The New Science of Dreaming Volume 3 Cultural and Theoretical Perspectives Praeger Perspectives PRAEGER, ieLibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data ‘The new science of dreaming / edited by Deirdre Barrett and Patrick MeNamara. Boom, Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-275-99045-9 (see: alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0.275-99046-6 (v1 valk, paper) — ISBN 978.0-275-99047-3 {v. 2 : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99048-0 (v. 3+ alk. paper) 1. Dreams, I, Barret, Deitde. I MeNNamara, Patrick, 1956 BF1O78.N454 2007 15463—de22 2007008458 Brish Library Cataloguing in Publication Daa is available Copyright © 2007 by Deirdre Barrett and Paerick McNamara Al rights seserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process oF technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2007008458 ISBN-13: 978-0-275-99045-9 (sr) ISBN-10; 0.275.99045-1 ISBN-13: 978-0-275-99046-6 (vol 1) ISBN-10: 0-275.99046-X ISBN-13: 978.0-275.99047-3 (vol 2) ISBN-10: 0.275.99047-8, ISBN-19: 9780-275-99048.0 (vol 3) ISBN-10: 0.275.99048-6 Figse published in 2007 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 ‘An imprine of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. ‘wonn pregersom Pineed in the United States of America e ‘The paper used in this book: complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Oxgenization (239.48-1984), 987654321Nine The Philosophy of Dreaming and Self-Consciousness: What Happens to the Experiential Subject during the Dream State? Jennifer Michelle Windt and Thomas Metzinger Dreams have been a topic of philosophical inquiry ever since Aristotle’ trea- tise On Dreams and throughout the history of Western thought (Dreisbach, 2000). Probably the most famous philosophical approach to dreaming is the problem of dream skepticism, which Descartes discussed in the first Medita- tion. Here, Descartes famously argued that because of the realistic quality of sensory experience during the dream state, it would never be possible to dis. tinguish dreaming from wakefulness on empirical grounds alone (Descartes, 1642/1967). In the twentieth century, however, interest in the epistemologi- cal problem of how co determine whether one is dreaming or awake was reduced considerably by an anti-Cartesian argument advanced by Norman Malcolm (1956, 1959). Arguing that reports about dreaming are not pub- liely verifiable even in principle, Malcolm asserted that the notion of c scious awareness in sleep was contradictory on purely logical grounds. “If a Person is in any state of consciousness it logically follows that he is not sound asleep” (Malcolm, 1956, p. 21)—hence, according to Malcolm, dreams are not experiences at all (see also Dennett, 1976; for a discussion see Metzinger, 1993/1999, p. 146, 194, 241. Revonsuo, 1995, p. 36). Today, based on a more differentiated understanding of both the phe: nomenological and neurophysiological features of dreaming, itis possible co give a relatively straightforward and affirmative answer to the question of whether dreams are conscious experiences occurring in sleep. At the same time, these new insights into the nature of dreaming require a more nuanced perspective that is capable of explaining the subdle differences between dreaming and waking consciousness 2s well. In this chapter, we will argue194 Culrusat and Theor ical Perspectives that these differences mainly concern the subjective quality of che dreaming experience. The interesting question, from a philosophical point of view, is, not so much whether or not dreams are conscious experiences at all. Rather, fone must ask in what sense dreams can be considered as conscious expeti- ‘ences, and what happens to the experiential subject during the dream state Finally, in order co attive at a more differentiated understanding of dream consciousness, we will contrast our analysis of ordinary dreams with lucid dreams, as well as with che varying degrees of lucidity and cognitive clatity seen in semislucid and prelucid dreams DREAMS In order to determine the particular quality of consciousness during the deeam state, we will Bese have to define a minimal notion of “conscious experience” and see how this concept relates to dreaming, An important insight from modern philosophy of mind is that conscious experience is rot an all-or-nothing affair. Instead, the degree to which a given state can be considered as conscious can be determined with the help of various conceptual constraints. Since conscious experience comes in many different strengths, a mencal state that only satisfies some, but not all, of the rele- vane constraints can still be considered as conscious. At