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STATE OF REISLAND
(RESPONDENT)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................iv
Multilateral Treaties and Conventions
International Court of Justice Cases
Permanent Court of International Justice Cases
Arbitral Awards
Draft Articles and Reports
Books and Journals
Miscellaneous
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.................................................................................xiv
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .............................................................................................xv
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................xvi
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS ..........................................................................................xxi
PLEADINGS ......................................................................................................................1
1. Rieslands Mass Electronic Surveillance Programs used against the Amestonian
people are inconsistent with international law ............................................................1
1.1 The Documents published by The Ames Post from the Frost Files are admissible
as evidence before this Court ..................................................................................1
1.1.1 Amestonia did not partake in the illegal acquisition of the evidence......1
1.1.2 There was no general rule in international law for the exclusion of
evidence.........................................................................................................2
1.1.3 Illegally obtained evidence is admissible before the ICJ..........................3
1.2 Rieslands Surveillance Programs lack justification under their internal law ...4
1.3 Rieslands Surveillance Programs are contrary to its international law
obligations..................................................................................................................5
1.3.1 The Surveillance Programs contravene the right to privacy under the
ICCPR...........................................................................................................6
1.3.2 The Surveillance Programs breach both the territorial integrity and nonintervention principles................................................................................7
1.4 The court should order that the Surveillance Programs cease with assurances of
non-repetition............................................................................................................8
2. Amestonia did not breach International Law by arresting Margaret Mayer and the
VoR Employees or by seizing the VoR Station and its equipment..............................10
2.1 Amestonia has a right to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over Magaret
Mayer and the VoR Employees...........................................................................11
2.2 The acts of Margaret Mayer and the VoR employees constitute a breach of
international law..................................................................................................11
2.3 The VoR employees do not qualify for immunity under the VCDR................12
2.4 The VoR employees have breached and forfeited their immunity under the
Broadcasting Treaty.............................................................................................14
2.5 The arrest and charges against Margaret Mayer and the VoR employees are
in line with the procedural detention rights under the ICCPR.......................16
2.6 Amestonia is under no obligation to return or compensate Riesland for the
seized and forfeited premises and equipment....................................................17
3. The detention of Joseph Kafker under the Terrorism Act of 2003 violates
International law.............................................................................................................22
3.1 Kafkers detention is arbitrary...........................................................................23
3.1.1 No reasons were given for Kafkers arrest.......................................
3.1.2 Kafker was not promptly brought before a judicial tribunal.........
3.1.3 Kafkers limited right to counsel violates international law...........
3.2 Even if Kafker was detained due to alleged terrorism, Riesland failure to
respect Kafkers right violated international law ............................................27
3.3 Amestonia is therefore entitled to demand Kafkers immediate release........28
3.4 Amestonia is entitled to compensation...............................................................30
4. Riesland is responsible for the cyber attacks of the Ames Post and Chester and
Walsingham and therefore Amestonia are entitled to compensation ....................... 25
4.1 The Ames Post and Chester and Walsingham are nationals of Amestonia and
therefore Amestonia is entitle to protect them...................................................26
4.2 The cyber-attacks amount to an International Wrongful Act..........................26
4.2.1 The cyber-attacks against Amestonia is equal to a use of force......27
4.2.2 The cyber-attacks breach the prohibition of the non-intervention
principle in international law.............................................................28
4.2.3 Amestonias territorial sovereignty was breached by the cyberattacks..................................................................................................28
4.3 The cyber-attacks are attributable to Riesland.................................................29
4.4 Riesland failed its obligation of Due Diligence..................................................31
4.5 Exhaustion of Local Remedies is satisfied.........................................................32
Bibliographical Information
Page No
4, 7, 18, 19
Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No.7.
23, 25
8, 10, 12, 32,
27
UN, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, United 10, 12, 13,
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 500
18
UN, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 24 April 1963
19
Council of Europe. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 22
and Fundamental Freedoms
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third 22
Geneva Convention), 1949, 75 UNTS 135
League of Nations, Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict 26
of Nationality Law, 13 April 1930, League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 179,
p. 89, No. 4137
Bibliographical Information
Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania), 1949 ICJ REP. 4 (Judgment of April 9)
Page No
3, 30, 33
PLO Observer Mission Case (U.N. v. U.S.), 1988 I.C.J. 12 (Advisory Opinion 4
of Apr. 26)
Pulp Mills, Merits, 20 Apr 2010, ICJ Rep 2010,
10
10
12
19
32
33
Bibliographical Information
Page No
The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey) 10 PCIJ 1927
8, 11, 28
Greece v UK, Judgment, PCIJ Series A no 2, 30th August 1924
25
Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco case, Great Britain v French, PCIJ 26
Series B no. 4, (1923)
Factory of Chorzow, Jurisdiction, 1927 P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 9
33
Arbitral Awards
Bibliographical Information
Page No
Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 831 (Perm. Ct. 3, 19
Arb. 1928)
Copland v. United Kingdom, 62617/00 [2007] ECHR 253 (3 April 2007)
Weber and Saravia v Germany [2006] ECtHR, 54934/00 CoE (ECtHR).
The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
A
v
Australia,
Communication
No.
560/1993,
UN
Doc.
6
7
14
19
No.
2120/2011,
UN
Doc. 21
CCPR/C/106/D/2120/2011
Marques de Morais v Angola, Communication No. 1128/2002, UN Doc. 21
CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002
Teran Jijon v Ecuador, Communication No. 277/1988, UN Doc. CCPR/C / 21
44/D/277/1988
Freemantle v Jamaica, Communication No. 625/1995, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ 21
68/D/625/1995
Borisenko v Hungary, Communication No. 852/1999, UN Doc. CCPR /C/ 21
75/D/852/1999.
