Property Cases Easements

Different Kinds of Easements- Concept of Easement
Calimoso vs Roullo
1.
The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway;
G.R. No. 198594, January 25, 2016

HELEN CALIMOSO, MARILYN P. CALIMOSO AND LIBY P.
CALIMOSO, Petitioners, v. AXEL D. ROULLO, Respondent.
2.
There is payment of proper indemnity;
Facts:
In his Complaint4 for Easement of Right of Way, the respondent mainly
alleged: that he is the owner of Lot 1462-C-1 5 situated in Brgy. Sambag,
Jaro, Iloilo City; that his lot is isolated by several surrounding estates owned
by petitioners that he needs a right-of-way in order to have access to a
public road; and that the shortest and most convenient access to the nearest
public road, passes through the petioners lot. The petitioners objected to the
establishment of the easement because it would cause substantial damage to
the two (2) houses already standing on their property. Due to the
respondent's allegedly malicious and groundless suit, the petitioners claimed
entitlement to damages. RTC granted the respondent's complaint and
ordered the petitioners to provide the respondent an easement of right-ofway (42sqm) and ordered the respondent to pay the petitioners proper
indemnity in the amount of Php1,500.00 per square meter of the portion of
the lot subject of the easement. CA affirmed in toto the RTC's decision and
held that all the requisites for the establishment of a legal or compulsory
easement of right-of-way were present in the respondent's case. The
petitioners moved to reconsider the CA's decision arguing that, while the
establishment of the easement through their lot provided for the shortest
route, the adjudged right-of-way would cause severe damage on their
property (damage to the nipa hut and bedroom of the concrete house) but
was denied.
Issues:
1. W/N the respondent has met all the requisites for the establishment
of a legal easement of right-of-way
Held:
No. To be entitled to an easement of right-of-way, the following requisites
should be met:
Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

1
3.
The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate; and
4.
The right-of-way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the petitioners' lot
would cause the destruction of the wire fence and a house on the petitioners'
property.10 Although this right-of-way has the shortest distance to a public
road, it is not the least prejudicial considering the destruction pointed out,
and that an option to traverse two vacant lots without causing any damage,
albeit longer, is available. Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the
easement of right-of-way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
Under this guideline, whenever there are several tenements surrounding the
dominant estate, the right-of-way must be established on the tenement
where the distance to the public road or highway is shortest and where the
least damage would be caused. If these two criteria (shortest distance and
least damage) do not concur in a single tenement, we have held in the past
that the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the shortest distance
criterion.
Additional Information:
The immovable in whose favor the easement is established is called the
dominant estate, and the property subject to the easement is called the
servient estate.8 Here, the respondent's lot is the dominant estate and the
petitioners' lot is the servient estate
Three options were then available to the respondent for the demanded rightof-way: the first option is to traverse directly through the petitioners'
property, which route has an approximate distance of fourteen (14) meters
from the respondent's lot to the Fajardo Subdivision Road; the second
option is to pass through two vacant lots (Lots 1461-B-l and 1461-B-2)
located on the southwest of the respondent's lot, which route has an
approximate distance of forty-three (43) meters to another public highway,
the Diversion Road; and the third option is to construct a concrete bridge
over Sipac Creek and ask for a right-of-way on the property of a certain Mr.
Basa in order to reach the Fajardo Subdivision Road
Different Kinds of Easements- Concept of Easement
LIWAYWAY ANDRES, RONNIE ANDRES, AND PABLO

FRANCISCO, Petitioners, v. STA.
LUCIA
REALTY
DEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
B.
&
G.R. No. 201405, August 24, 2015

Not all may demand for an easement of right-of-way. Under the law, an
easement of right-of-way may only be demanded by the owner of an
immovable property or by any person who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate
or
use
the
same.
FACTS:
Petitioners and Liza filed a Complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way
against respondent. They alleged that they are co-owners and possessors for
more than 50 years of three parcels of unregistered agricultural land in Pagasa, Binangonan, Rizal. A few years back, however, respondent acquired the
lands surrounding the subject property, developed the same into a
residential subdivision known as the Binangonan Metropolis East, and built
a concrete perimeter fence around it such that petitioners and Liza were
denied access from subject property to the nearest public road and vice

2
versa. They thus prayed for a right-of-way within Binangonan Metropolis

East in order for them to have access to Col. Guido Street, a public road.
Respondent denied knowledge of any property adjoining its subdivision
owned by petitioners and Liza. At any rate, it pointed out that petitioners
and Liza failed to sufficiently allege in their complaint the existence of the
requisites for the grant of an easement of right-of-way.
According to Pablo, he and his co-plaintiffs are still in possession of the
subject property. He clarified that the easement of right-of-way that they are
asking from respondent would traverse the latter's subdivision for about 50
meters from the subject property all the way to another subdivision that he
co-owns, Victoria Village, which in turn, leads to Col. Guido Street.
Liwayway testified next. According to her, she and her children Ronnie and
Liza are the surviving heirs of the late Carlos who owned the subject
property. Carlos acquired ownership over the same after he had been in
continuous, public and peaceful possession thereof for 50 years, the
circumstances of which he narrated in a Sinumpaang Salaysay that he
executed while he was still alive. Carlos stated therein that even before he
was born in 1939, his father was already in possession and working on the
subject property; that in 1948, he started to help his father in tilling the land;
that when his father became weak and eventually died, he took over the
land; and, that he already sought to register his ownership of the property
with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and to
declare
the
same
for
taxation
purposes.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court - said court concluded that petitioners
and Liza are entitled to an easement of right-of-way
It observed that petitioners and Liza's allegation in their Complaint that they
were in possession of the subject property for more than 50 years was not
denied by respondent in its Answer. Thus, the same is deemed to have been
impliedly admitted by the latter. It then ratiocinated that based on Article
1137 of the Civil Code, petitioners and Liza are considered owners of the
subject property through extraordinary prescription. Having real right over
the same, therefore, they are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way
under
Article
649redof
the
Civil
Code.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals - concluded that petitioners and Liza have
no right to demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent.
On appeal, respondent argued mat petitioners and Liza were neither able to
prove that they were owners nor that they have any real right over the
subject property intended to be the dominant estate. Hence, they are not
entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way. At any rate, they likewise
failed to establish that the only route available from their property to Col.
Guido
Street
is
through
respondent's
subdivision.
CA held that the evidence adduced by petitioners and Liza failed to
sufficiently establish their asserted ownership and possession of the subject
property. Moreover, it held that contrary to the RTC's observation,
respondent in fact denied in its Answer the allegation of petitioners and Liza
that they have been in possession of subject property for more than 50
years.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way
from respondent.
RULING:
NO. Petitioners are NOT entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way
from respondent.
Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, an easement of right-of-way may be
demanded by the owner of an immovable or by any person who by virtue of
a
real
right
may
cultivate
or
use
the
same.

3
It must be stressed at the outset that contrary to petitioners' allegations, there

is no showing that Carlos filed a claim of ownership over the subject
property with the DENR. His April 13, 1998 letter35to the said office which
petitioners assert to be an application for the registration of such claim is
actually just a request for the issuance of certain documents and nothing
more. Moreover, while Carlos indeed attempted to declare the subject
property for taxation purposes, his application, as previously mentioned,
was denied because a tax declaration was already issued to the Blancos.
Anent petitioners' invocation of ordinary acquisitive prescription, the Court
notes that the same was raised for the first time on appeal. Before the RTC,
petitioners based their claim of ownership on extraordinary acquisitive
prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code 36 such that the said court
declared them owners of the subject property by virtue thereof in its May
22, 2006 Decision.37 Also with the CA, petitioners initially asserted
ownership through extraordinary acquisitive prescription.38It was only later
in their Motion for Reconsideration 39 therein that they averred that their
ownership
could
also
be
based
on
ordinary
acquisitive
40
prescription. "Settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be
considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time
at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this
rule."41cralawrednad
Even if timely raised, such argument of petitioners, as well as with respect
to extraordinary acquisitive prescription, fails. "Prescription is one of the
modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code." 42 There are two
modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired ordinary acquisitive prescription which requires possession in good faith
and just title for 10 years and, extraordinary prescription wherein ownership
and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through
uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or of
good faith.43 However, it was clarified in the Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic of the Philippines,44 that only lands of the public domain
subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or

for the development of national wealth, or removed from the sphere of
public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or
lands of private ownership, may be alienated or disposed through any of the
modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. 45 And if the mode of
acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, it must first
be shown that the land has already been converted to private ownership
prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period. Otherwise, Article 1113
of the Civil Code, which provides that property of the State not patrimonial
in character shall not be the subject of prescription, applies. 46cralawrednad
Sifting through petitioners' allegations, it appears that the subject property is
an unregistered public agricultural land. Thus, being a land of the public
domain, petitioners, in order to validly claim acquisition thereof through
prescription, must first be able to show that the State has - expressly
declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued
by the President that the subject [property] is no longer retained for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express
declaration by the State, the land remains to be a property of public
dominion and hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of
prescription.47
In the absence of such proof of declaration in this case, petitioners' claim of
ownership over the subject property based on prescription necessarily
crumbles. Conversely, they cannot demand an easement of right-of-way
from
respondent
for
lack
of
personality.
Different Kinds of Easements- Elements

