Security Dialogue Presentation

The Security Dialogue Initiative for Cyprus
Interim Research Findings and Policy Recommendations
Purpose and Rationale of the Security Dialogue Initiative

To move away from win-lose security perceptions that feed from historical traumas
and fears
To broaden and deepen the debate around security, to include human,

economic, ontological and social aspects
To better understand and deliberate on the security needs, potential risks and
threat perceptions of the communities, as seen from a holistic understanding of
security
To collect and develop alternative security arrangements for these needs,
threats, fears and risks and to test their viability and acceptability through intercommunal public opinion research
To propose a comprehensive security architecture that can credibly address the
security needs of all communities
Added value of broadening security

Guarantees &
Military: Focused on
worst-case scenarios
Narrow &
Zero Sum
Discourse
Regional &
Realpolitik
Bargaining
Integrative &
Win Win
Discourse
Cypriot &
Domestic:
Focused on
sustainability
No
Convergence
SECURITY
Broader Security
Mechanisms:
Focused on shared
security needs
Convergence
Methodology and Approach of the Security Dialogue Initiative

Qualitative Public
Opinion Research
(11 focus groups Oct
2016 Nov 2016)
Dialogue with Policy

Stakeholders
(interviews & group
discussions Oct 2016
Jan 2017)
Security
Solutions for
Cyprus
Quantitative Public
Opinion Research
(3,000 participants, Dec
2016 Jan 2017)
Commissioned Expert
Research
(support of 10
international & Cypriot
security experts
solicited Oct Dec
2016)
Public Opinion on Settlement prospects and

conventional security scenarios
Hope that the Peace Process will produce results

60%
Desire that the Peace Process should succeed

60%
53%
50%
50%
48%
50%
43%
40%
40%
34%
34%
30%
30%
23%
20%
10%
0%
0%
Greek Cypriots
Hopeful
Turkish Cypriots
23%
20%
10%
Unsure
25%
21%
16%
No hope
31%
Wish that nothing

comes of the peace
process
Greek Cypriots
Ambivalent
Wish that the peace

process leads to a
settlement
Turkish Cypriots
Greek Cypriots
Unitary State
17%
Bizonal Bicommunal Federation
17%
28%
Continuation of Status Quo
52%
20%
31%
Tolerable
40%
Bizonal Bicommunal Federation
37%
77%
0%
Two States, both in EU
66%
36%
Two States, both in EU
Unacceptable
Turkish Cypriots
17%
12% 11%
60%
80%
32%
0%
70%
33%
25%
Unitary State
T/Cs: Unacceptable
22%
16%
Continuation of Status Quo
100%
Satisfactory or Desirable
9%
20%
T/Cs: Tolerable
51%
41%
34%
30%
40%
38%
60%
80%
100%
T/Cs: Satisfactory or Desirable
Greek Cypriots
Turkish guarantees to be cancelled after important parts of
implementation have succeeded, such as effective power sharing and
absence of serious inter-communal violence
52%
13%
Continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee with unilateral intervention

rights by Greece or Turkey, for five years after the solution, after which it
will be cancelled
36%
76%
Revision of the Treaty of Guarantee, so that Turkey can only intervene in

the northern part of the island while Greece can only intervene in the
southern part of the island.
79%
10%
14%
6%
15%
Continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee, with unilateral intervention

rights by Greece or Turkey, for fifteen years after the solution, after which
it will reviewed
83%
7%
10%
Turkish Cypriot constituent state to be able to call Turkey for help in case
of emergency, but without any Turkish troops actually being stationed in
Cyprus after a settlement
84%
5%
11%
Unilateral intervention right of Turkey abolished, but in case of need, the

parliament of the T/C constituent state would be able to call Turkey for
help after all agreed remedies are exhausted
88%
0%
Less Secure
10%
No Change
20%
30%
40%
More Secure
4% 8%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Turkish Cypriots
Revision of the Treaty of Guarantee, so that Turkey can only intervene in
the northern part of the island while Greece can only intervene in the
southern part of the island.
19%
Unilateral intervention right of Turkey abolished, but in case of need, the

parliament of the T/C constituent state would be able to call Turkey for
help after all agreed remedies are exhausted
29%
26%
28%
Continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee, with unilateral intervention

