Protagoras' Man-Measure Fragment

Author(s): Laszlo Versenyi

Source: The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Apr., 1962), pp. 178-184
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/292215
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PROTAGORAS' MAN-MEASURE FRAGMENT.

. . . IIpwrTayopas fE /3ovAXrat 7ravT(ov Xprlyardov Ltvat tLETp

avOpw7rov, iT(-V p rV OVT(rV o'tv, 'TLV v TdV SE OVK OVTOV W0 OVK

J-ETpOV oLEV AeyOv TNO KptTqfpLOV, XprLaT(v as ToV TrpaayiaTV

T Ta O TUTO VT?r Ta cfT O aWoaLeVcLa EKacuTo iova, Kac OvTOS ladyet TO

(Sextus, Pyr., I, 216).

The brevity of the fragment and the absence of direc

oration by Protagoras gave rise to endless controversy ab
meaning. Already Sextus, as we see, immediately proce
interpret the key terms so as to clarify the fragment, a
terms he is here concerned with have been interpreted
reinterpreted even before him-by Plato and Aristotle-an

tainly ever since. As it obviously depends on their interpret

what kind of relativity Protagoras introduced, we too

have to raise the question, whether, in the sentence, "m
means the individual or man in general; whether Ws m

"that," "in what manner," or "how," whether xp' aT

things or qualities; and finally, what kind of criterion or m

it is that Protagoras said man to be ? As these terms are

dependent, the interpretation of each mutually conditioning

meaning of the others, it is only after dealing with all o

that we begin to understand what Protagoras meant to c
Although in the Theaetetus-of which dialogue Sextus'

ysis of the fragment is hardly independent-Plato se

prefer the individual interpretation of the Protagorean "ma

the collective interpretation "all men" (and complete

exclusion: no one, no man) which is at least numerically

alent to mankind, man in general, also appears occasion
The general interpretation is on the whole absent, alth
Socrates comes close to it when he ironically remarks:
surprised that he does not say . . .that a pig or a dog-h
ape or some even more absurd creature . . . is the meas
Theaet., 152 A, 158 A, 161 D, E, 166 C, 171 E, etc.
2 Theaet., 170 A: "man, or rather all men"; also ol 7roXXoi 170 E, Tb
7rX6os 171 A, d7ravras 171 A, B, racTrwv 171 C, etc., which are not offered

as direct interpretations yet show how the "individual." often leads to

the collective, a fact Protagoras could hardly be unaware of.
178

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PROTAGORAS' MAN-MEASURE FRAGMENT.

17Y9

all things" (161 C). The reason for this absence, howe

not so much that the " man in general" interpretation is for

to Protagoras' thought, but rather that in the Theaetetu

uses Protagoras' sentence as a starting point for a discus

knowledge qua perception, and dealing with percepti

sensation, the individual, rather than man in general,

obvious "measure" of what is and appears to him. In

of this we have to ask, now, whether Protagoras restric

relativity expressed in the fragment to sense perception
At first glance the major portion of the Theaetetus se
support this supposition, and in consequence of this rest
"man" is taken to mean each man, Us is replaced by ola
Xp,qjuaTa are interpreted as 7TOLOTr7TE, perceived qualities,

and cold, bitter and sweet, etc. Since these qualities wer
considered as substances, prime elements, in Presocrati

losophy, it is not impossible that Protagoras should have wr

Xpv,=rara when referring to them.3 Nevertheless the sum o

evidence, in Plato and our other sources, points to the concl

that this restriction, and the Theaetetus' theory of sens

ception, are un-Protagorean.
Plato himself seems to indicate this even in the Theae

by his reference to Protagoras' "secret doctrine," by not dir

ascribing the theory of perception and the equation of p

tion and knowledge to Protagoras, but merely saying that in

end Protagoras' sentence and the Theaetetus' theory boil

to the same thing (160D), and finally by the "apolo

Protagoras" where he lets the Sophist protest against P

misinterpretations of his view: "Treat what I say in a s

more suitable to it" (166 C), Protagoras says, "and

pursue the letter of my argument but get at its meaning

clearly" (166D), "and do not be unjust in your ele

(167 D,E) "nor inimical and quarrelsome" (168 B), but

out what we really mean" and do not cause perplexity by

verting my words (ibid. C). Furthermore, even apart fro

apology of Protagoras, Plato is by no means consiste

restricting Protagorean relativity to sense perception i

Theaetetus, but it is at times opinions, thoughts, belief
judgments that seem to be the xpuara in question.4

3 As von Fritz points out in his article on Protagoras in R.-.,

'Theaet., 170, 171; cf. also Sextus, Adv. Math., VII, 60; Arist

Met., 1009a; Aet., Doxogr., 396b, 15.

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LASZLO VERSENYI.

