ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA vs.

SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity

as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his
capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
G.R. No. 79974
December 17, 1987
FACTS: In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners (n.b. Dean Ulpiano Sarmiento of SBCAlabang), who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the
functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo
Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of
Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.
Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, particularly, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the
departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to
which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention.
ISSUE: WON respondent Mison's appointment in office is valid?
HELD: YES. Note that (before) the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general rule, presidential
appointments to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw
fit, by way of an exception to such rule, to provide that Congress may, however, by law vest the
appointment of inferior officers (equivalent to 11 officers lower in rank" referred to in the 1987
Constitution) in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
In the 1987 Constitution, however, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude
presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except
appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII.
Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word
"alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of
lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint
is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in the case of
lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the
courts, or in the heads of various departments of the government. In short, the word "alone" in the
third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of
par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the
second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and
positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one
of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution
includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand, deliberately excluded the
position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937. After the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16,
Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is
one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorizedby law to make, such
appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED.

FELIMON LUEGO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO

G.R. NO. L-69137
August 5, 1986
FACTS: The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer 11, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City,
by Mayor Florentino Solon on February 18, 1983. The appointment was described as "permanent"
but the Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary," subject to the final action taken in the
protest filed by the private respondent and another employee, and provided "there (was) no pending
administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment nor any
decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment."
On March 22, 1984, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than
the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly, directed "that Felicula Tuozo be appointed
to the position, in place of Felimon Luego whose appointment as Administrative Officer II is hereby
revoked." The private respondent was so appointed on June 28, 1984, by the new mayor, Mayor
Ronald Duterte.
The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, is now before us to question that order
and the private respondent's title.
The Solicitor General avers that the petitioner could be validly replaced in the instant case because
his appointment was temporary and therefore could be withdrawn at will, with or without cause.
Having accepted such an appointment, it is argued, the petitioner waived his security of tenure and
consequently ran the risk of an abrupt separation from his office without violation of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the
ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding,
order his replacement by the latter?
HELD: NO. The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the character
of the appointment, which was clearly described as "Permanent" in the space provided for in Civil
Service Form No. 33. What was temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the appointment it
sell And what made the approval temporary was the fact that it was made to depend on the condition
specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of the appointee to the position.
The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment
extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the
appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified
and authorizing the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.
As Justice Ramon C. Fernandez declared in an earlier case:
It is well settled that the determination of the kind of appointment to be extended lies in the official
vested by law with the appointing power and not the Civil Service Commission. The Commissioner
of Civil Service is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by
the appointing officer. When the appointee is qualified, as in this case, the Commissioner of Civil
Service has no choice but to attest to the appointment. Under the Civil Service Law, Presidential
Decree No. 807, the Commissioner is not authorized to curtail the discretion of the appointing
official on the nature or kind of the appointment to be extended.

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which
it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess
the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground
that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred.
The Civil Service Commission is limited only to the non-discretionary authority of determining
whether or not the person appointed meets all the required conditions laid down by the law.
By the language of Section 9(h) of Article V of the Civil Service Decree because it says the
Commission has the power to "approve" and "disapprove" appointments. Thus, it is provides therein
that the Commission shall have inter alia the power to:
9(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional to positions in the civil
service, except those presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove those where the
appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. (emphasis
supplied)
A full reading of the provision, especially of the underscored parts, will make it clear that all the
Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee possesses the
appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his appointment is
approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the
Commission when it acts on--or as the Decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" an appointment
made by the proper authorities.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the respondent Commission on Civil Service dated March 22, 1984,
is set aside, and the petitioner is hereby declared to be entitled to the office in dispute by virtue of
his permanent appointment thereto dated February 18, 1983. No costs.

ANTONIO LACSON vs.HONORIO ROMERO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-3081
October 14, 1949
FACTS: Petitioner Lacson was appointed by the President of the Philippines, provincial fiscal of
Negros Oriental on July 25, 1946. The appointment was confirmed by the Commission on
Appointment on August 6, 1946. He took his oath of office on August 10, 1946, and thereafter
performed the duties of that office.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, on May 17, 1949, the President nominated
petitioner Lacson to the post of provincial fiscal of Tarlac. On the same date, the President
nominated for the position of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental respondent Romero. Both
nominations were simultaneously confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on May 19, 1949.
Lacson neither accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal of Tarlac. But respondent
Romero took his oath of office (the post of fiscal of Negros Oriental) in Manila on June 16, 1949,
notified the Solicitor General of the fact, and thereafter proceeded to his station.

Upon arrival at Dumaguete City, capital of Negros Oriental, he notified Lacson of his intention to take
over the office the following day, but Lacson objected. On June 24, 1949, Romero appeared in
criminal case No. 4433 before Judge Gregorio S. Narvasa. In said appearance, petitioner Lacson
filed his objection and asked that Romero's appearance be stricken from the record. After Romero
had exhibited his credentials as required by the court, Judge Narvasa on the same day denied the
petition of Lacson and recognized respondent Romero as the provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. On
June 27, 1949, Romero appeared in Special Proceedings No. 630 before Judge Felicisimo Ocampo.
Lacson again objected to said appearance but the court overruled his objection.
Thereafter, upon Lacson's request for payment of his salary for the period from June 16 to June 23,
1949 as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental, Angel Paguia, Provincial Auditor and L. J. Alfabeto,
Provincial Treasurer turned down his claim and instead paid respondent Romero the salary for the
position of provincial fiscal from June 16, 1949, and continued paying it to him periodically up to the
present time.
The purpose of the present action is to establish the right of the petitioner to the post of provincial
fiscal of Negros Oriental and to oust the respondent Romero therefrom.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lacson is entitled to the position.
HELD: YES. The appointment to a government post like that of provincial fiscal to be complete involves several
steps. First, comes the nomination by the President. Then to make that nomination valid and permanent, the
Commission on Appointments of the Legislature has to confirm said nomination. The last step is the acceptance
thereof by the appointee by his assumption of office. The first two steps, nomination and confirmation, constitute a
mere offer of a post. They are acts of the Executive and Legislative departments of the Government. But the last
necessary step to make the appointment complete and effective rests solely with the appointee himself. He may or he
may not accept the appointment or nomination.

Consequently, since Lacson has declined to accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac and
no one can compel him to do so, then he continues as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no
vacancy in said office was created, unless Lacson had been lawfully removed as Such fiscal of
Negros Oriental.
Note that the intended transfer of Lacson to Tarlac on the basis of his nomination thereto, if carried
out, would be equivalent to a removal from his office in Negros Oriental. To appoint and transfer him
from one province to another would mean his removal or separation from the first province. The
reason is that a fiscal is appointed for each province, and Lacson could not well and legally hold and
occupy the two posts of fiscal of Tarlac and Negros Oriental simultaneously. To be fiscal for Tarlac
must mean his removal from Negros Oriental.
The law regarding appointment to the post of provincial fiscal is contained in section 66 of the
Administrative Code which provides that "the Governor-General (now the President) shall appoint among other
officials, Secretaries to Departments, Provincial Treasurers, Provincial Fiscals, Register of Deeds, etc." And, Article
VII, section 10(3) of the Constitution provides that the President shall nominate and with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments shall appoint among other officials, "all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for" which clearly includes the office of provincial fiscal. It is

therefore clear that a provincial fiscal who is nominated and appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, as was petitioner Lacson, is included in the
unclassified service of the Civil Service, under section 671 (b):
"Officers, other than the provincial treasurers and Assistant Directors of Bureaus or
Offices, appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on

Appointments of the National Assembly, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are by law vested in the President of the Philippines alone."
The next question arises as to whether the President even with the concurrence or consent of the
Commission on Appointments may remove a provincial fiscal without cause. The Constitution itself
denies said right. Article XII, section 4 of said instrument provides that "no officer or employee in the
civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."
Ordinarily, the power of removal is inherent in the power to appoint and that consequently, the
President had the right to remove the petitioner as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and transfer
him to Tarlac. However, where there is no constitutional limitation the contention of the respondent
would be tenable; but where as in the Philippines and as already stated the Constitution forbids the
removal of a civil service official or employee like the petitioner except for cause as provided by law,
said right of the Chief Executive is qualified and limited. That constitutional prohibition is a limitation
to the inherent power of the Executive to remove those civil service officials whom he appoints.
In view of the foregoing, we are constrained to find and to hold that the transfer of Lacson to Tarlac
by his nomination to the post of provincial fiscal of that province was equivalent to and meant his
removal as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental; that said removal was illegal and unlawful for lack of
valid cause as provided by law and the Constitution; that the confirmation of the nomination by the
Commission on Appointments did not and could not validate the removal, since the Constitution is
equally binding on the Legislature; that a provincial fiscal is a civil service official or employee whose
tenure of office is protected by the Constitution; and that Antonio Lacson could not be compelled to
accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac; that having declined said appointment, he
continued as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental; that inasmuch as he neither left, abandoned nor
resigned from his post as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental, there was no vacancy in said post to
which the respondent could be legally appointed; and that consequently, the appointment of the
respondent was invalid.

