G.R. No.

103276 April 12, 1994

DOMINGO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:

The petitioner seeks reversal of his conviction for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He claims that as his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, he should
be accorded the constitutional presumption of innocence. The petitioner presumes too much.
At the time of the incident in question, Domingo de Guzman was the Officer-in-Charge and Assistant Director of the
Bureau of Plant Industry. 1 As such, he received the sum of P200,000.00 on December 17, 1985, with authority to
disburse it in connection with certain official training programs of the Department of Agriculture. 2 In a disbursement
voucher dated February 5, 1986, 3 he claimed credit for the amount but when required later to produce the supporting
receipts failed or refused to do so. This led to the filing against him of the corresponding information, 4 to which he pleaded
not guilty.
At the trial, the People presented one witness 5 and several exhibits purporting to show that as a public officer the accused
had received the said amount but failed to show that it had been lawfully disbursed for the training programs allegedly
held at Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur, and Baguio City. 6 After the prosecution had rested, the defense sought but did not obtain
leave to file a demurrer to evidence but filed it just the same. 7 Under Rule 119, Section 15, of the Rules of Court, this
would result in the forfeiture of the right of the defense to submit its own evidence if the demurrer was denied. Ultimately,
on November 19, 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Domingo de Guzman y Mateo GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH as
the minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the maximum; to further suffer perpetual
disqualification from public office; to indemnify the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the
amount of P200,000.00, and to pay the costs of this action. 8
In the present petition, the respondent court is faulted for basing its conviction on inconclusive evidence and giving
credence to the lone government witness as against the documentary evidence of the lawful disbursement of the amount
in question. It is argued that in criminal prosecutions every doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused, but this rule
was disregarded by the Sandiganbayan.
We see no such doubts in the case before us.
The petitioner himself has admitted having received the sum of P200,000.00 in his capacity as OIC and Assistant Director
of the Bureau of Plant Industry. He claims this was spent for training programs in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur and Baguio City,
but there is no positive evidence whatsoever that such training programs were really conducted. He has not presented a
single receipt to support his alleged disbursements and show that no undue injury has been caused to the Government.
Clearly, all this has resulted in violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, reading as follows:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.. . ..
In her testimony for the prosecution, Josephine Angeles declared that as training officer and chief of the training unit of the
Bureau of Plants and Industry from 1985 to 1986, she knew of no training programs conducted by the BPI at Ipil,
Zamboanga del Sur, and Baguio City during that period. Such training programs would have been officially brought to her
attention if they had actually been held. 9
The petitioner argues, however, that on cross-examination she admitted that there might have been training programs
held at that time that might not have been officially communicated to her. It is now suggested that the training programs at
Ipil, Zamboanga de Sur, and Baguio City might well have been among such programs.
In the first place, this negative statement cannot prevail against her categorical and positive assertion that as chief of the
training program she was supposed to know, and did know, about all such training programs funded by the BPI. In the
second place, she said that the training programs that could have been held without her knowledge were those funded not
by the BPI but by foreign agencies. In the third place, the mere conjecture that the training programs could have been
held is no proof that they were actually held.
The petitioner also places much value on Exhibit E, 10 the petitioner's disbursement voucher carrying the certification of
the Chief Accountant that inter alia it "is supported by documents appearing legal and proper." That is a bare statement,
however, and there is no explanation of what these documents are, nor are the supporting receipts attached or annexed
to the said voucher. As the Sandiganbayan correctly concluded:
. . . When accused claimed credit for the cash advance of P200,000.00 in the Disbursement Voucher,
dated February 5, 1986 (Exhibit E), for the expenses incurred during Three Regional Trainings in Ipil,
Zamboanga del Sur and Baguio City without any supporting receipts in liquidation thereof, as can be
seen from said exhibit itself, and without submitting testimonial or documentary evidence to justify either
the cash advance or the alleged expenses, then it stands clearly and positively established that he had
misappropriated said amount for his personal use or benefit. The attempt to liquidate the cash advance in
question appears to be amateurish and ill-conceived and which sustains anew the prosecution's charge
that accused had acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the discharge of his official
functions, thus causing undue injury to the government. (Emphasis supplied)
The evidence against the petitioner is in our view sufficient to convict. The government had established that he had
received the money and had failed to account for it, thus overcoming the presumption of innocence in his favor. Instead of
refuting that evidence, he smugly belittled it as if it were too inconsequential to disprove. Significantly, he sought leave to
file a demurrer to evidence, which he filed just the same even if leave was denied by the respondent court.
