ARTICLE IN PRESS

Reliability Engineering and System Safety 94 (2009) 412 417

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Reliability Engineering and System Safety

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ress

The management of mechanical integrity inspections at small-sized

Seveso facilities
Paolo A. Bragatto , Paolo Pittiglio, Silvia Ansaldi
ISPESL Italian National Institute for Occupational Safety and Prevention, Via Fontana Candida, 00040 Monteporzio Catone (Roma), Italy

a r t i c l e in f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history:
Received 23 May 2007
Received in revised form
9 April 2008
Accepted 23 April 2008
Available online 6 May 2008

The mechanical integrity (MI) of equipment has been controlled at all industrial facilities for many
decades. Control methods and intervals are regulated by laws or codes and best practices. In European
countries, the legislations implementing the Seveso Directives on the control of major accident hazards
require the owner of establishments where hazardous chemicals are handled, to implement a safety
management system (SMS). MI controls should be an integral part of the SMS. At large establishments
this goal is achieved by adopting the RBI method, but in small-sized establishments with a limited
budget and scanty personnel, a heuristic approach is more suitable. This paper demonstrates the
feasibility and advantages of integrating SMS and MI by means of a simple method that includes a few
basic concepts of RBI without additional costs for operator. This method, supported by a software tool, is
resilient as it functions effectively in spite of eventual budget reductions and personnel turnover. The
results of MI controls can also be exploited to monitor equipment condition and demonstrate the
adequacy of technical systems to the Competent Authorities (CA). Furthermore, the SMS can capture
knowledge resulting from MI experience and exploit it for a better understanding of risk.
& 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords:
Mechanical integrity
Safety management system
Risk-based inspection
Major accident hazard

1. Introduction
In developed countries, legislation on the control of major
accident hazards, such as the so-called Seveso Directives that have
been in force in the European Union for 25 years, has contributed
signicantly to reducing the accident rate. In industrial establishments, sound risk analysis methods, sound safety management
systems (SMS) and emergency plans have been introduced by all
major hazard legislations and have had a positive effect on the
overall safety level. Unfortunately, many accidents involving
hazardous chemicals are still reported at small-sized establishments, as well as at the storage units of large plants, which are
usually considered much simpler than process units. Major hazard
legislations do not discriminate small and large establishments,
but only lower-tier and upper-tier on the basis of hazardous
materials quantities. In small sized establishments, organization,
including SMS, may be weak and risk may be underestimated.
Cultural and social issues affecting SMS have to be carefully
considered. At small-sized industrial establishments, personnel
have a much lower cultural prole than workers employed at
facilities owned by major companies, who hire more qualied
staff, provide good training and have permanent education

 Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 6 94181 223; fax: +39 6 94181 225.

E-mail address: paoloangelo.bragatto@ispesl.it (P.A. Bragatto).

0951-8320/$ - see front matter & 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ress.2008.04.005

programs. Experienced workers often retire without transmitting

their practical knowledge to the new generation, and because of
the high turnover rate in these industries there are many young
and inexperienced workers. There is little team work in small
establishments where a single individual often deals not only with
all health, safety and environmental issues but may also be
responsible for quality and maintenance. Many workers come
from foreign countries and have a poor understanding of the local
language and culture. Communication between operator and
personnel, as well as with contractors, may become difcult
because of language differences. Moreover, the budget for safetyrelated activities could be reduced by small- and medium-sized
enterprises to respond to Asian competition.
It is clear that small-sized enterprises have to implement their
SMS in such a way as to prevent problems arising from reduced
budgets and poor personnel resources. Indeed, in the near future,
the whole industrial system, not only minor enterprises, might
have to face difcult problems such as staff reductions, cuts in
personnel and budget, faster turnover and foreign worker
integration. For this reason, the SMS must become resilient to
the impact of economic and social changes, at both minor and
major establishments. The SMS must be strong enough to survive
even severe budget reductions and inappropriate actions on the
part of unskilled personnel. The SMS for minor establishments
must be downsized and simplied, without jeopardizing consistency. The SMS should maximize safety and minimize safety costs.

