Rethinking History

Vol. 11, No. 4, December 2007, pp. 627 629

RESPONSE

Alison Landsberg

A response to the commentaries of James Berger and Alun Munslow.

Keywords: Berger; History; Media; Memory; Munslow; Politics

Let me begin by thanking David Harlan for putting together this forum on
Prosthetic Memory, and Alun Munslow and James Berger for engaging so
deeply with the argument and provocations of my book. I welcome this
opportunity to revisit the work, and take up what I see as the key issues
raised by Munslows and Bergers thought-provoking and illuminating
essays. I see this, in part, as an opportunity to return to first principles, to
explain what prosthetic memory is, and what I understand to be its
differenceboth in practice and effectfrom previous forms of memory,
and how this difference enables it to serve a specific set of social functions.
Both Munslow and Berger reflect on the notion of prosthesis, albeit
toward different ends. Munslow suggests that my notion of prosthetic
memory helps to reveal the way in which all narratives about the past are
prosthetic in that they stand in for the real. For him, the notion of
prosthetic memory illuminates the impossibility of defining what is
historical truth and casts serious doubt on notions of empirical
representability. Berger, on the other hand, suggests that humans have
always used prosthetic devicessymbols, narratives, and so onto learn
what other people are thinking and feeling, and that this capacity is part of
our our mammalian inheritance. Both of these claims, I believe, require
me to chart out what I see as unique, or new about prosthetic memory.
While I accept, and even embrace, Munslows claim that both memory
and history narratives are to a certain extent prosthetic, I chose to write this
ISSN 1364 2529 (print)/ISSN 1470 1154 (online) 2007 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13642520701652194

628 A. Landsberg
book on memory because I wanted to explore the interface between
individuals and larger historical narratives. It is my contention that in an
age of mass culture, individuals are more often and more easily brought
into intimate, experiential contact with narratives of the past, giving them a
sense that they have a personal link to a history that they did not live
through in any traditional sense. And yet I am not suggesting that a visitor
to the Holocaust Museum believes even for a moment that they are
experiencing the Holocaust: visitors dont walk through the freight car and
remember being a Holocaust victim. I have in mind something more
complicated: because the visitor is having a bodily experience while they are
apprehending the intellectual, or cognitive historical narrative that the
museum creates, they develop an individual and affective relationship to
that particular past. As I describe in the book, the shoes that once belonged
to Holocaust victims draw us into a relationship with them. But at the
same moment that we experience the shoes as their shoeswhich could
very well have been our shoeswe feel our own shoes on our feet . . . . We
feel mimetically connected to what we see but remain aware of the
profound differences that separate them from us. We are not, as Berger
suggests, literally experiencing someone elses memory, but rather learning
to see differently, as if through someone elses eyes. What I am describing
here has to do with positionality. These different media have the ability to
position us in different and unnatural ways. Visitors to the museum are
disempowered and made vulnerable in ways that dont usually occur in
their own lives, and their memory of that experience, in conjunction with
the historical narrative that the museum articulates, is the kind of memory
formation that I am trying to describe in the book. To me, this is memory
and not simply knowledge of history, because it involves an affective
relationship to the past. Moreover, with memory comes a sense of
obligation and responsibility: remembering is a moral injunction.
Berger asks whether prosthetic memory is different in kind from other
forms of memory, or simply different in degree. He suggests that if it is the
latter, then my claims are not that radical. In fact, I would accept that the
novelty of prosthetic memory is a question of degreeafter all, as I suggest
in my book, there have always been technologies for passing on
memoriesyet I continue to insist on its radical potential. With the mass
dissemination of film, the circulation of narratives about the pastand
hence, of potential memoriesincreased exponentially. Unlike earlier
technologies of memory, which were mostly geared toward consolidating
and passing on group memory in the service of group identity, the
memories made available by film and mass culture were equally available to
all for the price of a ticket. The sensuous engagement that these

Rethinking History 629

technologies enable creates the formation of a memory of an event that
wasnt lived in the traditional sense, and might not be acquired in any
natural or voluntary way. And this experience might not always be
comfortable. The technology of the cinema and the experiential museum
have the capacity to force us into someone elses social position. And heres
where I really must clarify my point vis-a`-vis Berger. Certainly the human
potential for empathy has long existed; however, throughout history, that
potential has not always been realized because of the deep social divisions
between people (nation, race, religion, ethnicity). When memories become
available across those social divisions, they can begin to create a common
ground or vocabulary between people who previously had none, an
essential precondition for the practice of empathy.
Calling these memories prosthetic not only signals their usefulness, but
also calls attention to their artificiality, to their unnaturalness. One uses
them like memories, and even comes to own them, but never confuses
them with ones own lived experiences. Because the premise is not
authenticity, their value derives exclusively from their social function, from
their ability to promote what Munslow calls egalitarian social benefits and
values. In allowing us to see as if through others eyes, they open up the
possibility of empathy, helping us to construct bridges in the face of
difference.
Okay, so its a bit utopian. My goal has never been to be an apologist for
mass culture, or even worse, a defender of the global economy. But neither
do I think that critique is the only acceptableor even most desirable
posture for leftist intellectual work. It is easy to point out oppression,
manipulation and exploitation but much more difficult to imagine the way
out. For me, intellectual academic work has to begin not with resignation,
but with the energy and determination to imagine a different future.