CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS

(cases with * means they are repeat cases; person who is assigned to said case will again report the said case)

1. Belcodero vs. CA

2. Spouses Estonina vs.

CA

3. Quiao vs. Quiao

4. Orpiano vs. Tomas

5. Castro vs. Miat

6. Titan vs. David

Art. 160 -All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the

conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife.
Given in the case that Alayo Bosing had legal impediment because
his marriage with Juliana is subsisting, his property cannot be
governed by Art. 144 but by Art. 160.
The presumption in Art. 160 that all property of the marriage
belongs to the conjugal property applies only when there is proof
that the property was acquired during the marriage.The mere fact
that the title was issued when the spouses were already married is
not sufficient proof of conjugality especially where there was no
proof as to when the property was acquired.
CPG shall be the presumed property relations in marriages
contracted under the Civil Code or in absence of an agreed
property relations.
Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law
was the Civil Code and since they did not agree on a marriage
settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent is the system of relative community or CPG.
Article 119 of the Civil Code - In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this
Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and
wife
Consent of other spouse is required in sale of conjugal property.
The absence of the consent of one spouse to a sale renders the
entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal
property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.
The property is conjugal because it was purchased during Moises
and Concordias marriage. Even though it was made on installment
basis and the purchase was finalized after Concordias death, it is
still conjugal because what applies here would be Article 153(1) of
the Civil Code.
Art. 153 (1) of the Civil Code - All property acquired by onerous
title during the marriage is considered conjugal. Purchasing on
installment is considered onerous title because onerous means
burdensome, an installment payment imposes a burden on a
person to pay regularly.
The property was bought during the time of marriage thus the
presumption is that it is conjugal property, thus not requiring the
husband to furnish financial proof that he had the financial capacity
to buy it.
Art. 116 of the Family Code - all property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
Art. 117 (1) of the Family Code - Those acquired by onerous title
during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether
the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the

7. Imani vs. Metrobank

8. Dewara vs. Lamela

9. Lim vs. Equitable PCI

Bank

10. Laperal vs. Katigbak

11. Francisco vs. CA

12. Tan vs. Andrade

13. Veloso vs. Martinez

14. Berciles vs. GSIS

15. Plata vs. Yatco

spouses.
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However,
for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first
prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material.
The presumption of conjugality of property is overturned only by
proper evidence. Even after having classified a property as
conjugal, it does not necessarily follow that it may automatically be
levied upon in an execution to answer for debts, obligations, fines,
or indemnities of one of the spouses. Before debts and obligations
may be charged against the conjugal partnership, it must be shown
that the same were contracted for, or the debts and obligations
should have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Allegations of forgery, like all other allegations, must be proved by
clear, positive, and convincing evidence by the party alleging it. In
the present case, petitioner failed to provide sufficient proof of
forgery. As for the absence of his wifes signature, it has no bearing
in the case, as the nature of the property was never raised as an
issue.
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is
shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or the wife.
The husband cannot bind the paraphernal property unless its
administration has been transferred to him, which wasnt the case.
Neither can the paraphernal property be made to answer for debts
incurred by the husband.
Property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and
subsequently brought to the marriage, is considered as his or her
separate property. Acquisitions by lucrative title refer to properties
acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse
during the marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation.
The party who invokes the presumption of Art. 160 of the Civil Code
which provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership must first prove that the
property in controversy was acquired during the marriage.
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
The party who invokes the presumption of Art. 160 of the Civil Code
which provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership must first prove that the
property in controversy was acquired during the marriage.
Jewelry Inherited from her mother is the sole and separate property
of the wife. She had the exclusive control and management of the
same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before
a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it
properly.
Retirement premiums are presumed conjugal property, if there is no
proof that the premiums were paid from the exclusive funds of the
deceased spouse.
The parcel of land that Plata acquired while she was single was
sold to Saldana and was later on resold to Plata, married to
Begosa. They mortgaged the land to Villanueva for a loan. It was

16. Laurena vs. CA

17. Veloso vs. Martinez*

18. Manotok Realty vs. CA

19. Ong vs. CA

20. Wong et al. vs. IAC

21. Dewara vs. Lamela*

held that the parcel of land is Platas exclusive property.

