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Utolo vs Pasion

Nature:
This is an appeal taken by the Leona Pasion Vda de Garcia from the order of the Court of First Instance
of the Province of Tarlac appointing the applicant as judicial administrator of the property left by the
deceased Luz Garcia.
Facts:
Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac for the administration of his property. Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, the surviving spouse and the
herein oppositor, was appointed judicial administratrix. The said deceased left legitimate children, named
Juan Garcia, jr., Patrocinio Garcia and Luz Garcia who, with the widow, are the presumptive forced heirs.
Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G. Utulo and during the pendency of the administration
proceedings of the said deceased, she died in the province without any legitimate descendants, her only
forced heirs being her mother and her husband. The latter commenced in the same court the judicial
administration of the property of his deceased wife (special proceedings No. 4188), stating in his petition
that her only heirs were he himself and his mother-in-law, the oppositor, and that the only property left by
the deceased consisted in the share due her from the intestate of her father, Juan Garcia Sanchez, and
asking that he be named administrator of the property of said deceased. Leona Pasion Vda de Garcia
objected to the petition, opposing the judicial administration of the property of her daughter and the
appointment of the applicant as administrator. She alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased left no
indebtedness, there was no occasion for the said judicial administration.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a need of appointing judicial administrator
Ruling:
There is no need to appoint judicial administrator. As a general rule that when a person dies living
property in the Philippine Islands, his property should be judicially administered and the competent court
should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in the section, in case the deceased left
no will, or in case he had left one should he fail to name an executor therein. This rule, however, is
subject to the exceptions established by sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as finally
amended. According to the first, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the
estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or
applying for the appointment of an administrator.
Construing the scope of section 596, this court repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving
pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a
judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings (Ilustre vs.Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434;
Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemorvs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367; Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317).
The SC finally held that, there is no weight in the argument adduced by the appellee to the effect that his
appointment as judicial administrator is necessary so that he may have legal capacity to appear in the
intestate of the deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he would appear in the said intestate by the right of
the representation, it would suffice for him to allege in proof of his interest that he is a usufructuary forced
heir of his deceased wife who, in turn, would be a forced heir and an interested and necessary party if she
were living. In order to intervene in said intestate and to take part in the distribution of the property it is not
necessary that the administration of the property of his deceased wife be instituted an administration
which will take up time and occasion inconvenience and unnecessary expenses.

N B: This case was decided on Sept 30, 1938

RULE 74
FULE vs. FULE
G.R. No. 21859 September 30, 1924
INTESTATE ESTATE OF SATURNINO FULE, deceased. CIRIACO FULE,
Petitioner-appellant, vs. ANASTACIO FULE, ET.AL., Opponents-appellees.

JOHNSON, J.:

FACTS:
1. On April 4, 1923, Saturnino Fule died intestate. On July 2, one
of his heirs, Ciriaco Fule, presented a petition in the CFI of
Laguna for the appointment of Cornelio Alcantara as special
administrator of Saturninos estate.
2. Petitioner Ciriaco alleged that at the time of death, the
deceased was the owner of real and personal property in San
Pablo, Laguna amounting to P50,000 with a rental value of
about P8,000. In addition, he also left P30,000 in cash.
3. The lower court
administrator.

then

appointed

Alcantara

as

special

4. On July 31, the children of Saturnino opposed through a motion


alleging that: (a) they were all of age and, (b) that they
opposed the appointment of an administrator on the ground
that the deceased had left no debts and that his property had
already been partitioned among his children during his lifetime
in conformity with article 1056 of the Civil Code, (c) that the special
administrator had taken possession of property of large value
belonging to them, and had thereby deprived them of their means of
livelihood, and prayed that the order appointing a special administrator
be denied.

5. Petitioner then prayed for the motion of the oppositors to be denied


alleging that the latter had been requested to make a partition of the
property of the deceased; there was no partition of the property and
that, the disputed property described in Exhibit A was his exclusive and
absolute property in quiet, public and exclusive possession as owner
for more than 40 years.
6. On August 15 the lower court revoked the appointment of special
administrator and ordered him to render an account. The appointment
of an administrator was then denied and the court recommended that
petitioner amend his petition within 30 days from this date and present
an ordinary action for partition.
7. On September 5 petitioner excepted to said order and presented a
motion for reconsideration or new trial and prayed that the court
declare without effect said August 15 order and proceed to the
appointment of an ordinary administrator who should present a project
of partition for approval.
8. On September 11, oppositors opposed upon the ground that the
judgment of August 15 had become final and non-appealable.
9. On September 17, the lower court annulled and set aside the August
15 order, which granted to petitioner the right to amend his petition
and fixed October 4 as the day within which the proof upon such
questioned appointment of an administrator should commence.
10.
On October 26, the petition was denied by the lower court on the
principal ground that all of the deceaseds property had been in the
possession of his heirs for many years before his death; and that at the
time of his death there were no debts and no property to be
administered. Petitioner appealed.
11.
Meanwhile, oppositors moved for the dismissal of such
appeal on the ground that it had not been perfected within the
20-day period under Sec.783 of Act No.190.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the appeal from the decision of the lower court was
perfected within the required time.

