E. DEFENSESi.

Plaintiffs negligence is proximate cause of injury

Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n)

48. PLDT v. CA, G.R. 57079 (September 29, 1989).

Facts: The case is about an action for damages instituted by Sps Esteban (private respondent) against
PLDT for the injuries they sustained in the evening of July 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth
and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its
underground conduit system.
Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping
darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her
arms, legs and face, and a permanent scar on her cheek, while her husband suffered cut lips. Moreover,
the windshield of the jeep was shattered.
PLDT contends that the injuries sustained by Spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the
entity which should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company, an independent contractor
which undertook the construction of the manhole and the conduit system. PLDT filed a third-party
complaint against Barte. Barte claimed that it had complied with the terms of its contract with PLDT by
installing the necessary and appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the work site, with barricades at
both ends of the excavation and with red lights at night along the excavated area to warn the traveling
public of the presence of excavations.
Trial court rendered a decision in favor of Spouses ordering PLDT to pay, and ordering Barte to reimburse
whatever amount paid by PLDT. Both PLDT and Spouses appealed. CA reversed holding that Spouses were
negligent and consequently absolving PLDT from the claim for damages. Thereafter, CA promulgated its
resolution affirming in toto the original decision of the lower court. Hence this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue: Whether PLDT is liable for negligence.
Held: NO. The accident which befell he Spouses was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio Esteban and
was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of PLDT. Records show that:
First. Estabans jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had remained on that inside
lane, it would not have hit the ACCIDENT MOUND. Evidence shows tire marks that the ACCIDENT MOUND
was hit by the jeep swerving from the left that is, swerving from the inside lane. The accident was not due
to the absence of warning signs,
but to the unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside lane.
Second. That Spouses jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could
have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south of the ACCIDENT MOUND. The
ditches along Lacson Street had already been covered except the 3 or 4 meters where the ACCIDENT
MOUND was located. Evidence shows that the ditches on Lacson Street north of the ACCIDENT MOUND had
already been covered, but not in such a way as to allow the outer lane to be freely and conveniently
passable to vehicles. The situation could have been worse to the south of the ACCIDENT MOUND for which
reason no picture of the ACCIDENT MOUND facing south was taken.
Third. Spouses jeep was not running at 25 KPH as claimed. At that speed, he could have braked the
vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. It would not have climbed the ACCIDENT MOUND
several feet as indicated by the tiremarks. Therefore, it must have been running quite fast. If the jeep had
been braked at 25 KPH, they would not have been thrown against the windshield and they would not have
suffered their injuries.
Fourth. With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights
which should have made him see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time. If he was running on the outside lane at
25 KPH his failure to see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time to brake the car even on dim lights was negligence
on his part. The ACCIDENT MOUND was relatively big and visible. If he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND in
time, he would not have seen any warning sign either. He knew of the existence and location of the

ACCIDENT MOUND, having seen it many previous times. With ordinary precaution, he should have driven
his jeep on the night of the accident so as to avoid hitting the ACCIDENT MOUND.
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his
injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the mishap and thereby precludes their right to
recover damages. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio Esteban could have avoided the
injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the
part of Esteban. The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only
purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site.
Estabans already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these
excavations which caused the jeep to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the
jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound.
The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the
excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would
have prevented the injury. They cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure
to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and
necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection.
Furthermore, Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the
negligence he imputes to PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday
and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that
exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his
imprudence.
Lastly, there is insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. Spouses Esteban only
presented the self-serving testimony of Esteban and the unverified photograph of merely a portion of the
scene of the accident. The absence of a police report of the incident and the non-submission of a medical
report from the hospital where Spouses were allegedly treated have not even been satisfactorily explained.
Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the
existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail.
49. Kim v. Phil. Aerial Taxi, 58 Phil. 838.
Facts: Teh Le Kim bought in Manila a passenger ticket for a flight to Iloilo in one of the PATCO's
hydroplanes. The engine of the plane Mabuhay, in which he was to make the flight, was not working
satisfactorily. Thus, Kim had to wait for some time. While the engine was being tested, Kim saw how it was
started by turning the propeller repeatedly and how the man who did it ran away from it each time in order
not to be caught by the said propeller.
Before the plane Mabuhay was put in condition for the flight, the plane Taal arrived and it was decided to
have Kim make the flight therein. Kim and his companion were carefully carried from the beach to the
plane, entering the same by the rear or tail end, and were placed in their seats to which they were
strapped. Later, they were shown how the straps could be tightened or loosened in case of accident and
were instructed further not to touch anything in the plane.
The plane landed on the waters of Guimaras Strait, in front of Iloilo, and taxied toward the beach until its
pontoons struck bottom, when the plane stopped. The pilot shut off the gasoline feed pipe, permitting the
engine, however, to continue to function until all the gasoline was drained from the feed pipe and
carburetor. This operation was necessary in accordance with the established practice of aviation in order to
avoid danger of fire which would exist if the pipes and carburetor remained full of gasoline, and to prevent
the sudden cooling of the engine which might cause serious damage, especially to the valves.

At the moment the pontoons touched bottom and while the pilot was signalling to the banca (to stay away
from propellers because it was dangerous), Kim unfastened the straps around him and, not even waiting to
put on his hat, climbed over the door to the lower wing, went down the ladder to the pontoon and walked
along the pontoon toward the revolving propeller. The propeller first grazed his forehead and, as he threw
up his arm, it was caught by the revolving blades thereof and so injured that it had to be amputated.
Bohn and Garrett of Warner, Barnes & Co., consignees of the PATCO in Iloilo, were on the beach to meet the
plane and to make arrangements for the disembarking of the passengers. Upon seeing Kim walking toward
the propeller, they shouted frantically and motioned to him to keep away from it, but the Kim took no heed
of them.

The usual procedure in discharging passengers from a hydroplane is to wait until the propeller stops, then
turn the plane around by hand so as to have the rear or tail and thereof towards the beach, and then take
the passengers to shore in a banca. The pilot in charge of the plane has had 14 years experience.
Issue: Whether PATCO is liable for negligence.
Held: NO. The plane arrived at the destination with nothing more left to do but to take Kim and his
companion, safe and sound, ashore. In order to do this, it was necessary to wait for the propeller to stop,
turn the rear or tail end of the plane towards the shore, take the passengers out by the aforesaid rear or
tail end thereof, place them in a banca, and take them ashore.
By sheer common sense, Kim ought to know that a propeller, be it that of a ship or of an aeroplane, is
dangerous while in motion and that to approach it is to run the risk of being caught and injured thereby. He
ought to know furthermore that inasmuch as the plane was on the water, he had to wait for a banca to
take him ashore.
Notwithstanding the shouts and warning signals given him from the shore, Kim, not being a man of
ordinary prudence, hastily left the cabin of the plane, walked along one of the pontoons and directly into
the revolving propeller, while the banca, which was to take him ashore was still some distance away and
the pilot was instructing the boatman to keep it at a safe distance from the plane. Kim acted with reckless
negligence in approaching the propeller while it was still in motion, and when the banca, was not yet in a
position to take him.
That Kims negligence alone was the direct cause of the accident, is so clear that it is not
necessary to cite authoritative opinions to support the conclusion that the injury to his right
arm and the subsequent amputation thereof were due entirely and exclusively to his own
imprudence and not to the slightest negligence attributable to the defendant entity or to its
agents. He alone should suffer the consequences of his act.
50. American Express v. Cordero, G.R. No. 138550, 14 Oct 2005 51. Cayao-Lasam v. Ramolete,
GR 159132 (December 18, 2008)
Facts: AMEX is a foreign corporation that issues charge cards to its customers which the latter uses to
purchase goods and services at accredited merchants worldwide. Nila Cordero, wife of respondent was one
such holder. An extension card was also issued to her husband, Noel Cordero.
Sometime after, respondent together with his wife and relatives went on a holiday trip to HK. During the
trip, they went to Watsons Chemist Shop. Noel bought some goods and handed to the sales clerk his AMEX
extension card. The sales clerk verified the card by making a telephone call to the AMEX Office in Hong
Kong. Its representative said he wants to talk to respondent in order to verify the latters identity, pursuant
to the procedure observed under the Inspect Airwarn Support System (IASS). However, respondent
refused.
Due to respondents refusal, Susan Chong, the store manager, emerged from behind the counter and
informed respondent that she had to confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut respondents AMEX card in
half with a pair of scissors. This, according to respondent, caused him embarrassment and humiliation
considering that it was done in front of his family and the other customers lined up at the check-out
counter. Hence, Nilda had to pay for the purchases using her own AMEX card.
Nilda called up AMEXs office in Hong Kong where it was learned through the Senior Authorized that a
person in HK attempted to use a charge card with the same number as respondents card. The HK AMEX
Office called up respondent and after determining that he was in Manila and not in HK, placed his card
under the IASS (a system used by AMEX to protect both the company and its cardholders from fraudulent
use of their charge cards; once a card suspected of unauthorized use is placed in the system, the person to
whom the card is tendered must verify the identity of the holder. If the true identity of the card owner is
established, the card is honored and the charges are approved; otherwise the card is revoked or
confiscated.).
Respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against AMEX. The RTC ruled in favor of Cordero.
Petitioner appealed.
Issue: Whether or not AMEX is liable to Cordero for the humiliation suffered by the latter.
Held: NO. Respondent anchors his cause of action on Article 2176. In order that an obligation based on
quasi-delict may arise, there must be no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. But there

are exceptions. There may be an action for quasi-delict notwithstanding that there is a subsisting contract
between the parties. A liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches
the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort,
thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of the damage
or injury suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not
have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of
logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of
Watson that indeed he is the authorized cardholder. This could have been accomplished had respondent
talked to AMEXs representative, enabling the latter to determine that respondent is indeed the true holder
of the card. Clearly, no negligence which breaches the contract can be attributed to AMEX. If at all, the
cause of respondents humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to AMEXs representative.
There was testimony to that effect which showed that when Watson Company called AMEX for
authorization, AMEX representative requested that he talk to Mr. Cordero but he refused to talk to any
representative of AMEX. AMEX could not prove then that he is really the real card holder.
Additionally, according to the terms of the Card member Agreement, AMEX can revoke respondents card
without notice. Again the subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had respondent talked to
AMEXs representative and identified himself as the genuine cardholder. Clearly, there was no negligence
on the part of the AMEX.

ii. Comparative v. Contributory Negligence (Article 2179) Comparative Negligence

52.

Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263

Facts: A storm with a strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan, during which several banana
plants near the transmission line of Alcala Electric Plant were blown down and fell on the electric wire. As a
result, the live wire was cut, one end of which was dangling on the electric post and the other on the
ground under the fallen banana plants.
The barrio captain, Bueno saw the wire and warned people not to go near the wire in order to avoid injury.
He also saw Baldomero, a laborer of the Alcala Electric Plant and notified him of the broken line. Baldomero
told Bueno that he could not do it but he will look for the lineman to fix it. However, after the two left the
place, a small boy named Saynes who lived across the road and who was only 3 years and 8 months old,
wandered in the place, got in contact with the broken line wire, got electrocuted and died. It was only after
the electrocution that the wire got fixed. The father of the child filed a complaint.
Issue: Whether Umali, as owner and manager of Alcala Electric Plant, is liable for negligence.
Held: YES. A series of negligence on the part of the Alcala Electric Plants employees were determinative of
their responsibility for the damage caused. First, it was apparent that there were tall banana plants that
could have posed a serious threat to the lines constructed by the plant. They did not undertake the
necessary precautions to have them removed. Second, realizing the danger that the storm could have
brought on the lines, the employees of the plant did not cut off the power pending inspection of the lines to
see if they were cut or damaged. Third, Baldomero, realizing the danger that the broken line posed, did not
take the necessary precautions to prevent anyone from entering the area. Instead he left the premises
because what was foremost in his mind was the repair of the line.
The court cannot also ascribe to Umalis that it was the parents negligence of allowing their child to
wander around that constituted the proximate cause of the victims death. However the court finds that
fallen live wire which posed a threat to life and property on that morning due to the series of negligence
adverted to above committed by defendants' employees and which could have killed any other person who
might by accident get into contact with it. Stated otherwise, even if the child was allowed to leave the
house unattended due to the parents' the real proximate cause was the negligence, he would not have
died that morning where it not for the cut live wire he accidentally touched.
Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case)

was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This
law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioners liability for
injury caused by his employees is defined in Article 2180.

