Acta Anal (2015) 30:115

DOI 10.1007/s12136-014-0232-x

Can the Embedding Problem Be Generalized?

Caj Strandberg

Received: 18 October 2013 / Accepted: 14 May 2014 / Published online: 3 July 2014
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Abstract One of the most discussed challenges to metaethical expressivism is the

embedding problem. It is widely presumed that the reason why expressivism faces this
difficulty is that it claims that moral sentences express non-cognitive states, or attitudes,
which constitute their meaning. In this paper, it is argued that the reason why the
embedding problem constitutes a challenge to expressivism is another than what it
usually is thought to be. Further, when we have seen the real reason why expressivism
is vulnerable to this difficulty, it is plausible to argue that it makes up a challenge to
certain other metaethical views as well.
Keywords Cognitivism . Expressivism . Embedding problem . Frege-Geach problem .
Internalism . Besire

1 Introduction
One of the most discussed challenges to metaethical expressivism is the embedding
problem which in turn is taken to comprise the basis for other significant difficulties for this view. It is widely assumed that the reason why expressivism faces this
problem is its claim that the meaning of moral sentences is constituted by noncognitive states, or attitudes, which they express. In this paper, it is argued that the
reason why the embedding problem presents a challenge to expressivism is another
than what it normally is supposed to be. The reason why expressivism faces this
problem is not that it claims that the meaning of moral sentences is constituted by
a particular type of mental states in the form of non-cognitive states. Rather, the
reason is that expressivism entails that the meaning of moral sentences has
approval or disapproval intrinsic to it in a certain manner. Moreover, it is argued
that when we have seen the real reason why expressivism is vulnerable to the
embedding problem, there is prima facie reason to think that it constitutes a challenge to
other metaethical views which have the same implication. As a consequence, it might be
C. Strandberg (*)
Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN), University of Oslo,
P.O Box 200, N-0316 Oslo, Norway
e-mail: caj.strandberg@gu.se

C. Strandberg

argued that the embedding problem is wider in scope than what usually is assumed to be
the case. It should be stressed that since the main concern of the present paper is what
makes a metaethical view vulnerable to the embedding problem in the first place, it will
not be concerned with the various solutions to it which usually are the focus of the
contemporary debate.

2 Preliminaries
In metaethics, there are considered to be two generic views about the meaning of moral
sentences. The central idea in cognitivism is that the semantic function of moral
sentences is to represent certain states of affairs in the world, whereas the central idea
in expressivism is that their semantic function is to express certain non-cognitive
mental states or attitudes towards the world. As cognitivism claims that the semantic
function of moral sentences is to represent, it can be characterized in accordance with a
traditional propositional, or, more generally, truth-functional, semantics. 1 Thus,
cognitivism might be understood to state that the meaning of a sentence such as ing
is wrong is constituted by its propositional content in the form of the proposition that
ing is wrong. It should be possible on this view to maintain that purely descriptive
sentences express beliefs, but this notion would then be derived from their primary
semantic values in the form of the propositions which constitute the objects of these
beliefs. By contrast, as expressivism denies that the semantic function of moral
sentences is to represent, it cannot be formulated in accordance with a traditional
propositional, truth-functional, semantics. Instead, the meaning of moral sentences is
understood by reference to what mental states they conventionally are used to express.
According to expressivism, the meaning of a sentence such as ing is wrong is
constituted by the mental state it expresses, which on this view is a non-cognitive
mental state with regard to ing.
It is sometimes proposed that the meaning of sentences quite generally can be understood
in terms of the mental states with which they are conventionally associated. This suggestion
is especially made by expressivists who want to make plausible that the kind of semantics
they are bound to adopt with regard to moral sentences can be applied both to moral and
non-moral sentences.2According to an overall expressivist semantics, the primary semantic
value of sentences quite generally consist in the mental states they express. 3 It might be
1
In what follows, I will take this type of traditional semantics to state that the semantic contents of purely
descriptive sentences consist in propositions, but my arguments can be formulated more generally in terms of
truth conditions.
2
See e.g. Gibbard (1992): 969980, and Gibbard (2003): Ch. 34. Cf. Blackburn (1998): Ch. 3. For a clear
formulation of this view, see Schroeder (2008): Ch. 2.
3
Thus, we should distinguish between metaethical expressivism, which is a theory about the meaning of
moral sentences, and expressivism as a general semantic view, which can be applied to both moral and nonmoral sentences. In what follows, expressivism refers to the first notion unless I indicate otherwise. The idea
that the meaning of a sentence consists in the mental state it expresses can be explicated in different manners.
One way, which has become influential in metaethics, explains this in terms of assertability or acceptability
conditions. Thus understood, the meaning of a sentence consists roughly in the mental state in which a person
needs to be, in order for it to be semantically appropriate to assert or accept the sentence. See Schroeder
(2008): Ch. 2. Cf. Ridge (2003): 563574, and Kalderon (2005): Ch. 2. For an alternative account, see e.g.
Gibbard (2003): Ch. 4.