180

All this is much more pronounced in the Protagor

"apology of Protagoras " in the Theaetetus, where no re

of "man" to the individual and of xp l,ara to sense

evident, and this fact is all the more significant as bot

passages are likely to be more reliable representation

goras' views than the major portion of the Theaetetu

In the Protagoras-Apology it is neither just sense p

nor just the individual as measure that Protagoras
about: "whatever seems right and honorable to a ci
and honorable to it as long as it holds it to be so" (1
the restriction is even more conspicuously absent in
goras, where the Sophist in fact answers Socrate

concerning pigs and dog-headed apes as measure

161 C). "Are those things good which are profitabl

Socrates asks (Prot., 333 D), and in his answer Prot
not only man qua species as the measure of goodness
(which are obviously not mere sense perceptions), b
relativity all the way down the line. What is good

relative to (its usefulness for) men, what for horses, ca

trees, etc., to horses, cattle, and so on. What is go

may be bad for animals, and vice versa, what may b
the roots of a tree may be bad for its shoots, what b
inward parts of man may harm the outside of the
Thus we see a diversity of "things" (fairness, justice
utility, nourishment, and their opposites) relative

variety of "measures," which may be more inclu

species of animals) or less inclusive (parts of man a
than the individual.

5 In the Protagoras the Sophist is represented as alive, speaking in the

first person; in the Theaetetus he is dead and has been dead a long time;
furthermore the Protagoras belongs in a period in Plato's activity when
-judging from his portrayal of Socrates-he is less inclined to take too

great liberties with other peoples' views and to use them entirely as
mouthpieces for his own thought; also in the Protagoras, and at the
time of its writing, Plato still has a great deal of sympathy with and
respect for the Sophist; all this diminishes as time goes by.
As for the " apology of Protagoras " in the Theaetetus, it is likely to
be more authentic than the rest of the dialogue, not only because it is

told at least vicariously by Protagoras himself, but mainly because of

its almost exact correspondence with the picture of Protagoras we get
in the Protagoras and in our other sources.

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PROTAGORAS' MAN-MEASURE FRAGMENT.

181

If further evidence is needed for the fact that the relat

the Protagorean fragment introduced went way beyond
perception and the individual,6 we only need to refer to

anonymous Dissoi Logoi which exhibits strong Protag

influence 7 and whose use of relativity shows the same l

restriction to sensation and individuals. Here it is the

and the bad, the useful and the harmful (? 1), beautiful

ugly (?2), right and wrong (?3), true and false (?4),

are shown to be relative to different people, states, etc.

different situations. Also, in view of the correspondence bet

Dissoi Logoi, 2, 9-19, but especially 2, 18 and Herodotus,

38, we might add the latter's "if one proposed to all me
choose from all the customs or laws what seemed to them
... each would choose his own," and the following passage
the relativity of funeral customs, as examples of the ext
of Protagorean 8 relativity to men, nations, etc., and of
relative Xplxlara in question not being mere perceptions
sensations.

6 T. Gomperz, H. Gomperz, H. Maier, W. Nestle, A. Levi, et al. all

agree that the restriction is un-Protagorean.
7 The reasons for the general agreement on Dissoi Logoi being influenced by Protagoras are many. First the use, in ?? 1-4, of an ingenious
antilogical scheme, with occasional blunders serious enough to make us
doubt that they could have been committed by a skilful antilogist, thus
leading to the inference that the writer took his scheme from someone
else. Protagoras, the inventor, according to Diogenes Laertius, of antilogies naturally comes to mind, especially as the first sentence of Dissoi

Logoi recalls the dovoL X6yot Diogenes attributes to Protagoras. (On

the Protagorean origin of the antilogical scheme of 1-4 cf. H. Gomperz,
Sophistik und Rhetorik; Nestle, Von Mythos zu Logos; Kranz in
Hermes, LXXII; Levi in A. J. P., LXI.). Secondly, the antilogical
scheme of Dissoi Logoi is rooted in Protagorean relativism. Thirdly,
there is a striking material correspondence between Dissoi Logoi, 1-4,
Protagoras' fragments 1, 5, Plato's Protagoras, 334 A, B, C; as well as
between Dissoi Logoi, 6, Protagoras' fragments 3, 10, and 11, the myth
and logos in Plato's Protagoras, Anonymus Iamblichi, and the Protagoras-Apology in the Theaetetus, which makes the assumption plausible
that each of these two groups of passages had a common Protagorean
source.

8 On the relationship of Protagoras and Herodot

pated in the foundation of Thurii, cf. Mass in Herm

Platons Protagoras; Von Mythos zu Logos; and "S

bei Isokrates," in Philologus, LXX.

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182

LASZLO VERSENYI.

If the preceding interpretation of the meaning of "

"things " in the fragment is correct, Protagoras' use of

XprWtara-rather than oVra or even 7rpdaytara-becomes e

appropriate, for the original meaning of XPuaTra i

things, beings, or objects in general, but things with

relation to our involvement with them: things o

needs; goods, property, etc.; generalized into affair
matters we are concerned with. xprtka is derived fro