the same time, the question of whether a weaker or a stronger concept of conscious expe- rience applies to a given case is determined by the respective degree of constraint satisfaction. For instance, full-blown subjectivity and the exis tence of a stable first-person perspective, chough cereainly the hallmark of rnonpathological wake staces in human heings, are not necessary conditions for conscious experience as such (Metzinger, 2004b). Therefore, ic is possible to consider dreams as conscious states even if they do not satisfy certain Rise-person constraints, such as the development of @ strong first-person perspective. One way of answering Malcolm’s question concerning the experiential character of dreams, then, is by saying that dreams are conscious experiences because they can be described as che appearance of an integrated, global model of reality within a virtual window of presence. From a purely phe- nomenalagical perspective, dreams are simply the presence of world. On the level of subjective experience, the dream world is experienced as representing the here and the now, And even though it is model constructed by the dreaming brain, itis not recognized as 2 model but is experienced as realty itself. Pu in philosophical terms, one can say chat the reality model created by the dreaming brain is phenomenally transparent; che fact that ie is 4 ‘model is invisible co the experiential subject.The Philosophy of Dreaming and SelEConsciousness 195 OF course, the same point can also be applied to waking consciousness even in wakefulness, our experience of che external world is mediated by she sensory organs and by the brain processes underlying our conscious experien- ces (for details on the neural correlates of consciousness, or the NCC, see Meczinger, 2000). Since we never realize that the reality model experienced in wakefulness is, in fact, model, we have the impression of being in direce contact with external reality—we live our lives as naive realists. In this very general sense, the conscious experience of dreaming is no different from waking consciousness, Another important point is that dreams are a second global srate-lass aside from wakefulness. Unlike hallucinations, which are typically restricted to an isolated type of phenomenal content in one or wo of the sensory modalities—a pattern on the wall, or strange sounds and voices—dreams usualy ineegrate several different types of imagery into a complex, multimo- dal, and sequentially organized model of the world." ut in more technical cerms, one can sey that dreams are conscious expe- riences because they satisfy the constraints of globality, or the activation of a global model of realiey, of presentationality, or the integration of this model into a virtual window of presence, and of transparency, since this model of reality is not recognized as a model by the experiential subject (Metzinger, 2004b, pp. 107, 251-264). On a very general level, the most stciking difference between dreaming and wakefulness is that the dream state is realized in the absence of external sensory stimuli that could modulate the unfolding chain of events. There are certain exceptions in which weak subliminal stimuli can directly influ- ‘ence consciously experienced dream content. For example, the sound of your alarm clock sometimes finds its way into your dreams without waking you up, instead becoming part of the ongoing dream narrative—though it is most likely to do so in a slightly distorted manner. Some dreamers can even learn to induce lucid dreams with the help of external sensory signals, for instance by using one of the famous lucid dream induction devices devel- coped by Stephen LaBerge at the Lucidity Instituce at Stanford University. These induction devices, which resemble the eye masks that are sometimes discributed on long-distance flights, an detect the onset of the characteristic rapid eye movements at the beginning of a dream phase. They then submit mild fight signals, which are subsequently incorporated into the beginning dream and are meant to “cue” the dreamer co the fact that he or she is cur- rently dreaming. Most dreams, however, unfold independently of external sensory stimuli, driven forward by internal inpuc generated deep inside the brain during rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. {n order to understand how the rich internal phenomenal world experienced by the dreaming subject is196 Cultural and Theoretical Perspectives generated in the absence of external sensory input and behavioral ouput, it is important to take a closer look at the specific functional configuration of the dreaming brain, Output Blockade Dreamers are not functionally