Can the Embedding Problem Be Generalized?

argued on this view that purely descriptive sentences also have propositional contents, but
this notion would then be derived from the primary semantic values of these sentences in
form of the beliefs they express. (We will return to this idea below.) On this type of
semantics, expressivism claims that the meaning of a sentence such as ing is wrong is
constituted by a non-cognitive state, whereas cognitivism claims that the meaning of such a
sentence is constituted by a belief.
While there are different theories about the correct account of non-cognitive mental
states, it seems uncontroversial to assume that such states, as they are understood in the
metaethical debate, have two features: 4 (i) A non-cognitive mental state does not
represent a certain state of affairs as being the case. They thereby contrast with
cognitive states, especially beliefs, which have this function. (ii) A non-cognitive
mental state is such that if a person is in it, she is for or against something. In other
words, the fact that a person is in a non-cognitive state entails that she approves or
disapproves of something. 5 The fact that a non-cognitive state involves approval or
disapproval in this manner means in turn that it is intrinsically motivating. Thus, a
person who is in a non-cognitive state is motivated to behave, or not to behave, in a
certain way. As we shall see, it has been argued that there are other mental states than
non-cognitive states, so-called besires, which involve approval or disapproval, and
hence are intrinsically motivating, in the same manner.
A prominent reason for adopting expressivism is the widely held notion that there is
a conceptually necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation to act:
Internalism: It is conceptually necessary that if a person judges that ing is wrong,
then she is motivated to refrain from ing (at least if a certain condition is fulfilled).6
In view of the fact that expressivism claims that the meaning of moral sentences is
constituted by non-cognitive states, which are intrinsically motivating, this view is
presumed to entail internalism.

3 Back to the Roots: Revisiting the Embedding Problem

P.T. Geach famously argued that any semantic view needs to maintain that a sentence
has the same meaning in the different sentential contexts in which it occurs, in order to
be able to explain its various semantic properties. 7 Thus understood, the embedding
problem amounts to a general challenge to any metaethical semantic view: to be able to
explain how a moral sentence, such as Lying is wrong, can have the same meaning
4
It might be objected that there are non-cognitive mental states which do not have these features. However, it
seems uncontroversial to assume that on expressivism, moral sentences express a type of non-cognitive states
that do have these features, and this is all that is needed for the arguments in subsequent sections.
5
Importantly, approval or disapproval does not refer to a non-cognitive mental state in this context, but to a
mental state which is such that if a person is in it, she approves or disapproves of something.
6
I follow the metaethical convention of letting judge and judgment refer to mental states.
7
Geach (1965): 449465. Cf. Searle (1962): 449465. In the first formulations of the problem, it was directed
against views that conceive of the meaning of sentences in terms of what speech acts they are used to perform.
It was later argued that it also applies to expressivism, which is the modern descendant of these views. See e.g.
Schueler (1988): 492493; Dreier (1996): 3032; van Roojen (1996): 313314; Unwin (1999): 337338;
Horwich (2005): 7880; Eklund (2009): 705706; Weintraub (2011): 601602; Kurth (2011): 161180.

C. Strandberg

when it occurs freestanding and embedded, e.g. under negation, or in conditionals and
disjunctions.8 This problem represents a challenge in its own right, but it also gives rise
to further challenges which often are referred to under the heading the Frege-Geach
problem. It was noticed that if a moral sentence does not have the same meaning in
different sentential contexts, it appears difficult to explain the validity of arguments in
which it figures as a premise. Furthermore, it was noticed that accounting for validity is
merely one instance of the moral general challenge of explaining compositionality with
regard to moral sentences, i.e. explain how the meaning of a complex moral sentence is
a function of the meanings of the sentences which make up its part. If a moral sentence
does not have the same meaning in different sentential contexts, it appears difficult to
explain compositionality.9 Hence, it is plausible to assume that a proper response to the
embedding problem is a necessary condition for the adequacy of any metaethical view
about the meaning of moral sentences.10 It should be mentioned, though, that the fact
that a metaethical semantic view entails that a moral sentence has the same meaning in
different sentential contexts clearly is not sufficient to evade the mentioned problems.
In this paper, I will however not be concerned with what additional conditions a
metaethical view needs to fulfil in order to evade them.
In the contemporary debate, the focus is specifically on how expressivism should
characterize the meaning of moral sentences so as to account for compositionality.11 In
view of the fact that expressivists are not allowed to adopt a propositional semantics,
but understand meaning in terms of mental states, it cannot account for this in the
traditional manner. Expressivists need to argue that the meaning of any complex
sentence consists in a mental state which is a function of the mental states which
constitute the meanings of the sentences that make up its parts. In this debate, the
general embedding problem as formulated above is not at the centre of attention, since
it is thought that the main challenge for expressivism is to explain compositionality.
In this paper, I will however be concerned with the general embedding problem as
stated above rather than the contemporary debate on expressivism and
compositionality. First, the embedding problem is the origin of the debate and that
which has given rise to further challenges, such as explaining compositionality. Second,
my primary concern is what makes a metaethical view face this generic problem in the
first place, rather than expressivist efforts to explain compositionality. As already
noticed, it is plausible to think that a reasonable constraint on the adequacy of a
metaethical view is that it can respond to this difficulty. Third, the embedding problem
appears to constitute a challenge in its own right regardless of whether a metaethical
view which is vulnerable to it would succeed in other respects. 12 In view of these
8

See e.g. Schroeder (2008): 1922, and Schroeder (2010): 4447.