MARCIAL COSTIN, ESTANISLAO LAJER, LIONEL KANEN as Chief of Police; FRANCISCO

TISADO, OCTAVIO TRAYA as Municipal Mayor; DOMINGO IPONG as Municipal Treasurer; and
THE
MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL
OF
ABUYOG,
LEYTE
vs. HONORABLE LOPE C. QUIMBO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, and
HIGINIO VERRA
G.R. No. L-32271
January 27, 1983
FACTS: Petitioner Estanislao Lajer was a member of the municipal police force of Abuyog, Leyte
since January 1, 1949. He was extended a promotional appointment as sergeant of police on. On
November 25, 1959, the outgoing municipal mayor of Abuyog accorded Lajer another promotional
appointment as chief of police. This last appointment was not attested and approved as required by
law.
On January 14, 1960, the new municipal mayor dismissed Lajer and eight other members of the
police department. On the same day, the municipal mayor extended to respondent Higinio Verra a
permanent appointment as Chief of Police of Abuyog with a salary of P2,280.00 per annum. Verra
immediately took over the position. His appointment was eventually approved as permanent under
Section 24 (b) of Republic Act 2260 by the Commissioner of Civil Service.

Thereafter, Lajer and the eight members of the police force filed an action for mandamus (Civil Case
No. 2713) against the municipal mayor, municipal treasurer and the municipal council of Abuyog,
contesting their separation from the service.
While this petition for mandamus was pending, there was again a change in the municipal
administration of Abuyog, Leyte as a result of the 1963 local elections. The newly elected municipal
mayor dismissed respondent Verra from office and was replaced by Victoriano Silleza officer-incharge, on January 17, 1964 until October, 1964 when petitioner Marcial Costin was appointed chief
of police.
On December 29, 1964, respondent Verra filed Civil Case No. 3606 for quo warranto with
mandamus against Marcial Costin the municipal mayor, and the municipal treasurer, questioning the
legality of his separation alleging that he could not be dismissed as chief of police because he was a
civil service eligible and in possession of an appointment to the position of chief of police of Abuyog,
Leyte duly attested "Permanent" by the Civil Service Commission.
On January 22, 1966, the mandamus suit (Civil Case No. 2713) filed by Lajer and his companions,
which had been appealed was decided by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court found that Lajer,
Tomines and Jervoso "were illegally removed from office and are, the afore entitled to reinstatement
to their respective positions with payment of the salaries they failed to receive. " As a result of the
appellate decision, petitioner (then mayor) Tisado reinstated Lajer as chief of police.
However, on December 2, 1969, respondent judge rendered his decision in Civil Case No. 3606,
declaring that Verra is entitled to reinstatement with salary to be paid to him for the Whole period of
his illegal separation to the date of his reinstatement. The court also ordered the municipal mayor to
reinstate Verra immediately and the municipal treasurer to pay his salary.
This decision is now before us for review.
Petitioners argue that the appointment issued in favor of respondent Verra as chief of police on
January 14, 1960, was invalid and ineffective because the said position was not vacant from the time
Lajer was illegally separated on January 14, 1960, up to the time he was actually reinstated.
Respondent Verra on the other hand, contends that the office in question was legally vacant when
he was appointed thereto because Lajers appointment was never attested as required by law or
incomplete, and, therefore, never became effective. Also, that he is a civil service eligible and his
appointment as chief of police was attested as permanent under Section 20 of Republic Act 2260
and served as such for four (4) years and two (2) days when he was dismissed without cause, his
dismissal is illegal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of respondent Higinio Verra to the position of Chief of Police
of Abuyog, Leyte, was valid; consequently, his removal therefrom illegal.
HELD: NO. When respondent Verra was appointed chief of police on January 14, 1960, Lajer had
just been dismissed from office with several other members of the police force. The validity of Verras
appointment, hinges on the legality of Lajers removal. It is elementary in the law of public officers
that no person, no matter how qualified and eligible he is for a certain position may be appointed to
an office which is not vacant. There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent
must first be legally removed or his appoint. ment validly terminated.

The private respondent is correct in asserting that when the promotional appointment of Lajer was
made in 1959, it could not be considered final or complete. Under Section 2(a) of Rule VI, the
Civil Service Rules implementing Section 16(g) of Republic Act 2260, an appointment extended by
an officer duly empowered to make it is not final and complete until after the Commissioner of Civil
Service has certified that such an appointment may be made.
It is likewise true that under Section 20 of Republic Act 2260 which, in part, provides:
SEC. 20. Delegation in the Civil Service Commission and to the Agencies. -... Appointments
by ... municipal mayors shall become effective upon issuance of such appointments and
upon attestation by the provincial treasurer in the case of appointments made by ...
municipal mayors ... . All appointments made by the ... municipal mayors ... shall, after being
attested to by the respective provincial treasurer ... be forwarded within ten days to the
Commissioner of Civil Service for review pursuant to Civil Service law and rules. If within one
hundred eighty days after receipt of said appointments, the Commissioner of Civil Service
shall not have made any correction or revision, then such appointments shall be deemed to
have been properly made...
the attestation by the provincial treasurer of Leyte was necessary to make the appointment of
petitioner Lajer effective.* However, these requirements could not be complied with because Lajer
who had been appointed on November 25, 1959 was replaced on January 14, 1960 by the new
mayor of the municipality who appointed Verra. The incoming mayor should have awaited the action
of the provincial treasurer and later, the Commissioner of Civil Service, before appointing his own
protege to a position with an incumbent occupying it.
The argument of respondent, Verra that Mayor Tisado should have refrained from reinstating Lajer
as chief of police notwithstanding the decision of the Court of Appeals because he, Verra had filed a
case with the Court of First Instance contesting the same position betrays a lack of understanding of
a final and executory decision of an appellate tribunal. The decision of the Court of Appeals
superseded any decision that the Court of First Instance or the Civil Service Commissioner could
have rendered on the same issue and the same facts. It was precisely the termination of Lajers
promotional appointment as chief of police which the appellate court struck down. Since Lajer was
not validly terminated from public office and, as a matter of fact, was ordered reinstated through a
warrant of mandamus, it follows that there was no vacancy in the office of chief of police on January
14, 1960 and there was no office to which Higinio Verra could have been appointed. The discussions
in the decision of the respondent judge on whether or not Higinio Vera was validly removed from
office are all beside the point. Never having been validly appointed, there was no office from which
he was -illegally dismissed. At most, he was a de facto officer during the years when Lajer was
litigating his action for reinstatement in the court of first instance and in the court of appeals

SALVACION A. MONSANTO vs. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.

G.R. No. 78239
February 9, 1989
FACTS: In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner
Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the
complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. They were further ordered to jointly
and severally indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the
amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently affirmed the same.
She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended on
December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December
21, 1984.
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be
restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant.
Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in view of the
provision of the Local Government Code transferring the power of appointment of treasurers from
the city governments to the said Ministry. The Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be
reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she
was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the city treasurer to see to it that the amount
of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had required to be indemnified in favor of the
government as well as the costs of the litigation, be satisfied.
Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on April 17, 1985
stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service
in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should
correspond to the date of her preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to
backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.
The Ministry of Finance, however, referred petitioner's letter to the Office of the President for further
review and action. Said Office, through Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. held:
"this Office holds that Salvacion A. Monsanto is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the basis
of the absolute pardon granted her but must secure an appointment to her former position and that,
notwithstanding said absolute pardon, she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous
conviction. "

Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition in
her behalf .
ISSUE: whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.

HELD: NO. The benign mercy of pardon is of British origin, conceived to temper the gravity of the
King's wrath. But Philippine jurisprudence on the subject has been largely influenced by American
case law.
Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which
exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It
is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is
intended, and not communicated officially to the Court. ... A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is
essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance."

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye
of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate
for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies
guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not
wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute pardon, the Chief Executive declared her
not guilty of the crime for which she was convicted. In the case of State v. Hazzard, we find this
strong observation: "To assume that all or even a major number of pardons are issued because of
innocence of the recipients is not only to indict our judicial system, but requires us to assume that which
we all know to be untrue. The very act of forgiveness implies the commission of wrong, and that wrong
has been established by the most complete method known to modern civilization. Pardons may relieve
from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but they cannot erase the stain of
bad character, which has been definitely fixed.
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is
rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by
the sentence. The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the
Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence
is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be
extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing
due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr., dated April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. no. 83896
FACTS: Two petitions were consolidated and are being resolved as both seeking resolution of the
unconstitutionality of E.O. no 284 issued by President Corazon Aquino on July 25, 1987 a llowing
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices
or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. CLU maintains that this
Executive Order runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including

government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.

The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution.
According to CLU, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the
Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under
Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Section 8, Article VIII: Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB on the Civil
Service Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said
exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the
President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants.
Petitioners insist that because of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in
Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution, as in the case of
the Vice-President being allowed to become a Member of the Cabinet under the second paragraph of
Section 3, Article VII or the Secretary of Justice being designated an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council under Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1).
Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the
appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitunional

HELD: NO.

The Court ruled in the negative.

It has been held that in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed.
The legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from holding
multiple positions in the government for self-enrichment which is a betrayal of public trust.
The provisions of EO No. 284 are in direct contradiction to the express mandate provided by the
Constitutional provisions (Sec 13, Art VII and Sec 8, Art VIII). The Constitution, the fundamental law of the
land, shall reign supreme over any other statute. When there is conflict, it shall be resolved in favor of the
highest law of the land. Thus, the Court held that EO No. 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As a result,
DENR Secretary Fulgenio Factoran, Jr., DILF Secretary Luis Santos, DOH Secretary Alfredo Bengzon
and DBM Secretary Guillermo Carague are ordered to immediately relinquish their offices and
employment.

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualifications stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284
is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.

