PELAYO VS PEREZ

FACTS: David Pelayo (Pelayo), by a Deed of Absolute Sale, conveyed to Melki Perez (Perez) two parcels of
agricultural land (the lots) situated in Panabo, Davao.
Loreza Pelayo, wife of Pelayo, and another one whose signature is illegible witnessed the execution of the
deed. Loreza, however, signed only on the third page in the space provided for witnesses on account of
which Perez application for registration of the deed with the Office of the Register of Deeds in Tagum, Davao
was denied. Perez thereupon asked Loreza to sign on the first and second pages of the deed but she
refused, hence, the instant complaint for specific performance against her and her husband Pelayo
(defendants).
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it stated no cause of action, citing the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which provides that contracts executed prior thereto shall be valid only
when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act.
The questioned deed having been executed on January 10, 1988, the defendants claimed that Perez had at
least up to September 10, 1988 within which to register the same, but as they failed to, it is not valid and,
therefore, unenforceable.
RTC dismissed the case. CA remanded case back to the lower court
Defendants now claimed that as the lots were occupied illegally by some persons against whom they filed an
ejectment case, they and Perez who is their friend and known at the time as an activist/leftist, hence feared
by many, just made it appear in the deed that the lots were sold to him in order to frighten said illegal
occupants, with the intentional omission of Lorezas signature so that the deed could not be registered; and
that the deed being simulated and bereft of consideration is void/inexistent.
Perez countered that the lots were given to him by defendant Pelayo in consideration of his services as his
attorney-in-fact to make the necessary representation and negotiation with the illegal occupants-defendants
in the ejectment suit; and that after his relationship with defendant Pelayo became sour, the latter sent a
letter to the Register of Deeds of Tagum requesting him not to entertain any transaction concerning the lots
title to which was entrusted to Perez who misplaced and could [not] locate it.
Defendant Pelayo also claimed that the deed was without his wife Lorezas consent, hence, it is null and
void.
RTC Ruling - deed was null and void
CA Ruling - deed was valid
ISSUE: W/N the deed was null and void for lack of marital consent?
HELD: We agree with the CA ruling that petitioner Lorenza, by affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on
the space provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale.
Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either be express or implied. A
wifes consent to the husbands disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or set
forth in any particular document, so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent or approval was
indeed given. In the present case, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed
only as an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the execution of said document point to the fact
that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and consented to the sale.
In their Pre-Trial Brief, petitioners admitted that even prior to 1988, they have been having serious problems,
including threats to the life of petitioner David Pelayo, due to conflicts with the illegal occupants of the
property in question, so that respondent, whom many feared for being a leftist/activist, offered his help in
driving out said illegal occupants.
Human experience tells us that a wife would surely be aware of serious problems such as threats to her
husbands life and the reasons for such threats. As they themselves stated, petitioners problems over the
subject property had been going on for quite some time, so it is highly improbable for Lorenza not to be
aware of what her husband was doing to remedy such problems. Petitioners do not deny that Lorenza
Pelayo was present during the execution of the deed of sale as her signature appears thereon. Neither do
they claim that Lorenza Pelayo had no knowledge whatsoever about the contents of the subject document.
Thus, it is quite certain that she knew of the sale of their conjugal property between her husband and
respondent.

DELA CRUZ, et al VS. GRACIA For Tiff

FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the Affidavit to use
the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the signature of the deceased
father, and because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has
no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child.
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial
court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the
same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.
The pertinent portion of the Autobiography:
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR
HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH
EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR
THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THATS ALL.[6] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
ISSUE: Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of the minor can be
considered as a recognition of paternity.
RULING: YES
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of
his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a
pubic of private handwritten instrument.
Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative father in the
private handwritten instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any
private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1)
Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,
there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging
parent; and
2)
Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten
by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominiques Autobiography have
been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein that Dominique,
during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as commonlaw spouses for several months in 2005 at his
parents house in Pulanglupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on
September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child they sufficiently
establish that the child of Jenie is Dominiques.

VANCIL VS BELMES
Bonifacia P. Vancil, petitioner, vs. Helen G. Belmes, respondent
Facts:
Petitioner is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States of America who died
in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and
Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes. Petitioner commences before the RTC a guardianship
proceeding over the persons and properties of minors Valerie, 6 years old and Vincent, 2 years old. She
was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of said children. The natural mother
of the minors, herein respondent, submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings
asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship.
The trial court rejected and denied Belmes motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian.
The subsequent attempt for reconsideration was likewise dismissed.
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.
Ruling: Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent,
respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. The ruling in Sagala-Eslao vs. Court
of Appeals is reiterated in this case that of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts
that the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to
parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not
created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.
Petitioners claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority
pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code which states that in case of death, absence or unsuitability of the
parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. The ruling in Santos,
Sr. vs. Court of Appeals is reiterated herein that the law vests on the father and mother joint parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent
present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
Considering that Belmes is still alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, Vancil
has to prove Belmes'unsuitability. Assuming that Belmes is unfit as a guardian of Vincent, still Vancil cannot
qualify as a substitute guardian. She admitted in her petition that an expatriate like her will find difficulty of
discharging the duties of a guardian. As the Court held in Guerrero vs Teran, the courts should not appoint
persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of the courts as they will find it difficult to protect the
wards.
Actual custody of and exercising parental authority over minor Vincent is vested on the natural mother.