For example, it would be problematic to explain how a moral sentence can make systematic and predictable
contributions to the meanings of the various complex sentences of which it is part. Cf. Schroeder (2010): 4754.
10
Cf. Schroeder (2008): 21.
11
For different accounts of expressivism, see e.g. Blackburn (1998): Ch. 3; Gibbard (2003): Ch. 2. Cf.
Schroeder (2008). For criticism, see references above to Dreier, Hale, Kalderon, van Roojen, Schueler, Unwin,
Wedgwood, and Zangwill.
12
It may perhaps be suggested that if expressivists are able to explain how the meaning of a complex sentence
consists in a mental state which is a function of the mental states which constitute the meanings of its part, it is
inconsequential if it turns out that a moral sentence does not express the same mental state in all sentential
contexts. However, there seems to be prima facie reason to prefer a view which evades this problem even if it
succeeds in other respects.
9

Can the Embedding Problem Be Generalized?

considerations, it seems appropriate to focus on the original embedding problem and

leave a discussion of expressivist accounts of compositionality for another occasion.
Let us therefore return to the original embedding problem as stated above. As
mentioned, it is generally agreed that it presents a challenge to expressivism, although
the focus in the contemporary debate is the more specific problem how it should
account for compositionality. The following quotation from Walter SinnottArmstrong is a representative statement of the standard conception of why
expressivism is vulnerable to the embedding problem:
The standard version [of the problem of embedding] begins with an instance of
the argument form modus ponens, such as this:
(1) Lying is wrong.
(2) If lying is wrong, then getting ones little brother to lie is wrong.
(3) Getting ones little brother to lie is wrong.
It is obvious that (1)(3) is a valid argument. The initial problem is that this
obvious fact seems inconsistent with expressivism. The argument (1)(3) would
not be valid if the sentence Lying is wrong had different meanings in the two
premises, since then the argument would commit a fallacy of equivocation.
However, expressivism appears to imply that Lying is wrong does have
different meanings in premise (1) and in the antecedent of premise (2).
One reason for this appearance is that expressivism explains the meanings of
evaluative sentences by saying that assertions of them express emotions or other
non-cognitive states. The sentence Lying is wrong is asserted in premise (1), so
expressivists would analyse premise (1) in terms of expressing something like
disapproval of lying. In contrast, Lying is wrong is not asserted when premise
(2) is asserted, so an utterance of (2) and thereby of its antecedent need not and
does not seem to express disapproval of lying. One could believe and assert
premise (2) whether or not one disapproves of lying. Thus, expressivism seems to
imply that premise (1) is used to express something that the antecedent of premise
(2) is not used to express. This suggests that according to expressivism, (1) does
not mean the same as the antecedent of (2), so (1)(3) equivocates and is invalid
(Sinnott-Armstrong (2000): 679. Italics added).13
There is a certain aspect of this standard conception of why expressivism is vulnerable
to the embedding problem that I would like to draw attention to. As is clear from the
quotation, this problem is assumed to represent at challenge to expressivism because this
view claims that moral sentences express non-cognitive states which constitute their
meaning. However, when the embedding problem is presented, it turns out that the origin
of the challenge to expressivism is that moral sentences express approval or disapproval
on this view. This is illustrated by the quotation above. Sinnott-Armstrong starts with
13
Similar formulations are abundant; for some examples, see Hale (1986): 71; Zangwill (1992): 177178;
Miller (2003): 4041; Kalderon (2005): 5758; Ridge (2006): 302; Wedgwood (2007): 4244, and Eriksson
(2009): 910.