ARTICLE IN PRESS
P.A. Bragatto et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 94 (2009) 412417

This challenging goal is possible if all safety-related information is

exploited in the best way, as demonstrated by Kallen and van
Noortwijk [1]. Furthermore, the SMS should capture and
manage all the implicit knowledge derived from operational
experience so as to prevent the negative impact of a continual
turnover of personnel.
As all process industries are under stress due to global
competition, even medium and large companies must be prepared
to adapt their procedures so as to prevent budget reduction or
personnel turnover impacting negatively on their safety level in
the near future. The resilience of SMS is a requirement that must
be given careful consideration by the Competent Authorities (CA)
in assessment procedures.
In countries where major hazard legislation is enforced, the
safety of the entire process industry depends on the efciency of
inspections performed by public authorities. To prevent a
potential reduction in government budget from having a marked
effect on overall safety in industry, the CA should also consider the
need for a more resilient inspection system.
This paper focuses basically on the needs of minor establishments that comply with legislation on the control of major
accident hazards, and aims at outlining a few issues for a more
efcient SMS. At establishments where major hazards are present,
many activities are directly related to safety. Among these, the
control of mechanical integrity (MI) usually absorbs most of the
economic and personnel resources. For this reason it is essential to
exploit the results of MI controls in the best way, without
increasing costs. To achieve this goal we have proposed a new
method that aims mainly at meeting the needs of small
establishment operators and may be applied to small- and
medium-sized plants. Major companies, which operate large
plants, should already have sophisticated systems to manage MI
controls; nevertheless, some suggestions might be useful for
improving the resilience of their SMS.
The next section outlines the MI controls usually performed at
industrial installations. In Section 3, we briey discuss MI policies
at establishments where major hazard legislation is enforced. In
Section 4 we discuss at length a potential integration between
SMS and MI. The strength of this solution lies on the inclusion in
the system of many activities that must be performed under the
existing legislation on MI controls. Section 5 illustrates and
discusses a few cases of practical application. Conclusions and
potential developments are reported in Section 6.

413

bubbling solutions to reveal leaks from joints or to check wet seals

can also be performed. Extra inspections may be decided in order
to increase safety levels and to prolong the service period.
Pressure systems legislation has been in force in numerous
countries for many years. This aims at preventing serious injury
from the hazard of stored energy due to failure of a pressure
system or one of its component parts and does not consider the
hazardous properties of the system contents released as a
consequence of a failure. Since 1997, an EU Directive implemented
in all member countries, the so-called PED Directive, has regulated
pressure equipment. No equivalent legislation for the PED exists
in the US where this matter is regulated by the well-known ASME
code on boilers and pressure vessels. PED legislation sets out
requirements for the design, manufacture and conformity assessment of pressure equipment and assemblies of pressure equipment with a maximum allowable pressure greater than 0.5 bar.
PED legislation has also established a classication system for
vessels and pipes. According to the European legislation, the
classication is based just on uid hazardousness (yes/no values)
and on PV (or PD) product, which is dened as
PV P m V

vessels

(1a)

pipes

(1b)

or
PD P m D

where Pm is the maximum design pressure; V is vessel volume; D

is pipe diameter.
Even though this schema is very simple, it is used worldwide in
pressure equipment trading. A great deal of national legislation on
pressure equipment also establishes a statutory inspection
interval. In most EU countries (including Italy) inspection
frequency depends on PED classication. In a few EU countries,
including the UK, Health and Safety regulations do not prescribe
inspection intervals, as a competent person is expected to use
judgement and experience in deciding inspection intervals, as
described by Ablitt and Speck [2]. In countries where statutory
inspection intervals are not enforced by law, frequency may be
dened by standard codes, as well as by recognized and generally
accepted good engineering practices (RGAGEP) and manufacturers recommendations. Most countries, including Italy, do not
have a statutory inspection interval for atmospheric equipment. A
thorough survey of inspection intervals enforced by major
European legislation is reported in RIMAP [3].