rights by Greece or Turkey, for fifteen years after the solution, after which
it will reviewed
34%
Turkish Cypriot constituent state to be able to call Turkey for help in case
of emergency, but without any Turkish troops actually being stationed in
Cyprus after a settlement
35%
Continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee with unilateral intervention

rights by Greece or Turkey, for five years after the solution, after which it
will be cancelled
46%
33%
33%
24%
37%
Turkish guarantees to be cancelled after important parts of

implementation have succeeded, such as effective power sharing and
absence of serious inter-communal violence
41%
27%
36%
56%
0%
Less Secure
52%
10%
No Change
20%
30%
24%
40%
More Secure
50%
60%
70%
20%
80%
90%
100%
Greek Cypriots
Full departure of all Greek and Turkish troops
13%
5%
A military contingent from a country other than Greece chosen by the

Greek Cypriots, stationed in the Greek Cypriot constituent state
83%
39%
A Greek military contingent stationed in the Greek Cypriot constituent

state
16%
46%
10%
A UN Security Council mandated international force, to guarantee security

in Cyprus for an agreed period, that will also include Greek and Turkish
forces
53%
A military contingent comprised of soldiers from different impartial,

Christian and Muslim states, but excluding Greece, Turkey and the UK,
stationed in Cyprus for guaranteeing the Cyprus agreement
54%
44%
8%
39%
12%
A Turkish military contingent stationed in the Turkish Cypriot constituent

state
34%
91%
0%
Less Secure
45%
10%
No Change
20%
30%
40%
More Secure
50%
5% 4%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Turkish Cypriots
A Turkish military contingent stationed in the Turkish Cypriot constituent
state
12%
A UN Security Council mandated international force, to guarantee security

in Cyprus for an agreed period, that will also include Greek and Turkish
forces
19%
22%
A Greek military contingent stationed in the Greek Cypriot constituent

state
35%
38%
A military contingent comprised of soldiers from different impartial,

Christian and Muslim states, but excluding Greece, Turkey and the UK,
stationed in Cyprus for guaranteeing the Cyprus agreement
44%
35%
42%
A military contingent from a country other than Greece chosen by the

Greek Cypriots, stationed in the Greek Cypriot constituent state
28%
30%
48%
Full departure of all Greek and Turkish troops
28%
32%
53%
0%
Less Secure
68%
10%
No Change
20%
30%
20%
28%
40%
More Secure
50%
60%
70%
18%
80%
90%
100%
Greek Cypriots
Full departure of all foreign military forces, including Greek and Turkish troops,
along with the dismantling of the British Military Bases.
16%
6%
78%
A Turkish military base in the northern part of the island, with a status similar to
the current British Bases, which will only be involved in international
peacekeeping missions, without interfering in internal Cypriot affairs
81%
Establishment of two additional military bases, one Greek and one Turkish, to
exist alongside the British Military Bases
84%
the current British Bases, which will be guaranteeing the security of the Turkish
Cypriot constituent state
10%
No Change
20%
30%
40%
More Secure
12%
4%
90%
0%
Less Secure
8%
50%
12%
5% 5%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Turkish Cypriots
the current British Bases, which will be guaranteeing the security of the Turkish
Cypriot constituent state
18%
Establishment of two additional military bases, one Greek and one Turkish, to
exist alongside the British Military Bases
21%
the current British Bases, which will only be involved in international
peacekeeping missions, without interfering in internal Cypriot affairs
59%
29%
24%
Full departure of all foreign military forces, including Greek and Turkish troops,
along with the dismantling of the British Military Bases.
50%
23%
53%
49%
0%
Less Secure
23%
10%
No Change
20%
31%
30%
40%
More Secure
50%
60%
20%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Potential Guarantor States: Greek Cypriots
Potential Guarantor States: Turkish Cypriots
Russia
32%
A coalition of neutral countries, not

including Greece, Turkey or any P5 states
35%
25%
41%
Greece
France
37%
22%
41%
United Kingdom
48%
Greece
38%
21%
42%
A coalition of neutral countries, not