C. Strandberg

suggesting that the reason why expressivism is susceptible to the embedding problem is
that it explains the meaning of evaluative sentences in terms of emotions or other noncognitive states. However, when he then turns to the embedding problem, the challenge
for expressivism is considered to be that the moral sentence in question does not seem to
express disapproval of lying when it is embedded; in particular, [o]ne could believe and
assert (2) [i.e. an embedded sentence] whether or not one disapproves of lying.14
Now, I think it can be argued that the standard conception of why expressivism is
vulnerable to the embedding problem is misguided in a certain respect. It might be
suspected that the embedding problem does not provide a challenge to expressivism
because this view claims that the meaning of moral sentences is constituted by noncognitive mental states, but because it entails that the meaning of moral sentences is
constituted by mental states which involve approval or disapproval. Moreover, it might
be argued that there are other metaethical views according to which the meaning of
moral sentences is constituted by different types of mental states which also involve
approval or disapproval in the same manner. As a result, it might be suspected that the
embedding problem makes up a challenge to these metaethical views as well.
In order to make plausible that the traditional conception of why the embedding
problem provides a challenge to expressivism is indeed misguided in the indicated way,
we need to spell out the relevant aspect of this challenge more clearly. To this end, it is
helpful to describe it as resting on three considerations where the second is the most
important in the present context. First, consider a freestanding moral sentence: (1)
Lying is wrong. According to expressivism, (1) expresses a non-cognitive state with
regard to lying which constitutes the meaning of the sentence. As we have seen, the fact
that a person is in this state entails that she disapproves of lying.15 Second, consider a
complex sentence in which (1) is embedded: (2) If lying is wrong, then it is wrong to
get ones little brother to lie. It seems evident that a person might assert, or accept, (2)
without disapproving of lying or anything else. Third, a sentence has the same meaning
irrespective of whether it is freestanding or embedded.
The embedding problem, when directed against expressivism, can now be understood as
follows. Expressivism states that the meaning of a freestanding moral sentence, like (1), is
constituted by a non-cognitive state, which is such that a person who is in this state
disapproves of lying (first consideration). It is evident, however, that the following holds:
A person who asserts, or accepts, a sentence like (2), in which (1) is embedded, need not
disapprove of lying or anything else (second consideration). It follows that she need not be in
the mentioned non-cognitive state. However, a sentence has the same meaning irrespective
of whether it occurs embedded or not (third consideration). It can then be questioned how the
meaning of the antecedent of (2) can be constituted by the non-cognitive state which
It should be stressed that the phrase disapproval of lying does not refer to a non-cognitive mental state in
this context, but to a mental state which is such that a person who is in it disapproves of lying. This becomes
clear when Sinnott-Armstrong clarifies the argument with saying that one could assert (2) whether or not one
disapproves of lying. If disapproves of lying refers to a non-cognitive state in this passage, the argument
would be question begging.
15
On certain versions of expressivism, this sentence does not express a non-cognitive state towards lying, but
a second order non-cognitive state, or some other more complex non-cognitive state, with regard to lying. As a
result, the fact that a person is in this mental state would not entail that she disapproves of lying. This
complication is however insignificant in the present context. What is important is that expressivism entails that
a sentence of the type ing is wrong consists in a non-cognitive state which is such that if a person is in this
state, she disapproves of something.
14

Can the Embedding Problem Be Generalized?

constitutes the meaning of (1). Thus, expressivists owe us an explanation as to how a moral
sentence, like (1), can have the same meaning when it is embedded, as in (2), and when it is
freestanding. By contrast, cognitivism is not vulnerable to this difficulty. On this view, (1)
can be claimed to have the same meaning, in the form of the same propositional content,
irrespective of whether this sentence is freestanding or embedded, such as in (2).
We may now return to the standard conception of why the embedding problem provides
a challenge to expressivism. The defining characteristic of expressivism is the claim that
moral sentences express a certain kind of mental states which constitute their meaning: noncognitive states. However, contrary to what is assumed in the traditional conception of this
problem, the reason why the embedding problem can be directed against expressivism is
not that this view maintains that the meaning of a moral sentence is constituted by a noncognitive mental state. Rather, it is that this view entails that the meaning of a moral
sentence is constituted by a mental state which is such that if a person is in this mental state,
she approves or disapproves of something. Otherwise put, the reason why expressivism is
vulnerable to the embedding problem is that it entails that the meaning of moral sentences
consist in mental states which involve approval or disapproval.
To see this clearer, recall the second consideration in the embedding problem. As we
have seen, it is this consideration that makes the crucial work in the argument.
Importantly, this consideration refers to the fact that a person might assert, or accept,
(2) without disapproving of lying. By contrast, it does not refer to the fact that a person
who asserts, or accepts, (2) need not be in a non-cognitive state. Now, the fact that a
person who asserts, or accepts, (2) need not disapprove of anything entails that she need
not be in the non-cognitive state which is assumed to constitute the meaning of (1). This
is the reason why expressivism faces the embedding problem. However, this is merely a
logical consequence of the fact that a person who does not approve or disapprove of
anything is not in a non-cognitive state, since the fact that a person is in a non-cognitive
state means that she approves or disapproves of something. Hence, when the embedding problem is directed against expressivism, it does not directly appeal to the
expressivist claim that the meaning of a sentence such as Lying is wrong is constituted
by a particular mental state in the form of a non-cognitive mental state. Instead, it
appeals to the fact that expressivism entails that the meaning of a sentence like Lying is
wrong consists in some mental state which involves disapproval.
It is not difficult to imagine how this misunderstanding of why expressivism is
vulnerable to the embedding problem might have occurred. According to expressivism,
the meaning of moral sentences is constituted by the non-cognitive states they express.
We saw above that non-cognitive states have two distinctive features: (i) A noncognitive mental state does not, in contrast to beliefs, represent any state of affairs as
being the case. (ii) A non-cognitive mental state is such that if a person is in such a
state, she approves or disapproves of something. The mistake consists in a failure to
separate such a non-cognitive state itself from a certain feature that is had by it, viz. (ii).
In the traditional conception of why expressivism faces the embedding problem, it is
observed that expressivism entails that the meaning of a freestanding moral sentence is
constituted by a mental state which involves approval or disapproval, i.e. has feature
(ii). It is then observed that expressivists need to explain how such a sentence can have
the same meaning when it is embedded. It is easy to come to think that it is the very fact
that expressivism claims that the meaning of moral sentences is constituted by noncognitive states which makes it susceptible to the embedding problem. Accordingly, it