2. Mechanical integrity control

As poor mechanical conditions were the prime cause of nearmisses and accidents in the history of the process industry, MI
control for boilers, pressure systems and other critical safety
equipment has been regulated by legislation for many decades in
all developed countries. MI controls aim basically at ensuring that
the conditions of equipment at an industrial installation are not
impaired over a period of time. The following types of equipment
are usually included in an MI control program:

 pressure vessels and storage tanks (including heat exchangers);

 piping systems (including piping components such as valves);

 relief and vent systems and devices.
In-service equipment is regularly inspected by visual methods.
During planned maintenance stops, the commonest MI inspection
techniques for pressure equipment are ultrasonic tests to reveal
corrosion zones or exfoliations and X-ray imaging to reveal cracks
or other defects in the welded joints. Pneumatic tests with

3. Mechanical integrity in legislation for the control of major

accident hazards
In establishments where major hazard legislation is enforced,
dutyholders are required to perform activities that might involve
hazard in a planned and systematic way in order to ensure safe
operation and prevent failures that could result in losses
accompanied by severe consequences. These activities include
personnel organization, operation control, including MI inspections on equipment, functional tests, preventive maintenance, the
management of changes, the training and information program,
audit and emergency procedures. To manage these activities,
dutyholders have to implement an SMS. In EU legislation, SMS is
required by art. 7 and 9 of the Seveso Directive, while in US
legislation it is required by OSHA Standard 29 CFR 1910.119
Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals.
Unfortunately, there is no universally recognized standard code
for SMS. A wide survey of SMS codes is reported in Robson et al.
[4]. An SMS code suitable for the management of major accident
hazards can be found in IAEA [5].

ARTICLE IN PRESS
414

P.A. Bragatto et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 94 (2009) 412417

In establishments where major hazard legislation is enforced,

the SMS should have written procedures, appropriate inspections,
and testing of process equipment to ensure on-going mechanical
integrity. The inspection program should consider the results of
hazard analysis.
To prepare this inspection program, the dutyholder must
observe strict checks on critical components, but must also keep
within budget limits and avoid any negative effects on operations.
Furthermore, for many types of equipment (e.g. pressure equipment) inspection intervals must comply with obligations established by the legislation. Kallen and van Noortwijk [1] have widely
discussed the preparation of an inspection program to comply
with all the rules and achieve all conicting objectives (safety
economicsorganization).
Since the 1990s, a few sophisticated methods have been
developed for managing inspection programs in the process
industry. These methods are known as risk-based inspections
(RBIs). The most widely used RBI methods have been dened in
ASME [6] and API [7]. Another credible RBI method, the RIMAP
method, is reported by Bareiss et al. [8]. As the expression risk
based is currently trendy in many industries, a number of
establishment operators claim to have some risk-based management of maintenance, inspections and so on. These solutions,
usually, differ greatly from API or ASME codes and cannot be
considered RBI implementation, since they are merely homemade systems. In this paper, only codied RBI methods will be
considered.
RBI methodology enables resources to be concentrated on
components at a higher risk level, thus reducing efforts for those
at a lower level. Basically the RBI method estimates for each
equipment item a risk value resulting from the combination of
the consequence of failure and the likelihood of failure, prioritizes
the equipment according to the measured risk and designs the
inspection program. A survey by Speck and Iravani [9] reported
that, in recent years, RBI methods have been applied in the
majority of oil reneries, major chemical installations and power
stations. Successful RBI implementation has been demonstrated
by many authors, such as Hagemeijer and Kerkveld [10], Apeland
and Aven [11], Wintle and Kenzie [12], Nilsson [13], Khan and
Mahmoud [14], Higgs et al. [15], Park et al. [16], Sitton [17]
and Patel [18].
In the RBI method, consequence values must include potential
personnel injuries, equipment damage, downtime costs and
environmental effects, all of which have to be assessed using
reliable simulation models. The failure rates for the actual process
conditions are often unknown and have to be guessed, with the
help of experienced personnel, if available.
Staff competency is the key factor in successful RBI implementation: sound experience in the elds of metallurgy and
corrosion is essential, as is knowledge of chemical processes, loss
modelling, re prevention and maintenance techniques. Since a
single person is unlikely to possess all these expertise, RBI should
be implemented only by a team skilled in the analysis and
interpretation of results. Therefore, in accordance with Abblit
and Speck [2], RBI is not for individual operating in isolation and,
consequently, if the organization of human resources is poor and
the personnel is unskilled, RBI will not work well and will not
yield any advantages.
RBI methods also require an adequate risk analysis. At
minor establishments, instead, there is only the hazard identication and classication, based on Dow, Mond or other equivalent
indexes. In a few cases, the hazard index is also lacking and
the establishment operator relies just on the PV ranking
required by the legislation on pressure equipment. These types
of evaluations, obviously, are not adequate for a credible RBI
implementation.