The petitioner insists that it is not for him to show that the supporting receipts exist; on the contrary, it is for the
prosecution to prove that they do not exist. This is, indeed, a strange manner of accounting. As for the possibility that the
training programs "might have really occurred," to use Angeles' words, this is a mere speculation that cannot explain the
petitioner's failure to account for the P200,000.00 entrusted to him.
The situation before us is starkly simple. The petitioner received P200,000.00 from the government to defray the
expenses of training programs. He has not liquidated it short of saying it was spent for some amorphous training
programs not on record. Who should prove those training programs? The petitioner, of course. And he should do so with
concrete facts and figures supported by receipts, not with the mere undocumented surmise that the training programs
could have been held.
We should not stretch the presumption of innocence beyond its reasonable intendment. Let us not forget that it is only a
presumption and can yield to contrary evidence of guilt. That evidence has been amply established in this case. The
petitioner's conviction was not based on what the Sandiganbayan mistakenly called a presumption of his guilt. The finding
of guilt was not a presumption but a conclusion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., dissenting:
With all due respect, I find it most difficult to share the opinion expressed by the majority.
Petitioner has been charged with having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. The elements of the
offense are:
1. That the offender is a public officer;
2. That he has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions; and
3. That he has thereby caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or has given any private party an
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
Except for the first element, which is conceded, the evidence on record, in my view, is clearly inadequate to justify the
conviction of the petitioner.
Undoubtedly, the amount of P200,000.00 was received by, and in the custody of, petitioner with authority to disburse the
sum for training programs in the implementation of the agricultural recovery program aforementioned. In convicting
petitioner, the Sandiganbayan depended, by and large, on (1) the testimony of lone witness Josephine Angeles that as far
as she knew no training programs were funded or held by BPI in 1985 and 1986, and (2) the failure of the petitioner to
support his Disbursement Voucher (Exhibit "E"), for expenditures incurred during "Three Regional Trainings in Ipil,
Zamboanga del Sur and Baguio City," with supporting receipts in liquidation thereof.
While Josephine Angeles did declare that to her knowledge there have been no training programs held or funded by BPI
in 1985 to 1986, on cross-examination, however, she has admitted the possibility of such courses having been given by
BPI in the region, since she would only be certain on training seminars coordinated by her. On further questioning, she
has even confirmed that such trainings could have "really occurred because there was a report submitted concerning" the
same. I also gather that the implementation of training programs which are foreign-funded are not coordinated by the
witness. (The records before us are bereft on the source for the funding of the P200,000.00 cash advance.)
The only remaining piece of evidence or, more accurately perhaps, the lack of it, is that petitioner has failed to account,
with receipts, for the P200,000.00 cash advance. The majority opinion, I most humbly submit, regrettably has failed to
properly take into account Exhibit E "disbursement voucher, dated February 5, 1986 in liquidation of the cash advance
in the amount of P200,000.00 in favor of accused Domingo de Guzman" certified to by no less than Daniel B. Coloma,
Jr., to the effect that said liquidation is "supported by documents, appearing legal and proper."
I am perturbed by the following statement found in the majority opinion:
The situation before us is starkly simple. The petitioner received P200,000.00 from the government to
defray the expenses of training programs. He has not liquidated it short of saying it was spent for some
amorphous training programs not on record. Who should prove those training programs? The petitioner,
of course. And he should do so with concrete facts and figures supported by receipts, not with the mere
undocumented surmise that the programs could have been held.
Lest we miss it, petitioner is not being charged with improper accounting. The provision of law under which he stands
accused of having violated reads:

Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.. . ..
I cannot go along with the Sandiganbayan when it has conjectured that petitioner's failure to submit supporting receipts to
his Disbursement Voucher, raises the presumption that "he misappropriated said funds and should be . . . sentenced
accordingly." In essence, the Sandiganbayan tells petitioner that because he demurred at the evidence of the prosecution,
the certification made by Daniel B. Coloma, Jr., on Exh. E, i.e., that the liquidation in the disbursement voucher is properly
documented and supported, must now be disbelieved; that petitioner must now thereby be considered to have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross negligence in the discharge of his official and administrative functions; and
that he has thereby caused undue injury to the government; and, ergo, he "must be sentenced accordingly." So much, in
my view, has been drawn from so little that is given in evidence.