53.

Phoenix Construction v. IAC, 148 SCRA 353.

Facts: At about 1:30 a.m., private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-anddinner meeting with his boss where Dionisio had taken a shot or two of liquor. Dionisio was driving his
Volkswagen car and proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights suddenly failed. He
switched his headlights on bright and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2.5 meters
away from his car.
The dump truck, owned and registered in the name of Phoenix Construction, was parked on the right hand
side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward
which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew in
such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were
neither lights nor reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck. The dump truck had earlier that
evening been driven home by Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in
view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning.
Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his
car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries
including some permanent facial scars, a nervous breakdown and loss of 2 gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the CFI Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and
proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck.
Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in
driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and
without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and
supervision of the dump truck driver.
Issue: Whether the proximate cause was trucks parking position.
Held: YES. DIONISIOS WAS ONLY CONTRIBUTORY. Before resolving such, there are four factual issues that
need to be looked into: (a) whether or not private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and
effective for that eventful night; (b) whether Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision
with the dump truck; (c) whether Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact with
the dump truck or whether those headlights accidentally malfunctioned moments before the collision; and
(d) whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
First: No curfew pass was found on the person of Dionisio immediately after the accident nor was any
found in his car according to the patrol man who took the unconscious Dionisio to Makati Med, and to the
nurse who took off Dionisio's clothes and examined them along with the contents of pockets together with
the patrolman. Dionisio was not able to produce any curfew pass during the trial. Instead, he offered the
explanation that his family may have misplaced his curfew pass. He also offered a certification issued by
one Major Libarnes who was said to have authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila.
This certification was to the effect that Dionisio had a valid curfew pass. This certification did not, however,
specify any pass serial number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed curfew pass.
Second: Patrolman Cuyno testified that people who had gathered at the scene of the accident told him that
Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did not have its headlights on. Dionisio, on the other hand, claimed
that he was travelling at a moderate speed at 30 KPH and had just crossed the intersection of General
Santos and General Lacuna Streets and had started to accelerate when his headlights failed just before the
collision took place. An automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary object
in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective,
reactions from observers who happened to be around at that time. The testimony of Cuyno was therefore
admissible.
Third: Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be
detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away
from the intersection.

Fourth: There is the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the effect that Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time
he was taken from his smashed car and brought to the Makati Medical Center in an unconscious condition.
This testimony has to be taken in conjunction with the admission of Dionisio that he had taken "a shot or
two" of liquor before dinner with his boss that night.
We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence
of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence.
In summary: Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving
faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of
General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew
and sticking out onto the road lane.
HOWEVER the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or
negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of Carbonel.
The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck
driver's negligence. The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was
rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the Dionisios car
would in all probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning
lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury
for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be
held responsible.
Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer
to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. Dionisio's negligence was not of an
independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the
improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability.
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is
reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular
circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons, because of failure to guard against
it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason.
We hold that Dionisio's negligence was only contributory, that the immediate and proximate cause of
the injury remained the truck driver's lack of due care and that consequently Dionisio may recover
damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.
Last Clear Chance Doctrine: The theory here of petitioners is that while the truck driver was negligent,
Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio
having failed to take that last clear chance must bear his own injuries alone.
54.

PCI Bank v. CA, G.R. No. 121413, 29 Jan 2001.

FACTS:
Ford Philippines drew and issued Citibank Check. No. SN 04867 on October 19, 1977, Citibank Check No.
SN 10597 on July 19, 1978 and Citibank Check No. SN-16508 on April 20, 1979, all in favor of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) for payment of its percentage taxes. The checks were crossed and
deposited with the IBAA, now PCIB, BIR's authorized collecting bank. The first check was cleared containing
an indorsement that "all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsements guaranteed." The same, however,
was replaced with two (2) IBAA's managers' checks based on a call and letter request made by Godofredo
Rivera, Ford's General Ledger Accountant, on an alleged error in the computation of the tax due without
IBAA verifying the authority of Rivera. These manager's checks were later deposited in another bank and
misappropriated by the syndicate. The last two checks were cleared by the Citibank but failed to discover
that the clearing stamps do not bear any initials. The proceeds of the checks were also illegally diverted or
switched by officers of PCIB members of the syndicate, who eventually encashed them. Ford, which was
compelled to pay anew the percentage taxes, sued in two actions for collection against the two banks on
January 20, 1983, barely six years from the date the first check was returned to the drawer. The direct
perpetrators of the crime are now fugitives from justice.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
st
1 case:
(1) Trial Court: Citibank and IBAA were jointly and severally liable for the checks
(2) CA: only IBAA (PCIB) solely liable for the amount of the first check

nd
2
case:
(1) Trial Court: absolved PCIB from liability and held that only the Citibank is liable for the checks issued by
Ford
(2) Court of Appeals: held both banks liable for negligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees resulting in the erroneous encashment of the checks.
ISSUE:
Has petitioner Ford the right to recover from the collecting bank (PCIBank) and the drawee bank (Citibank)
the value of the checks intended as payment to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue? Or has Ford's
cause of action already prescribed?
RULING:
A. Citibank Check No. SN-04867
FORD
Ford, is guilty of the "imputed contributory negligence" that would defeat its claim for reimbursement,
bearing in mind that its employees, Godofredo Rivera and Alexis Marindo, were among the members of the
syndicate.
although the employees of Ford initiated the transactions attributable to an organized syndicate, in our
view, their actions were not the proximate cause of encashing the checks payable to the CIR. The degree
of Ford's negligence, if any, could not be characterized as the proximate cause of the injury to the parties.
IBAA/PCIB
As agent of the BIR (the payee of the check), defendant IBAA should receive instructions only from its
principal BIR and not from any other person especially so when that person is not known to the defendant.
It is very imprudent on the part of the defendant IBAA to just rely on the alleged telephone call of one
(Godofredo Rivera and in his signature to the authenticity of such signature considering that the plaintiff is
not a client of the defendant IBAA."
Even considering arguendo, that the diversion of the amount of a check payable to the collecting bank in
behalf of the designated payee may be allowed, still such diversion must be properly authorized by the
payor. Otherwise stated, the diversion can be justified only by proof of authority from the drawer, or that
the drawer has clothed his agent with apparent authority to receive the proceeds of such check.
The crossing of the check with the phrase "Payee's Account Only," is a warning that the check should be
deposited only in the account of the CIR. Thus, it is the duty of the collecting bank PCIBank to ascertain
that the check be deposited in payee's account only. Therefore, it is the collecting bank (PCIBank) which is
bound to scrutinize the check and to know its depositors before it could make the clearing indorsement "all
prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsement guaranteed".
PCIBank is liable in the amount corresponding to the proceeds of Citibank Check No. SN-04867.
Citibank
None
B. Citibank Check Numbers SN-10597 and 16508
PCIBank
Section 5 31 of Central Bank Circular No. 580, Series of 1977 provides that any theft affecting items in
transit for clearing, shall be for the account of sending bank, which in this case is PCIBank.
Citibank
negligent in the performance of its duties. Citibank failed to establish that its payment of Ford's checks
were made in due course and legally in order. In its defense, Citibank claims the genuineness and due
execution of said checks, considering that Citibank (1) has no knowledge of any infirmity in the issuance of
the checks in question (2) coupled by the fact that said checks were sufficiently funded and (3) the
endorsement of the Payee or lack thereof was guaranteed by PCIBank (formerly IBAA), thus, it has the
obligation to honor and pay the same.
As the drawee bank breached its contractual obligation with Ford and such degree of culpability
contributed to the damage caused to the latter. It failed to perform what was incumbent upon it, which is
to ensure that the amount of the checks should be paid only to its designated payee.
Invoking the doctrine of comparative negligence, we are of the view that both PCIBank and
Citibank failed in their respective obligations and both were negligent in the selection and
supervision of their employees resulting in the encashment of Citibank Check Nos. SN 10597
and 16508. Thus, we are constrained to hold them equally liable for the loss of the proceeds of
said checks issued by Ford in favor of the CIR. Time and again, we have stressed that banking
business is so impressed with public interest where the trust and confidence of the public in
general is of paramount importance such that the appropriate standard of diligence must be
very high, if not the highest, degree of diligence. A bank's liability as obligor is not merely vicarious
but primary, wherein the defense of exercise of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees is of no moment. Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. By the very

nature of their work the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and
officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. Banks are expected to exercise the
highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
The relationship between a holder of a commercial paper and the bank to which it is sent for collection is
that of a principal and an agent and the diversion of the amount of the check is justified only by proof of
authority from the drawer; that in crossed checks, the collecting bank is bound to scrutinize the check and
know its depositors before clearing indorsement; that as a general rule, banks are liable for wrongful or
tortuous acts of its agents within the scope and in the course of their employment; that failure of the
drawee bank to seasonably discover irregularity in the checks constitutes negligence and renders the bank
liable for loss of proceeds of the checks; that an action upon a check prescribes in ten (10) years; and that
the contributory negligence of the drawer shall reduce the damages he may recover against the collecting
bank.
Since a master may be held for his servant's wrongful act, the law imputes to the master the act of the
servant, and if that act is negligent or wrongful and proximately results in injury to a third person, the
negligence or wrongful conduct is the negligence or wrongful conduct of the master, for which he is liable.
The general rule is that if the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring
contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter's negligence is imputed to his superior and
will defeat the superior's action against the third person, assuming, of course that the contributory
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made.
Given these circumstances, the mere fact that the forgery was committed by a drawer- payor's confidential
employee or agent, who by virtue of his position had unusual facilities for perpetrating the fraud and
imposing the forged paper upon the bank, does not entitle the bank to shift the loss to the drawer-payor, in
the absence of some circumstance raising estoppel against the drawer. This rule likewise applies to the
checks fraudulently negotiated or diverted by the confidential employees who hold them in their
possession.
As a general rule, however, a banking corporation is liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts and
declarations of its officers or agents within the course and scope of their employment. A bank will be held
liable for the negligence of its officers or agents when acting within the course and scope of their
employment. It may be liable for the tortuous acts of its officers even as regards that species of tort of
which malice is an essential element. A bank holding out its officers and agents as worthy of confidence
will not be permitted to profit by the frauds these officers or agents were enabled to perpetrate in the
apparent course of their employment; nor will it be permitted to shirk its responsibility for such frauds,
even though no benefit may accrue to the bank therefrom. For the general rule is that a bank is liable for
the fraudulent acts or representations of an officer or agent acting within the course and apparent scope of
his employment or authority. And if an officer or employee of a bank, in his official capacity, receives
money to satisfy an evidence of indebtedness lodged with his bank for collection, the bank is liable for his
misappropriation of such sum.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF SHALL REDUCE DAMAGES HE MAY RECOVER. Finally, we also
find that Ford is not completely blameless in its failure to detect the fraud. Failure on the part of the
depositor to examine its passbook, statements of account, and cancelled checks and to give notice within
a reasonable time (or as required by statute) of any discrepancy which it may in the exercise of due care
and diligence find therein, serves to mitigate the banks' liability by reducing the award of interest from
twelve percent (12%) to six percent (6%) per annum. As provided in Article 1172 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also
demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. In quasidelicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.

