.S. military than with any
other country's military. Their law enforcement and intelligence agencies have rapidly
expanded counterterrorism cooperation. This is rapid acceleration from a near-zero
base, by any measure. Understanding the current sources of frustration between the two
countries, then, becomes necessary for charting out the road map for the future. At least
four factors help explain the paradox of unprecedented progress and continuing
disappointment in IndiaU.S. bilateral relations. The first is rooted in strategic culture.
American postCold War foreign policy has been characterized by quickly shifting
priorities and short spans of intense attention. On the other hand, few countries are as
slow as India in shifting from one frame of reference to another. Those Americans who
demand that India do more on the foreign policy and security fronts tend to forget that
the United States was equally slow in adapting to the global changes at the dawn of the
last century. Although the United States was the number one industrial power by the end
of the 19th century, it took nearly half a century and two world wars before it assumed
international responsibilities commensurate with its size. India, on the other hand, must
recognize that opportune moments in the United States must be seized to consolidate
forward movement. After having invested a great deal of personal political capital on
seeing the nuclear deal through in the face of stiff domestic opposition, a general lack of
purpose during a large part of the second term of the Manmohan Singh government may
have impacted precious national opportunities, not limited merely to the relationship
with the United States. The second factor is rooted in the reality that significant sections
of the vast bureaucracies in both countries remain tied to default positions toward the
other that are not conducive to a deeper bilateral partnership. It must be borne in mind
that the dramatic changes in IndiaU.S. relations were driven from the top by political
leaders on both sides and pushed through the customary inertia of reluctant
bureaucracies by a few energetic decision makers. The same forces of habitual inertia
may have struck back after the heady days of conceptualizing and implementing the civil
nuclear initiative between 2005 and 2008. Both New Delhi and Washington need
continuous tending of the bilateral relationship at the highest political level. In both
democracies, it is not unusual that political leaders find it difficult to devote sustained
attention to a single issue. The inability to do so in the past few years has had a negative
effect on IndiaU.S. relations. The cycles of political clarity and activism in New Delhi
and Washington have not been in sync. Third, there have been genuine policy missteps in
both New Delhi and Washington with unintended negative consequences for the
bilateral relationship. The first year of the Obama Administration saw the United States
try to construct stronger relations with Pakistan and China without reference to India's
sensitivities and interests. The assumption in Washington that the road to peace in
Afghanistan demanded Indian political concessions to Pakistan raised genuine concerns
in New Delhi that President Obama was abandoning President Bush's neutrality on the
question of Kashmir. Similarly, President Obama's attempt to accommodate China's rise
through strategic reassurance and collaboration on regional and global
issues generated deep apprehensions in New Delhi about the potential
consequences of a SinoU.S. duopoly in Asia. To be sure, President Obama corrected the
direction and reaffirmed the importance of India in the American worldview. But there
was no denying the damage in New Delhi and the perceived need to hedge against
significant reversals in the U.S. policy toward India. In New Delhi, the Congress Party,
which returned triumphant in the 2009 elections, believed that economic populism was

the key to its political success. This, in turn, resulted in a de-emphasis of economic
reforms, and public discussion of some of the old foreign policy approaches, such as nonalignment. There is some recognition in New Delhi of the costs of these strategic errors,
and the Indian government is working on reviving economic reforms and rejuvenating
its foreign policy. Yet, there is no denying that the past three years generated many
anxieties among India's friends in the United States and beyond about New Delhi's
political commitment to the partnership. India's parliamentary management of the
nuclear-liability legislation also created difficulties for the U.S. nuclear industry, which
was hoping to make big investments after the historic civil initiative. Finally, there has
undoubtedly been some exaggeration of the possibilities in the bilateral relationship. In
both of these large democracies, making the case for a fundamental change in the
structure and direction of bilateral relations in the face of considerable skepticism
arguably raised expectations that could not be met. Realists on both sides, however,
know that India was never going to be an Australia or Japan to the United States. Instead
of an approximation of a traditional alliance relationship founded on presumed common
geostrategy, New Delhi and Washington should focus on pragmatic cooperation on the
basis of the intersection of their narrower respective interests. If the IndiaU.S.
relationship was imagined in the past decade in abstract terms and lofty possibilities, the
reality today is that both New Delhi and Washington need each other even more than
before. In the 2000s, the United States was at the peak of the unipolar moment. What
drove Washington to re-craft the relationship with New Delhi was not the prospect of
immediate gain or an urgent need for Indian partnership, but the perceived value of a
long-term strategic investment in India. For New Delhi, the affections of George W. Bush
and the civil nuclear initiative constituted an unexpected and significant political bonus
at a moment when India's international trajectory was on an upward trend. Today, when
Washington and New Delhi find themselves in more difficult circumstances, their
bilateral partnership acquires greater salience. It is no longer aspirational, but an
important mutual need.
But engagement with China casts doubt on US commitment
Burgess, US Air War College Department of International Security Studies
Professor, 15 [Stephen, Comparative Strategy, 34:4, 367-379, The U.S. Pivot to Asia
and Renewal of the U.S.India Strategic Partnership, Taylor and Francis, GE]
The BJP government is pursuing a more nationalist line than the previous government,
working to build the economy and military and taking a tougher line against Pakistan
and China. At the same time, India is soliciting foreign direct investment from China. It
appears that India is now engaging selectively in relation to U.S. overtures, as it did from
200104. It is possible that intensive U.S. overtures, such as greater naval
interoperability, will bear fruit. The United States could again try to sell F-16 fighters to
India and intensify its overtures, which could lead to a stronger partnership. A less likely
option for the BJP government would be to continue the previous governments coolness
toward the strategic partnership and allow it to deteriorate. If this happened, the United
States could lessen its engagement. However, the BJP government must engage the
United States to draw it away from its alliance with Pakistan and dialogue with China.
Another unlikely option is for the BJP government to adopt a great-power realist
position and quickly move India closer to the United States, which would propel the
strategic partnership toward developing into an alliance. The United States would
welcome Indias advances but would be faced with the choice of consummating an
alliance or stopping short. Moving quickly to an alliance could alienate China and
damage U.S. engagement and dialogue policy. At present, strengthening of the strategic
partnership with the United States is as far as India is prepared to go. An alliance with

the United States would run against Indias attachment to strategic autonomy and put
India in a confrontational position with China.62 In Indias vision of a strengthened
partnership, the United States would reduce ties with Pakistan; recognize more of Indias
claims against China; and continue to support Afghanistan and Indias interests there. A
number of security experts assert that India eventually will ask the United States for
assistance against China and that the United States could do more in the meantime to
support India.63 For instance, some think that the United States should work to prevent
China from strengthening its already close relations with Pakistan and go beyond
recognition of Indias claims on the McMahon Line in the northeast and recognize claims
on its border with China in Kashmir in the north.64 Conclusion Indias national interests
have been propelling the country toward becoming a valuable, cooperative partner with
the United States. The growing power of China has been pushing India to look for
partners, especially the United States. The BJP government is committed to advancing
Indias national interests and growing Indias power as a result of the changing balance
of power in Asia. After several years of stagnation, the new government has brought a
return of nationalism and closer relations with the United States. Therefore, U.S.India
relations appear to be developing more in line with the U.S. vision of an enhanced
strategic partnership and an Indian role in the rebalance to Asia. In the past year, India
has demonstrated that it will be a stronger partner with the United States. In the coming
years, India may be more willing and able to play a major role in maintaining security
and stability in the Indian Ocean region. To some extent, U.S. activity focused in
Southeast Asia will be complemented by Indias Look East policy and by the Joint
Strategic Vision roadmap. There is the prospect of Indo-U.S. cooperation in partnerships
with Myanmar, Vietnam, and other ASEAN nations. Many U.S. officials still see India as
a geopolitical underperformer, which may not be able to deliver as much in the way of a
strategic partnership. Conversely, it will be a struggle for the United States to reassure
partners such as India that it will follow through on its security commitments. U.S.
credibility will remain suspect, especially while it engages China in trade and a
strategic-economic dialogue and attempts to mitigate Chinese fears of
containment . In sum, while the United States has committed itself to focusing
increased attention on Asia, the rebalance appears to be augmenting the U.S.India
strategic partnership. However, moves toward a U.S.India alliance are less contingent
on the actions of the two countries than those of a rising China.
link china engagment
Chinese engagement is perceived as rebalancing creates doubts in US
alliances and security commitments
Burgess, US Air War College Department of International Security Studies
Professor, 15 [Stephen, Comparative Strategy, 34:4, 367-379, The U.S. Pivot to Asia
and Renewal of the U.S.India Strategic Partnership, Taylor and Francis, GE]
In regard to the ongoing U.S.China strategic dialogue, India would like the United
States to avoid any moves toward cooperation with China in solving Asian
security problems. In particular, India rejects any outside meddling in the Kashmir
dispute. India asserts that it is well on the way to resolving the Kashmir issue itself and
that dialogue with Pakistan will eventually bring peaceful resolution. India is more
concerned about the assertive stance of Chinas new leadership. This concern is
especially provoked by persistent Chinese violations of border areas as well as a military
buildup north of the border. Even though India has grown significantly in power over the
past two decades, it remains weak relative to China. China has grown faster, and
therefore India remains inferior in terms of geostrategic position, economic power, and
military capabilities.30 It appears India will never catch up with China and will never be

able to stand up to China on equal terms.31 Therefore, India will most likely be limited in
assisting the U.S. rebalance to Asia. It is limited in its ability to partner with the United
States because of doubts about the U.S. rebalance and credibility.32 For example, as
Japan and the Philippines have clashed with China over territorial claims, there is a
perception that the United States has not come sufficiently to the aid of its allies. Some
believe the United States is leading from behind and that the rebalance will not lead to
a dramatic change in its behavior. Others see the United States as a resident power in
Asia already and see the rebalance as not so significant.33 Furthermore, several Indian
experts noted that U.S. budget cuts may reduce the scale of the rebalance. In addition,
the U.S. strategic and economic dialogue with China leaves India and other
U.S. allies and partners fearing that deals may be made concerning their
interests without their knowledge or input. Finally, there is a belief in India that
the U.S. rebalance will mean less attention to the transition in Afghanistan and
constraining Pakistan.

link china space coop

Chinese regional space cooperation causes Indian weariness magnifies the
risk of ASAT testing
Liang and Rajagopalan, 16 - Citing Rajeswar Pillai Rajagopalan Head of New Delhis
Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative at the Observer Researcher Foundation
[Xiaodon,Intern with the Political and Security Affairs group at NBR, February 10, NBR,
India's Space Program: Challenges, Opportunities, and Strategic Concerns,
http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=651, accessed 6/22/16, ge]
Our most important international partner in space has been France, which launched
most of India's heavy-payload satellites. Until recently, we were reliant on the French
because any satellite that weighs more than two metric tons was always a problem for
our own launch vehicles. We lacked the cryogenic engine technology to improve our
launchers and failed in the early 1990s to buy it from Russia, which was put under
pressure from the United States not to transfer the technology to India. Our indigenous
cryogenic engines have only recently undergone a series of successful tests, and we will
soon no longer need to rely on our international partners to launch heavy payloads. The
other country that has been important for India has been Israel. India and Israel have
cooperated in developing advanced imaging and reconnaissance satellites, most notably
the RISAT-2. Israel Aerospace Industries and ISRO worked together to develop the
RISAT-2 imagery satellite shortly after the Mumbai terrorist attacks. ISRO was already
developing RISAT-1, but following the attacks, India decided to work with Israel to
launch the RISAT-2 right away, even before the RISAT-1 was complete. RISAT-2, using
synthetic aperture radar, is a day-night and all-weather radar-imaging satellite capable
of monitoring India's border areas on a 24/7 basis. Even as RISAT-2 has a number of
applications in the realm of agriculture, cyclone tracking, and disaster management, its
applications for security and surveillance, including over its immediate waters, have
been far more significant. The third important partner has been NASA, with which India
has a long history of cooperation, going back to its first launch of a sounding rocket in
1971. However, cooperation was restricted because of the export control regimes and
sanctions placed on ISRO and many of its associated institutions following the 1974 and
1998 nuclear tests. This history also explains why India is guarded and secretive about its
policies and capabilities. However, after the 2005 U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement,
things have begun improving. All ISRO entities have now been removed from the
sanctions list, and there is more cooperation at every level. The United States is now
talking about bringing India into the global export control regimes, and India has been
tweaking and adjusting its export control lists to facilitate this process. While Russia has
been a key partner to India in the defense realm, space cooperation has been limited.
However, even that limited cooperation has come under strain. For instance, Russia was
supposed to supply a Lunokhod rover and a lander for India's Chandrayaan-2 mission,
but it has faced several delays. In the face of this, India reportedly may develop its own
lander for the missionthus, the Chandrayaan-2 is being reconfigured with an Indian
orbiter, lander, and rover. Some Russian experts say the delays may be a result of
Chinese pressure on Russia to limit cooperation with India. In the face of the Ukraine
crisis, Russian scholars talk about how the country needs a strong voice on its side. India
cannot play that role, but China can. Although China does not have much to gain from
Russia in terms of new technologies, Beijing appears willing to see what it can gain
through this cooperation. The advanced space cooperation between these two countries
sparks a lot of apprehension and wariness in India .