Even remotely assuming that the several assumptions made by the Sandiganbayan are appropriate and sanctionable, I
doubt it whether they can measure up to the level of proof beyond reasonable doubt required for conviction.
There are cases, it is true, where prima facie evidence is authorized and sufficient to warrant a conviction. These
exceptional cases must, however, be statutorily expressed (see, for instance Art. 217, Revised Penal Code; People vs.
Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856; Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 336; Bacasnot vs. Sandiganbayan, 155 SCRA 379) one
that is altogether wanting in Republic Act No. 3019 of which violation the petitioner is accused.
The prosecution must stand on the merits of its own case and on the strength of its evidence. An accused, by
constitutional fiat, is not under obligation to prove his innocence, for he needs only, if he desires, to disprove that evidence
which, without rebuttal, would be enough to establish the requisite moral certainty that can justify conviction. These rules
have been observed with constancy and consistency, for they rest not by simple rhetorics or personal inclinations but on
valued traditions enshrined in law and jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote for the reversal of the judgment of conviction appealed from.
# Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., dissenting:

With all due respect, I find it most difficult to share the opinion expressed by the majority.
Petitioner has been charged with having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. The elements of the
offense are:
1. That the offender is a public officer;
2. That he has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions; and
3. That he has thereby caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or has given any private party an
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
Except for the first element, which is conceded, the evidence on record, in my view, is clearly inadequate to justify the
conviction of the petitioner.
Undoubtedly, the amount of P200,000.00 was received by, and in the custody of, petitioner with authority to disburse the
sum for training programs in the implementation of the agricultural recovery program aforementioned. In convicting
petitioner, the Sandiganbayan depended, by and large, on (1) the testimony of lone witness Josephine Angeles that as

far as she knew no training programs were funded or held by BPI in 1985 and 1986, and (2) the failure of the petitioner to
support his Disbursement Voucher (Exhibit "E"), for expenditures incurred during "Three Regional Trainings in Ipil,
Zamboanga del Sur and Baguio City," with supporting receipts in liquidation thereof.
While Josephine Angeles did declare that to her knowledge there have been no training programs held or funded by BPI
in 1985 to 1986, on cross-examination, however, she has admitted the possibility of such courses having been given by
BPI in the region, since she would only be certain on training seminars coordinated by her. On further questioning, she
has even confirmed that such trainings could have "really occurred because there was a report submitted concerning" the
same. I also gather that the implementation of training programs which are foreign-funded are not coordinated by the
witness. (The records before us are bereft on the source for the funding of the P200,000.00 cash advance.)
The only remaining piece of evidence or, more accurately perhaps, the lack of it, is that petitioner has failed to account,
with receipts, for the P200,000.00 cash advance. The majority opinion, I most humbly submit, regrettably has failed to
properly take into account Exhibit E "disbursement voucher, dated February 5, 1986 in liquidation of the cash advance
in the amount of P200,000.00 in favor of accused Domingo de Guzman" certified to by no less than Daniel B. Coloma,
Jr., to the effect that said liquidation is "supported by documents, appearing legal and proper."
I am perturbed by the following statement found in the majority opinion:
The situation before us is starkly simple. The petitioner received P200,000.00 from the government to
defray the expenses of training programs. He has not liquidated it short of saying it was spent for some
amorphous training programs not on record. Who should prove those training programs? The petitioner,
of course. And he should do so with concrete facts and figures supported by receipts, not with the mere
undocumented surmise that the programs could have been held.
Lest we miss it, petitioner is not being charged with improper accounting. The provision of law under which he stands
accused of having violated reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.. . ..

I cannot go along with the Sandiganbayan when it has conjectured that petitioner's failure to submit supporting receipts to
his Disbursement Voucher, raises the presumption that "he misappropriated said funds and should be . . . sentenced
accordingly." In essence, the Sandiganbayan tells petitioner that because he demurred at the evidence of the prosecution,
the certification made by Daniel B. Coloma, Jr., on Exh. E, i.e., that the liquidation in the disbursement voucher is properly
documented and supported, must now be disbelieved; that petitioner must now thereby be considered to have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross negligence in the discharge of his official and administrative functions; and
that he has thereby caused undue injury to the government; and, ergo, he "must be sentenced accordingly." So much, in
my view, has been drawn from so little that is given in evidence.