55.

Estacion v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 144723, 27 Feb 2006

Facts: Noe Bernardo boarded a Ford Fiera passenger jeep driven by respondent Geminiano Quinquillera,
owned by Cecilia Bandoquillo and was seated on the extension seat placed at the center of the Fiera. An
old woman wanted to ride, so Noe offered his seat. Since the Fiera was already full, Noe hung or stood on
the left rear carrier of the vehicle. The Fiera began to slow down and then stopped by the right shoulder of
the road to pick up passengers.
An Isuzu cargo truck, owned by Estacion and driven by Gerosano, which was traveling in the same
direction, hit the rear end portion of the Fiera where respondent Noe was standing. The cargo truck
smashed Noe against the Fiera crushing his legs and feet, which made him fall to the ground. A passing
vehicle brought him to the Silliman University Medical Center where his lower left leg was amputated.
Police investigation reports showed that Noe was one of the 11 passengers of the Fiera who suffered
injuries; that only 1 tire mark from the front right wheel of the cargo truck was seen on the road. The
sketch of the accident showed the relative positions of the two vehicles, their distances from the shoulder
of the road and the skid marks of the right front wheel of the truck measuring about 48 feet.

Noe filed a complaint for damages arising from quasi delict against Estacion as the registered owner of the
cargo truck and his driver Gerosano. It was alleged that the proximate cause of his injuries and suffering
was the reckless imprudence of Gerosano and Estacions negligence in the selection of a reckless driver
and for operating a vehicle that was not road-worthy.
Estacion and his driver Gerosano denied the allegations. They filed a third party complaint against the
owner and driver of the Fiera. It was alleged that it was the reckless imprudence of Fiera driver and his
clear violation of the traffic rules and regulations which was the proximate cause of the accident and asked
for indemnification.
Driver of the cargo truck, Gerosano, was charged criminally for reckless imprudence resulting to multiple
physical injuries with damage to property. MCTC found him guilty of the crime charged.
Trial court (in this case) ruled that Gerosanos gross negligence and reckless imprudence had been
confirmed by the Judgment in Criminal Case No. 463 and such negligence of Gerosano is the direct and
proximate cause of the incident and of the injuries suffered by respondent Noe.
It was also found that faulty breaks (only 1 tiremark) caused the truck to hit the Fiera. Also, tiremarks
showed that the truck had been driving fast. CA affirmed.
Issue: Who should be liable.
Held: ALL ARE GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE. The truck was running at a fast speed because if Gerosano was
really driving at a speed of 40 KPH and considering that the distance between the truck and the Fiera in
front was about 10 meters, he had more than enough time to slacken his speed and apply his break to
avoid hitting the Fiera. From the way the truck reacted to the application of the brakes, it showed that
Gerosano was driving at a fast speed because the brakes skidded a lengthy 48 feet as shown in the sketch
of police investigator of the tire marks visibly printed on the road. Photographs taken after the incident and
the testimony of Gerosano as to the extent of damage to the truck, i.e. the trucks windshield was broken
and its hood was damaged after the impact, further support the finding of both courts that Gerosano was
driving at a fast pace. Based on the sketch report, there was only one tire mark of the right tire of the
cargo truck during the incident which, as testified to by police investigator, meant that the brakes of the
truck were not aligned otherwise there would be two tire marks impressions on the road. Indeed, it is the
negligent act of petitioners driver of driving the cargo truck at a fast speed coupled with faulty brakes
which was the proximate cause of respondent Noes injury.
Gerosano admitted that his truck was at a distance of 10 meters prior to the impact. The distance between
the two vehicles was such that it would be impossible for Gerosano not to have seen that the Fiera had
pulled over to pick up passengers.
Also, Noes act of standing on the rear carrier of the Fiera exposing himself to bodily injury is in itself
negligence on his part. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as
a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to
conform for his own protection.
It has been established by the testimony of Noe that he was with 4 or 5 other persons standing on the rear
carrier of the Fiera since it was already full. Noes act of standing on the left rear carrier portion of the Fiera
showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger.
It has been held that to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to
health and body. Noes act of hanging on the Fiera is definitely dangerous to his life and limb.
Also, there was overloading which is in violation of traffic rules and regulations. Quinquillera should not
have taken more passengers than what the Fiera can accommodate. If the Fiera was not overloaded, Noe
would not have been standing on the rear carrier and sustained such extent of injury. Quinquillera was
negligent in allowing Noe to stand on the Fieras rear portion. Under the law, no driver shall allow any
person to ride on running board, step board, or mudguard.
Quinquilleras act of permitting Noe to hang on the rear portion of the Fiera in such a dangerous position
creates undue risk of harm to Noe. Quinquillera failed to observe that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance that the circumstances justly demand. Since respondent Quinquillera is negligent, there arises a
presumption of negligence on the part of his employer, respondent Bandoquillo, in supervising her
employees properly. Such presumption was not rebutted at all by Bandoquillo.

For the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort committed by his employee, an employer must
rebut the presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that in the selection and supervision
of his employee, he or she exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a family.
Case law teaches that for an employer to have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection of employees, he should not be satisfied with the applicants mere possession of a professional
drivers license; he must also carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his
experience and record of service. Petitioner failed to show that he examined driver Gerosano as to his
qualifications, experience and service records. The testimony of driver Gerosano in his cross-examination
showed the non-observance of these requirements.
Gerosano testified that petitioner was his first employer in Dumaguete and that he was accepted by
petitioner on the very day he applied for the job; that his drivers license was issued in Mindanao where he
came from and that while petitioner asked him about his driving record in Mindanao, he did not present
any document of his driving record. These clearly established that petitioner did not exercise due diligence
in the selection.
The fact that petitioners driver Gerosano was driving in an efficient manner when petitioner was with him
in his first two trips would not conclusively establish that Gerosano was not at all reckless. It could not be
considered as due diligence in the supervision of his driver to exempt petitioner from liability. In the
supervision of his driver, petitioner must show that he had formulated training programs and guidelines on
road safety for his driver which the records failed to show. Estacion failed to rebut the presumption of
negligence in the selection and supervision of his employees.
Furthermore, there was no proof that he exercised diligence in maintaining his cargo truck roadworthy and
in good operating condition. While Estacions mechanic driver testified that he made a routine check up
one day before the mishap happened, and found the truck operational, there was no record of such
inspection.
Since there was contributory negligence on the part of Noe, Estacions liability should be mitigated in
accordance to Art. 2179. The underlying precept of this article on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff
who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear
the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages
actually caused by his negligence.
The demands of substantial justice are satisfied by distributing the damages on a 20-80 ratio excluding
attorneys fees and litigation expenses. (based on the Phoenix Construction v. IAC case) Petitioner and
respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera are jointly and severally liable for the 80% of the damages as
well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses

Contributory Negligence

56.

Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf, 7 Phil 359

Facts:
Rakes, respondents employee, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbour to the
companys yard. At a certain spot near the waters edge, the track sagged, the car canted, the rails slid off
and caught Rakes. He was amputated at about the knee. Rakes claims that only one hand car was used in
his work. Atlantic has proved that there were two, so that the end of the rails lay upon sills secured to the
cars, but without side pieces to prevent them from slipping off.
Issue:
Whether there is contributory negligence on the part of petitioner
Held:
While Atlantic was negligent in failing to repair the bed of the track, Rakes was guilty of
contributory negligence in walking at the side instead of being in front or behind. The amount of
damages should be reduced.

57.

Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., 16 Phil. 8

Facts: The power plant of Manila Electric Railroad (MER) is situated at the eastern end of a small island in
Pasig River known as Isla del Provisor. Said power plant may be accessed by boat or by crossing a
footbridge. On one Sunday afternoon, David Taylor, 15 year old son of an MER engineer, who was more
mature than the average boy of his age, having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics, with 12
year old Manuel Claparols crossed said footbridge to visit an employee of MER.
Finding that said employee was not available, the boys, impelled by youthful curiosity, spent time
wandering about MERs premises. While walking across the premises, they found some 20-30 brass
fulminating caps (detonators for dynamite). They picked up all they could find and hung them on a stick
and carried them home. They met 9 year old girl named Jessie Adrian along the way.
They made a series of experiments with said caps (thrust the ends of the wires into electric sockets, tried
to break it with a stone, etc). They then opened one of them with a knife and saw yellowish substance
inside. As David held the cap, Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed
causing injuries to all 3 of them. Jessie, who started to run away as they were about to put a match on it
received a cut in the neck. Manuels hand was burned. David was struck in the face with several metal
particles one of which injured his right eye which had to be removed.
Davids father sued MER for damages resulting from negligence.
Issue: Whether MER can be held liable?
Held: NO. When the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff's own act, which
contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover damages for
the injury. Plaintiff, in an action for damages due to negligence, must establish by competent evidence the
ff: (1) damage incurred; (2) negligence by act or omission of which defendant or some person for whose
acts it must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the negligence and
the damage.
It is clear that the accident could not have happened had not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the
point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate
place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and
convenience, entered upon MERs premises, and strolled around thereon without the express permission of
the MER, and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its
premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its
contents.
The caps when found appeared to the boys who picked them up to have been lying there for a
considerable time, and from the place where they were found would seem to have been discarded as
defective or worthless and fit only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap. No measures seem to have been
adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its
premises unattended even if they were aware that children in their play crossed the footbridge to the
island.
Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are not
articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in the absence of all
evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery of 20-30 of these caps at the place where they were
found by the plaintiff on MERs premises fairly justifies the inference that MER was either the owner of the
caps in question or had these caps under its possession and control.
Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and impulses; and others who
are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate upon this, and take precautions
accordingly. If they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to
them, and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle
or play with, they should expect that liberty to be taken. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon
things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to
enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in
play, must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly.
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon MERs property without the latters express invitation
or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff,
without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of MER, we are of opinion
that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the MER in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not

attributable to the negligence of the defendant, and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiff's
action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its contents was the proximate cause of
the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the MER, therefore, is not
civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both
mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to
earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman 30 days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses
throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves
no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of
the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to
produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His
attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a
hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the
contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt
that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little
girl, 9 years of age, who was with him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap,
became frightened and ran away.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered
immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be made between the accident and
the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of
the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. Where he
contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in
conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the
defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent
for his own imprudence.
58.

PBCom v. CA, 269 SCRA 695

The negligence must be the proximate cause of the loss

FACTS:

Rommels Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current accounts with PBC in connection
with its business of selling appliances. The RMC General Manager Lipana entrusted to his secretary, Irene
Yabut, RMC funds amounting to P300,000+ for the purpose of depositing the same to RMCs account with
PBC. However, it turned out that Yabut deposited the amounts in her husbands account instead of RMC.
Lipana never checked his monthly statement of accounts regularly furnished by PBC so that Yabuts modus
operandi went on for the span of more than one year.
ISSUE:
What is the proximate cause of the loss Lipanas negligence in not checking his monthly statements or
the banks negligence through its teller in validating the deposit slips?
HELD:

The bank teller was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared
and presented by Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished
contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips,
original or duplicate.