RAMON LABO, JR. vs COMELEC

G.R. no. 86564

FACTS: Ramon Labo, Jr. is a mayor-elect who, through his marriage with an Australian national, was
naturalized and took an oath of allegiance as an Australian citizen. Said marriage was found to be
bigamous and therefore was annulled. Labo claims that his naturalization made him only a dual national
and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship.
He is now asking the Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking into the question of his
citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation that he is a foreigner, he
says, is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any
inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time.
The petitioner's position was : He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City, on January 20, 1988. The
petition for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent on January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was
paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his
proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed
only when the fee was paid. This was done beyond the reglementary period provided for under Section
253 of the Omnibus Election Code reading as follows:
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of a Member of the Batasang Pambansa,
regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall
file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the result of the
election.

Labo, Jr. adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under Rule 36, Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of the
COMELEC providing that Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course without the payment of a
filing fee in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research fee as required by law.

For his part, the private respondent, Luis Lardizabal, denies that the filing fee was paid out of time. In fact
he says, it was flied ahead of time. His point is that when he filed his "Petition for Quo Warranto with
Prayer for Immediate Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining Order or Injunction" on January 26,
1988, the COMELEC treated it as a pre-proclamation controversy and docketed it as SPC Case No. 88288. No docket fee was collected although it was offered. It was only on February 8, 1988, that the
COMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case No.
88-19, serving him notice on February 10, 1988. He immediately paid the filing fee on that date.
Luis Lardizaba argues further that during the period when the COMELEC regarded his petition as a preproclamation controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo warranto proceeding was deemed
suspended under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code. 2 At any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section 5,
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the petitioner, became effective only on November 15,
1988, seven days after publication of the said Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44
thereof. 3 These rules could not retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed his petition with the
COMELEC.
In his Reply, Labo Jr. argues that even if the Omnibus Election Code did not require it, the payment of
filing fees was still necessary under Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of the respondent
COMELEC, promulgated on January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980, respectively. To this, the private

respondent counters that the latter resolution was intended for the local elections held on January 30,
1980, and did not apply to the 1988 local elections, which were supposed to be governed by the firstmentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect only on March 3, 1988, following the lapse of
seven days after its publication as required by RA No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform
Law of 1987, which became effective on January 5, 1988. Its Section 30 provides in part:
Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission. The rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission shall take effect on the seventh day after their publication in the Official Gazette or in at least (2) daily
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

ISSUE(s):

1. Whether or not Labo Jr., can retain his public office

2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty
race, can replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.

HELD: NO. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was

naturalized as an Australian in 1976 and it was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an
Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the government
of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to the Philippines in
1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen.
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost
his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost
his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be
naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress none of this
happened.

Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not
overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even
unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution simply
by electing a foreigner curiously, would the people of Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he
is Australian. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the
Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that
privilege over their countrymen.

Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be
declared the mayor by reason of Labos disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second
highest number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that
public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one
can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority
or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

ANTONIA YEE vs THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS

G.R. no. L-16924

Facts: Antonia Yee was a public school teacher and had been appointed as such in the Division of
Antique in 1951. She was a civil service eligible as a regular national teacher having passed the
Junior Teachers' (Regular) Examination. Yee was receiving a monthly salary of P140.00 as such
teacher and in the school year 1957-1958 she was actually teaching in the Buhang Elementary
School, Buhang Hamtic, Antique.Yee having married Mr. Ng Foo alias Pio Chet Yee, a Chinese
citizen, on August 10, 1957 is presently a Chinese citizen.
Sometime on October 28, 1957 Yee was removed from her teaching service by virtue of Special
Order, issued by the Division Superintendent of Schools of Antique 9. That Special Order No. 296 of
the Division Superintendent of Schools of Antique, the ruling of the Director of Public Schools in his
2nd indorsement dated October 14, 1957 ,and Circular No. 40, series of 1947 had never been
appealed by Yee to the Secretary of Education.
So when this case was filed sometime on October 11, 1958, the original respondents were only the
Director of Public Schools and the Division Superintendent of Schools of Antique. Yee came to know
for the first time of the actions taken on her letter of October 25, 1957, sometime on January 9, 1959
when the respondents Division Superintendent of Schools and the Director of Public Schools
submitted their evidence in support of their motion to dismiss and which in the documents it appear
that the Secretary of Education in its 3rd indorsement dated March 17, 1958 concurs with the
recommendation of the Director of Public Schools for denial of the reinstatement of the petitioner to
the service and that on August 26, 1958, in its 4th indorsement the Commissioner of Civil Service
likewise concurs in the action separating Mrs. Antonio A. Yee from the teaching service.
Yee learned of the actions taken by the respondents on her letter dated September 26, 1958
sometime in May, 1959 and which actions are embodied in the indorsements hereto attached
indicating that in the 3rd indorsement dated February 2, 1959 the Secretary of Education ruled that
Mrs. Antonia A. Yee is still disqualified from holding any position in the teaching service reiterating its
position previously stated in the 3rd indorsement dated March 17, 1958 relative to the same matter,
and that this reiterated ruling of the Secretary of Education was duly noted by the Commissioner of
Civil Service on March 24, 1959
The original petition for mandamus was filed on October 11, 1958 against the Director of Public
Schools and the Division Superintendent of Schools as the stated respondents and by virtue of the
order of the Court, dated February 16, 1959, deferring the determination of said motion to dismiss,
respondents answer to the original petition was submitted to the Court on February 16, 1959.
On February 18, 1959 Yee filed a motion for leave to include the Secretary of Education and the
Commissioner of Civil Service as co-respondents; that to this motion, an opposition to the same was
filed on February 20, 1959 by the original respondents; that in its order of February 23, 1959 the
Court ordered the joining of the Secretary of Education and the Commissioner of Civil Service as
additional respondents;
On February 23, 1959, Yee submitted her amended petition for mandamus wherein the additional
respondents have been included, to which a motion to dismiss dated April 7, 1959 was filed by the
respondents and said motion to dismiss was denied by the Court in its order of July 24, 1959, but in
that same order, petitioner was directed to amend its petition to include averments of the cause of
action against the Secretary of Education and the Commissioner of Civil Service and on July 30,
1959, an amended petition for mandamus was filed by the Yee against all the herein respondents

and the corresponding answer to the amended petition was submitted in behalf of the same
respondents on July 31, 1959
ISSUE: Whether or not Yee is qualified as a teacher, under public function which may be performed by
Filipino citizens only.
HELD: The Court ruled that there is no doubt that her removal as a public school teacher because of loss
of Filipino citizenship is legal. Not being included in section 671 of the Revised Administrative Code which
enumerates the officers and employees constituting the unclassified service, teaching in a public school is
in the classified service a public function which may be performed by Filipino citizens only. An applicant
for admission to examination for entrance into the civil service must be a citizen of the Philippines(section
675 of the Revised Administrative Code).
And after he had qualified himself to be eligible for appointment to a civil service position and had been
appointed to such position, he must continue to be such citizen. A voluntary change of citizenship or a
change thereof by operation of law disqualifies him to continue holding the civil service position to which
he had qualified and had been appointed. Such being the case, upon the appellee's marriage on 10
August 1957 to Ng Fooalias Pio Chet Yee, a Chinese citizen, the appellee ceased to be a citizen of the
Philippines, and fort hat reason she is no longer qualified to continue holding the civil service position to
which she had qualified and had been appointed.Section 681 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides that In making selection from lists of certified eligible furnished by the Commissioner,
appointing officer shall, when other qualifications are equal, prefer:
First, Citizens of the Philippines; Second, Honorably discharged soldiers, sailors, and
mariners of the United States, is no argument against the limitation of holding public offices to
citizens of the Philippines. The preference provided for in the section quoted above was
operative during the period before 4July 1946 or before the Philippines became an
independent nation.
IN VIEW OF THE CONCLUSION ARRIVED AT, the point of exhaustion of administrative remedy need not
be passed upon. The judgment appealed from is reversed and petition denied, without pronouncement as
to cost in both instances.

LAUREL v. DESIERTO
G.R. No. 145368
FACTS: President Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 "constituting a Committee for the
preparation of the National Centennial Celebrationi n 1998." The Committee was mandated "to take
charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the
Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress. President Ramos
issued Executive Order No. 128,"reconstituting the Committee for the preparation of the National
Centennial Celebrations in 1988." It renamed the Committee as the "National Centennial Commission."
Appointed Vice-President Laurel as chair. Its duty is to "take charge of the nationwide preparations for the
National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the
Inauguration of the Malolos Congress and its existence shall terminate upon the completion ofall activities
related to the Centennial Celebrations. A corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98
Corporation (Expocorp) was created. Laurel was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators and was
elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.
Senator Coseteng delivered a privilege speech denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and
operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. The privilege speech
was referred to the Blue Ribbon Committee for investigation. President Estrada issued Administrative
Order No.35, creating an ad hoc and independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and

circumstances surrounding the Philippine centennial projects. Senator Saguisag was appointed to chair
the Committee. Blue Ribbon Committee filed its report recommending the prosecution by the
Ombudsman/DOJ of Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding,
relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & DevelopmentCorp.); for exhibiting
manifest bias in the issuanceof the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring)
even in the absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to government and for participating
in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the government for the implementation of
the said contracts all in violation of the anti-graft law.
The Saguisag Committee issued its own report. It recommended the further investigation by the
Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper cases of, Laurel for violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.3019,
Section 4(a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman issued its Evaluation Report, recommending:
1. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be conducted before the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau (EPIB),Office of the Ombudsman against former NCC and EXPOCORP chair Salvador H.
Laurel, former EXPOCORP President Teodoro Q. Pea and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles for violation of Sec.
3(e) and (g) of R.A. No.3019, as amended inrelation to PD 1594 and COA Rules and Regulations;
2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office, act as the nominal complainant. Apostol, OIC-Director
of the EPIB, directed Laurel to submit his counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses. Laurel filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of said office. Ombudsman denied motion to
dismiss. EPIB found probable cause to indict respondents LAUREL and PEA before the Sandiganbayan for
conspiring to violate Section3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act No. 1594.