Gavrilin v Belarus, Communication No. 1342/2005, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ 23
89/D/1342/2005
Kulov v Kyrgystan, Communication No. 1369/2005, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ 24
99/D/1396/2005
Gorji-Dinka v Cameroon, Communication No. 1134/2002, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ 24
83/D/1134/2002
Blanco v Nicaragua,
Communication
No.
328/1988,
UN
Doc. 25
CCPR/C/51/D/328/1988.
Sahadeo v Guyana,
Communication
No.
728/1996,
Un
Doc. 25
CCPR/C/73/D/728/1996
Bibliographical Information
Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic 6
Page No
Report of the United States, para 22, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C /USA/ CO/4 (Apr.
23,2014)
United Nations General Assembly, Report Of The Special Rapporteur On 7
The Promotion And Protection Of The Right To Freedom Of Opinion And
Expression, Frank La Rue (United Nations Human Rights, 2013)
<http://daccess-dds ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/132/01/PDF/ G111320
1.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 6 January 2016.
UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in 8
the
22
27
26
Bibliographical Information
Page No
W. Michael Reisman and Eric E. Freedman, The Plaintiff's Dilemma: 1, 2, 3
Illegally
Obtained
Evidence
And
Admissibility
In
International
Evidence
6,
available
at
http://works.bepress.com
/michael_scharf/2.
Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework For Surveillance 6, 7, 8, 10,
(2015) 55:2 Virginia Journal of International Law.
11, 12
Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties And Foreign Surveillance: 6
Privacy In The Digital Age (2015) 56 Harvard International Law Journal.
John Kish and David Turns, International Law And Espionage (M Nijhoff 8
Publishers 1995).
Juan Jose Quintana, Litigation at the International Court of Justice: 10
Practice and Procedure (M Nijhoff Publishers 2015)
10
Nicholas
Tsugourias,
State
Responsibility
for
Cyber
Operations: 31
32
33
Miscellaneous
Bibliographical Information
United Nations, Rules Of Court | International Court Of Justice (Icj- 3
Page No
cij.org,1978)<http://www.iccij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=3&>
accessed 6 January 2016
Compromis
4, 5, 6, 10,
12, 14, 15,
35, 18, 19,
20, 21, 22,
24, 27, 30,
33
UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 19
1948, 217 A (III)
11
23
12
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State of Amestonia and the Federal Republic of Riesland have submitted by Special
Agreement, with reservations, the dispute dated September 1 st, 2015, concerning the Frost
Files, to the International Court of Justice in accordance with Article 40(1) of the Courts
Statute.
Both parties have accepted the adhoc jurisdiction of the court in accordance with Article
36(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Both parties shall accept the
judgement of this court as final and binding and execute it in good faith in its entirety.
This agreement has been made in accordance with the contents of the Compromis, subject
to the Corrections and Clarifications issued November 12th, 2015.
13
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.
Whether the documents published by the Ames Post are admissible as evidence
before the Court and whether Rieslands mass electronic surveillance programs
are consistent with international law.
II.
Whether Amestonias seizure and forfeiture of the VoR station and equipment and
the arrest of the VoR employees are consistent with international law.
III.
IV.
Whether the cyber attack against The Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham are
attributable to Riesland and constitutes an internationally wrongful act for which
Amestonia is entitled to compensation.
14
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
Riesland is a developed democratic state and one of the fastest growing free-market
economies in the world. Its rapidly-expanding information technology and communication
sector is world-renowned. Bordering Riesland is Amestonia, a developing country that is a
predominantly agrarian export economy. Both States have similar ethnic compositions and
share a common language. On 11th December 1970, both States signed a number of bilateral
agreements, concerning tourism, trade, extradition, intelligence-sharing and other fields of
corporation.
Broadcasting Treaty:
On 4th March 1992, Riesland and Amestonia signed the Treaty on the Establishment of
Broadcasting Facilities, that permitted each State to build staff and operate a television
station in the others territory. As a result, Riesland established The Voice of Riesland
(VoR) which is hosted by Margaret Mayer, the Head of the VoR. The VoR broadcasted a
variety of award-winning documentaries and highly-acclaimed programs for the next 22
years. One of the VoRs most popular shows was Tea Time with Margaret, a weekly onehour news program featuring interviews with leading politicians and business figures.
Neonicotinoids:
On 2nd October 2012, The Institute for Land and Sustainable Agriculture published a report
that examined the negative impacts of the increased use of neonics by the Amestonia Farmers
on the population of bees and other pollinators. It urged both Riesland and Amestonia to reevaluate their production and extensive uses respectively, of the neonics. Further, it was only
15
until the European Commission adopted a Regulation on 24 th May 2013, restricting the use of
neonics temporary that triggered academic and parliamentary debates in both States.
However, no policy changes were undertaken in either State.
The Hive:
On 2nd July 2013, a new website, www.longlivethehive.com, was launched. The website
invited discussions by environmental activists from both States on online platforms that
protected users anonymity, on ways to stop the continued production and use of neonics,
many in support of drafting legislation. At its peak, it was visited by approximately 200,000
users a day. However, the promotion of violent actions was promoted by some members
including sabotage and arson.
Activities of the Hive:
On the night of 2nd February 2014, seven Amestonian warehouses that stored significant
number of barrels of neonicotinoids were simultaneously set on fire causing 5 deaths, two
being from Riesland and many others were injured. The image of a bee was found spraypainted on the asphalt outside the sites. Further on 7 th March 2014, 263 envelopes containing
white powder were sent to both States Minister of Trade and Agriculture, prominent
Amestonian farmers and board members of three Rieslandic neonic-producing corporations.