Ernest Godfrey Tejada
PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
vs.
LEGASPI TOWERS 300, INC., Respondent.
OFFICE, Petitioner,

4
G.R. No. 147957

July 22, 2009
FACTS: Caruff Development Corporation owned several parcels of land
along the stretch of Roxas Boulevard, Manila. Sometime in December
1975, Caruff obtained a loan from PNB to finance the construction of a 21storey condominium along Roxas Blvd. The loan was secured by a real
estate mortgage over 3 parcels of land where Caruff planned to erect the
condominium.
In 1979, Caruff started constructing a multi-storey building on the
mortgaged parcels of land. Along with the other appurtenances of the
building constructed by Caruff, it built a powerhouse (generating set) and
two sump pumps in the adjacent lot.
After the completion of the condominium project, it was constituted
pursuant to the Condominium Act (Republic Act No. 4726), as the Legaspi
Towers 300, Inc.
However, for Caruffs failure to pay its loan with PNB, the latter
foreclosed the mortgage. Thereafter, Proclamation no. 50 was issued which
provided for the creation of the Asset Privatization Trust (APT).
By virtue of A.O. No. 14 and the Deed of Transfer executed by PNB, the
National Government became the assignee and transferee of all its rights
and titles to and interests in its receivables with Caruff, including the
properties it acquired from the foreclosure of Caruffs mortgage.
Meanwhile, Caruff filed a case against PNB before the RTC, whereby
Caruff sought the nullification of PNBs foreclosure of its properties.
A Compromise Agreement was later entered into by Caruff, PNB, and
the National Government thru APT. The parties agreed, among other things,
that Caruff would transfer and convey in favor of the National Government
the lot where it built the generating set and sump pumps. The RTC rendered
a Decision approving the Compromise Agreement.
On July 5, 1989, respondent filed a case for Declaration of the existence
of an easement before the RTC. Respondent alleged that the act of Caruff of
constructing the powerhouse and sump pumps on its property constituted a
voluntary easement in favor of the respondent.
APT alleged that it acquired absolute ownership thereof by virtue of the
Compromise Agreement free from any liens and/or encumbrances. It was
not a privy to any transaction or agreement entered into by and between
Caruff, respondent, and the bank. It further alleged that the continued use of
the subject property by respondent and the condominium owners without its
consent was an encroachment upon its rights as absolute owner and for
which it should be properly compensated.
The RTC rendered a Decision declaring the existence of an easement
over the portion of the land occupied at present [by the] powerhouse and
sump pumps nos. 1 and 2 only, of Legaspi Towers 300, in favor of Legaspi
Towers 300, Incorporated.
Aggrieved, APT sought recourse before the CA. The petitioner,
Privatization and Management Office (PMO) substituted APT in its appeal.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the construction of a generator set and 2 sump
pumps constitutes as easement of the property.
HELD: NO. An easement or servitude is "a real right constituted on
anothers property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the owner
of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do
something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person."
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different
owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the
dominant estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate.
There are two sources of easements: by law or by the will of the owners.
Article 619 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the
owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements.
In the present case, neither type of easement was constituted over the
subject property.
In its allegations, respondent claims that Caruff constituted a voluntary
easement when it constructed the generating set and sump pumps over the
disputed portion of the subject property for its benefit. However, it should
be noted that when the appurtenances were constructed on the subject
property, the lands where the condominium was being erected and the
subject property where the generating set and sump pumps were constructed
belonged to Caruff. Therefore, Article 613 of the Civil Code does not apply,

5
since no true easement was constituted or existed, because both

properties were owned by Caruff.
Different Kinds of Easements- Intransmisibility

VELASCO v. CUSI and CITY OF DAVAO
105 SCRA 616
Easements
Art. 617 Intransmissibility (mere accessories to the real property)
FACTS:
Fe Velasco is the owner of a parcel of land in Davao City. She filed in the
CFI of Davao City an action against public respondent, City of Davao for
the quieting of her title over Lot 77-B-2, a portion of which she claims to
have been occupied illegally by Bolton Street, Davao City.
The court, presided over by Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. dismissed the case on
the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, filed by the City of
Davao.
The allegations in the complaint that the Bolton Street encroached on the lot
of the plaintiff and that the defendant had continuously occupied the portion
so encroached upon do not, contrary to the conclusion of the plaintiff found
in the complaint, cast '. . a cloud of doubt on the title of the plaintiff over
said portion which would justify this action.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Bolton Street is an easement and a legal encumbrance on
petitioners lot?
Whether the encroachment casts a cloud of doubt over the title of Velasco?
HELD:
YES. Bolton Street, a public highway, was already subsisting when the
OCT over the parcel of land of Velasco was issued. It has been where it is
since time immemorial. Bolton Street constituted an easement of public
highway on subject Lot No. 77, from which petitioners lot was taken, when
such bigger lot was originally registered. It remained as such legal

encumbrance, as effectively as if it had been duly noted, notwithstanding
the lack of annotation, on the certificate of title, by virtue of the clear and
express provision of Section 39 of Act 496, which states:
Section 39 of Act 496

Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree or
registration, and every subsequent purchasers of registered land who takes a
certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all
encumbrances, except those noted on said certificate, and any of the
following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
Third. Any public highway, way, private way, or any government
irrigation.
XX
This fact erases whatever cause of action petitioner may have to bring the
complaint she filed in the court a quo for quieting of title on a portion of the
street which she claims to be part of her lot, free from encumbrance of any
kind.
The case was dismissed.
Different Kinds of Easements- Intransmissibility

Valisno vs Adriano, 161 SCRA 398
(I focused on the subject matter based in the outline/syllabus, but I suggest
that you read the full text for some other interesting legal aspects discussed
in the case. The case is relatively short anyway. Good luck guys!)
FACTS:

6
On June 20, 1960, 'the plaintiff-appellant file against the defendant-appellee

an action for damages.
The complaint alleged that the plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual
possessor of a 557,949-square-meter parcel of land in La Fuente, Santa
Rosa, Nueva Ecija
The plaintiff-appellant Valisno bought the land from the defendantappellees sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco, on June 6,1959.
The land which is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco, and
other vegetables adjoins that of the appellee Felipe Adriano on the bank of
the Pampanga River.
At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water
from the Pampanga River through a canal about seventy (70) meters long,
traversing the appellee's land.
On December 16, 1959, the appellee levelled a portion of the irrigation
canal so that the appellant was deprived of the irrigation water and
prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land.
The appellant filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a
complaint for deprivation of water rights. A decision was rendered on
March 22, 1960 ordering Adriano to reconstruct the irrigation canal,
"otherwise judicial action shall be taken against him under the provisions of
Section 47 of Act 2152 (the Irrigation Act).
In the meantime, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own
expense because his need for water to irrigate his watermelon fields was
urgent.
On June 20, 1960, he filed a complaint for damages.
On October 25, 1961, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications

reversed the Bureau's decision by issuing a final resolution dismissing
Valisno's complaint. The Secretary held that Eladio Adriano's water rights
which had been granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or
1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of the water right
since then for a period of more than five years extinguished the grant by
operation of law, hence the water rights did not form part of his hereditary
estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves. Valisno, as vendee of
the land which Honorata received from her father's estate did not acquire
any water rights with the land purchased.
According to the appellant, the water right was the primary consideration
for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be
unproductive.
In a decision dated April 21, 1966, the trial court held that the plaintiff had
no right to pass through the defendant's land to draw water from the
Pampanga River. It pointed out that under Section 4 of the Irrigation Law,
controversies between persons claiming a right to water from a stream are
within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works and his decision on
the matter is final, unless an appeal is taken to the proper court within thirty
days. The court may not pass upon the validity of the decision of the Public
Works Secretary collaterally.
As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he

is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful
interference (19 CJ 984), such as the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation
canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.
ISSUE: The principal issue involved in this case falls under the subject
of servitude of waters which are governed by Article 648 of the new
Civil Code and the suppletory laws mentioned in the cases of Lunod vs.
Meneses 11 Phil. 128) and Osmena vs. Camara (C.A. 380 62773) which
are the irrigation law and the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866,
specifically Article 122 thereof.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation
purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the
conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running
across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by
a third person.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is set aside, and a new one is entered
ordering the appellee to grant the appellant continued and unimpeded use of
the irrigation ditch traversing his land in order to obtain water from the
Pampanga River to irrigate appellant's land. Let the records of this case be
remanded to the court a quo for the reception of evidence on the appellant's
claim for damages.
SO ORDERED.
RULING:
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer
of the water rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's
property.
Manner in which easements establishedLa Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