The bank tellers negligence, as well as the negligence of the bank in the selection and supervision of its
bank teller, is the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, not the latters
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. Xxx Even if Yabut had the fraudulent intention to misappropriate
the funds, she would not have been able to deposit those funds in her husbands current account, and then
make plaintiff believe that it was in the latters accounts wherein she had deposited them, had it not been
for the bank tellers aforesaid gross and reckless negligence.

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. It means that the
antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening
negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair
chance, could have avoided the impending harm by exercise of due diligence. (Phil. Bank of Commerce v.
CA, supra)
59.

Lambert v. Heirs of Castillon, GR 160709, 23 Feb 2006

Facts:
Issue: Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident was due to Raynaldos negligence.
Held: YES. When Reynaldo Gamot was approaching the side road, he slightly veered to the right for his
allowance. Ray Castillon, who was following closely behind, instinctively veered to the left but it was also
the moment when Reynaldo Gamot sharply turned to the left towards the side road. At this juncture both
were moving obliquely to the left. Thus the motorcycle sliced into the side of the jeepney throwing the
driver forward so that his forehead hit the angle bar on the left front door of the jeepney even as the
motorcycle shot forward and the jeepney veered back to the right and sped away. This was also backed by
testimonies that Reynaldo did not even stop for a second nor check for any following vehicles before
turning left.
Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first establishing his right of way, was the
proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. Proximate cause is defined
as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is
traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for, as the trial court correctly held, without that left turn
executed with no precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened.
Lambert relies on the courts ruling in Raynera v. Hiceta. However the same is misplaced. That case also
involved a motorcycle crashing into the left rear portion of another vehicle, and we declared therein that
drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the
accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. In Raynera, the death of the victim was solely
attributable to his own negligence in bumping the rear of the
Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother and borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his friend
Sergio and went to a roadtrip around Iligan City with Ray as the driver and Sergio as the backrider.
After having supper and imbibing a bottle of beer, they traversed the highway towards Tambo at a high
speed. However, upon reaching Brgy. Sto. Nino, they figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney owned
by Lambert and driven by Reynaldo. Apparently, the jeepney was travelling in the same direction but made
a sudden left turn. The incident resulted in the death of Ray Castillon and injuries to Sergio.

The trial court and the CA ruled in favor of Castillon, ruling that the proximate cause of the accident was
due to the negligence of Reynaldo.
trailer truck which was traveling ahead of him at 20 to 30 KPH. Raynera, being the driver of the rear
vehicle, had full control of the situation as he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. The
trailer truck therein did not make a sudden left turn as in the case at bar.

Thus, the theory that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the
cause of the accident. However, in this case, the same has been sufficiently contradicted by evidence,
which is the sudden left turn made by Reynaldo which proximately caused the collision.
Castillon is also guilty of contributory negligence but only serves as a mitigation of the damages awarded.
It was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2)
was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a
protective helmet. These circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his demise and
injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result.
60.

Estacion v. Bernardo, GR. 144723, 27 Feb 2006.

#55

61.

PNR v. Brunty, G.R. No. 169891, 2 Nov. 2006

Facts: Rhonda Brunty, Garcia, and Mercelita (the driver) were riding in a Mercedes Benz sedan en route to
Baguio. A PNR Train driven by Alfonso Reyes was also departing from La Union station.
At 2PM, Mercelita et al. were already approaching the railroad crossing at Barangay Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac.
Mercelita was driving at approximately 70 KPH and drove past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad track up
ahead. Eventually the sedan collided with the train, instantly killing Mercelita and gravely injuring Rhonda
and Garcia. Rhonda Brunty died thereafter.
Ethel Brunty (herein respondent) demanded for damages against PNR but the same remained unheeded.
Hence she filed a complaint, alleging that the death of Rhonda, Mercelita and Garica were the direct and
proximate result of the gross and reckless negligence of PNR in not providing the necessary equipment at
the railroad in Tarlac. They pointed out that there was no flagbar or red light signal to warn motorists who
were about to cross the railroad track, and that the flagman or switchman was only equipped with a hand
flashlight. They also aver the negligence of PNR in supervising its employees, particularly the driver and
operator of the train.
PNR meanwhile claims that it had the right of way on the railroad crossing in question, and that it has no
legal duty to put up a bar or red light signal in any such crossing. It insisted that there were adequate,
visible, and clear warning signs strategically posted on the sides of the road before the railroad crossing. It
countered that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was Mercelitas negligence, and that he
had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. The driver disregarded the warning signs, the whistle
blasts of the oncoming train and the flashlight signals to stop given by the guard.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the accident was due to Mercelitas negligence. (2) Whether Mercelita was guilty
of contributory negligence.(3) Whether last clear chance is applicable
Held: PNR IS NEGLIGENT. MERCELITA GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
It was clearly established that respondents sustained damage or injury as a result of the collision. PNRs
negligence is likewise beyond cavil. Considering the circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatal
accident, the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing is not only inadequate
but does not satisfy well-settled safety standards in transportation.
An examination of the photographs of the railroad crossing at Moncada, Tarlac presented as evidence by
PNR itself would yield the following: (1) absence of flagbars or safety railroad bars; (2) inadequacy of the
installed warning signals; and (3) lack of proper lighting within the area. Thus, even if there was a flagman
stationed at the site as claimed by PNR, it would still be impossible to know or see that there is a railroad
crossing/tracks ahead, or that there is an approaching train from the Moncada side of the road since ones
view would be blocked by a cockpit arena. A vehicle coming from the Moncada side would have difficulty in
knowing that there is an approaching train because of the slight curve, more so, at an unholy hour as 2AM.
Thus, it is imperative on the part of the PNR to provide adequate safety equipment in the area.
It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable
degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both in
the operation of trains and in the maintenance of the crossings. The Court has previously determined the
liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or
semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there
is no law or ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said device or equipment be

installed.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection. To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an
act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and
body.To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not
proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is
contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its
occurrence.
It is established that there was a slight curve before approaching the tracks, the place was not properly
illuminated, ones view was blocked by a cockpit arena, and Mercelita was not familiar with the road.
Despite all that, it was found that Mercelita was then driving the Benz at a speed of 70 KPH and, in fact,
had overtaken a vehicle a few yards before reaching the railroad track. Mercelita should not have driven
the car the way he did. However, while his acts contributed to the collision, they nevertheless do not
negate PNR liability (which according to the court, it was bereft of any allegation and proof as to the
relationship between Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty. Hence, the finding of contributory negligence on the
part of Mercelita, which generally has the effect of mitigation of liability, does not apply).
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply. The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both
parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the
antecedent negligence of plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the
supervening negligence of defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the
exercise of due diligence. The proximate cause of the injury having been established to be the negligence
of PNR, the above doctrine finds no application in the instant case.
iii. Assumption of Risk (Article 1174)
62. Afialda v. Hisole, 85 Phil. 67
Facts: This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal. The complaint alleges that
the now deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by the Spouses Hisole as caretaker of their carabaos at a
fixed compensation; that while tending the animals, he was gored by one of them and later died as a
consequence of his injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force majeure; and
that Afialda is his elder sister and heir depending upon him for support.
Plaintiff seeks to hold Spouses liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code, which reads:

The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should esca

This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suff

Spouses were absolved by the lower court because above provision was interpreted to mean that the
owner of the animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger and that for damage to the
caretaker, the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault.
Issue: Whether the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is caused to its caretaker.
Held: NOT LIABLE. Claiming that the lower court was in error, Afialdas counsel contends that the article
1905 does not distinguish between damage caused to the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether
or not he has been negligent or at fault. This opinion, however, appears to have been rendered in a case
where an animal caused injury to a stranger or third person. It is therefore no authority for a case like the
present where the person injured was the caretaker of the animal.
The distinction is important. For the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable
for any damages it may cause, and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody

and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.
Here, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such.
Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to
anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the
RISKS OF THE OCCUPATION which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences.
In a decision of the Spanish SC, the death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had
asked him to take to his establishment was by said tribunal declared to be a veritable accident of labor
(Manresa) which should come under the labor laws rather than under article 1905 CC.
The present action, however, is not brought under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there being no
allegation that, among other things, Spouses business, whatever that might be, had a gross income of
P20,000. As already stated, Spouses liability is made to rest on article 1905 CC. But action under that
article is not tenable for the reasons already stated. On the other hand, if action is to be based on article
1902 of the Civil Code, it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of the Spouses as owners
of the animal that caused the damage. But, the complaint contains no allegation on those points.

63. Transporto v. Mijares

Page 239
64. Ilocos Norte Electric v. CA, 179 SCRA 5
Facts: In the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon by the code
name Gening buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte. After the typhoon had abated and when the
floodwaters were beginning to recede, the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, ventured out of the house of her son
in-law, Antonio Yabes and proceeded towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was
the owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that might have been damaged. Wading
in waist-deep flood, the deceased was followed by Aida Bulong and by Linda. Aida and Linda walked side
by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased. Suddenly, the deceased screamed
Ay and quickly sank into the water. The 2 girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing
so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and
moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the
house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at 4 meters away from her he turned back
shouting that the water was grounded.
When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother- in-law had been electrocuted, he acted
immediately. He passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the people of Ilocos Norte
Electric Company (INELCO) to cut off the electric current. The floodwater was receding and the lights inside
the house were out indicating that the electric current had been cut off. Yabes instructed his boys to fish
for the body of the deceased. The body was recovered about 2 meters from an electric post.
About 4A.M. on that fateful date, Power Plant Engineer of the NPC at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant,
noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or
short-circuited lines. He decided to make an inspection. On the way, he saw grounded and disconnected
lines. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. Since he could not see any INELCO lineman,
he decided to go to the INELCO Office which was still closed. As he turned right at the intersection of
Guerrero and Rizal, he saw an electric wire about 30 meters long strung across the street and the other
end seemed to play with the current of the water.
Having learned of the death of Isabel Lao Juan, he passed by the house of the deceased to which the body
had been taken. Using the resuscitator, he tried to revive the deceased. His efforts proved futile. Rigor
mortis was setting in. On the left palm of the deceased, Engr. Juan noticed a hollow wound.
Proceeding to the INELCO office, he met 2 linemen. He told them about the grounded lines of the INELCO.
He went on a 3rd inspection trip preparatory to the restoration of power. The dangling wire he saw was no
longer there.
Upon the request of the relatives of the deceased, Dr. Castro examined the body. He found that the skin
was grayish or, in medical parlance, cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On the left palm, the