2. Whether or not the court erred in refusing to appoint an administrator for


the estate of the deceased.

HELD:
1. YES. The Supreme Court held that the judgment of August 15, 1923, was
not final; the final judgment rendered in the case was on the October 26,
1923 and that, the appeal from the final judgment was perfected within
time.
2. NO. It may be said (a) that it is admitted by all of the parties to the
present action, that at the time of his death no debts existed against his
estate and (b) that all of the heirs of Saturnino Fule were of age.
In the case of Bondad vs. Bondad (34 Phil., 232), Chief Justice Cayetano
Arellano said: " 'Under the provisions of the Civil Code (articles 657 to 661),
the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of
his death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the
property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In
the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may
enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If
they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to
partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual
agreement, they also have that privilege " (Sections 182-184, 196,
and 596 of Act No. 190.)
When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is no reason
why the estate should be burdened with the cost and expenses of an
administrator. The administrator has no right to intervene in any way
whatsoever in the division of the estate among the heirs when they are
adults and when there are no debts against the estate. (Ilustre vs. Alaras
Frondosa, supra;Bondad vs. Bondad, supra;
Baldemor vs. Malangyaon,
supra.)
3. Judgment appealed from is affirmed.

8. Pereira v. Court of Appeals


Facts: Andres Pereira died leaving his wife Pereira and his sister Nagac as his
only heirs. Nagac then instituted special proceedings to be appointed
administrator of her brothers estate to which the widow opposed alleging to
estate to be administered and in the alternative she be appointed
administratix. The RTC appointed Nagac as administratix which was upheld y
the CA hence this petition.

Issue: W/N there is a need for a special proceeding

Held: NO!
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same
should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator. An exception to this rule is sec. 1 of Rule 74 which
provides that when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due
from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without
instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an
administrator. However, this does not preclude them from instituting
administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if
they do not desire to resort FOR GOOD REASONS to an ordinary action for
partition. Now the question is what constitutes good reason"? The court has
time and again refused to sanction administration proceedings when the
issues to be resolved can be properly be ventilated in an action for partition
as administration proceedings are always long and costly.

In the case at bar, the reason why Nagac instituted the spec. Proc. is
because she and the widow are not in good terms and she wants to obtain

possession of the properties for her own purpose. This is not a compelling
reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate.

SPOUSES BENATIRO vs HEIRS OF CUYOS


FACTS:
Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos had nine children, namely: Francisco,
Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28,
1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu.
Before the CFI, after filing a petition to have herself appointed administrator, and after filing an
opposition thereto, Gloria & Fransisco, assisted by their corresponding counsels, agreed to
have Gloria appointed as administratrix of the estate&letters of administration of the estate of
the late Evaristo Cuyos were issued in favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian after posting a nominal
bond of P1,000.00. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to
effect the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of partition. In his Commissioners
reportdated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented by
telegrams to all the heirs to cause their appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon,
Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a conference or meeting to arrive at
an agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos
failed to attend. He reported that those who were present agreed not to partition the properties
of the estate but instead agreed to first sell it for the sum of P40,000.00& divide the proceeds
equally. Columba bought the properties. The CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new
administrator of the estate based on Glorias absence & change of residence. The Court
ordered the Administratrix to execute the deed of sale afterthe payment of the sum ofP36,000
which shall remain in custodia legis, then divided among the heirs after payment of necessary
taxes.
Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the six parcels of land in favor of Columba for a
consideration of the sum of P36,000.00.Original Certificates of Titles were issued in favor of the
latter.
In Feb 1998,Gloria, Patrocenia , Numeriano, Enrique & Salud filed with the CA a petition for
annulment of the order of the CFI of Cebu, alleging that the CFIs order was null and void and of
no effect, the same being based on a Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and
irregular; that such report practically deprived them of due process in claiming their share of