Desierto, in his capacity as Ombudsman, approved the resolution with respect to Laurel but dismissed the
charge against Pea.Laurel moved for a reconsideration but the motion was denied. Hence this present
petition
for
certiorari.

ISSUE(s):

1. Whether or not EXPOCORP is a private corporation and not a GOCC

2. Whether or not NCC was not a public office
3. Whether or not Laurel is not a public officer

HELD: The Court ruled that NCC was precisely created to ensure amore coordinated and synchronized
celebration of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation form the government and non-government
or private organizations and to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other countries and to carry
them into effect. E.O.No.128, reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrationsin
1998, cited the "need to strengthen the said Committee to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized
celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government and nongovernment or private organizations." It also referred to the "need to rationalize the relevance of historical
links
with
other
countries."
There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of industrialization and full employment is a
fundamental state policy. Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office,
and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer. That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation
during his tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining
the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the
office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is
supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be
characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit. But it is a public
office, nonetheless. The Court dismissed the petition.

FELIPE TAYKO vs NICOLAS CAPISTRANO

G.R. no. L-30188

Facts: The petitioners allege that the respondent judge, previous to this date, was appointed judge of the
Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros, to hold office during good behavior and until he should reach
the age of 65 years; that he now has reached that age and, therefore, under the provisions of section 148
of the Administrative Code as amended, is disqualified from acting as a judge of the Court of First
Instance.
The petitioners further allege that in view of the many election protests and criminal cases for violation of
the election law filed in the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros arising in the Court of First Instance
of Oriental Negros arising from the last election of June 5, 1928, the Honorable Six to de la Costa was
duly designated and acted as auxiliary judge of the Oriental Negros; that between the auxiliary judge and
the respondent judge herein there was an understanding, and the assignment of the said auxiliary judge
was made with this understanding, that the said auxiliary judge so designated would hear and take
cognizance of all election protests and criminal actions then pending or to filed arising from the said last
general election, and that the respondent Honorable Nicolas Capistrano would try and hear the ordinary
cases pending in the said court, but, notwithstanding this understanding or agreement, the respondent
judge tried and is still trying to take cognizance of the election protests an criminal actions in said court;
that said respondent is neither a judge de jure nor de facto, but that, notwithstanding this fact, he
continues to hold the office of judge of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros and pretends to be
duly qualified and acting judge of the said province; and that he has tried, and continues to try, to act as
such judge and that there is reasonable ground to believe that he will take cognizance of the cases in
question
unless
he
be
restrained
by
order
of
this
court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge is a de facto judge
HELD: The court ruled that the respondent is a de facto judge Briefly defined, a de facto judge is one who
exercises the duties of a judicial office under color of an appointment or election thereto. He differs, on the
one hand, from a mere usurper who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, and on the other
hand, from a judge de jure who is in all respects legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office
has not expired. Apart from any constitutional or statutory regulation on the subject there seems to be a
general rule of law that an incumbent of an office will hold over after the conclusion of his term until the
election and qualification of a successor. When a judge in good faith remains in office after his title has
ended,
he
is
a
de
facto
officer.
Applying the principles stated to the facts set for thin the petition before us, we cannot escape the
conclusion that, on the assumption that said facts are true, the respondent judge must be considered a
judge de facto. His term of office may have expired, but his successor has not been appointed, and as
good faith is presumed, he must be regarded as holding over in good faith.
The contention of counsel for the petitioners that the auxiliary judge present in the district must be
considered the regular judge seems obviously erroneous. In these circumstances the remedy prayed for
cannot be granted. "The rightful authority of a judge, in the full exercise of his public judicial function,
cannot be questioned by any merely private suitor, nor by any other, excepting in the
form especially provided by law. A judge de facto assumes the exercise of a part of the prerogative of
sovereignty, and the legality of that assumption is open to the attack of the sovereign power alone.
Accordingly, it is a well established principle, dating from the earliest period and repeatedly confirmed by
an unbroken current of decisions, that the official acts of a de facto judge are just as valid for all purposes
as those of a de jure judge, so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.

Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. vs Carlos Tan

G.R. No. L-3913; August 7,1952
Ponente: Bautista Angelo, J.
Facts:
Plaintiff claims that in December 1947, defendant usurped the office of the Senate of the
Philippines, and continuously collected salaries and other emoluments attendant to the office
until 1949.
Plaintiff filed a protest against defendant and in December 1949, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal declared plaintiff as duly elected Senator.
With said judgment, plaintiff now claims that defendant's usurpation caused him to suffer
damages and expenses, and hence, he is entitled to collect from defendant damages and
the salaries and allowances which the latter received by reason of his usurpation of the office
which rightfully belonged to plaintiff.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the judgment rendered by the SET in the
protest case bars this action under the principle of res judicata.
Plaintiff contends that since defendant was found, by final judgment, not to have been
entitled to the office, he was a mere de facto officer who must reimburse to plaintiff the
salaries and emoluments he received on the following grounds: a) the salaries and
emoluments follow and are inseparable to the legal title and do not depend on whether the
duties of the office are discharged or not; and b) such a rule tends to curb election frauds
and lessens the danger and frequency of usurpation.
Defendant contends that the rule invoked by plaintiff runs counter to the rule that one who
has been elected to an office, and has been proclaimed by corresponding authority, has a
right to assume and discharge its functions notwithstanding the protest filed against his
election, and as necessary consequence, he is entitled to the salaries and emoluments
thereunto appertaining as compensation for the services rendered. Also, the SET denied
without any reservation plaintiff's claim for expenses.
Issue/s: WON defendant can be ordered to reimburse the salaries and emoluments he has received
during his incumbency, to the plaintiff who has been legally declared elected by SET.
Held: Defendant did act as a de facto officer during the time he held the office of Senator. He was
proclaimed as one of those who had been elected by the Commission on Elections, and thereafter
he took the oath of office and immediately entered into the performance of the duties of the position.
Having been thus duly proclaimed as Senator and having assumed office as required by law, it
cannot be disputed that defendant is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances
which our Constitution provides for the position. This is in keeping with the ordinary course of events.

This is simple justice. The emolument must go to the person who rendered service unless the
contrary is provided. There is no averment in the complaint that he is linked with any irregularity
vitiating his election. This is the policy and the rule that has been followed consistently in this
jurisdiction in connection with the provisions held by persons who had been elected thereto but were
later ousted as a result of an election protest. The right of the persons elected to compensation
during their incumbency has always been recognized.
In Page vs US, the US SC ruled, "one whose credentials showed that he was regularly
elected a member of Congress, and who was sworn in and took his seat, and served, and drew his
salary, was although his seat was contested, and subsequently he was declared by Congress not
to have been elected, and this seat was declared vacant the predecessor of the person elected to
fill the vacancy". This case, thought it arose under a special statute, is significant in that it regarded
Pirce as the lawful predecessor of Page in the office to which he was later legally elected. Pirce was
declared entitled to the salary and emoluments of the office.
Another reason for the denial of plaintiff's claim is the principle of res judicata. Plaintiff has
already set up this claim in his protest before the SET, but when the case was decided on the merits,
the Tribunal passed up this matter sub silentio. This is a matter considered as an incident to the
power and authority given by the Constitution to the SET, whose jurisdiction over election cases is
ample and unlimited. When the SET chose to pass sub silentio, or ignore this important claim, the
clear implication is that it deemed it unjustified.

Ceferino Regala vs CFI Bataan

G.R. No. L-781; November 29, 1946
Ponente: Pablo, J.
Facts: (Note: Original text is in Spanish, a language I do not fully understand, so I relied
mostly on electronic translators.)
Appellant Regala is the accused in a criminal case for murder tried by the CFI Bataan.
In his arraignment in May 1946, he pleaded not guilty.
After said arraignment however, the fiscal, instead of adducing his evidence, filed an
amended information charging 2 more persons who were previously acting as witnesses, in
addition to Regala. The amended information charged the now 3 accused as to have
conspired, confederated and helped one another in executing the murder.
Regala appealed the order of the court admitting the amended information and allowing his 2
other co-defendants to be used as prosecution witnesses. Such appeal and his motion for
reconsideration were denied.
Regala now claims that the judge's order denying the motion for reconsideration is null and
void because said judge acted without jurisdiction, as his appointment was not approved by
the Commission of Appointments, as published in the newspaper.
Issue/s: WON the judge's order is null and void.
Held: It is not shown that the judge was aware of such disapproval before issuing the order. A
judge who demists office before hearing the disapproval of his appointment is a de facto judge. All
official actions of a judge de facto are valid for all legal purposes and for all kinds of issues, as that of
a de jure judge's acts.
(Additional; I didn't find this in the text itself but it was cited in attylaserna.blogspot: A de facto officer
is one who is in possession of the office and is discharging its duties under color of authority, and by

color of authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or
informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. If a person appointed to an office is
subsequently declared ineligible therefor, his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title
that will confer on him the status of a de facto officer.)

