At a complete turnaround from Carruthers contractualist argument is

Regans contractarian one, which states that rights need not be given on the
basis of rationality (or the resemblance of rationality), but rather on the basis
of being alive. Regan begins his argument (itself a summary of his full book)
with three simple demands: do not use animals in science, in agriculture, or
in sport hunting and trapping, full stop. He does not, like Carruthers, make
the assertion that since these acts are profitable to rational beings (as
providing life-saving research or economic support) they are acceptable, but
directly undermines that line of thoughtanimals, as living beings, are not
simply resources intended for human use. As resources, their pain would not
matter, and Regan argues that it does.
Carruthers claim in his Animals Issue is that animals (as non-rational beings)
do not have (or deserve) direct rights, but still enjoy rights-like protections as
the property of rational beings. Regan, on the other hand, claims that this
idea is in ignorance of the pain felt by all animals (including humans). If an
act committed against a human causes pain, and that pain is the driving
force of its wrongness, then any act causing pain toward an animal is also
wrong. For example, if a person were to be told that they would be kept
under the same conditions as a battery hen, they (and all other humans)
might cry that this is wrongit is hurtful in that it both causes pain and
restricts freedom. So why, then, would keeping the battery hen in the same
conditions not be wrong? This brings us back to the underlying philosophical
difference between Regan and Carruthers.
Regans contractarianism and Carruthers contractualism are both social
contract-based philosophies. But contractarianisms main difference is that it
is individual-driven: each rational individual must agree to the contract based
on their own self-interestby agreeing that they will not do wrong things to
others, they guarantee that others will not do wrong things to them.
Contractarianism also extends its rights and protections to those in the
sentimental interest of the social contracts rational signatoriestheir
children cannot understand the contract, so their parents sign for them, just
as they sign on behalf of their senile, dying grandmothers or their beloved
pets. But Regan argues that this still leaves a great deal of animals not
covered by the contractit is easy for our society to extend rights to all the
fluffy kittens in the world, but who signs for the snapping turtle or the
hagfish? (Or even the mosquitoone thing that I have not gleaned from any
of the readings so far is whether invertebrates count as animals. Certainly
some invertebrates are kept as pets and therefore beloved by arguably
rational agents, but does the roach I tread on in my bathroom even deserve
a second thought?) Regan acknowledges that contractarianism in such a
base form can also be used to defend systems of racism, sexism, and
ableism, but notes that other philosopherssuch as John Rawlsremove this
possibility by making further addenda to the theory, like the veil of ignorance
behind which the social contract is made.
Regan further rejects utilitarianism on its face value that the equality derived
from it is not an individual equality but a situational oneeach context in

which a decision must be made weights the value of a person unequally by

design. For example, in the situation in which one person must be murdered
to save the lives of another six, then while all of these peoples interests in
staying alive are equal, six is greater than one and therefore the individual
who is to be murdered is a less equal individual. Regan denotes this as being
a kind of moral receptacle. Regan instead champions the idea of inherent
value: that all beings, regardless of physical or mental difference, have
inherent moral value and therefore rights. And since it cannot be argued that
any intellectual difference may be taken into account in the assignment of
value, lest we do not include the mentally challenged or the simply stupid, it
cannot be argued that animals too must be excluded. For the lowest common
denominator in the assignment of value is having life.
If having life is to be equal in moral terms, then all animals are alike to all
humans in how they should be treated. Therefore, Regan says, we cannot do
anything to an animal that we would not do to a humanlike laboratory
testing. If we would not do such experiments on a human child, which has
moral rights on the grounds that it is experiencing life, then we cannot do
them on a rat, which also has moral rights on the same grounds.
Regan ends his summary with a call to action, directly aimed at a critic of his
who said his discussion of rights was cerebral and therefore of no direct use
to animals at all. I think this is an important thing to remember as we take
this course and read these essaysof course we must find a way,
philosophically, to back up our opinions and actions in the pursuit of human
and animal rights, but we must also remember that no change can be made
unless we effect it personally, by taking the conversation outside of the
classroom and into the public and legislative spheres. It is pointless to argue
philosophy alone and then go on doing cruel things (or, in the more widely
applicable case, to go on allowing them to happen).