Student number:

1446038

(this is your 7 digit number e.g. 0123456)

All summative assessment is marked
anonymously so your name must NOT
appear in your essay. If you wish to identify
your work in the header of your essay, use
your student number only.
Module code:

PL9374

Module title:

US Government and Politics

Module tutor:

Dr. Ian Stafford

Coursework title:

How can we explain the relative absence of

significant gun control reform in
the US in response to high profile mass
shootings, such as Columbine and
Newtown?

Word count:

1997

The word count does not include footnotes,

bibliography or list of references.

How can we explain the relative absence of significant gun control reform in
the US in response to high profile mass shootings, such as Columbine and
Newtown?

Introduction
According to the Gun Violence Archive (2016), 53,391 gun violence incidents took place in the US
in 2015, in which 698 children, aged 0 to 11, and 2,699 teenagers, aged 12 to 17, were injured or
killed. In the same year, 332 mass shootings, defined as four or more people shot in one incident,
not including the shooter (The Guardian 2016), occurred. High-profile mass shootings such as
those in Columbine, Newtown, and Orlando have sensitised the public and garnered support for
gun-control measures such as background checks and banning of assault weapons from
approximately 90 percent of Americans (The Economist, 2015a). Despite this, the Congress has
failed to take any substantive steps in addressing the issue (Siddiqui 2015). This essay argues that
the underlying factor of the gun-control policy stalemate is a flawed winner-take-all (Hill and
Richie 2012) electoral system which allows gun control opponents to form a potent single-issue
voting bloc that far outweighs their minority status (Hill and Richie 2012). Building up to this
argument, the first part of the essay provides a brief overview of Americas gun culture. The second
part offers a close-up on the National Rifle Association (NRA) while emphasising its power and
success in influencing gun policy, while the third part focuses on explaining the voting behaviour of
congressmen in relation to gun control.

Americas Gun Culture

Compared to other Western Democracies, an ideology of distrust in the government and devotion to
the protection of individual freedoms is deeply embedded in the American culture (McKay 2013, p.
347); so deeply, that the Bill of Rights came into being in 1789 from a desire to increase public
confidence in the government, to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, and to ensure
the beneficent ends of its institution (US Senate 2015). As an ultimate precaution against
governmental power abuses, the Second Amendment states that the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed (US Senate 2015). However, the absolute character of this right
started eroding when the Gun Control Act (GCA) of 1968 was passed (Palmer 2012). The NRA,
which was rather apolitical at the time, came under pressure to lobby on behalf of gun enthusiasts
who saw the GCA as the first stage of a government plan to strip them of their weapons (Palmer

2012). Ever since then, the NRA has grown into a political force, with the Second Amendment as
their bible (Palmer 2012). Its intense manner of advocacy for gun rights has uniquely American
characteristics (McKay 2013, p. 351), as nowhere else in the world is there such high controversy
regarding this issue. Britain and Australia issued strict gun control legislation in 1996 in the wake of
mass shootings, thus successfully preventing any more from happening (Jowit et al. 2016). Still, US
legislators seem unresponsive to the voices of citizens asking for more regulation of guns, despite
the increasingly high number of gun violence incidents. Moreover, it seems as if the Congress
inclination towards a laissez-faire approach on guns is growing even stronger. This is, Fleming et al.
(2016, p. 11) claim, proof of the NRAs influence.

The NRA and its success in influencing policy

It is perhaps not surprising how disruptive and destabilising mass shootings can be. Scholars such
as Fleming et al. (2016) describe them as shocks in the system; Birkland (1997, p. 21) calls them
focusing events.

A focusing event is sudden, relatively rare, can be reasonably defined as harmful or

revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms, inflicts harms or suggests
potential harms that are or could be concentrated on a definable geographical area or
community of interest, and that is known to policy makers and the public virtually
simultaneously (Birkland 1997, p. 21).

As demonstrated by the cases of Britain and Australia, shocks in the system open policy-windows
that can lead to substantial policy changes if taken advantage of (Fleming et al. 2016; Baumgartner
and Jones 1993). However, the likelihood for policy change is determined by how the issue is
framed and which of these frames gain more traction with legislators (Schattschneider, 1960).
Issue frames promote specific definitions, interpretations, policy solutions and increase the
salience of an issue thereby determining both the publics and the politicians understanding of it
(Gamson, 1992; Entman, 1993; Haider-Markel and Joslyn, 2001). Indeed, while the plague of massshootings across the US has raised support from a pragmatic majority of the public for some forms
of gun control, policy change is extremely limited and rare (Fleming et al. 2016, p. 3). As
shootings are becoming more frequent, the NRA is sticking to its guns, especially in the aftermath
of high-profile incidents. Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) demonstrate that lobbyists or policy

entrepreneurs, as deemed by Fleming et al. (2016, p. 3) begin advocating a causal story which
suits their purpose whenever mass shootings occur, in order to influence public opinion.