Gregorio Solis vs Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines

G.R. Nos. L-29777-83; March 26, 1971
Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L, J.
Facts:
Solis and several other co-accused were indicted, tried, and found guilty of malversation of
public funds.
The judgment was rendered on June 19,1954 by Leuterio, then Judge-at-large assigned to
Camarines Sur. All the accused were summoned to appear for promulgation of the judgment
on said date but no court proceeding was had, as the President declared it a special public
holiday.
On the next day, R.A. 1186 took effect without executive approval, abolishing existing
positions of Judges-at-Large.
On June 21, the defendants appeared before the court presided by Judge Palacio who
promulgated Judge Leuterio's judgment, against petitioner's objections.
Solis appealed to the CA where he raised as issue the validity of the promulgation of the
lower court's judgment, having been made by another judge after the incumbency of the
judge who rendered it had ceased.
CA acquitted him of the 2 charges but affirmed the lower court's decision in the others.
Petitioner however did not receive a copy of said decision until 3 years later when petitioner
was informed by the bondsman that the CFI had issued an order for his appearance for the
execution of the judgment. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the CA.
CA contends that the judgment of the CFI is valid since the approval of RA 1186, was not yet
publicly or generally known on June 21, 1954, Judge Leuterio should be considered as a
judge de facto and the promulgation of his appealed decision is valid and effective.
Issue/s: WON Judge Leuterio is a de facto judge.
Held: In Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, a judge de facto was defined as one who has the reputation of
being the officer he assumes to be and yet is not a good officer in point of law because there exists
some defect in his appointment or his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time; but it
is "essential to the validity of the acts of a de facto judge, that he is actually acting under some color
of right". In the present case, Judge Leuterio did not actually act or perform or exercise the duties of
judge when his decision was promulgated as he had ceased to be one, and the decision was
promulgated under another presiding judge. The other cases cited by the Court of Appeals (Regala

v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, 77 Phil. 684; U.S. v. Abalos, 1 Phil. 73) were
similarly misapplied, as said decisions refer to the acts of a de facto judge, not to a case where he
did not act.
It follows that the Court of Appeals' decision can not stand, there being no validly
promulgated judgment of the trial court from which an appeal could be taken. This conclusion
renders it unnecessary to pass upon the alleged error of the Court of Appeals in prematurely
remanding the records to the court of origin and later refusing to recall the same.

Roberto Monroy vs Court of Appeals and Del Rosario

G.R. No. L- 23258; July 1, 1967
Ponente: Bengzon, J.P., J.
Facts:
Monroy was the incumbent mayor of Navotas, Rizal, when his certificate of candidacy as
representative of the 1st District of Rizal was filed with the COMELEC on September 15,
1961.
On September 18, he filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of candidacy, which the
COMELEC approved by resolution.
However, on September 21, 1961, Del Rosario, then vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath of
office as mayor, on the theory that Monroy had forfeited his office upon the filing of said
certificate of candidacy.
The CFI (in the suit for injunction by Monroy) held that a) Monroy had ceased to be the
mayor upon his filing of certificate of candidacy; b) Del Rosario became the mayor upon his
having assumed as such on September 21, 1961; c) Monroy must reimburse (as actual
damages) the salaries to which Del Rosario was entitled as mayor from September 21 up to
the time he can reassume said office; and d) Monroy must pay Del Rosario P1000.00 as
moral damages.
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment except the award for moral damages which was
eliminated.
The Court held that the withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy did not restore petitioner to
his former position. Section 27 of the Rev. Election Code provides that there is an automatic
and permanent forfeiture upon filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office, as only
the moment and act of filing are considered.
Petitioner now contends that the CA erred in requiring him to pay respondent by way of
actual damages, the salaries respondent is allegedly entitled to receive from September 21,
1961, to the date that petitioner vacates his office as mayor. Petitioner maintains that he was
a de facto officer when he continued to occupy the office of the mayor after September 15.
Issue/s: WON petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to the salaries appurtenant to the office he held
as mayor after September 15.
Held: The Rodriguez case is not applicable here for absence of factual and legal similarities. The
Rodriguez case involved a senator who had been proclaimed as duly elected, assumed the office

and was subsequently ousted as a result of an election contest. These peculiar facts called for the
application of an established precedent in this jurisdiction that the candidate duly proclaimed must
assume office notwithstanding a protest filed against him and can retain the compensation paid
during his incumbency. But the case at bar does not involve a proclaimed elective official who will be
ousted because of an election contest. The present case for injunction and quo warranto involves
the forfeiture of the office of municipal mayor by the incumbent occupant thereof and the claim to
that office by the vice-mayor because of the operation of Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code.
It is the general rule, "that the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer
de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he
entered into the office in good faith and under color of title", that applies in the present case. The
resulting hardship occasioned by the operation of this rule to the de facto officer who did actual work
is recognized; but it is far more cogently acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been
formulated, not for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the
public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an
office without being lawful officers. The question of compensation involves different principles and
concepts however. Here, it is possession of title, not of the office, that is decisive. A de facto officer,
not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the de jure officer
for whatever amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention of the public
office.
Leyte Acting Vice-Governor Menzon vs Leyte Acting Governor Petilla
G.R. No. 90762; May 20, 1991
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Facts:
No Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte so Santos, Secretary of Local
Gov't, designated Vice Gov Petilla as acting governor in February 1988.
In March 1988, Menzon, senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, was likewise
designated by Santos as Vice Gov of the province.
In May 1989, Quintero, the Provincial Administrator, inquired from Rubillar, the
Undersecretary of the Department of Local Gov't, as to the legality of Menzon's appointment
as Vice Governor.
Undersecretary Rubillar answered that since B.P. 337 has no provision relating to succession
in the in the Office of the Vice Gov in case of temporary vacancy, Menzon's appointment is
not necessary since Acting Governor Petilla could concurrently perform the functions of both
the Office of the Governor and of the Vice Governor.
By reason of such answer, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued a Resolution holding
invalid the appointment of petitioner as Acting Vice Governor.
When petitioner sought clarification from the Undersecretary, the latter explained that the fact
that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan member was temporarily designated to perform the
functions of the vice-governor could not be considered that the Sangguniang member
succeeds to the office of the latter, for it is basic that designation is merely an imposition of
additional duties to be performed by the designee in addition to the official functions attached
to his office. However, the necessity of designating an official to temporarily perform a
particular office's functions would depend on the discretion of the appointing authority and
the prevailing circumstances. In this case, the peculiar situation in Leyte, where the electoral
controversy in the Governor's Office has not been settled yet, calls for the Sanggunian
Member's designation as acting Vice-Governor.
In view of said clarification, Resurreccion, the Regional Director of the Department of Local
Gov't, requested Petilla to modify the Sanggunian's Resolution and to pay Menzon his salary

as Acting Vice Governor.

Due to Petilla and the Sanggunian's refusal to carry out the request, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus to nullify the Resolution and compel payment of his salary.
In the meantime, the issue on governorship was settled, with Larrazabal as the proclaimed
Governor.
During the pendency of the initial petition, Provincial Treasurer Luna, allowed payment of
petitioner's salary; so when the petition was dismissed, Respondent Petilla requested for
Petitioner Menzon to pay back the salaries and emoluments he has received while acting as
Vice-Governor.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that he is entitled to the salaries he has
received under the principles of good faith, simple justice and equity.

Issue/s: WON there was a vacancy; WON the Secretary of Local Gov't has authority to make
temporary appointments; and WON petitioner is entitled to the salaries he received.
Held: There is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at
present the duties of the office. In this case, the office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the
duly elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law,
the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties
of the office of the Vice-Governor. The fact that the Secretary of Local Government was prompted to
appoint the petitioner shows the need to fill up the position during the period it was vacant.
The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in the event of a temporary
vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor. However, the silence of the law must not be understood
to convey that a remedy in law is wanting. There had been no de jure permanent Governor of Leyte
for 2 years, a circumstance revealing the necessity of the appointment of an Acting Vice Governor.
Thus, the Court rules that considering the silence of the Local Government Code, to obviate the
dilemma resulting from an interregnum created by the vacancy, the President, acting through her
alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may remedy the situation. The exigencies of public
service demanded nothing less than the immediate appointment of an acting Vice-Governor. As
between the President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the
members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the
President, until the law provides otherwise. A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no
approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation and
governance in their own local government.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's right to be paid the salary attached to the Office of
the Vice Governor is indubitable. The compensation, however, to be remunerated to the petitioner,
following the example in Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code, and
pursuant to the proscription against double compensation must only be such additional
compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the Office
of the Vice-Governor. Even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local
Government, possesses no power to appoint the petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is a de
facto officer entitled to compensation. Petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor under
color of a known appointment. The appointment has the color of validity. It was only when the
controversial Resolution No. 505 was passed by the same persons who recognized him as the
acting Vice-Governor that the validity of the appointment of the petitioner was made an issue and the
recognition withdrawn.
The petitioner, for a long period of time, exercised the duties attached to the Office of the
Vice-Governor. He was acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte. Upon the principle of public policy
on which the de facto doctrine is based and basic considerations of justice, it would be highly