including Greece, Turkey or any P5 states
49%
39%
United States
China
43%
United States
23%
70%
Turkey
Turkey 5%
53%
19%
51%
United Kingdom
Tolerable
20%
40%
69%
26%
40%
34%
31%
21%
37%
56%
12%
29%
16%
65%
25%
10%
13%
China
66%
24%
10%
13%3%
Russia
68%
22%
10%
17%
60%
26%
France
26%
84%
0%
Unacceptable
16%
80%
100%
0%
Unacceptable
Tolerable
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Potential Supporting Organizations: Greek Cypriots
European Union
Organisation for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
The United Nations
9%
73%
European Union
18%
28%
12%
20%
68%
Organisation for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
20%
9%
24%
67%
The United Nations
23%
NATO
48%
0%
Unacceptable
18%
Potential Supporting Organizations: Turkish Cypriots
20%
Tolerable
25%
40%
60%
NATO
26%
80%
100%
Unacceptable
30%
34%
0%
54%
20%
Tolerable
50%
34%
43%
30%
40%
37%
60%
80%
100%
Intended Vote in a Future Referendum

45%
40%
35%
32%
30%
24%
25%
20%
15%
10%
23%
21%
16%
18%
17%
23%
15%
12%
5%
0%
I would certainly, or almost I currently lean towards a No I am currently just as likely to I currently lean towards a Yes I would certainly, or almost
certainly vote No
vote, though I might at that
vote Yes as to vote No
vote, though I might at that
certainly vote Yes
time sway towards a Yes
time sway towards a No vote
vote
Greek Cypriots
Turkish Cypriots
Foundations for a new Security Architecture
Basic principles for a new Security Architecture in Cyprus

Security architecture should effectively respond to actual and perceived threats
Current positional bargaining approach is based on historic negotiating positions, not an in-depth
understanding of potential threats that a security architecture should remedy.
Preventive remedies are no less important than reactive remedies
Current conversations primarily focus on reactive remedies, such as number & deployment of troops,
military guarantees etc.
Building endogenous resilience should be the ultimate goal

In the long run, a settlement can be sustained only if Federal Cyprus develops its own internal
capacities to deal with stressors and threats.
Potential threats specific to each community

Greek Cypriots
Turkish Cypriots
Turkish troops will not

withdraw as agreed
Turkey will interfere in

government functioning
and undermine
sovereignty
T/Cs will gradually

be marginalized in
federal institutions
Orthodox Church
will interfere in
government
functioning
Territory & properties will

not be returned as
agreed
Collapse of the federal

state will leave G/C state
without international
recognition
Power sharing
provisions will not
be implemented as
agreed
Police & Judiciary

will display
communal bias in
favor of G/Cs
G/Cs will carry economic

burden of the settlement
T/C economy will

collapse or will not
be able to compete
with G/C economy
G/C extremist
groups will attack
T/Cs
Citizens from Turkey will

be serving interests of
Turkey rather than
Cyprus
Potential threats that are common to both communities

Citizens who choose to reside
in the other constituent state
might be victims of communal
bias & become marginalized
Daily inter-communal disputes

might spill over to political &
economic domains
Polarized public narratives &

linguistically isolated media
might amplify tensions
Regional disputes (e.g. over

energy) might spill over to
Cyprus
Lack of institutional capacities

& qualified human resources to
ensure good governance
Citizens hostile to the

settlement package might
undermine implementation
Lack of harmonization &

integration to the EU acquis in
the Turkish Cypriot community
might create imbalances
between the constituent states
Marginalization of women &

youth in public life
Connection of local extremist

groups with counterparts in
Greece and Turkey might
contribute to tension
Erosion of government
functioning due to corruption,
nepotism & lack of meritocracy
Ineffective mechanisms to deal

with hate speech &
discrimination might contribute
to tension
Lack of commitment to
federalism and its principles
might undermine
implementation
Conflicting mandates & lack of

will/capacity to coordinate
between security institutions
Ineffective mediation
mechanisms and deadlocks in
decision making might
undermine sense of justice
Foreign policy splits might

create deadlocks and tension
due to lack of common
national interest
Positive Scenario Expectations