doctor found an electrically charged wound or a first degree burn. The certificate of death prepared by
Dr. Castro stated the cause of death as circulatory shock electrocution
Defendant presented the testimonies of its officers and employees and sought to prove that on and even
before June 29, 1967 the electric service system of the INELCO did not suffer from any defect that might
constitute a hazard to life and property. The service lines, devices and other INELCO equipment in Area No.
9 had been newly-installed prior to the date in question. Defendant had installed safety devices; had 12
lines-men charged with the duty of making a round-the- clock check-up. It claimed that although a strong
typhoon struck the province of Ilocos Norte putting to streets of Laoag City under water, only a few known
places in Laoag were reported to have suffered damaged electric lines.
Fabico Abijero testified that in the early morning before 6 am on June 29, 1967, he did not see any cut or
broken wires in or near the vicinity. What he saw were many people fishing out the body of Isabel Lao Juan.
A witness in the person of Dr. Antonio Briones was presented by the defense to show that the deceased
could not have died of electrocution. Without an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, no doctor, not even
a medicolegal expert, can speculate as to the real cause of death. Cyanosis could not have been found in
the body of the deceased 3 hours after her death, because cyanosis, which means lack of oxygen
circulating in the blood and rendering the color of the skin purplish, appears only in a live person. The
presence of the elongated burn in the left palm of the deceased is not sufficient to establish her death by
electrocution; since burns caused by electricity are more or less round in shape and with points of entry
and exit. Had the deceased held the lethal wire for a long time, the laceration in her palm would have been
bigger and the injury more massive.
An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased. In INELCOs Answer, they raised as a
special defense that the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to
negligence attributable only to herself and not to INELCO. The deceased, without INELCOs knowledge,
caused the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate
and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on.
INELCO then conjectures that the switch to said burglar deterrent must have been left on, hence, causing
the deceaseds electrocution when she tried to open her gate
CFI found the facts in favor of INELCO and dismissed the complaint but awarded moral damages and
attorneys fees
Issue: (1) Whether deceased died of electrocution.
(2) Whether INELCO may be held liable for the death.
Held: (1) YES. It was shown that the deceased died of electrocution, derived from the photographed burnt
wounds on the left palm. Such wounds undoubtedly point to the fact that the deceased had clutched a live
wire of the INELCO. This was corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Jovencio Castro who actually examined
the body of the deceased a few hours after the death and described the said burnt wounds as a first
degree burn and electrically charged.
Witnesses Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong added that after the deceased screamed Ay and sank
into the water, they tried to render some help but were overcome with fear by the sight of an electric wire
dangling moving in the water in a snake-like fashion. The nature of the wounds as described by the
witnesses who saw them can lead to no other conclusion than that they were burns, and there was
nothing else in the street where the victim was wading thru which could cause a burn
To escape liability, INELCO ventures into the theory that the deceased was electrocuted, if such was really
the case, when she tried to open her steel gate, which was electrically charged by an electric wire she
herself caused to install to serve as a burglar deterrent. Such is mere speculation, not backed up with
evidence. each party must prove his own affirmative allegations. In fact, during the trial, this theory
was abandoned by the INELCO.
(2) While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held
responsible, it was not the said eventuality which directly caused the victims death. It was through the
intervention of INELCOs negligence that death took place. Defendant called to the witness-stand its
electrical engineer, chief lineman, and lineman to show exercise of extraordinary diligence and to negate
the charge of negligence. The witnesses testified in a general way about their duties and the measures
which defendant usually adopts to prevent hazards to life and limb. Lower court found that the electric
lines and other equipment of INELCO were properly maintained.
The finding of the lower court, however, was based on what the INELCOs employees were supposed to do,
not on what they actually did or failed to do on the date in question, and not on the occasion of the

emergency situation brought about by the typhoon. The lower court made a mistake in assuming that
INELCOs employees worked around the clock during the occurrence of the typhoon. Engr. Antonio Juan of
the NPC affirmed that when he first set out on an inspection trip, he saw grounded and disconnected
electric lines of the defendant but he saw no INELCO lineman. The INELCO Office at the Life theatre on
Rizal Street was still closed. Conrado Asis, electrical engineer, testified that he conducted a general
inspection of the franchise area of the INELCO only on June 30, 1967, the day following the typhoon. The
reason he gave for the delay was that all their vehicles were submerged.
In times of calamities, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to
prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that
INELCO did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men policing the area, nor even
manning its office.
Under the circumstances of the case, INELCO was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the
general public considering that the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate
with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends
to every place where persons have a right to be.
The negligence of INELCO having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that
the victims death was solely due to a fortuitous event. When an act of God combines or concurs with the
negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have
resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission.
INELCO claims that the CA gravely abused its discretion and erred in not applying the legal principle of
assumption of risk in the present case to bar private respondents from collecting damages from INELCO.
The maxim volenti non fit injuria (to a willing person, injury is not done) relied upon by INELCO finds no
application.
It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts
of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified, the deceased, accompanied by Aida and Linda,
were on their way to the latters grocery store to see to it that the goods were not flooded. As such,
shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her
the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been
held that a person is EXCUSED from the force of the rule that when he voluntarily assents to a known
danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of
another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand
as the deceaseds property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the
deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without
regard to INELCOs consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private
respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by
INELCOs negligence.

65. Co v. CA, 291 SCRA 111.

iv. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
65. Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809
Facts: Picart was riding his pony over the Carlatan bridge in La Union (75 m x 4.8m). However, he was on
the wrong side. Before he had gotten half way across, the Smith approached from the opposite direction in
an automobile, going at the rate of about 10-12 MPH. As Smith approached the bridge, he blew his horn
when he saw Picart. Observing that Picart was not observing the rules of the road, Smith gave 2 more
successive blasts. Perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or rapidity of the approach, Picart moved his
horse closer to the railing instead of going to the correct side of the road (which is the left side). Picart did
this as he thought he had no more time to reach the left side. Smith also guided his car toward the same
side where Picarts horse was. At this point, Smith and Picart are in a direct collision course. In so doing,
Smith assumed that the horseman would move to the other side.
However, since the Pony had not exhibited fright and the fact that Picart made no motion to stop, instead
of veering away, Smith continued to approach directly towards Picart without diminution of speed. As he
got closer, the possibility of the horse moving to the other side also grew slim. As a result, Smith guided
his car to the right to avoid hitting the horse. However, as the car passed, the pony became frightened and
turned its body. Consequently, the car struck the left hind leg of the horse. As the horse fell, the rider was
thrown off. The horse died as a result and Picart suffered some contusions and temporary

unconsciousness. It was seen that the space between the horse and the car at the time of the incident was
less than 1.5 meters.
Issue: Whether or not Smith (driver) is guilty of negligence.
Held: YES. While Smith had the right to assume that Picart would pass over the proper side of the bridge,
when this eventuality had become an impossibility, it became Smiths duty to either bring his car to an
immediate stop or, seeing there were no other people on the bridge, take the other side and pass
sufficiently far away from the horseman. Instead, Smith ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse.
He did not take into consideration the fact that there was an appreciable risk with regard to the fact that
the pony might get excited and/or frightened.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in
the same situation? If not, he is guilty of negligence.

The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course
be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular
case. Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to
them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to
take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.
In the present case, having recognized that the course he was pursuing was fraught with risk and would,
therefore, have foreseen harm to Picart as a reasonable consequence of that course. Under said
circumstances, the imposed on Smith the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
While Picart was also not free from fault for being on the wrong side of the road, the negligent acts of the
two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the Smith succeeded the negligence of the
Picart by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances, the law is that the person who has the last
fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

66. Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 398.

Facts: Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from defendant, damages, funeral expenses and attorneys fees for
the death of their son, Dominador Ong, in one of the swimming pools of the latter. After trial, the CFI
dismissed the complaint for it found the action of the plaintiffs-appellants untenable.
Issues: (1) WON plaintiffs have clearly established the fault/negligence of the defendants so as to make it
liable for the damages sought; (2) WON the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bench.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed.
(1) The person/s claiming damages has/have the burden of proving that the damages is caused by the
fault/negligence of the person from whom the damages is claimed. Plaintiffs failed to overcome the
burden. Defendant employed 6 well-trained lifeguards, male nurse, sanitary inspector and security guards
to avoid danger to the lives of their patrons. The swimming pools are provided with ring buoy, tag roof and
towing line. Also, conspicuously displayed in the pool area the rules and regulations for pool use. In that, it
appears that defendant has taken all the necessary precautions to avoid/prevent danger/accidents which
may cause injury to or even death of its patrons.
(2) The Doctrine of last Clear Chance means that, a person who has the last clear chance to avoid the
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident. Since minor Ong has went to the big swimming pool w/o any companion in
violation of the rules and regulations of the defendant as regards the use of pools, and it appearing that
the lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it, applying all efforts into
play in order to bring minor Ong back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the
Doctrine to impute liability to appellee. Minor Ongs fault/negligence is the proximate and only cause of his
death.

67. PLDT v. CA, 178 SCRA 94

Facts:
A jeep driven by private respondent Esteban fell into an open trench, the excavation was due to the
installation of an underground conduit system by PLDT, the said open trench was without cover and any
warning signs.
As a result the private respondent and his wife sustained injuries, and their vehicle was also damaged.
PLDT in its defense, imputes the injuries to the private respondents own negligence. Also, it alleges that
L.R. Barte and company acting as an independent contractor, should be responsible for the excavation
was performed by them.
As for Barte, they alleged that they have complied with the due standards in performing their work, and
that it was not aware of the accident involving the Estebans.
Court of Appeals held that respondent Esteban spouses were negligent and consequently absolved
petitioner PLDT from the claim for damages.
Upon respondents second motion to reconsideration, CA reversed its decision, following he decision of
Trial Court and held PLDT liable for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not PLDT is liable
Held:
NO
We find no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original decision that the accident which
befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not
imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of
said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private
respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these
excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden
swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the
omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes
the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. It is
basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise
due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one should
exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio
Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he
imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and
had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed
him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.

68. Raynera v. Hiceta, G.R. No. 120027 (April 21, 1999)

Raynera v Hiceta (Torts)
RAYNERA V HICETA [G.R. No. 120027. April 21, 1999.] EDNA A. RAYNERA, for herself and on behalf of the
minors RIANNA and REIANNE RAYNERA, petitioners, vs. FREDDIE HICETA and JIMMY ORPILLA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners herein are heirs of Reynaldo Raynera who was killed by an accident on his way home at about
2:00 A.M. Respondents, Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla were owner and driver, respectively, of an Isuzu
truck trailer which was involved in the said accident. On March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the morning,
Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home. He was riding a motorcycle traveling on the southbound lane of
East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. The Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers
per hour. 4 The truck was loaded with two (2) metal sheets extended on both sides, two (2) feet on the left
and three (3) feet on the right. There were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts each, on both sides of
the metal plates. 5 The asphalt road was not well lighted. At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera
crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail lights. Due to
the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Geraldino D. Lucelo 6 rushed him to the
Paraaque Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the attending physician, Dr. Marivic Aguirre, 7
pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead on arrival.
At time of his death, Reynaldo was manager of the Engineering Department, Kawasaki Motors (Phils.)
Corporation. The heirs of the deceased demanded from respondents' payment of damages arising from the
death of Reynaldo as a result of the vehicular accident. The respondents refused to pay the claims.
Petitioners, hence, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila a complaint for damages against respondents'
owner and driver of the Isuzu truck. Petitioners sought recovery of the damages caused by the negligent

operation of the truck- trailer at nighttime on the highway, without tail the lights.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The trial court held that respondents' negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of the victim's death. The trial court also applied the doctrine of
contributory negligence and reduced the responsibility of respondents by 20%.
(2) Court of Appeals: held that the victim's bumping into the left rear portion of the truck was the
proximate cause of his death, and consequently, absolved respondents from liability.
ISSUE:
Whether the truck is responsible for the accident
RULING: No.
Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents' truck was visible in the highway. It was
traveling at a moderate speed, approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. It used the service road,
instead of the highway, because the cargo they were hauling posed a danger to passing motorists. In
compliance with the Land Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act No. 4136)" 25 respondents installed 2
pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as the vehicle's cargo load extended beyond the bed or body
thereof.
DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE; THE DRIVERS OF THE VEHICLES "WHO BUMP THE REAR OF ANOTHER
VEHICLE" ARE PRESUMED TO BE THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, UNLESS CONTRADICTED BY OTHER
EVIDENCE; CASE AT BAR. It has been said that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear of another
vehicle" are presumed to be "the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence." The
rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he
is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
responsibility to avoid the collision with the front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle.
Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim himself since he was the one who bumped his
motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident.
He was traversing the service road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway.