Art. 109 (3) of the Family Code- The following shall be the
exclusive property of each spouse:
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by
exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouse.
The properties that were from the parents of a spouse is excluded
from the CPG.
Art. 109 (1-2) of the Family Code - The following shall be the
exclusive property of each spouse:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own.
(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title.
Jewelry Inherited from her mother is the sole and separate property
of the wife. She had the exclusive control and management of the
same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before
a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it
properly.
There is nothing in the records that show that Don Vicente Legarda
was the administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara
Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter.
Art. 136 of the Civil Code the wife retains the ownership of the
paraphernal property.
Art. 137 of the Civil Code The wife shall have the administration
of the paraphernal property, unless she delivers the same to the
husband by means of a public instrument empowering him to
administer it.
The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration
of the subject property is not sufficient proof that said property was
acquired during the marriage and is therefore conjugal. It is
undisputed that the subject property was declared solely in the
wifes name, but the house built thereon was declared in the name
of the spouses. Under such circumstances, coupled with a careful
scrutiny of the records of the present case, the lot in question is
paraphernal.
The party who invokes the presumption of Art. 160 of the Civil Code
which provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership must first prove that the
property in controversy was acquired during the marriage.
In the determination of the nature of a property acquired by a
person during marriage, the controlling factor is the source of the
money utilized in the purchase.
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in
the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to
overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are
exclusively owned by the spouse.
In the present case, it is unclear where Romanico obtained the
money to pay his loan to his officemate. Thus, the presumption is
that it is from the conjugal property.
The conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrinas obligations as
she exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her
husband nor they did redound to the benefit of the family. There
was also no evidence submitted that the administration of the
partnership had been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before
said obligations were incurred.
The presumption of conjugality of property is overturned only by

22. De La Pea vs. Avila

23. Quiao vs. Quiao*

24, Villanueva vs. CA

25. Mendoza vs. Reyes

26. Aguete vs. PNB

proper evidence. Even after having classified a property as

conjugal, it does not necessarily follow that it may automatically be
levied upon in an execution to answer for debts, obligations, fines,
or indemnities of one of the spouses. Before debts and obligations
may be charged against the conjugal partnership, it must be shown
that the same were contracted for, or the debts and obligations
should have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership, proof of acquisition during
the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
This presumption of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong,
clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of
exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.
When a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of
gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife
place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.
Thus, each couple has his or her own property and debts.
Mixture or merger of separate debts or property between the
spouses is not contemplated in CPG; thus, it established complete
separation of capitals.
Art. 116 of the Family Code.The tax declarations are not
sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under Art. 116 of the
Family Code. All property acquired by the spouses during the
marriage, regardless in whose name the property is registered, is
presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption is
not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the
property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses
only. Article 116 of the Family Code expressly provides that the
presumption remains even if the property is registered in the name
of one or both of the spouses.
Conjugal nature of property not destroyed even if property
registered in the name of only one of the spouses; Reason.
Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal
and the fact that the land is later registered in the name of only one
of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. Property
acquired during marriage was registered in the name of the
husband alone does not affect its conjugal nature, neither does
registration in the name of the wife. Any person who buys land
registered in the married name of the wife is put on notice about its
conjugal nature.
In the present case, the theory that the property bought from the
personal funds of the wife was negated by the fact that the funds
were also invested by husband and wife in their other business.
Art. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at
the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the

27. Jovellanos vs. CA

28. Munoz Jr. vs. Ramirez

29. Padilla vs. Padilla

30. Padilla vs. Paterno

31. Coingco vs. Flores

partnership, or for only one of the spouses.