61%
Turkish Cypriots will be able to move and settle, if that is their wish, in the Greek Cypriot
constituent state
92%
62%
Everyone will have unrestricted access to cultural and religious sites
74%
62%
Territorial lines will be adjusted as stipulated in the agreement
69%
64%
Greek Cypriots will be able to move and settle, if that is their wish, in the Turkish Cypriot
constituent state
Federal Cyprus will be able to develop a single and coherent foreign policy based on
common Cypriot interests, independent of Turkey and Greece
62%
57%
Federal Cyprus will have good and friendly relations with Turkey
60%
58%
Politicians will dedicate more time and resources to essential domestic reforms
59%
55%
The international community will effectively support the implementation of the solution
58%
58%
The country will enjoy great economic prosperity following a settlement
55%
61%
Young people and women will have a greater role in society and politics
46%
48%
Property restitution claims will be dealt with in a timely and effective manner
28%
The new state of affairs will be implemented smoothly, in accordance with agreed
timelines
39%
48%
0%
T/Cs: Likely / definitely will happen
65%
54%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
G/Cs: Likely / definitely will happen
70%
80%
90%
100%
Negative Scenario Expectations: Lack of Social Cohesion & Violence

63%
Most people will lack commitment to Federal institutions and will care only about
their own constituent state
75%
61%
Disputes over land or property will result in tensions and/or violence
70%
64%
Police officers and judges will be biased in favour of people from their own
community
66%
62%
Greek or Greek Cypriot extremist groups will target Turkish Cypriots
62%
44%
Turkish or Turkish Cypriot extremist groups will target Greek Cypriots
74%
55%
The cost of the solution will be too high, causing economic hardship
61%
58%
The government will be corrupt and inefficient
53%
The Turkish Cypriot constituent state will try to secede and become an independent
state
53%
There will be tension during the first few months or years, that will lead to the
collapse of the agreement
53%
56%
54%
46%
Many people will lose their jobs because of the settlement
34%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Negative Scenario Expectations: Governance Crises & External Interventions

71%
People who came from Turkey will be more loyal to Turkey than to Federal
Cyprus
80%
64%
There will be frequent deadlocks in the decision making of the federal

government
79%
60%
Turkey will try to interfere in decisions made by the government
83%
Turkey will be intervening in how Federal Cyprus decides to explore and

monetize its offshore natural resources
58%
82%
65%
The Orthodox Church will try to interfere in the decision making of the
government
70%
55%
Regional tensions involving Turkey and Greece will spill over to Cyprus and
create inter-communal problems
59%
65%
Greece will try to interfere in the decision making of the government
25%
The Greek Cypriots will attempt to marginalize or even expel the Turkish
Cypriots from the Federal government
53%
31%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Preventive Vs. Reactive security remedies
Government
dysfunction &
Socioeconomic
inequalities
Social tensions &

political
polarization
Preventive remedies / Soft Security
Isolated
outbreaks of
violence
Widespread
violence
Reactive remedies / Hard Security
Endogenous resilience Vs. State fragility

Stressors are reduced over time, leading to enhanced stability
Civic loyalty to the Federal

state is reinforced while
endogenous capacities for
peace & security increase
ENDOGENOUS
RESILIENCE
State & societal institutions

respond swiftly, effectively and
fairly
System is stressed or
shocked: Incidents of
gridlock, perceived
injustice or violence
Institutions fail to respond, or
disintegrate under the weight
of stressors and shocks
STATE
Stressors increase over time, leading to growing instability
Civic loyalty is transferred to

non-state or external actors while
endogenous capacities for peace
& security decrease
FRAGILITY
Proposed Security Framework
Agreement on EEZ
delineation & sharing
of profits from natural
gas exploitation
Federal
Commission on
Human Rights &
Gender Equality
Late
Prevention
Early
Prevention
Federal Public
Administration
Commission
Staged transition
via a Treaty of
Implementation
Ministry of
Reconstruction
and Social
Cohesion
Effective and
communally blind
Police & Judiciary
Early
Reaction
Council of
Unity and
Cooperation
Early Warning /
Early Response
system
Federal Naval and