embodied agents. When the human brain centers the state that is necessary to generate a reality model of the category “dream,” it loses ics ability to generate motor output. The central neural cor- relate of this functional sitmation consists of the postsynaptic inhibition of the motor neurons in the brain stem and the spinal cord (for a review of the neurobiological details, see Hobson, Pace-Schort, & Stickgold, 2000). ‘The result is a loss of muscle tone and the near-complete paralysis of the sleeping body. Consequently, the world models experienced during the dream state are without function with vegaed 0 the external concrol of behavior. Sometimes, nonintended, complex forms of behavior emerge dur- ing the dream state. This is the case for patients suffering from REM sleep behavior disorder (RBD), who ate forced to physically act out their dreams, but may also resule from other instances of incomplete motor inhibition, ‘These forms of automatic behavior during the dream state, however, are not genuine examples of actions, but of “behavioral artifacts": they have no true teleofunctionalise description, because they are maladaptive and do not fulfill a fanction for the system Input Blockade ‘During the dream state, peripheral sensory signals only rarely penetrate into the central mechanisms of information processing. Two mechanisms achieve the dreamer's isolation from the outer world. Firs, the transmission of exter- nal stimuli from the primary sensory neurons is actively inhibited, preventing. peripheral information from gaining access to the central nervous system. Sec- ond, those exccinal stimuli that manage to cross the threshold are drowned cout by an array of ineemnally generated signals that liverally “flood” the higher sensory cortices, This also explains why dreams, at least with regard to the cu rent sate of the system’ environment, are epistemically empey—chey contain ‘no information about the real world outside the dream. Internal Signal-Generation The sovcalled ponto-geniculo-occipital (PGO) waves are a good prelimi- nary candidate for the signal source underlying the activation of phenomenalThe Philosophy of Dreaming and SeS€-Conscionsness 197 Jdseam content. This characteristic eleceroencephalogram (EEG) pattecn is associated with bursts of phasic activity dusing REM sleep, resulting when automatic signals generated in the pontine brain seem (P) are conducted to the lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus (G) and the occipital cortex (O) (Hodson eusauy por Aagens susan jo 2218p 9484 ue dered 3yp go asm ontuayuy paressuss Apeusouy kg pormpous 243 Slnp poouzede> [spout ppow jeuswiousyd a no sor0ts nd) 208u2s wy pafdnosep seuopauny 1 (ges fenuotindes 91 poxempoU 51 sSexUNds9 yo fo] PU wore jeu uss. ‘ppepeyg nduy 2pO;q nding ‘woRENADE AUNT, -2ur0Uyd 94, eworEANTE UHI [ppow # 2 porscd 21 denndsouoo put poousuads> tpoq 2ousied Jo opto enata Pun pow POH 24p Jo YoREAROY ‘yeas 50 pour jqoj?‘pareanuy ve jo aouereadey sostoy ‘pesyoxo> pur Gopraeakg, voneanse ug uO, Gprdo iousredsuen Soreoag pony org, ora ‘surearg PINT pur SuresIG SSeUTYPTEA\ UF DuTHAdKy [FUSWOUDGY Jo aMINAG wy, 16 I18VI.“qepruos sazea Greaney Je woneause sudo yp 2nq SneausGowoy S| au23Ve7 —_ogunaefBay-YHIY Jo aausEqE > jo puswouryd onsadeonw! 10] agepay s6ne59q woR2edsonL 105 =yqETEA 20K) ‘e{pum ips are suonsonb apy ot Sie ava ‘garry weayp ausnno OY zdaoye yay BuLnp wowreande useag Jo Ao] «By Puonsuryorsuayp on posodde se) su23u09 uayp prouotiade> Amoyssu0> s90(] sunaig perl swenq, wonaadeonnu 2 agp) JeRuer vose ag85y put ‘fain9ps uorepou-seu09 50 auouisueyus ays‘ atp uoRuTy fowuonryoss jo suas ut 2uguad “39 mopsuoo jo anpes aandepe a4 SSURP TEAL paves yeuouiouayd jo GopusSomoy pu Aatsustu ouenipy (panunu0s) 16 FTV‘The Philosophy of Dreaming and Self-Consclousness 211 real as real could be, I was dreaming! With the realization of this fact, the ‘quality of the dream caanged in 2 manner very diffcule to convey to one who has not had the experience. Instantly, che vividness of life increased a hhundred-fold. Never had the sea and sky and trees shone with such glamorous beauty: even the commonplace houses seemed alive and mystically beauifl Never had I fele so absolutely well, so clear-brained, so inexpresibly re! The sensation was exquisite beyond words; but ie lasted only a few minutes and I awoke, (Fox, 1962, p. 32; quoted in LaBerge 8 Gackenbach, 2000, p. 154) This typical example of « lucid dream report illustrates several important differences between lucid and nonlucid dreams. Fits, the hucid dreamer is fully aware of the fact that the phenomenal world he is currently experiencing is not identical with external physical reality. Rather