Even remotely assuming that the several assumptions made by the Sandiganbayan are appropriate and sanctionable, I
doubt it whether they can measure up to the level of proof beyond reasonable doubt required for conviction.
There are cases, it is true, where prima facie evidence is authorized and sufficient to warrant a conviction. These
exceptional cases must, however, be statutorily expressed (see, for instance Art. 217, Revised Penal Code; People vs.
Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856; Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 336; Bacasnot vs. Sandiganbayan, 155 SCRA 379) one
that is altogether wanting in Republic Act No. 3019 of which violation the petitioner is accused.

The prosecution must stand on the merits of its own case and on the strength of its evidence. An accused, by
constitutional fiat, is not under obligation to prove his innocence, for he needs only, if he desires, to disprove that evidence
which, without rebuttal, would be enough to establish the requisite moral certainty that can justify conviction. These rules
have been observed with constancy and consistency, for they rest not by simple rhetorics or personal inclinations but on
valued traditions enshrined in law and jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote for the reversal of the judgment of conviction appealed from.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 103276. April 11, 1996]
DOMINGO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; RULES OF PROCEDURE; MAY BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO SERVE THE END OF
JUSTICE. - The power of this Court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations
whenever the purposes of justice require it, cannot be questioned. In not a few instances, this Court ordered a new
trial in criminal cases on grounds not mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of witness, negligence or incompetency
of counsel, improvident plea of guilty, disqualification of an attorney de officio to represent the accused in trial court,
and where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the prosecution and the
defense. Similarly, in a considerable host of cases has this prerogative been invoked to relax even procedural rules
of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, such as the period to appeal. Let us not forget that the rules
of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this liberality.This power to suspend or even disregard the rules
can be so pervasive and encompassing so as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be
final, as we are now compelled to do in this case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE IN CASE A PARTY WAS PENALIZED DUE TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF HIS COUNSEL.
- Petitioners present dilemma is certainly not something reducible to pesos and centavos. No less than his liberty is
at stake here. And he is just about to lose it simply because his former lawyers pursued a carelessly contrived
procedural strategy of insisting on what has already become an imprudent remedy, as aforediscussed, which thus
forbade petitioner from offering his evidence all the while available for presentation before the Sandiganbayan. Under
the circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner be not penalized for the costly
importunings of his previous lawyers based on the same principles why this Court had, on many occasions where it
granted new trial, excused parties from the negligence or mistakes of counsel. To cling to the general rule in this case
is only to condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to petitioners whose only fault was to repose his faith and
entrust his innocence to his previous lawyers.
3. ID.; SUPREME COURT; NOT TRIER OF FACTS. - The receipts and other documents constituting his evidence which
he failed to present in the Sandiganbayan are entitled to be appreciated, however, by that forum and not this Court,
for the general rule is that we are not triers of facts. Without prejudging the result of such appreciation, petitioners
documentary evidences prima facie appear strong when reckoned with the lone prosecution witness Angeles
testimony, indicating that official training programs were indeed actually conducted and that the P200,000.00 cash
advance he received were spent entirely for those programs.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Zambrano, Gruba & Associates for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
The Court in its June 16, 1994 En Banc Resolution [1] denied with finality petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
Courts April 12, 1994 Decision[2] affirming his conviction by the Sandiganbayan[3] of violation of Section 3(e) of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act[4] for his alleged failure to account for P200,000.00 received for certain official training
programs of the Department of Agriculture. Entry of judgment was ordered to be made in due course. [5] Six (6) years and
one (1) month as minimum, to nine (9) years and one (1) day as maximum in jail await petitioner.