7
The area comprising the 15-meter wide roadway was part of a land
owned by the Tuasons which was sold to Philippine Building Corporation
by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. Paragraph three (3) of the deed
provides that ". . .the boundary line between the property herein sold and
the adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15) meters
wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the property herein sold to the
VENDEE and the other half from the portion adjoining belonging to the
VENDORS." The land was later sold to Ateneo de Manila University with
the consent of the Tuasons. The Tuasons later developed its 7.5 meter
share of the Mangyan road, while Ateneo erected an adobe wall on the
entire length of the boundary of its property parallel to the 15-meter wide
roadway which was later removed due to an amicable settlement. Ateneo
sold 16 hectares of its property along Mangyan road to Solid Homes, Inc.
and the deed of sale provided among others that the vendor passes unto the
vendee the privileges of such right-of-way. Subsequently, Solid Homes, Inc.
developed the Loyola Grand Villas. La Vista, a residential village developed
by the Tuasons, prohibited the agents and assignees of Solid Homes, Inc.
and residents of Loyola from traversing the Mangyan Road. Solid
Homes Inc. then instituted an action, and prayed that LA VISTA be
enjoined from preventing and obstructing the use and passage of LOYOLA
residents through Mangyan Road. The trial court issued a preliminary
injunction in favor of Solid Homes, Inc. which was nullified and set aside
by the Appellate Court. In a petition for review on certiorari filed with the
Supreme Court, Solid Homes, Inc. assailed the nullification and setting
aside of the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.
Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City rendered a
decision on the merits affirming and recognizing the easement of right-ofway
along
Mangyan
Road
in
favor of Solid
Homes, Inc. LA VISTA appealed
to
the Court of Appeals,
which
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the easement is a voluntary one
Held:
Yes.

8
A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted by law

for public use or for private interest. By express provisions of Arts. 649 and
650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of an estate may claim a legal or
compulsory right-of-way only after he has established the existence of four
(4) requisites, namely: (a) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and
is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) after payment of the
proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts;
and (d) the right-of-way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be shortest. A voluntary easement
on the other hand is constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties.
From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the parties
and their respective predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an
easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both
as dominant and servient estates. This is quite evident when: (a) the Tuasons
and the Philippine Building Corporation in 1949 stipulated in par. 3 of their
Deed of Sale with Mortgage that the "boundary line between the property
herein sold and the adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a road
fifteen (15) meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the property
herein sold to the VENDEE and the other half from the portion adjoining
belonging to the vendors"; (b) the Tuasons in 1951 expressly agreed and
consented to the assignment of the land to, and the assumption of all the
rights and obligations by ATENEO, including the obligation to contribute
seven and one-half meters of the property sold to form part of the 15-meter
wide roadway; (c) the Tuasons in 1958 filed a complaint against
MARYKNOLL and ATENEO for breach of contract and the
enforcement of the reciprocal easement on Mangyan Road, and demanded
that MARYKNOLL set back its wall to restore Mangyan Road to its
original width of 15 meters, after MARYKNOLL constructed a wall in the
middle of the 15 meter wide roadway; (d) LA VISTA President Manuel J.
Gonzales admitted and clarified in 1976, in a letter to ATENEO President
Fr. Jose A. Cruz, S.J., that "Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters wide,
one half of which is taken from your property and the other half from
the La Vista Subdivision. So that the easement of a right-of-way on your 7
1/2 m. portion was created in our favor and likewise an easement of right-
of-way was created on our 7 1/2 m. portion of the road in your favor";
(e) LA VISTA, in its offer to buy the hillside portion of the ATENEO
property in 1976, acknowledged the existence of the contractual right ofway as it manifested that the mutual right-of-way between the Ateneo de
Manila University and La Vista Homeowners' Association would be
extinguished if it bought the adjacent ATENEO property and would thus
become the owner of both the dominant and servient estates; and,
(f) LA VISTA President Luis G. Quimson, in a letter addressed to the Chief
Justice, received by this Court on 26 March 1997, acknowledged that "'onehalf of the whole length of (Mangyan Road) belongs to La Vista Assn., Inc.
The other half is owned by Miriam (Maryknoll) and the Ateneo in equal
portions". These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties concerned
had indeed constituted a voluntary easement of right-of-way over Mangyan
Road and, like any other contract, the same could be extinguished only by
mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.
The argument of petitioner LA VISTA that there are other routes to
LOYOLA from Mangyan Road is likewise meritless, to say the least. The
opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or
compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The
fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an
easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property
right, which survives the termination of the necessity.
Continuous non apparent easements
BICOL
AGRO-INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCERS
COOPERATIVE, INC. (BAPCI) vs. OBIAS, et al.
Facts:
The Bicol Sugar Development Corporation
(BISUDECO) was established at Himaao, Pili,
Camarines Sur. In the same year, BISUDECO
9
constructed a road ("the disputed road")

measuring approximately 7 meters wide and 2.9
kilometers long. The disputed road was used by
BISUDECO in hauling and transporting sugarcane
to and from its mill site (Pensumil) and has thus
become indispensable to its sugar milling
operations.
Respondents unjustifiably barricaded the
disputed road by placing bamboos, woods,
placards and stones across it, preventing
petitioners and the other sugar planters vehicles
from passing through the disputed road, thereby
causing serious damage and prejudice to
petitioner.
Petitioner
alleged
that
BISUDECO
constructed the disputed road pursuant to an
agreement with the owners of the ricefields the
road traversed. The agreement provides that
BISUDECO shall employ the children and relatives
of the landowners in exchange for the
construction of the road on their properties.
Petitioner contends that through prolonged and
continuous use of the disputed road, BISUDECO
acquired a right of way over the properties of the
landowners, which right of way in turn was
acquired by it when it bought BISUDECOs assets.
Petitioner
prayed
that
respondents
be
permanently ordered to restrain from barricading
the disputed road and from obstructing its free
passage.
10
Respondents denied having entered into an

agreement
with
BISUDECO
regarding
the
construction and the use of the disputed road.
They alleged that BISUDECO, surreptitiously and
without their knowledge and consent, constructed
the disputed road on their properties and has
since then intermittently and discontinuously used
the disputed road for hauling sugarcane despite
their repeated protests. Respondents claimed they
tolerated BISUDECO in the construction and the
use of the road since BISUDECO was a
government-owned and controlled corporation,
and the entire country was then under Martial
Law. Respondents likewise denied that the road
has become a public road, since no public funds
were used for its construction and maintenance.
The RTC ruled that petitioner failed to
present any concrete evidence to prove that there
was an agreement between BISUDECO and
respondents for the construction of the disputed
road. Moreover, it held that petitioner did not
acquire the same by prescription.
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that
there was no conclusive proof to sufficiently
establish the existence of an agreement between
BISUDECO and respondents regarding the
construction of the disputed road. Moreover, the
CA also declared that an easement of right of way
is discontinuous and as such cannot be acquired
by prescription.
Issue:
Article 622 of the New Civil Code is the applicable

law in the case at bar, viz:
1. Whether or not there is an existing

agreement between BISUDECO and Respondents
2. Whether or not the principles of
prescription, laches and estoppels is applicable in
this case
Held:
1. No. In order for petitioner to acquire the
disputed road as an easement of right-of-way, it
was incumbent upon petitioner to show its right
by title or by an agreement with the owners of the
lands that said road traversed.
Easement or servitude is an encumbrance
imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of
another immovable belonging to a different
owner. By its creation, easement is established
either by law (in which case it is a legal easement)
or by will of the parties (a voluntary easement). In
terms of use, easement may either be continuous
or discontinuous. The easement of right of
way the privilege of persons or a particular
class of persons to pass over anothers land,
usually through one particular path or linen
is characterized as a discontinuous
easement because its use is in intervals and
depends on the act of man. Because of this
character, an easement of a right of way
may only be acquired by virtue of a title.
11
Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements,

and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not,
may be acquired only by virtue of a title.
It is clear that the plaintiff failed to present
any concrete evidence to prove that there was
such an agreement between BISUDECO and
defendants.
The lower court correctly disbelieved the
plaintiffs-appellants
contention
that
an
agreement existed because there is simply no
direct evidence to support this allegation. BAPCI
submitted purely circumstantial evidence that are
not sufficiently adequate as basis for the inference
than an agreement existed. By themselves, the
circumstances the plaintiffs-appellants cited i.e.,
the employment of sixteen (16) relatives of the
defendants-appellants; the defendants-appellants
unjustified silence; the fact that the existence of
the agreement is known to everyone, etc. are
events susceptible of diverse interpretations and
do not necessarily lead to BAPCIs desired
conclusion.
2. No. , "It is already well-established that a right
of way is discontinuous and, as such, cannot be
acquired by prescription."
Continuous and apparent easements are