than entertaining the delu- sional belie in the reality of dteam events, he is perfectly aware of the miscep- resentational character of his ongoing state of consciousness. At the same time, he is also freed from many of tae other cognitive deficiencies that characterize nonlucid dreams. For instance, the common features of disorientation, confab- ulatory reasoning and amnesia are much less pronounced in lucid dreams Let us adopt the following working definition of a lucid dream: 1. The defining feature of lucid dreams, of course, is that the lucid dreamer achieves fall mental clarity concerning the fact shat he is currently dreaming and chat he is capable of ascribing this property to himself. This means that his relation eo the phenomenal world he is currently experiencing—the fact that he is merely a dreamself transiently immersed in a dream world—has to become a pare of his current self-model. In other words, the lucid dreamer does noe simply know, on an abstrac level, that he is currently dreaming, but is also able to experience this very fact. Philosophically speaking, the dreamlike nature of his current state is amalable to him both on the levels of cognition and arcention, 2. The conscious state of the dreaming subject is generally characterized by fall in- celleceual caity. In fice, according te the subjective reports of lucid dreamers, overall levels of cognitive insight into the naxure of the state and intellectual co- hherence may equal or even auspass those experienced in wakefulness. 3. According co subjective experience, all five sensory modalities Function as well as they do during wakefulnes. 4, The lucid dreamer has fall access to memory of his past phenomenal seates, including waking life, as well as previously experienced lucid dreams. Aucobio sraphic memory is globally available on che level of conscious self modeling ‘There is also no asymmetric amnesia from the perspective of wakefulness, and lucid dreams are remembered mach more dearly than nonlucid ones. 5. The property of agency is fully realized on both the phenomenal and functional levels. The lucid dreamer is not a passive victim lost in a sequence of bizarre242 Cultural and Theoretical Perspectives «pisodes, but experiences himself as full-blown agent capable of selecting from 4 variety of possible behavioral patterns and of turning them into intended, real actions. Moreover, agency is not only experienced, but the lucid dreamer is also cognitively aware of his ability co exert dream contr ‘This definition is a strong definition in a number of ways. Firs, there is fan equivocation of “knowledge” in many earlier research definitions of lucidity, which simply describe lucid dreams as dreaming while knowing thax one is dreaming (Green, 1968; LaBerge, 1985; LaBerge & Gackenbach, 2000, p. 152). However, knowledge can consise of either cognitive availability (of a certain fact, 5 mentally represented in a quasi-propositional format) oF attentional availability (of information, in terms of intensified subsymbolic modeling). Cognitive availability leads to conceptual classification or cate- gorization; it enables the dreamer co borh realize and critically think about the face that her current experiential state belongs to the class of dreams. Axcentional availability, on the other hand, leads to the accessibility of earlier processing stages. The resulting stare of phenomenal opacity allows the dreamer to dircetly experience the dreamlike nature of her ongoing phenom- ‘nal state, Phenomenal opacity is the opposite of phenomenal eransparency; i ensues when the naive realistic impression of being in direct contact with external reality dissolves. Suddenly, the victual nature of conscious experience becomes available on che level of conscious experience: the dream world and the dream-self are no longer experienced as reality, but for the firse ime are recognized as models’? In order to understand the definition of lucid dreaming provided above, it is important to take a closer look at dhe notions of cognitive and astentional availablity and to see how they relate to the experiential quality of phenome- nal opacity. To illustrate this point, it is helpful to compare lucid dreaming to consciousness in the wake state. According to the self:model theory of subjec tivity (see Metzinger 1999, 2004a, b), conscious experience never brings you into direct contact with external reality. Instead, experience as such, including your conscious experience of being a self, is a simulation created by your brain ‘And it is only because you ate unable to recognize the simulational character of consciousness that you live your waking life—and, with the exception of lucid