il china tech theft

Space cooperation with China means theyll steal our tech to militarize space
Martin Marietta proves
Fisher, International Assessment and Strategy Center, Asian Military Affairs
Senior Fellow, 15 [Richard D, before the US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China Space and Counter space issues, Feb 18, Chinas Military
Ambitions in Space and Americas Response,
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Testimony_2.18.15.pdf, accessed
6/22/16, GE]
Question 3: Discuss China's approach to space diplomacy and cooperation, particularly
with the United States. Assess the risks and benefits of U.S.-China space cooperation.
Chinas space diplomacy approach toward the United States, as with Russia, has been to
try to use all doors the front and the back and sides. Despite occasional opportunities
for discussions between space officials, largely due to post-Tiananmen sanctions, China
and the U.S. did not engage in space-technical cooperation as China and Russia did
starting in the early 1990s. The U.S. was not selling, but Russia was, so China was able to
import significant Russian space technology to accelerate its 921 Program manned effort.
China has repeatedly expressed its willingness to consider space cooperation with the
United States, as it stands ready to cooperate with many others. But instead of
responding to over two decades of variously sourced U.S. concerns about its behavior on
Earth, or in space, Chinas basic space-diplomacy strategy is to wait out the Americans.
They are relying on Chinas accumulation of space power to convince enough U.S. power
centers to carry the rest that cooperation with China must proceed despite real risks. It is
a strategy that has worked well for Beijing in both economic and military
realms . A 29 September 2014 editorial in the prestigious Aviation Week and Space
Technology noted, It is absurd that the U.S. Navy can conduct joint exercises with the
Chinese navy but Congress bars NASA from working directly with Chinese engineers and
scientists. Well, to the shock of the U.S. Navy and its allies, when China accepted its first
invitation to participate in the 2014 multilateral RIMPAC exercises, it brought along
its own ELINT ship to record everybodys electronic emissions a
threatening response demonstrating essential hostility to the intent of
inviting Chinas participation . This simply does not bode well for cooperation in
space either. To boot, the U.S., Russia and Europe all have had their sad experiences with
Chinese espionage targeting their respective space sectors. According to the testimony of
a Chinese solid fuel rocket motor engineer interviewed by this analyst, what they
learned from the Martin Marietta solid satellite kick motor used on a Chinese SLV
in the early 1990s has enabled all of their solid rocket motors for their new
ballistic missiles now targeting the United States and its allies with nuclear
weapons . Europes Galileo navigation satellite program wanted China to be a partner,
but when China obtained the technology it needed, it left and built its Compass
system. At the 2007 Moscow Airshow, Russian space officials explained their attempt
circa 1998 to promote business and cooperation by selling internships or access, to
some 200 Chinese engineers, to 15 Russian space companies. The Russians did not sell
space station tech to China, but they now know why the Chinese space station looks like
theirs. A simple reality for U.S. policy makers to keep in mind is that cooperation in
space with China cannot be separated from Chinas ambitions on Earth or out into space.
Likewise, for the United States to wall off space cooperation with China and to treat it

as a special realm only plays into Chinas game. As long as it is ruled by the CCP,
China is not likely to alter its ambitions to end the democracy on Taiwan,
militarily consolidate the South China Sea, ensure that Iran and North
Korea, like Pakistan, become nuclear missile states , or facilitate wars which
challenge U.S. and Western security interests, merely to advance cooperation in space. It
is imperative for U.S. leaders to accept that each of these challenges -- and countering
Chinas expanding military ambitions in space --, are more important to
U.S. security than is space cooperation with China.
Chinese space militarization causes India to develop ASAT capabilities
spills over to full scale weaponization
Vasani, Manipal University Department of Geopolitics and International
Relations Postgrad Research Scholar, 16 [Harsh, June 14, The Diplomat, India's
Anti-Satellite Weapons, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/indias-anti-satelliteweapons/, accessed 6/25/16, GE]
The utility of space as a medium for war has grown exponentially since the days of the
Cold War Space Race. The military potential of satellites is manifold: communications,
navigation, early-warning systems, reconnaissance, and signal intelligence. Any state
that manages to get the upper hand in this frontier can be expected to dominate the
outcome of any war. A state with command over space-based assets can jam enemy
satellites or destroy them, and stop the enemy from communicating with troops or
accessing vital information about troop movements or incoming missiles. It is in this
context that the events in Indias neighborhood have caused anxiety and have led to calls
for a new space policy aimed at countering the growing might of Chinas space military
program. Threats From Chinas Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Program According to some
reports, Beijing conducted its latest anti-satellite missile test in 2013, when it launched
its new ASAT (anti-satellite) missile, the Dong Neng-2 or DN-2. A U.S. defense official
familiar with military intelligence, speaking on the condition of anonymity, described the
DN-2 as a ground-based, high earth-orbit attack missile. Further, a report by the
Secure World Foundation stated that while there is no conclusive proof, the available
evidence strongly suggests that Chinas May 2013 launch was the test of the rocket
component of a new direct ascent ASAT weapons system derived from a road-mobile
ballistic missile. This was not the first time Beijing tested its ASAT program. A more
prominent test occurred in January 2007, when the Chinese military launched a KT-1
rocket that successfully destroyed a redundant Chinese Feng Yun 1-C weather satellite in
Low Earth Orbit (LEO), approximately 800 kilometers above the Earth. The test left
behind approximately 2,500 to 3,000 pieces of dangerous debris in LEO, where
reconnaissance and weather satellites and manned space missions are vulnerable to
space debris. In May 2013, a Russian satellite was struck and destroyed, reportedly by
one such piece of debris. Hazardous space debris aside, the test also confirmed Chinas
capability to attack and destroy enemy satellites in the event of war, sabotaging the
enemys military operations. Such developments have not gone unnoticed in New Delhis
defense establishment. Security experts and scholars have called for a rethink of Indias
space policy, augmenting Indias ASAT weapons capability. Following Chinas 2007
ASAT weapons test, the then-chief of army staff of the Indian Army, General Deepak
Kapoor, was quoted in a Times of India report saying that Chinas space program was
expanding at an exponentially rapid pace in both offensive and defensive capabilities,
and that space was becoming the ultimate military high ground to dominate in the
wars of the future. Then-Integrated Defense Staff Chief Lt. General H S Lidder was also
quoted as saying, with time, we will get sucked into the military race to protect space
assets and inevitably there will be a military contest in space. In a life-and-death

scenario, space will provide the advantage. A breakthrough emerged in 2012 when V.K.
Saraswat, then the chief of the Defense Research and Development Organization
(DRDO), Indias premier defense R&D organization, announced that India has all the
building blocks in place to integrate an anti-satellite weapon to neutralize hostile
satellites in low earth and polar orbits. In an interview, Saraswat suggested that Indias
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense program could be utilized as an ASAT weapon, along
with its Agni series of missiles. This was corroborated by DRDO, which said that the
Indian Ballistic Missile Defense Program can incorporate anti-satellite weapon
development. It should also be remembered that with the recent successes of its Mars
mission and the geosynchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV-D5), the Indian Space
Research Organization (ISRO) now has the capability to launch satellites weighing in
excess of two tons, an important prerequisite for the deployment of any weapons system.
And while existing space treaties prohibit placing weapons of mass destruction in space,
they do not explicitly prohibit the placing of other types of weapons. For DRDO then, the
next goal would likely be todevelop orbital weapons, which could remain in space for as
long as required while orbiting Earth or the Moon. Does India Really Have an ASAT
Weapons Capability? While the statements by V.K. Saraswat created ripples all over, at
home his statements were dismissed by certain scholars as an exaggeration. Questioning
Indias purported capabilities, scholars like Michael Listner and Victoria Samson have
pointed out that without conducting a test and demonstrating its ASAT capability
explicitly, India will only be seen as a paper tiger by the arms control and intelligence
community. Listner pointed out that the acknowledgement by Saraswat about India
developing and bringing together the basic technologies to create a system that could be
used against enemy satellites, and the decision to adapt Indias ABM technology for an
ASAT role was doubtless encouraged by the ancillary capability demonstrated by the
United States when it adapted its ABM system to deorbit USA 193 in 2008. But should
such ancillary capability be taken as a evidence of full ASAT capability? Expressing
perplexity over contradictory statements from Indian officials, and their refusal to clear
the air about Indias ASAT program, Listner states that public statements about Indias
purported ASAT capability seem to fit neither an active program to develop an ASAT or
an ancillary capability to ballistic missile defense. However, in 2011, Bharath
Gopalaswamy, who was then a researcher in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, claimed that Indias
scientific community is open to an ASAT test, if it was done with caution. Rajeswari
Rajagopalan, senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, a New Delhi based
think tank, said that India might do an ASAT test in the next five to 10 years. While
these statements are illuminating as to the going-ons in Indias academic and scientific
circles, actually testing Indias purported ASAT capacity is easier said than done. As
pointed out by Arvind Kumar, professor of Geopolitics and International Relations at
Manipal University, ASAT capabilities require a number of technologies related to spacebased sensors, synthetic aperture radars, electronics, a sound navigation system,
guidance and control, and global positioning systems. A number of different types of
sensors, including infrared sensors, optical sensors, electronic-optical sensors, and
magnetic sensors are vital to monitor, detect, and help in sensing the events. Whether
India has the ability to acquire or build these technologies is doubtful. The Case for
ASAT Weapons Demonstration The questions raised over Indias ASAT weapons
capacity are doubtless important. Even if New Delhi does have an anti-satellite weapons
capability, it will only be acknowledged if it comes out in the open with a successful test.
But such a demonstration will come with its own costs. What would be the consequences
if New Delhi decided to demonstrate its purported ASAT capability? It should be
remembered that along with causing grave insecurity, and possibly a space-

weaponization race in the region, such a test will also lead to the creation of
hazardous space debris, which could doubtless elicit international opprobrium, and
possibly even sanctions. Burgeoning relations with the United States which even led to
the signing of the 2005 India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement and made India the first
country with nuclear weapons which is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), but still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with a nuclear weapons state
could end in jeopardy if India unilaterally tests ASAT weapons. Further, at a time when
India is looking at the indigenization of its defense industry to cut the costs of importing
weapons (India is the worlds largest arms importer) and hoping to garner international
investments in its defense and manufacturing industry, such a move could stall such
developments as investors would see the tests as a sign of aggression and defiance of
international norms. Additionally, for India to establish its defense-industrial base, it
needs the transfer of technology from technologically advanced nations. If New Delhi
decides to go ahead with ASAT tests, it will possibly be looking at sanctions, not tech
transfers.

il china causes india mil mod

Chinese space power causes India to militarize space
Jonson-Freese, Naval War College Professor, 14 [Joan, Naval War College, The
geostrategic, Techno-Nationalist Push Into Space*,
http://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/oasis/article/view/4006/4414, accessed
6/24/16, GE]
In India, however, space officials downplayed the technical aspects of Chinas launch,
confidently asserting that India could do the same if it chose to, which they said it did
not. Economics and need (what can a manned mission achieve that an unmanned
mission cannot?) were cited as reasons for that choice (Agence France Presse, 2003).
However, then Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee congratulated China on its
success and publicly encouraged Indian scientists to work toward a manned lunar
mission. Those who wonder what could be achieved by such space missions simply want
the status quo to continue, he proclaimed prior to the launch (Agence France Presse,
2003). It is unclear to or about whom he was speaking -the rest of the world, his own
scientific community, or perhaps both. Just two days after Chinas taikonaut launch,
India launched into orbit its most sophisticated remote sensing satellite to date. The lack
of consequent fanfare certainly validated Beijings manned spaceflight approach for
maximum prestige value. Since the 1960s India has had an ambitious space program,
one often considered perhaps extravagant for a poor country. (Johnson-Freese & Hoey,
2010). Childhood malnutrition remains a sweeping problem in India and as of 2012, 32%
of Indias population is considered to live below the international poverty line (Somini,
2009)1. Until recently, however, Indias space program largely enjoyed domestic
support. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, considered the father of Indias space program, clearly
linked heavenly goals to terrestrial responsibilities. There are some who question the
relevance of space activities in a developing nation. To us, there is no ambiguity of
purpose. We do not have the fantasy of competing with the economically advanced
nations in the exploration of the moon or the planets or manned space-flight. But we are
concerned that if we are to play a meaningful role nationally, and in the community of
nations, we must be second to none in the application of advanced technologies to the
real problems of man and society. (Indian Space Research Organization). While that
quote remains as a banner on the official website of the Indian Space Research
Organization (ISRO), Indias outlook and plans for space have changed dramatically over
the past 5-7 years. They are now much more in line with the vision of former President
Abdul Kalam (2002-2007), a key developer and explicator of Indias nuclear and missile
programs. While India once rejected human spaceflight as an extravagance of the rich, it
has now embarked on an accelerated plan for human spaceflight to the moon and
beyond. Indias plans are outlined in Space Vision 2025, released in 2009. Theoretically,
it is nested into the goals of India Vision 2020, authored by Kalam. While still including
such goals as satellite based communications and navigation systems for rural
connectivity, and enhanced imaging capability for natural resource management,
weather and climate change studies, it also now includes planetary exploration,
development of a heavy lift launcher, reusable launch vehicles and human spaceflight.
The specifics initially included a man on the moon by 2020, robotic missions to Mars,
and to a nearby asteroid and to an observable distance from the sun. In discussions with
Indian analysts, this philosophical change is often explained as simply evolutionary.
Indias space agenda is considered by many as even more ambitious than Chinas. India
has already successfully launched the Chandrayaan -1 lunar orbiter on its Polar Satellite
launch vehicle in 2008. Though Chandrayaan-2 was originally scheduled for launch in

2012, it has been postponed until 2016 or 2017. Perhaps most impressively, Indias Mars
Orbiter Mission (MOM), or Mangalyaan, was successfully launched in 2013, and will
reach Mars in September 2014. Only the United States, Europe and Russia have
previously achieved that goal - with China noticeably missing from that list. mom put
India into the record books as the first Asian country headed to the Red Planet,
something not unnoticed in news coverage. When the low-cost ($73 million), fast-turnaround mom mission was launched, the Christian Science Monitor heralded, Indias
Mars mission leaves earth orbit - surpasses Chinese ambitions (Asokan & Reuters,
2013). India created and launched the mission on a highly accelerated schedule (Rai,
2014) to meet a small launch window, less than two years, demonstrating the importance
placed on making that window, for reasons of both science - and the record books.
Within the realm of human spaceflight, an unmanned launch of a prototype capsule
capable of carrying humans into space on a variant of Indias Geosynchronous Satellite
Launch Vehicle is projected for 2014, although funding remains tenuous
(Ananthaswamy, 2014). A manned mission will likely not occur for another 4 or 5 years.
In January 2010, the Indian government said a manned mission would occur in 2016,
with a moon landing by 2020 so clearly, and not unexpectedly, delays are already
occurring. Early human spaceflights may get an assist from Russia, as did Chinas early
ventures. It is anticipated that Moscow will help with astronaut training. Previously,
there had even been talks about India accelerating its human spaceflight program by
buying a Russian Soyuz capsule to send two astronauts into orbit in 2013 (Interfax-AVN,
2010). Indias new, expanded approach to space has not come without criticism. India
has major issues regarding education, health and rural sanitation, and these struggle to
get funds, said columnist Praful Bidwai. Yet here we are, funding a giant national ego
trip when people do not have latrines. Its monstrous (Ramesh, 2009). Others discount
the link between Indias poverty and expanded expenditures on human spaceflight. The
poor will always be around If only the lunar missions bill of U.S. $77 million -or even a
bigger amount, according to other estimates- could make even a minute difference to the
undoubted privation of the poorMoon shots, of course, are more ambitious and may be
less lucrative (than the information technology sector), but they are a milestone to which
countries aspire on the way to becoming major powers (Hoey, 2009). Human
spaceflight programs historically have had a hard time competing against populist issues
for government funding, because the public gets a vote, as evidenced by both Europe and
Japan having the technological potential for a human spaceflight program but lacking
the political will. The 2009 cancellation of the Constellation program in the United
States similarly reflects public priorities. There seems only one way for democracies to
avoid resistance to human spaceflight goals over other national priorities, and that is to
link it to other strategic goals. In the case of the United States, it was techno-nationalism
during the Cold War. So too is it for India, in a technonationalist race against
China. India has an advantage over other democracies though, as it has basically been
on a war-fighting economy since its inception, with the populace largely willing to
make economic choices prioritizing those areas the government deems
important to security , broadly defined. Just as space and prestige are linked, so too
are security and space inherently linked, due to the dual-use nature of the technology.
Not only has India been feeling pressure from the prestige China has reaped from its
space accomplishments, but from the military potential of the space technology
China has been developing . As succinctly headlined by long-time American
aerospace journalist Craig Covault in 2012, India Races China for Asian Prestige,
Military Security (Covault, 2012). India states that its space program is in-tended for
peaceful purposes only. Different countries define peaceful differently though. India