acquired either by virtue of a title or by
prescription of ten years.
Under civil law and its jurisprudence,
easements
are
either
continuous
or
discontinuous according to the manner they
are exercised, not according to the presence
of apparent signs or physical indications of
the existence of such easements. Thus,
easement is continuous if its use is, or may be,
incessant without the intervention of any act of
man, like the easement of drainage; and it is
discontinuous if it is used at intervals and
depends on the act of man, like the easement of
right of way.
The easement of right of way is considered
discontinuous because it is exercised only if a
person passes or sets foot on somebody elses
land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles or
persons, an easement of right of way of railroad
tracks is discontinuous because the right is
exercised only if and when a train operated by a
person passes over another's property. In other
words, the very exercise of the servitude depends
upon the act or intervention of man which is the
very essence of discontinuous easements.
The presence of physical or visual signs only
classifies an easement into apparent or nonapparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a right
of way) and a window (which evidences a
12
right to light and view) are apparent

easements, while an easement of not
building beyond a certain height is nonapparent.
It has been held that the existence of
a permanent railway does not make the right of
way a continuous one; it is only apparent.
Therefore, it cannot be acquired by prescription. It
was also been held that a right of passage over
another's land cannot be claimed by prescription
because this easement is discontinuous and can
be established only by title.
In this case, the presence of railroad
tracks for the passage of petitioners trains
denotes the existence of an apparent but
discontinuous easement of right of way.
And under Article 622 of the Civil Code,
discontinuous easements, whether apparent or
not, may be acquired only by title. Unfortunately,
petitioner Bomedco never acquired any title over
the use of the railroad right of way whether by
law, donation, testamentary succession or
contract. Its use of the right of way, however long,
never resulted in its acquisition of the easement
because, under Article 622, the discontinuous
easement of a railroad right of way can only be
acquired by title and not by prescription.
Easements are either continuous or
discontinuous according to the manner they are
exercised, not according to the presence of
apparent signs or physical indications of the

existence of such easements. Hence, even if the
road in dispute has been improved and
maintained over a number of years, it will not
change its discontinuous nature but simply make
the same apparent. To stress, Article 622 of the
New Civil Code states that discontinuous
easements, whether apparent or not, may be
acquired only by virtue of a title.
The question of laches is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court and each case must
be
decided
according
to
its
particular
circumstances.
Philippines, which provides:
Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements,
and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not,
may be acquired only by virtue of a title.
The eminent jurist, former Senator Arturo M.
Tolentino, opines that this provision seeks to
prevent the imposition of a burden on a tenement
based purely on the generosity, tolerance and
spirit of neighborliness of the owners thereof.
We applied the cited provision to the
case in ruling that no easement of right of
way was acquired; based on the evidence
presented, the plaintiff-appellant failed to
satisfactorily prove the existence of an
agreement evidencing any right or title to
13
use the disputed road. We additionally

rejected the plaintiff-appellants position
that it had acquired the easement of right of
way through acquisitive prescription, as
settled
jurisprudence
states
that
an
easement of right of way cannot be acquired
by prescription.
We find that the positive mandate of
Article 622 of the Civil Code the statutory
provision requiring title as basis for the
acquisition of an easement of a right of way
precludes the application of the equitable
principle of laches.
This Court agrees with the CA. The fact that
the law is categorical that discontinuous
easements cannot be acquired by prescription
militates against petitioners claim of laches. To
stress, discontinuous easements can only be
acquired by title. On the other hand, as to the
issue of estoppel, this Court likewise agrees with
the finding of the CA that petitioner did not
present any evidence that would show an
admission,
representation
or
conduct
by
respondents that will give rise to estoppel.
Existence of apparent sign of easement
VALISNO V. ADRIANO- Doctrine of Apparent Sign

Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage
ditch
for
irrigation
purposes,
which
are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the
conveyance of the land, although not specifically
mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's
easement of necessity in a water ditch running
across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even
if the water is supplied by a third person.
FACTS:
Plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual
possessor of a land in Nueva Ecija, with TCT No.
NT-16281. He bought the land from the
respondents sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco.
The land which is planted with watermelon,
peanuts, corn, tobacco, and other vegetables
adjoins that of the respondent Adriano on the
bank of the Pampanga River. Both parcels of land
had been inherited by Honorata and Felipe from
their father. At the time of the sale of the land to
Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the
Pampanga River through a canal about seventy
(70) meters long, traversing the Respondent's
land.
In 1959, Respondent levelled a portion of the
irrigation canal so that Plaintiff was deprived of
14
the irrigation water and prevented from

cultivating
his
57-hectare
land.
Plaintiff filed in the Bureau of Public Works and
Communications a complaint for deprivation of
water rights.
A decision was rendered ordering Adriano to
reconstruct the irrigation canal. Instead of
restoring the irrigation canal, the appellee asked
for a reinvestigation of the case by the Bureau of
Public
Works
and
Communications.
A
reinvestigation
was
granted.
In the meantime, Plaintiff rebuilt the irrigation
canal at his own expense because his need for
water to irrigate his watermelon fields was urgent.
Later, he filed a complaint for damages in the RTC
claiming that he suffered damages when he failed
to plant his fields that yearfor lack of irrigation
water, and when he reconstructed the canal.
Meanwhile, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications reversed the Bureau's decision
by issuing a final resolution dismissing Valisno's
complaint. The Secretary held that Eladio
Adriano's water rights which had been granted in
1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or
1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His nonuse of the water right since then for a period of
more than five years extinguished the grant by
operation of law, hence the water rights did not
form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs

partitioned among themselves.
aforesaid should be removed before the execution

of the deed.
ISSUE:
The deed of sale in favor of Plaintiff included the

"conveyance and transfer of the water rights and
improvements"
appurtenant
to
Honorata's
property. According to the Plaintiff, the water right
was the primary consideration for his purchase of
Honorata's property, for without it the property
would be unproductive.
Whether or not Plaintiff has acquired

easement of water over Respondents land.
the
RULING: Yes.
The existence of the irrigation canal on
Respondents land for the passage of water from
the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to
and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to
the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the
vendee of the land to continue using it as
provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code (Doctrine
of Apparent Sign):
Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of

easement between two estates, established or
maintained by the owner of both shall be
considered, should either of them be alienated, as
a title in order that he easement may continue
actively and passively, unless at the time,
theownership of the two estates is divided, the
contrary should be provided in the title of
conveyance of either of them, or the sign
15
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage

ditch
for
irrigation
purposes,
which
are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the
conveyance of the land, although not specifically
mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's
easement of necessity in a water ditch running
across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even
if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact
that an easement by grant may also have
qualified as an easement of necessity does
detract from its permanency as property right,
which survives the determination of the necessity.
As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant
has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free
from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful
interference, such as the appellee's act of
levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the

use of water from the Pampanga River.
Rights and obligations of ownsers of dominant and servient estates- non

impairment of servitude
Gold Crest Realty vs. Cypress Gardens Condominium

Corporation
Facts
-
Goldcrest is the Developer of Cypress

Gardens- a 10-storey building in Makati
It incorporated Cypress Gardens
Condominium Corporation to manage the
condominium project and to hold title to the
common areas
Title of the Land were transferred to Cypress
Cypress retained ownership of penthouse
unit on level 9 and 10
Goldcrest controlled management and
administration of the Condo until 1995
Upon turnover, it was discovered that certain
common areas has pertaining to Cypress
were occupied and encroached upon by
Goldcrest
Cypress filed a complaint before the HLURB
to compel Goldcrest to remove the doors
built between 8 & 9th floor, 9F elevator