dreams, most of your dream life—as a naive reais. Nevertheless, the simulational nature of the world can become cognitively available (© you. In wakefulness—for instance at this very moment, as you are reading this book—you cat critically reflect upon the consequences of this fact, and you can even develop philosophical arguments about ic. This intelleccual insight, however, does not in the least make you shift into a state of “lucid waking,” a state in which che experiential quality of naive realismThe Philosophy of Dreaming and Self-Consciousness 213, would start to dissolve, It is a purely intellectual attitude, which has almost no influence on how you actually experience the world. Therefore, cognitive availability is also unlikely to be the sole cause of dseam lucidity. Asall lucid dreamers can confirm, the sudden experience of comprehend: ing the overall nature of their current state of consciousness is not only a cognitive event, but a purely intelleewal insighe, What makes lucid dreaming so fascinating is that the representational character of conscious content is preveflexively available on the level of attentional processing, As ilustrated by our initial example of a lucid dream, the onset of lucidity is often accompa- nied by a change in the overall experiential quality of the dream on the level of “direct” sensory awareness. At the very moment when the gabal model of reality shifts from transparency t0 opacity, earlier processing stages become available to introspection (see Metzinger, 20046, p. 163). Now, the lucid dteamer is nor only able to think about the fact she is euerencly dream- ing, but she is also able to attend 10 the siewulational character of her current phenomenal world. In contrast, the wansparency of the conscious model of reality experienced during wakefulness is much moze stable and attentionally impenetrable: full- Blown lucidiry, noe as an intelectual achievement, but as an all-pervading. experiential phenomenon, is much easier to achieve in the deam state chan in wakeflness. There may be obvious evolutionary reasons for this. At lease in standard cases of waking consciousness, lucid insight into the simulational character of conscious experience, which would allow us to detach from our current reality model and experience it as unreal can actually be considered as maladaptive. In addition, the waking-state model of reality is largely driven and constrained by external input, making its dependency om internal sirnula- tional mechanisms much harder to discover. AS opposed to the dream state, in which we can “wake up” into a Incid episode, there is usually no further type of global phenomenal reality model in our amobiographic memory that could alere us to the simulational nature of waking consciousness. These is simply no global state in which we were “more awake,” more coherent, and more insightfal about the actual nature of the overall process that could fune- tion as a reference basis and could be compared to standard cases of waking consciousness. As soon as aurobiographic memory becomes activated during a dream, however, this additional phenomenal frame of reference exists~it is formed by conscious memories of our richer and more coherent waking life ‘Therefore, one of the unique features of lucid dreaming is that during this brief interval, the transparency constraint Is no longer satisfied on a global level of phenomenal reality modeling, In a sense, a lucid dream isa globalized pscudo-hallucination, Or, ro use a metaphor an idealist philosopher might prefer, i is like one big thought.214 Cultural and Theoretical Perspectives The definition of lucid dreaming discussed above is also strong in that ic requires the availability of autobiographic memory as well as full-blown agency (like earlier research definitions put forwacd by Tart, 1988, and Tholey, 1988; for a dissenting view, see LaBerge & Gackenbach, 2000, p. 152). Because of the heightened degree of cognitive clarity, lucid dreamers can become aware ‘of, and critically reflect upon, their relation co both che dream-self and the decam world. This ability to selEascribe the experience of lucidity depends on the development of a stable fiest-person perspective (Baker, 1998; Metzinger, 2004b, p. 395). In fact, the transition from nonlucid dreaming to lucidity has a lot to do with the developmene of a strong first-person perspective and the availabilty of a stable model of the dreamer’s relation co the dream world, or a PMIR (previously discussed). And, as we can now see, che human selfmodel splays a decisive role in this transition, ‘What is known aboue lucid dreams from an empirical point of view? Lucid dreams occur spontaneously as well