Air Defence
Service
Late
Reaction
Federal Rapid
Reaction Force
Greek Cypriots
An agreement that will specify the conditions to be met before the new state of affairs can be put
into effect such as establishment of federal institutions, withdrawal of foreign troops, territorial
adjustments.
9%
Early warning system that will identify tensions between communities and take action to prevent
violence
10%
5%
6%
7%
Robust human rights protections and training in all institutions
A Treaty of Implementation that will clarify the obligations of Turkey, Greece and the Cypriots
regarding the implementation of the settlement, and clarify actions to take if something is not
implemented
84%
6%
16%
A Council of Unity and Cooperation, comprised of men and women from both communities, to
provide guidance in times of tension and crisis
11%
81%
6%
A Federal Rapid Reaction Force (i.e. a small armed unit), comprised of Cypriots from all
communities, to deal with asymmetric threats such as terrorism and with extreme threat scenarios,
such as civil unrest or inter-communal violence
77%
8%
25%
0%
10%
65%
31%
21%
An education system that would encourage multi-communal cooperation
74%
10%
11%
Civil servants that speak both languages, Greek and Turkish
78%
13%
19%
Bicommunal police units within each constituent state, to respond to inter-communal incidents
Less Secure
85%
9%
12%
Justice system that will swiftly deal with anyone that attacks a member of another community
86%
58%
23%
20%
No Change
30%
56%
40%
50%
More Secure
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Turkish Cypriots
Justice system that will swiftly deal with anyone that attacks a member of another community
7%
21%
72%
Robust human rights protections and training in all institutions
7%
27%
66%
Early warning system that will identify tensions between communities and take action to
prevent violence
8%
27%
65%
Bicommunal police units within each constituent state, to respond to inter-communal

incidents
11%
26%
64%
A Treaty of Implementation that will clarify the obligations of Turkey, Greece and the Cypriots
regarding the implementation of the settlement, and clarify actions to take if something is not
implemented
12%
26%
63%
A Council of Unity and Cooperation, comprised of men and women from both communities,
to provide guidance in times of tension and crisis
11%
A Federal Rapid Reaction Force (i.e. a small armed unit), comprised of Cypriots from all
communities, to deal with asymmetric threats such as terrorism and with extreme threat
scenarios, such as civil unrest or inter-communal violence
16%
An agreement that will specify the conditions to be met before the new state of affairs can be
put into effect such as establishment of federal institutions, withdrawal of foreign troops,
territorial adjustments.
10%
57%
27%
16%
0%
58%
32%
16%
An education system that would encourage multi-communal cooperation
59%
27%
11%
Civil servants that speak both languages, Greek and Turkish
Less Secure
31%
57%
36%
20%
No Change
30%
48%
40%
50%
More Secure
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Possible Element of Security Architecture

Staged transition via a Treaty of Implementation
Description
Will clarify the obligations of all sides (i.e. Federation, Constituent States, Turkey, Greece) particularly regarding troop withdrawal and/or
redeployment, establishment of federal institutions, power-sharing provisions, and territorial adjustments; will establish monitoring & auditing
committee with third-party participation, verification mechanisms, and specific mechanisms to address non-compliance; will include precommitment to take unresolved implementation disputes to an international court or other mediation body.
Specifically, the Treaty will set transition milestones and link aspects of implementation that are of concern to different sides: For instance, Turkish
military contingent to withdraw when Turkish Cypriot rotates into the Presidency; Federal government to be established when territorial adjustments
are ready to be implemented.
The Treaty of Implementation will cover many of the issues previously addressed by the Treaty of Guarantee, and will therefore supersede it. As a
result, the status of Turkey and Greece will change from Guarantor Power to Implementing Partner.
Positive impact on G/C sense of security
Positive impact on Common

sense of security
Positive impact on T/C sense of security
Addresses transition concerns regarding troops &

territorial adjustments, and about Turkeys
intervention stemming from an open-ended
guarantee clause.
Addresses concerns about

transitional obligations and
compliance with timeframes
Addresses transition concerns regarding implementation of

power-sharing arrangements.
Negative impact on G/C sense of security
Negative impact on Common

sense of security
Negative impact on T/C sense of security
Concerns about continuation of Turkeys role as

a partner in the post-settlement era.
Concerns over the change in Turkey's status from 'Guarantor