16
lobby, cyclone wire fence on the roofdeck,

and building structure on the roofdeck
Goldcrest averred that it was granted
exclusive use of the roofdecks limited
common area while the doors were
constructed for privacy purposes
Courts were in favor of Cypress
Issue: May Goldcrest build structures on the limited

common areas on the ground that they were granted
exclusive use for the same?
Held: No. Such will impair subject easement granted

to GoldCrest. The impairment of an easement is a
question of fact. There is no reason to overturn the
findings of the HLURB, OP, and CA that Goldcrest has
no right to erect an office structure on the limited
common area despite its exclusive right to use of the
same. Not only did Goldcrest impair the easement, it
also illegally altered the condominium plan.
The owner of a dominant estate cannot violate any of
the following prescribed restrictions on its rights on the
servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights
necessary for the use of the easement; (2) it cannot
use the easement except for the benefit of the
immovable originally contemplated; (3) it cannot
exercise the easement in any other manner than that
previously established; (4) it cannot construct anything
on it which is not necessary for the use and
preservation of the easement; (5) it cannot alter or
make the easement more burdensome; (6) it must

notify the servient estate owner of its intention to
make necessary works on the servient estate; and (7)
it should choose the most convenient time and manner
to build the said works so as to cause the least burden
to the owner of the servient estate. Any violation of
the above constitutes impairment of the easement
Rights and obligations of ownsers of dominant and servient estates- non

impairment of servitude
FACTS:
Marsal & Co., Inc., and Marcelino
Florete, Sr. is the present owner of the land adjoining
the Iloilo River up to the adjacent lot where the L.
Borres Elem. School is located. There existed a main
canal from the Iloilo River which passes through the
Marsal property and thru a canal that traverses the
school property going towards Lot 2344. Marsal & Co.
closed the dike entrance and later on demolished the
portions of the main dike connecting the main canal to
the canal running thru the school grounds. This closure
caused flooding in the premises of the school and its
vicinity because the canal serves as outlet of rain or
flood water that empties into the river. This prompted
the school and barangay officials to complain to higher
authorities about the closure of the canal. When
Florete was about to bury a pipe in lieu of an open
canal, he was prevented from doing so by the district
supervisor, Javellana, thus he instituted a complaint for
recovery of damages for allegedly denying his access
to the use of the canal to his property. The RTC ruled in
favor of Javellana thus Florete appealed to the IAC
which reversed the decision thus the case at bar.
Javellana vs IAC
ISSUE:Whether or not an easement was established in

favor of the school property
Construction was not necessary for the use or

preservation of the easement. Weight of the structure
increased strain on the condos foundation making the
easement more burdensome and adding unnecessary
safety risk on the condo owners. Construction clearly
went beyond the intendment of the easement since it
illegally altered the approved condominium project
plan and violated section 4 of the condominiums
Declaration of Restrictions.
ESTER JAVELLANA, ROLANDO DEMAFILES, CESAR

CRUZADA
and
ANTONlO
SISON, petitioners, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPEL
LATE COURT, 4th CIVIL CASES DIVISION, MARSAL
&
CO.,
INC.,
and
MARCELINO
FLORETE,
SR., respondents

17
RULING:
YES. A positive easement of water-rightof-way was constituted on the property of Florete as
the servient estate in favor of the L. Borres Elementary
School and the nearby lands as dominant estates since
it has been in continuous use for no less than 15 years
by the school fishpond as well as by the nearby

adjacent lands.
As a positive easement, Florete had no right to
terminate the use of the canal without violating Art.
629 of the CC which provides that The owner of the
servient estate cannot impair, in any manner
whatsoever, the use of the servitude. Nevertheless if
by reason of the place originally assigned or of the
manner established for the use of the easement, the
same should become very inconvenient to the owner
of the servient estate, or should prevent him from
making any important works, repairs or improvements
thereon, it may be charged at his expense, provided
he offers another place or manner equally convenient
and in such a way that no injury is caused thereby to
the owner of the dominant estate or to those who may
have a right to the use of the easement.
When Florete closed the entrance of the canal
and demolished portions of the main dike it impaired
the use of the servitude by the dominant estates.
Additional Facts:
> One witness almost drowned
> One witness saved a woman, who while picking
shells fell into the canal
> 2 witnesses took a bath in the canal, 1 when he was
still a child, the other when he was still single
> Canal is used by residents for salt-making using
plastic bags, which is in competition with Marsal & Co.
in the production of salt

18
> the canal is a source of salt water, it is fresh and

clean since the tide changes from the Iloilo River while
the fishpond is stagnant and polluted
> before the closure of the dikes, there were no floods
in the vicinity
> tube to be buried: 10-inch rubber tube
> canal:
o for the 1st 100 meters = 3 meters wide
o 200 meters = 2 meters
> depth of canal:
o high tide or rainy season = main canal =
meter; canal that traverses school = 2 meters
o ordinary days = no water
> Florete only caused the canal to be deeper
Easement in favor of higher estates
SPS. FERNANDO VERGARA AND HERMINIA

VERGARA, Petitioners, v. ERLINDA
TORRECAMPO
SONKIN, Respondent.
FACTS: Petitioners-spouses Fernando Vergara and

Herminia Vergara (Sps. Vergara) and Spouses Ronald
Mark Sonkin and Erlinda Torrecampo Sonkin (Sps.
Sonkin) are adjoining landowners in Poblacion,
Norzagaray, Bulacan. In view of the geographical
configuration of the adjoining properties, the property
owned by Sps. Sonkin (Sonkin Property) is slightly
lower in elevation than that owned by Sps. Vergara
(Vergara Property). When Sps. Sonkin bought the

Sonkin Property sometime in 1999, they raised the
height of the partition wall and caused the
construction of their house thereon. The house itself
was attached to the partition wall such that a portion
thereof became part of the wall of the master's
bedroom and bathroom. Sometime in 2001, Sps.
Vergara levelled the uneven portion of the Vergara
Property by filling it with gravel, earth, and soil. As a
result, the level of the Vergara Property became even
higher than that of the Sonkin Property by a third of a
meter. Eventually, Sps. Sonkin began to complain that
water coming from the Vergara Property was leaking
into their bedroom through the partition wall, causing
cracks, as well as damage, to the paint and the
wooden parquet floor. Sps. Sonkin repeatedly
demanded that Sps. Vergara build a retaining wall on
their property in order to contain the landfill that they
had dumped thereon, but the same went unheeded.
Sps. Sonkin filed the instant complaint for damages
and injunction with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction and issuance of a temporary restraining
order against Sps. Vergara, as well as Sps. Rowena
Santiago and Harold Santiago, Dolores VergaraOrbistondo, and Rosario Vergara-Payumo, the other
possessors of the Vergara Property. In defense, Sps.
Vergara,
in
their
Answer
with
Compulsory
Counterclaim,9 claimed that Sps. Sonkin's act of raising
the partition wall made the same susceptible to
breakage, which therefore cannot be attributed to
them (Sps. Vergara). They likewise claimed that when
they levelled their own property by filling it with gravel
and soil, they left a distance of one (1) meter from the
partition wall such that the edge of the landfill did not
breach it, asserting further that there was no valid and

19
legal reason why they should be enjoined from

exercising their proprietary rights.
During the trial, Sps. Sonkin presented the testimony
of Engineer Ma. Victoria Mendoza, considered an
expert witness, who categorically declared that in view
of the sloping terrain and the Sonkin Property being
lower in elevation than that of the Vergara Property,
the Sps. Vergara were then duty bound to provide a
retaining wall because they were the ones who caused
the landfill, citing Section 120211 of Presidential Decree
No. 1096,12 otherwise known as the "National Building
Code of the Philippines" (National Building Code). She
explained that it was Sps. Vergara's duty to provide
safety requirements for the landfill they made on their
property to prevent any danger to life or property.
Moreover, Sps. Vergara failed to provide a sewerage
line to divert the flow of the water into the adjoining
property, in violation of Section 90114of the National
Building Code.
RTC RULING: The RTC found Sps. Vergara civilly liable
to Sps. Sonkin for damages. The RTC found that the
earth dumped on the Vergara Property pushed back
the perimeter wall, causing cracks on Sps. Sonkin's
bedroom wall and water to seep through the floor of
the house. Moreover, the water seepage could only
have come from the Vergara Property which was
higher in elevation, as Sps. Vergara have failed to
provide any drainage to divert the flow of water. Given
the foregoing, the RTC concluded that Sps. Vergara's
act of dumping earth, soil, and other materials in their
property directly caused the damage to the house of
Sps. Sonkin and, thus, they should be held liable for
damages in favor of the latter.
CA RULING: While the CA concurred with the finding

of the RTC that the cause of the water seepage into
the Sonkin Property was the act of Sps. Vergara in
elevating their own property by filling it with gravel
and soil, it ascribed error upon the RTC in not fmding
that Sps. Sonkin were likewise guilty of contributory
negligence in building their house directly abutting the
perimeter wall.25 The CA explained that despite the
fact that under Article 637 of the Civil Code, the Sonkin
Property is legally obliged to receive any water from
higher estates such as the Vergara Property, it being
the lower estate, the Sps. Sonkin still built their house
with parts thereof directly abutting the perimeter wall
and, in the process, violated the two (2)-meter setback
rule under Section 70826 of the National Building
Code.27 Thus, the CA deduced that had Sps. Sonkin
followed such rule, then their house would not have
sustained any damage from water coming from the
Vergara property.
the harm he has suffered, which falls below the

standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the
Sonkin property is lower in elevation than the Vergara
property, and thus, it is legally obliged to receive the
waters that flow from the latter, pursuant to Article
637 of the Civil Code. This provision refers to the legal
easement pertaining to the natural drainage of lands,
which obliges lower estates to receive from the higher
estates water which naturally and without the
intervention of man descends from the latter, i.e., not
those collected artificially in reservoirs, etc., and the
stones and earth carried by the waters,
ISSUE: Whether or not CA should have ordered the

demolition of the portion of the Sps. Sonkin's house
that adjoins the partition wall.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works

which will impede this easement; neither can the
owner of the higher estate make works which will
increase the burden. In this light, Sps. Sonkin should
have been aware of such circumstance and,
accordingly, made the necessary adjustments to their
property so as to minimize the burden created by such
legal easement. Instead of doing so, they disregarded
the easement and constructed their house directly
against the perimeter wall which adjoins the Vergara
property, thereby violating the National Building Code
in the process, specifically Section 708 (a) thereof
which reads: Minimum Requirements for Group A
Dwellings:
HELD: YES.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides: When the
plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
Verily, contributory negligence is conduct on the part
of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to