To sum up, RBI brings recognized benets to major industries,

but is not suitable for minor establishments because

 it is difcult to implement when there is unskilled personnel;

 it requires a good understanding and evaluation of the risks;
 it cannot be implemented by people working alone.
Clearly a simpler method, tailored to the requirements of minor
establishments, is needed to support operators in these industries.
This method must be adaptable, and even when risk understanding is poor, it should be able to address an inspection
program by means of rough hazard classication.

4. Safety management systems and the control of mechanical

integrity at minor establishments
As has been widely demonstrated by Sitton [17] and Bragatto
et al. [19], MI control should be an integral part of SMS. This
section discusses the essential requirements for such an integration and presents a tool for implementing these requirements.
4.1. Essential requirements for integrating MI in SMS
Even if the RBI method is not necessarily applied in small and
medium establishments, a few requirements must however be
fullled in order to comply with MI inspection programs in establishments where major hazard legislation is enforced. Process equipment
inspection intervals must be consistent with enforced regulations,
manufacturers recommendations and RGAGEP, and must occur more
frequently if deemed necessary by prior operating experience or
hazard scoring. The employer must keep a report of each inspection
performed on process equipment. This report must record the date of
the inspection or test, the name of the inspector, the number of the
component on which inspection was performed, the inspection type
and the basic results of the inspection. Records should be kept of
defects found on a single item during inspections, and a higher hazard
priority should be considered for subsequent inspections.
Although there are software products to support the MI
management of large process plants, no tools designed specically
for small- and medium-sized establishments are available. Most
software tools implement only the RBI method, can be used solely
by a team of experts and are prohibitively expensive for small
entrepreneurs. Moreover, training is costly in terms of time. It is
therefore essential to have a relatively simple method and tools
that can be used by a single operator.
Even if complete implementation of the RBI method is not
feasible, a few basic RBI concepts could be transferred into the
management system of MI inspections. Highly sophisticated analysis
is not essential for the purpose of inspection planning; what is
required is a ranking of each component that must be inspected.
Mere PV classication could be inadequate for establishments where
major hazard legislation is enforced. In these establishments vessels
and pipes contain large quantities of ammable, explosive or toxic
uids. Since leakage of such materials could lead to a major accident,
adequate methods must be applied to assess and manage risks. An
adequate ranking method may be directly based on the DOW Fire &
Explosion index, as dened in [20]. DOW index may be converted in a
ranking according to the schema shown in Table 1. Instead of DOW
FEI other popular indexes may be used, such as Mond Fire Explosion
& Toxic index as dened in [21] or ISPESL index, as dened by Binetti
et al. [22]. In this case, as hazard indexes are calculated for plant units,
all components in a unit will be ranked at the same level. For a more
detailed evaluation, a distinct classication for each single item is
provided. A fairly simple method of risk evaluation (e.g. risk matrix)

ARTICLE IN PRESS
P.A. Bragatto et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 94 (2009) 412417