69. Phoenix Construction v. IAC, 148 SCRA 353.

#53
v. Prescription (Article 1146)
71. Kramer v. CA, 178 SCRA 518
Facts: In the early morning of April 8, 1976, a fishing boat (owned by Kramer) figured in a collision (en
route from Marinduque to Manila) with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private
respondent Trans- Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.
The F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch.
After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Board of
Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard.
The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of determining the proximate cause. On October 19,
1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to the
negligence of the employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during
the collision. The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a subsequent Decision of the
Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia
Philippines was suspended.
On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent.
Issue: Whether or not a Complaint for damages instituted by Kramer against TransAsia arising from a
marine collision barred by statute of limitation.
Held: BARRED. The TransAsia filed a Motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of
prescription. He argued that under Article 1146, the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for
damages arising from a quasi- delict like a maritime collision is 4 years. He maintained that the Kramer
should have filed their Complaint within 4

72. Spouses Santos v. Pizardo, G.R. No. 151452, 29 Jul 2005

Facts: In an Information dated 25 April 1994, Sibayan was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries. The Viron Transit Bus driven by Sibayan collided with a
Lite Ace, killing the driver and 3 passengers thereof. 5 passengers were injured. He was convicted and
sentenced to 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. However, a separate civil action was
reserved; no civil liability was pronounced.
On October 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit, and its
President/Chairman pursuant to their reservation. Viron moved to dismiss on the ground of improper
service of summons, prescription, laches, and defective certification of non-forum-shopping.
Petitioners opposed as the right to file a separate action prescribes in 10 years. The RTC dismissed, as
actions based on quasi-delict prescribes in 4 years, notwithstanding the reservation. The CA dismissed
their petition for Certiorari for being the wrong mode of appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the cause of action has prescribed.
Held: NO. Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. Such civil liability may consist of restitution, reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of
consequential damages. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability arising from the offense is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to 3 notable exceptions: FIRST, when the injured party
expressly waives the right to recover damages from the accused; SECOND, when the offended party
reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in a separate action in order to take full control
and direction of the prosecution of his cause; and THIRD, when the injured party actually exercises the
right to maintain a private suit against the offender by instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the
criminal case.
Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988, which governed the institution
of the criminal action, as well as the reservation of the right to file a separate civil action. Petitioners
expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime committed
by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the MTC, in its decision convicting Sibayan, did not make any
pronouncement as to the latters civil liability.
Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and their reservation to file a separate civil action
made in the criminal case, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman. Petitioners assert that by the institution of the complaint, they seek to recover private
respondents civil liability arising
from crime. Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the allegations in the complaint, the trial court
dismissed the same, declaring that petitioners cause of action was based on quasi delict and should have
been brought within 4 years from the time the cause of action accrued, i.e., from the time of the accident.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with petitioners claim that
the action was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of
negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were
pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint,
the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended
party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal
Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of
the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 RPC; and (2) independent civil liabilities,
such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana
under Article 2176; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and
distinct from the criminal action under Article 33. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the
offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery under the
Rules above-quoted.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had
already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their

reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action
ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime
especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the
subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer
becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the
employees. This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to
obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final
judgment convicting the employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, but
instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering
petitioners allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil liability arising from
crime.
This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil action waives the other
civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants
arising out of the same act or omission of the offender. However, since the stale action for damages based
on quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits
against private respondents as the only recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This
interpretation is also consistent with the bar against double recovery for obvious reasons.
The case is REMANDED.
73. De Guzman v. Toyota Cubao, G.R. No. 141480, 29 Nov. 2006

FACTS:

On November 27, 1997, petitioner purchased from respondent a brand new white Toyota Hi-Lux 2.4 SS
double cab motor vehicle, 1996 model, in the amount of P508,000. Petitioner made a down payment of
P152,400, leaving a balance of P355,600 which was payable in 36 months with 54% interest. The vehicle
was delivered to petitioner two days later. On October 18, 1998, petitioner demanded the replacement of
the engine of the vehicle because it developed a crack after traversing Marcos Highway during a heavy
rain. Petitioner asserted that respondent should replace the engine with a new one based on an implied
warranty. Respondent countered that the alleged damage on the engine was not covered by a warranty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an implied warranty.

FACTS:

Under Article 1599 of the Civil Code, once an express warranty is breached, the buyer can accept or keep
the goods and maintain an action against the seller for damages. In the absence of an existing express
warranty on the part of the respondent, as in this case, the allegations in petitioner's complaint for
damages were clearly anchored on the enforcement of an implied warranty against hidden defects, i.e.,
that the engine of the vehicle which respondent had sold to him was not defective. By filing this case,
petitioner wants to hold respondent responsible for breach of implied warranty for having sold a vehicle
with defective engine. Such being the case, petitioner should have exercised this right within six months
from the delivery of the thing sold.[7] Since petitioner filed the complaint on April 20, 1999, or more than
nineteen months counted from November 29, 1997 (the date of the delivery of the motor vehicle), his
cause of action had become time-barred.

Petitioner contends that the subject motor vehicle comes within the context of Republic Act No. 7394.
Thus, petitioner relies on Article 68 (f) (2) in relation to Article 169 of Republic Act No. 7394. Article 4 (q) of
the said law defines "consumer products and services" as goods, services and credits, debts or obligations
which are primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes, which shall include, but not
limited to, food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices. The following provisions of Republic Act No. 7394 state:

Art. 67. Applicable Law on Warranties. The provisions of the Civil Code on conditions and warranties
shall govern all contracts of sale with conditions and warranties.

Art. 68. Additional Provisions on Warranties. In addition to the Civil Code provisions on sale with
warranties, the following provisions shall govern the sale of consumer products with warranty:

e) Duration of warranty. The seller and the consumer may stipulate the period within which the express
warranty shall be enforceable. If the implied warranty on merchantability accompanies an express
warranty, both will be of equal duration.

Any other implied warranty shall endure not less than sixty (60) days nor more than one (1) year following
the sale of new consumer products.

f) Breach of warranties xxx

xxx

2) In case of breach of implied warranty, the consumer may retain in the goods and recover damages, or
reject the goods, cancel the contract and recover from the seller so much of the purchase price as has
been paid, including damages. (Emphasis supplied.)

Consequently, even if the complaint is made to fall under the Republic Act No. 7394, the same should still
be dismissed since the prescriptive period for implied warranty thereunder, which is one year, had likewise
lapsed.

vi. Force Majeur / Fortuitous Event (Article 1174)

74. Gotesco Investment Corp. v. Chatto, 210 SCRA 18.
Facts: In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, Lina went to see the
movie Mother Dear at Superama I theater, owned by Gotesco Investment Corporation. Hardly 10 minutes
after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. Pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt,
Chattos managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. They walked to the nearby FEU Hospital where they
were confined and treated for 1 day and subsequently transferred to the UST hospital. Due to continuing
pain in the neck, headache, and dizziness, plaintiff went toUSA in July 1982 for further treatment. She
stayed in the U.S. for about 3 months during which time she had to return to the Cook County Hospital 5 or
6 times.
Gtesco tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to
force majeure. Gotesco maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction
defect.
During the trial, Mr. Ong, employee of Gotesco, testified that he personally inspected the buildings
whenever he could (but did not give specific dates). He also testified that an investigation was conducted.
However, there were no results with respect to said investigation in connection to the cause of the
collapsed. He literally could not give any specific reason therefor. (PROBABLY DUE TO THE FACT THAT HE
WASN
Trial Court ruled in favor of the Chattos. CA affirmed. CA held: The lower court did not also err in its
finding that the collapse of the ceiling of the theaters balcony was due to construction defects and not to
force majeure. It was the burden of defendant-appellant to prove that its theater did not suffer from any
structural defect when it was built and that it has been well maintained when the incident occurred.
Considering the collapse of the ceiling of its theaters balcony barely 4 years after its construction, it
behooved defendant-appellant to conduct an exhaustive study of the reason for the tragic incident. There
was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and structural engineers on the cause of the
collapse of the theaters ceiling. Jesus Lim Ong is not an engineer. He is a graduate of architecture from the
St. Louie (sic) University in Baguio City. It does not appear he has passed the government examination for
architects. The ignorance of Mr. Ong about the cause of the collapse of the ceiling of their theater cannot
be equated as an act of God. To sustain that proposition is to introduce sacrilege in our jurisprudence.
Issue: Whether or not the incident was due to force majeure.
Held: NO. Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed
caused by force majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong could not offer any
explanation does not imply force majeure.
Gotesco could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. The
real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the
investigation or that he is, as the CA impliedly held, incompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect
who had not even passed the governments examination.
Verily, the post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings. What is
significant is the finding that the collapse was due to CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS. There was no evidence
offered to overturn this finding. The building was constructed barely 4 years prior to the accident in
question. It was not shown that any of the causes denominated as force majeure obtained immediately
before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only
Gotesco exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the
testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident.
His answers to the leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said inspection nor
the nature and extent of the same. That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly
approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued DO NOT
AT ALL PROVE that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering
that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all.
IMPLIED WARRANTY has given rise to the rule that: Where a patron of a theater or other place of public
amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have
happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference
of negligence on the part of the defendant.

That presumption or inference was not overcome by the Gotesco. Even assuming for the sake of argument
that, the cause of the collapse was due to force majeure, Gotesco would STILL BE LIABLE because it was
guilty of negligence, which the trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouviers definition of
and Cockburns elucidation on force majeure, for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must
have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence.
75. Servando v. Phil. Steam, 117 SCRA 832
Facts:
Servando & Bico loaded on board Phil. Steam Navigations vessel for carriage several cavans of rice and
cartons of
colored paper, toys and general merchandise. A bill of lading was issued by PSN which contained a
peculiar
stipulation:
Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless
such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage
caused by force majeure, dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters; war; public enemies; . . . fire.
Upon arrival, the cargoes were discharged in good order unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs.
However, on the same day, the warehouse was razed by a fire, destroying Servandos cargoes. Bico was
able to take delivery of a
certain portion of his goods. Their claim for the value of said goods were rejected by the PSN.
The lower court ruled in favor of Servando & Bico, holding that the delivery of the shipment in question to
the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736 which imposes
upon common carriers the duty to observe extraordinary diligence from the moment the goods are
unconditionally placed in their possession "until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the
carrier to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them. Moreover, since the burning of
the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of
the goods to the Servando & Bico, the loss is chargeable against the PSN.
Issue: Whether PSN is liable for the loss.
Held: NO. The court upheld the validity of the contractual stipulation. Servandos contention that the same
did not bind them since it was printed in fine letters on the back of the bills of lading and was not signed
does not persuade.
Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events
which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
The agreement contained in the above quoted Clause 14 is a mere iteration of the basic principle of law
written in Article
1174 of the Civil Code:
Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the
obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance. The Partidas, the antecedent of Article 1174 of the
Civil Code, defines 'CASO FORTUITO' as 'an event that takes place by accident and could not have been
foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers.
There is nothing in the record to show that PSN incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation. It
appears that PSN had not only notified Servando of the arrival of their shipment, but had demanded that
the same be withdrawn. In fact,
pursuant to such demand, Uy Bico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the

warehouse.
Nor can the PSN or its employees be charged with negligence. The storage of the goods in the Customs
warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by Servando was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and
consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government, it would be unfair to
impute negligence to the appellant, the latter
having no control whatsoever over the same.
Caso fortuito in the Enciclopedia Juridicada Espanola 'caso fortuito' presents the following essential characteristics:
In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a
(1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with
his obligation, must be independent of the human will;
(2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be foreseen,
it must be impossible to avoid;
(3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner; and
(4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the
creditor."
In the case at bar, the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened
independently of the will of the PSN. The latter could not have foreseen the event.
The lower court relied in the ruling of Yu Biao Sontua v. Ossorio wherein in that case, the defendant was
held liable for damages arising from a fire caused by the negligence of the defendants employees. Unlike
in this case, there is no shred of proof to prove that the fire that broke out was attributable to the
negligence of PSNs employees.
76. Yobido v. CA, 281 SCRA 1.
FACTS:
On April 26, 1988, spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children, Ardee and Jasmin, boarded at
Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur, a Yobido bus bound for Davao City. Along Picop road in Km. 17, Sta. Maria,
Agusan del Sur, the left front tire of the bus suddenly exploded. The bus fell into a ravine around three (3)
feet from the road and struck a tree which resulted in the death of Tito Tumboy and physical injuries to
other passengers. Thereafter, a complaint for breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorney's fees
was filed by Leny and her children against Alberta Yobido, the owner of the bus, and Cresencio Yobido, its
driver in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.