20
Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the

waters which naturally and without the
intervention of man descend from the higher
estates, as well as the stones or earth which
they
carry
with
them.
(a) Dwelling Location and Lot Occupancy.
The dwelling shall occupy not more than

ninety percent of a corner lot and eighty percent
of an inside lot, and subject to the provisions on
Easement on Light and View of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, shall be at least 2 meters
from the property line.
Hence, the CA correctly held that while the proximate
cause of the damage sustained by the house of Sps.
Sonkin was the act of Sps. Vergara in dumping gravel
and soil onto their property, thus, pushing the
perimeter wall back and causing cracks thereon, as
well as water seepage, the former is nevertheless
guilty of contributory negligence for not only failing to
observe the two (2)-meter setback rule under the
National Building Code, but also for disregarding the
legal easement constituted over their property. As
such, Sps. Sonkin must necessarily and equally bear
their own loss.
Finally, in view of Sps. Sonkin's undisputed failure to
observe the two (2)-meter setback rule under the
National Building Code, and in light of the order of the
courts a quo directing Sps. Vergara to provide an
adequate drainage system within their property, the
Court likewise deems it proper, equitable, and
necessary to order Erlinda, who is solely impleaded as
respondent before the Court, to comply with the
aforesaid rule by the removal of the portion of her
house directly abutting the partition wall. The
underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a
plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury
should not be entitled to recover damages in full but
must bear the consequences of his own negligence.
The defendant must therefore be held liable only for
the damages actually caused by his negligence.

21
Easement of Right of Way

Valdez vs Tabisula (From Internet)
G.R. No. 175510
July 28, 2008
VALDEZ V. TABISULA
FACTS:
Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez
purchased via a January 11, 1993 Deed of
Absolute
Sale from respondent-spouses Francisco
Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula a 200 square
meter (sq.m.)
portion (the subject property) of a 380 sq. m.
parcel of land located in San Fernando, La Union.
The deed
stated that the petitioners shall be provided a 2
1/2
meters wide road right-of-way on the
western
side
sale.
of their lot but which is not included in this
Respondents subsequently built a concrete wall on

the western side of the subject property.
Believing
Respondents, in their Answer averred that the 2

-meter easement should be taken from the
western
that that side is the intended road right of

way mentioned in the deed, petitioners,
through their
portion of the subject property and not from

theirs; and petitioners and their family are also
the owners of
representative, reported the matter to the

barangay for mediation and conciliation.
Respondents failed to
two properties adjoining the subject property,

which adjoining properties have access to two
public roads
attend the conferences scheduled by the

barangay, however, drawing petitioners to file in
April 1999 or
or highways. RTC dismissed petitioners

complaint. CA affirmed. The CA held that the
deed only
more than six years after the execution

of the deed a Complaint for Specific
Performance with
conveyed ownership of the subject property to

petitioners, and that the reference therein to an
easement in
Damages against respondents before the RTC of

San Fernando City, La Union. In their complaint,
favor of petitioners is not a definite grant-basis of

a voluntary easement of right of way.
petitioners alleged that they purchased the

subject property on the strength of respondents
assurance of
providing them a road right of way. They thus
prayed that respondents be ordered to provide
the subject
property with a 2-meter wide easement
and to remove the concrete wall blocking
the same.

22
ISSUE: W/N petitioners are entitled to a right of

way considering that the right of way is included
in the
deed of absolute sale executed by the parties
HELD: No.
Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any
transaction involving the sale or disposition of real
property must be in writing. The stipulation

harped upon by petitioners that they shall be
provided a 2
by virtue of which the owner of the same has to

abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to
do
meters wide road right-of-way on the western side

of their lotbut which is not included in this sale is
not
something on his property for the benefit of

another thing or person. The statutory basis of
this right is
a disposition of real property. The proviso that the

intended grant of right of way is not included in
this
Article 613 of the Civil Code. There are two kinds

of easements according to source by law or by
sale could only mean that the parties would have

to enter into a separate and distinct agreement
for the
purpose. The use of the word shall,
which is imperative or mandatory in its
ordinary signification, should be construed as
merely permissive where, as in the case at bar, no
public benefit
or private right requires it to be given an
imperative meaning. Besides, a document
stipulating a
voluntary easement must be recorded in the
Registry of Property in order not to prejudice third
parties under Articles 708 and 709 of the Civil
Code.
An easement or servitude is a real right
constituted on anothers property, corporeal and
immovable,
23
the will of the owners as provided in Article 619 of

the Civil Code. Petitioners are neither entitled to
a legal or compulsory easement of right of way.
For to be entitled to such kind of easement, the
preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 of the
Civil Code must be established.
Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of
way under Article 649, the following requisites
must be complied with: (1) the property is
surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet
to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity must
be paid; (3) the isolation is not the result of the
owner of
the dominant estates own acts; (4) the
right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to
theservient estate; and (5) to the extent

consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance
from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
The onus of proving the existence of these
prerequisites
lies on the owner of the dominant estate, herein
petitioners. As found, however, by the trial court,
which
is supported by the Sketch of the location of the
lots of the parties and those adjoining them, a
common
evidence of the parties, petitioners and their
family are also the owners of two properties
adjoining the
subject property which have access to two public
roads or highways. Since petitioners then have
more
than adequate passage to two public roads, they
have no right to demand the grant by respondents
of an easement on the western side of
[respondents] lot.
WOODRIDGE SCHOOL, INC., vs ARB CONSTRUCTION

CO., INC

24
FACTS:
Woodridge is the usufructuary of a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-363902 in the name
of spouses Ernesto T. Matugas and Filomena U. Matugas. Its
co-petitioner, Miguela Jimenez-Javier, is the registered
owner of the adjacent lot under TCT No. T-330688.
On the other hand, ARB is the owner and developer of
Soldiers Hills Subdivision in Bacoor, Cavite, which is
composed of four phases. Phase I of the subdivision was
already accessible from the Marcos Alvarez Avenue. To
provide the same accessibility to the residents of Phase II of
the subdivision, ARB constructed the disputed road to link
the two phases.
As found by the appellate court, petitioners' properties sit
right in the middle of several estates: Phase I of Soldiers
Hills Subdivision in the north, a creek in the east and Green
Valley Subdivision the farther east, a road within Soldiers
Hills Subdivision IV which leads to the Marcos Alvarez
Avenue in the west and Phase III of Soldiers Hills Subdivision
in the south.
Initially, petitioners offered to pay ARB P50,000 as
indemnity for the use of the road. Adamant, ARB refused the
offer and fenced the perimeter of the road fronting the
properties of petitioners. By doing so, ARB effectively cut off
petitioners' access to and from the public highway.
After failing to settle the matter amicably, petitioners jointly
filed a complaint in the RTC of Imus, Cavite to enjoin ARB
from depriving them of the use of the disputed subdivision
road and to seek a compulsory right of way after payment of
proper indemnity.
RTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioners. States that

The questioned road is part and parcel of the road network
of Soldiers Hills IV, Phase II. This road was constructed
pursuant to the approved subdivision plan of Soldiers Hills
IV, Phase II. As such, the road has already been withdrawn
from the commerce of men as the ownership of which was
automatically vested in the government without need of any
compensation. Thus, the subdivision owner can no longer
sell or alienate the roads for they are already owned by the
government
CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court
went on to rule that a compulsory right of way exists in
favor of petitioners as "[t]here is no other existing adequate
outlet to and from [petitioners'] properties to the Marcos
Alvarez Avenue other than the subject existing road lot
designated as Lot No. 5827-F-1 belonging to [ARB].In
addition, it awarded P500,000 to ARB as reasonable
indemnity for the use of the road lot.
Unsatisfied with the ruling of the appellate court, petitioners
filed this petition for review on certiorari insisting that ARB is
not entitled to be paid any indemnity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject road is public property?
Whether or not there is a need for a payment of indemnity?
Likewise, we hold the trial court in error when it ruled that

the subject road is public property pursuant to Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 1216.The pertinent portion of the
provision reads:
Section 2. xxx xxx xxx
Upon their completion as certified to by the Authority, the
roads, alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds shall be donated
by the owner or developer to the city or municipality and it
shall be mandatory for the local governments to accept
them provided, however, that the parks and playgrounds
may be donated to the Homeowners Association of the
project with the consent of the city or municipality
concerned
The law is clear. The transfer of ownership from the
subdivision owner-developer to the local government is not
automatic but requires a positive act from the ownerdeveloper before the city or municipality can acquire
dominion over the subdivision roads. Therefore, until and
unless the roads are donated,17 ownership remains with the
owner-developer.18
Since no donation has been made in favor of any local
government and the title to the road lot is still registered in
the name of ARB, the disputed property remains private
2) YES
To be entitled to a legal easement of right of way, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity;
(3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
RULING:
1)NO