As the Sandiganbayan and the Court saw it then, petitioners guilt was duly established by 1) lone prosecution
witness Josephine Angeles[6] testimony that no such training programs were held at the designated places, [7] and 2)
petitioners failure to present a single receipt to support due disbursement of the P200,000.00, resulting from his former
lawyers insistence in filing a demurrer to evidence despite prior leave for that purpose having been denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
To avert his looming imprisonment and with full awareness that he has nothing in our Rules of Court to rely on,
petitioner takes a novel recourse by filing the instant Omnibus Motion For Leave to Vacate First Motion For
Reconsideration In The Light Of The Present Developments And To Consider Evidence Presented Herein And To Set
Aside Conviction.[8] This was filed on petitioners behalf by a new counsel, as shown by the Entry of Appearance and
Motion For Leave To Submit Attached Omnibus Motion filed on June 27, 1994 [9] after petitioners former lawyers withdrew
their appearance.[10]
In this Omnibus Motion, petitioner, for the first time, seeks to be relieved from what he considers as the serious and
costly mistake of his former lawyers [11] in demurring to the prosecution evidence after court leave was denied, the effect of
which deprived him of presenting before the Sandiganbayan the pieces of documentary evidence that would have
completely belied the accusation against him. Annexed to the Omnibus Motion are photocopies of the list of expenses and
receipts[12] in support of the liquidation voucher (Exhibit E) showing due disbursement of the P200,000.00 received for
training programs actually conducted - the original records of which are all along kept in the Records Section of the
Bureau of Plant Industry as per letter of the Bureau Director Emillano P. Gianzon [13] and which are readily
available.Petitioner now appeals to the Courts sense ofjustice and equity that these documents be summoned and
appreciated by the Court itself or by the Sandiganbayan after remanding the case thereto, if only to give him the final
chance to prove his innocence.
When required by the Court to comment on the Omnibus Motion, [14] the Solicitor General, representing respondents,
was granted no less than eight (8) extensions to do so, [15] the last one with warning that no further extension will be given.
None was filed. Instead, the Solicitor General filed a ninth (9th) motion for extension which was denied considering the
warning contained in the eighth (8th) extension. [16] The tenth (10th) motion for extension was merely noted by the Court.
[17]
Thereafter, the Court in a Resolution dated August 15, 1995 required the Solicitor Generals Office to 1) SHOW CAUSE
why it should not be disciplinarily dealt with for its repeated failure to file comment and 2) file its comment, both within ten
(10) days from notice. In compliance therewith, the Solicitor Generals Office filed its Comment and Explanation. The Court
accepted such Explanation, noted the Comment filed and required petitioner to file a Reply thereto within ten (10) days
from notice in a Resolution dated October 10, 1995. A Reply was thus filed by petitioner in due time.
The Solicitor Generals Office advances the following arguments in its Comment:
1. Petitioners Omnibus Motion is violative of the Courts adopted policy on second motions for reconsideration as
expressed in a Resolution dated April 7, 1988 stating that:
Where the Court has resolved to deny a motion for reconsideration and decrees the denial to be final, no motion for leave
to file second motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
2. Petitioner is bound by the mistake of his former lawyers, assuming that the latter indeed committed one.

3. Even granting the petitioner is not bound by his former lawyers mistake, the documentary evidence petitioner now
attempts to present would nonetheless not cast at all a reasonable doubt on his guilt for violation of Section 3 of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, to warrant a reversal of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners Reply, on the other hand, contains the following counter-arguments:
1. The Omnibus Motion is not violative of the prohibition on second motions for reconsideration since such motion
does not seek leave to file a second motion for reconsideration but for leave to vacate the first Motion For Reconsideration
filed on May 6, 1994 and in its stead to admit the Omnibus Motion containing the petitioners documentary evidence and
arguments. Thus, petitioners Motion to vacate the first motion for reconsideration is but necessary to his defense that he
should be excused from the mistake of his former lawyers.
2. Adherence to the general rule that the client is bound by his counsels mistake is to deprive petitioner of his liberty
through a technicality.
3. The pieces of evidence petitioner is now presenting for appreciation either by this Court or the Sandiganbayan will,
contrary to the OSGs claim, disprove his guilt of the charge levelled against him.
After carefully considering anew petitioners plight and keeping in mind that substantial rights must ultimately reign
supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to reconsider.