C. Strandberg

is easy to overlook that it rather is the fact that expressivism entails that the meaning of
moral sentences consists in mental states which have feature (ii) that is the reason why
this is the case. Furthermore, since it is presumed that the embedding problem can be
directed against expressivism because this view claims that the meaning of moral
sentences is constituted by non-cognitive states, it is presumed that a view according
to which the meaning of moral sentences does not involve any non-cognitive states
may steer clear of this problem.
The reasoning so far suggests that the embedding problem can be directed against a
more general claim than expressivism:
The Intrinsic Claim: The meaning of a certain type of sentence, such as ing is
wrong, is constituted by a mental state which is such that if a person is in this
mental state, she approves or disapproves of something.
Expressivism entails the intrinsic claim since it states that the meaning of a
sentence such as ing is wrong is constituted by a non-cognitive mental state,
which is such that if a person is in it, she approves or disapproves of something. As
already mentioned, it has been claimed that there are other mental states than noncognitive states which involve disapproval or disapproval in the same manner. The
considerations above give therefore raise to the question whether there are other
metaethical views that also entail the intrinsic claim and face the embedding
problem as well. 16 In response to this suggestion, it might be contended that this
challenge can be directed against any expressivist semantic claim which understands
the meaning of a sentence in terms of the mental state it expresses, not merely
against the intrinsic claim. This important consideration will be discussed at the end
of the next section.

4 One Example of Generalizing the Embedding Problem

In what follows, I will consider one type of view which entails the intrinsic claim.17
This view is suggested by some moral philosophers who want to maintain that moral
thought and language are representational and yet intrinsically action guiding in the
manner codified in internalism. It is usually classified as a cognitivist position, since it
is taken to state that the first aspect is primary, although it acknowledges the second
aspect as well. As I am here mainly concerned with the principal question whether the

16
Needless to say, the intrinsic claim is not the only conceivable view that would be vulnerable to the
embedding problem, since we can imagine all types of claims according to which a given sentence has
different meaning in different sentential contexts. The question before us is whether there are metaethical
views other than expressivism that entail the intrinsic claim and on these grounds can be challenged by this
difficulty.
17
Other type of views that entail the intrinsic claim are hybrid theories according to which the meaning
of a sentence such as ing is wrong is constituted by a cognitive state (belief) in combination with a
non-cognitive state (desire). See e.g. Ridge (2006): 302336. It has been argued that such views also are
susceptible to the embedding problem; see Strandberg (2014). Cf. Schroeder (2009): 264275. It might
be argued that the embedding problem generalizes in other manners as well; see e.g. Eklund (2009):
705712.

Can the Embedding Problem Be Generalized?

embedding problem can be generalized, I will not discuss to what extent philosophers
actually have held this view in the exact form I describe it. Moreover, it should be
stressed that my aim is not to demonstrate that this view is unable to avoid the
embedding problem, but rather that it faces basically the same explanatory burden as
expressivism.
According to the view I have in mind, a moral sentence, such as ing is wrong,
expresses a certain sui generis mental state which has features that belong both to
cognitive states (beliefs) and non-cognitive states (desires), where such a mental state is
assumed to constitute the meaning of the sentence. This kind of mental state is
sometimes referred to as besire, since it is neither a belief nor a desire, but of an
entirely distinct kind.18 It is like a belief in that it represents a certain states of affairs as
being the case, and it is like a non-cognitive state in that it is such that if a person is in
this mental state, she approves or disapproves of something. It is claimed that such a
mental state, in virtue of the first feature, can be true or false in the same manner as
beliefs, and that it, in virtue of the second feature, is intrinsically motivating in the same
manner as desires. For example, a persons judgment that it is wrong to lie consists in a
mental state which represents lying as having the property of being wrong, but also
means that she disapproves of lying and, hence, is motivated to refrain from lying. As a
consequence, a main virtue of this view can be considered to be that it accommodates
internalism by entailing it and thus has the same advantage as expressivism in this
respect.
According to this view, the meaning of a moral sentence is constituted by a sui
generis mental state which is such that if a person is in this state, she approves or
disapproves of something. Thus, this view entails the intrinsic claim in exactly the same
manner as expressivism. Hence, the embedding problem should present a challenge to
this view for the same reason, and to the same extent, as it presents a challenge to
expressivism. Indeed, it is plausible to argue that this is the case by applying the
embedding problem, as formulated above, to the present view. This view claims that the
meaning of a freestanding sentence, like (1), is constituted by a certain sui generis
mental state which is such that if a person is in this mental state, she disapproves of
lying. It is evident, however, that the following holds: A person who asserts, or accepts,
a sentence like (2), in which (1) is embedded, need not disapprove of lying or anything
else. It follows that she need not be in such a mental state. However, a sentence has the
same meaning irrespective of whether it is embedded or not. It can then be questioned
how the meaning of the antecedent of (2) can be constituted by the same sui generis
mental state that constitutes the meaning of (1). Thus, advocates of this view owe us an
explanation of how a moral sentence, like (1), can have the same meaning when it is
embedded, as in (2), and when it is freestanding.
The view under consideration claims that the meaning of moral sentences is
constituted by a type of mental states which function to represent and can be true or
false in the same manner as beliefs. If the reasoning above is correct, this would mean
18