iniquitous to now deny him the salary due him for the services he actually rendered as the acting
Vice-Governor of the province of Leyte.
Funa v. CSC Chairman
G.R. No. 191672
FACTS:
On January 11, 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Duque as Chairman of the
CSC. The Commission on Appointments confirmed Duques appointment on February 3, 2010.
The Court is confronted with the proper interpretation of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 to ascertain the
constitutionality of the designation of Duque, in an ex officio capacity, as Director or Trustee of the
GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF.
Petitioner asserts that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the
independence of the CSC, which was constitutionally created to be protected from outside
influences and political pressures due to the significance of its government functions.5 He further
asserts that such independence is violated by the fact that the CSC is not a part of the Executive
Branch of Government while the concerned GOCCs are considered instrumentalities of the
Executive Branch of the Government.6 In this situation, the President may exercise his power of
control over the CSC considering that the GOCCs in which Duque sits as Board member are
attached to the Executive Department.7
Petitioner argues that Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 unduly and
unconstitutionally expands the role of the CSC, which is primarily centered on personnel-related
concerns involving government workers, to include insurance, housing and health matters of
employees in the government service.8 He observes that the independence of the CSC will not be
compromised if these matters are instead addressed by entering into a memorandum of agreement
or by issuing joint circulars with the concerned agencies, rather than allowing a member of the CSC
to sit as a member of the governing Boards of these agencies
Respondents insist that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, as well as
the charters of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, are consistent with each other. While the
charters of these GOCCs do not provide that CSC Chairman shall be a member of their respective
governing Boards, there islikewise no prohibition mentioned under said charters.20 EO 864, issued
in conformity with Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, could not have impliedly
amended the charters of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF because the former relates to the
law on the CSC while the latter involve the creation and incorporation of the respective GOCCs.21
As their subject matters differ from each other, the enactment of the subsequent law is not deemed
to repeal or amend the charters of the GOCCs, being considered prior laws.
ISSUE:
Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the independence of the CSC and
violate the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple offices for the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions?
RULING:

The Court partially grants the petition. The Court upholds the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter
3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declares unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque in
an ex officio capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court UPHOLDS THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292;
ANNULS AND VOIDS Executive Order No. 864 dated February 22, 2010 and the designation of
Hon. Francisco T. Duque III as a Member of the Board of Directors/Trustees of the Government
Service Insurance System; Philippine Health Insurance Corporation; Employees Compensation
Commission; and Home Development Mutual Fund in an ex officio capacity in relation to his
appointment as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
VIOLATIVE of Sections 1 and 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution; and DECLARES that Hon.
Francisco T. Duque III was a de facto officer during his tenure as Director/Trustee of the Government
Service Insurance System; Philippine Health Insurance Corporation; Employees Compensation
Commission; and Home Development Mutual Fund.

JUCO VS NLRC AND NATIONAL HOUSING CORP.

G.R. No. 98107,
FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of respondent National Housing
Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975 when he was separated from the
service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds.
On March 25, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the
Department of Labor.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on September 17, 1977 dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
The petitioner then elevated the case to the NLRC which rendered a decision on December 28,
1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the NLRC, respondent NHC appealed before this Court which
rendered a decision on January 17, 1985 reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter and setting
aside the decision of NLRC.
On January 6, 1989, the petitioner filed with the Civil Services Commission a complaint for illegal
dismissal, with preliminary mandatory injunction.
On February 6, 1989, respondent NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the case.
On April 11, 1989, the Civil Service Commission issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
On April 28, 1989, petitioner filed with respondent NLRC a compliant for illegal dismissal with
preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent NHC.
On May 21, 1990, respondent NLRC through Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday ruled that petitioners
was illegally dismissed from his employment by respondent as there was evidence in the record that
the criminal case filed against him was purely fabricated, prompting the trial court to dismiss the
charges against him.
On June 1, 1990, respondent NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March 14, 1981, the
NLRC promulgated a decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not public respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that
petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code.

RULING:
(1) The NLRC erred in dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Although we had earlier ruled in National Housing Corporation Vs. Juco, that employees of
government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed as

subsidiaries under the General Corporation Law, are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by
the Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution which now provides:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter. (Article IXB, Section 2(1).
The rule now is that the Civil Service now covers only government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters. Having been incorporated under the Corporation Law, respondent NHCs
relations with its personnel are governed by the Labor Code and come under the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Commission.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC in NLRC NCR-04-02036089 dated March 14, 1991 is
hereby REVERSED and the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 21, 1990 is REINSTATED.

MATURAN vs MAGLANA
GR No. L-52091
FACTS:
Petitioner Tereso Maturan is a police sergeant at San Franciso, Southern Leyte. He got promoted
from being a patrolman (February 1965) to a police sergeant (September 1972) through
appointments which were provisional. His provisional appointment was annually renewed for the
span of seven years including respective increase in the salary. Respondent Mayor Maglana
suspended Maturan on September 1972 because of two pending cases against him (1.Falsification
of public document by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts and 2. Falsification of
public document). A month after, respondent Vice Mayor Magoncia who was then the Acting Mayor
instructed Maturan to tender his resignation pursuant to the Letter of Instruction No. 14 of the
President of the Philippines. Maturan submitted his letter of resignation on the same month. The
resignation was approved on January 19, 1973 and petitioner was accordingly informed thereof.
Days after, his case on falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in the
narration of facts was dismissed. On November of that same year his other case was also
dismissed. A month after Maturan sought to have his resignation rendered null and void for on the
ground that Letter of Instruction No. 14 does not apply to him. Given that criminal charges against
him were already dismissed, the NaPolCom chairman stated that the preventive suspension is lifted
and he could go back to work. However, the Chief of Police refused to accept Maturan. Hence, he
appealed to the court. He filed for a claim for back wages and reinstatement. The lower court denied
the claim ruling that his appointment was provisional and he can be removed at any time by the
appointing power.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maturan can be reinstated to his position as police sergeant?
RULING: Maturan cannot be reinstated to his former post. This is so because he was not qualified
for the position nor did he possess any civil service eligibility for any position in the government. As
such what is required is a new appointment, not merely reinstatement. But even then, he cannot
compel the Mayor to reappoint him for the power to appoint is in essence discretionary and the
appointing power enjoys sufficient discretion to select and appoint employees on the basis of their
fitness to perform the duties and assume the responsibilities of the position filled.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 4, 1975 of the lower court is hereby affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

CORPUS VS. CUADERNO

13 SCRA 591
FACTS:
Marino Corpus, Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank, was administratively charged
with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of the internal regulations of the office.
He was suspended by the Monetary Board but the recommendation of the investigating committee
was that he be reinstated and there was no basis for actions against Corpus. The Board considered
him resigned as of the date of his suspension. Corpus moved for reconsideration but was denied. He
filed the petition to CFI of Manila which favored him and declared the Resolution of the Board as null
and void. He was awarded P5,000 as attorneys fees. Both Petitioner and respondent appealed the
judgment. Petitioner was appealing the amount awarded to him contending that it was lower than
what he has spent for attorneys fees. While the respondent claimed that an officer holding highly
technical position may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing power who
was Governor Cuaderno.
On August 31, 1955 Corpus received a letter from Cuaderno informing him that be had been
"reinstated in the service of the bank" with the designation of "Technical Assistant to the Governor."
On January 17, 1956 he was appointed Special Assistant to the Governor, in charge of the Export
Department.
On March 7, 1958 several of his co-employees in the same department filed an administrative
complaint against him, alleging a number of acts of misfeasance. The Monetary Board, upon
recommendation of the Governor, suspended him on March 18.
On March 25, 1958 Corpus instituted the present action, alleging that his suspension was
unwarranted and had been brought about by Cuaderno's malicious machinations. The latter's
counterclaim, after the denials and special defenses in his answer, alleged that the complaint had
been filed maliciously and that plaintiff had committed libel against him.
On March 22, 1960 the lower court rendered the decision appealed from, absolving Cuaderno from
liability but ordering Corpus to pay damages, as aforesaid, the allegation of libel having been duly
proven.
ISSUE:
Can the lack of confidence by the appointing power be a ground for removing an employee or a
public officer?
RULING:
The Constitution distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly technical employees, and to
the latter the loss of confidence as a ground for removal is not applicable. No public officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provided by law.
Pertaining to the petitioners claim for damages, the agreement between a client and his lawyer as to
attorneys fees cannot bind the other party who was a stranger to the fee contract. While the Civil
Code allows a party to recover reasonable counsel fees by way of damages, such fees must lie
primarily in the discretion of the trial court. Decision appealed affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Basilio Pineda vs Jovito Claudio