considered its nuclear program peaceful right up to and including its 1974 test, and there
are significant parallels, for example, between Indias nuclear program development and
its current space program development. Former President Kalams definition of peaceful
provides India considerable latitude. In the 3,000-year history of India, barring 600
years, the country has been ruled by others. If you need development, the country should
witness peace, and peace is ensured by strength. Missiles were developed to strengthen
the country (The Hindu, 2008). Kalams winding but consistent view of what
constitutes a peaceful program is also evident regarding space and provides the
rationale for developing a wide range of new and emerging space technologies with farreaching military applications. In the spring of 2000, a report entitled Military
Dimensions in the Future of the Indian Presence in Space caused waves within official
circles but drew little international attention, probably due to its lack of availability
outside of India. Perhaps most controversial was its suggestion that India could deploy a
directed-energy weapon, such as a particle beam weapon, in space by 2010 and also a
system referred to as the KALI (kinetic attack loitering interceptor). Likely not
coincidentally, Kali is also the Hindu goddess of death. At the time of publication, the
papers author, Dr. V. Siddharta, was an officer on special duty in the secretariat of the
scientific advisor to the Defense Minister. The paper is testament to, at the very least, a
long-standing interest within the Indian military of deploying not only a space-based
laser, but also an ASAT system. Over the past decade, there has been no shortage of
inflammatory comments made by Indian military officials claiming Indias intent to
weaponize space. There has also been no shortage of contradictions to these statements
from Indias most senior government officials - oftentimes happening within days of one
another. For example, on January 26, 2007, after Chinas satellite shoot-down, Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh and then-Russian President Vladimir Putin convened a joint
press conference where Singh declared: Our position is similar in that we are not in
favor of the weaponization of outer space. This was just one day after then-Indian Air
Force (IAF) chief Shashi Tyagi had stated, As the reach of our air force is expanding, it
has become extremely important that we exploit space, and for it you need space assets.
The pragmatic aspect of Indias quest to keep up with China in space, including ASAT
development, also stems from past experience with nuclear weapons and the 1970 NonProliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT basically divides the world into nuclear have
(those countries which had nuclear weapons prior to 1970) and have-not countries,
with the have countries bestowed nearly full latitude on their nuclear development,
with the have-nots highly restricted. India did not sign the NPT, exploded a nuclear
weapon in 1974 and was thereafter denied nuclear technology from the West. Feeling
stung from that NPT experience and determined not to be a have not in any potential
space weapons treaty, I ndia has been actively pursuing missile defense cum
ASAT technolog y. Just as China tests ASAT capable technology through missile
defense tests, so too does India (Samson, 2010). India began missile defense tests in
2006, with increasing levels of difficulty and achievement since then. As Indian scholar
Amit Saksena noted in his 2014 analysis of Indias military space efforts, The line
between militarization [of space] and weaponization is blurred (2014). India is not the
first country to take advantage of that blurred line. Both India and China deny a space
race between them. China is prudent to do so, as acknowledging Indias effort would only
give India the credibility it seeks as a challenger. India denies a race so as not to be
measured against Chinas substantial lead. Nevertheless, it is clear that both feel
compelled to develop technology comparable to those it feels challenged by, militarily
and/or for regional leadership. In the case of China, the perceived challenge is from the
United States; in the case of India, it is China.

Chinese space militarization causes India to develop ASAT capabilities

Liang and Rajagopalan, 16 - Citing Rajeswar Pillai Rajagopalan Head of New Delhis
Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative at the Observer Researcher Foundation
[Xiaodon,Intern with the Political and Security Affairs group at NBR, February 10, NBR,
India's Space Program: Challenges, Opportunities, and Strategic Concerns,
http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=651, accessed 6/22/16, ge]
How has the Indian space program changed in the last decade? Is there a new focus on
the military applications of space, and what brought about this shift in focus? India's
space program is several decades old and has been focused primarily on peaceful uses,
with a number of scientific and technological applications including telemedicine, teleeducation, disaster warning, search and rescue operations, mobile communications, and
remote sensing and weather. Given that India is a country with huge developmental
challenges, it is always tough to make an argument justifying allocations for space
missions that do not have a direct bearing on development. That said, while military
functions were not a focus of India's space program until about a decade ago, they have
always been at the back of decision-makers' minds. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first postindependence prime minister, and Vikram Sarabhai, the father of India's space program,
understood the relevance of space to India in the national security domain from the
program's inception. Nevertheless, India did not focus much on the security applications
of outer space until 2007. The wake-up call for India came when China conducted its first
anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test in January 2007. The test clearly illustrated the
challenges right in India's own neighborhood. Beijing came under a huge amount of
criticism on two counts: one, for not announcing the test, and two, and more
importantly, for creating long-lasting debris in low-earth orbit. While the test generated
anger and public outcry, it did not result in any real punitive measures. The informal
moratorium on ASAT tests, which had lasted for two and a half decades, was broken by
the Chinese ASAT test. Thereafter, the United States tested an ASAT missile in 2008,
which the international community was much more comfortable with because it was
done openly and did not lead to the creation of long-lasting debris. For India, however,
China has been of particular concern . Beijing's activities in recent years have been
driven by competition with the United States, so the capabilities it is developing are
much more advanced than what are necessary to deter India. Nonetheless, India has to
be mindful of Chinese advances. Following China's ASAT test, the scientific and technical
communities and the Indian Air Force leadership, as well as sections of the political
leadership, started debating whether India should be developing its own
ASAT capability, and whether this capability should be demonstrated or
simulated. India has a missile defense system under development, and the potential
for India to acquire an ASAT capability is linked to its missile defense
capabilities . The Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation has been
developing missile defense capabilities independently but is also increasingly looking to
partner with the United States and other countries. In contrast, China has followed the
route of developing an ASAT capability first and later developing missile defense based
on its ASAT capability. How do China's space capabilities play into the regional politics of
the subcontinent? India is closely monitoring China's space cooperation
initiatives in South Asia. China launched a satellite for Pakistan in 2011, and another
for Sri Lanka in 2012. Our concerns are informed by the nuclear precedent; cooperation
with China was critical for the Pakistani program. India feels that if Pakistan, which
today has very limited space capabilities, cooperated with China, it could
become a capable power in the space realm . The two major concerns are an
independent Pakistani ASAT capability and further development of Pakistan's long-

range missile capabilities. An ASAT capability is not quite as simple as rocket technology,
but it would not be the hardest thing for Pakistan to achieve either. For China, Sri Lanka
is extremely important in the maritime security context, and for the Maritime Silk Road
program. IndiaSri Lanka relations have gone through ups and downs, but the new
president, Maithripala Sirisena, and new prime minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, both
have a friendly disposition toward India. Nonetheless, there are strict limits to Indian
influence in Colombo. Critically, Sri Lanka is in dire need of economic opportunities and
faces huge developmental challenges. Even if India had all the goodwill to support and
help Sri Lanka, it does not have the deep pockets that China does. India is concerned that
space cooperation may become yet another path for China to make inroads
in Colombo . Have India's positions in multilateral forums on how the space domain
should be governed changed with the country's new focus on military capabilities?
Despite India's new interest in military capabilities in space, official rhetoric and official
statements at UN forums, such as the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, continue
to emphasize India's support for the peaceful and civilian use of outer space and
opposition to the weaponization of space capabilities and programs. Nevertheless, there
are changes on the ground. There has also been some evolution in India's stance to
developing global regimes for outer space. For instance, if you look at its position in
201112, the country was highly critical of the European Union's effort to develop a code
of conduct, arguing that the EU cannot decide what is good for the rest of the world and
expect all countries to sign on to the proposal. India has come a long way since then. In
the last three years, it has been actively engaged with the United States, all the European
countries, and the EU in particular in discussing a code of conduct and other
promising mechanism s. Nevertheless, India has continued with its stated position
that transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBM) are worthwhile, but they
are only complementary to legally binding mechanisms. Having said that, India is also
beginning to understand and appreciate that in the current political climate, negotiating
international treaties will not be easy as long as reaching consensus among the major
powers remains a challenge. India has become slightly more pragmatic and now believes
that TCBMs may be a good starting point, allowing for a gradual move toward legally
binding mechanisms with all the important clauses on verification and enforcement. The
best historical precedent would be the Outer Space Treaty, which started with a very
loose set of regulations within the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space that
went on to become a treaty in 1967. Has the increased use of space capabilities for
military applications changed how India thinks about its reliance on other countries and
private actors in space? Contemporary wars, from the first Persian Gulf War onward,
have been highly technology-dependent, with C4ISR (command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities
playing a key role. India appreciates that reliance on the integration of outer space and
cyber capabilities will only increase in future conflicts. Through 2013, India had about 25
satellites, of which 4 were dual-use. The military was relying on those 4 satellites and did
not have a dedicated military satellite until August 2013, when the first satellite was
launched for the Indian Navy for maritime communications. Until then, India was
relying on Inmarsat, a British commercial satellite communication provider. The next
military satellite will serve the Indian Air Force and Indian Army and will likely have a
delayed launch this year. Beyond the maritime domain, India has been relying on foreign
partners for many other satellite-based communications and data services. For instance,
it continues to rely on NASA for deep space communications. India also works a great
deal with France to launch its heavy satellites.

Chinese cooperation with Pakistan drives the need for Indian ASATs
Gapalaswamy and Wang, 10 [Bharath and Ting, Atlantic Council South Asia Center
Director and Cornell Postdoctoral candidate, August, Elsevier, Vol 26 Iss 4, 229-235, GE]
Although India does not have any official military satellites, satellite technology is
inherently dual use. And it is no surprise that some of these assets would be valuable
both from a civilian and a military perspective. One of the possible methods to protect
these satellites is to develop a KE-ASAT. We believe the following factors could most
likely motivate India to develop an ASAT. 3.1. Concerns about China India and China are
two of the oldest existing civilizations and have long coexisted in peace and harmony.
However, in the post-colonial world, except for a brief period of bonhomie in the 1950s,
their relationship has been marked by rivalry, conflict, containment, mutual
suspicion and deep mistrust . The countries adopted two different political systems
and issues such as border disputes, incursions by the Chinese military and visits by the
Dalai Lama to Indian territories claimed by Beijing have been sources of tension between
the two regional giants. Although 47 years have passed since both nations went to war in
1962 over border disputes, the issues still remain unsolved; consequently there is no
agreed border. Chinas repeated incursions across the Sikkim border and the line of
control across Arunachal Pradesh, its deployment of nuclear submarines at Hainan
Island, its increasing activity in the Indian Ocean and its growing defence
cooperation with Pakistan have been a source of concern to India. China and
Pakistan have had ties for almost five decades now. Stephen Cohen, a prominent South
Asia expert at the Brookings Institution has described China as pursuing a classic
balance of power strategy by supporting Pakistan in a relationship that mirrors the one
between the USA and Israel.19 China is Pakistans largest defence supplier. It has helped
Pakistan with its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes by maintaining a steady
supply of equipment and scientific supplies throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The two
countries relationship reached significant heights in 1992 when China supplied Pakistan
with 34 short-range M-11 ballistic missiles that can be used for carrying nuclear
warheads. They have also had a significant relationship in conventional weapons with
recent sales including JF-17 aircrafts, JF-17 production facilities, F-22P frigates with
helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, F-7 aircraft, small arms and other munitions. The
relationship also extends to China helping Pakistan build a deep sea-port at the naval
base at Gwadar in the province of Baluchistan on the Arabian Sea.20 The base is part of
Chinas strategy of establishing naval bases in the Indian Ocean, which has been dubbed
the string of pearls strategy. This has stoked a considerable fear of encirclement in
India,21 which in turn could be seen to justify a decision to develop an ASAT.

il coop zero sum

US-China and US-India relations are zero sum
Malik, Honolulu Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Professor, 12
[Mohan, July/August, World Affairs Journal, China and India Today: Diplomats Jostle,
Militaries Prepare, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/china-and-india-todaydiplomats-jostle-militaries-prepare, accessed 6/22/16, GE]
Just as the Indian subcontinental plate has a tendency to constantly rub and push
against the Eurasian tectonic plate, causing friction and volatility in the entire
Himalayan mountain range, Indias bilateral relationship with China is also a subtle,
unseen, but ongoing and deeply felt collision, the affects of which have left a convoluted
lineage. Tensions between the two powers have come to influence everything from their
military and security decisionmaking to their economic and diplomatic maneuvering,
with implications for wary neighbors and faraway allies alike. The relationship is
complicated by layers of rivalry, mistrust, and occasional cooperation, not to mention
actual geographical disputes. Distant neighbors buffered by Tibet and the Himalayas for
millennia, China and India became next-door neighbors with contested frontiers and
disputed histories in 1950, following the occupation of Tibet by Maos Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA). While the rest of the world started taking note of Chinas rise
during the last decade of the twentieth century, India has been warily watching Chinas
rise ever since a territorial dispute erupted in a brief but full-scale war in 1962, followed
by skirmishes in 1967 and 1987. Several rounds of talks held since 1981 have failed to
resolve the disputed claims. During his last visit to India, in 2010, Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao dashed any hopes of early border settlement, stating that it would take a very long
time to settle the boundary issuea situation that in many ways works to Beijings
advantage. An unsettled border provides China the strategic leverage to keep India
uncertain about its intentions, and nervous about its capabilities, while exposing Indias
vulnerabilities and weaknesses, and encouraging New Delhis good behavior on issues
of vital concern. Besides, as the ongoing unrest and growing incidents of selfimmolations by Buddhist monks in Tibet show, Beijing has not yet succeeded in
pacifying and Sinicizing Tibet, as it has Inner Mongolia. The net result is that the 2,520mile Sino-Indian frontier, one of the longest inter-state boundaries in the world, remains
Chinas only undefined land border. It is also becoming heavily militarized, as tensions
rise over Chinas aggressive patrolling on the line of actual control (LAC) and its military
drills, using live ammunition, for a potential air and land campaign to capture highaltitude mountain passes in Tibet. Over the last decade, the Chinese have put in place a
sophisticated military infrastructure in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) adjoining
India: five fully operational air bases, several helipads, an extensive rail network, and
thirty thousand miles of roadsgiving them the ability to rapidly deploy thirty divisions
(fifteen thousand soldiers each) along the border, a three-to-one advantage over India.
China has not only increased its military presence in Tibet but is also ramping up its
nuclear arsenal. In addition, the PLAs strategic options against India are set to multiply
as Chinese land and rail links with Pakistan, Nepal, Burma, and Bangladesh improve.
Developments on the disputed Himalayan borders are central to Indias internal debate
about the credibility of its strategic deterrent and whether to test nuclear weapons again.
Being the weaker power, India is far more concerned about the overall military balance
tilting to its disadvantage. India sees China everywhere because of Beijings hexiao
gongda policy in South Asia: uniting with the smallPakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal,
Burma, and Sri Lankato counter the bigIndia. When combined with Chinese
nuclear and missile transfers to Pakistan and building of port facilities around Indias