Power' to 'Implementing Partner .
Agreement on EEZ delineation & sharing of profits from natural gas exploitation
Description
A mutual agreement should be reached between Cyprus and Turkey with the involvement and consent of the two communities that will conclusively
arrange, a) the delineation of Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone vis--vis Turkeys, and b) how profits from natural gas exploitation will eventually be
shared by the two constituent states, via the Federal Government to prevent tension and deadlock during the transition period and beyond.
Depending on what is feasible from a negotiating perspective, this can be done either in the context of comprehensive settlement negotiations, or in
the period from agreement to referendum, or very early in the post-settlement era. In any case, some type of informal understanding before a
comprehensive settlement agreement is reached would be beneficial. If direct negotiations prove unfruitful, the sides can agree to refer the issue for
mediation.
Positive impact on G/C sense of
security
Addresses concerns that Turkey
will continue making claims on
Cyprus EEZ after a settlement
Negative impact on G/C sense of
security
Concerns about making Cyprus
natural resources part of the
negotiations and undermining G/C
sovereignty if this occurs as a
tripartite pre-agreement.
Positive impact on Common sense of security
Positive impact on T/C sense of

security
Removes the threat that a disagreement over EEZ delineation and / or natural Addresses concerns that G/Cs will
gas profit sharing could lead the federal government to a highly divisive and
refuse to share profits from
potentially destabilizing gridlock.
natural gas exploitation
Negative impact on Common sense of security
Negative impact on T/C sense of

security

Federal Commission on Human Rights & Gender Equality
Description
The Federal Commission on Human Rights & Gender Equality will monitor and audit federal and constituent state institutions, to
ensure that constitutionally mandated human rights are enjoyed by citizens of all ethnicities, wherever they choose to live in the
country, free from any kind of discrimination or harassment. Ombudspersons at the state level will be able to refer cases to the
Federal Human Rights Commission. The Commission will regularly submit reports on the status of human rights in Cyprus, liaise with
specific institutions to help improve their practices, recommend legislation and report infractions to prosecuting authorities.
Furthermore, the Commission will promotes gender equality and mainstreaming by a) advising the adoption and implementation of
1325 Agenda & Human Security proposal and toolkit; b) conducting research for policy making; c) providing support to improve
womens participation in peacebuilding, transition and post-transition; and d) mentoring to empower women candidates in
elections, to encourage political participation and enhance electability.
Positive impact on G/C sense
Positive impact on T/C sense
of security
of security
Provides assurances regarding
Fosters sense of justice, cohesion, human rights & gender equality, as
restoration of past human
well as addressing concerns about extremist and discriminatory
rights violations and
lack of communal blindness
behaviour, particularly regarding marginalization in the G/Cs & T/Cs
protection from future
in state institutions.
living in the other constituent state.
violations.
Negative impact on G/C
Negative impact on T/C
sense of security
sense of security

Federal Public Administration Commission
Description
The Federal Public Administration Commission, which should also include a Public Administration Academy, will work to promote
effectiveness, transparency and ongoing modernization in public institutions at the Federal and Constituent State levels. More specifically, it
will: a) propose legislation and other measures to combat corruption, nepotism and clientelism, b) adopt quotas to ensure the inclusion of
women and young people in governance, c) adopt transparent public employment processes to improve sense of justice, d) promote
bilingualism within public institutions at the Federal and Constituent State levels, e) organize internal trainings for civil servants to promote the
vision of a versatile, effective and non-discriminatory public sector, and f) provide capacity building and re-training of civil servants who will
be transitioning into new public institutions (e.g. integration of ex-military personnel into federal security institutions).
security

security
Ensures effectiveness of state institutions, increasing the likelihood that they Addresses concerns about
Addresses concerns that federal
will prove resilient in times of crisis; addresses concerns about lack of
discriminatory practices and
institutions will be fragile and
institutional & human resources capacity for good governance that relates
communal bias in public
might collapse
to functionality and accountability.
institutions (e.g. recruitment).
Negative impact on T/C sense
security
of security
Ministry of Reconstruction and Social Cohesion

Description
The Ministry of Reconstruction and Social Cohesion would take responsibility for several essential tasks in ensuring harmonious relationships
between communities in the post-settlement era. These would include: a) monitoring the work of the Immovable Property Commission from a
perspective of social and economic reconstruction, b) implementing a trust-building agenda through contact programs between members of
different communities, c) coordinating and bridging institutions that would otherwise lack a federal link, e.g. the education ministries of the
constituent states on issues that are pertinent to social cohesion, such as the teaching of civic education and certain aspects of history, d)
encouraging and supporting co-operation between professional associations of different communities, such as journalists, trade unions and
business federations, e) commissioning research into drivers of civic loyalty and political extremism, and f) monitoring the state of social &
economic equality at the local community level, recommending remedial measures accordingly (e.g. EU Regional Funds, Community-level
training programs, etc.)
security
security
Addresses concerns about the Addresses concerns about snowballing of daily inter-communal disputes and
G/C constituent state carrying an lack of commitment to federalism creating inter-communal tension and bias; Addresses concerns about lack
unequal proportion of the
promotes coexistence and social harmony; and promotes collaboration of
of economic competitiveness.
settlements economic burden
education institutions to foster civic loyalties.
security
of security