Defenses:
Abundio Salce, who was the bus conductor when the incident happened, testified that 1. the 42-seater bus
was not full as there were only 32 passengers, such that he himself managed to get a seat;
2. the bus was running at a speed of "60 to 50" and that it was going slow because of the zigzag road.
3. the left front tire that exploded was a "brand new tire" that he mounted on the bus on April 21, 1988 or
only five (5) days before the incident.

DECISION:

(1) Trial Court: dismissing the action for lack of merit

(2) Court of Appeals: rendered a decision reversing that of the lower court

ISSUE:
Whether the tire blow-out is a fortuitous event

RULING:
No.

A fortuitous event is possessed of the following characteristics:

(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his
obligations must be independent of human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it
must be impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner; and
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.

As Article 1174 provides, no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen,
or which, though foreseen was inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire exclusion of human
agency from the cause of injury or loss.

There is no reason to overturn the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. Petitioners' contention
that they are exempted from liability because the tire blowout was a fortuitous event that could not have
been foreseen, must fail. It is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or
through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability for
damages. Accordingly, the challenged decision is affirmed subject to modification that petitioners shall
additionally pay herein, respondents P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The explosion of the new tire may not be considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved
in the situation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing
defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used
in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode
within five days' use. Be that as it may, it is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the
automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from
liability for damages.

It was incumbent upon the defense to establish that it took precautionary measures considering partially
dangerous condition of the road. As stated above, proof that the tire was new and of good quality is not
sufficient proof that it was not negligent. Petitioners should have shown that it undertook extraordinary
diligence in the care of its carrier such as conducting daily routinary check-ups of the vehicle's parts. As
the late Justice J.B.L. Reyes said: "It may be impracticable, as appellee argues, to require of carriers to test
the strength of each and every part of its vehicles before each trip, but we are of the opinion that a due
regard for the carrier's obligations toward the traveling public demands adequate periodical tests to

determine the condition and strength of those vehicle portions the failure of which may endanger the
safety of the passengers."
It is interesting to note that petitioners proved through the bus conductor, Salce, that the bus was running
at "60-50" kilometers per hour only within the prescribed lawful speed limit. However, they failed to rebut
the testimony of Leny Tumboy that the bus was running so fast that she cautioned the driver to slow down.
These contradictory facts must, therefore, be resolved in favor of liability in view of the presumption of
negligence of the carrier in the law.

vii. Diligence (Article 2180, last paragraph)

77. Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 398.
#67
78. Dulay v. CA, G.R. No. 108017 (April 3, 1995).

FACTS:
December 7, 1988: Due to a heated argument, Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at Big Bang
Sa Alabang carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay
Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor
children filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela for wanton and reckless discharge of the
firearm and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (Safeguard) and/or Superguard Security Corp.
(Superguard) as employers for negligence having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury
Superguard:
Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and was committed with deliberate
intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.
civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
CA Affirmed RTC: dismising the case of Dulay
ISSUE: W/N Superguard and Safeguard commited an actionable breach and can be civilly liable even if
Benigno Torzuela is already being prosecuted for homicide

HELD: YES. Petition for Review is Granted. remanded to RTC for trial on the merits
Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives
the civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles
32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the
accused
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176
of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article
2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil
action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused
It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's
death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts.
79. Go v. IAC, 197 SCRA 22.
See AQUINO, TORTS AND DAMAGES 242 (2001).
viii. Mistake & Waiver
80. Gatchalian v. Delim, 203 SCRA 126
Facts:
At noon on 11 July 1973, Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, Arsenio Delims Thames
mini bus. On the way, while the bus was running along the highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, Union,
a snapping sound was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped
a cement flower pot on the side
of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch.
Several passengers, including Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly taken to Bethany Hospital for
medical treatment. Upon medical examination, Gatchalian was found to have sustained physical injuries on
the leg, arm and
forehead etc.
While there, Arsenios wife Adela Delim visited and paid for the expenses, hospitalization and
transportation fees. However, before she left, she had the injured passengers including the Gatchalian sign
an already prepared Joint
Affidavit constituting a waiver of any future complaint:
That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of
the said Thames, because it was an accident and the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone
to the extent of helping
us to be treated upon our injuries.
However, notwithstanding this document, Gatchalian filed an action Ex Contractu to recover compensatory
and Actual Damages. Delim denied liability on the ground that it was an accident and the Joint which
constitutes as a waiver. The trial court dismissed the complaint based on the waiver and the CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether the waiver was valid.

valid waiver of her cause of action had been made by Gatchalian. A waiver, to be valid and
effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually
be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to
abandon a right vested in such person.
Held: NO. There was no
The degree of explicitness which this Court has required in purported waivers is illustrated in Yepes and
Susaya v. Samar
Express Transit , where the Court in reading and rejecting a purported waiver said:
It appears that before their transfer to the Leyte Provincial Hospital, appellees were asked to sign as, in
fact, they signed the document Exhibit I wherein they stated that "in consideration of the expenses which
said operator has incurred in properly giving us the proper medical treatment, we hereby manifest our
desire to waive any and all claims against the operator of the Samar Express Transit.
Even a cursory examination of the document mentioned above will readily show that appellees did not
actually waive their right to claim damages from appellant for the latter's failure to comply with their
contract of carriage. All that said document proves is that they expressed a desire to make the waiver
which obviously is not the same as making an actual waiver of their right. A WAIVER of the kind invoked by
appellant must be clear and unequivocal (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of July 8, 1887) which
is not the case of the one relied upon in this appeal.
If we apply the standard used in Yepes and Susaya, we would have to conclude that the terms of the Joint
Affidavit in the
instant case cannot be regarded as a waiver cast in clear and unequivocal terms.
Moreover, the circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by Gatchalian need to be
considered. Gatchalian testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having
been in the hospital for only three days, when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was
presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the
other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to
read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances there appears substantial doubt
whether Gatchalian understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of
private respondent) she signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action
against private respondent.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by
passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must
construe any such
purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier.
For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good
customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under
circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of
extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard
unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is offensive
to public policy.
We have already noted that a duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in protecting the safety of its
passengers is imposed upon a common carrier. The standard of extraordinary diligence imposed upon
common carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of ordinary diligence, i.e., the
diligence of a good paterfamilias established in respect of the ordinary relations between members of
society. Thus, the question which must be addressed is whether or not Delim has successfully proved that
he had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the mishap involving his mini-bus. The records before

the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that Delim had exercised the extraordinary diligence required
by law. Curiously, he did not even attempt, during the trial before the court a quo, to prove that he had
indeed
exercised the requisite extraordinary diligence.
Respondent did try to exculpate himself from liability by alleging that the mishap was the result of force
majeure. But allegation is not proof and here again, he utterly failed to substantiate his defense of force
majeure. To exempt a common carrier from liability for death or physical injuries to passengers upon the
ground of force majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only that the efficient cause of the casualty was
entirely independent of the human will, but
also that it was impossible to avoid.
Elements of force majeure: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurence, or of the failure of
the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will; (2) it must be impossible
to foresee the event which constitutes the "caso fortuito", or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to
avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
Upon the other hand, the record yields affirmative evidence of fault or negligence on the part of Delims
common carrier. In her direct examination, Gatchalian narrated that shortly before the vehicle went off the
road and into a ditch, a "snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus. One of the
passengers, an old woman, cried out, What happened? The driver replied, nonchalantly, That is only
normal. The driver did not stop to check if anything had
gone wrong with the bus.
Moreover, the driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same snapping sound had been heard in the
bus on previous occasions. This could only mean that the bus had not been checked physically or
mechanically to determine what was causing the "snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently that
the driver had gotten accustomed to it. Such a sound is obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good
operating condition, and even a modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers dictated that the bus
be checked and repaired. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and
safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once
again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard
of
the physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of Delim and his driver.

81. Theis v. CA, 268 SCRA 167.

Facts: TCT Nos. 15515 (parcel no. 1); 15516 (parcel no. 2); 15684 (parcel no. 3).
The above lands are situated in Tagaytay. Beside parcel no. 3 is a vacant lot (parcel no. 4). Calsons
constructed a 1-storey house on parcel no. 3. Parcel no. 1 and parcel no. 2, remained idle.
In a survey conducted in 1985, there were ERRORS IN THE DESIGNATION OF THE LANDS:
70.

a) parcel no. 3, (where the two-storey house stands) became TCT No. 15515 (parcel no 1)

71.

b) parcel nos. 1 and 2 were mistakenly surveyed to be located on parcel no. 4 (which was not owned by
Calsons) and covered by TCT Nos. 15516 and 15684
Unaware of the mistake by which Calsons appeared to be the owner of parcel no. 4 as indicated in the
erroneous survey, and based on the erroneous information given by the surveyor that parcel no. 4 is
covered by TCT No. 15516 and 15684, Calsons sold said parcel no. 4 to Theis. Upon execution of the Deed
of Sale, Calsons delivered TCT Nos. 15516 and 15684 to Theis who immediately registered the same.