25
dominant estate and (4) the right of way claimed is at the

point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
All told, the only requisite left unsatisfied is the payment of
proper indemnity.
In the case of a legal easement, Article 649 of the Civil Code
prescribes the parameters by which the proper indemnity
may be fixed. Since the intention of petitioners is to
establish a permanent passage, the second paragraph of
Article 649 of the Civil Code particularly applies:
Art 649.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that
its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant
estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity
shall consist of the value of the land occupied and
the amount of the damage caused to the servient
estate.
Spouses Antero and Rosario Bongbong are the registered

owners of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Sambulawan,
Villaba, Leyte. As early as 1996, the National Power Corporation
(NPC) negotiated with the spouses Bongbong to use a portion of the
property for the construction of TWR SITE for the Leyte-Cebu
Interconnection Project. When the spouses Bongbong agreed, NPC
occupied a portion of the property.
NPC paid the spouses Bongbong the amount of P33,582.00
representing the value of the improvements that were damaged by
the construction of the project. The voucher for the payment of
easement fee was prepared. However, when NPC offered a check
for P163,150.00 (representing 10% of the total market value of the
area affected) as payment for the easement fee, Antero refused to
accept the amount and demanded that NPC pay the full value of the
portion it had occupied. On October 28, 1997, the spouses
Bongbong received the P163,150.00 under protest.
On October 3, 1997, the spouses Bongbong demanded that
the NPC pay P8,748,448.00 which they alleged to be the just and
reasonable value for their land and improvements. The refusal of
NPC to heed their demands prompted the spouses Bongbong to file
a complaint for just compensation before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Palompon, Leyte.
In the complaint, the spouses Bongbong alleged that NPC
was given the authority to enter the property due to its assurances
and promises that it would pay just compensation, but it never did.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. BONGBONG

520 SCRA 290
FACTS:

26
In its Answer, NPC claimed that its obligation towards the

spouses Bongbong had already been extinguished when it paid the
amount of P33,582.15 for the damaged improvements on April 22,
1996, and the easement fee pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6395, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 938, in the
amount ofP163,150.00 on October 28, 1997.
On May 21, 1999, the spouses Bongbong filed a Motion to
Admit as Supplement to the Amended Complaint the New
Reappraisal of Plaintiffs Real Property and Improvements,
dated February 8, 1999. In the said Reappraisal, which was issued
by the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Leyte (Resolution

No. 03-99), the lot was valued at P300.00 per sq m.
NPC opposed the motion, alleging that the payment of just
compensation should be based on the market value of the property
at the time of its taking in 1997; pursuant to its charter, it paid only an
easement fee.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is obliged to pay the full value of the property
taken or easement fee only;
RULING:
YES. Petitioner is obliged to pay the full value of the property taken.
RTC RULING - The trial court stressed that just compensation

should be reckoned from 1997 when the taking took place. It noted
that, in 1997, NPC consistently paid P300.00 per square meter to the
other owner spouses Felipe and Mercedes Larrazabal, Melchor
Larrazabal, Fedelina Tuazon, Aznar Enterprises, Inc., Yolinda
Beduya, and Trinidad Palanas for the properties it acquired for its
transmission lines. It held that NPC should not discriminate against
the spouses Bongbong, who should thus be paid the same rate.
COURT OF APPEAL RULING - The CA found no cogent reason to
reverse the finding of the trial court. It agreed with the trial court that
the spouses Bongbong should not be discriminated against in the
determination of just compensation. Considering therefore that NPC
had paid P300.00 per square meter for properties belonging to other
landowners in the Province of Leyte for the construction of its
transmission line, it should pay respondents the same amount. The
appellate court stressed that the value of the property at the time the
government took possession of the land, not the increased value
resulting from the passage of time, represents the true value to be
paid as just compensation for the property taken.
Petitioner further contends that it should only pay an
easement fee and not the full value of the property since it acquired
only a simple right-of-way easement for the passage of its overhead
transmission lines; respondents retained the full ownership and right
to use the land. It points out that under Sec. 3-A of R.A. No. 6395, as
amended by P.D. No. 938, it is only authorized to acquire a right-ofway easement where a portion of a land will be traversed by
transmission lines, and to pay only an easement fee 10% of the
market value of the land.
Petitioner insists that if any amount should be paid to respondents, it

should only be an easement fee of 10% the value of the property, not
the full value, since it acquired only a simple right-of-way easement
for the passage of its overhead transmission lines. It points out that
its charter authorizes the acquisition only of a right-of-way easement
for its transmission lines and the payment of an easement fee.
The Court do not agree with the contention of the petitioner. The
Court has consistently held that the determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. No statute, decree, or executive
order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the
courts findings.
In National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial
Development Corporation, petitioner (also the NPC) likewise sought
the expropriation of certain properties which would be traversed by
its
transmission lines. In the said case, petitioner similarly argued that
only an easement fee should be paid to respondent since the
construction of the transmission lines would be a mere encumbrance
on the property, and respondent would not be deprived of its
beneficial enjoyment. It posited that respondent should be
compensated only for what it would actually lose, that is, a portion of
the aerial domain above its property. The Court noted, however, that
petitioner sought, and was later granted, authority to enter the
property and demolish all the improvements thereon. It, therefore,
concluded that the expropriation would, in fact, not be limited to an
easement of a right of way only.
Similarly, the expropriation by petitioner in the present case
does not amount to a mere encumbrance on the property. The

27
records in this case show that petitioner has occupied a 25,100-sq-m

area of respondents property. This was not disputed by
respondents. Further, the Court ruled in the Manubay case that:
Granting arguendo that
what
petitioner
acquired over respondents property was purely an
easement of a right of way, still, we cannot sustain
its view that it should pay only an easement fee, and
not the full value of the property. The acquisition of
such an easement falls within the purview of the
power of eminent domain. This conclusion finds
support in similar cases in which the Supreme Court
sustained the award of just compensation for private
property condemned for public use. Republic v.
PLDT held, thus:
x x x. Normally, of course, the power of
eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and possession of,
the expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why the said power may not
be availed of to impose only a burden upon
the owner of condemned property, without
loss of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that real property may,
through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right of way.
neither more nor less

equivalent of the land.
than the monetary
Ernest Godfrey L. Tejada

EUSEBIO
FRANCISCO,
petitioner,
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE
COURT
CRESENCIO J. RAMOS, respondents.
vs.
and
G.R. No. L-63996 September 15, 1989

FACTS: The co-owners Dilas of Lot 860 executed a
deed by which an undivided 1/3 portion of the land
(Lot 860-B) was donated to a niece, Epifania Dila, and
another undivided 1/3 portion (Lot 860-D) to the
children of a deceased sister, Anacleta Dila, and the
remaining portion (Lots 860-A and 860-C), was
declared to pertain exclusively to and would be
retained by Cornelia Dila.
True, an easement of a right of way

transmits no rights except the easement itself, and
respondent retains full ownership of the property.
The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless,
not gratis. As
correctly
observed
by
the
CA, considering the nature and the effect of the
installation power lines, the limitations on the
use of the land for an indefinite period would
deprive respondent of normal use of the
property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to
payment of just compensation, which must be

28
After this, the co-owners signed a partition

agreement.
The
former
co-owners
evidently
overlooked the fact that, by reason of the subdivision,
Lot 860-B of Epifania came to include the entire
frontage of what used to be Lot 860 along Parada
Road, and thus effectively isolated from said road the
other lots.
Cornelia sold Lot 860-A to the sisters Eugenio. Then
Eugenio Sisters sold the land to Ramos. After having
set up a piggery on his newly acquired property,