FACTS:
In 1968, the Chief of Police of Pasay City died. Then Mayor Jovito Claudio appointed State
Prosecutor Francisco Villa as the replacement. The Deputy Chief of Police, Basilio Pineda, assailed
the appointment of Villa as he claimed that he has preferential rights over Villa because he is next in
line. Pinedas position is supported by the Civil Service Commissioner Abelardo Subido who held in
abeyance the appointment of Villa. Subido further stated that according to the Civil Service Act as
well as in a previous Supreme Court decision (Millares vs Subido, August 10, 1967), in filling up
vacancies in local offices the order of priority is as follows:
Promotion (next in rank)
Transfer (lateral movement)
Reinstatement/Reemployment
Certification (usually certified outsiders)
That in case the next in line cannot be promoted due to special reasons, only then can someone
be promoted in the subsequent order of transfer, reinstatement, or certification. Subido pointed out
that Claudio did not provide a special reason why he chose Villa over Pineda.
Claudio replied by stating that Pinedas track record shows that he was not able to solve the sagging
inefficiency of the local police organization.
The DOJ Secretary supported Claudios position and he pointed out that in as far as filling up a
vacancy in the police department is concerned, what governs is the Police Act of 1966 and in said
law, it is provided that it is within the mayors discretion as to who he should appoint to said office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pineda, as Deputy Chief of Police, has a preferential right to the said public office?
RULING:
No. The ruling in the Millares case is not conclusive because such case has different circumstances.
It must be clarified though that as far as practicable, in case of a vacancy, the next in line shall be
promoted by the appointing authority. But if not, the vacancy may be filled either by transfer,
reinstatement, reemployment or certification not necessarily in that order. There is no rule which
states that the mayor must appoint the next in line. It is not his ministerial duty to do so nor is it
mandatory. The appointing power can choose whether to appoint by promotion, transfer,
reinstatement, or certification (as what Claudio did in this case). It is necessary for effective public
administration that the mayor appoints men of his confidence, provided they are qualified and
eligible, who in his best estimation are possessed of the requisite reputation, integrity,
knowledgeability, energy and judgment. After all, it is the local executive, more than anyone else,
who is primarily responsible for efficient governmental administration in the locality and the effective
maintenance of peace and order therein, and is directly answerable to the people who elected him.
The Supreme Court also clarified that the only time that an appointing power is required to provide
specific reasons on why a next in rank is not appointed is that if the appointing power chose
promotion as the method to fill up the vacancy. (This is illustrated if say, there are two next in rank
persons and the person lower in rank is chosen instead of the other higher in rank).

NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (NASECO) AND ARTURO L. PEREZ vs.

THE HONORABLE THIRD DIVISION, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MINISTRY
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MANILA AND EUGENIA C. CREDO,
G.R. No. L-69870 November 29, 1988

EUGENIA C. CREDO vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL SERVICES

CORPORATION AND ARTURO L. PEREZ
G.R. No. 70295 November 29,1988

PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:

Eugenia C. Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), a domestic
corporation which provides security guards as well as messengerial, janitorial and other similar
manpower services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its agencies. She was first
employed with NASECO as a lady guard on 18 July 1975. Through the years, she was promoted
to Clerk Typist, then Personnel Clerk until she became Chief of Property and Records, on 10
March 1980.

Sometime before 7 November 1983, Credo was administratively charged by Sisinio S. Lloren,
Manager of Finance and Special Project and Evaluation Department of NASECO, for her noncompliance with Lloren's memorandum regarding certain entry procedures in the company's
Statement of Billings Adjustment. Said charges alleged that Credo "did not comply with Lloren's
instructions to place some corrections/additional remarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustment;
and when Credo was called by Lloren to his office to explain further the said instructions, Credo
showed resentment and behaved in a scandalous manner by shouting and uttering remarks of
disrespect in the presence of her co-employees."

On 7 November 1983, Credo was called to explain her side to Arturo L. Perez, then Acting
General Manager of NASECO and NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs in connection
with the administrative charges filed against her. After said meeting, on the same date, Credo
was placed on "Forced Leave" status for 1 5 days, effective 8 November 1983.

Before the expiration of said 15-day leave, or on 18 November 1983, Credo filed a complaint, ,
Ministry of Labor and Employment against NASECO for placing her on forced leave, without due
process.

While Credo was on forced leave, , NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs deliberated and
evaluated a number of past acts of misconduct attributed to her and recommended Credo's
termination, with forfeiture of benefits.

On 1 December 1983, Credo was called again to the office of Perez to be informed that she was
being charged with certain offenses. which NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs already
resolved, on 22 November 1983 to have been committed by Credo.

Due to Credos failure to explain her side in connection with the charges filed against her;
however, due to her failure to do so, she was handed a Notice of Termination, dated 24
November 1983, and made effective 1 December 1983.

On 6 December 1983, Credo filed a supplemental complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor
Arbiter dismissed Credos complaint and directed NASECO to pay Credo separation pay
equivalent to one half month's pay for every year of service.

Both parties appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which
affirmed the LAs ruling.. As a consequence, both parties filed their respective motions for
reconsideration, which the NLRC denied in a resolution of 16 January 1985.

In G.R. No. 70295, NASECO belatedly argued that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to order Credo's
reinstatement. NASECO claims that, as a government corporation (by virtue of its being a
subsidiary of the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary wholly
owned by the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which in turn is a government owned corporation),
the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law,
rules and regulations. In support of this argument, NASECO cites National Housing Corporation
vs. JUCO, where this Court held that "There should no longer be any question at this time that
employees of government-owned or controlled corporations are governed by the civil service law
and civil service rifles and regulations."

ISSUE: Which between NLRC and CSC has jurisdiction over the matter? NLRC
It would appear that, in the interest of justice, the holding in said case should not be given
retroactive effect, that is, to cases that arose before its promulgation on 17 January 1985. To do
otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated, because under the
same 1973 Constitution ,but prior to the ruling in National Housing Corporation vs. Juco, this Court
had recognized the applicability of the Labor Code to, and the authority of the NLRC to exercise
jurisdiction over, disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in government owned or
controlled corporations, among them, the National Service Corporation (NASECO).<re||an1w>
Furthermore, in the matter of coverage by the civil service of government-owned or
controlled corporations, the 1987 Constitution starkly varies from the 1973 Constitution, upon
which National Housing Corporation vs. Juco is based. Under the 1973 Constitution, it was provided
that:
The civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and
instrumentality of the Government, including every government-owned or
controlled corporation. ...
On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution provides that:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charter.

On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is the
Constitution in place at the time of decision thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord relief to the
parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a
government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter.

SALVACION A. MONSANTO vs. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR..

G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989
FERNAN, C.J.:
FACTS:

The Sandiganbayan convicted Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog

City) and three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public
documents.

The Court affirmed Monsantos appeal on her conviction. She then filed a motion for
reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by
then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984.

By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be
restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant.
Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance in view of the provision of the
Local Government Code transferring the power of appointment of treasurers from the city
governments to the said Ministry. The Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to
her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was
extended the absolute pardon.

Monsanto sought reconsideration from the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on
her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been
interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her
preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire
period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of
the indemnity

As the matter was referred to the Office of the President, Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio
S. Factoran, Jr. disagreed with the Ministrys decision on Monsantos automatic reinstatement
since petitioner was convicted of the crime for which she was accused. It asserted that acquittal,
not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former
position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during

the period of his suspension pendente lite. In fact, in such a situation, the former public official
must secure a reappointment before he can reassume his former position.

Petitioner's basic theory is that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason
of the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending
appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her employment
therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited. In
other words, without that final judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office
did not attach and the status of her employment remained "suspended." More importantly, when
pardon was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because there was no
offense to speak of. In effect, the President has declared her not guilty of the crime charged and
has accordingly dismissed the same.

ISSUE: Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled
to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.?
SC RULING:
It is well to remember that petitioner had been convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and sentenced to imprisonment of four years, two months and one
day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten years and one day of prision mayor as maximum. The
penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the
principal penalty. Temporary absolute disqualification bars the convict from public office or
employment, such disqualification to last during the term of the sentence. Even if the offender be
pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the accessory penalties remain unless the same have been
expressly remitted by the pardon. The penalty of prision correccional carries, as one of its
accessory penalties, suspension from public office.
Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment
the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive
magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated
officially to the Court. ... A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery
is not complete without acceptance."
At the time the antecedents of the present case took place, the pardoning power was
governed by the 1973 Constitution as amended in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The pertinent
provision reads:
The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations
and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, and with the concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa, grant amnesty.
The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended only
upon final conviction, implying that clemency could be given even before conviction. Thus,
petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal was pending in the High Court. It
is worth mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the former limitation of final conviction was
restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not material when the
pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same.
Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her
unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.

Having disposed of that preliminary point, we proceed to discuss the effects of a full and
absolute pardon in relation to the decisive question of whether or not the plenary pardon had the
effect of removing the disqualifications prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in
the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not
operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon
implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It
does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It
affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government
any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. "Since the offense has been
established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is
presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be
required." This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay
for lost earnings and benefits.
In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we are prepared to
concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give
meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by
legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an
individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever
may have been the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such
"moral changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in character and conduct with one who has
constantly maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's
innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of
the privilege.
we are in full agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso
facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the
conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
The rationale is plainly evident. Public offices are intended primarily for the collective
protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private
interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually
acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and
plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of
bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility
from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru
falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and
punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed.
Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her
conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts
constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine
ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon

granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment
but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply
and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON,

RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO
ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989
CORTES, J:
FACTS:

The SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA)

On June 11, 1987, a temporary restraining order was issued pending resolution of the application
for a writ of preliminary injunction In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging
the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter To this motion, the SSS filed an
opposition, reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction

. On July 22,1987, in a four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and
converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after finding that the
strike was]. As petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied
on August 14, 1988 petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction before this Court. The Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, but during its pendency the Court of
Appeals on March 9,1988 promulgated its decision on the referred Petitioners moved to recall
the Court of Appeals' decision.

The Court on June 29,1988 denied the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 97577 for being
moot and academic. Petitioners' motion to recall the decision of the Court of Appeals was also
denied in view of this Court's denial of the motion for reconsideration Hence, the instant petition
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals

Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the petitioners from staging another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they
filed with the Department of Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989 and to maintain
the status quo.