Council of Unity and Cooperation
Description
The Council of Unity and Cooperation would be a gender-balanced and age-inclusive advisory body, which would provide moral guidance
in times of social tension and crisis, and contribute to deadlock resolution and mediation in the Federal government. In the transitional
period, this Council would additionally exercise executive oversight over the Ministry of Reconstruction and Social Cohesion in order to
shield the work of the Ministry from political crises of the early post-settlement years.
Council members would be selected through a method that assures cross-communal support, where the candidates are mutually endorsed
by the two communities.
security

of security
Addresses concerns about communal bias, functionality, and effectiveness of

federal institutions. Alleviates policy splits due to competing
deadlocks and inefficiency due
allegiances/loyalties. Reduces the likelihood that intergroup tensions might
to the tyranny of the minority.
dominate the political agenda.
Negative impact on G/C sense
of security
of security

Early Warning / Early Response system
Description
The Early Warning / Early Response system will detect emerging security threats at the local community level and develop an
effective preventive response, such as mediation, dialogue facilitation or multicultural education, in coordination with local
authorities and other relevant institutions, including Federal and Constituent State Police when necessary. This system should be put
into place on day 1, and transitionally coordinated by a suitably qualified international organization (e.g. UN, OSCE) until this
capacity can be transferred to the Federal Government.
The Early Warning / Early Response system would prioritize peaceful management of contact hotspots where members of the two
communities will be most likely to experience friction on a daily basis, such as areas that are slated for territorial adjustment,
communities with many returning IDPs, and inner cities.
Positive impact on G/C sense
of security

of security
Would provide specific mechanisms to address inter-communal

disputes, especially those related to transition into the new state of
affairs; would provide a credible preventive response to the threat of
extremism and social unrest.
Negative impact on G/C sense
of security

of security

Effective and communally blind Police & Judiciary
Description
The goal of having effective and communally blind police & judiciary can be achieved through a combination of mechanisms: 1)
Establishing mixed/bi-communal police units beyond the mandate of the federal police at the constituent state and district level to
respond to inter-communal incidents in order to address language barriers and perceived communal bias. These units should include
active and equal participation of women as levels of violence and crime can sometimes rise after the signing of a peace agreement, and
women are seen as less corrupt and more trustworthy & compassionate. 2) Making it possible to challenge a judge on grounds of
discrimination by appealing to a special chamber. 3) During the transitional period, building in international monitoring of justice & civil
security institutions to develop a culture of non-discrimination and communal blindness in the justice and security sector.
security

security

security
Increases cooperation & collaboration among civil security institutions

and fosters gender mainstreaming & equality. Reduces the likelihood
that citizens might take the law in their own hands due to perceived
injustices of state institutions.

communal bias in state
institutions.

of security

Federal Rapid Reaction Force (FRRF)
Description
Comprised of Cypriot personnel from all communities under joint command, to be supported by UN during its establishment, the FRRF will be responsible for
asymmetric threats and exceptional domestic emergencies; will contribute to international missions (humanitarian, peacekeeping, rescue & crisis
management). Best practices will be integrated from other successful examples of multi-communal security forces (e.g. Lebanon), in creating an ethos of
shared security-shared responsibility and adopting an integrity policy amongst servicepersons of different communal backgrounds.
Establishment of FRRF and draw-down of existing G/C National Guard and Turkish Army troops to agreed levels would be expected to take place before the
coming into force of the Comprehensive Settlement agreement.
If necessary, the FRRF can be triggered to deal with emergencies through a distress call by Constituent State authorities.
Any transitional non-Cypriot contingents (i.e. Turkish and Greek) that may remain, would need to coordinate with the FRRF through appropriate status of
forces agreements between Federal Cyprus and Turkey / Greece respectively.
Requirement for contingents to coordinate with FRRF
may alleviate concerns about abuse of mandate, risk
of intervention/invasion and secessionist tendencies.
Requirement for FRRF to be established before the
agreement comes into force will alleviate concerns
for a repeat of 1960, when establishment of the
agreed Cyprus Army never materialized.
Negative impact on G/C sense of security
Possible transitional presence of a Turkish contingent
will make G/Cs uneasy.
Credibly and professionally addresses specific