After returning from Germany, they went to Tagaytay to look over the vacant lots and to plan the
construction of their house thereon, they discovered that parcel no. 4 was owned by another person; that
the lots actually sold to them were parcel nos. 2 and 3 covered by TCT Nos. 15516 and 15684, respectively.
Parcel no. 3 however, could not have been sold by the Calsons as a two-storey house, the construction cost
of which far exceeded the price paid by the Calsons, had already been built thereon even prior to the
execution of the contract.
Theis insisted that they wanted parcel no. 4, which is the idle lot beside parcel no. 3. However, Calsons
could not have possibly sold the same to them for it did not own parcel no. 4. The mistake in the identity of
the lots is traceable to the erroneous survey conducted in 1985.
To remedy the mistake, Calsons offered parcel nos. 1 and 2 covered by TCT Nos. 15515 and 15516,
respectively, as these 2 were precisely the 2 vacant lots which they owned and intended to sell when it
entered into the transaction with Theis. Theis refused and insisted on taking parcel no. 3, covered by TCT
No. 155864 and upon which a 2-storey house stands. Such refusal of Theis prompted Calsons to offer the
return of an amount double the price paid by Theis. Latter still refused. Calsons was then compelled to file
an action for annulment of deed of sale and reconveyance.
Trial court annulled said contract of sale after finding that there was indeed a mistake in the identification
of the parcels of land. Trial court, which was affirmed by the CA, held that
When one sells or buys a real property, he either sells or buys the property as he sees it, in its actual
setting and by its physical metes and bounds, and not be the mere lot number assigned to the same
property in the certificate of title or in any document. And, when a buyer of real property decides to
purchase from his seller, he is ordinarily bound by prudence to ascertain the true nature, identity or
character of the property that he intends to buy and ascertain the title of his vendor before he parts with
his money. The foregoing precepts and precautions were observed by the parties.
Both brokers of the sale brought defendants to the vicinity where plaintiffs 3 adjacent parcels of land are
located and pointed to defendants the 2 vacant parcels right beside plaintiffs house. When defendants
intimated to the brokers their desire to buy the vacant lots pointed to them, they were brought to plaintiffs
representative where the parties discussed the terms of the sale.
It is clear that defendants did not intend to buy the parcel of land where plaintiffs house stood as
defendant Betty Theis declared in her testimony that they wanted to buy the parcel at the right side of
plaintiffs house where she and her husband would construct their house. Neither can this Court accept the
hypothesis that plaintiff intended to sell that parcel where its house was already constructed for if this was
its true intention, it would not sell its two (2) lots at the price of P486,000.00 which is way below the costs
of its construction of P1,500,000.00.
Consent of the parties is one of the essential elements to the validity of the contract and where consent is
given through mistake, the validity of the contractual relations between the parties is legally impaired.
When defendants bought the properties of plaintiff, they intended to buy the vacant lots owned by the
latter. As the sale that was finally consummated by the parties had covered the parcel where plaintiffs
house was constructed even before the sale took place, this Court can safely assume that the deed of sale
executed by the parties did not truly express their true intention. The mistake on the subject of the sale
appears to be substantial as the OBJECT of the transaction is DIFFERENT from that intended by the parties.
This fiasco could have been cured and the pain and travails of this litigation avoided, had parties agreed to
a reformation of the deed of sale. The defendants refused, insisting that they wanted the vacant lots on
the right side of plaintiffs house, which was impossible for plaintiff 3 to do, as said vacant lots were not of
its own dominion.
Issue: Whether Calsons is liable.
Held: NO. According to Art. 1390, contracts are voidable/annullable, even though no damage was done to
the contracting parties where consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or
fraud. Also, according to Art. 1331, in order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the
substance of the thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally
moved one or both parties to enter into the contract.
Tolentino explains that the concept of error must include both ignorance, which is the absence of
knowledge with respect to a thing, and mistake properly speaking, which is a (1) wrong conception about
said thing, or (2) a belief in the existence of some circumstances, fact, or event, which in reality does not
exist. In both cases, there is a lack of full and correct knowledge about the thing. The mistake committed
by Calsons in selling parcel no. 4 to the Theis falls within the second type. Such mistake invalidated its

consent and as such, annulment of the deed of sale is proper.

Calsons obviously committed an honest mistake in selling parcel no. 4. It is quite impossible for them to
sell the lot since he does not own it. The GOOD FAITH of the Calsons is evident in the fact that when the
mistake was discovered, it immediately offered 2 other vacant lots to the Theis or to reimburse them with
twice the amount paid. That Theis refused either option left the Calsons with no other choice but to file an
action for the annulment of the deed of sale on the ground of mistake.
Theis cannot be justified in their insistence that parcel no. 3, upon which Theis constructed a two-storey
house, be given to them. The cost of construction for the said house P1.5m far exceeds the amount paid
by the petitioners (P486,000.00). Calsons witness, Atty. Tarciso Calilung clarified that parcel no. 4, the lot
mistakenly sold, was a vacant lot. To allow the Theis to take parcel no. 3 would be to countenance unjust
enrichment. They intended at the outset to purchase a vacant lot, their refusal to accept the offer of the
Calsons to give them two (2) other vacant lots in exchange, as well as their insistence on parcel no. 3,
which is a house and lot, is manifestly unreasonable.

82. YHT Realty v. CA, G.R. No. 126780 (17 Feb 2005)
FACTS

Maurice Peaches McLoughlin is an Australian businessman-philanthropist who used to stay at the

Sheraton Hotel during his trips to the Philippines prior to 1984. He met Brunhilda Mata-Tan who befriended
him and showed him around. Tan convinced Mcloughlin to transfer to the Tropicana from the Sheraton
where afterwards he stayed during his trips from Dec 1984 to Sept 1987.

On 30 Oct 1987, McLoughlin arrived from Australia and registered with Tropicana. He rented a
safety deposit box as his usual practice. The box required two keys, the guest had one and one from the
management. He placed US $10,000 in one envelope and US$5,000 in another , AU$10,000 in another
envelope and other envelopes with his passport and credit cards. On 12 Dec 1987, he took from the box
the envelope with US$5,000 and the one with AU$10,000 to go to Hong Kong for a short visit, because he
was not checking out. When he arrived in HK, the envelope with US$5,000 only contained US$3,000, but
because he had no idea if the safety deposit box has been tampered, he thought it was just bad
accounting.

After returning to Manila, he checked out of the Tropicana on 18 Dec 1987 and left for Australia.
When he arrived he discovered that the envelope with US$10,000 was short of US$5,000. He also noticed
that the jewelry he bought in Hong Kong which he stored in the safety deposit box upon his return to
Tropicana was likewise missing, except for a diamond bracelet.

He went back to the PH on 4 Apr 1988 and asked Lainez (who had custody of the management key)
if some money was missing or returned to her, to which the latter answered there was not. He again
registered at the Tropicana and rented a safety deposit box. He placed an envelope containing US$15,000,
another of AU$10,000. On 16 Apr, he opened his safety deposit box and noticed that US$2,000 and
AU$4,500 was missing from the envelopes.

He immediately confronted Lainez and Payam who admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit box
with the key assigned to McLoughlin. McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was staying and
confronted her. Tan admitted that she had stolen McLoughlins key and was able to open the safety
deposit box with the assistance of Lopez, Payam and Lainez. Lopez also told McLoughlin that Tan stole the
key assigned to McLoughlin while the latter was asleep.

McLoughlin requested the management for an investigation of the incident. Lopez got in touch with
Tan and arranged for a meeting with the police and McLoughlin. When the police did not arrive, Lopez and
Tan went to the room of McLoughlin at Tropicana and thereat, Lopez wrote on a piece of paper a promissory
note.

He made Lopez and Tan sign a promissory note for him for the loss. However, Lopez refused liability
on behalf of the hotel, reasoning that McLoughlin signed an "Undertaking for the Use of Safety Deposit
Box" which disclaims any liability of the hotel for things put inside the box.


On 17 May 1988 McLoughlin went back to AU and consulted his lawyers. They wrote a letter
addressed to Pres. Cory Aquino which was pushed back to the DOJ and the Western Police District. He went
back from the PH to AU several times more to attend business and follow up but the matter was only filed
on 3 Dec 1990 since he was not there to personally follow up.

McLoughlin filed an action against YHT Realty Corporation, Lopez, Lainez, Payam and Tan.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of McLoughlin. The CA modified only the amount of damages
awarded.

Tan and Lopez, however, were not served with summons, and trial proceeded with only Lainez,
Payam and YHT Realty Corporation as defendants.
(a) whether the loss of money and jewelry is supported by the evidence. YES.
Where the credibility of a witness is an issue, the established rule is that great respect is accorded to the
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court. The trial court is in the best position to assess
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.
(b) whether there was gross negligence on the part of the innkeepers
Payam and Lainez, who were employees of Tropicana, had custody of the master key of the management
when the loss took place. They even admitted that they assisted Tan on three separate occasions in
opening McLoughlins safety deposit box.
The management contends that McLoughlin made its employees believe that Tan was his spouse for she
was always with him most of the time. The evidence on record is bereft of any showing that McLoughlin
introduced Tan to the management as his wife. Mere close companionship and intimacy are not enough to
warrant such conclusion. They should have confronted him as to his relationship with Tan considering that
the latter had been observed opening McLoughlins safety deposit box a number of times at the early
hours of the morning.
Art 2180, par (4) of the same Code provides that the owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches
in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Given the fact that the loss of
McLoughlins money was consummated through the negligence of Tropicanas employees both the
employees and YHT, as owner of Tropicana, should be held solidarily liable pursuant to Art 2193.
WON the "Undertaking for the Use of the Safety Deposit Box" is null and void.
Yes, it is null and void. Art. 2003[1] is controlling. This is an expression of public policy that the hotel
business like common carriers are imbued with public interest. This responsibility cannot be waived away
by any contrary stipulation in so-called "undertakings" that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by
hotel keepers on guests for their signature.
The CA (former case) even ruled before that hotelkeepers are liable even though the effects are not
delivered to them or their employees, but it is enough that the effects are within the hotel or inn.
Pars. 2 and 4 of the undertaking manifestly contravene Art. 2003 of the NCC. Meanwhile, the defense that
Art. 2002 exempts the hotel-keeper from liability if the loss is due to the acts of the guest, family or visitors
falls because the hotel is guilty of negligence as well. This provision presupposes that the hotel-keeper is
not guilty of concurrent negligence or has not contributed in any degree to the occurrence of the loss.
dispositive

Damages awarded by the lower court sustained

US$2,000.00 and AUS$4,500.00 or their peso equivalent at the time of payment;

Air fares for a total of 11 trips + transpo expense

Hotel payments

Moral 50K

ED 10K

AF 200K

[1] Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that
he is not liable for the Arts brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest
whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in Arts 1998 to 2001[37] is suppressed or diminished
shall be void.

ix. Emergency or sudden peril doctrine

F. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
83. Gula v. Dianala, 132 SCRA 245
84. San Ildefonso Lines v. CA, 289 SCRA 568
FACTS: At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner
Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) figured in a
vehicular mishap at the intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig, Metro
Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2) passengers in the process.
A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991 charging
the driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with multiple physical injuries.
About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance and
Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner
SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured under a motor
vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00 (P454,000.00 as
actual/compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney's fees;
P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 as appearance fees.)

ISSUEs: 1) If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case?
2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an independent civil action during the pendency of a
criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action was made in the criminal
action and despite the fact that the private complainant is actively participating through a private
prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal case?
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated February
24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO SUSPEND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS" filed by
petitioners is GRANTED.
RATIO: Now that the necessity of a prior reservation is the standing rule that shall govern the institution of
the independent civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, past pronouncements that view
the reservation requirement as an "unauthorized amendment" to substantive law - i.e., the Civil Code,

should no longer be controlling. There must be a renewed adherence to the time-honored dictum that
procedural rules are designed, not to defeat, but to safeguard the ends of substantial justice. And for this
noble reason, no less than the Constitution itself has mandated this Court to promulgate rules concerning
the enforcement of rights with the end in view of providing a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases which should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Far from
altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in
"Caos v. Peralta"
Clearly then, private respondent PISC, as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is not exempt from
the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasi-delict arising from the same
act or omission of petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case. As private respondent PISC merely
stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the
procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil case.