their father's estate, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud caused them to be deprived of their
property.
The CA granted the petition and declared the CFI order & the Certificates of Title issued in the
name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro null & void, hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON extrinsic fraud existed in the case at bar serving as a sufficient ground to annul
the CFIs order.
HELD: The Court held that the CFI;s order should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic
fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but
on the ground that the assailed order is void for lack of due process.
Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that: Grounds for annulment of judgment.
The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
However, jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional ground therefor.
The veracity of Atty. Taneos report was doubtful. There was no evidence showing that the heirs
indeed convened for the purpose of arriving at an agreement regarding the estate properties,
since they were not even required to sign anything to show their attendance of the alleged
meeting. The Commissioner's Report, which embodied the alleged agreement of the heirs, did
not bear the signatures of the alleged attendees to show their consent and conformity thereto.It
was imperative that all the heirs must be present in the conference and be heard to afford them
the opportunity to protect their interests. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the
absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI's order based on
a void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.
The CFI's order being null and void may be assailed anytime, the respondents' right to due
process is the paramount consideration in annulling the assailed order. An action to declare the
nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe. Since the CFI judgment is void, it has no legal
and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent.
Hence, the execution of the Deed of Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said void
judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are
void ab initio.
The petition was denied

44. Tayco vs Heirs of Tayco (Dec. 13,2010)


FACTS: Francisco Tayco, Concepcion Tayco-Flores and ConsolacionTayco
inherited the some lands from from their parents in Aklan. Sometime in
September of 1972, petitioner Francisco Tayco and his sister
ConsolacionTayco executed a document called Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation
of Sale of Shares,transferring their shares on the abovementioned properties
to their sister Concepcion Tayco-Flores. The said document was notarized
and, on March 16, 1991, Concepcion Tayco-Flores and ConsolacionTayco
executed the Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in Three (3) Parcels of Land
ConsolacionTayco died on December 25, 1996 and Concepcion Tayco-Flores
died on January 14, 1997. Thereafter, petitioner Francisco Tayco filed a case
for nullity of documents and partition with damages with the RTC of Kalibo,
Aklan claiming that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the
Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of Shares and the
Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in three (3) Parcels of Land are null and
void; According to him, the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was executed at
that time, because Concepcion Tayco-Flores was in need of money and
wanted the properties to be mortgaged in a bank. He claimed that the
mortgage did not push through and that he requested his sister to cancel the
said Deed, to which the latter ensured that the same document had no
effect.he further claimed that without his knowledge and consent, her sisters
Concepcion and Consolacion executed another document
entitled Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in three (3) Parcels of Land in

order to have the tax declarations and certificates of title covering those
three parcels of land transferred in the name of Concepcion. He also alleged
that he came to know of the said facts only when he had the property
surveyed for the purpose of partition and some of the heirs
of Concepcion objected to the said survey.
RTC ruled in favor of Francisco
In reversing the trial court's findings, the CA reasoned out that the
genuineness and due execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement was not
disputed and was duly signed by the parties and notarized.
ISSUE:CAN THE DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF
THE DECEASED DIEGA REGALADO WITH CONFIRMATION OF SALE OF SHARES
DIVEST CO-HEIR AND CO-OWNER FRANCISCO TAYCO OF HIS SHARES IN THE
THREE (3) PARCELS OF LAND IN QUESTION? DID CA ERR?
HELD: YES. WHAT is the validity of the document that contains the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased, DiegaRegalado. The
trial court ruled that it is null and void based on its assessment of the facts,
while the CA adjudged it valid based on its examination of the said
document.
At the outset, the document, Exhibit A, was executed at Lezo, Aklan which
is about ten kilometers from Kalibo where all the parties are
residents. Defendant had to hire a tricycle from Kalibo to bring the parties to
Lezo. Assuming that a certain Engr. Reynaldo Lopez was helping the
defendants at that time in this transaction, he is also a resident of Kalibo,
Aklan which is the center of Aklan where almost all the lawyers have their
offices. Engr. Lopez has also his office here. Why would he still recommend
the execution of this document particularly in Lezo and before that particular
alleged Notary Public? This sounds incredible.
CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court without
providing any substantial evidence to support its own findings.
Dispo: CA set aside rtcaklan branch 9 upheld reinstated