The power of this Court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the
purposes of justice require it, cannot be questioned. [18] In not a few instances, this Court ordered a new trial in criminal
cases on grounds not mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of witness, [19] negligence or incompetency of counsel,
[20]
improvident plea of guilty,[21] disqualification of an attorneyde oficio to represent the accused in trial court, [22] and where
a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the prosecution and the defense. [23] Similarly, in a
considerable host of cases has this prerogative been invoked to relax even procedural rules of the most mandatory
character in terms of compliance, such as the period to appeal. Take for instance the relatively recent case of PNB, et
al. v. CA, et al.[24] where the Court once again extended this liberality of allowing an appeal filed beyond the reglementary
15-day period. It should be noted that Mr. Justice Melo, while dissenting therein, [25] nonetheless made this crucial
observation:
The majority opinion, with due respect would suspend the rule - actually the law - for what it says are petitioners detailed
demonstration of the merits of the appeal without, however, delving on such so-called merits. The simple merits of ones
case, lost through neglect, to my mind should not automatically call for the suspension of applicable rules, laws, or
jurisprudence. At the very least, before this may be done transcendental matters, surely, life, liberty, or the security of the
State, should be at risk, but obviously, not simple matters which can be reduced to pesos and centavos. (Italics supplied)
Clearly, when transcendental matters like life, liberty or State security are involved, suspension of the rules is likely to be
welcomed more generously.
Petitioners present dilemma is certainly not something reducible to pesos and centavos. No less than his liberty is at
stake here. And he is just about to lose it simply because his former lawyers pursued a carelessly contrived procedural
strategy of insisting on what has already become an imprudent remedy, as aforediscussed, which thus forbade petitioner
from offering his evidence all the while available for presentation before the Sandiganbayan. Under the circumstances,
higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner be not penalized for the costly importunings of his previous
lawyers based on the same principles why this Court had, on many occasions where it granted new trial, excused parties
from the negligence or mistakes of counsel. [26] To cling to the general rule in this case is only to condone rather than rectify
a serious injustice to petitioners whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence to his previous
lawyers. Consequently, the receipts and other documents constituting his evidence which he failed to present in the
Sandiganbayan are entitled to be appreciated, however, by that forum and not this Court, for the general rule is that we
are not triers of facts. Without prejudging the result of such appreciation, petitioners documentary evidences prima
facie appear strong when reckoned with the lone prosecution witness Angeles testimony, indicating that official training

programs were indeed actually conducted and that the P200,000.00 cash advance he received were spent entirely for
those programs. In this connection, the Court in US v. Dungca,[27] had occasion to state that:
xxx, the rigor of the rule might in an exceptional case be relaxed, this would be done only under very exceptional
circumstances, and in cases where a review of the whole record taken together with the evidence improvidently omitted
would clearly justify the conclusion that the omission had resulted in the conviction of one innocent of the crime charged.
(Italics supplied)
Let us not forget that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this liberality.[28] This power to suspend or
even disregard the rules can be so pervasive and encompassing so as to alter even that which this Court itself has
already declared to be final, as we are now compelled to do in this case. And this is not without additional basis. For
in Ronquillo v. Marasigan,[29] the Court held that:
The fact that the decision x x x has become final, does not preclude a modification or an alteration thereof because even
with the finality of judgment, when its execution becomes impossible or unjust, as in the instant case, it may be modified
or altered to harmonize the same with justice and the facts. (Italics supplied)
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind
and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights,
and not the other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, should give
way to the realities of the situation. [30] And the grim reality petitioner will surely face, if we do not compassionately bend
backwards and flex technicalities in this instance, is the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which he might
not have committed after all. More so, considering that petitioners record as public servant remained unscathed until his
prosecution. Indeed, while guilt shall not escape, innocence should not suffer.[31]
In resume, this is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the overriding goal of courts
of justice to render justice where justice is due - to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his
innocence of a crime of which he is charged.To borrow Justice Padilla s words in People v. CA, et al.,[32] (where
substantial justice was upheld anew in allowing therein accuseds appeal despite the withdrawal of his notice of appeal
and his subsequent escape from confinement) that if only to truly make the courts really genuine instruments in the
administration of justice, the Court believes it imperative, in order to assure against any possible miscarriage of justice
resulting from petitioners failure to present his crucial evidence through no fault of his, that this case be remanded to the
Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioners evidence.
WHEREFORE, petitioners Omnibus Motion is GRANTED and the Courts April 12, 1994 Decision and June 16, 1994
Resolution are hereby RECONSIDERED. Accordingly, let this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for reception
and appreciation of petitioners evidence. No costs.
SO ORDERED.