XpdolatL: to use, to have dealing with, to live with some

in Xp. vooLts or avotlal; X. reXvr, XP. yVVatKI, XP. 7tvt o

In all these cases what is stressed is the connotation of our use

of, dealing and living with, attitude and relation to a thing,

and not what that thing may or may not be in itself.9
In this sense of the word, xprlla already implies a derpov, i. e.
something in relation to which it is what it is, so that the fragment becomes nearly tautological, or at least trivial, for it takes

no great insight or ingenuity to pronounce the relativity of

things relative by definition, or to point out that man is the

measure of things whose esence-by definition-depends on

man's relationship to them. Taken, however, as a statement of
principle at the very beginning of Protagoras' book, there is
nothing trivial about the sentence. Narrowing down the contemporary meaning of Xp?!ara-any thing, object, whatsoeverto its original connotation, Protagoras announces a practical
program: The things we are concerned with are Xp/marTa, i.e.
things we are decisively related to; thus there is no point in
speaking in a grand manner about what things may or may not
be in themselves; what we have to take into account and concentrate on is what they are for us, in the world we live in,
in a world in which our relationship to things, our living in
the world, is decisive.
If the sentence is understood in this manner, the controversy

about the Us in the fragment, i.e. whether it means "that,"

9 All this is not to say that the use of the word alone establishes our
interpretation, for by Protagoras' time the meaning of xp,ula was much
too general and all-inclusive to allow this, and we have no evidence
indicating that Protagoras engaged in etymological research like Prodicus, trying to define and distinguish precise meanings. On the contrary, it is our interpretation that makes Protagoras' use of Xpiuiara
in the fragment seem appropriate.

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PROTAGORAS' MAN-MEASURE FRAGMENT.

183

"in what manner," or "how," and whether the statem

ErLtv is existential, or a mere judgment of quality o
becomes largely verbal. Since we are no longer dealin
abstract-theoretical questions concerning things in th

but with what things are for us, i. e. not with absolute b

relative existence, judgments of quality (hot-cold, bitt

and value (good, bad, fair, just, nourishing, harmful
priate, unhealthy; food, poison, medicine) are judgm
existence. The what, how, and that of a xp;yia are det
in, defined by, and dependent on its region of use fr
it (xp~xca) cannot be abstracted, for without this dete
relation Xpx 'jara do not exist (qua XP laTa in the stri

There is not any further necessity either to try to assign

limit to what "man" denotes in the fragment, for th

of any xpyp/a is neither man as the individual, nor m

tively, nor man in general, but simply whatever organism

vidual, state, mankind, other animals, plants, etc.) is

relation to it which determines it (its essence and ex
qua Xp-la.O
The fact that the fragment says "man is the measure of all
things," and not that the measure of a thing is that in relation
to which it is what it is, i. e. the region into which qua Xprqxa
it belongs, in no way conflicts with this conclusion. Protagoras
obviously holds11 that the things a pig, a firefly, a dog-headed
ape, or some still stranger creature may be concerned with are
relative to each of these creatures. The point, however, is-and
this is what the fragment is designed to emphasize-that we are
neither pigs, nor dog-headed apes, nor some more bizarre creature

(like the pure intellect of a Parmenides) but human beings, and

thus, as far as we are concerned, man indeed (whether the individual, the state, or mankind) is the measure of things. If at
first it seems merely tautological to say that things of our concern concern us, it is far from trivial to recall this at a time
when men appear oblivious to the fact. At such time to remind
man that he is not an abstract-theoretical chimera in communica-

tion with objective-immutable absolute essences, but a living

10 On this interpretation of Xp/,Aa cf. Nestle, Von Mythos zu Logos.
pp. 276 ff.
11 Cf. Prot., 333 D.

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184

LASZLO VERSENYI.

human being, to point out that it is this world of xp'ya

which he lives, that ultimately concerns him, and th

him from the world of Parmenides and post-Parmenidea

philosophy, in which he literally lost himself, into a

practical action, all this is far from trivial; it is the
first and most important task. And this is what Prot
Pointing to the world in which our relationships, att

opinions are decisive, our concerns of utmost concern, h

man to himself.

Were this not the case, Protagoras' insistence on relativity

would be a great deal less significant. After all, lyric poetry 12
had already found value-judgments relative, Xenophanes had
already derided the relativity of our anthropomorphic religious
imagery, and Heracleitus emphasized the relativity of "private"
judgment, long before the Sophists. It is Protagoras' historical
position, i. e. that he radicalized and unified these views in the
midst of and in opposition to natural philosophy's search for
absolute, unchanging, universal first principles and substances,
that gives his relativism the status of a much needed reform.

While natural philosophy wanted-and thought itself capable

of-getting away from what is merely human, relative, and conditioned, Protagoras in effect declared that this attempt is
neither fruitful nor desirable. The world we live in and are

able to know is the world of our relative, conditioned, human

experience, and so instead of framing abstract hypotheses abou
the theoretical nature of the universe we had better return to

everyday life and try to solve the problems that confront u

here and now.13
LASZLO VERSENYI.
WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

12 Cf. e.g. Archilochus, frs. 41, 68; Sappho, 16.

13 This attitude of Protagoras resembles that of Hippocratic medicin
in general. It is especially interesting to read the Hippocratic On
Ancient Medicine in this connection, for its explicit antagonism to the
formulation of "empty hypotheses " and first principles, its advocacy
of investigating "what man is in relation to foods and drinks and other

habits," as well as its general insistence on relativity (and certain

other traits), show a striking similarity to Protagoras' thought.

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