as a resule of intentional induetion (for a review, see Laberge & Gackenbach, 2000). Younger people tend co have lucid dreams more frequently, and the capacity to induce lucid dreams can be learned co a certain degree (LaBerge & Rheingold, 1990; Tholey, 1987). General factors conducive t0 the induction of lucid dreams include high levels of physical activiey during the day (Gackenbach, Curren, & Cutler, 1983; Garfield, 1975) and heightened affective arousal (Gackenbach et al, 1983; Sparrow, 1976). Shore interruptions of sleep, especially when the subject ‘engages in incellectual or physical activities before going back to bed, also increase the probability of experiencing a lucid dream (for example, Garfield, 1975; LaBerge, 1980a, 1980b, 1990; Sparrow, 1976). One study actually found that lucidity was ten times more likely to occur during morning naps than in preceding nighttime sleep (LaBerge, Phillips, & Levitan, 1994) As all experienced lucid dreamers know, fixing one’s gaze on visual objects is a reliable method of terminating a lucid dream. Incerestingly, there seems to be a stable mapping beeween the phenomenal self-model (PSM), of the consciously experienced dream-self, and the unconscious, functional self model in terms of eye movements and gaze direction: If a lucid dreamer voluntarily suppresses his eye movements within the dream seate, he also interrupts the rapid eye movements in his sleeping body, which constitute one of the most eeable “Functional correlates” of dreaming, In other words, ‘fin whar seems to be a paradigm example of top-down causation—you suppress your phenomenal cye movements in the lucid dream, you suppress the eye movements in your physical body as well, thereby forcing ie to wake ‘up, that is, to shift into another global state of reality-modeling, ‘The interesting fact that the dream-self seems to be firmly anchored in the fanetional structure of the human brain in that there is a direct and reliable‘The Philosophy of Dreaming ané relationship becween the direction of polygraphically recorded eye movements and the gize shifts reported by lucid dreamers made a particularly ingenious type of experiment possible (LaBerge, Nagel, Dement, & Zarcone, 19812: LaBerge, Nagel, Taylor, Dement, & Zarcone, 1981b). Experienced subjects indicated the onset of lucidity by performing specific pateerns of eye move- ments that had been determined before the experiment. In what appears to be a genuine instance of “trans-reaity communication,” these patterns of gaze shifts, which clearly showed up on the polygraph, were used £0 signal the beginning and end of a lucid dream phase to the outside world. Polysomnographie analysis then showed that the onset of lucidity eypi- cally occurred during the first two minutes of an REM phase, following short, interrupting intervals of waking consciousness during an REM phase and/or during periods of heightened phasic REM activity (for a brief review of psychophysiological scudies of lucid dreaming, sce LaBerge, 1990; for far- ther references, see LaBerge & Gackenbach, 2000, p. 157). Therefore, it is plausible to assume chat a sudden increase in che general level of cortical arousal is one of che most important physiological correlates of lucid drearn- ing. The phenomenal correlates on the level of subjectively experienced dream content include increased vividness, heightened fear or stress, che dis- covery of contradictions within the dream world, and the subjective experi- cence of becoming aware of a “dreamlike” or “unteal” quality. Interestingly, Allan Hobson and colleagues (2000, p. $37) hypothesized that the height: ened degree of cognitive clarity and reflective thought associated with hucid reaming might be related to a selective reactivation of the DLPFC, which is known co be deactivated during ordinary REM sleep and may be responsi ble for the cognitive deficiencies seen in most nonlucid dreams (see eatlier discussion). Single reports about the emergence of lucid dreams in NREM sleep exist but have nor been studied systematically (for an introduction, see Gackenbach & LaBerge, 1988). ‘The phenomenon of lucid dreaming as such has been known for millen- nia and an early reference can be found in Aristotle's treatise On Dreams. Nevertheless, lucid dreaming has only become a topic of serious scientific research during the last three decades.'