Table 1
Hazard ranking based on DOW Fire and Explosion index
DOW F&E index

Hazard ranking

060
6196
97127
128158
4159

1Low
2Moderate
3High
4Very high
5Extremely high

can be used. This requires, for each item, a qualitative evaluation of

both the severity of failure consequences and the likelihood of failure.
Severity and likelihood are ranked according to a qualitative scale,
which can be adjusted by the user to obtain a more or less accurate
evaluation. In a critical unit a low-risk component may be present. In
this case the component classication prevails over the unit
classication, to avoid paying special attention to unimportant
components. In other words, unit ranking based on the Dow index
should be used for a conservative approach, while single-component
ranking, based on the risk matrix, should be preferred for a more
exible approach.
4.2. PELM software
These basic ideas have been implemented in a software
developed by ISPESL, the Italian Institute for Health and Safety
at Work. As shared tools often promote a better exchange between
dutyholders and authorities, this software has been disseminated
on the ISPESL website. At current time about 800 copies of the
software were downloaded from the website by dutyholders, as
well as by professionals and public authorities.
The tool is named PELM, which is an acronym for Process
Equipment Inspections in Lifecycle Management. PELM aims at
managing inspections and tests on process equipment in establishments where SMS is enforced by major hazard legislation.
PELM helps the dutyholder to determine inspection frequencies,
plan and schedule inspections and manage inspection results
during the lifecycle of the equipment. PELM ensures that process
equipment inspection and test frequency are consistent with
applicable statutory regulations and that these occur more
frequently if required by hazard ranking. All that is needed to
use PELM efciently is a consolidated list of process equipment;
no organization changes or long training courses are required.
Each component of the equipment is recorded in the PELM
database. Each inspection and test performed on any item of the
process equipment is recorded. The date of inspection and the
inspector are recorded in the equipment database as well as a
brief description of the inspection performed and the results
attained. A description of the software is not a goal of the paper
and may be found in Bragatto et al. [19].
Inspection intensication is initially done by PELM in a very
simple way. The choice of whether or not to carry out noncompulsory inspections depends on the user. Furthermore,
component ranking may be changed on the basis of previous
inspection results. Even if, to an inexperienced user, PELM may
appear to be a banal calendar manager, this tool facilitates the
introduction of some basic concepts of RBI.

 The exploitation of inspection results for a better risk understanding.

 The demonstration of safety conditions during inspections

performed by the CA in the framework of major hazard
legislation enforcement.

5.1. Dening an inspection program

PELM establishes an inspection frequency in compliance with
current legislation for all types of equipment. If the statutory
inspection interval is not established by legislation, the inspection
interval is set by RGAGEP. Good inspection planning should
intensify inspections only on items with a higher risk ranking,
and should comply with the statutory inspection interval for
items classied as less risky. For this reason, risk ranking is
translated by PELM into an inspection frequency intensication
factor IF. The IF look-up table, which associates risk ranking
and the intensication factor, can be customized by the operator.
In this way a higher inspection frequency (and consequently a
shorter inspection interval) is suggested by PELM, according to the
following equation:
f sugg f min IF

(2)

where fsugg 1/Tsugg; Tsugg suggested inspection interval;

fmin 1/Tstat; or fmin 1/Tgp; Tstat inspection interval, as dened
by national legislation, if present; Tgp inspection interval, as
dened by good practice, if in national legislation a mandatory
inspection interval is not present; IF inspection frequency
intensication factor.
The IF is derived from the risk ranking according to a look-up
table, which may be tuned to congure the system in order to
meet constraints including local legislation, corporate standard
and quality objective. A sample of this is shown in Fig. 1.
Basically there are two options to congure the IF look-up
table, according to specic legislation:
Case 1. Legislation establishes a statutory inspection interval
based on PV product. Exceptions can be authorized by the CA. In
this case, IF should range from 0.5 to 2 (this is the case shown in
the Fig. 1). In other words, as reference frequencies are high,
inspections are intensied just for equipment with higher hazard
ranking. On the contrary, inspection frequency is reduced for
equipment with lower hazard ranking. In the application to the CA

5. Some applications of PELM

This section discusses PELM potentials and presents three
applications:

 The denition of a detailed inspection program, based on

regulation compliance and hazard ranking.

415

Fig. 1. The look-up table that associates risk ranking and IF.

ARTICLE IN PRESS
416

P.A. Bragatto et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 94 (2009) 412417

for the inspection frequency reduction, PELM results can be

mentioned, as a supporting argument.
Case 2. Legislation does not establish a statutory inspection
interval. In this case IF should range from 1 to 3. In other words, as
minimal frequencies established by good practices are low, they
must be increased for the component with a higher hazard
ranking, but cannot be decreased for lower ones.

inspection results. For each inspection, PELM records essential

data such as date and inspector name and inspection results,
as shown in Fig. 3. The operator may use recorded inspection
data to monitor the equipment condition and to ensure maximum installation availability. Furthermore, he may use inspection results to adapt the inspection program. If the operator
detects unexpected results on a single component, or group of

The above-described IF schema is implemented in the PELM

software. The typical PELM ranking pane is shown in Fig. 2. The
following items may accounted for ranking a component:

 the uid classication;

 the ranking according to PED categories and the inspection
frequencies, in conformance with Italian legislation;

 the classication according to risk index; (In the present



implementation the ISPESL risk index has been chosen as the

most popular in Italy.)
the ranking according to the well-known risk matrix.