The envelopes also bear the image of a bee. On 16 th October 2014, Tom Silvaneta, the
Bureaus Director, informed the Amestonia Minister of Internal Affairs that the Bureau has
successfully identified a ring of Amestonian environmental activists plotting to contaminate
with chemically-altered and toxic neonics, a large shipment of honey intended for Rieslandic
consumption. The Bureau gave Amestonia the names and locations of the ring members.
Subsequently, on 21st October 2014, the police apprehended three Amestonian college
16
17
Ambassador of the United Nations phone and emails regarding Amestonias position on
upcoming votes in the General Assembly and specialized agencies.
18
On 22th March 2015, the computer networks and communication switches of both The Ames
Post and Chester and Walsingham were hacked and disabled. Investigators found the
implementation of a malicious malware which rendered nearly 90% of the information nonrecoverable. Cyber security experts concluded after tracing the IP addresses, that the
computers used came from Riesland governmental computer infrastructures and significant
segments of code in the malware are exact replicas of that used by Riesland previously by
which are not available to no one else but the government. Further external appraisers
estimate damage of unrecoverable data amounted to 45-50 million. As a result, court
proceedings were delayed and The Ames Post had to shut down its operations entirely
temporary. Riesland President issued a statement denouncing the cyber attacks to Riesland
but Riesland refused to respond to the allegations made against them vis--vis the attacks.
19
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
1. The documents published by The Ames Post are admissible in the ICJ as the court has
the discretion to accept any evidence, regardless of method of collection, as long as
procedural fairness is adhered to. The surveillance programs used against Amestonia
are contrary to international law. It breaches the extraterritorial right to privacy as it is
an unreasonable and disproportionate violation of the right. It is also highly likely,
based a cumulative review of the available factual evidence, that the principles of non
intervention and territorial integrity were violated.
2. Amestonia possesses the right to exercise its jurisdiction over crimes committed in its
territory. Not only do the actions of the VoR employees breach the domestic laws
against espionage, but also constitute violations of the right to privacy and non
intervention. The proposed immunity from prosecution enjoyed by the VoR
employees is inconsistent with the criteria set out in international law. This coupled
with issues of accountability suggest that they should not have immunity rights. If
found to possess immunity right, the VoR employees were nonetheless operating in
breach of the domestic laws of Amestonia, thereby forfeiting their rights to immunity
protection. Due to the forfeit of immunity, the station and equipment of the VoR is
open to being disposed of by Amestonia.
20
unlawful as the principles of justice were not respected and therefore Amestonia
respectfully requests his release and compensation for breaches of the aforementioned
rights by virtue of the principle Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium.
4.
21
PLEADINGS
2 Ibid pg 4.
3 Durward V Sandifer, Evidence Before International Tribunals (University Press of
Virginia 1975), pg 189-190.
4 Alford, Fact Finding by the World Court, 4 Vill. L. Rev. 37, 81 (1958).
2
show that the particular procedural law of this Court would be breached by admission. 5 In
this case, the only real bar to admission is the Courts duty to maintain internal procedural
fairness and good judicial order.6 However, even procedural bars have been disregarded
by the Court, as seen in the Island of Palmas Arbitration7, where delays in submitting
evidence were overlooked. Nonetheless Amestonia has not contravened any procedural
bar of this Court, hence the evidence should be admitted for consideration.
1.1.3 Illegally obtained evidence is admissible before the ICJ.
Even if this Court does find that Amestonia were in some way linked to the arbitrary,
unilateral, or illegal acquisition of evidence, as Alford states, the exclusion of evidence by
this Court, based on the method it was gathered is an unrealistic practice. 8 In the Corfu
Channel case9 this Court admitted evidence concerning mines that had been unlawfully
swept by the United Kingdom, despite condemning and declaring that the UKs actions as
being a violation of Albanias sovereignty. Here the Court established that the unlawful
collections of evidence will be declared violations of international law, yet no sanction
will be imposed on the gatherer, nor will the illegally gained evidence be deemed
5 Supra note 4.
6 United Nations, Rules of Court | International Court of Justice (Icj-cij.org, 1978)
<http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=3&> accessed 6 January 2016,
Article 56.
7 Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Intl Arb. Awards 831 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
8 Supra note 5, pg 81.
9 Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania), 1949 ICJ REP. 4 (Judgment of April 9).
3
inadmissible.10 In further analysis of the Courts decision, it can be concluded that the
liberal reliance on circumstantial evidence is deemed acceptable by the Court when it
runs parallel to the direct evidence available and where the direct evidence is under the
private control of the other party.11 In Amestonias case both of these criteria are clearly
satisfied. In the Genocide Convention case12, Bosnia and Herzegovina were also
permitted to produce circumstantial evidence. Hence Amestonia asks that the same
principle be used to admit the published documents of the Frost Files as evidence.
1.6 Rieslands Surveillance Programs lack justification under their internal law.
Riesland cannot use its domestic legislation (SSBA) as justification for breaching its
treaty obligations, clearly seen in the VCLT.13 Amestonia wishes to contend further, that
the various surveillance programs conducted over its nationals by Riesland, specifically
the Verismo Program, is contrary to the provisions of the SSBA.14 According to the
1313 UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations,
Treaty
Series, vol. 1155, [hereinafter referred to as VCLT] Art. 27; PLO Observer
Mission Case (U.N. v. U.S.), 1988 I.C.J. 12 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 26), 57.