For an account of the nature of this kind of mental state, see Millikan (1995): 185200. Among the authors
that can be interpreted to embrace this view, see e.g. McDowell (1978): 1329; Little (1997): 5979; Bedke
(2009): 189209. Cf. Tenenbaum (2006): 235264. Gunnar Bjrnsson has briefly suggested that a view
according to which moral judgments consist in this kind of mental states might be vulnerable to a difficulty
akin to the embedding problem: Bjrnsson (2001): 87.

10

C. Strandberg

that a metaethical view can be vulnerable to the embedding problem even if it entails
that moral sentences have genuine truth values.
Let me now address two important objections to the preceding reasoning.19
(A)It might be objected that the embedding problem does not generalize in the way I
have suggested. In particular, it might be contended that advocates of the view under
consideration need not adopt an expressivist semantics according to which the meaning
of a sentence is constituted by the mental state it expresses. It can further be contended
that on views according to which a sentence has a meaning which functions to
represent, its meaning should be understood in accordance with a propositional semantics. As a result, it might be concluded that this view is not vulnerable to the embedding
problem.
In response, I would like to make two comments. First, it would be inaccurate to
formulate the present view in terms of a propositional semantics since this would fail
to capture the distinctive semantic claim of this view. It should be recalled that as
understood here, it is a semantic claim according to which the meaning of a moral
sentence such as ing is wrong is constituted by a certain sui generis state which it
expresses. What is characteristic of this kind of mental states is in turn that they both
are representational and involve approval or disapproval. However, it seems difficult to
formulate this view in terms of propositions, which do not have any conative dimension. Thus, to formulate the view under consideration by saying that the meaning of a
sentence such as ing is wrong consists in a proposition to the effect that ing is
wrong would not do it justice, since it would fail to capture something that is intrinsic
to the meaning of moral sentences according to this view, namely approval or
disapproval.
Second, it would be problematic to formulate the present view in terms of a
propositional semantics since it then would fail to accommodate internalism in the
desired manner. As we have seen, a basic reason to adopt this view is to accommodate
internalism. According to internalism, it is conceptually necessary that if a person
judges that ing is wrong, she is motivated to refrain from ing (at least given that a
certain condition is fulfilled). According to the present view, the explanation why a
person who judges that ing is wrong is motivated to refrain from ing is that this
judgment consists in a kind of sui generis mental state which is intrinsically motivating.
Thus, if this view is understood as the claim that the meaning of a sentence such as
ing is wrong is constituted by such a mental state, it can quite readily accommodate

19
Another objection is that the present view can avoid the embedding problem in the same manner as hybrid
theorists want to avoid the Frege-Geach problem. (For a hybrid theoretical solution to this problem, see e.g.
Ridge (2006): 324330.) On this objection, the present view can explain the validity of moral arguments such
as (1)(3) by appealing to the fact that moral sentences have truth values. Thus, (3) follows from (1) and (2)
because (3) cannot be false if (1) and (2) are true. First, my point is not that it would be impossible for the
present view to avoid the embedding problem, but rather that this problem constitutes a challenge to the
present view for the same reason, and to the same extent, as it constitutes a challenge to a view according to
which moral sentences express non-cognitive states, either wholly or partly. Second, it has been argued that the
indicated proposal is insufficient to account for the validity of moral arguments (Strandberg (2014)). Third, it
should be observed that the mentioned proposal exclusively addresses validity. It does not address the generic
problem how a moral sentence can be taken to express a mental state that involves approval or disapproval in
different sentential contexts. So, even if it would succeed to account for validity, it is not obvious that it avoids
the embedding problem as understood here.

Can the Embedding Problem Be Generalized?