(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of
the spouses, or of either of them.
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the
marriage, coming from the common property or from the exclusive
property of each spouse.
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife.
Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, but even if
delivered, the ownership may still be with the seller until full
payment is made, if there is stipulation to this effect in the terms of
sale. This stipulation is known as puctum reservati dominii, or
contractual reservation of title. Compliance with the stipulated
payments is a suspensive condition, meaning that failure to comply
prevents the vendors obligation to convey title from acquiring
binding force.
When the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in the
value are more than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement; otherwise, the property shall
be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
reimbursement for the cost of improvement.
Mere construction of a building from common funds does not
automatically convey the ownership of the wife's land to the
conjugal partnership. Before the payment of the value of the land is
made from common funds, all the increases or decreases in its
value must be for her benefit or loss and she can only demand
payment after the conjugal partnership is liquidated.
The Supreme Court maintains that however small the value of the
buildings at the time of the demolition, considering the principles of
justice and equity, it still should be reimbursed to the wife.
In the present case, ownership of the land is retained by the wife
until she is paid the value of the lot, as result of the liquidation of
conjugal partnership.
Where the acquisition by the partnership of certain properties was
subject to the suspensive condition that their values would be
reimbursed to the widow on the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, once paid, the effects of the fulfillment of the condition
should be deemed to retroact to the date of the obligation was
constituted. Consequently, all the fruits of these properties, after the
dissolution of the partnership by the death of the husband, until
final partition, logically belonged to the universal heir of said
husband and to the surviving widow in co-ownership, share and
share alike.
If there were buildings erected on the lands which were
paraphernal personal property of the appellee during the latters
marriage with the appellant, and such buildings were destroyed by
reason of the recent war, before the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of both spouses, it is obvious that the conjugal
partnership did not ipso facto acquire the land from the time of the
construction of the buildings, so as to make afterwards the land
without any buildings a conjugal property irrespective of the result
of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

32. Mariano vs. CA

33. Ayala Investment vs.

CA

34. Ching vs. CA

35. Homeowners vs. Dailo

36. Ando vs. Campo

The husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a stranger

to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife. Considering
that the wife had engaged in business with her husbands consent,
and the income derived therefrom had been expended, in part at
least, for the support of her family, the liability of the conjugal
assets to respond for the wifes obligations in the premises cannot
be disputed.
The loan obtained by the husband from AIDC was for the benefit of
PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching.
If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and
the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context
of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
In the present case, the contract of loan or services is clearly for
the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his
family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband
enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be
presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal
partnership.
All the properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wifeas long as the
properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they
are presumed to be conjugal in nature.
To make a conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that
should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the
objective of the Family Code to show the utmost concern for the
solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. The husband is
denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to
the financial stability of the conjugal partnership; No presumption
can be inferred from the fact that when the husband enters into an
accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal
partnership would thereby be benefited.
Art. 121 (3) of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership shall be
liable for:
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have
benefited.
In Conjugal Partnership of Gains, the spouses must have
knowledge and consent of the sale of property.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant
claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he
who asserts, not he who denies, must prove).
Where the property belongs to petitioner and his wife, and not to
the corporation of which the petitioner is president, it can be said
that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, a third party,
or, at the very least, the Court can consider that petitioners wife is
a third party within the contemplation of the law.
The husband being the agent of the corporation, is therefore is not
a stranger to the case such that the provision on third-party claims
will not apply to him, the property was registered not only in the
name of petitioner but also of his wife. She stands to lose the

37. G-Tractors vs. CA

38. Ong vs. CA*

39. Ayala Investment vs.

CA*

40. Security Bank vs. Mar

Tiera Corp.