periphery, and a dramatic increase in the PLAs incursions and transgressions across the
LAC, the official Indian perception of China has undergone a dramatic shift since 2006,
with China now being widely seen as posing a major security threat in the short to
medium term rather than over the long term. The Indian military, long preoccupied with
war-fighting scenarios against Pakistan, has consequently turned its attention to the
China border, and unveiled a massive force modernization program, to cost $100 billion
over the next decade, that includes the construction of several strategic roads and the
expansion of rail networks, helipads, and airfields all along the LAC. Other measures
range from raising a new mountain strike corps and doubling force levels in the eastern
sector by one hundred thousand troops to the deployment of Sukhoi Su-30MKI aircraft,
spy drones, helicopters, and ballistic and cruise missile squadrons to defend its
northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, territory three times the size of Taiwan that the
Chinese invaded in 1962 and now claim sovereignty over as Southern Tibet. Propelled
by incidents related to border disputes, Chinese opposition to the US-India nuclear
energy deal, Indias angst over the growing trade deficit due to perceived Chinese unfair
trade practices, potential Chinese plans to dam the Brahmaputra River, and the war
talk in the official Chinese media in the 2007 to 2009 period (reminding India not to
forget the lessons of 1962), mutual distrust between the Indian and Chinese peoples is
growing. Clearly, Chinas extraordinary economic performance over the last three
decades has changed the dynamics of the relationship. China and India had similar
average incomes in the late 1970s, but thirty years later they find themselves at
completely different stages of development. Chinas economic reformslaunched in
1978, nearly thirteen years before Indias in 1991changed their subsequent growth
trajectories by putting China far ahead of India in all socioeconomic indices. Both
Chinas gross domestic product and military expenditure are now three times the size of
Indias; recent surveys conducted by Pew Global Research show a growth in popular
distrust, with just twenty-five percent of Indians holding a favorable view of China in
2011, down from thirty-four percent in 2010 and fifty-seven percent in 2005. Likewise,
just twenty-seven percent of Chinese hold a favorable view of India in 2011, down from
thirty-two percent in 2010, with studies of Internet content showing a large degree of
hostility and contempt for India. Nor is there much effort to keep these emotions
submerged. Reacting to the test launch in mid-April of a long-range Agni-V ballistic
missile, dubbed the China killer by Indias news media, a Chinese daily wryly noted
that India stands no chance in an overall arms race with China, because Chinas
nuclear power is stronger and more reliable. The unequal strategic equation, in
particular the Chinese perception of India as a land of irreconcilable socioreligious
cleavages with an inherently unstable polity and weak leadership that is easily contained
through proxies, aggravates tensions between the two. In 2008, an official reassessment
of Chinas capabilities and intentions led the Indian military to adopt a two-front war
doctrine against what is identified as a collusive threat posed by two closely aligned
nuclear-armed neighbors, Pakistan and China. This doctrine validates the long-held
belief of Indias strategic community that China is following a protracted strategy of
containing Indias rise. India is also responding by strengthening its strategic links with
Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Burmacountries on Chinas
periphery. In testimony to the US Senate in February, James Clapper, the director of
national intelligence, noted that the Indian military is strengthening its forces in
preparation to fight a limited conflict along the disputed border, and is working to
balance Chinese power projection in the Indian Ocean. That balance includes a
strategic tilt toward the United States that has also had a damaging effect on SinoIndian relations . Although leaders from both countries often repeat the ritualized
denials of conflict and emphasize burgeoning trade ties, such platitudes cannot obliterate

the trust deficit. Few if any of Chinas strategic thinkers seem to hold positive views of
India for Chinas future, and vice versa. Chinese strategists keep a wary eye on Indias
great power dreams, its military spending and weapons acquisitions, and the
developments in Indias naval and nuclear doctrines. A dominant theme in Chinese
commentary in the last decade is that Indias growing strengthbacked by the United
Statescould tip Asias balance of power away from Beijing. Not surprisingly, bilateral
relations between Asias giants remain, in the words of Zhang Yan, Chinas ambassador
to India, very fragile, very easy to be damaged, and very difficult to repair. Both have
massive manpower resources, a scientific and industrial base, and million-plus
militaries. For the first time in more than fifty years, both are moving upward
simultaneously on their relative power trajectories. As the pivotal power in South Asia,
India perceives itself much as China has traditionally perceived itself in relation to East
Asia. Both desire a peaceful security environment to focus on economic development and
avoid overt rivalry or conflict. Still, the volatile agents of nationalism, history, ambition,
strength, and size produce a mysterious chemistry. Neither power is comfortable with
the rise of the other. Both seek to envelop neighbors with their national economies. Both
are nuclear and space powers with growing ambitions. Both yearn for a multipolar world
that will provide them the space for growth and freedom of action. Both vie for
leadership positions in global and regional organizations and have attempted to establish
a sort of Monroe Doctrine in their respective neighborhoodswithout much success. And
both remain suspicious of each others long-term agenda and intentions. Each perceives
the other as pursuing hegemony and entertaining imperial ambitions. Both are non
status quo powers: China in terms of territory, power, and influence; India in terms of
status, power, and influence. Both seek to expand their power and influence in and
beyond their regions at each others expense . Chinas Malacca paranoia is matched
by Indias Hormuz dilemma. If Chinas navy is going south to the Indian Ocean, Indias
navy is going east to the Pacific Ocean. Both suffer from a siege mentality born out of
their elites acute consciousness of the divisive tendencies that make their countries
present political unity so fragile. After all, much of Chinese and Indian history is made
up of long periods of internal disunity and turmoil, when centrifugal forces brought
down even the most powerful empires. Each has its vulnerabilitiesregional conflicts,
poverty, and religious divisions for India; the contradiction between a market economy
and Leninist politics for China. Both are plagued with domestic linguistic, ethnoreligious, and politico-economic fault lines that could be their undoing if not managed
properly. In other words, China and India are locked in a classic security dilemma: one
country sees its actions as defensive, but the same actions appear aggressive to the other.
Beijing fears that an unrestrained Indian powerparticularly one that is backed by the
West and Japanwould not only threaten Chinas security along its restive southwestern
frontiers (Tibet and Xinjiang) but also obstruct Chinas expansion southwards. Faced
with exponential growth in Chinas power and influence, India feels the need to take
counterbalancing measures and launch strategic initiatives to emerge as a great power,
but these are perceived as challenging and threatening in China. Chinas use of regional
and international organizations to institutionalize its power while either denying India
access to these organizations or marginalizing India within them has added a
new competitive dynamic to the relationship. In the past decade, India has found itself
ranged against China at the UN Security Council, East Asia Summit, the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Asian Development Bank.
In 2009, China vetoed a development plan for India by the latter in the disputed
Arunachal Pradesh, thereby internationalizing a bilateral territorial dispute. In a tit-fortat response, New Delhi has kept Beijing out of India-led multilateral frameworks such
as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation,

the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue, and the MekongGanga Cooperation forums,

and rejected Chinas request to be included as observer or associate member into the 33member Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, started by India in 2008. Resource scarcity has
added a maritime dimension to this geopolitical rivalry. As Chinas and Indias energy
dependence on the Middle East and Africa increases, both are actively seeking to forge
closer defense and security ties with resource supplier nations (e.g., Saudi Arabia and
Iran), and to develop appropriate naval capabilities to dominate the sea lanes through
which the bulk of their commerce flows. Since seventy-seven percent of Chinas oil comes
from the Middle East and Africa, Beijing has increased its activities in the Indian Ocean
region by investing in littoral states economies, building ports and infrastructure,
providing weaponry, and acquiring energy resources. Nearly ninety percent of Chinese
arms sales go to countries located in the Indian Ocean region. Beijing is investing heavily
in developing the Gwadar deep-sea port in Pakistan, and naval bases in Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Whether one calls it a string of pearls or a series of places
at which Chinas navy can base or simply be resupplied, that navy is setting up support
infrastructure in strategic locations along the same sea lanes of communication that
could neutralize Indias geographical advantage in the Indian Ocean region. A recent
commentary from the official Xinhua news outlet called for setting up three lines of navy
supply bases in the northern Indian Ocean, the western Indian Ocean, and the southern
Indian Ocean. It stated: China needs to establish overseas strategic support stations for
adding ship fuel, re-supply of necessities, staff break time, repairs of equipment, and
weapons in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, which will be the core support bases in
the North Indian Ocean supply line; Djibouti, Yemen, Oman, Kenya, Tanzania, and
Mozambique, which will be the core support bases in the West Indian Ocean supply line;
and Seychelles and Madagascar, which will be the core support bases in the South Indian
Ocean supply line. For its part, New Delhi is pursuing the same strategy as Beijing and
creating its own web of relationships with the littoral states, both bilaterally and
multilaterally, through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, to ensure that if the military
need arises, the necessary support infrastructure and network will be in place. India has
also stepped up defense cooperation with Oman and Israel in the west, while upgrading
military ties with the Maldives, Madagascar, and Myanmar in the Indian Ocean, and
with Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, Japan,
and the United States in the east. In December 2006, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, then
Indias naval chief, expanded the conceptual construct of Indias greater strategic
neighborhood to include potential sources of oil and gas imports located across the
globefrom Venezuela to the Sakhalin Islands in Russia. The Indian navy currently has a
stronger naval presence on the Indian Ocean than does China. It is strengthening its port
infrastructure with new southern ports, which allow greater projection into the ocean.
Taking a leaf out of Chinas book, the new focus is to develop anti-access and area-denial
capabilities that will thwart any Chinese attempt at encirclement or sea-access denial. In
short, maritime competition is intensifying as Indian and Chinese navies show the flag in
the Pacific and Indian oceans with greater frequency. This rivalry could spill into the
open after a couple of decades, when one Indian aircraft carrier will be deployed in the
Pacific Ocean and one Chinese aircraft carrier in the Indian Oceanostensibly to
safeguard their respective trade and energy routes. In turn, Indias Look East policy is
a manifestation of its own strategic intent to compete for influence in the wider AsiaPacific region. Just as China will not concede Indias primacy in South Asia and the
Indian Ocean region, India seems unwilling to accept Southeast and East Asia as Chinas
sphere of influence. Just as Chinas rise is viewed positively in the South Asian region
among the small countries surrounding India with which New Delhi has had difficult
relations, Indias rise is viewed in positive-sum terms among Chinas neighbors

throughout East and Southeast Asia. Over the last two decades, India has sought to
enhance its economic and security ties with those Northeast and Southeast Asian nations
(Mongolia, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and
Australia) that worry about China more than any other major power. As Chinas growing
strength creates uneasiness in the region, Indias balancing role is welcome within the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order to influence Chinas behavior
in cooperative directions. While the Southeast Asian leaders seek to deter China from
utilizing its growing strength for coercive purposes and to maintain regional autonomy,
Indian strategic analysts favor an Indian naval presence in the South China Sea and the
Pacific Ocean to counter Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. On maritime
security, Southeast Asians seem more willing to cooperate with India than China,
especially in the Strait of Malacca. A key element of Indias Pacific outreach has been
regular naval exercises, port calls, security dialogues, and more than a dozen defense
cooperation agreements. India has welcomed Vietnams offer of berthing rights in Na
Trang Port in the South China Sea, and news reports suggest that India might offer
BrahMos cruise missiles and other military hardware at friendship prices to Vietnam.
The conclusion of free-trade agreements with Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, Japan,
and the ASEAN, coupled with New Delhis participation in multilateral forums such as
the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Plus Eight defense ministers meetings, have also
reinforced strategic ties. Indias determination to strengthen its strategic partnership
with Japan and Vietnam, commitment to pursue joint oil exploration with Hanoi in the
South China Sea waters in the face of Chinese opposition, and an emphasis on the
freedom of navigation are signs of India maneuvering to be seen as a counterweight to
Chinese power in East Asia. New Delhi is also scaling up defense ties with Tokyo, Seoul,
and Canberra. The US-India partnership is also emerging as an important component of
Indias strategy to balance Chinas power. India seeks US economic and technological
assistance. It helps this relationship that Indias longtime security concernsChina and
Pakistanalso now happen to be the United States long-term and immediate strategic
concerns as well. Both the Bush and Obama administrations have encouraged Indias
involvement in a wider Asian security system to balance a rising China and declining
Japan. Apparently, US weaknessreal or perceivedinvites Chinese
assertiveness. Since the United States does not wish to see Asia dominated by a single
hegemonic power or a coalition of states, Indias economic rise is seen as serving
Washingtons long-term interests by ensuring that there be countervailing powers in
AsiaChina, Japan, and India, with the United States continuing to act as an engaged
offshore power balancer. The India factor is increasingly entering the ongoing US
policy debate over China. Asia-Pacific is now the Indo-Pacific, a term underlining the
centrality of India in the new calculus of regional power. The 2010 US Quadrennial
Defense Review talked of Indias positive role as a net security provider in the Indian
Ocean and beyond. Indias Look East policy, which envisions high-level engagement
with China-wary nations (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia,
and Australia), dovetails with the US policy of establishing closer ties with countries
beyond Washingtons traditional treaty partners to maintain US predominance. The USIndian strategic engagement, coupled with Indias expanding naval and nuclear
capabilities and huge economic potential, have made India loom larger on Chinas radar
screen. An editorial in a Shanghai daily last November lamented the fact that India will
not allow itself to stay quietly between the US and China. It wants to play triangle
affairs with the duo, and will do anything it can to maximize its benefit out
of it. Therefore, China will find it hard to buy India over. The Chinese fear that the
Indian-American cooperation in defense, high-tech R&D, nuclear, space, and maritime
spheres would prolong US hegemony and prevent the establishment of a post-American,

Sino-centric hierarchical regional order in Asia. This tightening relationship, and the
possibility that what is presently a tilt on Indias part could turn into a full-fledged
alignment, is a major reason for recent deterioration in Chinese-Indian relations.
Although these relations remain unstable and competitive, both have sought to reduce
tensions. Despite border disputes, denial of market access, and harsh words against the
Dalai Lama, leaders in both countries understand the dangers of allowing problems to
overwhelm the relationship. Burgeoning economic ties between the worlds two fastestgrowing economies have become the most salient aspect of their bilateral relationship.
Trade flows have risen rapidly, from a paltry $350 million in 1993 to $70 billion in 2012,
and could surpass $100 billion by 2015. Several joint ventures in power generation,
consumer goods, steel, chemicals, minerals, mining, transport, infrastructure, info-tech,
and telecommunication are in the works. Intensifying trade, commerce, and tourism
could eventually raise the stakes for China in its relationship with India. On the positive
side, both share common interests in maintaining regional stability (for example,
combating Islamist fundamentalists), exploiting economic opportunities, and
maintaining access to energy sources, capital, and markets. Despite ever-increasing trade
volumes, however, there is as yet no strategic congruence between China and India. As in
the case of Sino-US and Sino-Japanese ties, Sino-Indian competitive tendencies, rooted
in geopolitics and nationalism, are unlikely to be easily offset even by growing economic
and trade links. In fact, the economic relationship is heavily skewed. The bulk of Indian
exports to China consist of iron ore and other raw materials, while India imports mostly
manufactured goods from Chinaa classic example of the dependency model. Most
Indians see China as predatory in trade. New Delhi has lodged the largest number of
anti-dumping cases against Beijing in the World Trade Organization. India is keener on
pursuing mutual economic dependencies with Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian
nations through increased trade, investment, infrastructure development, and aid to
bolster economic and political ties across Asia that will counter Chinese power. Even as a
range of economic and transnational issues draw them closer together, the combination
of internal issues of stability (Tibet and Kashmir), disputes over territory, competition
over resources (oil, gas, and water), overseas markets and bases, external overlapping
spheres of influence, rival alliance relationships, and ever-widening geopolitical horizons
forestall the chances for a genuine Sino-Indian accommodation. Given the broad range
of negative attitudes and perceptions each country has for the other, it is indeed
remarkable that China and India have been able to keep diplomatic relations from
fraying. How long this situation can last is more and more uncertain as each country is
increasingly active in what would once have been seen as the others backyard and both
engage in strategic maneuvers to checkmate each other. Just as China has become
more assertive vis--vis the United States, Indian policy toward China is
becoming tougher. Indias evolving Asia strategy reflects the desire for an arc of
partnerships with Chinas key neighborsin Southeast Asia and further east along the
Asia-Pacific rimand the United States that would help neutralize the continuing
Chinese military assistance and activity around its own territory and develop counterleverages of its own vis--vis China to keep Beijing sober. At this point, the two
heavyweights circle each other warily, very much aware that their feints and jabs could
turn into a future slugging match.