In Fig. 2, the ranking coming from the risk matrix, which is

lower, prevails over the ranking coming from the ISPESL index and
extension of the inspection period may be proposed. Of course,
the alternative choice (index ranking prevailing over risk matrix)
is also possible.
5.2. Inspections follow-up
After inspection planning the operator has to manage inspection results. A company may have its own form for reporting

Fig. 3. The record of an inspection, as shown in PELM. In the case of a detected

defect, images may be added to the inspection record.

Fig. 2. A typical PELM pane, as used for ranking a component.

ARTICLE IN PRESS
P.A. Bragatto et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 94 (2009) 412417

components, he may reconsider risk classication, thus altering

inspection frequency. In this way, inspection frequency may be
intensied depending on the condition of the components.
Along the component lifecycle, the risk level may be increased
and the inspection interval reduced, according to the remaining
lifetime, which may be forecasted on the basis of the measured
corrosion trend. Sometimes the operator may reconsider overall
inspection results and consequently modify the look-up table by
associating inspection interval and risk classication, in order to
have a more adequate inspection policy.
5.3. Inspections in the framework of major hazard legislation
In most countries where major hazard legislation is enforced,
the public authorities establish appropriate inspection and audit
programs to monitor the safety of hazardous installations.
Inspection has always been considered one of the most
powerful and effective tools available to authorities for enforcing
the major hazard legislation. The Seveso Directive requires the CA
to organize a system of on-going inspections to determine
whether operators are complying with their duties under the
Directive. The European inspection system is described by Basso
et al. [23] and Wood [24]. During inspection the operator must
demonstrate that relevant regulations, standards and practices are
being met and that SMS are in place and functioning appropriately. As an inspection is not able to examine the condition of
all safety-related items of hazardous installations, it could focus
on assessing whether the management system adequately
addresses controls and tests on the MI of the equipment.
Inspection data managed by PELM may be used to demonstrate
that technical systems are adequate for safe and protable
operations, during internal and external audits and, especially,
during visits carried out by the CA to prevent major accidents,
according to art. 18 of the Seveso Directive.

6. Conclusions
A stronger link between SMS and MI control systems should be
encouraged by the CA. Inspections performed under the SMS in
the framework of major hazard legislation, primarily consider
issues such as safety policy, procedures, personnel, training and
emergency planning, while integrity inspections consider safety
only from a technical point of view. Integrity controls are
widespread, but not systematic, as they are performed by different
experts and by different bodies at different times. Their integration into the SMS is very useful, does not entail additional costs or
higher organizational models and allows owners to exploit
integrity control results to manage overall safety. During inspections on the SMS, the dutyholder could use a system such as PELM
both to demonstrate that integrity control management is
adequate and to give inspectors information for a general
understanding of the current MI conditions.
Economic conditions could lead to reductions in the number of
employees and changes in corporate structures. Cuts in staff could
lead to reduced safety communications, increased stress, less time
for internal inspections and loss of knowledge. The SMS should be
resilient enough to survive these events. PELM is a resilient
implementation of the MI management system, as it can survive
even if the budget is cut. In this case the focus will be on the
mandatory inspections and on critical components, but an
accurate management of inspection data, at no extra cost, will
anyway ensure a reasonable safety level.