BRITO V. DIANALA.
FACTS:
Subject of the present petition is a parcel of land located at Barrio Sicaba, Cadiz City, Negros
Occidental. The said tract of land is a portion of Lot No. 1536-B, formerly known as Lot No. 591B, originally owned by a certain Esteban Dichimo and his wife, Eufemia Dianala, both of
whom are already deceased. On September 27, 1976, Margarita Dichimo, assisted by her
husband, Ramon Brito, Sr., together with Bienvenido Dichimo, Francisco Dichimo, Edito
Dichimo, Maria Dichimo, Herminia Dichimo, assisted by her husband, Angelino Mission,
Leonora Dechimo, assisted by her husband, Igmedio Mission, Felicito, and Merlinda Dechimo,
assisted by her husband, Fausto Dolleno, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Damages with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Negros Occidental,
against a certain Jose Maria Golez. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 12887.
Petitioners wife, Margarita, together with Bienvenido and Francisco, alleged that they are the
heirs of a certain Vicente Dichimo, while Edito, Maria, Herminia, Leonora, Felicito and Merlinda
claimed to be the heirs of one Eusebio Dichimo; that Vicente and Eusebio are the only heirs
of Esteban and Eufemia; that Esteban and Eufemia died intestate and upon their death
Vicente and Eusebio, as compulsory heirs, inherited Lot No. 1536-B; that, in turn, Vicente and
Eusebio, and their respective spouses, also died intestate leaving their pro indiviso shares of
Lot No. 1536-B as part of the inheritance of the complainants in Civil Case No. 12887.
On July 29, 1983, herein respondents filed an Answer-in-Intervention claiming that prior to his
marriage to Eufemia, Esteban was married to a certain Francisca Dumalagan; that
Esteban and Francisca bore five children, all of whom are already deceased; that herein

respondents are the heirs of Esteban and Franciscas children; that they are in open,
actual, public and uninterrupted possession of a portion of Lot No. 1536-B for more than 30
years; that their legal interests over the subject lot prevails over those of petitioner and his coheirs. On November 26, 1986, the trial court issued an Order dismissing without prejudice
respondents Answer-in-Intervention. Civil Case No. 12887 then went to trial. Subsequently, the
parties in Civil Case No. 12887 agreed to enter into a Compromise Agreement wherein Lot
No. 1536-B was divided between Jose Maria Golez, on one hand, and the heirs of Vicente,
namely: Margarita, Bienvenido, and Francisco, on the other. It was stated in the said
agreement that the heirs of Eusebio had sold their share in the said lot to the mother of
Golez. Thus, on September 9, 1998, the RTC of Bacolod City rendered a decision approving
the said Compromise Agreement. Thereafter, TCT No. T-12561 was issued by the Register
of Deeds of Cadiz City in the name of Margarita, Bienvenido and Francisco.
On January 18, 1999, herein petitioner and his co-heirs filed another Complaint for Recovery
of Possession and Damages, this time against herein respondents. Herein respondents,
on the other hand, filed with the same court, on August 18, 1999, a Complaint for
Reconveyance and Damages against petitioner and his co-heirs. RTC dismissed both cases.
Herein respondents then appealed the case to the CA praying that the portion of the RTC Joint
Orders dismissing their complaint be declared null and void and that the case be decided on the
merits. CA granted the respondents appeal.
ISSUE: W/N respondents are barred by prescription for having filed their complaint for
reconveyance only after more than eight years from the discovery of the fraud allegedly
committed by petitioner and his co-heirs, arguing that under the law an action for reconveyance
of real property resulting from fraud prescribes in four years, which period is reckoned from the
discovery of the fraud
HELD: No. There is no dispute that respondents are in possession of the subject property as
evidenced by the fact that petitioner and his co-heirs filed a separate action against respondents
for recovery of possession thereof. Thus, owing to respondents possession of the disputed
property, it follows that their complaint for reconveyance is, in fact, imprescriptible. As
such, with more reason should respondents not be held guilty of laches as the said doctrine,
which is one in equity, cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal
right.
In their complaint for reconveyance and damages, respondents alleged that petitioner and his
co-heirs acquired the subject property by means of fraud. Article 1456 of the Civil Code
provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years, the reckoning point of which
is the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property.
In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust is
an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the
property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription,
Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable. Article 1144. The following actions must be
brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

(1) Upon a written contract;


(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce
prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of
very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well settled that an
action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from
the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. In the instant case, TCT No. T-12561 was
obtained by petitioner and his co-heirs on September 28, 1990, while respondents filed
their complaint for reconveyance on August 18, 1999. Hence, it is clear that the ten-year
prescriptive period has not yet expired. Respondents are not guilty of laches simply
because they are no longer parties to the case and, as such, have no personality to assail the
said judgment. Respondents act of filing their action for reconveyance within the ten-year
prescriptive period does not constitute an unreasonable delay in asserting their right. Laches is
recourse in equity. Equity, however, is applied only in the absence, never in contravention, of
statutory law. Moreover, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to
reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession thereof. Otherwise, if the
plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription does not commence to run against
him.