14 Compromis 4-5.
4
15 Compromis 4.
16 Ibid.
17 Compromis 22.
18 Supra note 15.
19 Supra note 17.
20 Supra note 15.
21 Compromis 5.
22 Ibid.
5
23 Ibid.
24 Supra note 17.
25 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16
December 1966, United Nations Series, vol. 999, p. 171. [hereinafter referred to as
ICCPR].
foreign surveillance.26 In that light, there are already mechanisms of international law
which can be interpreted to place heavy restrictions on spying and foreign surveillance.27
1.7.1
Both States are party to the ICCPR 28 which establishes the right to privacy.29 The Human
Rights Committee has also stated that the ICCPR contemplates an extraterritorial right to
privacy.30 While this right is not absolute, a high standard should be satisfied before
denying the right to any individual, as is the practice of the European Court of Human
Rights.31
27 Ibid pg 303.
28 Compromis 43.
29 ICCPR, Art. 17(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour
and reputation.
For mass surveillance to be lawful under the ICCPR, it must pursue a legitimate aim and
be proportionate to that aim.32 In relation to the need for proportionality, human rights
groups and scholars have argued that bulk collection of information, much like that of the
Verismo Program, constitutes a disproportionate and arbitrary interference with the right
to privacy.33 The HRCs Special Rapporteur Report also expressed concern over State
surveillance over the internet.34 They further state that the justification of national security
protection, as the SSBA35 attempts to posit, is usually a guise for furthering a States
political agendas. The concept of national security is too broadly defined, and is
vulnerable to manipulation by a State36 to justify arbitrary and covert breaches of privacy.
The case of Weber v Germany37 supports this, where it states that there must be a balance
between the interest of the respondent State in protecting its national security through
32 Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the
Digital Age (2015) 56 Harvard International Law Journal.
(United
Nations
Human
Rights,
2013)
<http://daccess-dds-
secret surveillance and right to privacy.38 The assessment of this must have consideration
to the duration, scope and nature of the surveillance activities. If these factors are not
properly addressed it may lead to the destruction of democracy, disguised as its
protection.39 Foreign surveillance must also be conducted pursuant to specific and clearly
defined laws40, of which the SSBA is not.
In light of all of the above, Amestonia asserts that the Verismo Program, inter alia, is in
breach of the right to privacy enumerated in the ICCPR. Hence they have committed an
internationally wrongful act through their surveillance programs.
1.7.2
One of the seminal principles of Customary International Law is the obligation of a State
to respect the territorial integrity of others.41 The UN Charter condemns threats against the
territorial integrity of any State.42 The PCIJ has added to the dialogue by declaring that no
38 Ibid, 106.
39 Ibid.
40 Supra note 27, pg 306.
41 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 1986 ICJ 14, pg 212214.
42 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No.7 [hereinafter referred
to as UN Charter] Art. 2(4).
State may exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. 43 Based on
this, it is argued that the principle negates the general permissibility of strategic
observation in foreign territory44. Rieslands surveillance through the Verismo, and
more materially, the Carmen Programs within Amestonia, may constitute a breach of
territorial integrity.45
Further, the principle of non intervention is fundamental to international law and the
concept of sovereignty.46 This principle is supported by both treaty 47 and customary law.
Also, the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention48 and the Declaration on the
Principles of International Law49 articulates that every state has the duty to refrain from
interfering in the internal affairs of other states. Amestonia therefore claims that the
49 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res.
2625(XXV), UN GAOR, 25TH Sess., Supp. No.28, UN Doc. A/8082 (1970), principle 7,
para.1.
10
1.8 The court should order that the Surveillance Programs cease with
assurances of non-repetition.
The various breaches of international obligations by Rieslands activities warrant the
immediate cessation of those programs along with an order by the Court to assure nonrepetition. International law establishes cessation and the guarantee of non- repetition as
accepted consequences of wrongful acts.50 Cessation overlaps with the remedy of
restitution, hence the decisions of this Court in the past have been interpreted to create an
obligation of cessation.51 Although cessation is generally applied to continuing acts52, and
the wire tapping pod has been removed, the order should still be made. The pod
51 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy) 3 Feb. 2012, ICJ Rep. 2012,
pg 154 138.
52 Pulp Mills, Merits, 20 Apr 2010, ICJ Rep 2010, pg. 102 269.
11
2. AMESTONIAS
DID
NOT
BREACH
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
BY
The arrest of Margaret Mayer and other two VoR Employees, as well as the seizure and
forfeiture of the VoR premises and equipment does not constitute a breach of Amestonias
obligations under the Broadcasting Treaty or International Law. The VoR Stations illegal
53 Juan Jose Quintana, Litigation at the International Court of Justice: Practice and
Procedure (M Nijhoff Publishers 2015)
54 LaGrand 27 Jun 2001, ICJ Rep. 2001 p 484, 46.
55 Navigational Rights 13 Jul 2009 ICJ Rep. 2009, pg. 267, 150
56 Supra note 54.
12
2.2 The acts of Margaret Mayer and the VoR employees constitute a breach of
International Law.
57 Compromis Annex 1.
58 UN, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, United Nations,
Treaty Series, Vol. 500, [hereinafter referred to as VCDR].
59 Slot & Grabandt, Extraterritoriality and Jurisdiction, 23 Common Mrkt L. Rev. 545,
548 (1986); Lotus Case, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 18, 19.
The use of the VoR station to tap the communications of Amestonian public figures is not
only contrary to the object and purpose of the Broadcasting Treaty, but is also contrary to
the principles enshrined in the and the ICCPR and UN Charter, such as the principle of
non repetition, much like Rieslands other surveillance program (Verismo).