® It has to be noted, however, that compared to the quantity of research on ordinary dreams, the quantity of rigorous research on lucid dreams is almost negligible. This is a deplorable scate of affairs, because the phenomenon of lucid dreaming is of great sys- tematic interest in developing a general theory of consciousness and of the phenomenal first-person perspective. On the representational level of analysis, the most important feature of lucid dreaming clearly consists of the generalized absence of the transparency constraint. Lucid dreams are perhaps the only globally opaque class ofphenomenal states. What exactly does this mean? First, it is plausible co assume that the episodically overshooting levels of cortical arousal that ace ed with the emergence of lucidity lead to a sudden increase in the of internal self-rlated information and computational resources in the brain. Second, the generalized “dreamlike” or “unreal” quality of the dream world emerges at exactly the same moment that the all-pervading guilty of naive realism—which also characterizes ordinary waking states—is finally lost. The simulational viz. misrepresentational character of the experi- ential process as such becomes globally available for both attentional process- ing and cognition. Because the dream state, among other things, is also an internal emulation of a bebavioral space, this information now becomes available for the control of action as well: with the establishment of full blown agency, the dreamer is no longer a passive observer but has the capacity to utlize the knowledge shat all this is a dream, a global phenomenal simula- tion, in determining the course of his or her future actions. Computationally speaking, lucidity consists of the increased availability of selfrelated informa- tion. Our core claim, therefore, is that what changes in the transition frors ordinary dreaming to lucid dreaming is, frse of all, the content and the fanc- tional profile of che PSM. The shift in the PSM chen enables the stabilization of the PMIR. Viewed as global, phenomenal models of selity, lucid dreams ae fally characterized by the criterion of offline activation (Mesinger, 2004, p. 179) Just like in ordinary dreams or waking states, simple phenomenal content is homogeneous, but the representation of intensity (Metzinger, 20046, p. 184) can vary considerably. AS is the case for nonlucid dreams, the level of emo- tional arousal, such as fear or bliss, can be much more intense than in wake- fulness, whereas other types of sensory experiences, such as sensations of temperature or pain, are extremely rare. Compared to nonlucid dreams, how- ever, lucid dreams have more marked kinesthetic and auditory content (Gack- enbach, 1988). Presently, it is unclear whether the phenomenon of lucid dreaming fulfils any adaptive functions, Could Iucid dreams, for instance, have played a role in the cultural history of humankind by making the appear ance-reality disnetion a topic of intersubjective communication? Or sight lucid dreams have influenced the establishment of certain religious beliefs such as the existence of a soul thae is independent of the physical body? In a number of ways, lucid dreams are perspectival global states in a much stronger sense than ordinary dreams. The phenomenal first-person perspective— thacis, the eansparent model of the intentionality relation (Metzinger, 20048, 2006a)—is much more stable in terms of temporal extension and semantic continuity. The selectivity and variability of content that is available as an ‘object component—that is, the availability of content chat the éeeaming‘The Philosophy of Dreaming and $16.6 | subject can attend to and think about, and the range of behavior thae he can decide co engage in—are greatly increased. In ordinary dreams, high-level attention, deliberation, volitional action, and coherent cognition ate almost nonexistent; alll these capacities are almost. exclusively available in the hacid dream state. However, the well-known hyperassociativty of ordinary dreams seems to be markedly decreased, and lucid dreams also average fewer dream characters than nonlacid dreams (Gackenbach, 1988). The world of the lucid dreamer can certainly be bizarse, but it exhibies a much higher degree of internal coherence. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that on the func- tional level of description, a general correlate of lucidity consists in the suck den availability of additional processing capacities to the syscem as a whole This in eur may facilitate the selforganization of a globally coherent state and strengthen the hypothetical process of “highest-order binding” (Met Zinger, 1995). Even fiom a coarse-grained phenomenological analysis of lucid dreams, a straightforward prediction follows: the global model of the world represented daring lucid episodes is much less bizatce in terns of content than the world model experienced in ordinary dreams. In chore, lucidity imposes semantic coherence and stability on the internal simulation