Building on the initial argument that bearing arms is a constitutional right granted by the Founding
Fathers, the gun lobby has managed to transform the debate. They are now declaring being armed a
duty and the ultimate defence of law-abiding citizens against government tyranny, criminals and
terrorists what Wayne LaPierre calls the moment when the glass breaks in the middle of the
night (cited in The Economist 2013). This framing pattern has proven successful with parts of the
public. Whereas in 1999 only 26 percent of Americans were citing protection as the main reason for
owning a gun (The Economist 2013), 47 percent out of which 70 percent are Republicans and
only 26 percent Democrats now believe that encouraging more people to carry guns legally is a
better response to terrorist attacks than gun control (The Economist 2016). The NRA rallies
supporters with a masterful use of fear and distrust of government, and intimidates Republican
politicians by turning support for gun rights into a defining test of conservative values, writes The
Economist (2015b). In terms of lobbying, the NRA directs approximately 3 million USD per year to
lawmakers to influence gun policy (BBC News 2016). Furthermore, it also has substantial indirect
influence over politicians via its politically engaged members, who are often as single-minded as
the organisation they belong to (Bouton et al. 2014, p. 30). The NRA publicly grades congressmen
on a scale from A to F based on their affinity for gun rights, which considerably affects poll
numbers (NRA-PVF 2016; BBC News 2016). As further evidence of the pro-gun lobbys success in
framing the issue, out of the over 100 gun-control laws proposed since 2011 (Shabad 2016), not
even one was passed. What is more, Fleming et al. (2016, p. 11) note, the cumulative impact of such
incidents has been to increase the number of lenient policy proposals in Congress. The ambiguity
here lies in the fact that the NRA manages to influence the outcome of the gun debate in Congress
without achieving this to the same extent with public opinion.

Congressmens voting behaviour explained

In order to understand what Schuman and Presser (1978; 2013) call the gun control paradox, the
re-election motives of politicians and the different intensities of voters preferences also need to be
considered (Bouton et al. 2014, p. 2). Constitutionally speaking, Congress should be the
government branch that is the most responsive to the people, as its members are directly elected
every two years for the House of Representatives and every six years for the Senate. However,

Mayhew (2004, p. 5) presents US congressmen as single-minded seekers of reelection, who

channel their entire political energy into getting votes.

Congress has declined into a battle for individual survival. Each of the Congressmen and
each of the Senators has the attitude: Ive got to look out for myself. [] Most of them are
willing only to follow those things that will protect them and give them the coloration which
allows them to blend into their respective districts or their respective states. If you dont
stick your neck out, you dont get it chopped off, states Senator William B. Saxbe (cited in
Mayhew 2004, p. 11).

Hill and Richie (2012) argue that since control of the House of Representatives is determined by
only about 35 swing districts which amount to less than 10 percent of the total 435 the voters
living in these districts have an overwhelming power over the outcome of Congressional elections.
They also tend to be rural and conservative-leaning. Hence, even though polls reveal that a majority
of Americans support stronger gun-control legislation, it is only the stance of the swing-district
voters many of whom are NRA members that matters to the congressmen.

In order to gain a broader understanding of the issue, the intensity of voters preference also needs
factoring in. When Americans who support gun-control measures were asked to rank this issue on
their priority list, the average place for gun-control was 18 out of 21, according to a survey
conducted by the Pew Research Center in January 2013 (cited in Bouton et al. 2014, p. 2, footnote
3). Moreover, a Gallup survey revealed that gun-control is considered the most important issue
facing the country by only 4 percent of respondents (cited in Bouton et al. 2014, p. 2, footnote 3).
On the other side of the spectrum, Goss (2006, p. 6) points out that American gun owners are
intense, well organized, and willing to vote for or against candidates purely on the basis of their
position on gun control. They are a highly motivated, intense minority, prevailing over a larger,
relatively apathetic majority, thus being able to determine politicians to support their interests. In
other words, as Grover Norquist, Republican strategist and NRA board member (cited in Hill and
Richie 2012) explains, the question is intensity versus preference. You can always get a certain
percentage to say they are in favor of some gun controls. But are they going to vote on their
control' position? Though many may back gun control, they have only one vote to account for a
variety of policy issues. If they do not fundamentally disagree with the agenda of a candidate

opposing gun control, they will not vote against him based solely on this issue. "But for that 4 to 5
percent who care about guns, they will vote on this (Norquist, cited in Hill and Richie 2012).

Thus, politicians can secure the votes of this single-issue voting minority by catering to its interests
without losing too many votes from the majority (Bouton et al. 2014). The findings of Bouton et al.
(2014, p. 28) support this statement, as they reveal that: i) senators who are closer to facing
reelection are more likely to vote pro-gun; ii) only Democratic senators flip flop on gun control
during their terms in office, becoming more supportive of pro-gun legislation when they approach
re-election; and iii) election proximity has an impact on the voting behaviour of Democratic
senators only when they are seeking re-election (i.e. not retiring) and when the pro-gun group in
their constituency is neither too small nor too large. To further support this point, Hill and Richie
(2012) emphasise that in 2006, Democrats regained control of the House of Representatives by
winning in Republican-leaning districts. As they knew supporting gun control might cost them the
election, most of the winning Democrats adopted a NRA-approved position, regardless of how wide
national support for gun control was.

Conclusion
Americas gun culture is deeply embedded in the founding documents of the country and is rooted
in its liberal tradition. Gun-rights supporters represent a single-issue voting bloc ready to endorse or
dismiss politicians based solely on their stance in this matter. Despite popular support for more gun
regulations, the NRA is arguing that the only thing that stops a bad guy with a gun is a good guy
with a gun (Lichtblau and Rich 2012). But the relative absence of significant gun control reform in
the US in response to high profile mass shootings is not a direct consequence of the gun lobbys
power. It is a consequence of the fundamental design of our geographic-based political map in
which representatives are elected in single-seat, winner-take-all districts (Hill and Richie 2012),
which gives the gun lobby such power over Congress. Since even a change of 5 percent of the vote
in one of the swing districts where many gun-rights supporters live can be decisive in an
election, politicians garner conservative credentials using gun rights (The Economist 2013). The
NRA's job is made easier because it can target its resources at the three dozen swing districts like a
military strategist dividing quadrants on a battlefield (Hill and Richie 2012), thus being able to
capitalise on the self-interest of politicians. The structure of the electoral system gives small groups
disproportionate influence over gun policy, hence allowing congressmen to further their interests by
catering to the vocal gun-loving minority that overrides the silent and unfocused majority.

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