As detailed earlier, the ICCPR establishes the right to privacy 61, which was breached by
the arbitrary gathering of information by the Bureau engineers doubling as VoR
employees. There was no aspect of proportionality in their breach of this fundamental
human right. This pursed no objectives of national security protection for Riesland.
Rather, the Carmen Program, as revealed by the published documents of the Frost
Files, were for the sole purpose of furthering Rieslands political and economic interests
in the region.62
The acts of the VoR also significantly compromise the territorial integrity and political
independence63 of Amestonia, as well as the principle of non-intervention 64. The Carmen
Program specifically targeted Amestonian public figures and private sector leaders.
Therefore they gained access to information integral to the affairs and interests of
Amestonia domestically and internationally65. This constituted an internationally
wrongful act.
61 Ibid.
62 Compromis 26.
63 Supra note 45.
64 UN Charter, Art 2(7).
65 Supra note 62.
14
2.3 The VoR employees do not qualify for immunity under the VCDR.
The rules of immunity are governed by custom66 which has been enshrined in the VCDR
of which both States are party too. Amestonia argues that the VCDR is lex specialis as it
outlines specific duties and protections of immunity, an individual, short of being a
person of the sovereign, is entitled. The Broadcasting Treaty on the contrary is lex
genralis as it merely gives a general immunity over all offences to VoR employees,
regardless of class of employee or the nature of their function. International law dictates
that where possible, lex specialis and lex generalis regimes should be interpreted to
ensure an amicable relationship between the two67, however, priority shall be given to the
more specific of the two.68
Based on this, Amestonia claims that the VoR station and its employees do not qualify as
a diplomatic mission within meaning of the Convention. 69 The VoR does not perform
any State functions on behalf of Riesland and in fact fail to reproduce the five functions
of a diplomatic mission within the Convention.70 Further, the theory of functional
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid, Art. 3.
70 VCDR, Art. 3.
15
necessity has often been relied on to justify the existence of diplomatic immunity.
Clearly seen in the preamble of the Convention, which states that, the purpose of such
privileges and immunities is not to benefit the individuals but to ensure the efficient
performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States 71. In light of
this, Amestonia contends that the functions of the VoR under the Broadcasting Treaty lack
the qualities required to warrant diplomatic protection for its employees and premises as
the treaty contemplates.
Despite there being a contemporary practice among States to offer non-diplomatic bodies
immunity, this practice is reserved for bodies that offer strategic benefits to the host State.
For example, the immunities offered by Switzerland to financial institutions within its
territories. Mayer and the other VoR employees however can in no way be seen to have
offered any strategic benefits to Amestonia through their actions, distinguishing them
from this modern practice.
Further, the practice of offering immunity to non-governmental bodies raises concerns
over accountability for illegal actions by their subsidiaries. The accountability concern
has even been attached to the United Nations and their peacekeeping missions. 72 It is
believed that immunity rights of this nature carry the principle out of bounds with the U
Nations own principle of equality upon men and women, in its preamble. 73 Immunity has
71 VCDR, Preamble.
72 Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not to Waive: Immunity and Accountability in U.N.
Peacekeeping Operations (2002) 18 Conn. J. Intl L 103.
73 Ibid.
16
2.4 The VoR employees have breached and forfeited their immunity under the
Broadcasting Treaty.
If this Court does find that the VoR employees have immunity, their acts of espionage in
Amestonian territory, over its public figures, constitute a forfeiture of their protection.
Both the VCDR76 and the Broadcasting treaty77 prescribe an express duty on the
employees of the VoR to respect and uphold the laws and regulations of the receiving
State, Amestonia. Both documents also place an added duty to refrain from interfering in
the internal affairs of Amestonia. This duty has been applied to small infringements such
as traffic code violations78 hence should be strictly applied where the offense is of the
serious nature that espionage constitutes. Their acts constitute a gross abuse of their
diplomatic privileges, violating the spirit of the VCDR and the tradition of diplomatic
immunities79, which were never intended to justify illegal acts.
The VCDR also provides that the receiving State can declare any diplomatic staff as
persona non grata80 at any time, without giving reason for such 81. In such circumstances,
the sending state is required to either recall the persons concerned or terminate their
functions at the mission. Indeed President Hale of Amestonia declared the VoR employees
as such through his public address,82 hence withdrawing their immunity rights under the
VCDR.83
Finally, the Broadcasting Treaty stipulates that upon the cessation of the stations functions
as envisaged by the treaty, all immunities and privileges once enjoyed cease to have
effect.84 Amestonia argues that because the practices under the Carmen Program began
78Circular Note of the U.S. Government, in Contemporary Practice of the United States,
82 Am. J. Intl L. 106 (1988).
82 Compromis 30.
83 VCDR, Art. 43 (b).
84 Supra note 60, Art. 36.
18
since the inception of the station in 1992,85 the stations functions were never really
realized. The purpose of the station was inter alia to strengthen the understanding and
cooperation between the peoples of both States and espionage is a far departure from
such.
The VoR was always used as a front for criminal activity hence the immunity offered
under Article 1586 never came into existence. Even though protection would still be
offered to acts done in the exercise of an employees functions, their functions under the
Broadcasting Treaty never contemplated those domestically and internationally
condemned acts. For these reasons, Amestonia cannot be considered in breach of their
obligations under the Broadcasting Treaty or international law by arresting and charging
the three VoR employees.
2.5 The arrest and charges against Margaret Mayer and the VoR employees are
in line with the procedural detention rights under the ICCPR.