il space coop zero sum

Space cooperation between India and China is zero sum
Brown, Asia Times, 10 [Peter, Jul 16, Asia Times, Asia takes stock of new US space
policy, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LG16Df02.html, accessed 6/22/16,
GE]
India is a different story entirely, and India certainly welcomes the direction in which
the new US space policy seems to be heading. "This could facilitate further cooperation
with India-US technology transfer in exchange for the use of Indian launch vehicles for
US payloads. Space cooperation with India already picked up speed after the agreement
on nuclear cooperation," said Ghoshroy. "The emphasis in the new policy on
international cooperation can only help this process. The policy also mentions potential
for government to government agreement for transfer of sensitive technology. For
example, US-India cooperation in missile defense is going forward." Suzuki described
India as a good partner with the US on certain space science missions. "India will be the
happiest of these three Asian countries," said Suzuki. The new US space policy makes
cooperation in space with India more viable, "not on the application programs, but on
the scientific programs. When it comes to space technology, Indian application programs
are strongly concentrated on its domestic concerns, and there is not much for the US to
cooperate on these programs. But for the science programs, it would be more viable."
Still, a curious debate is now underway in India. With the launch in early July by the
Indian Space Research Organization of a new satellite for Algeria - one of five spacecraft
launched simultaneously on a single launch vehicle by ISRO - some in the Indian space
sector are celebrating because certain foreign-built components aboard the Algerian
satellite have never been allowed into India before, let alone processed through an
Indian launch facility. At the same time, others in the Indian space sector have been
pointing fingers and blaming the presence of foreign components aboard Indian
spacecraft for contributing to several recent partial and total mission failures. While this
gets sorted out, India's space program is entering an exciting phase. Indeed, India could
soon engage in more aggressive partnering at China's expense.

impacts

! indo-pak war
Indian ASATs cause Indo-Pak war escalates and goes nuclear
Lewis, Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program postdoctoral
fellow, 04 [James, PhD Poli Sci Augustana College, July, Center for Defense
Information, What if Space Were Weaponized?,
http://openscenarios.ida.org/scenarios/287-What_If_Space_Were_Weaponized.pdf,
accessed 6/26/16, GE]
Previous scenarios outlined the relationship between U.S. pursuit of space weapons and
their possible spread to other countries. Perhaps the most straightforward possibility for
this phenomenon lies in the relationship between India and Pakistan. India is a state that
may pursue ASAT capabilities, if other states do so first. The chief of the Indian Air
Force, S. Krishnaswamy, recently remarked that: Any country on the fringe of space
technology like India has to work towards such a command as advanced countries are
already moving towards laser weapons platforms in space and killer satellites.57
Pakistan has a much smaller industrial base, but has long attempted to match Indian
deployments particularly in military matters. Pakistan is likely to emulate Indian
ASAT efforts , given the enmity between the two countries and the relative advantage
that India derives from the use of space for military operations. Developing states like
India and Pakistan could develop two types of ASATs by 2010. First, both states could
create modified missile defense systems to intercept satellites. All missile defense
interceptors have an inherent capability to intercept satellites in LEO. India already has
an active program to develop its own indigenous missile defenses and has expressed
interest in purchasing the U.S. Patriot PAC-3 and Russian S-300 short-range missile
defense systems.58 Sec ond, both states might develop so-called killer satellites based
on civilian microsatellite technology. The Indian Space Research Organization is already
supporting the development of a 60 kg technology demonstration microsatellite, called
ANUSAT, to be launched in 2005. India may also be interested in directed energy
weapons, although New Delhi probably lacks the technical expertise to develop such
weapons. Nevertheless, Indias Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) reportedly
commissioned a study on directed energy weapons and the Indian Defense Research and
Development Organization (DRDO) funds research on laser weapons.60 There are also
reports that the Indian military has conducted studies on space-based lasers, as well as a
kinetic attack loitering interceptor. Although Pakistan has a smaller technological base
than does India, Pakistan is also investing in space systems. Pakistan has created an
indigenous space agency, the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission
(SUPARCO), to build and launch indigenous satellites. Pakistan has also signed an
agreement to increase cooperation with the Chinese space program.61 The role that
space systems will play in Indian and Pakistan military operations in the future remains
unclear, and the nuclear arsenals of both countries remain inchoate. India has positioned
itself to exploit space technologies. New Delhi has launched several remote-sensing
satellites under the Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) Satellite System, including the
Technology Experimental Satellite with one-meter resolution.62 Already New Delhi is
sophisticated enough to eliminate any coverage of its military operations areas when
selling the IRS data commercially. Pakistan is more likely to focus on strategies that deny
India the use of space, rather than exploiting these advantages itself. Pakistan does,
however, lease a U.S.-built communications satellite in geostationary orbit Space-based
capabilities would provide India with a real advantage over Pakistan. When the U.S.based Federation of American Scientists (FAS) purchased one-meter resolution images
from a commercial satellite company, FAS analysts expressed surprise at the amount of

detail available about the Pakistani nuclear force. Looking at one image, an FAS analyst
said the image shows the Pakistanis have all their eggs in one basket. These Pakistani
missiles are vulnerable to an Indian first strike.63 The Indian military is also reportedly
interested in acquiring military GPS receivers from the United States and has launched a
national communications satellite constellation, INSAT, that will carry military traffic.64
India may also be interested in supplementing national capabilities with commercial
systems By 2010, these capabilities could provide India with a substantial advantage in a
crisis. Both countries rely on offensively oriented conventional military doctrines. India
reportedly considered limited conventional strikes on Pakistani targets in response to
alleged Pakistani support for terrorists. Indian officials apparently believe that nuclear
weapons would discourage the escalation of a low-intensity conflict into a full-scale
conventional war. The Pakistani Army, in contrast, emphasizes launching counteroffensives to respond to limited strikes.65 Perhaps mindful of Pakistans strategy, India
considered a round of air strikes during a recent conflict that would have been limited to
the monsoon season, when heavy rains impede large-scale conventional armor
operations.66 In war games conducting by the United States Navy, very similar scenarios
were played out.67 In each of these scenarios, Pakistan used limited nuclear weapon
attacks to attempt to disrupt Indian conventional operations. During a conflict in 2010,
Pakistan may have a strong incentive to launch preemptive strikes against satellites used
by the Indian military for reconnaissance and communications. Such strikes would pose
substantial challenges to U.S. security policy. First, even limited strikes against Indian
satellites could very well endanger U.S. space assets, including imaging satellites and
civil space missions. A 1985 ASAT test conducted by the United States created hundreds
of pieces of debris, many of which remained in orbit for a decade. In 1999, one of these
pieces of debris came within about one kilometer from the International Space
Station.68 Although unlikely, the National Academy of Sciences has warned of the
possibility of collisional cascading from debris impacts at crowded altitudes.69 High
altitude nuclear detonations could also create substantial collateral damage, through
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and radiation effects. Second, Pakistan might target thirdparty satellites used by the Indian Army. Potential targets would include commercial
imaging and communications satellites, as well as the GPS or European Galileo system if
Indian forces were allowed to utilize those services during an offensive. Such attacks
would have unanticipated affects on the United States. In one war game, the United
States faced what one participant called ugly choices about commercial satellites being
used by potential opponents. Participants discovered that they were unable to determine
who might be affected by a decision to shoot down a commercial satellite. This,
according to one participant, vastly complicates the national security landscape.70 The
United States has made clear that it would regard a deliberate attack on U.S. space
assets, including commercial satellites, as an act of war. The U.S. National Space Policy
states: Pur-poseful interference with U.S. space systems will be viewed as an
infringement on our sovereign rights. The United States may take all appropriate selfdefense measures, including if directed by the National Command Authorities, the use of
force to respond to such an infringement on U.S. rights.71 In practice, of course, the
U.S. threat to treat attacks on satellites as an act of war may not be credible for
commercial satellites supporting foreign military operations. Moreover, the lack of
casualties in an attack on U.S. space assets also raises questions about the credibility of
this commitment Perhaps more importantly, the risk of Pakistani ASAT attacks would
create the same escalatory incentives for India that the United States faces in the second
scenario. U.S. war games suggest that future conflicts in South Asia may not be
very stable.72 A contractor who has conduct more than two dozen war games for the
Pentagon and other military-planning centers told the Wall Street Journal that the

India-Pakistan scenarios usually escalate to the use of nuclear weapons within the
first 12 days of the war game. Its a scary scenario, said one participant. Antisatellite weapons would reinforce the strong escalatory dynamic that many war games
have revealed. For example, war games that quickly escalate to nuclear use are often
restarted to allow the Indian side to reconsider some of the moves that lead to Pakistani
escalation. The Indian side, however, generally learns the opposite lesson and attempts a
lighting strike to destroy the Pakistani nuclear stockpile. When asked if the Indian
Armed Force could really execute a preemptive strategy, one participant noted,
Probably not, but they believe they could. According to U.S. intelligence estimates, a
limited nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan could kill as many as 12 million
people .73 The scale of the humanitarian catastrophe has led the military to war game
possible scenarios for peacekeeping missions to prevent escalation. Participants learned
that such interventions , as often as not, escalated into a crisis . In at least one
game, the United States was compelled to send a rescue team to forcibly enter Pakistan
and relieve a besieged division of U.S. peacekeepers this force was attacked with
nuclear weapons. Yet, will the United States really be able to keep out of a conflict if vital
military and commercial assets in space are threatened, either deliberately or
collaterally, by South Asian ASATs?

! laundry list
ASAT tests result in space debris, collapse the Civil Nuclear Agreement, and
stall Indian indigenization
Vasani, Manipal University Department of Geopolitics and International
Relations Postgrad Research Scholar, 16 [Harsh, March 27, International Politics
Review, THROUGH ADVERSARIES, TO THE STARS,
http://www.internationalpoliticsreview.com/through-adversariesto-the-stars/, accesed
6/26/16, GE]
III. New Delhis Dilemma The questions raised over Indias ASAT weapons capacity are
doubtless important. Even if New Delhi does have anti-satellite weapons capability, it
will only be acknowledged if it comes out in the open with a successful test. But such a
demonstration will come with its own costs. What would be the consequences if New
Delhi decided to demonstrate its purported ASAT weapons capability? It should be
remembered that along with causing grave insecurity, and possibly a spaceweaponisation race in the region, such a test will also lead to creation of hazardous
space debris which would doubtlessly elicit international opprobrium, possibly even
sanctions. The burgeoning relations between the United States and Indiawhich led to
the signing of the 2007 India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement and made India the first
country with nuclear weapons which is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), but still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with Nuclear Weapons States
could be jeopardised if India unilaterally tests its ASAT weapons. At a time when India is
looking at indigenisation of its defence industry to cut the costs of importing weapons
(India is the worlds largest arms importer) and hoping to garner international
investments in its defence and manufacturing industry, such a move could stall such
developments as investors would see the tests as a sign of aggression and
defiance of international norms . Additionally, for India to establish its defenceindustrial base it needs the transfer of technology from technologically advanced states;
if New Delhi decides to go ahead with ASAT tests, it may end up looking at sanctions,
instead. It would also also be incongruous with its conduct if New Delhi decided to test
its ASAT weapons. India is a member of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination
Committee (IADC), and has contributed significantly to crafting that organisations
guidelines. A successful test of an ASAT weapon by India and the resulting debris would
seriously erode Indias credibility in this arena . Security analysts and scholars
advocating the demonstration of weapons should not
Sorry, nothing terminal here :/

! nuc terror
US-Indo relations solve nuke terror
Joshi et al, 13 [Sunjoy, Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswar Pillai Rajagopalan PhD,
James Jay Carafano PhD, Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis, Derek Scissors Ph.D, April 26,
Heritage Foundation, Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-us-indiarelations, accessed 6/24/16, GE]
India and the U.S. have several common interests when it comes to nonproliferation. For
both countries, the spread of nuclear weapons is a direct threat. Traditionally, India has
been a critic of the global nonproliferation regime while the U.S. has been a strong
advocate of it. While it has been a critic of the nonproliferation regime, India has never
supported the spread of nuclear weapons. Many of the differences between New Delhi
and Washington have, however, been removed in the past 10 years, beginning with the
Bush Administration. With the U.S.India nuclear deal, India has become more
integrated into the global nuclear order and has been more forthcoming in supporting
the nonproliferation regime. Under the Obama Administration, there have been further
advances with export-control regimes. Nevertheless, differences persist over how to
prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
Nuclear Terrorism. One promising area for expanded U.S.India cooperation is the
prevention of nuclear terrorism. Given the level of terrorist activity in the region and
India's vulnerability to Pakistan-based and state-supported terrorism, as well as the
question of the safety of Pakistan's nuclear assets, there is strong concern in New Delhi
about the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Furthermore, New Delhi is concerned about
partial state support to terrorist groups that might be interested in gaining access to
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The vulnerability of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is a growing
concern, especially given the number of Pakistani Taliban attacks on Pakistan's military
facilities.
A few years ago, the U.S. had put in place contingency plans for the recovery of
Pakistan's nuclear weapons in the event of a crisis of governance or, worse, an extremist
takeover of the country. India and the U.S. must institute measures that would ensure
that nuclear weapons are in responsible hands. Helping to strengthen Pakistan's
command-and-control structure is an important task. In the unlikely event of a Taliban
takeover, India and the U.S. would have to work with both the civilian and military
institutions to gain complete control of the weapons, failing which, India and the U.S.
would have to physically take control of the weapons and neutralize them.
With the U.S. set to draw down forces in Afghanistan, India's concerns about the
potential for nuclear terrorism in the region will only grow. The U.S., and India to a
lesser extent, are also concerned about the possibility that Iran might transfer its
emerging nuclear capabilities to terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah. There is strong
potential for India and the U.S. to increase their cooperation to deal with this common
threat, including establishing certain contingency measures in the event of a catastrophic
development, as well as preparing means to secure vulnerable nuclear facilities.