417

Inspections conducted by regulatory bodies are an essential

item of the overall safety system. In a few countries, including
Italy, the budget of these inspections is partially provided by
public funding and could suffer for budget cuts. In this event, the
regulator will always be able to have a good understanding of
the internal inspection program in progress as well as of the
mechanical conditions of equipment, thanks to MI inspection
results managed by tools such as PELM.
The PELM software architecture is suitable for further extensions. In the present implementation the intensication factors
and the look up table has to be updated by the user, but it could be
driven by an automatic computation engine, which could take
into account the results of the previous inspections, as well as the
inspection budget and the safety improvement objectives.
References
[1] Kallen MJ, van Noortwijk JM. Optimal maintenance decisions under imperfect
inspection. Reliab Eng Syst Saf 2005;90(1):17785.
[2] Ablitt C, Speck J. Experiences in implementing risk-based inspection. In: Third
MENDT Middle East nondestructive testing conference & exhibition2730
November 2005, Bahrain, Manama, /www.ndt.netS.
[3] RIMAP. Report on current practice ref. 1-11-F-2004-01-1 in /http://
research.dnv.com/rimap/S, 2004.
[4] Robson LS, Clarke JA, Cullen K, Bielecky A, Severin C, Bigelow PL, et al. The
effectiveness of occupational health and safety management system interventions: a systematic review. Saf Sci 2007;45(3):32953.
[5] IAEA. The Safety Management System for Facilities and Activities IAEA Safety
Standard Series GS-R-3 Vienna, 2006.
[6] ASME. CTRD Vol. 20-1: RISK-based inspection-development of guidelinesgeneral document. Centre for Research and Technology Development,
American Society of Mechanical Engineers; 1991.
[7] API 580 Recommended Practice. Risk based inspection. Washington, DC:
American Petroleum Institute; 2003.
[8] Bareiss J, Buck P, Matschecko B, Jovanovic A, Balos D, Perunicic M. RIMAP
demonstration project. Risk-based life management of piping system in
power plant Heilbronn. Int J Pressure Vessels Piping 2004;81(1011
sp.):80713.
[9] Speck JB, Iravani A. Industry survey of risk-based life management practice.
In: ASME PVP conference proceeding, 2002.
[10] Hagemeijer PM, Kerkveld G. A methodology for risk based inspection of
pressurized systems. Proc Inst Mech Eng, Part E: J Process Mech Eng 1998;
212(1):3747.
[11] Apeland S, Aven T. Risk based maintenance optimization: foundational issues.
Reliab Eng Syst Saf 2000;67(3):28592.
[12] Wintle JB, Kenzie BW. Best practice for risk based inspection as a part of plant
integrity management. HSE Book; 2001 in /www.hse.gov.ukS.
[13] Nilsson F. Risk based approach to plant life management. Nucl Eng Des
2003;221(13 SPEC.):293300.
[14] Kahn F, Mahmoud H. Risk based maintenance a new approach for process
plant inspection and maintenance. Process Saf Prog 2004;23(4):25265.
[15] Higgs PA, Parkin R, Jackson M, AlHabaibeh A, Zorriassatine F, Coy J. A survey
on condition monitoring systems in industry. In: Proceedings of ESDA
Manchester, UK, 2004. p. 1922.
[16] Park YJ, Choi JB, Kim YJ. Application of knowledge based information system
for life extension of steel making plant. Am Soc Mech Eng, Pressure Vessels
Piping Div (Publication) PVP 2004;473:1438.
[17] Sitton R. Integration of RBI with an inspection data management system. In:
MENDTMiddle East nondestructive testing conference & exhibition2730
November 2005 Bahrain, Manama, 2005, /www.ndt.net-3rdS.
[18] Patel R. Risk based inspection. IN: MENDTMiddle East non destructive
testing conference & exhibition2730 November 2005 Bahrain, Manama,
2005, /www.ndt.net-3rdS.
[19] Bragatto P, Pittiglio P, Ansaldi S. Intensication of inspection programs at
major hazard establishments. In: Proceedings of the ESREL conference 2007
Stavanger, 2527 June 2007.
[20] DOWs Fire & explosion index hazard classication guide, 7th ed. AIChE, New
York, 1994. p. 10971102.
[21] ICI. The Mond index. 2nd ed. Imperial Chemical Industries PLC; 1985.
[22] Basso B, Carpegna C, Dibitonto C, Gaido G, Robotto A. Reviewing the safety
management system by incident investigation and performance indicators.
J Loss Prevent Process Ind 2004;17(3):22531.
[23] Binetti R, Cappelletti F, Graziani R Ludovisi G, Sampaolo A. Index method for
risk analysis and evaluation of some industrial activities Prevenzione Oggi, 1,
1990 [in Italian].
[24] Wood M. The mutual joint visit programme on inspections under Seveso II:
exchanging lessons learned on inspections best practices. Inst Chem Eng
Symp Ser 2005;150:97794.