11

internalism, since it entails it. However, if it is understood as the claim that the meaning
of a sentence such as ing is wrong consists in the proposition that ing is wrong, it
would not be possible to accommodate internalism as a conceptual claim in this
manner. The reason is that it is not a proposition, but rather a particular kind of mental
state, which carries the relevant relation to approval or disapproval, and hence to
motivation.
Assume, however, that the embedding problem is not generalizable in the
aforementioned manner and that expressivism is the only recognized metaethical
view which is vulnerable to it. The findings of the preceding section would still be
significant. This problem is one of the most discussed arguments in metaethics,
and it is therefore important to understand why it provides a challenge to
expressivism.
(B) It might be objected that I have misunderstood the reason why the embedding
problem presents a challenge to a semantic claim. On this objection, the reason why a
semantic claim faces this problem is not, as I have argued, that it entails the intrinsic
claim, i.e. that the meaning of a certain type of sentence is constituted by a mental state
which involves approval or disapproval. Rather, the reason is that it claims that the
meaning of a sentence may consist in a mental state at all. Thus, on this objection, the
embedding problem can be directed against any expressivist semantic view according
to which the meaning of a certain type of sentence is constituted by the mental state it
expresses, quite irrespective of whether this mental state is a belief, a non-cognitive
state or something else.
This objection might be supported by the observation that an expressivist account of
purely descriptive sentences, according to which the meaning of such a sentence is
constituted by the belief it expresses, also might seem susceptible to the embedding
problem. Consider the sentence Grass is green. According to the present view, the
meaning of this sentence is constituted by the belief that grass is green. Now, consider a
sentence in which the sentence is embedded, such as If grass is green, eyes are blue. It
is evident that a person who asserts the latter sentence need not have the belief that
grass is green. However, a sentence has the same meaning irrespective of whether it is
embedded or not. It can then be questioned how the meaning of the antecedent of this
conditional can be constituted by the belief that constitutes the meaning of Grass is
green.
It should first be observed that if it indeed is the case that any expressivist semantic
view is vulnerable to the embedding problem, this would be an important finding, since
it would constitute a significant argument against these views in general. However, I
think the correct response to this objection is to deny that any expressivist semantic
view faces the embedding problem. More precisely, an expressivist semantic view
about purely descriptive sentences, according to which the meaning of such a sentence
is constituted by a belief, is not vulnerable to this problem. But an expressivist semantic
view which entails the intrinsic claim, according to which the meaning of a certain type
of sentence is constituted by a mental state that involves approval or disapproval, is
vulnerable to this problem. In order to make this point, I need to make a slight
digression.
We distinguished earlier between propositional and expressivist semantics. Mark
Schroeder has argued that these views can be understood to make different claims about
what makes up a sentences primary semantic value and then derive other semantic

12

C. Strandberg

concepts from this fundamental semantic value. 20 Thus understood, a propositional

semantics states that the primary semantic value of a purely descriptive sentence
consists in the propositional content of the sentence in the form of a certain
proposition. For example, the primary semantic value of Grass is green consists in
the proposition that grass is green. However, it should be possible on this view to
accommodate the natural thought that such sentences express beliefs. What is important
on this view is that a sentence expresses a belief merely as a consequence of having a
certain primary semantic value. The mentioned type of sentence can consequently be
claimed to have a derived semantic value which consists in a belief, where this belief
has the mentioned proposition as its object. For example, the derived semantic value of
Grass is green is the belief that grass is green. According to an expressivist semantics,
the explanatory order between primary and derived semantic value is reversed. The
primary semantic value of a purely descriptive sentence consists in the belief that the
sentence expresses. For example, the primary semantic value of Grass is green is the
belief that grass is green. However, it should be possible on this view to maintain that
such a sentence also has a propositional content, provided that the expressive relation is
considered as the fundamental one. First, as Schroeder stresses, it would be implausible
to deny that an ordinary descriptive sentence, such as Grass is green, has any
propositional content. 21 Second, it would be innocuous to claim that a purely
descriptive sentence has such a content on the present view, given that it is derived
from its primary semantic value. Advocates of an expressivist semantics should then be
free to maintain that a purely descriptive sentence has a derived semantic value which
consists in a proposition. This proposition consists in the object of the belief which
makes up the primary semantic value of the sentence in question. For example, the
derived semantic value of Grass is green is the proposition that grass is green.
It can now be suggested that on an expressivist semantic view about purely
descriptive sentences, there is a direct correspondence between the belief which such
a sentence expresses and its propositional content. The propositional content of a purely
descriptive sentence consists in the proposition which constitutes the object of the belief
which is expressed. Most importantly, as regards this type of sentence there does not
appear to be anything about the belief the sentence expresses that cannot also be
captured by referring to the proposition which constitutes its propositional content.
No essential information seems to be left out by referring to the proposition instead of
the belief. Consequently, claims about what constitutes the meaning of a purely
descriptive sentence could be formulated either in terms of beliefs or in terms of
propositions. For instance, if it is asked what makes up the meaning of Grass is green,
it would be equally correct to respond that it consists in the belief that grass is green or
to respond that it consists in the proposition that grass is green, provided that it is made
clear that the former comprises the primary semantic value from which the latter is
derived.
It can now also be suggested that an expressivist semantic view of purely descriptive
sentences is able to avoid the embedding problem by referring to propositional contents
of sentences. According to this view, a purely descriptive sentence has a propositional
20
Schroeder (2008): Ch. 2. Cf. Chrisman (2011): 103125. For related claims see e.g. Wedgwood (2007): 35,
and Charlow (2014): 635665.
21
Schroeder (2008): 23.

Can the Embedding Problem Be Generalized?