! space weapons
Weaponization collapses the nuclear threshold ensures nuclear
proliferation and global war extinction
Zhong, PLA National Defense University of Beijing Fellow, 16[Jing, January,
New Strategist Vol 1, Space Security and Strategic Stability,
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/55faab67e4b0914105347194/t/56f42f125f43a6ecc
531088e/1458843412729/newstrat-zhong.pdf, accessed 6/22/16, GE]
Faced with these serious challenges, it is undeniable that the situation for space has
become serious in recent years. Space weaponization will surely have deep implication
for strategic stability due to its strategic nature not least as a countermeasure against
nuclear weapons. Moreover, it will almost certainly change the arms control regime in
the future. Firstly, space weaponization will possibly lead to a power unbalance. Strategic
stability in essence refers to the notion of a balance of power among the leading nations,
and a sustained stability through certain international mechanisms. Strategic stability
can also be defined therefore as an enduring situation, in which various strategic forces
in the world are able to establish and sustain a framework for the fundamental relations
with each other, giving them, in turn, an adequate sense of security. Strategic stability
thus is closely related to the existing world order, through established international
mechanisms and norms of behavior in international relations. During the Cold War, the
nuclear weapon was the pillar of strategic stability. The nuclear balance between the
United States and the Soviet Union became the central theme for that stability. The
equilibrium of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) was believed to be e ective in
preventing nuclear war as neither side would not dare launch a preventive nuclear strike
lest the attack would lead to the automatic retaliation by the other side and bring about a
guaranteed self-destruction. MAD thus was not only a practice, but also the basis of a
theory, which constituted the conceptual basis for the strategy of deterrence that both
these two Superpowers were believed to embrace. According to deterrence strategy, the
focus was on the prevention rather than the actual fighting of a nuclear war. Thus, a
nuclear balance was achieved in terms of the identical nuclear doctrine as well as the
nuclear force structure between the two Superpowers. And it was based on this nuclear
balance that strategic stability was ultimately established. It was indeed a balance of
terror, codified by the ABM Treaty and other related nuclear agreements. At the same
time, strategic stability went beyond the manipulation by the two superpowers even in
the Cold War years. With the development of the world campaign for peace, nuclear
disarmament and nonproliferation, tension between the nuclear weapons states (NWS)
and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) increased. This situation had led the
conclusion of a number of important multilateral treaties like the Partial Test Ban Treaty
(PTBT) in 1963 and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1967. Strategic stability in the
Cold War years was therefore further consolidated as it became institutionalized through
the gradual establishment of a series of arms control and disarmament agreements, and
regional security arrangements both at bilateral and multilateral levels. Yet nuclear
weapons, as a core of strategic stability during the Cold War, was challenged with the
development of a revolution in military aairs (RMA) and new types of strategic
technology such as space power and cyber power. In particular, with the development of
space power and its extensive use in military operations, space power has become a
significant component of strategic power. Compared to the ordinary conventional
weapon, the use of a space weapon, projected onto the surface of the earth, would have
unimaginable shock eects on the populace and lead to the escalation of a war due to the
inevitable reaction from an adversary. Although a space weapon could not perhaps cause

the massive damage of a nuclear weapon, it would become even more important than
nuclear weapons in the future frame of global strategic stability because of its special
eects on a countrys politics, economics and security. We might also anticipate an
amazingly rapid development by dierent nations. Space weaponization could therefore
have grave and perhaps unknown negative implications for the world strategic stability
and arms control mechanisms. On one hand, space weaponization would undermine
strategic stability. Full-scale missile defense, as one step of space weaponization, will lead
to the nuclear unbalance due to its counteraction to nuclear weapons. This is a typical
case where the search for absolute security at the expense of the stability can a ect the
whole world. As a result, space weaponization will perhaps further stimulate the
horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear and conventional missiles.
Furthermore, space weaponization would destroy arms control and disarmament
mechanisms. As noted above, strategic stability in the Cold War years was consolidated
with a series of arms control and disarmament treaties. These legal documents reflected
the convergence of interests of the majority members of the world, as well as their
willingness to accept certain constraints on their own actions in the international arena.
However, space weaponization will completely overturn all these eorts by the
international community . An unlimited missile defense system (via space) will
undermine the nuclear balance, the very basis of these arms control treaties. It will thus
block directly the progress towards nuclear disarmament and that will surely spread to
related field of nuclear nonproliferation. Of course, some hold different views on this
issue. In the 2011 London Summit known as Global nuclear zero, the Global nuclear
zero initiative was committed to support to development of the proposed Missile
Defense cooperatively. Ultimately, it was seen as a benefit for strategic stability by
advancing the case for nuclear zero. However, as far as I am concerned, future
cooperative development of fullscale MD will create ambiguity because of the sharing of
sensitive technology and the absence of trust amongst those outside the MD system.
Meanwhile, as long as full-scale MD exists, it is di"cult to continue to cut nuclear
weapons. Therefore, fullscale MD will directly and seriously impede disarmament.
Space weaponization will be a huge challenge to a series of arms control and
disarmament agreements.

at: india wont asat-ize

Tech and political will exists
Gapalaswamy and Wang, 10 [Bharath and Ting, Atlantic Council South Asia Center
Director and Cornell Postdoctoral candidate, August, Elsevier, Vol 26 Iss 4, 229-235, GE]
India has now begun to take the military dimensions of its space programme seriously.
In the realization that modern day defence operations rely heavily on space assets, the
Indian government decided in 2008 to establish an Integrated Space Cell for more
effective utilization of the nations space-based assets for military purposes in 2008.10
This cell will function under the Integrated Defence Services Headquarters, which falls
under the Ministry of Defence and will be jointly operated by the three services of the
armed forces and the civilian Department of Space and ISRO.11 Although India has
consistently opposed the militarization of outer space, it seems to have been left with
little choice but to follow the trend towards its militarization. In a recently released
document entitled Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap 2010, the Indian
Ministry of Defence spelt out its views on space and in particular on ASAT technologies.
The roadmap specifically stated that it would focus on the following areas: ASAT (a) EMP
hardening of satellite & sensors and satellites against anti-satellite weapons. (b)
Development of ASATs for electronic or physical destruction of satellites in both LEO
[Low Earth Orbit] and Geo-Synchronous orbits.12 Very little information is available
from official and published sources on Indias Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite (KE-ASAT)
plan. It is fair to assume that the country will use the findings from its Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) programme for the development of its KE-ASAT. In fact, V.K. Saraswat,
the Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister was quoted earlier in 2010 as saying that
the kill vehicle, which is needed for intercepting the satellite, needs to be developed, and
that work is going on as part of the ballistic missile defense program.13 In a series of
interviews in 2008, Indian Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO)
scientists characterized Indias ABM programme as having two layers with interceptors
in the exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric regions, respectively.14 It has been
reported that both these capabilities have been tested in both regions in 2006 15 and
2007.16

at: us cant stop india

Yes it can
Gapalaswamy and Wang, 10 [Bharath and Ting, Atlantic Council South Asia Center
Director and Cornell Postdoctoral candidate, August, Elsevier, Vol 26 Iss 4, 229-235, GE]
Finally, the US government strongly opposes debris-creating activities in space, since the
USA has more space assets than any other country. Indian plans in this field would not
only damage its relationship with the USA but could also cause problems in the
burgeoning IndoUS relationship on missile defence, now flourishing thanks to the
synergies in technologies.
- Status quo solves
- Additional coop insufficient (on all space coop impacts, general miscalc stuff)
- No space war
- SSA fails (solvency ev) maybe some DA
- Any DA/CP link to potential DA, CP for different mechanism, different
countries, etc.

other offcase args

da links

link china politics

Plan unpopularseen as ceding Chinas key advantages to the US

Weeden and He 16. (Brian, former U.S. Air Force space and missile operations officer and
currently technical adviser for Secure World Foundation, a non-profit organization dedicated to the longterm sustainable use of outer space. Xiao, Assistant Research Fellow, Division of International Strategy, U.S.
Diplomacy and Politics @ Chinese Academy of Social Science, Institute of World Economic and Politics.
U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space, US-China Relations in Strategic Domains. The National Bureau of
Asian Research, Report #57, April 2016.
http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf)//CB

A key challenge in developing these agreements will be overcoming cultural and

bureaucratic incentives for opacity on both sides. In the United States, the national
security community has a deeply rooted culture of secrecy and unilateralism in the space
domain that results from policy decisions made during the Kennedy administration as
well as the consideration that space remains the last domain where the United States has
a decisive advantage. For China, which sees itself as significantly inferior to the United
States, opacity in space activities and programs is seen as one of the few tools to
offset overwhelming U.S. capabilities and resources. Both countries also have the
usual organizational silos and impediments to sharing information internally that are
inherent to all large bureaucracies and undermine bilateral sharing.

link us politics
Plan unpopularseen as ceding the USs key advantages to China

Weeden and He 16. (Brian, former U.S. Air Force space and missile operations officer and
currently technical adviser for Secure World Foundation, a non-profit organization dedicated to the longterm sustainable use of outer space. Xiao, Assistant Research Fellow, Division of International Strategy, U.S.
Diplomacy and Politics @ Chinese Academy of Social Science, Institute of World Economic and Politics.
U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space, US-China Relations in Strategic Domains. The National Bureau of
Asian Research, Report #57, April 2016.
http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf)//CB

A key challenge in developing these agreements will be overcoming cultural and

bureaucratic incentives for opacity on both sides. In the United States, the national
security community has a deeply rooted culture of secrecy and unilateralism in the space
domain that results from policy decisions made during the Kennedy administration as
well as the consideration that space remains the last domain where the United States
has a decisive advantage. For China, which sees itself as significantly inferior to the
United States, opacity in space activities and programs is seen as one of the few tools to
offset overwhelming U.S. capabilities and resources. Both countries also have the usual
organizational silos and impediments to sharing information internally that are inherent
to all large bureaucracies and undermine bilateral sharing.

Space cooperation is perceived as opening ourselves up to security threats

and helping their military
Wolf 2011 (Jim, prize-winning career journalist based in Paris, Washington D.C., and Bangkok, serves
as a news consultant to the Washington bureau of Japans NHK public broadcaster, Agence France-Presse
deputy bureau chief in Bangkok, 1980 to 1986, studied economic development and Thai during a 1998-99
Freedom Forum fellowship in Asian studies at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, completed a China study
tour co-sponsored by the Honolulu-based East-West Center and the Better Hong Kong Foundation during a
leave of absence from Reuters, guest lecturer at the U.S. National War College and Fudan Universitys
Journalism School in Shanghai, China, among other academic institutions, Analysis: Space: a frontier too
far for U.S.-China cooperation, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-spaceidUSTRE7010E520110102, January 2, 2011, silbs)

The prospects for cooperation between the United States and China in space are fading
even as proponents say working together in the heavens could help build bridges in
often-testy relations on Earth. The idea of joint ventures in space, including spacewalks, explorations and symbolic "feel
good" projects, have been floated from time to time by leaders on both sides. Efforts have gone nowhere over the past
decade, swamped by economic, diplomatic and security tensions , despite a 2009 attempt by
President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, to kick-start the bureaucracies. U.S. domestic politics make the issue

Washington is at odds with

Beijing over its currency policies and huge trade surplus but needs China's help to deter
North Korea and Iran's nuclear ambitions and advance global climate and trade talks,
among other matters. Hu's state visit will highlight the importance of expanding cooperation on "bilateral, regional and global
issues," the White House said. But space appears to be a frontier too far for now, partly due to U.S.
fears of an inadvertent technology transfer. China may no longer be much interested in any event, reckoning it does
unlikely to advance when Obama hosts Hu at the White House on January 19.

not need U.S. expertise for its space program. New obstacles to cooperation have come from the Republicans capturing control
of the U.S. House of Representatives in the November 2 congressional elections from Obama's Democrats. Representative Frank Wolf,
for instance, is set to take over as chairman of the appropriations subcommittee that funds the U.S. space agency in the House. A China
critic and human rights firebrand, the Republican congressman has faulted NASA's chief for meeting leaders of China's Manned Space
Engineering Office in October. "As you know, we

have serious concerns about the nature and goals of

China's space program and strongly oppose any cooperation between NASA and China ,"

Wolf and three fellow Republicans wrote NASA Administrator Charles Bolden on October 15 as he left for China. SPACE EXPLORATION
Obama and Hu, in a statement in November 2009, called for "the initiation of a joint dialogue on human spaceflight and space exploration,
based on the principles of transparency, reciprocity and mutual benefit." The statement, marking a visit by Obama to China, also called for

reciprocal visits in 2010 of NASA's chief and "the appropriate Chinese counterpart." Bolden, who went to China as head of a small team,
said discussions there "did not include consideration of any specific proposals for future cooperation" -- a statement apparently designed to
placate Wolf, who will have a big say in NASA's budget. The Chinese visit to NASA did not materialize in 2010 for reasons that have not
been explained. NASA representatives did not reply to questions but a Chinese embassy spokesman, Wang Baodong, said he suspected it
was "mainly a scheduling issue." China is an emerging space power. Over 13 years starting in August 1996, it ran up 75
consecutive successful Long March rocket launches after overcoming technical glitches with the help of U.S. companies. China launched its
second moon orbiter in October. In 2008, it became the third country after the United States and Russia to send astronauts on a spacewalk
outside an orbiting craft. Beijing plans an unmanned moon landing and deployment of a moon rover in 2012 and the retrieval of lunar soil
and stone samples around 2017. Chinese

scientists have talked about the possibility of sending a

man to the moon after 2020 -- more than 50 years after U.S. astronauts accomplished
the feat. ANTI-SATELLITE TESTS Possible U.S.-Chinese cooperation became more controversial
after Beijing carried out a watershed anti-satellite test in January 2007, using a ground-based
missile to knock out one of its inactive weather satellites in high polar orbit. No advance notice of the test was given. Thirteen
months later, the United States destroyed a malfunctioning U.S. spy satellite using a shiplaunched Raytheon Co Standard Missile 3 after a high-profile buildup to the event. The U.S. interception was just
outside the atmosphere so that debris would burn up promptly . U.S. officials say China's capabilities
could threaten U.S. space assets in low orbit. The Chinese test also created a large cloud of orbital debris that
may last for 100 years, boosting the risk to manned spaceflight and to hundreds of satellites belonging to more than two dozen countries.