Ramos had his lawyer write to Francisco, owner of the
adjoining lot (Lot 266), to ask for a right of way
through the latter's land. Negotiations thereafter had
however failed to bring about a satisfactory
arrangement.
Later that year, Ramos succeeded, through
the
intercession
of Councilor
Tongco
of
Valenzuela, in obtaining a 3-meter wide
passageway through Lot 860-B of Epifania. Yet in
August 1973, he inexplicably put up a 10-foot
high concrete wall on his lot and thereby closed
the very right of way granted to him across Lot
860-B. It seems that what he wished was to have a
right of passage precisely through Francisco's land,
considering this to be more convenient to him.
Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted
by replacing the barbed-wire fence on his lot along
Parada Road with a stone wall. Shortly thereafter,
Francisco was served with summons and a copy of the
complaint in CFI instituted by Ramos as well as a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction directing him to
remove his stone fence and keep his lot open for
Ramos' use.
The CFI handed down its verdict, adversely to
Francisco. The CA affirmed the Trial Courts decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramos is entitled to an
easement of right of way through the land belonging
to petitioner Francisco

29
RULING: The SC held that a compulsory easement of

way cannot be obtained without the presence of four
(4) requisites provided for in Articles 649 and 650 of
the Civil Code, which the owner of the dominant
tenement must establish, to wit:
(1)
That the dominant estate is surrounded
by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
(2)
After payment of proper indemnity (Art.
649, par. 1, end);
(3)
That the isolation was not due to acts of
the proprietor of the dominant estate; and
(4)
That the right of way claimed is at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. (Art. 650)
What clearly the appealed Decision overlooked or
failed to accord the significance due it is the fact
already adverted to and which has never been
disputed that respondent Ramos, having already been
granted access to the public road (Parada Road)
through the other adjoining Lot 860-B owned by
Epifania inexplicably gave up that right of access by
walling off his property from the passageway thus
established.
If at the time he filed suit against the petitioner,

such access could no longer be used, it was because
he himself had closed it off by erecting a stone wall on
his lot at the point where the passageway began for no
reason to which the record can attest except to
demonstrate the isolation of his property alleged in his
complaint. But the law makes it amply clear that
an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his
own act isolate his property from a public
highway and then claim an easement of way
through an adjacent estate. The third of the
cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of
way has not himself procured the isolation of his
property had not been met indeed the
respondent had actually brought about the
contrary condition and thereby vitiated his claim
to such an easement.
It will not do to assert that use of the passageway
through Lot 860-B was difficult or inconvenient, the
evidence being to the contrary and that it was wide
enough to be traversable by even a truck, and also
because it has been held that mere inconvenience
attending the use of an existing right of way does not
justify a claim for a similar easement in an alternative
location.
G.R. No. L-57641 October 23, 1982

30
ANTOLIN A. JARIOL, and PAULO S. RODRIGUEZ, In

their capacities as Joint Executors of the Estate of
Humiliano Rodriguez, deceased, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINO JAGDON, in his
Capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Timoteo
Rodriguez, deceased, CLEMENTE RODRIGUEZ,
TERESITA
RODRIGUEZ,
JULIA
RODRIGUEZ,
AMPARO
RODRIGUEZ,
FAUSTA RODRIGUEZ,
FRANCISCA VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ, INES VDA. DE
RODRIGUEZ, ADDULA RODRIGUEZ, DOLORES
RODRIGUEZ and JUANITA RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
Facts:
The deceased Quirino Rodriguez left four children:
Humiliano, Timoteo, Jose, all surnamed Rodriguez, and
Ines Rodriguez de Pages. On November 25, 1951, these
heirs, entered into an extrajudicial partition to divide a
parcel of land in Cebu covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title in the name of the deceased. In this agreement, Lot
"F" was adjudicated to Humiliano, and Lot "G" to Timoteo.
Lot "G" has no egress to the public roads. On May 22,
1956, Timoteo died and his son, Clemente Rodriguez,
was appointed executor of the estate, but was later
replaced by Dominino Jagdon and after Humiliano's
death in 1961 or 1962, petitioners Antolin A. Jariol, his
son-in- law, and Paulo S. Rodriguez, his son, were
appointed executors of his estate. On June 27, 1960, the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was registered by
Clemente Rodriguez, in the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Cebu. To be noted from the partition agreement
is the fact that four heirs were to contribute for the
easement of right-of-way three meters each, while
Humiliano, to whom Lot "F" appertained, was to give six

meters. Upon the contention that they had discovered the
annotations only in 1964, petitioners together with Ines
Rodriguez de Pages, filed an action with the Court of
First Instance of Cebu against respondents seeking to
declare the nullity of the annotations and insertions for
having been surreptitiously and maliciously added long
after the execution of the principal document, and the
cancellation of the easements of right of way noted as
encumbrances on the Certificates of Title issued for the
subdivided lots, particularly on "Lot F". It was alleged that
the initials of Humiliano and Ines Rodriguez de Pages
affixed to the insertions were forged. Defendantsrespondents, on the other hand, sustained the
genuineness and due execution of the annotations or
additions and presented their own handwriting expert.
They averred that the agreement merely confirmed the
existing right of way.
RTC - signatures of Ines and Humilano were forged
hence alleged agreement creating the easement is of no
force and legal effect upon the heirs of Quirino Rodriguez
and declared the alterations or annotations complained of
illegal and unlawful and without any legal force and
effect; ordered the Register of Deeds of Cebu to cancel
the easement of right of way noted as encumbrances on
the title.
CA - reversed judgment; on the ground that the right-ofway involved, which was a pre-existing one, even prior to
the extra judicial partition, sprang not from any voluntary
concession but from law.

31
Issue:
W/N Appellate Court erred in skirting the issue on the
genuineness and/or binding effect of the forged
alterations and insertions on the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition; and in holding that a legal easement of right-ofway automatically attaches to Lot "F" adjudicated to
Humiliano, as the servient estate
Held:
CA did not entirely disregard the matter of the questioned
alterations and insertions. It summarized the conflicting
evidence thereon observing that "unrebutted was the
testimony of Mrs. Casafranca that her father Humiliano
Rodriguez favored the maintaining of a right-of-way. If
Humiliano himself favored the right-of-way, petitioners, as
his successors-in-interest, should be held bound by it.
Respondent Court added that the Notary Public, Atty.
Bernardo Solotan, who authenticated the document, also
declared that the initials of Humiliano and Ines R. de
Pages were authentic, and that the insertions were made
at the instance of Humiliano.
In point of fact, a road right of way providing access to
the public road from "Lot G" existed long before the
execution of the extrajudicial partition even during the
lifetime of Quirino Rodriguez. The Deed of Partition
merely sought to legalize and give stability to the access
road already existing. As a matter of law, considering that
"Lot G " has no access to the public road, the easement
is explicitly provided for in Article 652 of the Civil Code 7 ,
its width being determined by the needs of the servient
estate pursuant to Article 651 8 of the same law. The
annotations did not "create" a right-of-way, contrary to the
opinion of the Trial Court. They merely confirmed an

existing one. Petition for review denied.

32

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Different Kinds of Easements- Concept of Easement

G.R. No. 198594, January 25, 2016

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

Different Kinds of Easements- Concept of Easement

LIWAYWAY ANDRES, RONNIE ANDRES, AND PABLO

G.R. No. 201405, August 24, 2015

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

versa. They thus prayed for a right-of-way within Binangonan Metropolis

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

It must be stressed at the outset that contrary to petitioners' allegations, there

subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or

Different Kinds of Easements- Elements

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

G.R. No. 147957

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

since no true easement was constituted or existed, because both

Different Kinds of Easements- Intransmisibility

such bigger lot was originally registered. It remained as such legal

Section 39 of Act 496

Different Kinds of Easements- Intransmissibility

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

On June 20, 1960, 'the plaintiff-appellant file against the defendant-appellee

On October 25, 1961, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications

As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he

Manner in which easements establishedLa Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted by law

constructed a road ("the disputed road")

Respondents denied having entered into an

Article 622 of the New Civil Code is the applicable

1. Whether or not there is an existing

Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements,

Continuous and apparent easements are

right to light and view) are apparent

apparent signs or physical indications of the

use the disputed road. We additionally

Existence of apparent sign of easement

VALISNO V. ADRIANO- Doctrine of Apparent Sign

the irrigation water and prevented from

form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs

aforesaid should be removed before the execution

The deed of sale in favor of Plaintiff included the

Whether or not Plaintiff has acquired

Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of

Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage

levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the

Rights and obligations of ownsers of dominant and servient estates- non

Gold Crest Realty vs. Cypress Gardens Condominium

Goldcrest is the Developer of Cypress

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

lobby, cyclone wire fence on the roofdeck,

Issue: May Goldcrest build structures on the limited

Held: No. Such will impair subject easement granted

make the easement more burdensome; (6) it must

Rights and obligations of ownsers of dominant and servient estates- non

ISSUE:Whether or not an easement was established in

Construction was not necessary for the use or

ESTER JAVELLANA, ROLANDO DEMAFILES, CESAR

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

by the school fishpond as well as by the nearby

Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem

> the canal is a source of salt water, it is fresh and

Easement in favor of higher estates