The ICCPR states that persons awaiting trial will not as a general rule, be detained in
custody while awaiting trial87. Rather, they should be released subject to guarantees to
appear inter alia for trial. However, the process of preventative detention, that is, the
refusal of bail for the purpose of preventing future crimes or obstruction of the judicial
process88 ensures that Amestonia is not in breach of this right.
85 Compromis 25.
86 Supra note 60, Art. 15.
87 ICCPR, Art. 9(3).
19
Preventative detention is not explicitly prohibited under the ICCPR.89 As long as the
preventative detention is not arbitrary90 under the ICCPR then it can be considered a
permissible deprivation of liberty.91 International institutions have refused to condemn the
practice of preventative detention on several occasions.92 As long as the detention fall
within legislative or executive authorization and is not unjust, then it is not considered
arbitrary.93
In Amestonias case, the arrests and charges were based on the domestic offense of
espionage. Further the denial of bail was based on the real possibility that the VoR
employees would attempt to flee Amestonia before the trial. This fear is well founded on
the evidence of their previous attempt to flee, and failure to cooperate in producing their
89 Claire Macken, Preventative Detention and the Right of Personal Liberty and Security
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 26 Adelaide Law Review
2005, pg 4.
travel documents. For these reasons Amestonia has found it necessary to deny these
individuals bail, so as to prevent an obstruction to the judicial process. All other rules
regarding detention of individuals under the ICCPR have been followed, hence the
preventative detention in this case cannot be considered arbitrary.
premises by way of a forfeiture order, granted on account of the criminal activity taking
place on the site.
22
detention105 did not conform to the principles of justice thereby resulting in an arbitrary
detention.106
104 UN, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 24 April 1963 at Art. 36(b) (c); See
also UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35, Art. 9, 16 December 2014,
CCPR/C/GC/35; UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10
December 1948, 217 A (III) at Arts 3, 9, 10, 13; UN Commission on Human Rights,
Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 28 December 1999,
E/CN.4/2000/4; UN General Assembly, Body of Principles for the Protection of All
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment: resolution/ adopted by the
General Assembly, 9 December 1988. A/RES/43/173 [hereinafter cited as Body of
Principles].
arbitrary110 as the 2003 Terrorism Act did not observe the principles of procedural fairness
and natural justice.111 In addition, under a contextual analysis of the ICCPR 112 in general,
with considerations to the right to life, 113 the right to privacy114 and the right to enter its
own country115 as well as the travaux preparatories,116 it would also reveal that the
detention was arbitrary since the safeguards to detention was not observed.
Riesland claimed that Kafkers detention was due to reasons to national security.117
However the guarantees enshrined that is the right of reasons, right to promptness before
judicial authority, right to counsel and challenge should nevertheless be respected. If such
rights are not respected the HRC noted that it will be a matter of great concern. 118 In the
present case, such rights were not respected.119
3.1.1
The right to give reasons for an arrest can be found in treaties120 and customs.121 This
right122 was not sufficiently available to Amestonia123 since the police, upon detaining
Kafker and the Rieslandic Minister when asked by Amestonia did not disclose the reasons
of his arrest.124 The Human Rights Committee (HRC) noted that, not only should the legal
basis of the detention be given but also the factual specifics of the basis of the claimed
should also be known as well.125 Riesland judicial authority acted contrary to this
guarantee as the documents alleging Kafkers criminality was considered closed
materials by reason of national security.126 Therefore Amestonia, exercising diplomatic
protection over Kafker is entitled to the disclosure of information of Kafkers detention.
3.1.2
The ICCPR127 and customary international law128 stipulates that a detainee should be
brought promptly before a judge.129 Kafker was detained on 7 March 2015 and brought 3
days after on 10 March 2015 before the National Security Tribunal. 130 The HRC noted
that the period to be brought before the judge varies on a case by case basis. 131 For
26
example in Marques de Morais v Angola, the Committee noted that the person must be
detained not more than a few days.132
Further, the HRC outlined that five days 133 and four days134 in detention before brought in
front of a judge will not suffice. Neither would three days 135 suffice. Ultimately, the
Committee in various instances recommended that the period should not exceed 48 hours.
Thus, Kafkers detention was inconsistent with international law as he was not brought
promptly before the National Security Tribunal.
3.1.3
133 Teran Jijon v Ecuador, Communication No. 277/1988, UN Doc. CCPR/C /44/D/
277/1988 5.3.
135 Borisenko v Hungary, Communication No. 852/1999, UN Doc. CCPR /C/ 75/ D/
852/1999.
27
The right to counsel under international law 136 must be afforded at the initial time of
arrest.137 Under the right, the detainee is also allowed to select a lawyer of his/her
choice138 and implicit to the right to counsel is the right to effective participation. 139 The
right to legal counsel must be given to the person being detained promptly i.e. within 24
hours.140 Riesland thus violated international law by limiting Kafkers choice of a lawyer
to a list of approved special advocates and not his own choice. Further violations occur
as Kafkers lawyer was not permitted to consult or share with him within 24 hours, the
information that is said to substantiate the allegations against him while being present at
the proceedings141 Therefore adequate time was not given between Kafker and his lawyer
136 Council of Europe. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 6(3)(c); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the
Americas, Principle V; International Committee of the Red Cross. Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 1949, 75
UNTS 135, Art. 99; Body of Principles, Principle 17.
Body
of
Principles,
Principle
11;
Concluding
Observation:
Kenya
CCPR/C/KEN/CO/3/2012 19.
139 Douglass Cassel, Pretrial and Preventative Detention of suspected terrorists: Option
and Constraints under International Law, 98 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
811 (2007-2008)
3.2 Even if Kafker was detained due to alleged terrorism, Riesland failure to
respect Kafkers right violated international law.