property subject of execution without ever being a party to the

case. This will be tantamount to deprivation of property without due
process.
The power of the NLRC, or the courts, to execute its judgment
extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the
judgment debtor alone. A sheriff, therefore, has no authority to
attach the property of any person except that of the judgment
debtor. Likewise, there is no showing that the sheriff ever tried to
execute on the properties of the corporation.
The conjugal partnership must equally bear the indebtedness of the
husband in pursuit of his career or profession and his losses from a
legitimate business.
The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership and as
long as he believes he is doing right to his family, he should not be
made to suffer and answer alone. So that, if he incurs an
indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession or
suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal partnership
must equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he
deliberately acted to the prejudice of his family.
There is no rule or law requiring that in a suit against the husband
to enforce an obligation, either pertaining to him alone or one
chargeable against the conjugal partnership, the defendant
husband must be joined by his wife.
There is no presumption that the family benefited when the
spouses are in fact separated.
The loan obtained by the husband from AIDC was for the benefit of
PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching.
If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and
the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context
of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
In the present case, the contract of loan or services is clearly for
the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his
family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband
enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be
presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal
partnership.
Art. 161(1) of the Civil Code - the conjugal partnership is liable for
all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership.
In acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not
act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is
clearly intended for a third party.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e.,
the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for
his own business or profession, the transaction falls within the term
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In other
words, where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the
family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation
redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another
person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or
guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation

41. Aguete vs. PNB*

42. Costuna vs. Domondon

43. Carlos vs. Abelardo

for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of the
principal debtor and not for the surety or his family.
Debts contracted by a spouse for and in the exercise of the industry
or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family
cannot be deemed to be his exclusive private debts. Hence, the
debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
As a general rule, the sale of conjugal property by one spouse
without the consent of the other is invalid as the other spouses
consent is necessary.
However, in this case, the consent of Estela was unreasonably
withheld by her. The Court is constrained to relax the application of
the law, and consider the sale falling within the legal exceptions to
the general rule.
The conjugal partnership shall be liable for all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
A loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged
against the conjugal partnership if it has redounded to the

benefit of the family.

44. Villanueva vs. Chiong

45. Ravina vs. Villa-Abrille

46. Fuentes vs. Roca

Where the husband contracts obligations in behalf of the family

business the law presumes and rightly that such obligation will
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership
Where the cnjugal property was sold by the husband without the
consent of the wife, even if they were separated in fact prior to the
selling, the deed of sale should be annulled as the wife had not
given her consent to it. (Sale was done before FC)
Art. 166 of the Civil Code - that the husband cannot alienate or
encumber the property without the wifes consent.
Art. 167 of the Civil Code - if a property was indeed encumbered by
the husband absent the wifes consent, the wife may file for
annulment of the contract, during the marriage, within 10 years
from the transaction.
The deed of sale covering the conjugal property is void due to the
absence of the consent of the wife. Since the sale was concluded
after the effectivity of the Family Code, what applies then is Art. 124
of the Family Code.
Art. 124 of the Family Code disposition of conjugal property is
void if it is done without:
(a) the consent of both the husband and the wife, or
(b) in case of one of the spouses inability, the authority of the court.
Additionally, the Court stated that Art 124 only contemplated that it
is only in the administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership where the husbands decision shall prevail, if in case of
disagreement
Disposition of conjugal property made without the consent of the
other spouse is void.The death of the other spouse does not
prevent the heirs to question the validity of such disposition.
In a case where consent of the other spouse was obtained through
forgery, the disposition of the conjugal property is not void by virtue
of the forgery, but rather because of the absence of the consent of
the other spouse.
The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of the
contract does not prescribe.