China's work on anti-satellite weapons is "destabilizing," Wallace Gregson, assistant U.S. secretary of

defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs, said in December, also citing its investment in anti-ship missiles, advanced submarines,
surface-to-air missiles and computer warfare techniques. "It

has become increasingly evident that China is

pursuing a long-term, comprehensive military buildup that could upend the regional
security balance," Gregson told a forum hosted by the Progressive Policy Institute in Washington. The Heritage Foundation, a

conservative think tank, called on members of the incoming Congress to be wary of any space cooperation with China on the grounds it
could bolster Beijing's knowledge and harm U.S. security. " Congress

should reject (the Obama) administration

attempts to curry favor with the international community while placing U.S. advantages
in space at risk," Dean Cheng, a Heritage research fellow for Chinese political and security affairs, and two colleagues said in a
December 15 memo to lawmakers.

coc+plasma physics/helio physics

counterplan

1nc low-level coop cp

Text: The United States federal government should pursue a diplomatic
strategy that encourages countries with which China cooperates in space to
adopt the Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities as well as engaging
with China directly to extend work in plasma physics and heliophysics.
While human spaceflight cooperation leaves us vulnerable to tech
espionage, scientific cooperation could be mutually beneficial and be vital to
increase solar storm warning systems.
Pace 11 (Scott Pace is Professor of the Practice of International Affairs and the Director of the Space Policy Institute at
GWU. From 2005-2008, Dr. Pace served as the Associate Administrator for Program Analysis and Evaluation at NASA.
Prior to NASA, he was the Assistant Director for Space and Aeronautics in the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP). From 1993-2000, Dr. Pace worked for the RAND Corporation's Science and Technology Policy
Institute (STPI). From 1990 to 1993, he was Deputy Director and Acting Director of the Office of Space Commerce, in the
Office of the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Commerce. Dr. Pace received a Bachelor of Science degree in Physics
from Harvey Mudd College in 1980; Masters degrees in Aeronautics & Astronautics and Technology & Policy from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1982; and a Doctorate in Policy Analysis from the RAND Graduate School in
1989. Dr. Pace received the NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal in 2008, the US Department of States Group Superior
Honor Award, GPS Interagency Team, in 2005, and the NASA Group Achievement Award, Columbia Accident Rapid
Reaction Team, in 2004. How far - if at all - should the USA cooperate with China in space? Elsevier Space Policy
27)///CW
The first point that should be made is that China does not have a fully separate civil space program in the model of NASA and US civil space activities. Chinas development of space capabilities

The development of space

launch vehicles was part of the same development of diverse aerospace capabilities such
as rockets, guided missiles and aviation. Chinas human spaceflight efforts are managed
by elements of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and require industrial capabilities that are the same as those used for military
programs. Thus it might be more accurate to say that China has civil space activities, such as science and exploration,
but does not have a civil space program. An important second point is that China sees its space activities as part of its comprehensive national
power. That is, the development of space capabilities contributes to Chinas overall
economic, military, foreign policy, and even social and cultural objectives . Space launch capabilities
represent a dual-use capacity that can be used for long-range ballistic missiles. Requirements for human spaceflight are used to
improve the quality control of Chinese industries. Offers of space technology to
developing countries are used to secure access to needed raw materials for the Chinese
economy. Chinese astronauts are helpful to promoting the China brand in promotional videos and international conferences. Interestingly, China has also recognized the achievements
began in the mid1950s at the direction of the Central Military Commission, less than a decade after the founding of the Peoples Republic.

of persons of Chinese descent, such as Taylor Wang e an American scientist who flew on the Space Shuttle in 1985. While an American citizen, Dr Wangs achievement as the first person born in
China to fly in space has been included in lists of Chinese achievements in space. The history of Chinese manned space activities leads to a third important point. China has engaged in a steady,
longstanding effort to build and strengthen its space capabilities. Current programs are not the results of crash efforts but have spanned almost the entire period of the modern Chinese state.
Table 1 shows the dates of major space milestones for China, Russia, and the United States. China has achieved progressively more ambitious space capabilities over a longer period of time and
with fewer missions than those of the USA or the USSR. It has proceeded cautiously but steadily without any sense of racing an adversary. While recognizing the experience gap with the partners

there is a risk of underestimating how soon China will have

comparable space capabilities to those of those same partners . It is not a question of
whether China will have a full range of human spaceflight capabilities, but a question of
when and what they intend to do with those capabilities. One possible use for Chinese
human spaceflight would be to advance Chinese foreign policy objectives. The USSR and the USA both used
on the International Space Station (ISS),

flights of foreign astronauts as symbolic means of aiding allies and creating good will. China could do the same, as well as using such flights to support economic growth by securing supplies of raw
materials and access to markets. Chinese space cooperation agreements in Africa (e.g. Nigeria) and Latin America (e.g. Brazil, Venezuela) have reportedly included offers of technology, training,

As its space capabilities increase, China is becoming more active

in international organizations such as the International Astronautical Federation and is hosting more space conferences. China leads an intergovernmental
loan guarantees, and other inducements to trade.

space cooperation organization, the AsiaPacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) that is similar in some respects to the European Space Agency. APSCO is based in Beijing with member
space agencies from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey. China is also a member of a less formal association of space agencies, the AsiaPacific Regional
Space Agency Forum, led by Japan. The forum includes space agencies, governmental bodies and international organizations, as well as nongovernmental organizations such as companies,

China
has given clear indications of what its next steps are in human spaceflight . It plans to place an
unmanned module in space, demonstrate docking using another unmanned module and then send a crew to visit a modest space laboratory,
Tiangong. In some respects, this would be similar to what the USSR did in the Salyut space station program. Following the Tiangong would be a more ambitious space station akin to the
universities and research institutes. Japan is among the many Asian countries with their own space ambitions that are paying attention to China. At recent international conferences,

Soviet/Russian Mir space station. It would consist of multiple modules with an overall mass of about 60metric tons to which a single Shenzhou ship could dock along with an unmanned cargo

this station would be deployed at about the same time as the

International Space Station may be preparing to close down. China does not publicly have a formal program for sending
resupply vehicle. Interestingly, on current schedules,

humans to the Moon. However, the Chinese are making progress toward acquiring the capabilities necessary to conduct such missions. For example, the Chinese EVA suit derived from the Russian

Orlan design has boots with heels and other features for walking on a surface as well as floating outside a spacecraft. While I was at NASA, we did a notional analysis of how the Chinese might be
able to send a manned mission to the Moon. We concluded that they could use four Long March 5 vehicles, capable of lifting 25 metric tons each, to place a little under 15 metric tons on the lunar
surface. This is about the same mass as the US lunar modules that were launched by a single Saturn V. Fig. 1 shows the notional concept developed in 2008. As noted earlier, it is not a question of
whether China will have a full range of manned spaceflight capabilities, but what the nation intends to do with those capabilities. 3. Cooperative developments Growing Chinese space capabilities

A recent issue of Aviation Week and Space

Technology (22 April 2011) covered the wide and diverse range of international aerospace
cooperation with China, notably in commercial aircraft. Such cooperation includes a full range of US and European suppliers as well as
traditional rivals, Boeing and Airbus. The amount and depth of cooperation is even more striking when
compared to the minimal level of cooperation in space, even including space and Earth
science. The two most recent US-China summit meetings included brief joint statements on space: The United States and China look
forward to expanding discussions on space science cooperation and starting a dialog on
human spaceflight and space exploration, based on the principles of transparency,
reciprocity and mutual benefit. Both sides welcome reciprocal visits of the NASA Administrator and the appropriate Chinese counterpart in 2010. (Beijing, 17
November 2009) The United States and China agreed to take specific actions to deepen dialog and
exchanges in the field of space. The United States invited a Chinese delegation to visit
NASA headquarters and other appropriate NASA facilities in 2011 to reciprocate for the productive visit of the U.S. NASA
have naturally created speculation about future international space cooperation.

Administrator to China in (October) 2010. The two sides agreed to continue discussions on opportunities for practical future cooperation in the space arena, based on principles of transparency,
reciprocity, and mutual benefit. (Washington, DC, 19 January 2011) The 2009 statement was vague regarding who the Chinese counterpart to the NASA administrator would be, as that seems to be
unclear even to the Chinese. The China National Space Administration (CNSA) had previously been used as the civil, interlocutor for space cooperation and it was initially assumed that this

the technical capabilities and management of human space

missions reside with the PLA and it has not been clear that the CNSA would add value
to discussions. For the USA, however, it would also seem odd to have a former Marine Corps General
(Administrator Bolden) meeting with senior PLA officers if the future for U.S.China
military-to-military dialog continues to be as uncertain as it has been.1 Nonetheless, the NASA administrator did visit China in
might hold true for discussions of human spaceflight. However,

October 2010 and the 2011 summit statement said that discussions of practical cooperation would continue on the basis of transparency, reciprocity and mutual benefit. The latter two principles

The principle of transparency is a

different consideration and goes to one of the central concerns with all Chinese space
activities e a lack of understanding of how decisions are made and what strategic
intentions drive them. In large part, such opacity is intentional on the part of Chinese
officials. In various discussions, they have expressed their discomfort even with the term transparency, preferring other formulations such as clarity of outcomes e thus shielding their
internal decision-making processes. Gaining a better understanding of Chinas decision-making process and
strategic intentions remains a central objective and problem for the USA. This applies to civil space cooperation as well as
other areas of the relationship. To oversimplify, in the case of the USSR, we knew their intentions as well as their capabilities. China is not the USSR, thankfully, but we may know
more about their capabilities than their intentions. It is also possible they may not know
themselves; but it is hard to tell even that. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the demise of the USSR and the emergence of Russia, there was a compelling case for human spaceflight
are unremarkable and have been a consideration in all US space cooperation since the beginning of NASA.

cooperation with Russia. The Russians had extensive experience with long-duration manned space station just as the USA was building its space station with multiple foreign partners. There was a
desire to symbolize a new post-Soviet relationship with the USA. Finally, there was a desire to engage the Russian space community internationally in a constructive project as opposed to seeing

there are no compelling political or technical

reasons to engage in human spaceflight cooperation with China . The Chinese have space
capabilities but nothing unique that the USA needs.2 As the Chinese themselves said to the NASA Administrator Bolden during his
it engaging in missile proliferation and other destabilizing activities. Unfortunately,

2010 visit (to paraphrase): we dont need you and you dont need us but we could do good things together. The question of cooperation with NASA may be moot for the moment as a result of

None of the funds made

available by this division may be used for the National Aeronautics sand Space
Administration or the Office of Science and, Technology Policy to develop, design, plan,
promulgate, implement, or execute a, bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any
kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chineseowned
company, unless such activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of, enactment of this division.
Even if this language was not in place, I would not recommend engaging with China on human
spaceflight cooperation. The technical and political challenges are just too great e as are the political risks of not meeting raised expectations. However, I
do believe that scientific space cooperation with China could be mutually benefi- cial and
reciprocal, while improving our understanding of Chinese decision making and
intentions. Space cooperation with China could start small with scientific projects that
have minimal to no technology transfer concerns or potential for dual-use exploitation . As
an example, European and Chinese cooperation in space plasma physics has been successful . Two
Congressional language barring bilateral cooperation with China in the House 2011 continuing resolutions appropriations bill: SEC. 1340. (a)

Chinese Double Star spacecraft carrying European and Chinese experiments joined four ESA spacecraft in high orbits around the Earth. The combination of six spacecraft produced new insights

A similar US project might extend work in plasma physics and

heliophysics on a traditional basis of no exchange of funds and open sharing of the
scientific data produced. For example, a primary source of solar storm warnings is an
into the magnetosphere and the solar wind.

aging NASA satellite, the Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE), which is almost 15
years old. Solar storms and coronal mass ejections can cause damage to electrical power
grids and telecommunication networks. While plans are in work to replace ACE, it would
be beneficial to have more robust sources of warnings . Cooperation need not involve
creating new spacecraft but could involve ensuring compatibility and interoperability
with existing spacecraft. China and the USA already participate in international voluntary
standards bodies such as the Consultative Committee on Space Data Standards (CCSDS), which develops open standards that
enable cross-support for telecommunications and space navigation. The USA has been engaged in discussions with
China for some years on its COMPASS satellite navigation system to ensure compatibility and interoperability. While GPS and COMPASS are both dual-use systems, commercial competition and

Joint ventures are another

way to engage commercially with China and strengthen international use and acceptance
of GPS while avoiding transfer of sensitive space technologies .3 Given the reliance of the USA on space systems, it is
unsurprising that it seeks to reduce and mitigate the creation of orbital debris. The 2007 Chinese ASAT test of course added greatly to the orbital debris
population. This was a regrettable action for many reasons, among which was that fact that China had earlier
participated constructively in technical discussions within the Science and Technology Subcommittee
of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS ), which developed
open markets are expected to foster sales for satellite navigation receivers that can use the civil or open signals from both systems.

a consensus set of orbital debris mitigation guidelines. Nonetheless, the USA continues to seek Chinese cooperation on reducing the creation of orbital debris and routinely provides conjunction
warnings to countries e including China e at risk from being struck by debris. If China is successful in maintaining astronauts in orbit for extended periods of time, they might have increased

If asked about protecting the space

environment today, the likely response from China, would include the RussianeChinese draft Treaty
on the Prevention of the Placement of, Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of
Force against Outer Space Objects, (PPWT). The PPWT is outside the scope of this article save to note that the USA rightly remains opposed to its
adoption. In contrast, the USA is considering a European Union draft proposal for an international,
voluntary, nonbinding Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities that would promote a
variety of transparency and confidence-building measures of value to all spacefaring
states. Such a code would have little value as just an agreement between the USA, Europe and
Japan but would be more effective if space powers such as China and India, as well as emerging spacefaring states such as
Brazil, Korea, Nigeria, and South Africa, were to adopt it . Thus, the USA should pursue a diplomatic strategy
that encourages countries with which China cooperates in space to adopt the Code of
Conduct as well as engaging with China directly. Chinese space capabilities could be of
potential value in reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. While the six-party talks (North Korea, South Korea, China,
incentives to cooperation with ISS partners in reducing potential hazards to those astronauts.

the USA, Japan and Russia) are currently suspended, future discussions will continue to deal with missile proliferation as well as de-nuclearization. If North Korea is to give up its long-range
missile capabilities and suspend space launch activities, it is likely that the countrys leadership will require inducements or compensation of some sort. One such offset could be Chinese launch
services for North Korean satellites as part of a broader agreement that eliminated North Korean strategic missiles. While highly speculative, it is possible to imagine constructive outcomes if China
chose to pursue them.

The impact is extinction

IBT 11 [International Business Times, Solar Flare Could Unleash Nuclear Holocaust
Across Planet Earth, Forcing Hundreds of Nuclear Power Plants Into Total Meltdowns,
http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/213249/20110914/solar-flare-could-unleash-nuclearholocaust-across-planet-earth-forcing-hundreds-of-nuclear-power-pl.htm]
What happens when there's no electricity? Imagine

a world without electricity. Even for just a week.