All persons are entitled to human rights protection.143 It is a rule of international law that
while States must take all measures to counter terrorism, they must also comply with their
obligation under international law, the United Nations Charter and international
humanitarian law.144 Therefore, Kafkers detention breaches this obligation since human
rights and security are inextricably link thus respect for the rule of law in counterterrorism efforts must be observed.145
Amestonia is entitled to exercise the right of habeas corpus for Kafker 146 under the
ICCPR147 as it is seen to be part of the general international law.148 All the obligations
arising out of the ICCPR is binding on States 149 and therefore the right to habeas corpus
will also be binding on Riesland. Further, as hitherto mentioned, Riesland breached
Kafkers right to reasons and counsel, right to be brought promptly before judicial
authority and right to challenge the detention. Furthermore, Riesland also placed Kafker
in a maximum security facility without charge and was extended every 21 days. 150 This
remand in the maximum-security facility is unreasonable and unnecessary.151 Ultimately,
the detention is arbitrary since the detention embodied principles of inappropriateness,
injustice and due process violations152 and was not proportionate to its objective. 153 As
a result, Riesland partial observance relating to the international norms of a fair trial
30
under the ICCPR and other international instruments rendered the detention arbitrary.154
Notwithstanding this, in order to detain Kafker under the Terrorism Act, a warrant must
be issued by the National Security Tribunal. 155 The police officers did not get the requisite
warrant for Kafkers arrest hence the arrest breaches the procedural under the Terrorism
Act rendering it unlawful. Therefore, Amestonia is entitling to Kafkers release as his
detention was unlawful under international law. Thus Riesland must release him as he
suffered a deprivation from an unlawful and arbitrary detention that did not comply with
the principles of justice.
153 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 35, Article 9, (2014), CCPR/C/
GC/35.
154 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Arbitary Detention:
United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and Procedures on the Right
of Anyone Deprive of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings Before a Court, (2015),
A/HRC/30/37.
detention can satisfy the unlawful requirement under the ICCPR.158 Further, the principle
Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium will apply as many of Kafkers rights were breached. As a result,
Amestonia is entitled to compensation for all of the violated rights as well as his arbitrary
detention.
157 Stephen Bailey, Rights in the Administration of Justice in David Harris and Sarah
Joseph (eds), The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and United
Kingdom Law (1995).
158 Supra note 13 9.5; See also Blanco v Nicaragua, Communication No. 328/1988,
UN Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/328/1988 10.3; Sahadeo v Guyana, Communication No.
728/1996, Un Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/728/1996 11.
159 Greece v UK, Judgement, PCIJ Series A no 2, 30th August 1924; See also ILC, Draft
Articles on Responsibilities for International Wrongful Acts, November 2001,
Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp. IV.E.1 [hereinafter cited as ILC Draft Articles].
160 Ibid
32
Riesland and therefore by virtue of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibilities,
Amestonia is entitled to compensation.161
4.1 The Ames Post and Chester and Walsingham are nationals of Amestonia and
therefore Amestonia is entitled to protect them.
Questions of nationality are in principle within the reserved domain of the sovereign
jurisdiction.162 Consequently, Amestonia is entitled to exercise diplomatic protection over
The Ames Post and Chester and Walsingham.163 As a result Amestonia can bring a claim
on behalf of both entities.164
163 UN, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, 2006; Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, International Court of
Justice (ICJ), 5 February 1970 (Joint Declaration of Judge Petren and Onyearna 2-3).
164 Emer de Vattel, Le Droit des gen ou les principes de la loi naturelle, cited by
Mohammed Benouna in his Preliminary Report on Diplomatic Protection to the
International Law Associated, 1998; UN, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, 2006
Art. 3.
33
165 Richard A Clarke & Robert K Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National
Security and What to do About it, GGSR Vol. 1 Issue 1 (2010)
use of force172 and not an armed attack because no military weapons were used. 173
Consequently, the effects arising from the cyber-attacks in Amestonia were the disruption
of the operation of the computer systems and corruption of master boot records which
resulted in 90% of the data unrecoverable amounted to 45-50 million. 174 The attacks
resulted in a delay in the justice system for months and the temporary shutdown of the
media.175 Subsequently, the attacks affect the core principles of Amestonias territorial
integrity and democracy. The key features of democracy, is the respect of rights and
fundamental freedoms inter alia the freedom of expression.176 Many citizens freedom of
expression rights were infringed as a result of the temporary shutdown. Furthermore,
cases were delay for months therefore justice was not awarded to those by which have
pending cases before the judicial systems. These acts, furthers undermines rule of law
which subsequently undermines democracy.177 Thus the injury of individuals, the
destruction of data and the damage done to the core features of democracy can equate the
cyber-attacks to the impacts of kinetic warfare on a society178 which is an international
wrongful act.
172 Duncan B Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations,
11 Lewis and Clarke L. Rev. 1023, 1042 (2007).
173 Ibid; Supra note 159; Tom Ruys, Armed Attack and Article 51 of the UN Charter
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010) 13.
4.2.2
The principle of non-intervention outlines other states should not interfere in its domestic
affairs of another State.179 Conversely, interference pure and simple is not intervention. 180
However, intervention is wrongful when it uses a method of coercion. 181 Subsequently,
the use of a malicious malware in the cyber-attacks against both entities could be deemed
as forceful. The attacks also penetrated into the domestic realm of the State and affected
the administration of justice as well as limited the freedom of expression. These activities
are all domestic affairs and thereby rendering the forceful cyber-attacks an international
wrongful act as it breaches international law.