ISSUE #1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?
SC RULING:
[The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the
case initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as

jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and Employment or the National Labor Relations
Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.
On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the employees
of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore
they do not have the right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the
dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from striking.]
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the
State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law"
[Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees,
including those in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this
impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the
scope of the civil service as "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters," that
"[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l)
and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[tlhe right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that
the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether
such recognition also includes the right to strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the
meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that
drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to
organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations
only, without including the right to strike.
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which was repealed by the
Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in the Government, including
instrumentalities exercising governmental functions, but excluding entities entrusted with proprietary
functions:
.Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. The terms and conditions of employment
in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law
and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of
securing changes or modification in their terms and conditions of employment. Such employees may
belong to any labor organization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in
strike:Provided, however, That this section shall apply only to employees employed in governmental
functions and not those employed in proprietary functions of the Government including but not
limited to governmental corporations.
No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time it recognized the right
of employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code to organize and
bargain collectively and those in the civil service to "form organizations for purposes not contrary to
law" [Art. 244, before its amendment by B.P. Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided that
"[t]he terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of
government owned and controlled corporations, shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules
and regulations" [now Art. 276]. Understandably, the Labor Code is silent as to whether or not

government employees may strike, for such are excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil
Service Decree [P.D. No. 807], is equally silent on the matter.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government
employees to organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise
of the right to organize of government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil
Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be
observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress." The President was
apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under
date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike
by government employees ... enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers
and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of
mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service." The air was thus
cleared of the confusion. At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government
employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are
prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O.
No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at
issue].
The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987
Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters"
[Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are
denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are
part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are
covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the
strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment [G.R. No. 60403, August 3, 1:983, 124 SCRA 11 is relevant as it furnishes the rationale
for distinguishing between workers in the private sector and government employees with
regard to the right to strike:
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that 'the terms and conditions of employment in
the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law"
(Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code,
P.D. No. 442, as amended). Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by
law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector
to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry
is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private
employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of
employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining.
In government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated
power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment.
And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through
collective bargaining agreements.
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of
government employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to

allow negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed
by law. Thus:
.SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements
thereof, except those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations
between duly recognized employees' organizations and appropriate
government authorities.
The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the settlement of
labor disputes in the public sector to wit:
.SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever
applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances and
cases involving government employees. In case any dispute remains
unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under existing laws
and procedures, the parties may jointly refer the dispute to the [Public Sector
Labor- Management] Council for appropriate action.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition
the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the
ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of
those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred
to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil
service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in
the private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided under
Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of GovernmentEmployees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and
conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof and government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by
law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."
ISSUE 2: Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the labor dispute?
SC RULING: YES
The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being prohibited
by law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it.
It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of
injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike. The Labor Code itself provides that terms and
conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law,
rules and regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor Management Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government
employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint
for damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector
Labor - Management Council has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in
labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has

jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ
of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES, Petitioner vs. NATIONAL
HOUSING CORPORATION and ATTY. VIRGILIO SY, as Officer-inCharge of the Bureau of Labor
Relations,
G.R. No. 49677 May 4, 1989
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent National Housing Corporation (NHC) is a corporation organized in 1959 in
accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of
Government Corporations, dated January 1, 1951. Its shares of stock are and have been
one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 459,
the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the
Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank
of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the Peoples
Homesite and Housing Corporation.[ Petitioner Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied
Services (TUPAS) is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC.

On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with
Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in order to determine the exclusive
bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised
the majority of the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter
Eusebio M. Jimenez holding that NHC being a government-owned and or controlled
corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor
organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.

TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations where Director Carmelo C. Noriel
reversed the order of dismissal and ordered the holding of a certification election. This order
was, however, set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. upon a motion for reconsideration
of NHC.

ISSUE: Can a certification election be conducted among the rank and file employees of NHC?
SC RULING: YES
As a general rule, the majority of the worlds countries now entertain public service unions. What
they really add up to is that the employees of the government form their own association. Generally,
they do not bargain for wages because these are fixed in the budget but they do acquire a forum
where, among other things, professional and self-development is (sic) promoted and encouraged.
They also act as watchdogs of their own bosses so that when graft and corruption is committed,
generally, it is the unions who are no longer afraid by virtue of the armor of self-organization that
become the publics own allies for detecting graft and corruption and for exposing it.There is,
therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for it is
clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and or
controlled corporation without an original charter Statutory implementation of the last-cited section of
the Constitution is found in Article 244 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111,
thus:

Right of employees in the public service. Employees of the government corporations established
under the Corporation Code shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their
respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right to form
associations for purposes not contrary to law.
insofar as certification elections are concerned, subsequent statutory developments have
rendered academic even the distinction between the two types of government-owned or controlled
corporations and the laws governing employment relations therein, as hereinbefore discussed. For,
whether the employees of NHC are covered by the Labor Code or by the civil service laws, a
certification election may be conducted. For employees in corporations and entities covered by
the Labor Code, the determination of the exclusive bargaining representative is particularly governed
by Articles 255 to 259 of said Code. Article 256 provides for the procedure when there is a
representation issue in organized establishments, while Article 257 covers unorganized
establishments. These Labor Code provisions are fleshed out by Rules V to VII, Book V of the
Omnibus Implementing Rules.
With respect to other civil servants, that is, employees of all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies of the government including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters and who are, therefore, covered by the civil service laws, the
guidelines for the exercise of their right to organize is provided for under Executive Order No. 180.
Chapter IV thereof, consisting of Sections 9 to 12, regulates the determination of the sole and
exclusive employees representative.
Parenthetically, note should be taken of the specific qualification in the Constitution that the
State shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law and that (t)hey
shall also participate in policy and decision making processes affecting their rights and benefits as
may be provided by law.
VICENTE GARCIA vs. THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE
HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV,
G.R. No. 75025 September 14, 1993
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:

Vicente Garcia was a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. On 1 April 1975, he was summarily dismissed from the
service on the ground of dishonesty for the loss of several telegraph poles which were located at
the Sariaya-Lucena City and Mauban-Sampaloc, Quezon, telecom lines. Petitioner did not
appeal from the decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Based on the same facts obtaining in the administrative action, a criminal case for qualified theft
was filed against petitioner with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Quezon. On 23 January 1980, the trial court rendered its decision acquitting petitioner of the
offense charged.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtualaw library

Consequently, petitioner sought reinstatement to his former position in view of his acquittal in the
criminal case . However, petitioner's request to be reinstated was denied by the Bureau of

Telecommunications. Hence, petitioner pleaded to the President of the Philippines for executive
clemency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On 26 August 1981, acting on the favorable indorsements of the then Ministry of Transportation
and Communications and the Civil Service Commission, Deputy Presidential Executive Assistant
Joaquin

T. Venus, Jr. granted executive clemency to petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles

virtual law library

Petitioner thereafter filed with respondent COA a claim for payment of back salaries effective 1
April 1975, the date of his dismissal from the service. This was denied by the COA on the ground
that the executive clemency granted to him did not provide for the payment of back salaries and
that he has not been reinstated in the service.ch

It appears that petitioner was recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do not
show whether petitioner's reinstatement was to the same position of Supervising
Lineman. hanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner again filed a claim to recover his back salaries for the period from 1 April 1975, the
date of his dismissal, to 12 March 1984, when he was reinstated. On 23 July 1985, respondent
COA denied the claim stating that the executive clemency was silent on the payment of back
wages and that he had not rendered service during the period of his
claim.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner appealed the COA decision of 23 July 1985 to the Office of the President. On 21 April
1986, Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., by authority of the President,
denied the appeal "due to legal and constitutional constraint and held that the appeal on
certiorari should be raised to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Is Garcia entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the
grant of executive clemency?
SC RULING: YESw library
In the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively liable for dishonesty and consequently
dismissed from the service. However, he was later acquitted by the trial court of the charge of
Iif the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him
a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged. When a
person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the
party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean
name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of
guilt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
qualified theft based on the very same acts for which he was dismissed. The acquittal of
petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the
fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of
the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public
servant. Verily, petitioner's innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive

clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement by the
Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service Commission.i
The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse
effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his
separation from the service. This canbe inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating
petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered
automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be
reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the
clemency
Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back
wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make
reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. To rule
otherwise would defeat the very intention of the executive clemency, i.e., to give justice to petitioner.
Moreover, the right to back wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and were
thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them. There is no
doubt that petitioner's case falls within the situations aforementioned to entitle him to back wages
After having been declared innocent of the crime of qualified theft, which also served as
basis for the administrative charge, petitioner should not be considered to have left his office for all
legal purposes, so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrued to him by virtue of
the office held, including back wages. Nr
Further, it is worthy to note that the dismissal of petitioner was not the result of any criminal
conviction that carried with it forfeiture of the right to hold public office, but is the direct consequence
of an administrative decision of a branch of the Executive Department over which the President, as
its head, has the power of control. The President's control has been defined to mean "the power of
an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to the judgment of the former for the latter." 10 In pardoning petitioner
and ordering his reinstatement, the Chief Executive exercised his power of control and set aside the
decision of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. The clemency nullified the dismissal
of petitioner and relieved him from administrative liability. The separation of the petitioner from the
service being null and void, he is thus entitled to back wages.