47. People vs. Lagrimas

48. Pana vs. Heirs of

Juanite

49. Guiang vs. CA

50. Roxas vs. CA

51. Docena v Lapesura

52. Alinas vs. Alinas

53. Aggabao vs. Parulan

Fines and indemnities upon either husband or wife may be

enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code have been covered, if the
spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it
should be sufficient.
The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on
the wife may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in Art. 121 of the Family Code have
been covered. Art. 121 allows payment of the criminal indemnities
imposed on the wife out of the partnership assets even before
these are liquidated. It states that such indemnities may be
enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in the preceding article have been covered. No prior
liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair
since Art. 122 states that at the time of the liquidation of the
partnership, such offending spouse shall be charged for what has
been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.
The sale of the conjugal property requires the consent of both the
husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders
the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely
voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
Even if the husband is administrator of the conjugal partnership,
administration does not include acts of ownership. For while the
husband can administer the conjugal assets unhampered, he
cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal realty. Thus, the joinder
of the wife, although unnecessary for an oral lease of conjugal
realty which does not exceed one year in duration, is required in a
lease of conjugal realty for a period of more than one year. In case
the wife's consent is not secured by the husband as required by
law, the wife has the remedy of filing an action for the annulment of
the contract.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property
belongs to the husband and the wife jointly. However, unlike an act
of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is
required, joint management or administration does not require that
the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly
exercise full power of management alone, subject to the
intervention of the court in proper cases.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
Art. 124 of the Family Code - the administration and enjoyment of
the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly.
Art. 124 of the Family Code categorically requires the consent of
both spouses before the conjugal property may be disposed of by
sale, mortgage, or other modes of disposition.
Standard to determine the good faith of the buyers dealing with a
seller who had title to and possession of the land but whose
capacity to sell was restricted: that the consent of the other spouse

54. Uy vs. CA

55. Sabalones vs. CA

56. Cheeseman vs. IAC

57. Frenzel vs. Catito

was required before the conveyance, declaring that in order to

prove good faith in such a situation, the buyers must show that they
inquired not only into the title of the seller but also into the sellers
capacity to sell.
Thus, the buyers of conjugal property must observe two kinds of
requisite diligence, namely:
(a) the diligence in verifying the validity of the title covering the
property;
(b) the diligence in inquiring into the authority of the transacting
spouse to sell conjugal property in behalf of the other spouse.
The procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article
124 of the Family Code are not applicable when the nonconsenting spouse is incapacitated to give consent. Hence, the
proper remedy was the appointment of a judicial guardian of the
person or estate or both of such incompetent.
The law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of
administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian. In
this case, the wife who desires to sell real property as administrator
of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of
the wards estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95 of the
1964 Revised Rules of Court and not the summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code.
Furthermore, the Court held that absent an opportunity to be heard,
the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due
process and may be assailed or impugned at any time either
directly or collaterally.
While spouses have joint administration over the conjugal
properties, Art. 61 of the Family Code also states that after a
petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in
the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint
either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the
administrator.
In the case at bar, no formal designation of the administrator has
been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial
court denying the husband any share in the conjugal properties
which also provides that he is disqualified to act as the
administrator. The designation was in effect approved by the CA
when it issued in favor of the respondent wife.
The foreigner husband has no capacity or personality to question
the sale of the property because it would be an indirect
contraversion of the constitutional prohibition. Aliens are prohibited
from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, Cheesemans
defense that he is merely exercising his right as a husband in
respect to the conjugal property is unmeritorious. If the property
were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien
husband not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would
then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. Even if
the wife did use conjugal funds to make the acquisition, his
recovering and holding the property cannot be warranted as it is
against the constitution.
A contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void
and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal
effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract,
cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective

58. Ravina vs. Villa-Abrille

59. Siochi vs. Gozon

60. Fuentes vs. Roca*

61. Aguete vs. PNB*

62. Flores vs. Lindo

63. Novares vs. Novares

64. Partosa-Jo vs. CA

carried out. One who loses his money or property by knowingly

engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral
turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses.
Art 124 only contemplated that it is only in the administration and
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership where the husbands
decision shall prevail, if in case of disagreement, which is still
subject to recourse to the court by the wife to be availed within five
years from the date of the decision, this however, as the Court
stated does not apply to the disposition or encumbrance of the
property, which, as previously mentioned, requires :
(a) the consent of both the husband and the wife, or
(b) in case of one of the spouses inability, the authority of the court.
Disposition of conjugal property made without the consent of the
other spouse is void.The death of the other spouse does not
prevent the heirs to question the validity of such disposition.
In a case where consent of the other spouse was obtained through
forgery, the disposition of the conjugal property is not void by virtue
of the forgery, but rather because of the absence of the consent of
the other spouse.
The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of the
contract does not prescribe.
A spouse cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property
without the consent, express or implied, of his spouse. Should one
party do so, then the contract is voidable. Annulment will be
declared only upon a finding that the other party did not provide
consent.
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial
separation of property was not tackled in the trial courts decision
because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as
liquidation of the absolute community of properties.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated
for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute
community of property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community
property automatically dissolves the absolute community regime,
as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 of the Family Code.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she
has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning. The
spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three
months or has failed within the same period to give any information
as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have
no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (Art. 128 of FC)
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed
intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just
cause, and without in the meantime providing in the least for one's
family although able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of
marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual
separation. This idea is clearly expressed in the above-quoted
provision, which states that a spouse is deemed to have
abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling
without any intention of returning.
The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by

65. Novares vs. Novares*

66. Heirs of Go vs.

Servacio

67. Ugalde vs Ysasi

68. Lavadia vs. Heirs of

Luna

69. Noveras vs. Noveras*

70. Tarrosa vs. De Leon

the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to

constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of
their conjugal property.
There was no abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial
separation of properties under Article 135 (4) of the Family Code.
Abandonment, under Art. 101 of the Family Code must be for a
valid cause and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the
other when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of
returning.
The intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the
allegedly abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to
his or her whereabouts within the period of three months from such
abandonment.
Art. 126 (1) of the Family Code -The conjugal partnership
terminates: (1) Upon the death of either spouse.
Art. 130 of the Family Code - Upon the termination of the marriage
by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in
the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted the surviving
spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either
judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the
deceased spouse. Is upon the lapse of the six month period no
liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the
conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be
void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory
regime of complete separation of properties shall govern the
property relations of the subsequent marriage.
A co-owner could sell his undivided share.
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of
property results in the termination of the conjugal partnership of
gains. Hence, the finality of the Amicable Settlement approving the
parties' separation of property resulted in the termination of the
conjugal partnership of gains.
Petitioner who is the second wife of deceased cannot claim death
benefits as it was a bigamous marriage entered. Art. 148 of the FC
governs their property relations (co-ownership through actual joint
contribution.)
However, Art 147 governs the property relations belonging to the
first wife (co-ownership in equal shares) despite the marriage being
void for lack of marriage license.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated
for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute
community of property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community
property automatically dissolves the absolute community regime,
as stated in the 4th paragraph of Art. 99 of the Family Code.
Art. 99 (4) of the Family Code - the absolute community terminates:
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
under Articles 134 to 138.
The sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of
the partnership is void. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal

71. Cabreza vs. Cabreza

72. Quiao vs. Quiao*

partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is

inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor
an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it appears
that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation
and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net
remainder resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the
partnership after its dissolution.
Art. 129 (9) of the Family Code - Upon the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the
lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by
the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of
the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of
seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the
court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the
court shall decide taking into consideration the best interests of
said children.
In Art 129 of the Family Code, it presupposes the husband and wife
has more than one property aside from the conjugal dwelling. In
case spouses have more properties, these properties are liquidated
and divided but the conjugal dwelling will be given to the spouse
whom majority of the children will reside. However, if there is only
one conjugal property, the property will be sold and liquidated.
Procedures for dissolution provided by Family Code shall be
applied when marriage was dissolved, separated, or annulled
during the effectivity of the Family Code even though the marriage
was contracted under the Civil Code.
Since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the
respondents marriage the operative law is already the Family
Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law
in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and
liabilities is concerned is Art. 129 of the Family Code in relation to
Art. 63 (2) of the Family Code.

73. Barrido vs. Nonato

74. Noveras vs. Noveras*

Liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute

community regime, following the procedure in Art.
102 of the Family Code.

75. Santero vs. CFI

Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the
surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support
during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right
cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which
is a procedural rule. Note however that with respect to "spouse,"
the same must be the "legitimate spouse" and not common-law
spouses who are the mothers of the children here.