178 Schmitt at 573; See also Marco Roscini, World Wide Warfare Jus ad bellum and the
use of Cyber Force, Max Planck UNYB 14, 103 (2010) [hereinafter cited as Roscini].
material damage to the cyber infrastructure 183 of both The Ames Post and Chester &
Walsingham resulting in material damage amounting to 45-50 million.184
183 R. Jennings/A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheims International Law, Vol. 1, para 123, 9 th ed.
Jennings and Watts (eds.) (Harlow 1992).
37
threshold.190 Under the former, it must be shown that the State largely financed, trained,
equipped, armed and organized191 the group. The ICJ uses the words all the operation
every stage of the conflict wholly devised by the United States. 192 The uses of such
words indicate an extremely high bar to establish. Contrary to this, the latter test stipulates
that the State must wield overall control over the group 193 and does this by equipping or
financing and by coordinating or helping in the general planning of its military
activity.194
Nonetheless, the former test was not informed by any customary international law or
general principles of international law.195 Thus the latter test would be a more effective
test as the test was formulated vis--vis customary rules. 196 Employing this overall control
test, and bearing in mind that each case is governed by its own facts, 197 the cyber-attacks
could be attributed to Riesland as the cyber-attacks were traced back to Riesland
190 Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and Tardic Test Revisited in the Light of the ICJ
Judgement on Genocide in Bosnia, EJIL vol. 18 no. 4 (2007).
governmental infrastructures and the segment code of the malware used was the similar to
that of the Bureaus Blaster program, a code not available and was not known to be used
by the public.198
Therefore, in this regard, it could be presumed that Riesland is attributed to the cyberattacks as they provided the facility, the software thereby equipping the cyber-attackers
with the necessary means. The software was unavailable to the public thus it can also be
presumed that Riesland coordinated the attacks as well.
However, there is a factual distinction between the Amestonian incident and the hitherto
cases. Military activity is not present in the Amestonian incident and thereby cannot be
used since each case is to be decided on its own facts. 199 Thus as a result, a new test
should be formulated i.e. of due diligence.
4.4 Riesland failed its obligation of Due Diligence.
The genesis of the principle of due diligence arose from the principle of sovereignty 200
and was formulated in the Corfu channel case where the court stressed on the fact that a
State must have knowledge of the incident for due diligence to arise. 201 However the
Tallinn Manual notes that this requirement of knowledge is no longer necessary and
39
therefore if the attacks originate from a governmental cyber infrastructure, the State
would be attributed.202 This is because it is difficult to enforce and determine the actors of
cyber-attacks.203 Subsequently, it is reasonable to state that attribution standards should be
flexible and adapt to the exigencies of cyberspace 204 since logic doesnt require the same
test to be adopted when resolving issues which are very different in nature.205 Thus a
proper test would be to combine due diligence with causation to provide an effective
regime of responsibility of cyber-attacks206 since the laws currently governing state
responsibility of cyber-attacks are ineffective.207 Thus such rule would be an emerging
rule of international law. Implementing this test to Amestonia, the mere fact that the
attacks originated from a governmental infrastructure indicates that Amestonia is
202 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Relating to Cyber Warfare, Michael N.
Schmitt ed., 2013.
203 Nicholas Tsugourias, State Responsibility for Cyber Operations: International Law
Issues, Event Report, British Institute of International and Comparative Law (2014);
Mark Landour et at, After Computer Seige in Estonia, War Fears Turn to Cyberspace,
N.Y. Times, (2007); Siobhan Gormon, Cyberspace Accompanies the Shooting, Wall. St. J.
(2008).
204 Ibid.
205 Supra note 81 405.
206 Supra note 96.
207 Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A
Justification for the Use of Active Defences against States Who Neglect Their Duty to
Prevent, 201 M.L.R. 1, 62 (2009).
40
associated with the operation,208 and since a similar malware was used to one only known
to be used by Riesland, coupled with the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility, Riesland can be attributed to the cyber-attacks.
211 Ambatielos Case, 12 U.N.R.I.A.A. 83; Edwin M Borchard, The Local Remedy Rule,
28 Am. J. Intl L. (1934); supra note 102.
link between the act and the injury incurred. 213 Additionally, a claim to compensation is
generally understood to include a claim to material and moral damage. 214 It is a wellestablished rule that an injured State is entitle to receive compensation from the State
which committed the international wrong215 and such compensation is to be awarded by
the court.216 The external appraisers estimated the damage incurred from unrecoverable
data and infrastructure to 45-50 million.217 In the Corfu Channel case, the court awarded
a compensation of 700,087 as the replacement cost of the destroyer.218 Amestonia
replacement cost thus is 45-50 million. Adding to this, the court also allowed UK
claimed for 50,048 and noted that this cost covered the cost of pensions and other
grants medical treatment, etc.219
Similarly in M/V Saiga case, the Tribunal held that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was
entitle to compensation of US$ 2,123,357 with interest by which the heads of damage
compensated, inter alia, cost of repair, damage to vessel, damage of detention of captain,
Graefrath,
Responsibility
and
Damage
Caused:
Relations
between
member of crew and other board members etc. 220 Consequently, Amestonia is entitled to
more than the external appraisers calculations as other factors will be taken into account
in assessing compensation by virtue of Art 36 of the ILC Draft Articles. As hitherto
mentioned, the justice system was delayed, the media was inactive as a result of the
international wrong and data and damage to infrastructure incurred. These heads of
damages will be assessed by the court and Amestonia thus is entitled to compensation.
220 M/V Saiga (No 2) (St. Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea) ITLOS, Judgement, 1
July 1999 176.
43
44