of che world. ‘As discussed at the beginning of this chaprer, one centrally relevant con- straint for phenomenal representations is their activation within a vireual win- dow of presence, The face chat short-term memory is much more reliable in Iucid dreams than in nonlucid ones may point co the fact that this window of presence is enlarged and stabilized during lucid episodes. In general, lucid dreams although shorter—are much less “Heeting” experiences than ordinary dreams, and the subjectively experienced degree of “realness” that i, the degree to which their content is represented as actually being present, is much higher. This issue, however, leads to a much more decisive question: What role does the self-model play in the transition from ordinary dreaming to lucidity? Our claim is that che key t0 understanding the phenomenon of lucidity lies in analyzing the additional eype of information chat is made globally available during lucid dreams in terms of a change in the cantent of the self- ‘model. Call this the “self model hypothesis of dream lucidity.” The idea is that in order to get a grip on this specific target phenomenon, the first and ‘most important step consists of investigating the functional and representa- tional phase transitions in the conscious human selmode. Ae the onset of 2 lucid episode, context information of a system-related type suddenly becomes available; ucidity has a lot ro do with “state clarity,” or with glob ally svailable knowledge about the general category of representational state that is currently realized by the system. On the functional level of description, the most important feature is certainly the reappearance of autobioggaphic218 Cultural and Theoretical ¥ ve memory concerning earlier episodes of waking consciousness, as well as previous episodes of lucid dreaming, including their distinction. As auto biographical memory becomes cognitively avaiable, che content of the con- scious self model changes dramavically. By integrating thoughts of the type, “My God, am dreaming!” into its internal self-representation, the system is suddenly able co grasp the simulational character of its overall state, Cognitive self reference, in turn, leads co full-blown agency and to the reestablishment of executive control. ‘As all lucid dreamers can confirm, the phenomenological profile associ- ated with the sudden process of “coming to” strongly resembles the sudden reappearance of long lose but highly relevane memories. This may count as a strong indicator for the relevance of memory functions in the generation of lucidity. In most ordinary dreams, deliberate action control, high-level atten- tion, and cognitive access to autobiographic memories are completely absent. In a conceptually clear sense involving degrees of constraint satisfaction, or- ddinary dreams are much less conscious than lucid dreams, because the feature of perspectivalness is expressed to a much weaker degree, and the PMIR is absent or unstable, Consequently, nonlucid dreams are only weak first person phenomena and cannot be considered as truly subjective states As soon as the system possesses additional computational resources, as appeats to be the case in lucid dreams, more internal information can be used in interpreting the current phenomenal world, and an appropriate self-madel can be generated. In particular, the ability to achieve mental clarity concern- ing the nature of the current phenomenal state requires the additional repre- sentation of the inner history of the system. Ie requires the capacity to recognize a global state as belonging t0 a certain class of states, namely a5 being a representational—and also a mivepresentational—state compared earlier global representational states undergone by the system. Now, a global simulation for the first time can be experienced as a simulation. Ie is pre- cisely this metacognitive achievement that is brought about by a stable self model, because it makes autobiographic information globally available for cognitive seléreference, Thus, the transition fom an ordinary dream co 4 lucid dream is concomitant with a dramatic enrichment of the autobio- graphical selfmodel, and consequently of the cognitive, attentional, and voli: sional self model Finally, Frederik van Eeden (1913), who coined the original concept of “lucid dreaming,” not only considered full recognition of waking life and the ability t0 act voluntarily in his dreams as defining characteristics of lucidity, but also drew attention to a shird feature, remarking that “I was 8° fast asleep that no bodily sensations penetrated into my perception” (van Eeden, 1913, p. 441). Compared co waking states, dreams and lucid dreams