Imagine New York City with no electricity, or Los Angeles, or Sao Paulo. Within 72
hours, most cities around the world will devolve into total chaos, complete with looting,
violent crime, and runaway fires. But that's not even the bad news. Even if all the major
cities of the world burned to the ground for some other reason, humanity could still
recover because it has the farmlands: the soils, the seeds, and the potential to recover,
right? And yet the real crisis here stems from the realization that once there is no power
grid, all the nuclear power plants of the world suddenly go into "emergency mode" and
are forced to rely on their on-site emergency power backups to circulate coolants and prevent
nuclear meltdowns from occurring. And yet, as we've already established, these facilities typically have only a few hours of
battery power available, followed by perhaps a few days worth of diesel fuel to run their generators (or propane, in some
cases). Did I also mention that half the people who work at nuclear power facilities have no idea what they're doing in the
first place? Most of the veterans who really know the facilities inside and out have been forced into retirement due to
reaching their lifetime limits of on-the-job radiation exposure, so most of the workers at nuclear facilities right now are

newbies who really have no clue what they're doing. There are 440 nuclear power plants
operating across 30 countries around the world today. There are an additional 250 so-called "research
reactors" in existence, making a total of roughly 700 nuclear reactors to be dealt with (http://www.worldnuclear.org/info/i...). Now imagine the scenario: You've got a massive solar flare that knocks out
the world power grid and destroys the majority of the power grid transformers , thrusting the
world into darkness. Cities collapse into chaos and rioting, martial law is quickly declared (but it hardly matters), and
every nation in the world is on full emergency. But that doesn't solve the really big problem, which is that you've got 700

nuclear reactors that can't feed power into the grid (because all the transformers are blown up) and
yet simultaneously have to be fed a steady stream of emergency fuels to run the
generators the keep the coolant pumps functioning. How long does the coolant need to circulate in
these facilities to cool the nuclear fuel? Months . This is also the lesson of Fukushima: You can't cool nuclear fuel in
mere hours or days. It takes months to bring these nuclear facilities to a state of cold shutdown. And that means in
order to avoid a multitude of Fukushima-style meltdowns from occurring around the
world, you need to truck diesel fuel, generator parts and nuclear plant workers to every
nuclear facility on the planet, ON TIME, every time, without fail, for months on end . Now
remember, this must be done in the middle of the total chaos breakdown of
modern civilization, where there is no power , where law enforcement and emergency services
are totally overrun, where people are starving because food deliveries have been disrupted, and when looting and violent
crime runs rampant in the streets of every major city in the world. Somehow, despite all this, you have to run these diesel
fuel caravans to the nuclear power plants and keep the pumps running. Except there's a problem in all this, even if you
assume you can somehow work a logistical miracle and actually deliver the diesel fuel to the backup generators on time
(which you probably can't). The problem is this: Where do you get diesel fuel? Why refineries will be shut down, too from
petroleum refineries. Most people don't realize it, but petroleum refineries run on electricity. Without the power grid, the
refineries don't produce a drop of diesel. With no diesel, there are no generators keeping the coolant running in the
nuclear power facilities. But wait, you say: Maybe we could just acquire diesel from all the gas stations in the world. Pump
it out of the ground, load it into trucks and use that to power the generators, right? Except there are other problems here:
How do you pump all that fuel without electricity? How do you acquire all the tires and spare parts needed to keep trucks
running if there's no electricity to keep the supply businesses running? How do you maintain a truck delivery
infrastructure when the electrical infrastructure is totally wiped out? Some countries might be able to pull it off with some
degree of success. With military escorts and the total government control over all fuel supplies, a few nations will be able
to keep a few nuclear power facilities from melting down. But here's the real issue: There are 700 nuclear power facilities
in the world, remember? Let's suppose that in the aftermath of a massive solar flare, the nations of the world are somehow
able to control half of those facilities and nurse them into cold shutdown status. That still leaves roughly 350 nuclear
facilities at risk. Now let's suppose half of those are somehow luckily offline and not even functioning when the solar flare
hits, so they need no special attention. This is a very optimistic assumption, but that still leaves 175 nuclear power plants
where all attempts fail. Let's be outrageously optimistic and suppose that a third of those somehow don't go into a total
meltdown by some miracle of God, or some bizarre twist in the laws of physics. So we're still left with 115 nuclear power

Imagine the devastation of 100+

nuclear power plants, all going into meltdown all at once across the planet .
It's not the loss of electricity that's the real problem; it's the global tidal wave of invisible radiation
that blankets the planet, permeates the topsoil, irradiates everything that
breathes and delivers the final crushing blow to human civilization as we
know it today . Because if you have 100 simultaneous global nuclear meltdowns ,
the tidal wave of radiation will make farming nearly impossible for years. That means no
food production for several years in a row. And that, in turn, means a near-total collapse of
the human population on our planet. How many people can survive an entire year with no food from
plants that "go Chernobyl." Fukushima was one power plant.

the farms? Not one in a hundred people. Even beyond that, how many people can essentially live underground and be safe
enough from the radiation that they can have viable children and repopulate the planet? It's a very, very small fraction of
the total population.

2nc solvency-- COC

CP solves transparency and promotes peaceful exploration and use of outer
space
Billings 2015 (Lee, editor at Scientific American covering space and physics, author of
Five Billion Years of Solitude, War in Space May Be Closer Than Ever: China, Russia
and the U.S. are developing and testing controversial new capabilities to wage war in
space despite their denial of such work, August 10, 2015, Scientific American,
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever/,
silbs)
Chinese officials maintain that their military activities in space are simply peaceful science experiments, while Russian officials have stayed mostly mum. Both
nations could be seen as simply responding to what they see as the U.S.s clandestine development of potential space weapons. Indeed, the U.S.s ballistic missile
defense systems, its X-37B space planes and even its GSSAP spacecraft, though all ostensibly devoted to maintaining peace, could be easily repurposed into

For years Russia and China have pushed for the ratification of a legally
binding United Nations treaty banning space weaponsa treaty that U.S. officials and
outside experts have repeatedly rejected as a disingenuous nonstarter. The draft treaty
from Russia and China seeks to ban the very things that they are so actively pursuing,
Krepon says. It serves their interests perfectly. They want freedom of action, and theyre covering that with this proposal to ban space weapons. Even if the
treaty was being offered in good faith, Krepon says, it would be dead on arrival in Congress and would stand no chance of
being ratified. After all, the U.S. wants freedom of action in space, too, and in space no other
country has more capabilityand thus more to lose. According to Rose, there are three key problems with the treaty.
weapons of space war.

One, its not effectively verifiable, which the Russians and Chinese admit, he says. You cant detect cheating. Two, it is totally silent on the issue of terrestrial
anti-satellite weapons, like the ones that China tested in 2007 and again in July 2014. And third, it does not define what a weapon in outer space is. As an

the U.S. supports a European-led initiative to establish norms for proper

behavior through the creation of a voluntary International Code of Conduct for Outer
Space. This would be a first step, to be followed by a binding agreement. A draft of the code
which Russia and China prevented from being adopted in last months UN discussionscalls
for more transparency and confidence-building between spacefaring nations as a way
of promoting the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. This, it is hoped, can
prevent the generation of more debris and the further development of space weapons. However, like the Russian-Chinese
alternative,

treaty, the code does not exactly define what constitutes a space weapon.

2nc solvencysolar storms

US/China cooperation on plasma physics and heliophysics key to warn
against solar stormsfills in critical data gaps.

Weeden 13. (Brian, Technical Advisor for Secure World Foundation. Anti-satellite Weapons,
Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations, Stimson. September 2013.
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/Anti-satellite_Weapons.pdf)//CB

Heliophysics and space weather monitoring could be another area of joint space cooperation. The energy and particles emitted from the Sun interact with the Earths mag- netic
shield to create a number of effects on both satellites and ground infrastructure on the Earth.
Monitoring of solar activity is critical to developing a better understand- ing of the Sun,
improving the ability to forecast significant space weather events and providing timely warning of
disruptive events. While monitoring is done from a wide variety of sensors located in space and on the Earth, some of the
most important monitoring is done from satellites located at the Earth-Sun L1
Lagrangian point. This is an area of space directly between the Earth and the Sun where the gravitational forces of the two balance
each other out. A spacecraft placed at the Lagrangian Point can stay in the region without expending a
significant amount of fuel and thus be in a prime loca- tion to monitor the Suns activity and provide
early warning of solar storms. Currently, NASA operates a critical spacecraft for
this task at the Earth-Sun L1 called the Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE). Another critical spacecraft is
operated jointly with the European Space Agency, the Solar and Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO). These two
spacecraft are operating far beyond their expected lifespans and are likely to fail in the near future,
depriving the world of critical data on the Sun and warnings of potentially harmful
events . NASA has recently revived a spacecraft in storage called the Deep Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR) that will be sent to
the Earth-Sun L1 point to provide a few of the most critical solar monitoring functions. DSCOVR will not, however, be able to replace the
full suite of instruments on either ACE or SOHO. China

has developed plans for an Earth-Sun L1

monitoring spacecraft of its own called Kuafu as part of a constellation that will include two more satellites in ellipti- cal

orbits around the Earth. KuaFu was planned to contain an instrument that, when combined with those on DSCOVR, could replace the most
critical capabilities of ACE and SOHO. Heliophysics

research and space weather monitoring are

essential for understanding the space environment; sharing of the data from these
satellites could provide mutual and international benefits. Concerns over technology
transfer are not prominent in the area of researching space weather , and collaborative
building and launching satellites for the Earth-Sun L1 point is a relatively low-cost
endeavor, com- pared to ambitious collaborative human spaceflight initiatives.

transparency cp

1nc transparency cp
CP text: The United States federal government should:
-repeal the Space Situational Awareness Sharing Strategy of 2014
-substantially increase publically available Space Situational Awareness
data pursuant to that of the aviation industry
CP solvesincreases SSA innovation and accountability to aggressive actors
in space.

Weeden 15. (Brian, former U.S. Air Force space and missile operations officer and currently
technical adviser for Secure World Foundation, a non-profit organization dedicated to the long-term
sustainable use of outer space. Dancing in the dark redux: Recent Russian rendezvous and proximity
operations in space, Space Review. 10/5/2015. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2839/3)//CB

However, that does not mean there is nothing that can be done. There are still steps that
can be taken to enhance transparency and confidence-building measures for RPO, and
other space security and stability challenges as well. The most important step to
take is to recognize the value of making more information on activities in orbit publicly
available. The analysis presented in this article was possible only through the ability to
access such public information. Without the public information, those outside of
classified government circles would have no basis to determine what is going on, aside
from the information provided by governments, and thus could not play a role in
bringing political pressure to bear on irresponsible actors. Publicly accessible
information also allows a much wider group of people to analyze it, increasing the
chances that innovative techniques will be developed and important insights will be
found.
Increasingly, open source analysis based on publicly accessible information is also
having a significant impact on world affairs. An early pioneer in this field, the Satellite
Sentinel Program, used data from commercial imagery satellites and other sources to
document war crimes and deter mass atrocities in Sudan and South Sudan. Open source
analysts have also provided public evidence about the shoot-down of Malaysian Airline
Flight 17 over Ukraine, Chinas island-building in the South China Sea, and Russias
expanding military presence in Syria. In the space world, publicly-available data and
open source analysis was able to debunk some of the wilder rumors about the on-orbit
activities of the US X-37B spaceplane.
This call for more publicly accessible data does not mean all governments need to be
completely transparent about their space activities. There will always be activities for
which the national security concerns outweigh the benefits of transparency. However, at
the moment, nearly all the on activities in space data is controlled by militaries, and
much of it is hidden from public view. Perhaps a good model for a better balance
between transparency and secrecy is the aviation world, where the vast majority of data
on aircraft activities and flight are publicly available, and where militaries still find ways
to operate clandestinely where necessary in specific places and situations.
There are also worrying signs that the US government may be reducing the amount of
data on space activities it makes publicly available. Historically, the US government has
been the primary source of public information on activities in space, a policy stance for
which it should be commended. However, the Space Situational Awareness Sharing

Strategy that was put in place by USSTRATCOM in 2014 indicates that might not be the
case in the future. Since it was implemented, the United States has stopped providing
data on the size of objects in its public satellite catalog, and now simply refers to objects
as small, medium, or large. It has also placed more emphasis on only sharing specific
data with specific end users, and only after those end users sign a legally binding
agreement that places significant restrictions on what can be done with the data. While
in the short-term this strategy might help keep US control of SSA data, over the longterm it is likely to incentivize the creation of alternative sources of data that ultimately
lead to less US control. And it also hinders the introduction of new sources of data, and
wider innovation in SSA techniques and capabilities.

shielding cp

1nc shielding cp
Shielding satellites solves for space debris
Peterson 16 - Senior Engineering Specialist, System Analysis and Simulation
Subdivision, joined Aerospace in 1997. He works on a variety of topics
including space debris, collision analysis, meteor showers, and satellite
disposal. He has a B.S. and an M.S. in aerospace engineering from San Diego
State University, and a Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin. (Glenn,
ADDRESSING THE DANGERS OF DEBRIS, February 10, 2016, Aerospace,
http://www.aerospace.org/crosslinkmag/web-exclusive/addressing-thedangers-of-debris//dmeth)
Smaller debris objects (less than 1 centimeter) cannot be tracked and hence are unavoidable.
Satellites will be hit by small particles during their lifetime . One way to mitigate this
is to add shielding to protect a spacecraft from this small debris , but the sheer
number of such small debris objects in orbit requires hard decisions in terms of tradeoffs: as the amount of debris grows,
greater amounts of shielding will be required. Extra shielding takes extra mass, which lowers the amount of functioning
payload mass that can be delivered to orbit. This extra mass and/or reduced functionality is referred to as satellite cost.

When a small particle hits a spacecraft, the damage can range in severity from minor
surface degradation to inhibiting or ending the mission by hitting a critical component.
An object that penetrates a satellite wall may continue on into the spacecraft interior,
possibly damaging internal components; further, the object will break up on penetration,
creating more objects from that breakup and through creating fragments from the
punctured satellite wall. In some instances, the particle does not even have to penetrate
the wall; the impact can cause material on the back of the wall to come off and spread
further. All of these secondary particles generated by an impact are called spall and can damage the interior of the
spacecraft. One way to combat this small particle damage is to shield the
spacecraft surface. The most simplistic shielding consists of thickening the spacecraft wall
until debris objects can neither penetrate nor create spall. However, the better the single-wall shield
is in terms of resisting impact energy, the greater its mass becomes. This greater shield mass means either increased
launch costs or reduced payload mass. Another shield type is the so-called Whipple shield. There are a number of
variations, but the

basic design consists of using one or more thin layers of a substance like
aluminum placed at a certain standoff distance from the main spacecraft wall. Multiple
layers of material are often used, with the space between sometimes filled with materials
like Kevlar, to provide protection of the spacecraft interior. The Whipple shield works by
dissipating the energy of an impacting debris object into the layers; the object fragments,
and the fragments spread over a larger area until they lose momentum and cannot
penetrate further. While the required mass for Whipple shields is less than
that for single-wall shields , the spacing between the layers results in an increase in overall spacecraft size,
which has implications for the spacecrafts launch fairing. Specific designs can be complex; for example, the International
Space Station has more than 100 different Whipple shielding configurations for different parts of the vehicle.

AT: high cost

Peterson 16 - Senior Engineering Specialist, System Analysis and Simulation
Subdivision, joined Aerospace in 1997. He works on a variety of topics
including space debris, collision analysis, meteor showers, and satellite
disposal. He has a B.S. and an M.S. in aerospace engineering from San Diego
State University, and a Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin. (Glenn,
ADDRESSING THE DANGERS OF DEBRIS, February 10, 2016, Aerospace,
http://www.aerospace.org/crosslinkmag/web-exclusive/addressing-thedangers-of-debris//dmeth)
The cost of shielding must be balanced against the benefit it delivers . The amount of shielding cannot
be so great that the vehicles mission is impaired or its overall cost becomes prohibitive. In a study performed by the European Space

Agency ,

the lower replacement cost and lower failure probability for a shielded
versus an unshielded spacecraft resulted in an overall savings greater than
the cost of the added shielding; total savings were approximately 1 percent of the
original satellite cost. Thus there was a small but noticeable benefit to be had by
shielding this sample spacecraft, but the benefit for each individual satellite design must be evaluated for that particular vehicle.