13

content in the same sense as this is the case on a propositional semantics. Consequently,
advocates of an expressivist account of purely descriptive sentences can maintain that
such a sentence has the same propositional content when it is freestanding and
embedded. For example, Grass is green has the same propositional content when it
occurs freestanding and when it occurs embedded in a conditional, such as If grass is
green, eyes are blue. The same holds for other purely descriptive sentences, such as
moral sentences according to cognitivism. This lessens the pressure on an expressivist
semantic view of purely descriptive sentences to explain that such a sentence expresses
the same belief in different sentential contexts, since it has the same propositional
content in such contexts. What first and foremost needs to be accounted for is that a
sentence has the same propositional content in different sentential contexts, not that a
sentence expresses the same belief in all such contexts, which seems as a much less
plausible assumption.22
Thus, it does not seem to be the case that expressivist semantic views in general face
the embedding problem. In particular, an expressivist semantic view about purely
descriptive sentences appears able to avoid this problem in the manner outlined above.
However, we can now see that an expressivist semantic view which entails the intrinsic
claim is not able to avoid the embedding problem in this way.
Let us start with considering the view according to which the meaning of moral
sentences is constituted by sui generis mental states of the type described above.
According to this view, there is not the kind of direct correspondence between
expressed mental states and propositional contents that is the case as regards purely
descriptive sentences. In particular, there is something about the mental state
expressed by a moral sentence that cannot be captured by referring to a corresponding proposition. We have already seen why characterizing this view as the claim that
a moral sentence has a propositional content would leave out something that is
essential to it. First, characterizing it in this manner would not capture its distinctive
semantic claim. The unique semantic claim of this view is that the meaning of a
moral sentence consists in a sui generis mental state which involves approval or
disapproval in the manner explained above. It would not do justice to this view to
formulate it as the claim that moral sentences have propositional contents, since
propositions do not have any intrinsic connection to approval or disapproval. Second,
characterizing it in this way means that it would not be able to accommodate internalism,
which is an essential reason for adopting the view under consideration. More precisely,
22
Schroeder maintains that according to an expressivist semantics, sentential connectives need to operate on
mental states rather than on propositional contents (Schroeder (2008): esp. Ch. 7). This contention rests on the
assumption that an expressivist semantics is combined with metaethical expressivism. Metaethical
expressivists need to explain the meaning of a complex moral sentence (e.g. If it is wrong to lie, then it is
wrong to get ones little brother to lie) in terms of sentential connectives operating on the non-cognitive
mental states that constitute the meanings of the sentences which constitute its parts. Now, there are also
complex sentences which combine moral sentences and purely descriptive sentences (e.g. If it is wrong to lie,
then few will do so). In order to explain the meaning of such mixed complex sentences, metaethical
expressivists need to maintain that sentential connectives quite generally operate on mental states (noncognitive states and beliefs) rather than on propositional contents. However, if an expressivist semantics
instead is combined with metaethical cognitivism it might be argued that it need not understand sentential
connectives as operating on mental states, but should be free to argue that they operate on propositional
contents. The basic reason is that on this view it would be possible to explain compositionality in terms of the
propositional contents of sentences rather than in terms of the beliefs they express.

14

C. Strandberg

since propositions do not have any intrinsic connection to motivation, it would not be
possible to account for internalism as a conceptual claim in the desired manner. Hence,
in contrast to what is the case with purely descriptive sentences, if it asked what makes
up the meaning of a moral sentence such as Lying is wrong, it would be misleading to
respond that it consists in the proposition that lying is wrong, since this would leave out
something essential from what this view aims to say about its semantic impact. In order
to be accurate, an answer to this question needs to be provided in terms of the sui generis
mental state that the sentence expresses. As a consequence, this view cannot avoid the
embedding problem in the manner outlined above. More precisely, since this view
cannot be properly formulated as saying that a moral sentence has a meaning which
consists in its propositional content, it cannot be maintained that a certain moral sentence
has the same meaning in different sentential contexts by referring to sameness in
propositional content.
Next, consider briefly metaethical expressivism according to which the meaning of
moral sentences is constituted by non-cognitive states. First, we have seen that noncognitive mental states do not function to represent anything as being the case, with the
consequence that moral sentences do not have traditional truth values. This means that
moral sentences cannot be claimed to have propositional contents, as this would
provide them with truth values. Second, it would be mistaken to characterize
expressivism in this way for the same reason that it would be mistaken to characterize
the abovementioned view in this manner: it would fail to capture its commitment to
internalism in the desired manner.

5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued the reason why expressivism is vulnerable to the
embedding problem is not, as standardly presumed, that it claims that the meaning
of a moral sentence is constituted by a non-cognitive mental state, but rather that it
entails that the meaning of a moral sentence is constituted by a mental state which
is such that if a person is in this mental state, she approves or disapproves of
something. Therefore, I suggested, this problem also makes up a challenge to other
metaethical views that have the same implication. Indeed, it is plausible to
maintain that any view according to which the meaning of moral sentences is
constituted by mental states which involve approval or disapproval faces this
difficulty.23
Acknowledgments I am very grateful to the audiences in Ume, Gothenburg, Eindhoven, Oslo and
Stockholm, for valuable discussions about earlier drafts of this paper. Special thanks are due to John Eriksson
and Sara Packaln for their helpful comments.

23
It might be wondered whether this argument can be directed against metaethical views which understand
meaning in some other manner than in terms of expressed mental states. For example, I have in mind a view
according to which the meaning of a moral sentence of the type ing is wrong consists in a proposition
which makes beliefs that have this proposition as their objects motivating. This issue requires an extended
discussion that has to be postponed for another occasion.

Can the Embedding Problem Be Generalized?

15

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