FRRF will serve as a role model of security sector
extreme threat scenarios that T/Cs are often
co-operation, help build common interests,
concerned about. Triggering of FRRF at the
preferences and loyalty, and promote the role of
Constituent State level increases the credibility of the
Cyprus in the regional security dynamics. Existing
force as a potential security provider. If non-Cypriot
military personnel from both communities will be
contingents are included, the proposal additionally
given career & employment reassurances for postaddresses Turkish Cypriot concerns for a transitional
settlement.
Turkish presence as deterrence.
Negative impact on T/C sense of security

Federal Naval and Air Defence Service (FNAD)
Description
The FNAD will be comprised of Cypriot servicepersons hailing from all communities. It will address regional security challenges, and
protect the external borders of Cyprus as well as offshore economic activities.

security

FNAD will serve as a role model of security sector
co-operation and reduce suspicion about
personnel of other ethnicities; Will address
concerns that Federal Cyprus might be vulnerable
to external threats in the volatile East Med region.
Negative impact on Common sense of security Negative impact on T/C sense of security
Agreement on EEZ
delineation & sharing
of profits from natural
gas exploitation
Federal
Commission on
Human Rights &
Gender Equality
Late
Prevention
Early
Prevention
Federal Public
Administration
Commission
Staged transition
via a Treaty of
Implementation
Ministry of
Reconstruction
and Social
Cohesion
Effective and
communally blind
Police & Judiciary
Early
Reaction
Council of
Unity and
Cooperation
Early Warning /
Early Response
system
Federal Naval and

Air Defence
Service
Late
Reaction
Federal Rapid
Reaction Force

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The Security Dialogue Initiative for Cyprus

Interim Research Findings and Policy Recommendations

Purpose and Rationale of the Security Dialogue Initiative

To broaden and deepen the debate around security, to include human,

Added value of broadening security

Methodology and Approach of the Security Dialogue Initiative

Dialogue with Policy

Public Opinion on Settlement prospects and

Hope that the Peace Process will produce results

Desire that the Peace Process should succeed

Wish that nothing

Wish that the peace

Bizonal Bicommunal Federation

Continuation of Status Quo

Bizonal Bicommunal Federation

Two States, both in EU

Two States, both in EU

Continuation of Status Quo

T/Cs: Satisfactory or Desirable

Continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee with unilateral intervention

Revision of the Treaty of Guarantee, so that Turkey can only intervene in

Continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee, with unilateral intervention

Unilateral intervention right of Turkey abolished, but in case of need, the

Unilateral intervention right of Turkey abolished, but in case of need, the

Continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee, with unilateral intervention

Continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee with unilateral intervention

Turkish guarantees to be cancelled after important parts of

A military contingent from a country other than Greece chosen by the

A Greek military contingent stationed in the Greek Cypriot constituent

A UN Security Council mandated international force, to guarantee security

A military contingent comprised of soldiers from different impartial,

A Turkish military contingent stationed in the Turkish Cypriot constituent

A UN Security Council mandated international force, to guarantee security

A Greek military contingent stationed in the Greek Cypriot constituent

A military contingent comprised of soldiers from different impartial,

A military contingent from a country other than Greece chosen by the

Full departure of all Greek and Turkish troops

Potential Guarantor States: Greek Cypriots

Potential Guarantor States: Turkish Cypriots

A coalition of neutral countries, not

A coalition of neutral countries, not

Potential Supporting Organizations: Greek Cypriots

Organisation for Security and

The United Nations

Organisation for Security and

The United Nations

Potential Supporting Organizations: Turkish Cypriots

Intended Vote in a Future Referendum

Foundations for a new Security Architecture

Basic principles for a new Security Architecture in Cyprus

Building endogenous resilience should be the ultimate goal

Potential threats specific to each community

Turkish troops will not

Turkey will interfere in

T/Cs will gradually

Territory & properties will

Collapse of the federal

Police & Judiciary

G/Cs will carry economic

T/C economy will

Citizens from Turkey will

Potential threats that are common to both communities

Daily inter-communal disputes